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In the introductory words of his 2007 article ‘Abducted Fugitives Before the 
International Criminal Court: Problems and Prospects’, Robert J. Currie puts 
forward the question of why one would wish to revisit “every international law 
student’s favourite essay topic [emphasis added, ChP]”. Now, Currie’s article is 
original, inspiring and well-written, but here, he appears to be wide of the mark: he 
does not provide the reader with any further evidence to sustain this bold statement, 
thereby seemingly violating one of the most precious commands in the scientific 
world, namely to write in a verifiable way. 
 
However, was there really any need for Currie to insert a footnote with references 
here? Of course not. Some statements are simply so true that they do not need to be 
supported by further evidence.  
 
In 2004, I wrote and defended my master’s thesis, entitled ‘Male Captus Bene 
Detentus? Human Rights and the Transfer of Suspects to International Criminal 
Tribunals’, at the Law Faculty of Tilburg University. Luckily, I was (and, by the 
way, still am) so intrigued by this fascinating topic that I was able to transfer some 
of my enthusiasm regarding this subject to the text and its readers. As a result, the 
thesis was well-received, which, among other things, enabled me to gain a position 
in the first generation of students following the research master of the Tilburg 
Graduate Law School. This, in turn, led to a PhD position, as from September 2005, 
at the Department of International and European Public Law, a very competent and 
cosy department where I already had the privilege to work between 2001 and 2003 
as a student-assistant. 
 
Now, four and a half years later, I am writing the final words of this PhD thesis – the 
acknowledgements. Being aware of the fact that these are normally the most often 
read words of any PhD thesis, especially of those which are so massive that they 
could be used in a ripping-huge-books-in-half challenge of a strongman 
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1 CONTEXTUALISING THE PROBLEM 
 
1.1 From the past...  
 
The men in the first car had almost given up hope. They saw the bus stopping but 
didn’t think anything would happen. All of a sudden Kenet noticed someone walking 
at the side of the road. It was too dark to make out who it was. “Someone’s coming,” 
he said to Gabi, “but I can’t see who it is.” A few seconds later, in a whisper that 
sounded to him like a shout, he exclaimed, “It’s him!” Gabi’s heart leapt with 
excitement. He threw a hurried glance at his men to check that they were all in 
position. Eli picked out the approaching figure immediately, but it took Gabi another 
fifteen seconds. Meanwhile, Klement was turning the corner into Garibaldi Street. 
Kenet hissed in Gabi’s ear, “He’s got one hand in his pocket – he may have a 
revolver. Do I tell Eli?” “Tell him,” Gabi answered. “Eli,” Kenet whispered, “watch 
out for a gun. He’s got his hand in his pocket.” Klement was standing right in front of 
the car. “Momentito,” Eli said and sprang at him. Panic-stricken, Klement stepped 
back. In their practice exercises Eli had used the method called sentry tackle, seizing 
the man from behind and dragging him backward, but Kenet’s warning about the gun 
forced him to change his tactics. He pounced on Klement to bring him down, but 
because Klement had stepped back Eli’s leap brought them both crashing to the 
ground. As he fell, Klement let out a terrible yell, like a wild beast caught in a trap.1 
 
This extract describes the thrilling details of Ricardo Klement’s abduction in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, on 11 May 1960. Klement, better known as Adolf Eichmann, the 
former head of the Gestapo section which had to implement the policy of the ‘final 
solution’ of the Jews in Europe,2 was seized by agents of Israel’s Secret Service the 
                                                          
1 Harel 1975, pp. 165-166. 
2 See the 1946 Judgment of the IMT of Nuremberg, under ‘War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity’ 
and ‘Persecution of the Jews’ (read by Judge Nikitchenko and available at: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judwarcr.asp): “In the summer of 1941 (...), plans were made for the 
“final solution” of the Jewish question in all of Europe. This “final solution” meant the extermination of 
the Jews, which early in 1939 Hitler had threatened would be one of the consequences of an outbreak of 
war, and a special section in the Gestapo under Adolf Eichmann, as head of Section B4 of the Gestapo, 








Mossad3 and, a little more than nine days after the capture, flown to Israel to face 
justice.4 
Like Eichmann, Argentina was not content with the abduction – albeit, of course, 
for other reasons. The South American State charged Israel with violation of its 
sovereignty rights and claimed that the latter had illegally exercised authority on 
Argentine territory.5 As a consequence, it demanded that Eichmann be returned to 
Argentina and that the captors be punished by Israel.6 When Argentina felt that 
reparation was not forthcoming through direct negotiations with Israel,7 it lodged a 
complaint with the UNSC, which requested Israel “to make appropriate reparation”.8 
It thereby thus (implicitly) declared that Israel committed an international wrong – 
otherwise the reparation would not have been necessary. In a joint communiqué 
issued on 3 August 1960, the two Governments stated that they “resolve[d] to regard 
as closed the incident which arose out of the action taken by citizens of Israel, which 
infringed the fundamental rights of the State of Argentina”.9 
After the settlement of the ‘incident’,10 the trial commenced before the District 
Court of Jerusalem. Eichmann was charged with crimes against the Jewish people, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and membership of hostile organisations.11 
After the 15-count indictment was read to Eichmann, his counsel Servatius raised 
the preliminary objection that the Court had no jurisdiction because, among other 
things, “the Accused was seized forcibly and kidnapped and brought before the 
Court”.12 This can be seen as a reference to the dictum ex iniuria ius non oritur, 
which means that no right (in this case: jurisdiction to try Eichmann) can be derived 
from a wrong (in this case: Eichmann’s abduction in Argentina).13 Although 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Shaw 2003, p. 577, Cryer et al. 2007. p. 46 or even the website of the Israeli Secret 
Service itself, available at: http://www.mossad.gov.il/Eng/About/IsarHarel.aspx. This site, like every 
site from this book, has been last accessed on 1 March 2010, the date this book was finalised. This also 
means that this book has not taken into account material which became available after that date. 
4 In the words of the accused himself: “I was assaulted in Buenos Aires, tied to a bed for a week and 
then drugged by injections in my arms and brought to the airport in Buenos Aires; from there I was 
flown out of Argentina.” (Statement by the Accused on the sentence, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, 
Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem, Vol. V, Session 120, available at: 
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-120-03.html.) 
5 See Silving 1961, p. 312. 
6 See ibid.  
7 See Baade 1961, p. 407. 
8 UNSC Res. 138 of 23 June 1960.  
9 District Court of Jerusalem, The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 
‘Judgment’, 12 December 1961, Criminal Case No. 40/61, para. 40 (36 International Law Reports 1968, 
p. 59).  
10 For a more thorough examination on the diplomatic tension between Argentina and Israel after 
Eichmann’s abduction, see Subsection 3.3.2 of Chapter III. 
11 See The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem, Vol. 1, 
Session 1, available at: 
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-001-01.html and  
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-001-02.html. 
12 Ibid., available at: 
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-001-02.html. 








Attorney-General Hausner did not deny the kidnapping itself, he was not impressed 
by Servatius’ argument and stated: 
 
[W]here a person is legally [a]ccused of committing a crime and he is legally kept 
under arrest at the time when he is brought before the Court and stands his trial, the 
Court should not examine the circumstances which led to the fact that the Accused 
(…) is brought before the Court. In other words – the circumstances of the Accused’s 
detention, his seizure and his transfer are not relevant for competence and they 
contain nothing which can affect this competence, and since they are not relevant, 
they should not be considered and evidence concerning them should not be heard.14  
 
The judges of the District Court of Jerusalem, like their colleagues of the Israeli 
Supreme Court (on appeal), concurred with this counter-argument,15 which can be 
viewed as an application of another Latin maxim: male captus bene detentus,16 
sometimes referred to as the ‘tough luck rule’:17 a court can properly detain a person 
(read: can properly exercise jurisdiction over a person) (bene detentus), even if that 
person was brought into the power of that court in an irregular way (male captus). It 
is this maxim which is at the core of this study.  
 
 
                                                          
14 The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem, Vol. 1, 
Session 1, available at: 
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-001-05.html. 
15 See District Court of Jerusalem, The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf 
Eichmann, ‘Decision on the Preliminary Objections’, 17 April 1961, Criminal Case No. 40/61, available 
at: 
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-006-01.html: “As for 
the arguments over the circumstances under which the Accused was brought to the State of Israel, in 
view of the fact that we have found that the Court has jurisdiction to try the Accused, the manner in 
which he was brought within the jurisdiction of this Court has no relevance according to law, neither has 
the fact whether he was apprehended abroad by emissaries of the governing authorities of the State of 
Israel or not.”; District Court of Jerusalem, The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf 
Eichmann, ‘Judgment’, 12 December 1961, Criminal Case No. 40/61, para. 41 (36 International Law 
Reports 1968, p. 59): “It is an established rule of law that a person being tried for an offence against the 
laws of a State may not oppose his trial by reason of the illegality of his arrest or of the means whereby 
he was brought within the jurisdiction of that State. The courts in England, the United States and Israel 
have constantly held that the circumstances of the arrest and the mode of bringing of the accused into 
the territory of the State have no relevance to his trial, and they have consistently refused in all instances 
to enter upon an examination of these circumstances.”; Supreme Court of Israel, Adolf Eichmann v. The 
Attorney-General of the Government of Israel, ‘Judgment’, 29 May 1962, Criminal Appeal No. 336/61, 
para. 13 (36 International Law Reports 1968, pp. 306 and 307): “[W]e agree with the reasoning of the 
District Court in its entirety and shall therefore content ourselves here with a brief reply to some of the 
contentions by which counsel for the appellant sought to destroy it. (…) As has been indicated, the 
moment it is conceded that the State of Israel possesses criminal jurisdiction both according to local law 
and according to the law of nations, the Court is no longer bound to investigate the manner and legality 
of the appellant’s detention, as indeed may be gathered from the judgments upon which the District 
Court has rightly relied.” 
16 See Strijards 2003, p. 755 and Sloan 2005, p. 497. 








1.2 …via the ‘war on terror’… 
 
Almost half a century later, irregular methods are still used to seize suspects (of 
serious crimes). For example, in the ‘war on terror’, it seems that the ends often 
justify the means: suspects of terrorism are to be caught, while the way they are 
caught is considered less important.18 For example, in the Amnesty International 
Report 2005, one can read: 
 
There is strong evidence that the global security agenda pursued since 11 September 
2001, the US-led “war on terror”, and the USA’s selective disregard for international 
law encouraged and fuelled abuses by governments and others in all regions of the 
world. In many countries, new doctrines of security continued to stretch the concept 
of “war” into areas formerly considered law enforcement, promoting the notion that 
human rights can be curtailed when it comes to the detention, interrogation and 
prosecution of “terrorist” suspects.19   
 
One can easily add the word ‘arrest’ here as well: in 2006, both a committee from 
the Council of Europe and the European Parliament issued reports in which one can 
find several examples of abduction operations involving terror suspects.20 The most 
                                                          
18 This is perhaps also due to the dangerous metaphor ‘war on terror’ which can be interpreted as 
meaning that the normal rules of criminal justice do not apply in this context at all. (See the famous 
phrase of Cicero from Pro Milone: silent [enim] leges inter arma, “[l]aws are silent amid arms” (Garner 
2004, p. 1758).) Admittedly, two international armed conflicts have taken place within the wider context 
of the ‘war on terror’ (Afghanistan and Iraq) and in those conflicts, most legal rules are different than 
those applicable in peace situations. (See Borelli 2005, p. 46.) That, however, is not saying at all that the 
laws are silent in this context. In addition, “[t]o the minds of those who invoke that notion, (…) the “war 
on terror” extends far beyond the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq to encompass all the anti-terror 
operations which have taken place since September 2001.” (Ibid.) Every operation within the context of 
the ‘war on terror’ not related to proper armed conflicts should be executed within the normal context of 
criminal justice. In the words of MacDonald: “On the streets of London, there is no such thing as a ‘war 
on terror’, just as there can be no such thing as a ‘war on drugs’. (...) We should hold it as an article of 
faith that crimes of terrorism are dealt with by criminal justice.” (K. MacDonald, ‘Security and Rights’ 
(Speech to the UK Criminal Bar Association), 23 January 2007, available at: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/security_rights.) 
19 Amnesty International Report 2005: The state of the world’s human rights (available at: 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/POL10/001/2005), under ‘‘Terror’, ‘counter-terror’ and the rule 
of law’. 
20 See Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (rapporteur: D. Marty), Parliamentary Assembly, 
Council of Europe, Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving 
Council of Europe member states, Doc. 10957, 12 June 2006 and (from the same rapporteur) Secret 
detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report, 
Explanatory Memorandum, AS/Jur (2007) 36, 7 June 2007. See also: Temporary Committee on the 
alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners 
(rapporteur: G.C. Fava), European Parliament, Report on the alleged use of European countries by the 
CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (2006/2200 (INI)), 30 January 2007 
(FINAL A6-0020/2007) and European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution on the alleged use 
of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners 
(2006/2200(INI)), 14 February 2007 (P6_TA(2007)0032). See finally: Amnesty International, State of 
denial. Europe’s role in rendition and secret detention, June 2008. See for earlier publications on this 








famous example is probably that of Hassan Osama Mustafa Nasr, also known as 
Abu Omar, in Milan, Italy. On 17 June 2003, this Egyptian cleric was “grabbed on 
the sidewalk by two men, sprayed in the face with chemicals and stuffed into a 
van”.21     
 
Italian authorities suspect the Egyptian was the target of a CIA-sponsored operation 
known as rendition, in which terrorism suspects are forcibly taken for interrogation to 
countries where torture is practiced. (…) The CIA has kept details of rendition cases a 
closely guarded secret, but has defended the controversial practice as an effective and 
legal way to prevent terrorism. Intelligence officials have testified that they have 
relied on the tactic with greater frequency since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.22  
 
These words show that it might not even be the intention of the kidnappers to bring 
the suspects to a courtroom, but merely to an interrogation room. In such a case, the 
male captus bene detentus maxim does not even have to be applied, for the case will 
not entail the involvement of a judge.23 Admittedly, these practices are therefore not 
directly interesting for the purpose of this book.24 However, they nevertheless 
                                                                                                                                              
Global Justice, Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to “Extraordinary 
Renditions”, ABCNY & NYU School of Law, New York, 2004 and Center for Human Rights and 
Global Justice, Beyond Guantánamo: Transfers to Torture One Year After Rasul v. Bush, NYU School 
of Law, New York, 2005. It may be interesting to note that apparently, the new US Administration is not 
going to change its policy in that respect: “The Los Angeles Times on Sunday (1 February [2009]) 
revealed that according to executive orders signed by Mr Obama on 22 January, the CIA is to be 
permitted to engage in the abduction of terrorist suspects, so long as this is only performed for short-
term periods.” (L. Phillips, ‘US rendition flights to continue’, EUobserver, 3 February 2009, available 
at: http://euobserver.com/9/27523.) In Phillips’ article, one can also find the following interesting 
remarks: “The US daily quotes an anonymous administration official as saying that the practice could be 
expanded as it is the last mechanism that remains to capture individuals suspected of terrorism. 
“Obviously you need to preserve some tools – you still have to go after the bad guys,” the US official 
told the LA Times. “The legal advisors working on this looked at rendition. It is controversial in some 
circles and kicked up a big storm in Europe. But if done within certain parameters, it is an acceptable 
practice.”” 
21 C. Whitlock, ‘Europeans Investigate CIA Role in Abductions’, The Washington Post, 13 March 2005, 
available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30275-2005Mar12.html. 
22 Ibid. Note that such tactics, even though ‘9/11’ strengthened the feeling that they could be used in the 
terrorism context, were, in fact, indeed already part of a pre-‘9/11’ policy. A good example of this is 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, ‘US Policy on Counterterrorism’ of 21 June 1995 (signed by 
Clinton): “If we do not receive adequate cooperation from a state that harbors a terrorist whose 
extradition we are seeking, we shall take appropriate measures to induce cooperation. Return of suspects 
by force may be effected without the cooperation of the host government”. (See Borelli 2004, p. 351.) 
See also Kash 1997.  
23 See also Arbour 2006, pp. 514-515, who contrasts the ‘old normal’ with the ‘new normal’: 
“Reasonable people may disagree about the appropriate framework that should govern the apprehension 
and transfer to trial of an international terrorist suspect, war criminal or torturer. (...) But what all these 
cases [in the ‘old normal’, ChP] have in common (...) is that they were ultimately aimed at bringing 
alleged criminals to justice. (...) [The] features of the ‘new normal’ are characterized by the fact that it 
would appear that terrorist suspects are being arrested, detained and interrogated with no apparent 
intention of bringing them to trial.” See also Parry 2005, p. 529.     
24 However, one can imagine (or at least hope) that if a suspect, after being kidnapped, interrogated and 








clearly demonstrate more generally that in the context of the struggle against 
terrorism, authorities may not hesitate to resort to irregular means of obtaining 
custody over high-level suspects. Now, if suspects of terrorism are ‘lucky’ enough 
to be brought to justice after their alleged irregular arrest, and if the outcome of the 
suspect’s case is not already settled because of an established rule of law applicable 
to any suspect, whether that suspect is charged with fraud, genocide or terrorism (cf. 
the case in Eichmann and the text in footnote 15), one can imagine that the judge, in 
balancing all the different interests at stake, will probably not refuse jurisdiction too 
readily because of the seriousness of the suspect’s alleged crimes and hence the 
importance of the continuation of the trial.25  
 
1.3 …to the International Criminal Court 
 
It has become clear from the above that the use of irregular means was (Eichmann) 
and is still (Abu Omar) considered an option in apprehending suspects, especially 
when the interests are (considered to be) strong. After all, it seems obvious that the 
authorities of State A would not easily put, among other things, relations with State 
B on the line by abducting a person from the latter State if that person is merely 
suspected of fraud. Conversely, the authorities of State A might consider the 
possibility of abduction more seriously if that person is suspected of serious crimes 
such as genocide or terrorism.  
The link with the International Criminal Court (hereinafter: ICC) is now easily 
made: this Court tries suspects of “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole”,26 namely genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and aggression.27 The crime of terrorism – the previous subsection was 
                                                                                                                                              
jurisdiction. See also the remainder of Arbour’s words (in n. 23): “And I say ‘with no apparent intention 
of bringing them to trial’ because the circumstances of their arrest, detention and interrogation – take 
only the length of their detention – would in any credible jurisdiction amount to such an abuse of 
process that trial jurisdiction, if it ever existed, could never be exercised.” 
25 Although much will, of course, depend on the exact circumstances. Cf. the Al-Moayad case, to be 
discussed in Chapter V. 
26 Art. 5, para. 1 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter: ICC Statute). 
27 Note that at the time the ICC Statute was signed in Rome, there was no consensus on the exact 
definition of the crime of aggression (the waging of an unlawful war). Between 31 May and 11 June 
2010, a Review Conference will be held in Kampala, Uganda, to review and where necessary amend the 
ICC Statute (see Art. 5, para. 2 of the ICC Statute: “The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 [entitled ‘Amendments’, ChP] 
and 123 [entitled ‘Review of the Statute’, ChP] defining the crime and setting out the conditions under 
which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be 
consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”) and this will, of course, 
constitute an excellent opportunity to retry reaching consensus on a precise definition. If that were to be 
realised, then the possibility of the ICC to actually prosecute persons responsible for waging an unlawful 
war would be within reach. The point ‘Proposals for a provision on the crime of aggression’ has, in any 
case, been included in the provisional agenda of the Review Conference, see point 9 (b) of the draft 
provisional agenda, available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/RevConf-prov-
agenda.ENG.15-September-2009.pdf. See for more information on this topic, for example, A. Seibert-
Fohr, ‘The Crime of Aggression: Adding a Definition to the Rome Statute of the ICC’, ASIL Insights, 








not only included to show that abductions still take place in our times – is not 
mentioned in the ICC’s jurisdiction ratione materiae, but this might change in the 
future.28 Furthermore, acts of terrorism might also fall under existing ICC crimes.29 
Now, what is the ICC’s position on suspects30 claiming to have been the victim 
of a male captus? Does it opt for effectiveness (in the sense of achieving 
prosecutions and convictions), male captus bene detentus and a continuation of the 
case? Or is it of the opinion that values such as fairness, human rights and the 
integrity of its proceedings demand that in the case of an irregular arrest, the 
exercise of jurisdiction must be refused: ex iniuria ius non oritur?31 Of course, one 
                                                          
28 As explained in the previous footnote, the ICC Statute, including its jurisdiction ratione materiae, can 
be amended pursuant to Art. 121 of the ICC Statute. In this context, reference should be made to 
Resolution E adopted at the Rome Conference in 1998 (see Annex 1 (‘Resolutions Adopted by the 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court’) to the Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Done at Rome on 17 July 1998, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/10, 17 July 1998). This resolution states, among other things: “The United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
Having adopted the Statute of the International Criminal Court, (…) Regretting that no generally 
acceptable definition of the crimes of terrorism and drug crimes could be agreed upon for the inclusion, 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, (…) Recommends that a Review Conference pursuant to article 123 
of the Statute of the International Criminal Court consider the crimes of terrorism and drug crimes with 
a view to arriving at an acceptable definition and their inclusion in the list of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court [emphasis in original, ChP].” In the context of the 2010 Review Conference, 
the Netherlands has proposed to include terrorism as a distinct crime in the ICC Statute pursuant to the 
above-mentioned Resolution E (comparable with the method used in 1998 in the context of the crime of 
aggression, meaning that the crime should now be included and that States can later agree on its exact 
definition and on the conditions regarding the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to that crime). See for 
more information on this proposal (and the initial reactions from other States): ASP, Eighth session, The 
Hague, 18 – 26 November 2009, OR (ICC-ASP/8/20), Annex II (Report of the Working Group on the 
Review Conference), paras. 40-51. 
29 See Goldstone and Simpson 2003, p. 24: “The effectiveness of the ICC as a forum for the prosecution 
of acts of terrorism is hampered by the fact that the crime of terrorism may only be included within the 
ICC’s jurisdiction by way of amendment, which can happen no earlier than seven years after the Statute 
has come into force (i.e., 2009). Moreover, if such an amendment is made to the Statute, it will only be 
binding on those States Parties that accept it. In the interim, other kinds of fora must be used to 
prosecute any acts of terrorism that occur, unless of course the acts also fall under the definition of one 
of the crimes already within the ICC’s competence [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
30 The word ‘suspect’ has been chosen in this book to typify the person under ICC investigation whose 
charges have not been confirmed yet – the person who will normally make the male captus claim. (After 
the confirmation of the charges, the actual trial process starts and the ‘suspect’ becomes an accused.) 
However, one must be aware of the fact that the term ‘suspect’ has been merely chosen for convenience 
sake: the ICC Statute itself does not use it. See also Hall 2008 A, p. 1097: “The drafters of the Rome 
Statute decided not to use the term “suspect”, in part because some states thought that it would lead to 
premature prejudice against the person targeted by an investigation. However, in line with others who 
have sought to avoid the resulting awkwardness, this Commentary uses the term “suspect” to describe a 
person with regard to whom “there are grounds to believe that [he or she] has committed a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court” and with respect to whom the Pre-Trial Chamber has not confirmed 
charges pursuant to article 61 para. 7, at which point a suspect becomes an “accused””. Cf. also Edwards 
2001, p. 332, n. 33. 
31 This dilemma is reminiscent of Packer’s two models of the criminal process: the Due Process Model 








can assume that much will depend on the exact circumstances here, for example, on 
the sort of male captus involved, but it is nevertheless good to keep this basic 
dilemma in mind when embarking on this study.  
Luckily, this intriguing dilemma can now be examined, for already in the very 
first cases of the ICC, male captus claims were made to which the judges had to 
respond. However, when the first words of this book were written (in September 
2005), when it was not yet clear that the ICC would issue male captus decisions, it 
was already predicted that the ICC would probably be confronted by male captus 
cases some day. This prediction was based on the following two features of the 
ICC’s system.  
First, the ICC cannot try suspects in absentia, that is, without them being present 
in the courtroom.32 Hence, a trial can only commence when the suspect is in The 
Hague and, in most cases, that means that the person must be arrested and 
surrendered.33 In other words, the arrest and surrender normally constitutes a 
conditio sine qua non to prosecution.34  
Secondly, the ICC does not have its own police force. This means that it is 
dependent on others – one could hereby think of States and international forces – in 
the enforcement of arrests and surrenders. It can be seen, to use Cassese’s famous 
and often-quoted metaphor when he was typifying the ICTY, as “a giant without 
arms and legs”35 who “needs artificial limbs to walk and work”.36  
These two features can lead to the following two scenarios.  
First, it may occur that a State is unwilling to cooperate with the ICC, for 
example, because the suspect still enjoys considerable support from the public back 
home and those in power do not feel like taking measures which will not be well 
received by their constituents37 or because those in power are themselves being 
investigated by the Court.38 In those cases, the ICC is dependent on a State which 
does not want to cooperate with the Court in The Hague. The question is how long 
the ICC can wait for suspects to be arrested – how damaging a prolonged period of 
                                                                                                                                              
control emphasizes outcome justice, effectiveness, and speediness, while due process centres on the 
right of the individual, the rights of defence, in short the concept of procedural justice.” 
32 See Art. 63, para. 1 of the ICC Statute. See n. 1 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII for more 
information. 
33 As will become clear in Subsection 3.1 of Chapter VIII, a suspect can also be summoned to come to 
The Hague (without the necessity of arrest). Finally, there is the possibility that a suspect appears 
voluntarily before the judges. However, even though the ICC case of Abu Garda has already shown that 
an arrest may not be necessary, one can assume that this situation will not occur too often. 
34 See also Young 2001, p. 317. 
35 Cassese 1998, p. 13.  
36 Ibid. See in that respect also the title of Maogoto’s article: ‘A Giant Without Limbs: The International 
Criminal Court’s State-Centric Cooperation Regime’ (Maogoto 2004). 
37 Cf. in that respect the case of Croatian ‘war hero’ Gotovina in the context of the ICTY. See also Ph. 
Vallières-Roland, ‘Prosecuting War Criminals: A Critique of the Relationship between NATO and the 
International Criminal Courts’, Centre for European Security and Disarmament (CESD) – Briefing 
Paper, February 2002, available at http://www.isis-
europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_87_2002_archives_59_paper.natoandiccs.pdf, p. 7. 








non-cooperation is for the ICC’s credibility in the world.39 Now, the ICC is a 
permanent international criminal court, so in a way, time is on its side: it can wait.40 
However, victims of the suspect in whom the ICC is interested (especially if that 
suspect is still continuing to commit his41 crimes) do not have this luxury: they 
cannot wait. Their existence, in contrast to the ICC’s, is not eternal.42 Hence, it is 
not difficult to imagine that if a situation of non-cooperation lasts for quite some 
time, (international) pressure for ‘results’ will increase. And such pressure will 
probably not only be focused on the non-cooperative State, but also on the ICC itself 
as the latter, in the eyes of the international community, may not have been as 
efficient in trying suspects of international crimes as was hoped for.43 In such a 
situation, it is not unthinkable that ICC officials may be inclined to look for more 
‘creative’ ways in bringing suspects to The Hague,44 even if such methods do not 
strictly follow the legal procedures to which the Court should adhere.45  
                                                          
39 Cf. Ruxton 2001, p. 20, writing on the experience of the ICTY: “We had great difficulty in securing 
arrests in the early period. To such an extent that the credibility of the whole institution was put in 
jeopardy.” 
40 See the following words of Chief Prosecutor of the ICC Moreno Ocampo: “To be indicted by the ICC 
is very serious. I would like Harun to be arrested quickly, but the court is a permanent one and it can 
wait.” (S. Bradley, ‘Prosecutor has Darfur masterminds in sights’, Swissinfo, 12 March 2008, available 
at: http://www.swissinfo.org/eng/search/Result.html?siteSect=882&ty=st&sid=8848704.) 
41 As will become clear in the remainder of this study, almost all the suspects who will be reviewed in 
this book have the dubious honour of being male persons. As a result, the words ‘he’ and ‘his’ will be 
used when the sex of the suspect to which is being referred is not clear. For convenience sake, the 
masculine words ‘he’ and ‘his’ will also be used for other persons than suspects if the sex of that person 
is unclear. However, it is evident that in both situations, the feminine words ‘she’ and ‘her’ could and 
should be read here as well.     
42 See the above-mentioned (see n. 40) interview where Moreno Ocampo’s words “it can wait” are 
followed by: “The problem is the victims. Harun is still active. It’s not just about 
punishing him; we need to stop his activities.” (Bradley 2008.) Note furthermore that long delays may 
also have other consequences, see Harmon and Gaynor 2004, p. 410, writing on the context of the 
ICTY: “Delays in securing the prompt arrest of indicted persons result in considerable problems in 
prosecuting and defending cases in the ICTY. The quality and availability of evidence may deteriorate 
over time: memories fade, witnesses die, and as witnesses settle into new, stable lives in the former 
Yugoslavia and elsewhere, some become reluctant to The Hague to retell and, in a sense, relive the 
horror of their past experiences.” 
43 This, in turn, could have an effect on the credibility of the ICC. Cf. in that respect the following 
quotation from 1996 – the year in which not even one of the over fifty indicted persons had been 
detained by the ICTY – of the then ICTY’s Prosecutor Goldstone: “This failure of the ICTY to follow 
through and arrest those indicted could well be fatal to the credibility of the Tribunal”. (Goldstone 1996, 
p. 13.) (It must be noted, of course, that the ICC has already several suspects in its custody, but the 
remark of Goldstone can still be relevant for those (future) ICC situations under investigation where 
suspects are not surrendered to The Hague.) See finally also the words of Ruxton in n. 39. 
44 See also the ICC OTP’s ‘Informal expert paper: Fact-finding and investigative functions of the office 
of the Prosecutor, including international co-operation’, 2003, available at: http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/490C317B-5D8E-4131-8170-7568911F6EB2/248459/372616.PDF, para. 89: 
“Articles 91 and 92 set forth arrest procedures in coordination with requested States. [The arrest 
procedures of the ICC, including Artt. 91 and 92 of the ICC Statute, will be addressed in detail in 
Chapter VIII of this book, ChP.] However, situations may arise where the Prosecutor is compelled, due 
to non-co-operation by a requested State or the sensitivity of “tipping off” the requested State, to explore 








Although such a scenario will probably not happen too often (it cannot be 
completely excluded, however), the second scenario of an alleged male captus can 
occur quite easily. (It is also this scenario by which ICC judges were confronted in 
their very first case.) What is meant is the situation that a State (or international 
force) allegedly arrests or detains a suspect unlawfully before surrendering him to 
the ICC.46  
It is not difficult to imagine that especially in a State (recently) torn apart by 
war,47 less attention may be paid to exactly following the legal rules in 
arresting/detaining a person. Only a month after the above-mentioned prediction 
was made in September 2005, a situation occurred which confirmed the idea that the 
ICC would probably have to decide a male captus case stemming from this second 
scenario at some stage. This situation had to do with the ICC’s case in Uganda, 
against the (initially) five leaders of the LRA: Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska 
                                                                                                                                              
States to execute an arrest warrant under these circumstances could lead to innovative and extraordinary 
measures not contemplated by the Statute or the rules.” Cf. in that respect also the (failed) attempt in 
2007 of the ICC to divert a plane, allegedly carrying ICC suspect Harun, see P. Worsnip, ‘ICC bid to 
arrest Sudan suspect failed – spokeswoman’, Reuters, 6 June 2008, available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN06455243: “The idea was to divert a plane carrying Ahmad 
Harun, Sudan’s minister for humanitarian affairs, as it was heading for Saudi Arabia, where the annual 
Muslim haj pilgrimage is held in Mecca, [ICC] spokeswoman Florence Olara said. The pilgrimage, 
which Muslims must perform at least once if they are able, took place last year from Dec. 17-21. “Using 
cooperation from some states, the plane would have been diverted,” Olara said. “There was a country 
ready to receive the plane once it was diverted, but he was tipped off and got off the plane. So he never 
went to Mecca.”” See finally also Gillett 2008, p. 27: “In light of the difficulties experienced by the ICC 
in its efforts to arrest those people accused of international crimes, creative solutions grounded in the 
principles underpinning the Rome Statute must be explored.” (Note, however, that Gillett does not see a 
solution in, for example, an abduction legally ‘approved’ by the male captus bene detentus rule, see 
ibid., p. 24.)  
45 Cf. in that respect the ICTY Dokmanović case (see Subsection 3.1.1 of Chapter VI) where an 
investigator of the ICTY lured (see Subsection 1.3 of Chapter III for more information on this method) 
Dokmanović from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia to Croatia where he was subsequently arrested, 
an operation which was deemed legal by the ICTY, but not by Sluiter (2001, p. 153) who qualified 
Dokmanović’s arrest as unlawful. (Cf. also Scharf 1998, p. 376 and Van Sliedregt 2001 B, p. 79.) See 
finally Swart 2002 C, p. 1675 (writing about “abduction and other methods of getting hold of a 
person”): “There may be a special temptation to use these methods in relation to States which have 
refused to comply with requests or orders for arrest or transfer issued by a tribunal.”  
46 Indeed, even private individuals may play a role in this context, see again the ICC OTP’s ‘Informal 
expert paper: Fact-finding and investigative functions of the office of the Prosecutor, including 
international co-operation’, 2003, available at: http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/490C317B-5D8E-
4131-8170-7568911F6EB2/248459/372616.PDF, para. 89: “Alternatively, arrests may simply be 
spontaneously effected by private individuals in absence of any request or authorisation. This has on 
occasion occurred before the ad hoc Tribunals, where third parties have, via irregular processes, simply 
detained indictees on their own initiative and thereafter delivered them to peacekeeping forces obliged 
to transfer indictees to the seat of the Tribunal, thus prompting an immediate jurisdictional challenge 
before a Pre-Trial Chamber.” This topic will also be addressed in detail in this book. 
47 This may also constitute an additional complication for the ICC’s functioning: in contrast to several 
other international(ised) criminal tribunals, the ICC may often have to deal with ongoing conflicts. 
However, it should also be noted that the fact that the ICC may operate in such a context does not 
necessarily mean that it will be harder for the ICC to have persons arrested, see n. 35 and accompanying 








Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen.48 After it had become clear in 
2005 that some of the rebels led by Vincent Otti might have fled to neighbouring 
DRC, the Los Angeles Times stated that Ugandan President Museveni “has said if 
the Congolese army doesn’t apprehend the rebels, he’ll send his army across the 
border to do the job”.49 Although this case has not seen any arrests yet, it is clear 
that if Otti were to be arrested in the DRC by the Ugandan army, he would probably 
claim to have been kidnapped before being brought to The Hague by the Ugandan 
authorities.50 
Furthermore, the inter-State context of the struggle against terrorism described 
above may also lead to States taking a tougher stance on suspects of serious crimes 
more generally. That, in turn, may also have its consequences for the ICC, because 
that institution, as explained, is dependent on those States.51   
 
2 GOALS, CENTRAL QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
It is clear from the above section that this study more generally wants to combine 
two fascinating subjects which have not previously been put together in one book: 
male captus bene detentus and the ICC. As a result, the Latin maxim, the ICC (arrest 
and surrender) system and, most importantly, the area where these two subjects 
merge, namely the actual ICC position on male captus cases, will be thoroughly 
analysed. This might not merely be interesting to the reader; perhaps it might also be 
helpful. One could think here of (ICC) judges struggling with the topic and in need 
of more background information. Nevertheless, with respect to the ICC male captus 
                                                          
48 The proceedings against Raska Lukwiya were terminated on 11 July 2007 when it became clear that 
Lukwiya was killed on 12 August 2006, see ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Uganda, In the 
Case of The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, Dominic 
Ongwen, ‘Decision to Terminate the Proceedings Against Raska Lukwiya’ (Public), ICC-02/04-01/05, 
11 July 2007.  
49 E. Sanders, ‘Ruthless Rebels of Uganda Appear to Be Losing Steam’, Los Angeles Times, 10 October 
2005, available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2005/oct/10/world/fg-uganda10. Cf. also the following 
words (which seem to constitute implicit concerns) of UNSG Annan one year later in his Report of the 
Secretary-General pursuant to resolutions 1653 (2006) and 1663 (2006), 29 June 2006, S/2006/478, 
para. 54: “It should be emphasized that the countries of the region have an overwhelming capacity to 
address the LRA threat. If the Governments in the region find a mutually agreeable way to strengthen 
cooperation on the ground among their security forces, it could create a solid basis to deal more 
effectively with the lingering threat from LRA. However, I would urge them to seek a coherent 
approach to this challenge, which should be based on strict adherence to the provisions of international 
law, including respect for the inviolability of the internationally recognized borders and territorial 
integrity of the States affected by the activities of LRA and other illegal armed groups.” 
50 Currie (2007, pp. 383-384) provides another example, namely of a national leader or another 
perpetrator who commits crimes on the territory of an ICC State Party and then flees to a non-State 
Party: “One can easily imagine circumstances in which vengeful politicians in a post-conflict or post-
dictatorship government were motivated enough by an individual’s crimes to employ their own forces – 
or bounty hunters – to apprehend their otherwise unreachable quarry.” Note that Kony, Odhiambo and 
Ongwen are believed to have fled to Sudan, but this State “has given permission to the Ugandan army to 
pursue the wanted individuals on Sudanese territory.” (Bekou and Shah 2006, p. 524, n. 132.) 
51 Cf. in that respect also Ülgen 2003, p. 441 (writing on the context of the ICTY, an institution which is 








position, this study does not want to confine itself to a ‘mere’ description or 
analysis; it also wants to know how the ICC position is doing in a broader context. 
In short, it wants to assess. All this leads to the following 
 
Central question:  
 
How does the ICC currently cope with the dilemmas that a male captus case can 
give rise to and how should this approach be assessed? 
 
Describing and analysing the principle male captus bene detentus, the ICC (arrest 
and surrender) system and the current ICC position on the male captus issue is 
unproblematic in terms of methodology. These subjects and their correlations ‘only’ 
have to be sorted out and written down in such a manner as to be clearly understood 
by the reader. 
It is the assessment exercise that needs some explanation here. This study is 
interested in two main questions, namely 1) how similar or different is the ICC male 
captus position to the position of other courts that have dealt with this problem 
before; and 2) how is the ICC position to be assessed in relation to its own law? 
Hence, what this study is striving for is to create two evaluative frameworks against 
which the ICC male captus position can be assessed, an external one (vis-à-vis the 
position of other courts) and an internal one (vis-à-vis the law of the ICC itself).     
The last evaluative framework is probably the most important one for the ICC. It 
wants to compare the actual ICC male captus position with what the law of the ICC 
prescribes the judges to do. By making such a comparison, one can hopefully see if 
the practice of the ICC is in conformity with the theory, if the law in action is in 
accordance with the law in the books. This framework will be created by a detailed 
examination of Article 21 of the ICC Statute, which is entitled ‘Applicable law’ and 
which prescribes the legal route that judges must follow in making their decisions. It 
is submitted that with help of this framework, one should be able to see if the ICC is 
functioning as it should function according to its own law. 
The first evaluative framework is more non-committal but certainly no less 
interesting. Its goal is not to see whether the ICC is acting as it should act; its goal is 
to see how other judges have coped with the problem in order to find out whether 
the ICC judges follow their colleagues or whether they take a different stance (and, 
if possible, what the reasons for potential divergence are/could be). Even if the ICC 
judges are not obliged to follow case law from other jurisdictions,52 it is the opinion 
of this study that an examination of this case law can nevertheless be instructive as a 
comparison will help in elucidating the exact position of arguably the most 
important institution in the field of international criminal justice in this old53 and 
                                                          
52 Whether this is truly the case will be addressed when examining Art. 21 of the ICC Statute, see 
Chapter IX of this study.  
53 Bauer notes, for example, that Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400), one of the most famous jurists from 
the Middle Ages, already argued that a court has no jurisdiction over a person who has been the victim 








very interesting discussion in which so many have given their opinions before.54 
This framework will be created by reviewing the position of courts dealing with 
male captus cases from the context between States on the one hand and between 
States and international(ised) criminal tribunals other than the ICC on the other.55 
This study will try to examine case law, literature and regulatory documents as 
objectively (but certainly not uncritically!) as possible because it is believed that 
only such an approach can lead to useful internal and external evaluative 
frameworks. However, the material can sometimes be interpreted in several ways. In 
such instances, this study will, of course, not hesitate in taking a position either.  
This latter point also has to do with the third and final objective of this study; as 
well as more generally combining two fascinating subjects which have not 
previously been put together in one book and more specifically answering the 
above-mentioned central question, this study also seeks to make a contribution to 
the male captus discussion itself, to the discussion as to how ICC judges and judges 
in general can best deal with alleged irregularities in the pre-trial phase of their case, 
to the discussion on how proceedings can be achieved which are considered both 
effective and fair. Hence, this study will also contain several recommendations, of 
which the most important ones will be presented in the final chapter, after the 







                                                                                                                                              
violenter captus, licet extra territorium, est quocumque modo sub fortia judicis, ubi deliquit, ibidem 
veniat puniendus. Sed his non obstantibus est veritas: quia non licuit eum capere in territorio alieno … 
forma (sc. remissionis) non servata debet captus tanquam spoliatus propria libertate in eandem 
libertatem restitui.“ [emphasis in original, ChP]” (Bauer 1968, p. 144, n. 2.) 
54 In addition to this evaluative value for this study, an overview of male captus case law from other 
jurisdictions can also be helpful to (ICC) judges struggling with the male captus problem and in need of 
more background information, just like the general information on the maxim itself and the ICC’s 
surrendering system. After all, in many cases where a judge is confronted by a male captus case, 
abundant reference is often made by the Defence and Prosecution to male captus cases from different 
jurisdictions. For example, in the first male captus case before the ICC’s Appeals Chamber (ICC, 
Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision 
on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 
October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006), all the parties 
involved referred to (inter)national case law to back their positions. Overviews, which summarise the 
most important male captus cases from both the inter-State context and the context of the 
international(ised) criminal tribunals, may to a certain extent help judges who can no longer see the 
wood for the trees, who are trying to assess the relevance of these cases for their own decision, who are 
more generally struggling with the dilemmas male captus cases can bring forth and who would not mind 
to learn from the views of other judges who have already coped with the problem (even if they would 
not be obliged to follow their views). 
55 The precise benchmarks, namely the exact courts to be used in this external framework, will be further 










This research is composed of five parts. 
Part 1 (and Chapter I) will end with this section and consists of a first 
introduction to the subject, including the goals, central question, methodology and 
outline of this study. 
Before examining the status of male captus bene detentus in practice, the maxim 
itself will be scrutinised in Part 2. “Where does it come from?” and “What does it 
mean exactly?” are the two main questions of this rather theoretical part. As a result, 
an attempt will be made to find the (Roman?) origin of these four Latin words 
(Chapter II). In addition, the different elements of the maxim will be thoroughly 
analysed (Chapter III). In this third chapter, answers will be provided to four main 
questions, namely 1) “Which male captus situations exist?”, 2) “What is violated by 
these male captus situations?”, 3) “Who violates?” and 4) “What are the 
consequences of such violations?” At the end of this part, the reader will have been 
presented with concepts, delimitations and definitions which are necessary for a 
good understanding of the rest of this study. 
In Part 3, after a short introduction (Chapter IV), the material necessary to create 
the external evaluative framework will be presented: attention will be paid to male 
captus case law from the context between States (Chapter V) and from the context 
between States and international(ised) criminal tribunals (Chapter VI). Furthermore, 
and when necessary for a better understanding of the problem, information will also 
be provided on (the reaction by) legal literature (to those cases) and on the legal 
systems in which those different courts function – one could hereby think of the 
transfer regime in the context of the international criminal tribunals. Finally, in 
Chapter VII, the principles distilled from Part 3, the actual external evaluative 
framework of this study, will be presented. 
Part 4 is dedicated to the ICC. After providing general information on its arrest 
and surrender regime (Chapter VIII), attention will be paid to the crux of the internal 
evaluative framework: Article 21 of the ICC Statute (Chapter IX). After that, the 
two most important subjects of this study – male captus bene detentus and the ICC – 
will be put together to find the ICC’s current position on this (by then hopefully 
very familiar) maxim (Chapter X).  
In Part 5 (and Chapter XI) – the conclusion of this research – the successive parts 
will be brought together in order to answer the study’s central question: “How does 
the ICC currently cope with the dilemmas that a male captus case can give rise to 
and how should this approach be assessed?” Furthermore – and in an effort not to 
deliver only a descriptive and analytic work – recommendations will be provided 
which might hopefully be of help to anyone interested in the topic, in particular the 






















This chapter should start with an explanation as to why it will be somewhat different 
from the rest of this study. As will be shown in the next part of this book – perhaps 
it has already become clear from some sentences written in the previous chapter – 
this study will in principle only look at male captus cases where a jurisdictional 
border has been crossed. Of course, male captus bene detentus may be applied 
within one and the same jurisdiction as well, meaning that a judge from State A 
would approve the trial of a suspect who was improperly arrested in State A by State 
A police forces. However, as the ‘target’ context of this book, that of the ICC, is 
characterised by a suspect being tried in another jurisdiction than the one in which 
he was arrested, only male captus cases with a multi-jurisdictional dimension will 
be examined in this study. To be even more precise, attention will only be paid to 
multi-jurisdictional male captus cases where the border of a country has been 
crossed.1 (There are also multi-jurisdictional male captus cases within one and the 
same country, for example between the several States of the US.)2 This further 
delimitation has been chosen because the surrender of a suspect from a country to an 
international criminal tribunal like the ICC is more akin to (although absolutely not 
the same as) extradition between two sovereign countries than to surrender between 
two entities within one sovereign country. After all, the ICC and the country which 
surrendered the suspect are not equal parts of a higher sovereignty, such as, for 
example, Texas and Ohio are of the US. Because of this international focus, it may 
be good to slightly adjust the introductory and rather general definition of male 
                                                          
1 Note that the focus should be here on the country’s legal border. After all, it might be possible that the 
person surrendered into the jurisdiction of the court does not physically leave the geographical national 
borders of a State. For example, when the Dutch authorities transfer or surrender a person from their 
own national jurisdiction to the ICTY or ICC (which have their headquarters in The Hague), a national 
jurisdictional and not a national geographical boundary is crossed. (The same goes for Sierra Leone and 
the SCSL and other internationalised criminal tribunals (with the exception of the STL).) 
2 Despite the fact that almost all the political entities within the country US are called ‘States’, the word 








captus bene detentus as could be found in the first chapter of this book3 because the 
words “was brought into the power of that court” could also be applied to a purely 
domestic context, a context on which this book does not focus. Hence, it is 
suggested to now understand the maxim to mean that a court can exercise 
jurisdiction over a person, even if the way that person was brought from one 
jurisdiction to another (namely the jurisdiction in which the court before which the 
suspect is now standing operates) was irregular. 
Why then is this chapter different? As it is merely looking at the origin of the 
maxim, which may perhaps be found in a purely national setting, the above-
mentioned delimitation does not need to be applied here as well. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the purely internal situation might also be looked at in the following pages 
does not mean that special attention cannot be paid, in this chapter as well, to the 
most interesting context for this book, namely the one where national borders are 
crossed.  
 
2 ROMAN ORIGIN? 
 
In several books and articles in which the topic of male captus bene detentus is 
addressed, history is often used to illustrate and contextualise the problem involved. 
One of the most comprehensive books on this subject, Wilske’s Die 
völkerrechtswidrige Entführung und ihre Rechtsfolgen, even starts with the mythical 
Oedipus who, while in exile in Kolonos, had to defend himself against agents from 
Thebe who tried to bring him back to their territory “mit List und Gewalt”.4 One of 
the oldest historical inter-State male captus cases in which not only the abduction 
itself but, more importantly, also its legal context are described can be found in an 
article by O’Higgins. It is the intriguing case of Dr. John Story, who was seized by 
British agents in Antwerp in 1569:  
 
Story (…) was a bitter persecutor of religious dissentients under Mary. During the 
reign of Elizabeth he was under suspicion for some time and eventually was arrested. 
He escaped and with the aid of the Spanish Ambassador in London reached asylum in 
Flanders. Here, under the Duke of Alva, he was given the task of searching all vessels 
that called at Antwerp for English goods, and in particular for heretical books. 
Believing that Story was engaged in plotting against Elizabeth, Cecil instructed some 
of his agents to abduct Story from Spanish territory. Story was induced to board a 
ship at Antwerp by the report of one of Cecil’s agents that it carried a number of 
blasphemous books. As soon as Story came aboard the vessel set sail for England, 
where he was put on trial for treason. He denied the jurisdiction of the English courts 
on the ground that he had become a Spanish national but made no attempt to oust 
their jurisdiction on the ground of the violation of Spanish sovereignty committed by 
Cecil’s agents. The Spanish Ambassador did on two occasions demand Story’s 
                                                          
3 See Subsection 1.1 of the previous chapter: a court can properly detain a person (read: can properly 
exercise jurisdiction over a person) (bene detentus), even if that person was brought into the power of 
that court in an irregular way (male captus). 








release and the punishment of those who has been concerned in his abduction. But 
without result and Story was executed [original footnotes omitted, ChP].5          
 
Now, this is all very interesting, but it does not say anything about the history of the 
principle itself. Who was the first to ‘invent’ the maxim as such, namely the four 
words male captus bene detentus?6 In his report to the Re Argoud case, which will 
be examined in detail in Subsection 2.1 of Chapter V, rapporteur Comte is sure of at 
least one thing, namely that the maxim “is certainly not from Virgil”.7 However, that 
does not help this study further, of course. Nevertheless, Comte’s remark may imply 
that the maxim has antique roots (even if these roots cannot be traced back to the 
Roman poet Virgil).  
Since the four words are Latin, it is indeed not illogical to think that their origin 
might be found in antiquity. In fact, an initial inquiry into some basic sources 
dealing with Latin rules8 shows that a considerable number of them can be traced 
back to Roman times. To give two well-known examples: Cicero’s already-
mentioned phrase from Pro Milone: silent [enim] leges inter arma9 (“[l]aws are 
silent amid arms”)10 and Celsus’ phrase [i]us est ars boni et aequi11 (“[l]aw is the 
science of what is good and just”).12 However, this is not the case with male captus 
bene detentus. This fact alone should make one doubt whether the above-mentioned 
(and prima facie logical) mental leap is in fact correct. Notwithstanding this 
uncertainty, the rule has often been labelled in literature as a(n “ancient”13 or 
“old”)14 Roman maxim.15 Unfortunately (but perhaps understandably), in none of 
these articles, a reference to a Roman source is made. 
Therefore, it might be useful to shift the focus of this quest from the more basic 
sources dealing with Latin maxims to Roman law itself to see whether the latter 
reveals some information on the origin of male captus bene detentus.  
                                                          
5 O’Higgins 1961, pp. 281-282. 
6 Or other representations of the same maxim such as: mala captus bene detentus or male captus bene 
iudicatus. The latter version of the adage is arguably the most correct one (see, for example, Schultz 
1967, Poort 1988, Grams 1994, Bugnion 2002 and Van der Wilt 2004) as it represents the best 
translation of the idea that a judge can try a person/can exercise jurisdiction over him (iudicare), even if 
the way that person was brought into the court’s jurisdiction was irregular. In addition, this formulation 
of the maxim also circumvents the possible confusion which might be created by the fact that an 
unlawful detention (which one may easily translate as male detentus) may also fall within the notion of 
male captus), see n. 6 and accompanying text of Chapter III. However, since the maxim is most often 
written as male captus bene detentus (and thus recognised as such), the latter version will be used in this 
book. 
7 Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, Vol. 45 
(1972), p. 104 (Report of M. le Conseiller Comte). 
8 See, for example, Stein 1966 and Liebs, Lehmann and Strobel 1982. 
9 See Liebs, Lehmann and Strobel 1982, p. 197. See also n. 18 of Chapter I. 
10 Garner 2004, p. 1758. 
11 See Liebs, Lehmann and Strobel 1982, p. 105. 
12 Garner 2004, p. 1728. 
13 See, for example, Webb 1975, p. 171, Gray 1991, p. 172 and Stark 1993, p. 125. 
14 See, for example, Goldie 1987, p. 131, n. 31.  








In such an examination, one should not leave out the legislation of Emperor 
Justinian (483-565), which 
 
mark[ed] the end of the first period of the history of Roman law and the beginning of 
the second period. Together the Digest, the Code and the Institutes give a 
comprehensive picture of the way in which Roman law developed from the first 
century BC up to and including the sixth century. Although the compilers 
undoubtedly altered the texts in places, adapting them to their own time, they did not 
make any major changes. Consequently these three works are still the most important 
source of our knowledge about classical Roman law.16 
 
Unfortunately, the maxim will not be found in the Digest, Code and Institutes 
either.17 In fact, some rules seem to point to a(n international) legal context in which 
a rule like male captus bene detentus had perhaps no place at all. Taking the “most 
important”18 work of the three, the Digest, as an example, and focusing first on the 
most interesting (inter-State) context for this book, the following rules are quite 
illustrative in that respect:  
 
-The governor of a province has authority only over the people of his own province, and 
that only while he is in the province. For the moment he leaves it, he is a private citizen. 
Sometimes he has power even in relation to non-residents, if they have taken direct part 
in criminal activity. For it is to be found in the imperial warrants of appointment that he 
who has charge of the province shall attend to cleansing the province of evil men; and no 
distinction is drawn as to where they may come from.19 (…) -One who administers justice 
beyond the limits of his territory may be disobeyed with impunity.20 (…) -It is customary 
for the governors of provinces in which an offense has been committed to write to their 
colleagues [in whose provinces] the perpetrators are alleged to live, requesting that they 
be returned along with those who are to prosecute them; this also is laid down in a 
number of rescripts.21 
 
From such rules, the 17th century writer Matthaeus (logically) concludes that the 
governor from a province where a crime was committed could not arrest the alleged 
perpetrator on his own authority if the latter was residing in another province.22 He 
continues:  
 
But the commentators ask what must be said if a judge has begun the pursuit of an 
accused person in his own territory, or when the accused was escaping into another 
territory. Can he continue to chase and arrest him? It is nearer to the truth to say that 
he cannot do so; for if he were to do so, he would be exercising jurisdiction in 
                                                          
16 Tellegen-Couperus 1993, p. 148. 
17 One can easily scan these works on the very practical website 
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/justinian.html. 
18 Stein 1999, p. 33.  
19 D.1.18.3 (from Paul, Sabinus, book 13). See Mommsen, Krueger and Watson 1985 A, pp. 34-35.   
20 D.2.1.20 (from Paul, Edict, book 1). See Mommsen, Krueger and Watson 1985 A, p. 42.   
21 D.48.3.7 (from Macer, Duties of the Governor, book 2). See Mommsen, Krueger and Watson 1985 B, 
p. 801a. 








another’s territory, not in his own. Everyone realised how dangerous this would be 
and how easily it would offer a reason for conflict.23   
 
This valid argument is very simple yet very strong. If two States wish to live 
peacefully together, they should respect each other’s sovereignty. Conversely, lack 
of this necessary respect will lead to distrust and potentially to complete chaos. That 
this powerful argument has not lost any strength over the centuries is evidenced by 
the UNSC’s condemnation of Eichmann’s abduction in Argentina (see Subsection 
3.3.2 of Chapter III for more information).  
This short overview appears to show that inter-State abductions were not 
permissible in antiquity either. Nevertheless, that does not necessarily imply that the 
rule male captus bene detentus was never applied in those days.24 An analogy can be 
drawn to modern times here: even though the UNSC did indeed condemn the inter-
State abduction of Eichmann, it did not lead to the refusal of exercising jurisdiction 
in the Israeli courts, where the judges applied male captus bene detentus. 
Notwithstanding this, and reconsidering the above-mentioned rule that “[o]ne who 
administers justice beyond the limits of his territory may be disobeyed with impunity 
[emphasis added, ChP]”, one may doubt whether the international legal context of 
classical Roman law offered a good breeding ground for the growth of male captus 
bene detentus.  
In the 1991 case Opinion in State v. Ebrahim,25 which will be addressed in more 
detail in Chapter V, Judge Steyn of the South African Appellate Division (Supreme 
Court) examined “our common law”26 on the issue of an abduction’s effect on the 
jurisdiction of a court. As this South African common law “is still substantially 
Roman-Dutch law as adjusted to local circumstances”27 Steyn also looked at Roman 
law. Referring to exactly the same rules from the Digest already mentioned supra,28 
Steyn explains:  
 
This limitation on the legal powers of Roman provincial governors and lawgivers is 
understandable and was unavoidable in the light of the great number of provinces 
comprising the Roman Empire in classical times, with their ethnic and cultural 
diversity, and their different legal systems which the politically pragmatic Romans 
allowed to remain largely in force in their conquered territories. Until late in the 
history of the Roman Empire certain provinces were controlled by the Senate and 
others by the Emperor. Intervention by one province in the domestic affairs of another 
was a source of potential conflict. In order to maintain sound mutual relations, a 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 It is therefore hard to agree with Burr, who states with (a probably unjustified) certainty that “Roman 
courts (…) declined to exercise jurisdiction over kidnapped suspects brought before (…) [their] courts 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Burr 2001, p. 108.)  
25 In this chapter, the edited and abbreviated English translation in International Legal Materials 
(prepared by John Dugard) was used: Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 
16 February 1991, 31 International Legal Materials (1992), pp. 888-899. 
26 Ibid., p. 892. 
27 Ibid., p. 895. 








practice developed among provincial governors relating to the arrest and extradition 
of offenders.29    
 
After clarifying the fact that this practice became law in Justinian’s Novellae 
Constitutiones,30 he concludes: 
 
It is inconceivable that the Roman authorities would recognize a conviction and 
sentence, and allow them to stand, when they were the result of an abduction of a 
criminal from one province on the order or with the co-operation of the authority of 
another province. This would not only have been an approval of illegal conduct, and 
therefore a subversion of authority, but would also have threatened the internal inter-
provincial peace of the Empire.31   
 
This conclusion confirms the above-mentioned idea that acceptance of a rule which 
approves the trial of an internationally abducted person would not have seemed very 
appropriate in classical Roman law.  
What can be said about the domestic context of classical Roman law? Again, one 
can turn here to Matthaeus, who also explains the arrest procedure in this context:  
 
If an accused person is present [in a footnote from the editors, one can read that here 
is meant “in the province”, ChP] or if it is known to the judge where he is hiding, he 
orders him to be produced and taken into custody by an apparitor (minor public 
servant) (…). And it makes no difference whether he is arrested in public or at his 
home. Now some people think that formerly it was not permissible to drag an accused 
out of his house, but this is not true, for the rule which forbids this pertains to civil, 
not criminal cases (…). On the contrary, men can even be dragged from a sacred 
building, if they are accused of the more serious crimes like murder, adultery, or 
abduction (…).32 
                                                          
29 Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 International 
Legal Materials (1992), p. 893. 
30 Ibid. See Novella 134, Chapter 5: “When any one of the criminals whom we have just mentioned 
conceals himself, or leaves the province in which he has committed the offence, We order the judge to 
call him into court by the publication of lawful edicts, and if he does not obey, the judge shall proceed in 
the manner prescribed by the laws. If it should be ascertained that the guilty party is living in some other 
province, We order the judge of the district in which the offence was committed to notify the judge of 
the province in which the delinquent resides, by means of a letter, to arrest him on his own responsibility 
and that of his court, and to send the accused to him. When the judge who has received a public letter of 
this kind fails to do what We have stated, and his court does not surrender the criminal, or if it does not 
execute the orders given it, We decree that the said magistrate shall pay a fine of three pounds in gold, 
and his court an equal amount. If, induced by a desire for gain, a judge, or any officer of his court, does 
not arrest a person of this description, or if, after having arrested him, he does not deliver him up, he 
shall, after conviction, be deprived of his office, and sent into exile.” 
31 Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 International 
Legal Materials (1992), p. 894. 
32 Hewett and Stoop 1994, p. 497. The word “or” (in the sentence: “If an accused is present [in the 
province], or if it is known to the judge where he is hiding”) might be a little confusing here. One could 
namely understand it to mean that a person can also be dragged from his home when the person is not 
living in the province if the judge knows where he is hiding abroad. Nevertheless, as has been shown 








This information could be interpreted as meaning that the above-mentioned breeding 
ground for male captus bene detentus was perhaps more present in the domestic 
field than in the international context. However, the fact that an accused could be 
dragged out of his house in criminal cases is not an indication that the rule male 
captus bene detentus was accepted in classical Roman domestic law: if arresting a 
person at home was legally possible (as is the case in our modern society if law 
enforcers have fulfilled several procedural conditions) then one can no longer speak 
of male captus as the captus was perfectly legal: bene captus. Logically, if there is 
no male captus involved, then the judge cannot pronounce a decision summarised 
by the maxim male captus bene detentus. After all, in such a situation, the essential 
premise (namely that there was an irregular arrest) is not fulfilled. In conclusion, 
strong doubts remain about the origin of the Latin maxim in classical Roman law.   
Until now, the focus of this Roman law survey was on classical Roman law, 
which ‘merely’ deals with a specific Roman law period (even if that period covers 
no less than seven centuries). However, also in more general sources on Roman 
criminal law, the maxim was not found.33    
Although this survey cannot and will not be exhaustive, it is, in any case, clear 
that the true origin of the maxim is extremely difficult to find in sources on Roman 
criminal law. In fact, the legal contexts searched do not seem to be perfect places for 
the maxim to flourish at all.  
In conclusion, one could assert that, notwithstanding its old-fashioned 
appearance, male captus bene detentus does not seem to have its roots in Roman 
criminal law. The four-word phrase may be Latin, but it is probably not Roman.34 
 
3 MODERN ORIGIN? 
 
In fact, the origin of the four-word Latin phrase may perhaps be relatively modern: 
the oldest text found which actually uses this phrase is M.H. Cardozo’s article 
‘When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the Solution?’, which was published in the 
American Journal of International Law of January 1961.35 Cardozo hereby refers to 
                                                          
33 Books searched include Mommsen 1955 (“the platform on which any worker in the field of Roman 
criminal law must build” (Robinson 1995, p. x)), Strachan-Davidson 1969 and Santalucia 1998.     
34 Cf. in that respect, for example, the Latin maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, which can be 
traced back ‘only’ to P.J.A. Feuerbach, Lehrbuch des gemeinen in Deutschland gültigen peinlichen 
Rechts, Georg Friedrich Heyer: Giessen 1801, para. 20. See Schreiber 1976, p. 17: “Die lateinische, bis 
heute allgemein gebräuchliche Formulierung des Satzes findet sich bekanntlich erstmals bei Feuerbach, 
und zwar in § 20 seines im Jahre 1801 erschienenen Strafrechtslehrbuches. Freilich hat Feuerbach hier 
dem Prinzip im Rahmen seines – später noch eingehend zu erörternden – Systems nur die klassisch 
gewordene Formel gegeben. Das Prinzip selbst ist älter, schon vor Feuerbach hat es in den Vereinigten 
Staaten während der siebziger Jahre des 18. Jahrhunderts und in Europa in Österreich (1787), Preußen 
(1794) sowie in für die weitere Zukunft maßgeblicher Gestalt in den Art. 7 und 8 der französischen 
Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte vom 23. 8. 1789 und den Revolutionsverfassungen der 
folgenden Jahre gesetzlichen Ausdruck gefunden. Nach ganz allgemeiner Ansicht ist der Satz in der bis 
heute geltenden Gestalt ein Ergebnis des Rechtsdenkens der Aufklärungsepoche (...). Die Ansicht, es 
handele sich um ein Prinzip des römischen Rechts, stellt nur eine gänzlich unhistorische Kuriosität dar 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” 








the 1952 Frisbie v. Collins case and also to Hyde’s International Law36 but the 
maxim will not be found in these sources either. The same can be said of the 
reference to the rule in the equally ‘old’ article by H.W. Baade: ‘The Eichmann 
Trial: Some Legal Aspects’.37 In footnotes 12-15 of this article, published in Duke 
Law Journal in the summer of 1961, Baade refers to several older sources, but in 
none of them, the four-word Latin phrase can be found.38   
Taking all the above into account, one can say that there are several factors 
pointing to the fact that the maxim might ‘just’ be relatively modern.39 A maxim 
that nicely and concisely summarises the legal reasoning that an irregular arrest will 
not prejudice the exercise of a court’s jurisdiction.  
 
4 ORIGIN OF THE REASONING BEHIND THE MAXIM 
 
If one tries to find the origin of the legal reasoning behind the Latin maxim, then 
one might have more success. Focusing on the, for this book, most interesting (inter-
State) context, one might think back to the case of Dr. Story, which was introduced 
at the beginning of this chapter. However, in this 16th-century case, the legal 
reasoning of the English courts with respect to the effect on the exercise of 
jurisdiction of an (alleged) irregular arrest abroad was not presented (by O’Higgins).  
A case which keeps re-appearing in literature and case law as the oldest one with 
a truly multi-jurisdictional, international dimension40 and in which one can find such 
a consideration is the Ex Parte Susannah Scott case, decided by Lord Chief Justice 
Tenterden of the Court of King’s Bench on Tuesday 19 May 1829.41 In England, a 
                                                          
36 See ibid., p. 132, n. 33. Hyde’s book, in turn, refers to: “Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436; Ex parte 
Wilson, 140 S.W. 98; Mr. Bacon, Acting Secy. of State, to the Mexican Chargé, June 22, 1906, For. Rel. 
1906, II, 1121. See also United States v. Unverzagt, 299 Fed. 1015; People ex rel. Stilwell v. Hanley, 
207 N.Y.S. 176; Ex parte Campbell, 1 F. Supp. 899. See documents in Hackworth, Dig., IV, § 345.” 
(Hyde 1945, p. 1032, n. 4.)   
37 See Baade 1961, p. 404. 
38 They are the following: “Lord Goddard, C.J., in Ex Parte Elliott, [1949] 1 All E.R. 373, 377-78 
(K.B.). (…) Ex Parte Susannah Scott, 9 B & C 446, 109 E.R. 166, 167 (K.B. 1829). (…) Afouneh v. 
Attorney-General, [1941-1942] Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases 327, 328 
(…) (Supreme Court of Palestine, sitting as Court of Criminal Appeal, 1942); (…) Yousef Said Abu 
Dourrah v. Attorney-General, id. 331, 332 (same court, 1941). See the authorities collected in Note, 165 
A.L.R. 947 (1946) [this is Williams 1946, ChP], and in Scott[, Jr.] (…) 1953 (…) Garcia-Mora (…) 
1957 (…). (…) Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888) (…) 
Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537, 543 (1893); In re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120, 125-27 (1897). (…) 
Fairman (…) 1953 (…). (…) Frisb[i]e v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952).” 
39 That may include a period like the Middle Ages, cf., for example, the words of Baldus de Ubaldis 
(1327-1400) as mentioned in n. 53 of the previous chapter (opposing the idea behind male captus bene 
detentus). 
40 There is another multi-jurisdictional case from 1829 as well, but that one was within one State 
(namely within the US): State v. Smith, 1 Bailey Law 283, 19 Am. Dec. 679 (S.C. 1829). See Plumb, Jr. 
1939, p. 340, n. 13. 
41 Court of King’s Bench, Lord Chief Justice Tenterden, Ex parte Susannah Scott, 19 May 1829, 9 
Barnewall & Cresswell’s King’s Bench Reports (1829), pp. 446-448; 109 English Reports (1829), pp. 
166-167. Factual information from this case has been obtained from 9 Barnewall & Cresswell’s King’s 








certain Susannah Scott was indicted for perjury. Lord Chief Justice Tenterden 
granted a warrant for her arrest, specially directed to the English police officer 
Ruthven. When the latter apprehended her in Brussels, Scott applied to the English 
Ambassador for assistance. When he refused to interfere, Ruthven took her to 
Ostend, and from there to England. There, she was brought before Tenterden, and 
committed by him to the King’s Bench Prison. Scott asked for her discharge 
(release) on the basis of habeas corpus42 but Tenterden refused, stating:   
 
The question, therefore, is this, whether if a person charged with a crime is found in 
this country, it is the duty of the Court to take care that such a party shall be amenable 
to justice, or whether we are to consider the circumstances under which she was 
brought here. I thought, and still continue to think, that we cannot inquire into them. 
If the acts complained of were done against the law of a foreign country, that country 
might have vindicated its own law. If it gave her a right of action, she may sue upon it 
[emphasis added, ChP].43  
 
This quote is one of the oldest, if not the oldest, demonstration of a44 male captus 
bene detentus reasoning in an international context:45 an irregular arrest abroad will 
                                                          
42 Habeas corpus, literally meaning “that you have the body”, is “[a] writ employed to bring a person 
before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal 
(habeas corpus ad subjiciendum).” (Garner 2004, p. 728.) See for more information on the history of 
this concept Duker 1980. Although the goal of habeas corpus is that the person detaining someone must 
bring the person deprived of his liberty to court so that a judge can check whether the deprivation of 
liberty is lawful, the aim is, of course, also that the person deprived of his liberty be released if the judge 
deems the deprivation unlawful. Well-known habeas corpus provisions, such as Art. 9, para. 4 of the 
ICCPR and Art. 5, para. 4 of the ECHR (to which considerable attention will be paid in the next 
chapters), also mention this remedy of release. 
43 Court of King’s Bench, Lord Chief Justice Tenterden, Ex parte Susannah Scott, 19 May 1829, 9 
Barnewall & Cresswell’s King’s Bench Reports (1829), pp. 448; 109 English Reports (1829), p. 167. 
44 As will be shown in this book, there are more rationales behind invoking the male captus bene 
detentus rule. In this case, the judge did not refuse jurisdiction because it was not in his power (see the 
word “cannot”) to look at pre-trial irregularities. Another example of a male captus bene detentus 
rationale is that a judge continues to exercise jurisdiction, not because he believes that he cannot look at 
the way in which a person was brought before him but simply because he is not interested in this pre-
trial phase.  
45 In Ex parte Susannah Scott, reference was made to two older criminal cases to support the idea that 
“the court will not inquire into the manner in which the caption was effected” (Court of King’s Bench, 
Lord Chief Justice Tenterden, Ex parte Susannah Scott, 19 May 1829, 9 Barnewall & Cresswell’s 
King’s Bench Reports (1829), p. 447; 109 English Reports (1829), p. 166): Rex v. Marks, 3 East, 175 
from 1802 and Ex parte Krans 1 B. & C. 258 from 1823. However, both habeas corpus cases took place 
within one jurisdiction, see Plumb, Jr. 1939, p. 340, n. 13. (There is something special about Ex parte 
Krans: this case was born out of a battle on the high seas between a British Navy cutter and a smuggling 
boat. The men from the latter ship were arrested and brought to another ship, the Severn. “The principle 
question on appeal to the King’s Bench from the denial of the writ [of habeas corpus, ChP] was whether 
the time of the smuggler[s]’ (…) detention in the hold of the Severn was unreasonable so as to demand 
their release.” (Birkett 1991, p. 609.) Chief Justice Abbott (actually the same judge as the one in Ex 
Parte Susannah Scott: Chief Justice Lord Tenterden is a title, see Birkett 1991, p. 610, n. 78) stated: “It 
appears to me that our proper course is, not to inquire into the facts of the case, whatever may be our 
power, but to commit the prisoners to the custody of the Marshal of the Marshalsea, that they may 








not endanger the exercise of jurisdiction in another State for it is not within the 
power of the judges to examine the circumstances of the apprehension.46  
Before continuing to discuss other interesting male captus case law in Part 3 of 
this book, it is first important to pay attention, in the next chapter, to the different 
concepts, delimitations and definitions within the context of the maxim male captus 
bene detentus, for it is believed that a good understanding of these matters is 
essential for being able to clearly follow the remainder of this study. 
                                                                                                                                              
omitted, ChP].” (Birkett 1991, p. 610.) Although this case seems to have an international dimension, 
Plumb, Jr. (see the beginning of this footnote) probably correctly placed this case in the category ‘illegal 
arrest within the jurisdiction’. See in that respect Birkett 1991, p. 609, n. 75: “The ship was apparently 
flying no flag and contained stolen goods and liquor. As such it was a ship having no status as sovereign 
territory. Thus, the boarding of this ship cannot properly be considered a violation of any principle of 
sovereign territory.”) 
46 It should, however, also be mentioned that the international dimension of Scott’s case was probably 
only limited to its facts, namely that she was brought from the Netherlands to England. “Lord Tenterden 
held that the Court could not inquire into the circumstances of the arrest. It is significant, however, that 
the learned Judge seems to have thought only in terms of a violation of Belgian law, not of international 
law.” (Morgenstern 1953, p. 273.) (Note that in 1829, the State of Belgium did not exist yet (but was 




DISSECTING THE MAXIM: CONCEPTS, 








In the very first subsection of this book, the maxim was defined to mean that a court 
can properly detain a person (read: can properly exercise jurisdiction over a person) 
(bene detentus), even if that person was brought into the power of that court in an 
irregular way (male captus). Because the words “brought into the power of that 
court” could also be applied in a purely domestic male captus situation, and because 
this book is focusing on the international context, it was suggested in the 
introduction of the previous chapter that the introductory and rather general 
definition of male captus bene detentus from the first chapter should be slightly 
adjusted so as to mean that a court can exercise jurisdiction over a person, even if 
the way that person was brought from one jurisdiction to another (namely the 
jurisdiction in which the court before which the suspect is now standing operates) 
was irregular. This chapter seeks to clarify the different elements of this maxim in 
more detail. To start with its first part, which situations fall under the words male 
captus? 
Before addressing that question however, it must be emphasised that the 
information in this section is merely there for reasons of clarity. Of course, one can 
come up with the most lucid theoretical examples of male captus situations, but 
reality often shows a mix of different and more complex situations. However, as the 
following pages want to clarify instead of to confuse, only the basic scenarios will 
be reviewed. Furthermore, it must be understood that in the end, it will be up to the 
suspect to claim that a certain situation is to be seen as a male captus situation which 
must lead to the refusal of jurisdiction by the judges. In the same spirit, it is up to the 
judges to hear that argument and to decide whether the alleged male captus situation 
is indeed a proper one and if so, whether this has any impact on their exercise of 
jurisdiction.  
Taking this into account (and returning to the question that was just posed), the 
spectrum of possible male captus situations may be broader than thought of initially. 








identified with an unlawful capture. However, as already explained, the maxim has 
to do with irregularities connected with the way a person was brought from one 
jurisdiction to another (namely the jurisdiction in which the court before which the 
suspect is now standing operates). And although the apprehension is an important 
aspect of this process, it is not the only aspect. After all, an arrest as such does not 
bring the arrested person before the judges: he may be put in pre-trial detention first 
and, of course, he needs to be surrendered to the court. Hence, it is submitted that all 
those pre-trial irregularities which are related to this process, to the process of 
bringing a suspect from one jurisdiction to another, can fall under the term male 
captus. Recall in that respect – see Chapter I – the words of Attorney-General 
Hausner in the Eichmann case:   
  
[T]he circumstances of the Accused’s detention, his seizure and his transfer are not 
relevant for competence and they contain nothing which can affect this competence, 
and since they are not relevant, they should not be considered and evidence 
concerning them should not be heard [emphasis added, ChP].1 
 
The pre-trial irregularities may also include irregularities preceding the (official) 
arrest. For example, in the ICTY Nikolić case (see Chapter VI), it was assumed that 
the defendant was abducted in the FRY “by unknown individuals having no 
connection with SFOR and/or the Tribunal”,2 brought to Bosnia and Herzegovina – 
where he was officially arrested by SFOR – and then transferred to The Hague. This 
irregularity preceding the official arrest by SFOR was used by Nikolić to challenge 
the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICTY. According to the Trial Chamber, Nikolić 
brought forth two lines of reasoning in that respect. The first was that 
 
                                                          
1 The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem, Vol. 1, 
Session 1, available at: http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-
adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-001-05.html. See also the reasoning of the judges in the District Court 
of Jerusalem (see also n. 15 and accompanying text of Chapter I): District Court of Jerusalem, The 
Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, ‘Decision on the Preliminary 
Objections’, 17 April 1961, Criminal Case No. 40/61, available at: 
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-006-01.html: “As for 
the arguments over the circumstances under which the Accused was brought to the State of Israel, in 
view of the fact that we have found that the Court has jurisdiction to try the Accused, the manner in 
which he was brought within the jurisdiction of this Court has no relevance according to law, neither has 
the fact whether he was apprehended abroad by emissaries of the governing authorities of the State of 
Israel or not [emphasis added, ChP].”; District Court of Jerusalem, The Attorney-General of the 
Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, ‘Judgment’, 12 December 1961, Criminal Case No. 40/61, 
para. 41 (36 International Law Reports 1968, p. 59): “It is an established rule of law that a person being 
tried for an offence against the laws of a State may not oppose his trial by reason of the illegality of his 
arrest or of the means whereby he was brought within the jurisdiction of that State. The courts in 
England, the United States and Israel have constantly held that the circumstances of the arrest and the 
mode of bringing of the accused into the territory of the State have no relevance to his trial, and they 
have consistently refused in all instances to enter upon an examination of these circumstances [emphasis 
added, ChP].” 
2 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the 








by taking over the accused from the unknown individuals, SFOR and/or the 
Prosecution have acknowledged and adopted the alleged illegal conduct of those 
individuals. The illegality of the acts of the individuals thereby becomes attributable 
to SFOR and to the Prosecution.3 
 
The second line of reasoning was that “the illegal character of the arrest [by the 
“unknown individuals”, ChP] in and of itself should bar the Tribunal from 
exercising jurisdiction over the accused.”4  
Thus, when this book refers to male captus situations, these situations can 
encompass in fact every pre-trial irregularity which can be seen to have occurred 
within the context of a certain case. Hence, they may include irregularities related to 
the surrender itself,5 to the pre-trial detention,6 to the official arrest and even to 
matters which occurred prior to that.7 Notwithstanding the theoretically broad scope 
of this term, it must be admitted that most attention will be paid to irregularities 
dealing with the (formal) arrest.8 After all, the word captus refers first and foremost 
to the capture, to the apprehension. 
In the discussion of the case law in the remainder of this book, several 
(combinations of) male captus situations will be reviewed. To properly understand 
these situations, it is worth first giving some information on three basic situations. 
                                                          
3 Ibid., para. 29. 
4 Ibid. See also ibid., para. 25 where the Trial Chamber mentions the Defence’s submission “that the 
forcible removal of the Accused from the FRY [by the private individuals prior to the handing over to 
SFOR, ChP] entailed a breach of both the sovereignty of the FRY and the Accused’s individual due 
process guarantees; and that although such breaches occurred prior to the delivery of the Accused into 
the custody of SFOR and the Tribunal, these breaches were of such magnitude that even absent the 
involvement of SFOR or Prosecution, the release of the Accused from the custody of this Tribunal and 
the dismissal of the indictment against him is the only appropriate remedy [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
5 Although the surrender/transfer itself (the actual transportation of the suspect from one place to 
another) will normally be without any problems, a suspect may claim that the ground for his surrender is 
unlawful, hence affecting the surrender itself. One could, for example, think here of the still-to-discuss 
Milošević case, see Subsection 3.1.3 of Chapter VI, in which case the former President of Yugoslavia 
claimed that his transfer to The Hague was illegal. 
6 See in that respect also the still-to-discuss ‘Order of Provisional Detention’ in the case of Kaing Guek 
Eav, alias Duch, where the co-investigating judges of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, discussing the male captus bene detentus rule, explained: “Many examples exist in domestic 
as well as international law which apply this maxim, whereby the circumstances which bring an 
Accused before a tribunal have no effect on the judgement of the Accused. Although most of these 
precedents are based on the initial arrest of the Charged Person, and more rarely on the condition of 
their prior detention, in both cases the reasoning is the same as that with which we are now confronted 
[emphasis in original, ChP].” (ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, Criminal case File No: 
002/14-08-2006, Investigation No: 001/18-07-2007, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, 31 July 2007, 
para. 5.) See also Sluiter 2003 C, p. 649: “There has always been, and remains to be, abundant scholarly 
debate on the mala captus bene detentus doctrine. This doctrine enables a court to exercise jurisdiction 
even over an individual who has been unlawfully arrested or detained [emphasis added and original 
footnote omitted, ChP].”  
7 However, as already stated, whether those irregularities are really to be seen as male captus situations 
is up to the judges to decide.  
8 As perhaps has already become clear from the previous two chapters where the words ‘irregular arrest’ 








They are the following: disguised extradition, luring and kidnapping/abduction.9 As 
these situations originate from the context between States, they will now be 
explained in light of that specific framework. When examining case law in contexts 
different from that between States (such as between States and international(ised) 
criminal tribunals), it will, of course, be explained to what extent this difference in 
context affects these male captus situations. For now, however, it suffices to 
examine them in their original legal setting. Note finally that in this chapter’s first 
section, the focus will be on explaining the situations as such (and not on the values 
which are violated by these male captus situations; that will be the subject of 
Section 2 of this chapter).  
 
1.2 Common context 
 
To better understand the following explanations on disguised extradition, luring and 
abduction/kidnapping, the following short common context might be useful. 
Suppose State A wants to try a person residing in State B. First, the former needs to 
have the legal means or laws to start a trial. However, that is not enough: State A 
also needs to have the person in its power.10  
The situations mentioned below will continue here: how will the person get from 
State B (which, in this book, depending on the situation, may be referred to as, for 
example, the State of residence/the injured State/the sending State) into the 
jurisdiction of State A (which, in this book, depending on the situation, may be 
referred to as, for example, the forum State/prosecuting State/‘abducting’ 
State/receiving State)?  
Normally, the suspect will arrive in State A as a result of the very old11 method 
of extradition, which “designates the official surrender of a fugitive from justice, 
regardless of his consent, by the authorities of the State of residence to the 
authorities of another State for the purpose of criminal prosecution or the execution 
                                                          
9 See, for example, also Van der Wilt 2004, p. 276. As one can see, these are primarily examples of 
apprehensions in which the normal procedures were not followed. However, a suspect can, of course, 
also claim that the arrest procedures themselves were perfectly correct, but that the actual arrest was 
executed with an excessive amount of force, hence leading to a male captus. Another example of a male 
captus situation is an excessively long pre-trial detention. 
10 Unless, of course, State A accepts the possibility of a trial in absentia (without the suspect being 
present during the trial). This book will, however, focus on the situation that a person is tried in his 
presence as a trial in absentia is not only in violation of a provision of the ICCPR (see its Art. 14, para. 
2 (d)) but also in violation of all the Statutes of the international(ised) criminal tribunals which will be 
discussed in this book, see Artt. 21, para. 4 (d) of the ICTY Statute, 20, para. 4 (d) of the ICTR Statute, 
63, para. 1 of the ICC Statute and 17, para. 4 (d) of the SCSL Statute. An exception to this, however, is 
the STL, see n. 1169 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
11 Shearer (referring to “W. Mettgenberg, ‘Von mehr als 3000 Jahren’, 23 ZVölkR 23 (1939) citing S. 
Langdon and A.H. Gardner, in 6 Journal of Egyptian Archeology 179 (1920)”) shows that “[i]n what 
has been described as the oldest document in diplomatic history, the peace treaty between Rameses II of 
Egypt and the Hittite prince Hattusili III (c. 1280 B.C.), provision was made for the return of the 








of a sentence.”12 The exact form of extradition may vary, but in any case, a certain 
arrangement is required. In the words of Gilbert:  
 
[S]ome form of arrangement, whether formal or informal,[13] whether general or ad 
hoc, is necessary between the States involved. The arrangement may be based on a 
treaty, bilateral or multilateral, or on the application with respect to the requesting 
State of the requested State’s domestic extradition legislation. Regardless, some level 
of agreement must have been reached between the two States acknowledging that a 
fugitive might be surrendered given that certain prerequisites are met.14  
 
It is thus important to understand that there is not necessarily a problem if State B 
wants to fulfil the extradition request but does not have an extradition treaty with 
State A.15 Much will depend on the domestic situation in that case: 
 
[G]eneral international law contains no limitations on a State’s freedom to extradite, 
except for those fundamental (…) human rights that can be considered as part of (…) 
jus cogens. Whether, beyond that bar, extradition is admissible in the absence of a 
treaty is decided solely under domestic law. While the common law countries and, for 
example, the Netherlands are prevented from extraditing in the absence of a treaty, 
most civil law countries do grant extradition without treaty on the basis of 
reciprocity[16] and according to their national extradition acts.17 
                                                          
12 Stein 1995, p. 327. 
13 With informal arrangements, one could think of “written instruments to express national obligations 
with greater precision and openness than tacit or oral agreements but without the full ratification and 
national pledges that accompany formal treaties.” (Lipson 1991, p. 502.) Lipson continues explaining 
(ibid): “These informal arrangements range from executive agreements and nonbinding treaties to joint 
declarations, final communiqués, agreed minutes, memoranda of understanding, and agreements 
pursuant to legislation. Unlike treaties, these informal agreements generally come into effect without 
ratification and do not require international publication or registration.” Note, however, that other 
definitions of extradition may not accept such informal arrangements, see, for example, European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion no. 363/2005 (CDL-
AD(2006)009, Strasbourg, 17 March 2006) on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe 
Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, adopted 
by the Venice Commission at its 66th Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 March 2006), para. 12: 
“Extradition is a formal procedure whereby an individual who is suspected to have committed a 
criminal offence and is held by one State is transferred to another State for trial or, if the suspect has 
already been tried and found guilty, to serve his or her sentence [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
14 Gilbert 1998, p. 27. 
15 A good example of extradition without an extradition treaty is extradition on the basis of the 
(principle of mutual recognition respecting) European Arrest Warrant (EAW), although some may 
wonder whether, due to the EAW’s far-reaching simplified scheme, one should still speak of extradition 
here. See, for example, Fennelly 2007, pp. 519-520: “It is a remarkable (even astounding) fact that, 
within a very short space of time, an entirely new common binding system of surrender of suspects for 
criminal prosecution has come into effect between twenty-seven states. That system has replaced a 
multiplicity of bilateral extradition treaties and similar arrangements. Perhaps more importantly, it has 
introduced a system of extradition (if one is permitted to continue to use this term) between many states 
which previously had no such arrangements of any kind.” 
16 Although this principle, which may be summarised by the Latin maxim quid pro quo (something for 
something) is especially interesting in extradition situations where there is no treaty available, it can be 








Gilbert shows that there is even a growth of ad hoc extradition arrangements and 
that, as a consequence, one might think that there is less need for States to use 
methods not involving extradition to bring (or take!) a suspect from one jurisdiction 
to the other.18 Nevertheless, such methods are sometimes used19 and it is with 
respect to these ‘techniques’ that problems may occur.20 In the words of Shearer: 
 
[I]t is necessary to stress the point that extradition is the only regular system devised 
to restore fugitive criminals to the jurisdiction of a court competent by municipal and 
international law to try them. As will be shown, the possible alternative methods are 
either irregular or are methods devised for some other primary purpose, in either 
event having only the probable de facto result of delivering fugitive criminals to a 
jurisdiction wishing to prosecute or punish them.[21] Whether from the aspects of 
                                                                                                                                              
where there are treaties available). See Stein 1995, p. 330: “Traditionally, the principle of reciprocity 
underlies the whole structure of extradition. Where general extradition relations are established by virtue 
of a treaty, reciprocity to a large extent is guaranteed, although even here optional grounds for denying 
extradition may result in the equality of reciprocal obligations. Extradition in the absence of a treaty is 
the field where the principle of reciprocity is mainly applied; here, surrender takes place usually only 
after assurances of reciprocity have been expressly given by the requesting State. The precondition of 
strict reciprocity, however, is increasingly considered as being detrimental to the interests of justice. 
Some recent extradition treaties and statutes, therefore, either do not mention reciprocity at all, allow 
considerable exceptions or express the principle in optional terms, thus conceiving reciprocity as a 
political maxim rather than as a legal precondition.” Next to reciprocity, extradition is also possible on 
the basis of comity. 
17 Stein 1995, p. 329. 
18 See Gilbert 1998, p. 335. 
19 See ibid. 
20 Note, however, that there are also ways not involving extradition to bring a suspect from one 
jurisdiction to another which seem rather well-accepted. One could hereby think, for example, of a 
removal of a person from one jurisdiction to the other under the authority of Status of Forces 
Agreements (SOFAs). Sluiter explains: “There are instances where persons are delivered up to other 
states for the purpose of prosecution that are outside the realm of extradition. For example, under the 
Status of Forces agreements, states that send troops practically exercise exclusive jurisdiction over those 
soldiers. When they exercise their jurisdiction, the receiving state has a duty to hand over the requested 
person.” (Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 607-608, n. 6.) For more information on this topic, see Norton 1975. 
21 An irregular method which will not be addressed here in detail but which should nevertheless be 
briefly mentioned is the technique of informal/simple return, “that is where one State hands over a 
fugitive to another without recourse to any officially recognised or organised procedure”. (Gilbert 1998, 
p. 13.) (See also Cherif Bassiouni 1974, p. 121.) This method is much linked to disguised extradition, 
see, for example, the still-to-discuss Öcalan case (where the ECtHR, however, concluded that Öcalan’s 
arrest and detention were in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, see ns. 348 and 351 and 
accompanying text). This method has also been qualified as an abduction, but then as an abduction in 
which the authorities of the State of residence cooperated. (See also Acting Justice of Appeal O’Linn’s 
term ‘official abduction’ in the Mushwena case, see n. 782 of Chapter V.) Because of this cooperation, 
there will not be any violation of the sovereignty of the State of residence, but the operation itself seems 
to be without any procedural guarantees. Cf. also Loan 2005 (writing on ‘the right of an individual to be 
free from extraterritorial abduction’): “The basis of this right stems from the absence of procedural 
protections available to an abductee and the deliberate attempt by the abducting state to disregard the 
procedural safeguards available to the individual under the domestic law of the host state. This 
individual right exists independently from a breach of a state’s sovereignty and can therefore be invoked 








regularity and fairness or from the practical consideration of certainty, extradition is 
clearly superior to any other system.22   
 
1.3 Disguised extradition 
 
The first male captus situation, disguised extradition, is a good example of the 
second method referred to by Shearer (“methods devised for some other primary 
purpose”). It is a method 
 
by which a state relies upon its immigration laws to deny an alien the privilege of 
remaining in that state and then, in carrying out the exclusion, expulsion, deportation 
or denaturalization provisions of such laws against the individual, it places him 
directly or indirectly in the control of the agents of another state that is seeking him.23  
 
Thus, what happens is that a mechanism, set up for other purposes,24 is unlawfully 
used to make an impossible extradition possible or to make a possible, but, for 
example, too slow or expensive, extradition quicker or cheaper.25 In other words: the 
                                                          
22 Shearer 1971, p. 67. See also Gilbert 1998, p. 13 (hinting, however, that in some extreme cases, such 
techniques may be acceptable): “Given extradition is only possible where an international arrangement 
exists between the requested and requesting States, whether permanent or ad hoc in nature, and that 
many States do not have any such arrangements, then fugitives will sometimes be returned by other 
means. No problems arise as long as these other options are considered to be merely alternatives in 
extremis – in terms of international public order, overall efficiency and human rights, extradition must 
always be the primary method.” 
23 Cherif Bassiouni 1987, p. 147. 
24 See Stein 1995, p. 327: “Unlike the case where an alien is expelled or deported (…), the motive for 
the return of a fugitive from justice [by extradition, ChP] is not the maintenance of domestic public 
order or security, but the furtherance of foreign criminal proceedings.” In that respect, it is rather strange 
to hear that “the European Convention on Human rights permits co-operation between states, within the 
framework of extradition treaties or on matters of deportation, for the purpose of bringing fugitive 
offenders to justice, provided that this co-operation does not interfere with any specific rights recognised 
in the Convention [original footnote omitted and emphasis added, ChP].” (Extradition. European 
standards. Explanatory notes on the Council of Europe convention and protocols and the minimum 
standards protecting persons subject to transnational criminal proceedings, Council of Europe, 
December 2006, p. 104.) The omitted footnote refers to para. 86 of the ECtHR’s decision of 12 May 
2005 in Öcalan, see ns. 325-326 and accompanying text.  
25 See Stein 1995, pp. 327-328: “In numerous instances (...), expulsion and deportation have been and 
continue to be used as alternatives to extradition, sometimes in order to accelerate the transfer of the 
fugitive, in other cases also to circumvent rules of extradition law which would preclude the return of 
the fugitive”. See also Borelli 2004, p. 338. Note that the other male captus situations may also be 
resorted to because of these reasons; because of the fact that the normal procedures are unavailable, 
have failed or are considered to be too slow or too cumbersome. See, for example, the ‘Brief of the 
Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent’ in the still-to-discuss Alvarez-
Machain case (see Subsection 1.2 of Chapter V): “The position adopted by the petitioner in this case, 
however, raises a potentially far more serious problem; the spectre not only of federal, but more likely 
of official state and local incursions to abduct fugitives, where extradition is seen as too costly, too slow 
or unavailable, in violation of Canada’s territorial integrity.” (31 International Legal Materials (1992), 
p. 923.) See also Scott, Jr. 1953, pp. 91-93. In his book The Capture and Trial of Adolf Eichmann, 
Moshe Pearlman explains the arguments of one of the Israeli agents to capture Eichmann in Argentina 








mechanism to bring the suspect from State B to State A itself may not be irregular 
but its unlawful use in this particular case makes the whole procedure irregular.26  
A well-known case in that respect is Bozano.27 Bozano, an Italian national, was 
arrested on a charge of abduction and murder of a 13-year-old Swiss girl, Milena 
Sutter.28 He was also charged with indecency and indecent assault with violence on 
four women.29 The Italian Assize Court of Appeal, giving judgment in absentia30 on 
22 May 1975, sentenced Bozano to life imprisonment for the murder on Sutter and 
to four years’ imprisonment for the other crimes.31 Bozano, however, had taken 
refuge in France where he was arrested during a routine check.32 Italy subsequently 
requested his extradition but the French Court of Appeal in Limoges ruled on 15 
May 1979 that the Italian trial in absentia was incompatible with French public 
                                                                                                                                              
to arrange for the Argentine government to be notified, in the hope that it would take appropriate action 
against him as a war criminal. But the procedures, even for the issue of a warrant, were likely to be so 
lengthy that Eichmann would have time to escape once again. He could certainly count on the help of 
his Nazi friends in Buenos Aires. And, with the best will in the world, the Argentine government could 
not prevent a Nazi sympathizer from tipping off Eichmann that he was “wanted” and had best make 
himself scarce. Nor was the Argentine government under the legal obligation to allow his extradition to 
Israel. For the extradition treaty between the two countries had not yet been ratified.” (Pearlman 1963, 
pp. 43-44.) See also ibid., p. 64, quoting an Argentinian political leader: “Even though our patriotic 
feelings have been hurt somewhat by the kidnaping of Eichmann, we understand that there was no other 
way in which he could be brought to justice. If our extradition procedures were regularized, there would 
be no cause for kidnapings.” (Note that the word “kidnap(p)ing” and “kidnap(p)ed”, especially in older 
contributions and cases (but see also the still-to-discuss 1992 Alvarez-Machain case), is sometimes 
written with one “p” only, but this is no error, see ns. 261 and 561 of this chapter, n. 434 and 
accompanying text of this chapter, ns. 213 and 407 of Chapter V and n. 208 and accompanying text of 
Chapter V.) As explained in the first chapter of this book, male captus techniques may be especially 
interesting for prosecuting authorities in the context of suspects of international crimes, cf. again (see 
also n. 45 of Chapter I) Swart 2002 C, p. 1675, writing about “abduction and other methods of getting 
hold of a person” in the context of the tribunals: “There may be a special temptation to use these 
methods in relation to States which have refused to comply with requests or orders for arrest or transfer 
issued by a tribunal.” See finally Arendt 1994, p. 264, writing on Eichmann’s abduction and his trial in 
Israel: “Its justification was the unprecedentedness of the crime and the coming into existence of a 
Jewish State. There were, moreover, important mitigating circumstances in that there hardly existed a 
true alternative if one indeed wished to bring Eichmann to justice. Argentina had an impressive record 
for not extraditing Nazi criminals; even if there had been an extradition treaty between Israel and 
Argentina, an extradition request would almost certainly not have been honored.”  
26 Cf. also Cowling 1992, p. 254: “The essence of the concept of deportation is the decision by the 
appropriate authorities in a particular state that the continued presence of an alien in that state is 
undesirable. So such alien is ordered to leave the territory. The expelling state should not concern itself 
with the destination of the deportee, nor should deportation be preceded by a request from another state. 
Thus if a supposed act of deportation was initiated by a request from another state (...) to the effect that 
an alien should be deported to that state with the ultimate objective of his standing trial, this would 
constitute a clear case of disguised extradition.” 
27 ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Bozano v. France, Application No. 9120/80, ‘Judgment’, 18 December 
1986. 
28 See ibid., para. 12. 
29 See ibid. 
30 Bozano claimed that due to medical reasons, he could not appear in court. 
31 See ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Bozano v. France, Application No. 9120/80, ‘Judgment’, 18 
December 1986, para. 14. 








policy.33 Therefore, the French Government could not extradite Bozano to Italy.34 
On the evening of 26 October 1979, the day on which the investigating judge of 
Limoges issued an order committing Bozano for trial on charges of less serious 
French crimes,35 three plain-clothed policemen stopped Bozano on his way home 
and ordered him to follow them.36 When he protested, he was seized, forced into an 
unmarked car, handcuffed and brought to Limoges where he was served with a 
deportation order dated 17 September 197937 in which it was stated that his presence 
in French was “likely to jeopardise public order”.38 The same night, he was forced to 
get into an unmarked BMW which drove him to the Swiss border.39 After a first 
(and unsuccessful) attempt to cross the border and a few telephone calls, a Swiss 
unmarked car appeared and a Swiss policeman got out.40 After other handcuffs were 
put on Bozano, he was made to sit in the Swiss car which crossed the border in the 
early hours of 27 October.41 A couple of months after these events, Switzerland 
extradited Bozano to Italy where he was imprisoned.42 
In his article ‘Male Captus Male Detentus43 – a Human Right’, Frowein writes 
that “[i]t is frequently stated that expulsion may not be used to circumvent 
extradition proceedings.”44 Nevertheless, it would be quite difficult for a suspect to 
prove that the authorities abused their power to circumvent the regular procedures 
(détournement de pouvoir). After all, the fact that someone is wanted abroad does 
not mean that he cannot be deported, even if his extradition is impermissible.45 
                                                          
33 See ibid., para. 18. 
34 See ibid. 
35 Namely forging and falsifying administrative documents and using false identity documents. (See 
ibid., para. 21.)  
36 See ibid., para. 23. 
37 See ibid., paras. 23-24.  
38 Ibid., para. 24. 
39 See ibid., para. 25. 
40 See ibid., para. 26. 
41 See ibid. 
42 See ibid., para. 27.  
43 This is another version of the maxim ex iniuria ius non oritur and means that the irregular way in 
which a person was brought into the jurisdiction of the court (male captus) must lead to a refusal of 
jurisdiction (male detentus). The oldest source in which this study could find this maxim is Dugard 
1991. 
44 Frowein 1994, p. 179. See also Schomburg 1995, p. 105, citing Resolution No. 9 relevant to the topic 
‘The Protection of Human Rights in International Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ (unanimously 
approved at the closing session of the XV Congress of the International Association of Penal Law in Rio 
de Janeiro, 4-10 September 1994): “[P]rocedures such as deportation or expulsion, deliberately applied 
in order to circumvent the safeguards of extradition procedures should be avoided.” 
45 See Van der Wilt 2004, p. 285. See also the following words of Lord Denning in the Soblen case: “If a 
fugitive criminal is here and the Secretary of State thinks that in the public good he ought to be 
deported, there is no reason why he should not be deported to his own country, even though he is there a 
wanted criminal.” (Court of Appeal, Reg. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex Parte Soblen, 31 August 
1962, International Law Reports, Vol. 33 (1969), p. 279.) See also Michell 1996, pp. 391-392: “The 
mere fact that an individual has been deported from state X to state Y, and Y seeks to prosecute him, is 
neither inherently objectionable nor a violation of international law. It only becomes objectionable when 
X deports the individual to Y with the intent of circumventing extradition proceedings, or perhaps where 








Moreover, the deporting State often has no choice but to deport the undesirable alien 
to his State of origin, where criminal proceedings may also have been initiated 
against him, because only that State is obliged, from an international law point of 
view, to take him back.46  
In addition to this, some judges may only consider whether the deportation or 
expulsion order as such was lawful (and not whether it was used for the right 
purpose). Notwithstanding this uncertainty in the law,47 Gilbert explains that “there 
seems to be a trend for courts to query more forcefully attempts to achieve de facto 




As shown above, disguised extradition is a method executed by State B itself. 
Therefore, State A does not really have to do anything except wait to ‘receive’ the 
person from State B.49 However, what happens if State B does not know that the 
person is on its territory or knows but is unwilling (or unable and not using the 
technique of disguised extradition) to deliver the person to State A, which is very 
eager to detain the suspect? In such situations, State A itself might act. Two 
techniques can be used in these situations: abduction/kidnapping (which will be 
discussed in the next subsection) and luring.  
Luring (or trickery) is a method by which “deceit, fraud and tricks [are used] to 
lure individuals from the country of their residence to a location where there is 
jurisdiction to arrest the suspects.”50 This location does not necessarily have to be 
                                                                                                                                              
procedures by means of deportation [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” It would be easier for a suspect 
to prove abuse of power if he is not deported to the most obvious country such as the country whose 
borders are closest to the place from which the person is deported. In the Bozano case, for example, one 
can wonder why Bozano was deported to Switzerland and not to Spain (a country closer to Limoges 
than Switzerland), see also ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Bozano v. France, Application No. 9120/80, 
‘Judgment’, 18 December 1986, paras. 31 and 59. In addition, the Defence argued that “in choosing 
Switzerland out of five neighbouring countries (…), the authorities knew that they were handing him 
over to the European State most likely to extradite him to Italy, owing to the existence of an extradition 
agreement between Italy and Switzerland and the nationality of the murdered girl.” (Ibid., para. 29.) See 
also Michell 1996, p. 391:  “Deportation to a specific foreign state may give rise to the suspicion that 
“disguised extradition” is taking place, thus depriving the individual of the procedural protections 
inherent to formal extradition proceedings.” 
46 See Van der Wilt 2004, p. 285. 
47 See Gilbert 1998, p. 366: “The law in this area is in a state of flux. Some decisions favour the fugitive, 
while others merely look to see if the deportation or expulsion is technically lawful, regardless of the 
underlying motive of the requested State to avoid its extradition procedure.” 
48 Ibid., p. 373. 
49 Nevertheless, it is clear that very often, there will be some involvement of State A in the disguised 
extradition operation as well. After all, the idea behind this male captus situation is not that State B 
deports the suspect to a random place, but to a place where State A can (directly or indirectly) get hold 
of him.  








State B itself, as became clear in the Yunis case,51 a good example of a luring 
operation.  
In Yunis, the US Government sought to arrest and bring to justice the leader of a 
group of men who hijacked and later blew up a Jordanian aircraft in Beirut.52 After 
months of investigation, the US identified Lebanese citizen Fawaz Yunis as the 
leader of this group.53 It was with the help of a former friend of Yunis and now US 
informant, Jamal Hamdan, that this identification was made possible.54 A detailed 
plan was made to lure Yunis, under the promise of a lucrative narcotics deal, from 
Lebanon to a location in international waters off the coast of Cyprus.55 On 13 
September 1987, the FBI-led operation ‘Goldenrod’ began: that morning, Hamdan 
and Yunis boarded a small motorboat off the coast of Cyprus which brought the men 
to a yacht anchored in international waters.56  
 
Immediately upon boarding the yacht, defendant was greeted, given a routine pat 
down and then offered a beer by one of the FBI agents. S.A. [Special Agent, ChP] 
George Gast, who assumed the role of one of the narcotic contacts, escorted Yunis to 
the stern of the boat where he and Yunis joined S.A. Donald Glasser. At a 
prearranged signal – a slight nod – the two agents, who were then positioned 
alongside Yunis, engaged in a “take down”. Together, they grasped the defendant’s 
arms, “kick[ed] his feet out from underneath him, and [took] him down to the deck 




The James Bond calibre of the final basic male captus situation, abduction or 
kidnapping,58 is even greater. In this male captus situation, the way State A obtains 
custody of the suspect residing in State B without that latter’s consent does not 
involve non-violent techniques such deceit, fraud and tricks, but plain force. One 
could hereby also think of the threat of use of force, for example, if an agent visits 
the suspect and, while holding him at gunpoint, orders him to come with him to the 
forum State. A (if not the most) famous example of this situation has already been 
described in the very first pages of this book: the Eichmann case.  
                                                          
51 US District Court, District of Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, Crim. No. 87-0377 
(681 F.Supp. 909). 
52 See ibid., p. 912. 
53 See ibid. 
54 See ibid. 
55 See ibid. 
56 See ibid. 
57 Ibid., p. 913. 
58 Some jurisdictions recognise a difference between the two crimes. See, for example, Gershenson 
1954, writing on the Penal Law of the State of New York, at p. 35: “An abduction always must involve 
a female, a kidnapping may be committed as to either sex. An abduction always concerns a sexual 
purpose, a kidnapping concerns a seizure or detention and requires no sexual element.” However, in the 
specific context of international criminal law, the two nouns (and the verbs deriving from them) are used 








Although luring and abduction thus differ from each other, they are often put in 
the same category: see in that respect the often-used definition from Shearer, which 
defines abduction as “the removal of a person from the jurisdiction of one state to 
another by the use of force, the threat of force or by fraud.”59 In the same vein, 
Scharf explains that “most countries do not distinguish between abduction by fraud 
and abduction by force.”60 However, it is hard to disagree with the idea that 
abduction is clearly more objectionable than luring, since in the latter case only 
tricks and no weapons are used.61  
Nevertheless, it may sometimes be difficult to ‘label’ certain situations. For 
example, while the above-mentioned situation of a threat of use of force can clearly 
be seen as an abduction and a threat from a foreign agent operating from another 
State (for example, via a telephone call) to induce the suspect to come to the forum 
State as a luring operation, it is more difficult to specify the latter situation if it takes 
place on the territory of the State of residence; on the one hand, the foreign agent 
uses a threat of force on the territory of the State of residence with the result that the 
suspect arrives in the forum State (abduction) but on the other hand, weapons were 
not used (luring). Another example illustrating the problem of ‘labelling’ is that two 
States may informally cooperate in transferring the suspect without any guarantees 
from one State to another. Such an informal transfer much resembles the situation of 
disguised extradition, but in the latter case, the transferring State still tries to give 
the operation a legal appearance by using its immigration laws to (unlawfully) 
deport/expel the suspect. However, a State may not even need to resort to those laws 
and just informally hand over the suspect with no guarantees.62 This could also be 
done in a more forceful way, resembling the technique of abduction. The ‘only’ 
difference would then be that the State of residence consents to the operation.63  
In short, the three situations – disguised extradition, luring and abduction – have 
been presented to clarify three basic situations which one will often find in male 
captus case law. However, as will also be shown in the next chapters, practice may 
also produce other male captus situations which do not clearly fall within one of 
                                                          
59 Shearer 1971, p. 72. See also Garner 2004, pp. 4: Abduction is “[t]he act of leading someone away by 
force or fraudulent persuasion.” and 886: Kidnapping is, inter alia, “[t]he crime of seizing and taking 
away a person by force or fraud.”    
60 Scharf 1998, p. 374. See also ibid., p. 382: “[B]oth are generally objectionable.” 
61 See also Scharf 2000, p. 970: “As an extraterritorial law enforcement practice, luring is much more 
common, and less objectionable, than abductions. Unlike abduction by force, weapons are not used to 
get the suspect to the location where the arrest will occur. A luring can be accomplished telephonically, 
by fax, or by e-mail.” See also Sluiter 2001, p. 152: “[F]orcible abduction is more serious than luring an 
accused”. See finally also Costi 2003, pp. 64-65: “There is (…) abundant practice and legal opinion 
differentiating between forcible abduction and the luring of an individual from the state of refuge. 
Luring is found to be less objectionable since it involves no use of force or flagrant violation of the 
territorial sovereignty of the state of refuge [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
62 See, for example, the still-to-discuss Hartley case, see Subsection 1.2 of Chapter V. 
63 Cf. in that respect also the term ‘official abduction’ (an abduction in which the authorities of the State 
of residence cooperated), to be found in the (still-to-discuss) Mushwena case (a case which, however, 
could perhaps be best qualified as a disguised extradition), see n. 21 of the present chapter and ns. 94 








those three categories and are therefore difficult to label. However, perhaps the 
exact label is not that important. What is arguably more important is to find out 
which values such techniques violate and what the result of such violations are.  
 
2 WHAT IS VIOLATED BY THESE MALE CAPTUS SITUATIONS? 
 
A number of important values can be violated by the three basic male captus 
situations, the three most important being: 1) State sovereignty, 2) human rights and 
3) the rule of law.64  
 
2.1 State sovereignty 
 
One of the most important characteristics of a State is its independence, its 
sovereignty. This concept has an internal and external aspect. The internal one is 
that State A is the only one having authority over the territory of State A.65 This 
means, for example, that it does not have to tolerate authority over its territory by 
State B. The external aspect signifies that State A itself must also respect the 
sovereignty of other States, meaning that it cannot intervene in the domestic affairs 
of State B. (There are, however, some exceptions but these will be addressed infra.)  
That States (or even the UN)66 in principle cannot intervene in each other’s 
internal affairs is clearly a principle of international law;67 this has been confirmed 
                                                          
64 See, for example, also Van Sliedregt 2001 B, pp. 75ff. 
65 Note that a State’s territory is not limited to the land of that State (which includes the territorial 
subsoil), but also extends to its territorial sea, internal waters and the airspace above its land, internal 
waters and territorial sea. See Brownlie 2003, p. 115. The high seas/international waters are outside the 
jurisdiction of any State, although States have, in principle, exclusive jurisdiction over ships flying their 
flag on the high seas. Hence, if a person with the nationality of State B is arrested on a ship with the 
nationality of State A (the flag State) in international waters, State A does not violate the territorial 
sovereignty of State B, see also the briefly mentioned (see n. 56 and accompanying text) Yunis case. 
(Note, however, that the luring in Lebanon (which led to the arrest in international waters) might be seen 
as a violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty, but this point will be returned to infra and in Chapter V.) A 
very topical exception to the above-mentioned rule that, in principle, only the flag State has jurisdiction 
over the ship flying its flag is related to piracy, see Art. 19 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas 
(available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf): 
“On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a 
pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons 
and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon 
the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, 
aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.” 
66 See Art. 2, para. 7 of the UN Charter: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state 
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.” 
67 See generally Shen 2001, who argues that this fundamental principle (including its corollaries such as 
the prohibition on the use of force) constitutes a norm of ius cogens. Note that, although the principle of 
non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force are often addressed together, there is a clear 
difference between the two: the former is general and broad in nature and encompasses the latter, see, 








in numerous political statements and documents, such as the United Nations General 
Assembly’s ‘Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty’68 of 
1965 and ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations’ of 1970.69 
The following authoritative cases also confirm the principle of non-intervention 
in relation to the (territorial) sovereignty of a State. In the S.S. Lotus case, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) held that “the first and foremost 
restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – failing the existence of 
a permissive rule to the contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the 
territory of another State.”70 In the Corfu Channel case, the successor of the PCIJ, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), recognised that “between independent 
States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international 
relations.”71 The ICJ ruled again on this topic in the 1986 Military and Paramilitary 
Activities case where it stated that “the principle of non-intervention involves the 
right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference”.72 
The concept of “exercise of power in any form” obviously includes the exercise of 
police powers. In the words of Lauterpacht, writing about “the obligation of States 
to refrain from performing jurisdictional acts within the territory of other States 
except by virtue of a general or special permission”,73 “[s]uch acts include, for 
instance, the sending of agents for the purpose of apprehending within foreign 
territory persons accused of having committed a crime.”74  
                                                                                                                                              
tolerable without explicit prior agreements under international law. Armed intervention or other forms 
of intervention involving the use of force are further prohibited by the principle of non-use of force”. 
68 UNGA Res. 2131 (XX). Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of 
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, 1408th plenary meeting, 21 December 
1965. In this document, the UNGA solemnly declared, among other things, that “[n]o State has the right 
to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any 
other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats 
against the personality of the State or against its political, economical and cultural elements, are 
condemned.” 
69 UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV). Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1883rd 
plenary meeting, 24 October 1970 (annex). One apt quotation from this declaration can be found in its 
Preamble, in which the UNGA states that it is “[c]onvinced that the strict observance by States of the 
obligation not to intervene in the affairs of any other State is an essential condition to ensure that nations 
live together in peace with one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates 
the spirit and letter of the Charter, but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international 
peace and security”. 
70 PCIJ, The case of the S.S. “Lotus”, ‘Judgment’, 7 September 1927, Publications of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, Series A. – No. 10, Judgment No. 9, p. 18. 
71 ICJ, The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), ‘Judgment’, 9 April 1949, p. 35. 
72 ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) (Merits), ‘Judgment’, 27 June 1986, para. 202. 
73 Lauterpacht 1970, pp. 487-488.  
74 Ibid., p. 488. See also the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 








Returning to the three basic male captus situations, it is clear that an abduction 
by State A on the territory of State B violates the latter’s (territorial) sovereignty and 
integrity and the norm of non-intervention.75 This was also recognised by the UNSC 
in the Eichmann case (see also Subsection 3.3.2 of this chapter), when it, in 
Resolution 138 of 23 June 1960, considered “that the violation of the sovereignty of 
a Member State is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations”, noted “that 
the repetition of acts such as that giving rise to this situation would involve a breach 
of the principles upon which international order is founded”, and declared  
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
1987), which stipulates in Section 432 (‘Measures in Aid of Enforcement of Criminal Law’), para. 2: “A 
state’s law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with 
the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that state.” Comment (b) on this rule 
(ibid.) clarifies that the rule is “universally recognized”. See also the positions of the UNGA’s Sixth 
(Legal) Committee, (“[I]nternational law prohibits a state from exercising its criminal jurisdiction 
beyond its territory as contrary to the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states, unless the 
other state concerned has given its consent.” (Morris and Bourloyannis-Vrailas 1994, p. 357)) and of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights’ Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (Commission on Human 
Rights, Fiftieth session, Item 10 of the provisional agenda, Question of the Human Rights of All Persons 
Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/27, 17 December 1993, Decision No. 48/1993 (United States of 
America), pp. 135-140), pp. 138-139: “Another basic principle of international law and of international 
relations is respect for the territorial sovereignty of States, a principle which, in addition to prohibiting 
the use of force and intervention by one State in the affairs of another – includes refraining from 
committing acts of sovereignty in the territory of another State, particularly acts of coercion or judicial 
investigation. (...) What is more, intervention by one Power in the territory of another is not only a 
breach of international law but, in addition, if it is repeated, it may “endanger international peace and 
security” (United Nations Security Council, Claim by Argentina in the Eichmann case, resolution 138 
(1960)).” See finally Gluck 1994, p. 620: “It is a well-established primary rule of international law that 
no state may exercise its police power in the territory of another state without the consent of the host 
state [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
75 See not only the already-mentioned quotation of Lauterpacht (see the previous footnote and 
accompanying text) but, for example, also Jennings and Watts 1992, pp. 387-388, writing about 
violations of independence and territorial and personal authority, “the three main aspects of the 
sovereignty of a state” (ibid., p. 382) (“It is (…) a breach of international law for a state without 
permission to send its agents into the territory of another state to apprehend persons accused of having 
committed a crime [original footnote omitted, ChP].”), Michell 1996, p. 411 (“It is beyond controversy 
that a states violates customary international law by sending its agents into another state to abduct an 
individual for trial. Respect for the territorial integrity of other states is a fundamental principle of 
international law. (…) It would make a mockery of state sovereignty, a principle at the very foundation 
of the international legal order, if states were free to send their agents into other states to abduct 
fugitives [original footnotes omitted, ChP].”) and Costi 2003, p. 61: “A state cannot send agents abroad 
to abduct an alleged criminal. An abduction carried out by agents instructed by the state within the 
territory of another state is a violation of international law. This rule is firmly rooted in the principle of 
respect for territorial sovereignty and integrity of other states and in the ensuing obligation of non-








“that acts such as that under consideration, which affect the sovereignty of a 
Member State and therefore cause international friction, may, if repeated, endanger 
international peace and security.”76 
                                                          
76 UNSC Res. 138 of 23 June 1960, UN Doc. S/4349. Although it is thus clear that such an abduction 
violates the norm of non-intervention, and also involves the (threat of) use of force, it is less obvious 
whether it also violates the more specific prohibition on the threat or use of force as can be found in Art. 
2, para. 4 of the UN Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Although the UNSC in the Eichmann case has 
not explicitly qualified the abduction as such (see also Findlay 1988, p. 25), authors and cases have 
nevertheless used the Eichmann case to found their argument that abductions violate Art. 2, para. 4 of 
the UN Charter. See, for example, Glennon 1992, pp. 746-747: “Numerous authorities have viewed it as 
flatly impermissible under longstanding customary norms for one state to send its agents to seize an 
individual located in the territory of another state without the consent of the government of that state. 
(…) This norm not only is a bedrock of customary international law but is, in addition, incorporated in 
numerous treaties, among them the United Nations Charter (…) [Glennon hereby refers to Art. 2, para. 4 
of the UN Charter, ChP.] Following Israel’s 1960 abduction of the nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, 
the UN Security Council construed Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter as proscribing abduction 
without the consent of the state in which the abduction occurs [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See 
also the still-to-discuss Toscanino case: “Here, (…) Toscanino alleges that he was forcibly abducted 
from Uruguay, whose territorial sovereignty this country has agreed in two international treaties to 
respect. The Charter of the United Nations, the members of which include the United States and 
Uruguay (…) obligates “All Members” to “refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity of political independence of any state . . ..” See U.N. Charter, art. 2 para. 4. 
Additionally, the Charter of the Organization of American States, whose members also include the 
United States and Uruguay (…) provides that the “territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the 
object, even temporarily, . . . of . . . measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on 
any grounds whatever . . .” See O.A.S. Charter, art. 17. That international kidnappings such as the one 
alleged here violate the U.N. Charter was settled as a result of the Security Council debates following 
the illegal kidnapping in 1960 of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina by Israeli “volunteer groups.” (…) 
The resolution merely recognized a long standing principle of international law that abductions by one 
state of persons located within the territory of another violate the territorial sovereignty of the second 
state”. (US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, 
Docket 73-2732 (500 F 2d 267), pp. 277-278.) See for the same argument (but without reference to the 
Eichmann case), for example, Scharf 2000, p. 967: “The unconsented exercise of such powers 
constitutes an infringement of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the host state in violation of the 
U.N. Charter [Here, Scharf refers to Art. 2, para. 4 of the UN Charter, ChP.] and customary international 
law [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Lamb 2000, p. 222. However, the opposite has also been 
asserted, see, for example, Findlay 1988, p. 25: “Publicists agree that many exercises of power within 
the territorial domain of another state do not rise to the level of a “threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state” within the meaning of article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter. Thus, according to Professor Bowett, actions directed against individuals within 
the territory of a state do not violate the territorial integrity or political independence of the state 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].” However, it can be argued that this view is rather restricted and that 
it would be better to view the words “against the territorial integrity and political independence” broader 
as to mean territorial inviolability. State A does not need to have an intention to, for example, occupy 
State B; when it sends its agents into State B without the latter’s consent, one can arguably already 
speak of a violation, by State A, of State B’s territorial integrity and of Art. 2, para. 4 of the UN Charter. 
Cf. also Shen 2001, pp. 23 and 26-28: “D’Amato (…) argued that the prohibition of the use of “force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence” of states was technical and did not incorporate 
all uses of force, and in particular did not include the concept of territorial inviolability, but instead was 
confined to “preventing the permanent loss of a portion of one’s territory” (…). “Political 








It is also clear that the method of disguised extradition does not violate a State’s 
sovereignty as agents from State A in that situation do not exercise police powers on 
State B’s territory. After all, although State A may also collude in the operation (and 
may thus be complicit in the commission of the male captus), it does not need to 
violate State B’s sovereignty for the latter State will transfer the suspect from its 
territory to the territory of State A itself.77  
Luring is more complex in that respect.78 The idea behind luring is that agents of 
State A get hold of the alleged criminal ‘only’ by using deceit, fraud and tricks to 
lure the individual from State B to a location where there is jurisdiction to arrest the 
suspect. Very often, agents from State A do not have to enter the territory of State B 
to be able to lure the suspect to another State. For example, they simply can make 
telephone calls from another State to convince the suspect to leave his State of 
refuge.79 However, it is also possible that those agents do enter the territory of State 
                                                                                                                                              
enough to cover a State’s political integrity, dignity and sovereignty to manage its own internal and 
external affairs free from any foreign interference. (…) Similarly, “territorial integrity” cannot be 
narrowly regarded as merely referring to the inalienability of a State’s territory. Rather, it refers to the 
territorial sovereignty, dignity and inviolability of a State. (…) Lauterpacht, in Oppenheim’s 
International Law, convincingly wrote with force that “territorial integrity, especially when coupled 
with ‘political independence,’ is synonymous with territorial inviolability” (…). This and other evidence 
confirms that the fundamental principles of international law relating to non-intervention and the non-
use of force, as embodied in the Charter, do not simply prohibit intervention and the threat or use of 
force aimed at dismembering a State or causing the permanent loss of a portion of its territory, but also 
proscribe any other form of intervention or use of force that otherwise offends a State’s sovereignty, 
international personality, dignity, territorial inviolability and political freedom from foreign interference. 
The narrow interpretation of Article 2(4) is not only contrary to lex lata, but also dangerous and harmful 
to all nations. If we were to accept D’Amato’s proposition, then Mexican law enforcement officers 
would be entitled to come across the border into Texas to capture criminal suspects without violating the 
“territorial integrity” of the United States, unless by doing so they designed to separate Texas from the 
federation [emphasis in original, ChP].” See also Skubiszewski 1968, p. 746: “The intentions of the 
framers of the Charter, though not always clearly expressed, were directed at removing force as a means 
of settling all international disputes, and, therefore, the ban equally covers situations where territory or 
independence are not at stake. Also, the principle of effectiveness requires Article 2 (4) to be read as 
prohibiting all threat or use of force unless the Charter, in other provisions, expressly permits its use.”  
77 See also Morgenstern 1953, p. 270: “[T]he numerous cases in which individuals have been 
surrendered by agents of the state of refuge without resort to extradition proceedings are not directly 
relevant here. The state which receives the fugitive for prosecution has not exercised any force on the 
territory of the state of refuge and has in no way violated its territorial sovereignty. There is thus no 
violation of international law.” 
78 See also Van der Wilt 2004, p. 283. 
79 See also Scharf 2000, p. 970: “A luring can be accomplished telephonically, by fax, or by e-mail. In 
this way, physical presence of law enforcement authorities in the territory of the host state can be 
avoided. Therefore, the risk of injury, damage, or incident in the host state is minimized.” Note, 
however, that such an operation has also been viewed as violating the sovereignty of a State, see the 
still-to-discuss 1982 Swiss case X. See also Mann 1989, pp. 408-409: “It is submitted that a violation of 
international law occurs also where the State or its agent does not abduct the victim by force, but 
induces him by fraud or other illegal means to leave the country of refuge and proceed to some other 
country where he is apprehended. In such circumstances (…) the wrong is committed in the foreign 
State, because the illegal means are used or have their effect there. A State, being sovereign, is not 
expected to tolerate acts that involve generally recognized illegality, though they are not performed by 








B. This would be done, not with the aim of making the actual arrest there (in that 
case, the operation could be qualified as an abduction/kidnapping), but with the aim 
of enabling the luring operation to succeed. It is highly likely that the suspect will 
not be convinced by the telephone calls or other techniques from other States,80 thus 
making it necessary for the agents to enter the territory to persuade the suspect in a 
face-to-face conversation to come to another State. One can wonder whether such an 
operation, in which agents from State A enter State B’s territory, not to make an 
arrest, but to make an arrest elsewhere possible, is a violation of State B’s territory. 
Although the clearest enforcement operation, the arrest itself, is not carried out on 
State B’s territory, one cannot deny that in such situations, operations on State B’s 
territory are being carried out with the purpose of making the arrest possible. 
Therefore, one can very well argue that these operations are also to be seen as 
“jurisdictional acts” to which Lauterpacht was referring supra, even if the climax of 
the whole operation (the actual arrest) is effected elsewhere. Arguably more in line 
with the principle of respect for another State’s sovereignty is not the (restricted) 
idea that agents of other States are not allowed to arrest persons in another State 
without that latter State’s consent, but rather the (broader) idea that agents of other 
States are not allowed to carry out police operations in that other State, whether 
these operations amount to an actual arrest or not.81 More far-reaching in that 
respect is the already briefly mentioned (see footnote 44) Resolution No. 9 relevant 
to the topic ‘The Protection of Human Rights in International Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters’ (unanimously approved at the closing session of the XV Congress 
of the International Association of Penal Law in Rio de Janeiro, 4-10 September 
1994) which views luring in general (whether agents from State A are operating on 
State B’s territory or not) as a violation of State B’s territory:  
 
Abducting a person from a foreign country or enticing a person under false pretences 
to come voluntarily from another country in order to subject such a person to arrest 
                                                                                                                                              
sovereignty of the State [emphasis added, ChP].” See further the following general words of Paust et al. 
1996, p. 435: “The international community appears to view the practice of abduction by fraud as a 
violation of territorial sovereignty and international law [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also 
Knoops 2002, pp. 244-245: “Strict adherence to this principle [the principle of non-intervention, ChP] 
implies that even if no physical violation of the foreign territory whatsoever took place and the luring 
was merely conducted over the phone, radio, email or fax between law enforcement officials and the 
suspect, an infringement of international law can be present [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See 
finally Swart 2002 D, who notes that “the Dutch government has always maintained the view that 
activities of foreign police officers aimed at inducing a suspect to leave the Netherlands need prior 
consent of the competent Dutch authorities since the sovereignty of the Netherlands is at stake. This is 
the case even if the foreign agent himself does not enter the Netherlands.” 
80 Note that such techniques may be in violation of the law of the ‘luring’ State, but they are often not 
seen as violations of international law as they do not take place on the territory of the suspect’s State of 
residence. (See for other views, however, the previous footnote.) 
81 See also the following examples of Jennings and Watts 1992, p. 386: “A state is not allowed to send 
(…) its police forces into or through foreign territory, (…) or to carry out official investigations on 
foreign territory or let its agents conduct clandestine operations there, or to exercise an act of 









and criminal prosecution is contrary to public international law and should not be 
tolerated (...).82  
 
Notwithstanding this, it must be repeated that, even if luring indeed violates another 
State’s sovereignty, this violation can be seen as less serious than the case of an 
abduction in which actual force is used on the territory of the injured State without 




There are some exceptions though. There are circumstances which ensure that the 
wrongfulness of an action (such as sending agents into another State’s territory to 
seize a person) is precluded. Here, it might be useful to consult the rather influential 
ILC’s ‘Draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts’.84 
In Chapter V of these Draft articles (hereinafter: DARS) are six wrongfulness-
precluding circumstances which ensure that no internationally wrongful act will take 
place. In an effort not to complicate matters too much (see also the ‘disclaimer’ in 
Subsection 1.1), only the two best-known circumstances will be addressed here: 
consent and self-defence.85 In addition to that, some attention will be paid to 
interventions based on humanitarian grounds. 
 
 
                                                          
82 Schomburg 1995, p. 105. See also ns. 79-80. 
83 See, again (see also n. 61), Costi 2003, pp. pp. 64-65: “There is (…) abundant practice and legal 
opinion differentiating between forcible abduction and the luring of an individual from the state of 
refuge. Luring is found to be less objectionable since it involves no use of force or flagrant violation of 
the territorial sovereignty of the state of refuge [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
84 See the Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the 
Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York 
and Geneva, 2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), pp. 26-143. Here, one can find both the articles 
and the commentaries to these articles which were commended to the attention of governments “without 
prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate action” by the UNGA, see UNGA 
Resolutions 56/83 of 28 January 2002 (para. 3) and 59/35 of 16 December 2004 (para. 1). With respect 
to the authority of the Draft articles, see Caron 2002, who concedes that the articles are influential but 
who is also concerned “that the ILC’s work, primarily because of its form, will have unwarranted 
influence.” (Ibid., p. 866.) See also ibid., pp. 872-873: “The articles will have great effect, and that is a 
significant achievement. But they should have effect because of their integrity and value, not because 
they emerged from the ILC in a form that looks like a treaty. The ILC’s work on state responsibility will 
best serve the needs of the international community only if it is weighed, interpreted, and applied with 
much care. (…) The articles are a mix of codification and progressive development; to be frank, it 
would often be difficult to say which article partakes more of one or the other. (…) The articles have 
already affected legal discourse, arbitral decisions, and perhaps also state practice. Now that they have 
been adopted by the ILC, they are likely to have even greater impact. To apply them correctly, decision 
makers must avoid a simple reading of the articles but, instead, must consult the commentaries and 
reports for each article, which illuminate the practice underlying the rule, the discussions of the ILC, and 
the comments of various governments. Together these sources bring life to the articles and reveal the 
degree of consensus.” 
85 The other four are: Countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act (Art. 22), Force 










In Article 20 of the DARS, one can read: “Valid consent by a State to the 
commission of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in 
relation to the former State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that 
consent.” Thus, if State B gives consent to the exercise of police powers by State A 
on the territory of State B, there is no internationally wrongful act by State A. 
Consent to (otherwise unlawful) conduct may be given “in advance or even at the 
time it is occurring”.86 Consent given after the conduct does not take away the 
unlawfulness of the conduct (as is the case with respect to consent given in advance 
or at the time of occurrence). It is merely “a form of waiver or acquiescence, leading 
to loss of the right to invoke responsibility. This is dealt with in article 45.”87 
According to the ILC, consent precluding wrongfulness “must be freely given and 
                                                          
86 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2007, 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 73. A good example of prior consent could be a treaty between 
two States in which the topic of hot pursuit is regulated. See also Gilbert 1998, p. 363, who argues that 
the concept, “which is undergoing a revival in Europe”, allows “for the police authorities of one State to 
cross into a neighbouring State in order to effect the arrest of a fugitive in flight. Its popularity in Europe 
is due to the policy of internal open borders within the European Union from 1993.” An example in that 
respect is the Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in 
combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration (Prüm Convention), signed in Prüm 
(Germany) on 17 May 2005 and available at: http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/Prum-
ConventionEn.pdf. Art. 27, para. 2 (10) of this Convention reads: “The Contracting Parties’ competent 
authorities shall provide one another with assistance (…), in particular by: (…) supplying information 
on practical implementation of cross-border surveillance, cross-border hot pursuit and controlled 
deliveries”. For the concept of hot pursuit in the context of the law of the sea, see, for example, Shaw 
2003, p. 551, who notes that “[t]he right of hot pursuit of a foreign ship is a principle designed to ensure 
that a vessel which has infringed the rules of a coastal state cannot escape punishment by fleeing to the 
high seas. In reality it means that in certain defined circumstances a coastal state may extend its 
jurisdiction onto the high seas in order to pursue and seize a ship which is suspected of infringing its 
laws.” The modern origin of this right can be found in Art. 23 of the already-mentioned (see n. 65) 1958 
Convention on the High Seas. Note finally, and to also come back to the plane diversion plan of the ICC 
as mentioned in the first chapter of this book (see n. 44 of that chapter), that a number of States 
neighbouring the State of the suspect could also cooperate in the air, agreeing, for example, that a plane 
carrying that suspect cannot enter their territory (which includes, it is reminded, see n. 65, the airspace 
above its land, internal waters and territorial sea). If that plane nevertheless enters their territory, States 
could lawfully divert that plane to an airfield in order to arrest the suspect. Cf. also Shaw 2003, p. 475, 
where he is writing about “[t]he right of a state to require a civil aircraft to land at a designated airport, 
where the aircraft is flying above its territory without authority”. 
87 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2007, 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 73. Art. 45 of the DARS (‘Loss of the right to invoke 
responsibility’) reads: “The responsibility of a State may not be invoked if: (a) The injured State has 
validly waived the claim; (b) The injured State is to be considered as having, by reason of its conduct, 








clearly established”.88 In addition, it must be actually expressed (rather than 
presumed),89 and it “may be vitiated by error, fraud, corruption or coercion”.90 An 
example of a case of consent, provided by the ILC, is the famous Savarkar case. The 
facts of this case between France and Great Britain can be found in the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration’s award of 24 February 1911:91  
 
[I]t is established that, by a letter dated the 29th June 1910, the Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police in London informed the “Directeur de la Sûreté générale” at 
Paris, that the British Indian Vinayak Damodar Savarkar was about to be sent to 
India, in order to be prosecuted for abetment of murder, etc., and that he would be on 
board the vessel “Morea” touching at Marseilles on the 7th or 8th July. (…) [O]n the 
7th July, the “Morea” arrived at Marseilles. The following morning, between 6 and 7 
o’clock, Savarkar, having succeeded in effecting his escape, swam ashore and began 
to run; he was arrested by a brigadier of the French maritime gendarmerie and taken 
back to the vessel. Three persons, who had come ashore from the vessel, assisted the 
brigadier in taking the fugitive back.92  
 
The Court concluded:  
 
[I]t is manifest that the case is not one of recourse to fraud or force in order to obtain 
possession of a person who had taken refuge in foreign territory,[93] (…) there was 
not, in the circumstances of the arrest and delivery of Savarkar to the British 
authorities and of his removal to India, anything in the nature of a violation of the 
sovereignty of France, (…) all those who took part in the matter certainly acted in 
good faith and had no thought of doing anything unlawful.94 
 
The ILC’s commentary explains that the Permanent Court of Arbitration considered 
that there was no violation by Great Britain of France’s sovereignty because “France 
had implicitly consented to the arrest through the conduct of its gendarme, who 
                                                          
88 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2007, 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 73. 
89 See ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 See ‘Award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Case of Savarkar, between France and Great 
Britain, February 24, 1911’, to be found in the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 5 (1911), 
pp. 520-523. 
92 Ibid., p. 521. 
93 These words can be used as authority for the idea that not only abductions, but also luring operations 
(as a fraudulent method of gaining custody over a person abroad) are to be seen as violating the concept 
of State sovereignty, see the discussion supra in Subsection 2.1. See also Schultz 1967, p. 71: “Dieses 
Urteil (…) hat unbestrittenermaßen klargestellt, daß das Völkerrecht verletzt ist, wenn sich ein Staat 
durch List oder Gewalt strafprozessualen Zugriff auf einen im Ausland befindlichen Angeschuldigten 
verschafft.” See also Schultz 1984, pp. 100-101. 
94 ‘Award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Case of Savarkar, between France and Great 









aided the British authorities in the arrest [original footnote omitted, ChP].”95 This 
was so even though the French central Government protested the arrest of Savarkar 
and had demanded his restitution.96 Hence, consent (not leading to a violation of 
State sovereignty) can, in certain circumstances, be given by a local official.97  
An interesting point which ought to be mentioned here is that the ILC had 
explained that consent “may be vitiated by error, fraud, corruption or coercion”,98 
but that this case can arguably be seen as an example in which error (namely on the 
part of the French gendarme, who mistakenly cooperated with the British agents on 
French territory as he did not know exactly what was going on) was not viewed as a 
means which could jeopardise the consent.99 Hence, on the basis of this case, one 
                                                          
95 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2007, 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 73. 
96 See ‘Award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Case of Savarkar, between France and Great 
Britain, February 24, 1911’, to be found in the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 5 (1911), p. 
520. 
97 Cf. also Michell 1996, p. 421: “Consent from local officials is sufficient”. It would perhaps have been 
better if Michell had used the word “may” here. After all, some expressions of consent from a local 
official can arguably never lead to valid consent from a State. One could hereby think of consent from a 
local police official that another State can establish a military base on the territory of the ‘consenting’ 
State. One can argue that only the central government can consent (or not) to these kinds of matters. 
(See also the Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the 
Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York 
and Geneva, 2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 73.) See for another opinion than the one of 
Michell: Henkin 1990, p. 313: “The police of State X may not enter the territory of State Y (without Y’s 
consent) to arrest an individual for violation of X’s laws, not even to enforce law that is subject to 
universal jurisdiction. International law, sensitive to State autonomy and impermeability, requires that 
any consent to such entry be authentically that of high officials who authoritatively represent the State; 
the acts or omissions of local officials may be attributable to the State for some purposes, but generally 
are not sufficient to constitute State consent to foreign police activities [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].” Cf. finally De Sanctis 2004, p. 553: “[I]t can be argued that the exercise of jurisdiction by foreign 
officials on one’s own soil should require the explicit, or at least implicit, consent of a high-level agent 
of the State, such as the chief of police. Holding that every State official has the authority to consent to a 
transnational seizure on his territory (…) may result in a legitimisation of the law of the jungle, where 
decisions deeply affecting fundamental rights of individuals may be taken by low-ranking officials 
without a clear assumption of responsibility at the high levels of the chain of command [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
98 See n. 90 and accompanying text. 
99 See ‘Award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Case of Savarkar, between France and Great 
Britain, February 24, 1911’, to be found in the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 5 (1911), 
pp. 521-523: “[F]rom the statements made by the French brigadier to the police of Marseilles, it appears: 
That he saw the fugitive, who was almost naked, get out of a porthole of the steamer, throw himself into 
the sea and swim to the quay; That at the same moment some persons from the ship, who were shouting 
and gesticulating, rushed over the bridge leading to the shore, in order to pursue him; That a number of 
people on the quay commenced to shout “Arretez[-]le;” That the brigadier at once went in pursuit of the 
fugitive and, coming up to him after running about five hundred metres, arrested him. Whereas the 
brigadier declares that he was altogether unaware of the identity of the person with whom he was 
dealing, that he only thought that the man who was escaping was one of the crew, who had possibly 
committed an offence on board the vessel. (...) Whereas, while admitting that an irregularity was 
committed by the arrest of Savarkar, and by his being handed over to the British police, there is no rule 








would perhaps sooner conclude that, in the words of Michell, “[c]onsent from local 
officials is sufficient, even if it is mistaken or ultra vires [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].”100  
Also briefly addressing the ultra vires point made by Michell: a local official 
may indeed go beyond his powers in finding that he has authority to consent on 
behalf of his State with a certain arrest operation orchestrated by another State. In 
such a case, it might be possible that the ‘injured State’ consented to the operation, 
even if the central Government did not agree (see Savarkar) and even if this local 
official was not authorised to consent on behalf of his State. However, this situation 
must arguably be differentiated from the situation where, for example, another State 
bribed local police officials of the State where the operation took place to cooperate 
in the events. Such a case also involves local police officials agreeing with the 
operation and acting ultra vires, but they consent to the operation because of 
personal financial reasons. However, it can be argued that they do not consent to the 
operation with the idea in mind that they do so on behalf of their State. And that is, it 
is submitted, essential before one can speak of valid consent from the State where 
the operation took place.101 
A final important point, made by Michell (especially when looking at the context 
of this book which often deals with conflict zones where there might be no 
functioning government), is the following: “Where there is no effective government 
in the host territory, no offense, consent, or protest is possible. Thus, an abduction 
will engender no state responsibility on the abducting state’s part [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].”102 One well-known case in which this element played a role is the 
                                                                                                                                              
obligation on the Power which has in its custody a prisoner, to restore him because of a mistake 
committed by the foreign agent who delivered him up to that Power [emphasis added, ChP].”  
100 Michell 1996, p. 421. See also n. 97 where it was argued that it would perhaps have been better if 
Michell had used the word “may” here because some expressions of consent from a local official can 
arguably never lead to valid consent from a State. 
101 See the Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the 
Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York 
and Geneva, 2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 73: “Whether consent has been validly given 
is a matter addressed by international law rules outside the framework of State responsibility. Issues 
include whether the agent or person who gave the consent was authorized to do so on behalf of the State 
(and if not, whether the lack of that authority was known or ought to have been known to the acting 
State), or whether the consent was vitiated by coercion or some other factor [emphasis added and 
original footnote omitted, ChP].” Hence, there is not only the question of authority which may play a 
role here (see also n. 97), but also the question of whether the consent was given on behalf of the State. 
102 Michell 1996, p. 421. See also Weissman 1994, p. 471, n. 78: “[N]o violation of national sovereignty 
could occur in the case of a suspect abducted from a territory with no effective sovereign government. 
(…) This is so because in the absence of a government, the asylum nation has no political independence 
or territorial sovereignty to violate.” Cf. finally the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty’s report The Responsibility to Protect (December 2001), available at: 
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf, para. 4.22 (p. 33): “In a failed or collapsed state 
situation, with no government effectively able to exercise the sovereign responsibility of protecting its 








1948 Chandler case.103 In this case, a US citizen called Douglas Chandler was 
accused of treason against the US104 and brought from occupied Germany to the 
US.105 He contended that the way in which he was brought before the US courts was 
unlawful, among other things, because he was not extradited according to the 
interbellum extradition treaty between the US and Germany. Chief Judge Magruder 
rejected this argument and showed that the extradition treaty was not to be consulted 
at all: 
 
Passing these difficulties with the argument, the treaty on its face has no application 
to the abnormal situation here presented. (…) To establish that the treaty has been 
violated here, appellant would have to show from the language of the treaty that the 
United States thereunder assumed a contractual obligation as follows: that if a citizen 
of the United States should betake himself to Germany upon the eve of the outbreak 
of war between the United States and Germany, and if after war is declared between 
the two countries the American citizen should commit in Germany acts of treason 
against the United States, and if the armed forces of the United States and those of its 
Allies should invade and occupy Germany, supplant the defunct Government of the 
German Reich, and assume the powers of sovereignty, then, in such event, the United 
States contracts that it will not apprehend such traitor and bring him to trial for 
treason. Putting the proposition in this naked form, its absurdity is manifest. The 
United States made no such contract in the extradition treaty. (…) Chandler was not 
taken into custody and returned to the United States pursuant to the extradition treaty 
between the United States and Germany. His arrest by our occupying forces was 
                                                          
103 US Court of Appeals, First Circuit, Chandler v. United States, 3 December 1948, No. 4296 (171 F.2d 
921). Another case is the 1886 Ker-Illinois case, which will be discussed in detail in Subsection 1.1 of 
Chapter V, see n. 20 of that chapter. 
104 More specifically, “[t]he indictment charged that the defendant, in various places within the German 
Reich, and at all times beginning on December 11, 1941, and continuing thereafter up to and including 
May 8, 1945, he then and there being a native-born citizen of the United States, and a person owing 
allegiance to the United States, in violation of said duty to allegiance, did knowingly, intentionally, and 
traitorously adhere to the enemies of the United States, and more particularly, to wit, the Government of 
the German Reich, and the German Radio Broadcasting Company and the officials and employees 
thereof, giving to the said enemies of the United States aid and comfort within the United States and 
elsewhere; that the aforesaid adherence of the defendant and the giving of aid and comfort by him to the 
aforesaid enemies of the United States ‘consisted of working as a radio speaker and commentator in the 
U.S. zone of the Short Wave Station of the German Radio Broadcasting Company, a company 
controlled by the German Government, which work included the preparation and composition of 
commentaries, speeches, talks and announcements, and the recording thereof for subsequent broadcast 
by radio from Germany to the United States’; that these activities of the defendant ‘were intended to 
persuade citizens and residents of the United States to decline to support the United States in the 
conduct of said war, and to weaken and destroy confidence in the administration of the Government of 
the United States.’” (US Court of Appeals, First Circuit, Chandler v. United States, 3 December 1948, 
No. 4296 (171 F.2d 921), p. 928.)  
105 See ibid., p. 927: “In May, 1945, shortly after the close of hostilities in Europe, Chandler was taken 
into custody by the U.S. Army at his home in Durach, Bavaria, but he was returned to Durach, and 
apparently released from custody, on October 23, 1945. He was rearrested by the Army on or about 
March 12, 1946, at the request of the Department of Justice. On December 10, 1946, still in military 








wholly outside the treaty, and not in violation of any international undertaking either 
expressed or implied in the treaty.106 
 
This elucidates that there could not have been any violation of the extradition treaty 
or of the sovereignty of Germany because at the time Chandler was arrested, there 
was no effective German authority.107  
However, it is clear that this cannot be easily established.108 Gillett, for example, 
explains:  
 
There is a virtually uniform practice in international law and politics of treating any 
group of nationals in control of their territory as the legitimate government. If the 
consenting party is the incumbent government, then the fact it has lost control over 
the state territory will not prevent its consent being recognized [original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].109 
 
Nevertheless, if there is really “no recognizable or organized authority within a 
territory that is capable of declaring a legally valid consent, and if there is no pre-
existing instrument of consent”,110 it will be hard to establish whether consent has 




The wrongfulness-precluding circumstance of self-defence can be found in Article 
21 of the DARS: “The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act 
                                                          
106 Ibid., pp. 935-936. 
107 See also Morgenstern 1953, p. 273, n. 4 (distinguishing this case from the Palestinian Afouneh case 
(see Subsection 3.1 of Chapter V)): “The unlawful seizure [of Afouneh, ChP] took place on Syrian 
territory at a time when that country was under British occupation. An irregular apprehension by British 
forces was thus facilitated but not justified, because Syria did not lose her independence and extradition 
did not fall within the powers of the occupation authorities. On the other hand, the decision of a United 
States Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Chandler v. United States (1948), 171 F. 2d 921, to the 
effect that there was jurisdiction to try a person who had been arrested in Germany by American 
military forces of occupation may be justified by reference to the fact that at the time Germany’s 
independence was in suspense.” See also Cardozo 1961, p. 133 (“There was no sovereign whose 
sovereignty was offended by the action of foreign officers on its soil.”) and finally Weismann 1994, p. 
471, n. 78: “The First Circuit Court of Appeals (…) stated that U.S. agents did not violate Germany’s 
territorial sovereignty because no effective government existed at the time of the abduction.” 
108 See Gillett 2008, pp. 24-25: “[T]here are publicists who argue that when a state’s governmental 
authorities have substantially collapsed (…) no rights of sovereignty pertain to that territory. On that 
basis, it is argued that an incursion into that territory to carry out a lawful arrest would not constitute any 
breach of general international law. However, that approach is problematic. Whilst it is true that 
underlying the doctrine of consent is a presumption of representative autonomy, the principles of the 
international legal order are strongly oriented towards the continued recognition of a state, existing or 
nascent, within any given territory. Even the most dysfunctional of the State Parties to the Rome Statute 
will not readily be considered to lack sovereign rights, and thus fair game for external intervention 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
109 Ibid., p. 25. 








constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of 
the United Nations.” The principle of self-defence is undisputed.111 See also in that 
respect the wording of Article 51 of the UN Charter, speaking of an “inherent right”: 
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
 
Article 21 of the DARS refers to “a lawful measure of self-defence [emphasis added, 
ChP]”. This requires, among other things, compliance with the concepts of 
proportionality and necessity.112 Randelzhofer explains: 
 
Consequently, lawful self-defence is restricted to the repulse of an armed attack and 
must not entail retaliatory or punitive actions. The means and extent of the defence 
must not be disproportionate to the gravity of the attack; in particular, the means 
employed for the defence have to be strictly necessary for repelling the attack 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].113  
 
In addition, Article 21 of the DARS requires that this “lawful measure of self-
defence [is] taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.” This is a 
reference to the above-mentioned Article 51 of the UN Charter.  
The principle of self-defence has been used in the context of male captus 
situations as well. In the words of Halberstam: “Not all abductions are violations of 
international law. Abduction of terrorists may be justified self-defense under Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter and may thus not be in violation of international 
law.”114 Paust, writing about “an individual whose present activity forms part of a 
process of armed attack on a state in violation of the United Nations Charter”,115 
comes back to the above-mentioned concepts of necessity and proportionality in his 
observation that abduction of such an individual “may provide a less violent and 
                                                          
111 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission 
to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 
2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 74. 
112 See ibid., p. 75. See also ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ‘Advisory Opinion’, 
8 July 1996, para. 41: “The submission of the exercise of self-defence to the conditions of necessity and 
proportionality is a rule of customary international law.” (Referring to ICJ, Case Concerning Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), 
‘Judgment’, 27 June 1986, para. 176.) See generally Gardam 2004.  
113 Randelzhofer 2002, p. 805.  
114 Halberstam 1992, p. 736, n. 5. 








injurious option than general military strikes or targeting that is otherwise 
reasonably necessary and proportionate.”116  
A comparable idea can be found in Calica’s article ‘Self-Help Is the Best Kind: 
The Efficient Breach Justification for Forcible Abduction of Terrorists’, in which he 
argues:  
 
In essence, under the efficient breach justification, forcible abductions of terrorists are 
optimal because the benefits to the breaching nation and to the international 
community outweigh its costs. (…) Where abduction would constitute a breach of 
international law, breach is efficient if (1) the terrorist threat appears imminent and 
the opportunity for abduction is fleeting; (2) the target nation is unwilling to extradite 
or prosecute; (3) the operation involves minimal threat to bystanders; (4) the 
territorial infringement is reasonably limited; and (5) the accused will receive humane 
treatment and a fair trial [original footnotes omitted, ChP].117 
 
Calica thus asserts that an imminent threat, among other things, may justify an 
abduction whereas the above-mentioned remarks by Halberstam and Paust refer to 
the seemingly stricter requirement of an armed attack. (Halberstam refers to Article 
51, which in turn refers to the occurrence of an armed attack.) Although Calica’s 
proposition is not limited to the context of self-defence,118 it is interesting to look 
                                                          
116 Ibid. Cf. also Bush 1993, p. 980. Note that acts of non-State actors, such as terrorists, might indeed 
lead to an armed attack, as a result of which a State can exercise its right of self-defence. However, 
whether this is only possible if these acts can be attributed to a State or not is the object of debate. See in 
that respect Trapp, commenting on the case ICJ, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), ‘Judgment’, 19 December 2005, in which 
the World Court did not address this question: “The Court’s continued refusal to engage the issue (…) 
has resulted in scholars taking extreme positions regarding the right to use force in self-defence against 
non-State actors – either reading the Court’s jurisprudence as requiring that armed attacks always be 
attributable to a State before they give rise to a right to use force in self-defence in foreign territory (or 
supporting a similar position), or arguing that there is an emerging right under international law to use 
force in self-defence directly against non-State terrorist actors, irrespective of the territorial host State’s 
non-involvement in the terrorist attacks [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Trapp 2007, p. 141.) See 
Trapp’s article and Ruys and Verhoeven 2006 for a middle position. Gill (2007, p. 118) is of the opinion 
that “[n]othing in either Article 51 or customary law says that attacks can only be carried out by States. 
(…) Any act of force which can be deemed to constitute an armed attack can trigger the right of self-
defense, irrespective of whether such an attack is carried out by official State organs, by a State acting 
indirectly through other agents, such as armed bands, militias, terrorist groups and so forth, or by a non-
State entity which is capable of mounting an attack on its own.” Note finally that even if an abduction of 
persons can in theory be seen as a very proportionate and limited form of self-defence (see, however, 
Quigley (1988, p. 208): “Measures of self-defense may be taken only against a state. They may not be 
taken against individuals, even individuals operating on behalf of a state.”), one can assume that a State 
will only turn to self-defence if the danger posed is so great that the defending State will probably not 
limit itself to a mere abduction operation, see Bush 1992, p. 980: “[S]elf-defense and related rationales 
have always assumed an overwhelming exigency for which only a military response would suffice 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
117 See Calica 2004, pp. 414-415. See also McNeal and Field 2007, pp. 519ff. See for older accounts: 
Kash 1997 and Izes 1997. 
118 See Calica 2004, p. 394: “The theory of efficient breach justifies self-help and takes into account 
both a country’s need to protect its nationals as well as the self-defence justification.” For the meaning 








more generally to the concept of imminence in order to see at what moment in time 
the right of self-defence may be exercised. 
In explanations related to the concept of imminence, reference is often made to 
the Caroline incident. Here, one can find “[t]he traditional definition of the right of 
self-defence in customary international law”.119  
 
In 1837, the United Kingdom was facing a rebellion in Canada, which at the time was 
still under British control. It was in the context of this rebellion that British forces 
attacked and sank a forty-five ton, privately-owned, U.S. steamer, the Caroline. A 
number of the rebel forces acting in support of the Canadian rebellion, (the majority 
of which being U.S. nationals) were stationed on Navy Island, in British territory. 
They were supplied in munitions and personnel by the Caroline, which was hired for 
that purpose. On December 29, while the Caroline was docked at Schlosser, in U.S. 
territory, it was attacked by British-Canadian forces that set fire to the steamer and 
towed it over the Niagara Falls. In the process, Amos Durfree, a U.S. citizen, was 
killed [original footnotes omitted, ChP].120  
 
                                                                                                                                              
limited significance in present international law. The concept itself has been given different meanings. 
Historically, it involved retaliatory measures of a state against another state that had violated its rights 
protected by international law. The basic idea of self-help consisted in the fact that there was no 
centralized enforcement in the international community. Self-help covered retorsions, reprisals, both 
armed and peaceful, and peaceful blockade as well as war itself. The limits on its use were vague and 
depended on the will of the state. Furthermore, self-defence was considered to be self-help by numerous 
authors. [Note that Gill (2007, p. 152), for example, also views self-defence as a form of self-help, ChP.] 
In Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, however, self-defence was defined as a separate institution, 
while self-help is not mentioned by the Charter at all. At present self-help includes retorsions and 
peaceful reprisals, but as a separate, although exceptional, means of the use of armed force, it has no 
support in contemporary international law.” In the commentaries to the DARS, one can read that 
nowadays, there is at least one category of accepted self-help, namely countermeasures, see Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission to the General 
Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2007, 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 128: “It is recognized both by Governments and by the 
decisions of international tribunals that countermeasures are justified under certain circumstances. This 
is reflected in article 22 which deals with countermeasures in response to an internationally wrongful act 
in the context of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness. Like other forms of self-help, 
countermeasures are liable to abuse and this potential is exacerbated by the factual inequalities between 
States. Chapter II has its aim to establish an operational system, taking into account the exceptional 
character of countermeasures as a response to internationally wrongful conduct. At the same time, it 
seeks to ensure, by appropriate conditions and limitations, that countermeasures are kept within 
generally acceptable bounds.” See also ibid., p. 136: “Countermeasures are a form of self-help, which 
responds to the position of the injured State in an international system in which the impartial settlement 
of disputes through due process of law is not yet guaranteed. Where a third party procedure exists and 
has been invoked by either party to the dispute, the requirements of that procedure, e.g. as to interim 
measures of protection, should substitute as far as possible for countermeasures. On the other hand, even 
where an international court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a dispute and authority to indicate interim 
measures of protection, it may be that the responsible State is not cooperating in that process. In such 
cases the remedy of countermeasures necessarily revives.” 
119 Shaw 2003, p. 1024. 








This violation of US territory and the death of at least one US national121 caused 
some uproar and the tensions between the UK and the US were not sufficiently 
resolved through diplomatic channels.122 In November 1840, when the British-
Canadian Alexander McLeod was arrested in New York for his alleged involvement 
in the incident, the intrusion by Britain was again the centre of (diplomatic) 
debate.123 In a letter to the British Special Representative to the US, Lord Ashburton 
(dated 27 July 1842), US Secretary of State Daniel Webster quoted a letter he had 
sent to the British Minister in Washington, Henry Fox, on 24 April 1841: 
 
[I]t will be for Her Majesty’s Government to show, upon what state of facts, and what 
rules of national law, the destruction of the Caroline is to be defended. It will be for 
that Government to show a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving 
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, 
that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment 
authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing 
unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-defense 
must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it [emphasis added, ChP].124        
 
The British did not agree with the facts as understood by the Americans, but they 
did agree on the above-mentioned principles.125 These principles are now “accepted 
as part of customary international law [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.126  
As Caroline does not mention the requirement of an armed attack, one could 
argue that on the basis of Caroline, a State may also be permitted to exercise its 
right of self-defence before an armed attack has actually occurred. After all, 
Caroline only stipulates that a State must show a ‘necessity of self-defence’. That 
could mean that a State can also exercise its right of self-defence when an armed 
attack is going to occur, thereby creating a necessity for the target-State-to-be to 
defend itself. Nevertheless, in that case, the attack (or whatever circumstance is 
creating the necessity: as already mentioned, Caroline does not speak of an armed 
attack) must be imminent. In the words of Caroline, a government must show “a 
necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation”.127 128  
                                                          
121 See ibid., pp. 433-434, n. 11: “It should be noted that some more recent accounts refer to the death of 
the ship’s cabin boy, “Little Billy.” (...)  However, this may be brought into question, as this death was 
not mentioned in the various testimonies of the crew.” 
122 Green 2006, p. 434. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid., p. 435 (referring to its original source in the British and Foreign State Papers). 
125 Ibid., p. 436. 
126 Shaw 2003, p. 1025. 
127 There are in fact two concepts of necessity in Caroline. The first is the above-mentioned idea that a 
State must show a necessity of self-defence: a State can only use self-defence if it is really necessary. 
The second concept has been explained by Randelzhofer (see n. 113 and accompanying text) and is only 
important if the State is justified in using self-defence. In that case, it is not allowed to take just any 
measures. Its freedom to use measures of self-defence is restricted: it may only take those measures 








What is the correlation between the arguably broader notion of self-defence as 
found in Caroline and the version of Article 51 of the UN Charter, to which the 
DARS refer and which states that self-defence is only possible “if an armed attack 
occurs”?  
The examination of this very controversial point129 can start with the already-
mentioned fact that Article 51 of the UN Charter refers to an “inherent” right of self-
defence. That could mean that the broader, inherent, customary right to self-defence 
(from Caroline) is not affected by Article 51 and that UN Member States would also 
                                                                                                                                              
“[T]he act justified by the necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity, and [must be] kept 
clearly within it.”) 
128 This formulation, by the way, clearly excludes the so-called ‘Bush doctrine’ on self-defence, where 
the attack may not necessarily be imminent but located in a more distant future. See The National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17 September 2002 (available at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf), p. 15: “Given the goals 
of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we 
have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the 
magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit 
that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first. (…) For centuries, international law recognized that 
nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against 
forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often 
conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat – most often a visible 
mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of 
imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do 
not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on 
acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction – weapons that can be easily 
concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning. The targets of these attacks are our military 
forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. 
As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific 
objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and 
used weapons of mass destruction. The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive 
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk 
of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile 
acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. The United States will not 
use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for 
aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most 
destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.” See also ‘President 
Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point’ (United States Military Academy, West Point, New 
York, 1 June 2002, available at: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html): “We cannot defend America and 
our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign 
non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, 
we will have waited too long.” See for criticism on this doctrine, for example, Gill 2007, pp. 147-150. 
Gill notes, among other things: “Self-defense however defined, has always been linked to the existence 
of a concrete (threat of an) attack within at least the foreseeable future. While this is not necessarily the 
immediate temporal future in the sense of minutes, hours or even days, the principles of immediacy and 
necessity are central to the concept of self-defense itself and cannot be open ended as the NSS implies.” 
(Ibid., p. 149.)  








be able to use the customary right of self-defence (not requiring the ‘trigger’ of an 
armed attack).130 The ICJ, in the Nicaragua case, stated on this point: 
 
As regards the suggestion that the areas covered by the two sources of law are 
identical, the Court observes that the United Nations Charter (…) by no means covers 
the whole area of the regulation of the use of force in international relations. On one 
essential point, this treaty itself refers to pre-existing customary international law; this 
reference to customary law is contained in the actual text of Article 51, which 
mentions the “inherent right” (in the French text the “droit naturel”) of individual or 
collective self-defence, which “nothing in the present Charter shall impair” and which 
applies in the event of an armed attack. The Court therefore finds that Article 51 of 
the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a “natural” or “inherent” right 
of self-defence, and it is hard to see how this can be other than of a customary nature, 
even if its present content has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter. 
Moreover the Charter, having itself recognized the existence of this right, does not go 
on to regulate directly all aspects of its content. For example, it does not contain any 
specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are 
proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established 
in customary international law. Moreover, a definition of the “armed attack” which, if 
found to exist, authorizes the exercise of the “inherent right” of self-defence, is not 
provided in the Charter, and is not part of treaty law. It cannot therefore be held that 
Article 51 is a provision which “subsumes and supervenes” customary international 
law. It rather demonstrates that in the field in question (…) customary international 
law continues to exist alongside treaty law. The areas governed by the two sources of 
law thus do not overlap exactly, and the rules do not have the same content.131 
 
Nevertheless, even though the ICJ recognises that the law of self-defence can be 
found in both customary as well as in conventional law, one could also argue that 
the customary version is only of importance with respect to those issues which are 
not regulated by the conventional version, for example, regarding the definition of 
the concept of an armed attack or the principles of necessity and proportionality. It 
seems, however, that the ICJ does not recognise that the right of self-defence can be 
invoked by a party to the UN (Charter)132 in situations other than in the case of an 
armed attack.133 Although the “inherent right” of self-defence is referred to in 
                                                          
130 That would thus also mean that States could argue that Art. 21 of the DARS is complied with if they 
would abduct a terrorist implicated in an imminent attack. (The argumentation would then be: Art. 21 of 
the DARS refers to the conventional version of self-defence, which in turn refers to the broader 
(anticipatory) inherent right of self-defence.)  
131 ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) (Merits), ‘Judgment’, 27 June 1986, para. 176. 
132 Almost every territorial entity in the world is a member of the UN and thus bound by the UN Charter. 
(Exceptions are, for example, the Holy See (a non-member State maintaining Permanent Observer 
Mission at UN Headquarters) and Palestine (an entity maintaining Permanent Observer Mission at UN 
Headquarters), see http://www.un.org/members/index.shtml.) 
133 In that case, the ICJ’s acceptance of the principle of necessity does not imply that UN Member States 
can refer to the first concept of necessity in Caroline as was explained in n. 127, namely that a State 
only has to show a necessity of self-defence before it can resort to self-defence. After all, in the above-








Article 51, it is also clearly connected to the words “armed attack”: “[T]he (…) text 
of Article 51 (…) mentions the “inherent right” of individual or collective self-
defence, (…) which applies in the event of an armed attack.”134   
Does this mean that a State can never act in anticipation of an attack, can never 
use anticipatory self-defence?135 Randelzhofer, first referring to those who would 
argue that the above-mentioned question is to be answered in the negative,136 
explains that this would indeed not be permissible:  
 
An anticipatory right of self-defence would be contrary to the wording of Art. 51 (‘if 
an armed attack occurs’), as well as to its object and purpose, which is to cut to a 
minimum the unilateral use of force in international relations. Since the (alleged) 
imminence of an attack cannot usually be assessed by means of objective criteria, any 
decision on this point would necessarily have to be left to the discretion of the State 
concerned. The manifest risk of an abuse of that discretion which thus emerges would 
de facto undermine the restriction to one particular case of the right to self-defence. 
Therefore Art. 51 has to be interpreted narrowly as containing a prohibition of 
anticipatory self-defence. Self-defence is thus permissible only after the armed attack 
has already been launched [original footnotes omitted, ChP].137     
                                                                                                                                              
self-defence. Hence, the fact that the ICJ accepts the principle of necessity can, in this view, only refer 
to the second concept of necessity in Caroline (see also the explanation of Randelzhofer at n. 113 and 
accompanying text and n. 127), meaning that a State, after an armed attack has started, can only take 
those measures which are strictly necessary to repulse that attack. This view is supported by the above-
mentioned words of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case (para. 176): “For example, it does not contain any 
specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the attack 
and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law.” 
134 See in that respect also para. 193 of the Nicaragua case where the ICJ noted “that in the language of 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the inherent right (or “droit naturel”) which any State 
possesses in the event of an armed attack, covers both collective and individual self-defence [emphasis 
added, ChP].” 
135 The ICJ did not comment on this issue in the Nicaragua case as the facts of that case did not demand 
this, see its para. 194: “In view of the circumstances in which the dispute has arisen, reliance is placed 
by the Parties only on the right of self-defence in the case of an armed attack which has already 
occurred, and the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed attack has not 
been raised. Accordingly the Court expresses no view on that issue.” 
136 “[I]n particular those authors who interpret Art. 51 as merely confirming the pre-existing right of 
self-defence consider anticipatory measures of self-defence to be admissible under the conditions set up 
by Webster in the Caroline Case, i.e. when ‘the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming 
and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’ [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
(Randelzhofer 2002, p. 803.) 
137 Ibid. See also ibid., p. 793: “The content and scope of the customary right of self-defence are unclear 
and extend far into the spheres of self-help [Recall the title of Calica’s article, ChP.] in such a way that 
its continuing existence would, to a considerable extent, reintroduce the unilateral use of force by States, 
the substantial abolition of which is intended by the UN Charter.” This view might lead to problems 
with respect to the problem of nuclear weapons where one can doubt whether a State, which has become 
the victim of a nuclear attack, is still able to defend itself. Randelzhofer (ibid., p. 804) explains: “[I]t 
must be pointed out that the prohibition of anticipatory self-defence embodied in Art. 51 is compatible 
with the nuclear strategy of the Super-powers only as States are able to defend themselves against a pre-
emptive strike launched against them. Should this so-called second-strife capability become void, the 
prohibition of anticipatory self-defence would not be removed as such, but it would nevertheless be 








The word “inherent” (as in: inherent right of self-defence) would in that view simply 
mean that every State (even a State which is not a member of the UN) has a ‘natural 
right’ to defend itself.138 Nevertheless, those States which have signed the UN 
Charter can only exercise this ‘natural’ right under certain circumstances, namely if 
the armed attack has started.  
It should, however, be repeated that this is a very controversial point.139 Gill, for 
example, states: 
 
While there are some[140] international lawyers who, relying on a literal textual 
interpretation of Article 51, reject the possibility of any form of anticipatory self-
defense altogether, most authorities and States are prepared to concede the possibility 
of some degree of anticipatory action within what are frequently referred to as the 
“strict criteria” of the Caroline case [original footnote omitted, ChP].141  
 
Gill, repeating the point already mentioned by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case that 
“the right to self-defense cannot be interpreted solely on the basis of Article 51 of 
the Charter”,142 is of the opinion that one should follow Article 51 of the UN Charter 
where it is clear, for example in requiring the occurrence of an armed attack,143 but 
that where it is not, for instance regarding the exact meaning of an armed attack or 
                                                          
138 See ibid., p. 793. Randelzhofer hereby explains (ibid., p. 792, n. 25) that the Special Rapporteur of 
the ILC, R. Ago (in his Eight Report on State Responsibility, ILC Yearbook (1980), Vol. 2, part 1, p. 67, 
n. 263) “takes the term ‘inherent’ to emphasize that the ability of lawfully defending itself against an 
armed attack is a prerogative of every sovereign State which it is not entitled to renounce”. 
139 See also Wilmshurst 2006, p. 963: “There are few more controversial questions in international law 
than the proper limits of the right of self-defence.” 
140 Note, however, that Gill, in n. 2 of his article, asserts that “[a] significant number of scholars oppose 
any notion of anticipatory or preemptive self-defense prior to the actual launching of an armed attack 
[emphasis added, ChP].” (Gill 2007, p. 113, n. 2.) 
141 Ibid., p. 125. See also ‘The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in 
Self-Defence’ which clarify: “[T]he view that States have a right to act in self-defence in order to avert 
the threat of an imminent attack – often referred to as ‘anticipatory self-defence’ – is widely, though not 
universally, accepted. It is unrealistic in practice to suppose that self-defence must in all cases await an 
actual attack [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Wilmshurst 2006, p. 964.) The Chatham House hereby 
refers, among other things, to the UNSG’s report In larger freedom: towards development, security and 
human rights for all, UN Doc. A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, para. 124: “Imminent threats are fully 
covered by Article 51, which safeguards the inherent right of sovereign states to defend themselves 
against armed attack. Lawyers have long recognized that this covers an imminent attack as well as one 
that has already happened.” 
142 Gill 2007, p. 117. Gill hereby refers to “both the drafting history of Article 51 and the fact that it was 
never intended to completely codify the law of self-defense.” (Ibid., pp. 116-117.) According to him, 
Art. 51 “primarily sought to safeguard the right to mutual assistance provided for in regional self-
defense agreements and delineate the relationship between the right of States to exercise self-defense 
and the system of collective security contained in Chapter VII of the Charter. This relationship is spelled 
out in detail in Article 51, while the substance of the right is merely mentioned.” (Ibid., p. 117.) 
143 See ibid.: “Where Article 51 is specific it will clearly prevail, as for instance in subjecting the 
exercise of self-defense to the requirement of an armed attack, or in providing for the Security Council 









the starting point of this armed attack,144 one can turn to the customary law version 
of self-defence. And as this customary version (read: Caroline) recognises some 
form of anticipatory self-defence, States do not have to wait, for example, for the 
missile to be actually launched. In short,  
 
self-defense is a right, grounded in both Charter and in customary law, which allows 
some degree of anticipatory action to counter a clear and manifest threat of attack in 
the immediate, or at least proximate, future, within the confines of the well-known 
and widely accepted 1837 Caroline incident criteria, relating to necessity, immediacy 
and proportionality [original footnote omitted, ChP].145  
 
Notwithstanding these controversies – to which already enough attention has been 
paid here – it is clear that Paust’s earlier mentioned example of the abduction of a 
terrorist will probably be accepted under the DARS as he refers to an armed 
attack.146 Whether one also accepts Calica’s proposition, which is not restricted to 
the context of self-defence but also covers the field of self-help, is more problematic 
and will partly depend on one’s view on the above-mentioned discussion.  
In conclusion, self-defence (from the perspective of State A)147 or consent (from 
the perspective of State B) are two important scenarios which do not lead to a 
                                                          
144 See ibid: “However, where Article 51 is incomplete, as in leaving open what constitutes an armed 
attack and when an attack has commenced, or silent, as in relation to other requirements governing self-
defense, recourse must be had to customary law as a means of complementing the Charter lex scripta.” 
145 Ibid., p. 114. Gill further explains that “immediacy in relation to anticipatory self-defense is not 
primarily a question of time, but one of the existence of a credible threat of probable (or in some cases 
potential) attack, which together with necessity and the absence of feasible alternatives, make 
anticipatory action justifiable or even imperative. While time is a relevant consideration, it is not the 
only one, nor necessarily the most important.” (Ibid., p. 146.) “[A] classic example of a lawful 
anticipatory self-defense” (ibid.) mentioned by Gill is the Six Day War: “The conduct of Israel’s 
neighbors in creating a crisis, engaging in preparations for a potential attack, and uttering hostile 
pronouncements formed an immediate threat which justified Israel’s anticipatory action in self-defense. 
Irrespective of whether such an attack was in fact on the point of being launched, or ever would have 
been, Israel had every reason at the time to believe that there was a high possibility, that an attack would 
be mounted in the near future. How near was unknown, but under the circumstances that fact hardly 
mattered. Likewise, it was clear that waiting would only increase Israel’s vulnerability, without any 
likelihood that the situation would resolve itself.” (Ibid.)   
146 Paust wrote about “an individual whose present activity forms part of a process of armed attack on a 
state in violation of the United Nations Charter”. (See Paust 1993, p. 566 or n. 115 and accompanying 
text.) 
147 It is interesting to also briefly mention here the subject of ‘protection of nationals abroad’, which is 
sometimes seen as a form of self-defence. In that view, it is not the State itself, but its nationals (to be 
seen as ‘little parts’ of that State) who are under attack, which in turn leads to resorting to self-defence. 
The most famous example in that respect is the Entebbe rescue operation in 1976 during which Israel 
intervened in Uganda (at the Entebbe airport) to free hostages from a plane hijacked by terrorists. Shaw, 
also examining similar incidents, explains: “It is difficult to extract from the contradictory views 
expressed in these incidents the apposite legal principles. While some states affirm the existence of a 
rule permitting the use of force in self-defence to protect nationals abroad, others deny that such a 
principle operates in international law. (...) On balance, and considering the opposite principles of 
saving the threatened lives of nationals and the preservation of the territorial integrity of states, it would 
seem preferable to accept the validity of the rule in carefully restricted situations consistent with the 








violation of State’s A obligation to refrain from interference in State B’s domestic 
affairs.  
A final matter which should be discussed here are interventions based on 
humanitarian grounds.  
 
2.1.1.3 Humanitarian grounds 
 
Although the concept of State sovereignty was earlier presented as rather absolute, it 
is, of course, true that in the modern world, in which States through various means 
are interconnected (for example, via the internet) and in which many problems are 
seen as international problems (for example, global warming), (legal) boundaries 
seem to disappear and with that the importance of State sovereignty. This also goes 
for the human rights context.148  
It may be that in the past, a tyrant could commit genocide on its territory with 
impunity by shielding outside interference with the notion of State sovereignty, 
arguing that it was a domestic affair with which other States had no business.149 
However, that was then. Nowadays, such a tyrant cannot get away with it as easily 
as he perhaps used to; these kinds of issues are now also considered to be of interest 
to other countries and the international community as a whole.150 For example, if 
genocide occurs in a certain State, that State can no longer convincingly assert that it 
is a purely internal matter, with which other States or the international community as 
a whole have no business.  
It was mentioned supra that the concept of State sovereignty has both an internal 
and external aspect.  
The internal aspect, it was stated, meant that State A is the only one having 
authority over the territory of State A. However, it should be understood that that 
                                                                                                                                              
for more information on this subject in the context of abductions Findlay 1988 (who, by the way, views 
this justification as distinct from the justification ‘self-defence’). On p. 29 of his article, he writes: 
“[T]he United States could seize terrorists on the territory of another country pursuant to the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention to protect nationals, as long as the capture was necessary to prevent future 
harm to its citizens and the mission’s objectives were strictly confined to that task. If the United States 
acted under this doctrine, the territorial state would have little basis to complain about a violation of its 
territorial sovereignty [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
148 See generally Flinterman 2000 and Lauren 2004. 
149 See Lauren 2004, pp. 16 and 26. At this last page, Lauren provides the interesting example of 
Hermann Goering, who “declared in response to accusations of crimes against humanity: “But that was 
our right! We were a sovereign state and that was strictly our business.” [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]” 
150 See Van Genugten 1992, p. 205, writing on the (now defunct) UN Human Rights Commission: “The 
former argument of non-intervention (‘mind your own business’) today makes little impression and is 








does not mean that State A can do whatever it pleases on its territory.151 Having the 
supreme power over a territory also brings with it responsibilities.152  
It seems more and more accepted that in compelling cases such as genocide, in 
which the territorial State is unwilling or unable to fulfil its responsibility to protect 
its own people from barbarity, political/economic pressure by other States to stop 
the atrocities may not be enough. It might be necessary to actually intervene. The 
argument that such an intervention would violate the foundation of the international 
order can then be countered by the idea that in fact non-intervention would damage 
that order. Perhaps non-intervention in each and every case makes the legal order 
stable (in that no State interferes with another State) but one can doubt whether such 
an ‘order’, in which genocide can take place without a serious reaction from another 
State, does not gravely undermine its own basic values.153 In addition, one can 
wonder whether the above-mentioned idea that non-intervention makes the legal 
order stable would also be accurate in such a situation. After all, in our 
interconnected world, a conflict of considerable size – if not tackled soon enough – 
can easily spread to other countries and become a regional conflict, thereby creating 
a direct threat to the stability of the international order.154 In such cases, it is obvious 
that intervention, as an ultimum remedium, should not be ruled out.155 The most 
                                                          
151 See the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s report The Responsibility 
to Protect (December 2001), available at: http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf, para. 1.35 
(p. 8): “The defence of state sovereignty, by even its strongest supporters, does not include any claim of 
the unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its own people.” 
152 See ibid.: “It is acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally – to respect 
the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people 
within the state.” 
153 One of the purposes of the UN is “[t]o achieve international co-operation (…) in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all”. (Art. 1, para. 3 of the UN 
Charter.) See also Art. 55 (“With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which 
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: (…) c. universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all”) and 56 of the UN 
Charter (“All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the 
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.”) See also the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s report The Responsibility to Protect (December 
2001), available at: http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf, para. 8.31 (p. 75): “[T]he very term 
“international community” will become a travesty unless the community of states can act decisively 
when large groups of human beings are being massacred or subjected to ethnic cleansing.” Cf. finally 
Silving 1961, p. 358, who writes that the UN Charter “declares it to be one of its several goals “to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person,” and 
postulates encouragement of “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all. …” If 
these words are more than so-called “jurisprudential niceties,” perhaps they might be taken to afford a 
basis for argument that, given most exceptional circumstances, “fundamental human rights” ought to 
override considerations of conventional international law.” 
154 Think, for example, of the flux of refugees to neighbouring countries. 
155 These two aspects (serious violations of the basic values of the international order and a direct danger 
to the stability of that order) are also reflected in the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty’s report The Responsibility to Protect (December 2001), available at: 
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf, para. 4.13 (p. 31): “The Commission found in its 








appropriate route through which such a military intervention for humanitarian aims 
should be effected is clearly the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
(‘Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression’). Nevertheless, in some cases, an intervention will take place without 
the UNSC’s approval. If such an intervention, often called ‘humanitarian 
intervention’, is more or less accepted (afterwards) by the international 
community,156 one can imagine that the apprehension of the person allegedly behind 
the genocide, in the context of the more general operation to stop that (imminent) 
genocide, would be acceptable as well.  
Nevertheless, one can seriously doubt whether an intervention without the 
approval of the UNSC, only consisting of the apprehension of that same person a 
couple of years later, after he has been charged with the genocide that has in the 
meantime ended, would also be condoned.157 After all, the emergency situation, 
                                                                                                                                              
sovereignty, there was general acceptance that there must be limited exceptions to the non-intervention 
rule for certain kinds of emergencies. Generally expressed, the view was that these exceptional 
circumstances must be cases of violence which so genuinely “shock the conscience of mankind,” or 
which present such a clear and present danger to international security, that they require coercive 
military intervention.” 
156 Note that such an intervention without the approval of the UNSC, in contrast to consent and self-
defence, is not yet seen as an established exception to the norm of non-intervention. See Shen 2001, p. 
29: “The “humanitarian” intervention doctrine, although seemingly attractive, cannot be sustained as an 
exception to the non-intervention principle. International law does not recognize this alleged exception 
as such.” See also Shaw (2003, pp. 1045-1046) who is, however, less outspoken: “[I]t [the right to 
humanitarian intervention, ChP] is difficult to reconcile today with article 2(4) of the Charter unless one 
either adopts a rather artificial definition of the ‘territorial integrity’ criterion in order to permit 
temporary violations or posits the establishment of the right in customary law. Practice has also been in 
general unfavourable to the concept, primarily because it might be used to justify interventions by more 
forceful states into the territories of weaker states. Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that in some 
situations the international community might refrain from adopting a condemnatory stand where large 
numbers of lives have been saved in circumstances of gross oppression by a state of its citizens due to 
an outside intervention. In addition, it is possible that such a right might evolve in cases of extreme 
humanitarian need.” 
157 Cf. also C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, Working Paper No. 24 – 
April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), p. 60. However, if the UNSC were to 
approve an arrest operation of a person suspected of having committed international crimes (even 
though one can imagine that it will be very unlikely that this will happen), this would be unproblematic, 
see also Van der Wilt 2004, p. 295. Cf. in that respect, for example, Sharp, Sr. 1997, p. 435: “The 
coercive authority of the Security Council has also been used to authorize the arrest and prosecution of 
persons suspected of international crimes against noncombatants in an area of ongoing conflict. On June 
6, 1993, the Security Council unanimously reaffirmed the authority of the Secretary-General to take all 
measures necessary to ensure the arrest and prosecution of those persons responsible for the murder of 
twenty-four U.N. peacekeepers in Somalia on June 5, 1993. This resolution served as the authority for 
the U.N. Special Representative to publicly call for the arrest of General Aideed, and to conduct an 
aggressive series of military operations to arrest him. Accordingly, as a coercive measure to maintain 
international peace and security under Article 39 of the Charter, the Security Council has the authority 
to impose upon states an obligation to search and arrest persons suspected of war crimes [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].” Although it must be borne in mind that this situation involved a State which 
was under the control of an international force (namely UNOSOM II), such an operation might also be 








justifying an intervention, no longer exists. The ‘damage’ – unfortunately – has 
already been done.158 It may sound harsh, especially for the victims, but in the 
context of an intervention without the approval of the UNSC, an arrest of a person 
who is actually committing, or, in the very near future is about to commit genocide 
would probably be more acceptable than the arrest of a person who is charged with 
already having committed the genocide.159  
However, the concept of humanitarian intervention ignoring for now, such an 
arrest may perhaps be based on other humanitarian considerations. The idea that a 
suspect who is charged with such serious crimes that it is imperative that there 
should be no safe haven for him and that he is to be brought to justice (irrespective 
of the means), may perhaps be founded in the Latin (but again not Roman, see 
Chapter II) maxim aut dedere aut iudicare.160 This maxim, meaning ‘extradite or 
prosecute’, “requires a state which has hold of someone who has committed a crime 
of international concern either to extradite the offender to another state which is 
prepared to try him or else to take steps to have him prosecuted before its own 
courts.”161 For example (and as will be shown in Chapter VIII), such an aut dedere 
                                                                                                                                              
2000, pp. 966-967: “[W]ithout the authorization of the Security Council, the consent of the territorial 
state in a peace agreement, or a situation that qualifies as self-defense, an apprehension of an indicted 
war criminal may constitute an “unlawful abduction” in violation of international law.” 
158 Cf. the ‘just cause threshold’ from the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty’s report The Responsibility to Protect (December 2001), available at: 
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf, p. XII: “Military intervention for human protection 
purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and 
irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: A. 
large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either 
of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or B. large scale 
‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror 
or rape [emphasis added, ChP].”  
159 It is, of course, possible to arrest an indicted war criminal in the context of a humanitarian 
intervention (cf., for example, ibid., paras. 7.26 and 7.49 (pp. 62 and 66)) but in those situations, the 
arrests are ‘only’ small parts of the bigger humanitarian intervention. However, in these cases, the 
arrests cannot be seen as humanitarian interventions. That seems only possible if the person is not yet 
indicted for, but is actually, or on the verge of, directing a genocide. 
160 This famous rule comes from Grotius’ maxim aut dedere aut punire (extradite or punish). See Hugo 
Grotius’ De Iure Belli Ac Pacis, Book 2, Chapter XXI, para. 4 (entitled: “Nisi aut puniant aut dedant: 
quod exemplis illustratur [emphasis added, ChP]”), especially under 1: “Cum vero non soleant civitates 
permittere ut civitas altera armata intra fines suos poenae expetendae nomine veniat, neque id expediat, 
sequitur ut civitas apud quem degit * qui culpae est compertus, alterum facere debeat, aut ut ipsa 
interpellata pro merito puniat nocentem, aut ut eum permittat arbitrio interpellantis. * hoc enim illud 
est dedere, quod in historiis saepissime occurrit [emphasis added and original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
(See Grotius 1913, p. 368.) The translation by Kelsey goes as follows: “Since as a matter of fact states 
are not accustomed to permit other states to cross their borders with an armed force for the purpose of 
exacting punishment, and since such a course is inexpedient, it follows that the state in which he who 
has been found guilty dwells ought to do one of the two things. When appealed to it should either punish 
the guilty person as he deserves, or it should entrust him to the discretion of the party making the 
appeal. This latter course is rendition, a procedure most frequently mentioned in historical narratives 
[emphasis added and original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Kelsey 1925, p. 527.)  








aut iudicare obligation already exists with respect to grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions.162  
It must be noted that this maxim addresses the State of residence (State B); the 
maxim only demands that that State does something, namely prosecute (on its own 
territory)163 or extradite the suspect.164 However, a third State could perhaps argue, 
if the State of residence does not either prosecute or extradite the suspect itself, and 
if by doing so violates an international obligation, that it must act itself to ensure 
that the suspect does not escape justice.165  
In that context, it may invoke the concept of countermeasures,166 which is, like 
consent and self-defence, an accepted wrongfulness-precluding circumstance which 
                                                          
162 Cf. also Michell 1996, p. 423, n. 205: “[I]n cases where the fugitive is accused of war crimes or 
crimes against humanity, it is arguable that the presumption against enforcement jurisdiction within the 
territory of another state may be realigned. States may be able to abduct a fugitive from another state 
and charge him with crimes under international law without incurring international responsibility for the 
violation of the latter’s territorial sovereignty, particularly where the asylum state has refused to either 
extradite or prosecute a fugitive accused of an international crime.”  
163 Cf. also Van der Wilt 2004, pp. 280-281, rightly explaining that one should not confuse the authority 
(or obligation) to create universal jurisdiction with the physical enforcement of criminal law 
(enforcement power). See also Lamb 2000, pp. 220-221 and Strijards 2001, p. 99. The obligation to 
arrest and prosecute suspects charged with grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions is only valid for a 
State’s own territory and does not extend to the territory of other States. 
164 Note that the maxim aut dedere aut iudicare could perhaps be used by the State of residence to argue 
that it, if it cannot prosecute the suspect itself, will deliver the suspect to a third State, whether or not it 
has extradition arrangements with that State. Although the above-mentioned translation and explanation 
of the maxim speak of (the lawful method of) extradition, the rule itself uses the broader term dedere. 
(See also Bassiouni and Wise 1995, p. 4, n. 7: “[S]trictly speaking, dedere means “surrender” or 
“deliver” rather than “extradite.””) This could be interpreted as meaning that if State B cannot prosecute 
the suspect itself, it has an obligation to deliver him to a State which is willing and able to prosecute, 
even if no extradition arrangements exist with that State. 
165 See in that respect also the interesting 1662 case of Okey, Corbet and Barkestead presented by 
Strijards (see Strijards 2001, pp. 93-95). In this case, three former members of the English parliament 
“pledged their vote in favour of the decapitation of King Charles the first.” (Ibid., p. 93.) Unfortunately 
for them, however, the Royal Government was restored. As a result, the men fled to The Hague, where 
they were arrested by English officials and brought back to England. The Dutch Grand Pensionary 
Johan de Witt explained the States of Holland, which had decided to admit the English men for an 
application for asylum, that the action on Dutch territory was in accordance with the law of nations. In 
the words of Strijards: “Because of the unchallengeable egregiousness of the act of regicide, the Dutch 
Republic was in its relationship to England under the obligation either to prosecute and punish the 
regicidici or to extradite them to the State where their abominable deeds were done (“aut dedere aut 
iudicare”). Whereas the Republic failed to act in either manner in order to comply with its obligations 
directly prompted by ius cogens (international peremptory law) – it did not prosecute itself, it did not 
comply with the English request for extradition – England, as the grieved party, had the right to grant 
itself the right to exercise its national penal enforcement power on Dutch soil [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” (Ibid., p. 94.) See also Izes 1997, p. 18 (writing on the Eichmann case): “Other authorities justify 
Israel’s action under the international legal principle of “extradite or prosecute.” This principle holds 
that no state should offer a safe haven to individuals who are accused of serious crimes under 
international law.” See finally Gurulé 1994, pp. 490-491. 
166 See Art. 22 of the DARS (‘Countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act’): “The 
wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards another 
State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter 








ensures that no internationally wrongful act will take place. Nevertheless, 
countermeasures may not involve the threat or use of force,167 which would exclude 
a male captus technique such as abduction.168 However, perhaps, the concept could 
be used to justify a luring operation, although it must also be noted that 
countermeasures must not affect obligations for the protection of fundamental 
human rights.169 (And that a luring operation may affect the right to liberty and 
security, a human right with, at least, customary international law/general 
international law status. This point will be addressed in Subsections 2.2 and 2.2.5.) 
Before turning to the next subsection, it must be stressed that humanitarian 
grounds may very well lead to a justified arrest of a suspect without the consent of 
the State of residence, but much will depend here on the circumstances. However, 
more generally, it can be stated that even though the concept of State sovereignty is 
being eroded, it is still the fundament of the fragile inter-State community170 and 
should therefore only be trespassed in clearly accepted situations. If one goes 
beyond these accepted situations, it is arguably a matter of time before the law of the 
jungle re-enters the international arena. In the words of the Argentine Ambassador 
Mario Amadeo in his speech to the UNSC after Eichmann’s capture in Buenos 
Aires:   
 
[T]he main threat to international peace and security does not arise from the fact 
(which in itself is prejudicial to the rule of law) of the violation of Argentine 
sovereignty and its unfortunate repercussions on Argentine-Israel relations. It results 
from the supreme importance of the principle impaired by that violation: the 
unqualified respect which States owe to each other and which precludes the exercise 
of jurisdictional acts in the territory of other States. If this principle were to fall into 
abeyance, if it could be violated with impunity, if each State considered itself entitled, 
whenever it so desired, to supersede the authority of another State and take justice 
                                                          
167 See Art. 50 of the DARS (‘Obligations not affected by countermeasures’): “1. Countermeasures shall 
not affect: (a) the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations; (b) obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights; (c) obligations of a 
humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals; (d) other obligations under peremptory norms of general 
international law. 2. A State taking countermeasures is not relieved from fulfilling its obligations: (a) 
under any dispute settlement procedure applicable between it and the responsible State; (b) to respect 
the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives and documents.” 
168 Cf. Borelli 2004, p. 363, n. 127. Cf. also Lamb 2000, pp. 220-221: “When armed insurgents are sent 
by a State (or with the connivance of a State) into the territory of a third State to effect an arrest, this 
could be categorized as either a breach of the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the 
third State, a violation of the territorial integrity of that State, or even, exceptionally, as an armed attack. 
This is so despite the fact that States are, in view of their treaty obligations (most notably those arising 
under the 1949 Geneva Conventions), obliged to prosecute and punish persons accused of serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. Although the existence of this obligation is undisputed, its 
scope nevertheless extends only to the borders of the prosecuting State and not into the territory of a 
third State [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (See also n. 163.) 
169 See n. 167.  
170 See Shaw 2003, p. 410: “The principle of respect for the territorial integrity of states is well founded 
as one the linchpins of the international system”. See also the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty’s report The Responsibility to Protect (December 2001), available at: 








into its own hands, international law would very soon be replaced by the law of the 
jungle. (...) Can it be argued that the repetition of such incidents is not likely to strike 
at the very roots of international order?171     
 
2.2 Human rights 
 
The previously mentioned argument by Eichmann that his capture violated the 
sovereignty of Argentina is a male captus defence originating from classical 
international law when it “concerned itself exclusively with the relationship between 
states”.172 It was étatiste international law so to say.173  
States were the only real actors in the international community and respect for 
State sovereignty was the most important principle governing this system of inter-
State/‘inter-national’ law.  
By contrast, individuals played no important role in this field.174 This meant that 
State sovereignty and not human rights was the most important value to complain 
about in the case of, for example, an abduction.175  
In addition, only States and not individuals could complain about these 
violations of State sovereignty.176  
In the words of the District Court of Jerusalem:  
 
The ratio of this rule is that the right to plead violation of the sovereignty of a State is 
the exclusive right of that State. Only a sovereign State may raise the plea or waive it, 
and the accused has no right to take over the rights of that State.177 
 
Indeed, there is no escaping the conclusion that the question of the violation of 
international law by the manner in which the accused was brought into the territory of 
                                                          
171 UNSC, 15th Year, OR, 865th meeting, 22 June 1960, UN Doc. S/PV.865, para. 34 (p. 7). See also 
Mann 1989, p. 420: “The wrongful abduction from a foreign State’s territory is bound to lead to 
international anarchy and friction, both in law and in fact.” 
172 Goldstone 1996, p. 1. 
173 See Feinrider 1997, p. 81. 
174 See Strijards 2003, p. 755. 
175 A very good example of this can also be found in Art. 16 (‘Apprehension in violation of international 
law’) of the 1935 Harvard Research in International Law’s Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with 
Respect to Crime, see the American Journal of International Law Supplement, Vol. 29 (1935), pp. 435-
651 for the entire research. This male captus male detentus article states: “In exercising jurisdiction 
under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish any person who has been brought within its 
territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law or 
international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been 
violated by such measures.” 
176 Note that not only the State whose sovereignty had been violated could protest the abduction, but 
also the home State of the abducted person. However, in the latter case, the home State has to exercise 
its prerogative of diplomatic protection (see Feinreider 1997, p. 81) which is “the protection given by a 
(...) subject of international law to individuals, i.e. natural or legal persons, against a violation of 
international law by another subject of international law.” (Geck 1992, p. 1046.)   
177 District Court of Jerusalem, The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 









a country arises at the international level, namely, the relations between the two 
countries concerned alone, and must find its solution at such level.178  
 
Although it is not often mentioned in literature,179 Eichmann not only tried to plead 
a violation of the sovereignty of Argentina, he also brought forth a human rights 
argument. On appeal, his counsel Servatius stated: 
                                                          
178 Ibid., para. 50 (36 International Law Reports 1968, p. 70). Note that this stance, which was, for 
example, also followed by the French Argoud (see n. 389 and accompanying text of Chapter V) and US 
Noriega (see n. 207 of Chapter V) cases, was rejected in the context of the international criminal 
tribunals, see ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a/ “Dule”, ‘Decision on the 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction’, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, 
para. 55: “Authoritative as they may be, those pronouncements do not carry, in the field of international 
law, the weight which they may bring to bear upon national judiciaries. Dating back to a period when 
sovereignty stood as a sacrosanct and unassailable attribute of statehood, recently this concept has 
suffered progressive erosion at the hands of the more liberal forces at work in the democratic societies, 
particularly in the field of human rights. Whatever the situation in domestic litigation, the traditional 
doctrine upheld and acted upon by the Trial Chamber is not reconcilable, in this International Tribunal, 
with the view that an accused, being entitled to a full defence, cannot be deprived of a plea so intimately 
connected with, and grounded in, international law as a defence based on violation of State sovereignty. 
To bar an accused from raising such a plea is tantamount to deciding that, in this day and age, an 
international court could not, in a criminal matter where the liberty of an accused is at stake, examine a 
plea raising the issue of violation of State sovereignty. Such a startling conclusion would imply a 
contradiction in terms which this Chamber feels it is its duty to refute and lay to rest.” It should be 
clarified, however, that the fact that a suspect has ius standi to plead an alleged violation of State 
sovereignty does not mean that this plea will also be successful; as will be shown at n. 582 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VI, if there is no request by the injured State for the return of the suspect, 
the latter’s argument for returning him to the injured State is doomed to failure. (Although this does not 
mean, of course, that the suspect cannot claim that his case should be dismissed on other (human 
rights/due process) grounds.) See ibid., para. 56: “The Trial Chamber was (...) fully justified to write, on 
this particular issue: “[I]t is pertinent to note that the challenge to the primacy of the International 
Tribunal has been made against the express intent of the two States most closely affected by the 
indictment against the accused – Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
former, on the territory of which the crimes were allegedly committed, and the latter where the accused 
resided at the time of his arrest, have unconditionally accepted the jurisdiction of the International 
Tribunal and the accused cannot claim the rights that have been specifically waived by the States 
concerned (...) [emphasis added, ChP].”” See also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, 
Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by 
the Accused Slavko Dokmanovic’, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 76 (see n. 259 of 
Chapter VI), ICTY, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić 
a/k/a Miro Brko, Stevan Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo a/k/a Monstrum and Simo Zarić a/k/a Šolaja, 
‘Prosecutor’s Response to the “Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention and 
Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorović and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss Indictment” 
Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 February 1999’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 February 1999, para. 32 
(this case will be discussed in Subsection 3.1.2 of Chapter VI) and ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor 
v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the 
Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 97 (and n. 107) (see Subsection 3.1.4 of Chapter 
VI). See finally also the discussion of the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision in Nikolić in the same 
Subsection 3.1.4 of Chapter VI. 
179 See, however, Quigley 1988, p. 198. The point is also mentioned in an annex to a motion from the 
Defence in the still-to-discuss Nikolić case, see ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan 
Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the Prior 








The District Court is wrong to assume that only the states concerned can derive rights 
resulting from violation of international law. This conception must be considered 
obsolete on account of the development of international law. The individual, having 
duties imposed on him deriving from international law, must also be granted rights to 
the same extent in the case of infringements committed. It cannot be accepted that an 
individual becomes a toy of states who, for the sake of national interests, disregard 
the interests of the individual.180 
 
Regarding “the development of international law”, Servatius referred to the 1948 
UDHR and, more specifically, to the 1950 ECHR. Although he conceded that Israel 
was not a party to the European Convention, he made a sort of customary 
international law plea by arguing that both instruments mention the right to liberty 
and security, “a basic principle which ought to serve as a guideline to every 
country”.181 The Israeli Supreme Court, however, was not impressed by these 
arguments: it agreed with the reply of the Attorney-General that Israel was simply 
not a party to the European Convention. In addition, it was stated that “[f]rom the 
point of view of customary international law, (…) the abduction of the appellant is 
no ground for denying to the Court the competence to try him once he is within the 
area of its jurisdiction.”182 
Times have changed, however. The UDHR and the ECHR, born out of the 
horrors of WW II, set in motion the signing of other human rights treaties such as 
the ICCPR.183 More and more, individuals entered the arena of international law. 
This was also visible in the field of mutual assistance in criminal matters which 
“increasingly focused on the individual.”184 And rightly so. After all, individuals are 
                                                                                                                                              
Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 72’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 17 May 
2001, p. 18. 
180 Supreme Court of Israel, Adolf Eichmann, Appellant versus The Attorney General, Respondent, 
Criminal Appeal No. 336/61, 31 January 1962, Written Pleadings Submitted by Counsel for the 
Appellant Adolf Eichmann, available at:  
http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.py?people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Appeal/Appeal-Pleading-01-01. 
181 Supreme Court of Israel, Adolf Eichmann, Appellant versus The Attorney General, Respondent, 
Criminal Appeal No. 336/61, 22 March 1962, Transcripts of Appeal Session 1, available at: 
http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.py?people/e/eichmann.adolf/transcripts/Appeal/Appeal-Session-01-01. 
182 Supreme Court of Israel, Adolf Eichmann v. The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel, 
‘Judgment’, 29 May 1962, Criminal Appeal No. 336/61, para. 13 (36 International Law Reports 1968, 
p. 308). 
183 See also Zappalà 2002 A, p. 1187 and Lauren 2004, p. 25. 
184 Trechsel 2005, p. 431. See also Cherif Bassiouni and Wise 1995, p. ix: “International law 
traditionally has been the law of a society made up almost exclusively of sovereign national states. It is 
becoming the law of a planetary community of which all human beings are members”. See also Costi 
2003, p. 68. In that connection, it is also interesting to compare the UNSC’s condemnation of abductions 
in 1960 (focusing on the rights of the injured State alone) and the following condemnation in 1985 
where there was a focus on the rights of the individual as well: UNSC Res. 579 of 18 December 1985 
states: “Considering that the taking of hostages and abductions are offences of grave concern to the 
international community, having severe adverse consequences for the rights of the victims and for the 
promotion of friendly relations and co-operation among States, (…) 1. Condemns unequivocally all acts 
of hostage-taking and abduction; 2. Calls for the immediate safe release of all hostages and abducted 
persons wherever and by whomever they are being held; 3. Affirms the obligation of all States in whose 








more than little parts of States.185 Now that they have rights independent of the 
States where they live or of which they are nationals, they should be able to protest 
against a male captus situation, even if the injured State consents to the operation, 
hence even if there is no problem from a classical international law point of view 
(between States).186  
Nevertheless, one will not find generally drafted human rights (conventions) 
specifically forbidding the techniques of disguised extradition, luring and abduction 
as methods to bring a person to justice.187 What a victim of a male captus situation 
                                                                                                                                              
safe release and to prevent the commission of acts of hostage-taking and abduction in the future; (…) 5. 
Urges the further development of international co-operation among States in devising and adopting 
effective measures which are in accordance with the rules of international law to facilitate the 
prevention, prosecution and punishment of all acts of hostage-taking and abduction as manifestations of 
international terrorism [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
185 See also ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a/ “Dule”, ‘Decision on the 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction’, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, 
para. 97: “[T]he impetuous development and propagation in the international community of human 
rights doctrines, particularly after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, 
has brought about significant changes in international law, notably in the approach to problems besetting 
the world community. A State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a 
human-being-oriented approach. Gradually the maxim of Roman law hominum causa omne jus 
constitutum est (all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has gained a firm foothold in the 
international community as well.” 
186 See Michell 1996, p. 439: “Under international human rights law, individuals have legal rights and 
duties; they are not stand-ins or beneficiaries of rights derived from states. Thus, individuals may assert 
their own rights and need not wait for the injured state to do this for them.” One may also argue, as was 
done in the ICTY Tadić case, see n. 178, that individuals should be able to plead a violation of State 
sovereignty. Nevertheless, as also stated in the same n. 178, this does not mean that such a plea will be 
successful; much will depend here on the reaction of the injured State and that State may not protest the 
abduction or demand the return of the suspect, see Rayfuse 1993, p. 890: “Even in the face of an 
egregious violation of international law there may be occasions when no protest is forthcoming from the 
offended State – for any number of reasons which may not necessarily be related to the case at hand. For 
example, in Ker [see Subsection 1.1 of Chapter V, ChP] the individual in question had not been a 
national of Peru, the country from which he was abducted. Although Peruvian territory had been 
violated Peru would probably have had little interest in protesting in order to seek the return of a non-
national – assuming the authorities were even aware that he had been kidnapped – especially during a 
time of national emergency such as Peru was experiencing at the time.” However, this dependence on 
the reaction of the injured State is lacking in the context of human rights, which individuals enjoy 
irrespective of the reaction of any State.  
187 An example where the prohibition on kidnapping can be seen in another context is the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, whose signing ceremony 
took place in Paris on 6 February 2007. This Convention is focused on kidnappings as tools to make 
persons disappear (instead of kidnappings as tools to bring persons to justice), see its Art. 2 which 
states: “For the purposes of this Convention, “enforced disappearance” is considered to be the arrest, 
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or 
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a 
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the 
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law [emphasis added, 
ChP].” Another human rights example where one can see a condemnation of kidnapping can be found in 
Art. 35 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by UNGA Res. 44/25 of 20 November 
1989: “States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent 
the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form.” Nevertheless, this 








could do, however, is rely on more general human rights provisions from 
international and regional human rights treaties.188 Before giving examples, two 
remarks should be made. First, the examples only cover the basic male captus 
situations. Of course, during an abduction, the suspect may also be mistreated or 
even tortured by his kidnappers. In fact, in many cases in this book, the suspect 
alleges that he was mistreated. In such situations, he can also turn to articles such as 
Article 3 of the ECHR,189 Article 7 of the ICCPR (the prohibition of torture) or 
Article 10, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR (“All persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human 
person”).190 To keep matters clear, however, the examples in the following pages 
                                                                                                                                              
individuals, namely children. Art. 1 of the same Convention explains what a child is: “For the purposes 
of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless 
under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.” It may finally be interesting to 
mention that a bilateral treaty has been drafted which explicitly forbids the use of abductions as a means 
to bring suspects to justice, but this instrument has not entered into force. This instrument is the Treaty 
Between the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of 
America to Prohibit Transborder Abductions, which was drafted after the (in)famous Alvarez-Machain 
case of 1992, which will be discussed in Subsection 1.2 of Chapter V. (The treaty can be found in 
Abbell 2001, at A-303-A-306.) Although both Mexico and the US signed the treaty on 23 November 
1994, it was never submitted to the US Senate for advice and consent to ratification. As a result, it has 
never entered into force. See, for example, Henderson 2006, p. 196 and US Court of Appeals, Ninth 
Circuit, Alvarez-Machain v. United States et al. (No. 99-56762) and Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa et al. (No. 
99-56880), 3 June 2003 (331 F.3d 604), p. 619. 
188 See also the following statements. (It must be mentioned that these were made before the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which 
explicitly states in Art. 1, para. 1 that “[n]o one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance” (which 
includes an abduction). Nevertheless, as already explained in the previous footnote, such an abduction is 
not focused on bringing a person to justice (the context in which this study is interested) but on making 
a person disappear.) Costi 2003, p. 69: “No international treaty explicitly recognises an individual 
human right against forcible abduction or irregular rendition. Yet, such a right has been read into the 
provisions of regional and international human rights instruments relating to the right to liberty and 
security of the person and to protection against torture or other degrading treatment.” American Law 
Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 1987, para. 432 
(‘Measures in Aid of Enforcement of Criminal Law’), Reporters Note 1 (‘Exercise of enforcement 
functions in foreign state without consent’): “None of the international human rights conventions to date 
(…) provides that forcible abduction or irregular extradition is a violation of international human rights 
law. However, Articles 3, 5, and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as Articles 7, 
9 and 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights might be invoked in support of such 
a view.” Borelli 2004, p. 356: “Forcible abduction is not expressly prohibited by any human rights treaty 
or customary rule. Nevertheless, the kidnapping of an individual implies per se the violation of several 
fundamental rights protected by international law. For instance, concerns like the preservation of the 
security of the individual, the condemnation of arbitrary arrest and detention, the respect of the right to a 
fair trial may be interpreted to preclude State-sponsored kidnapping [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
See finally also Quigley 1988, p. 198.  
189 For example, in the Öcalan case (see Subsection 2.2.4), the suspect in question claimed that his male 
captus from Kenya to Turkey did not only violate his right to liberty and security but also “his right to 
respect for his physical integrity. He added that the circumstances in which the arrest had been effected 
also amounted to degrading and inhuman treatment.” (ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. 
Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 2005, para. 177.) (The Court, by the way, did 
not agree with this, see ibid., para. 185.) 








will focus on ‘simple’ male captus situations, where these complicating and 
aggravating factors are not present.191 Secondly, the examples will only involve (the 
more important)192 general human rights treaties. To take again a suspect who 
alleges to have been mistreated during the male captus: such a person could perhaps 
also rely on more specific treaties such as the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. However, an inquiry into 
all these specific instruments would only complicate matters, whereas this chapter – 
as has already been said several times – is merely there to clarify. (They may appear 
in the remainder of this book however.)  
The arguably two most important human rights that can be violated in basic male 
captus situations are the right to liberty and security and the right not to be subjected 
to arbitrary arrest or detention.193  
However, before analysing these two rights, it is also worth mentioning the right 
to a fair trial here. Although the provisions in human rights treaties where the word 
‘fair’ can be found are mainly dedicated to a fair hearing in court, this does not 
preclude a suspect from arguing more generally that his trial must be considered 
unfair if something goes wrong during, for example, his arrest and judges in court 
subsequently do not pay attention to this matter.  
Arguably, the concept of a fair trial is not limited to the hearing in court, but 
encompasses the whole criminal proceedings, including the pre-trial phase and 
hence also the arrest proceedings.  
See in that respect the following words of Nowak, commenting on Article 14 of 
the ICCPR: 
 
The claim to a fair trial in court on a criminal “charge” (“accusation”) does not arise 
only upon the formal lodging of a charge but rather on the date on which State 
activities substantially affect the situation of the person concerned. This is usually the 
                                                          
191 Cf. Garner 2004, p. 886: a simple kidnapping is a “[k]idnapping not accompanied by an aggravating 
factor” whereas an aggravated kidnapping is a “[k]idnapping accompanied by some aggravating factor 
(such as (…) injury of the victim).” Although “Professor Henkin also stated (…) that “[a]bduction 
would also appear to be ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ in violation of” human rights law 
[original footnote omitted, ChP]” (Paust 1993, p. 563), the view of Paust himself is arguably better: “I 
do not agree (…) that every abduction or capture of a person in foreign state territory without foreign 
state consent (…) is necessarily  (…) “cruel,” “inhuman,” or “degrading” within the meaning of relevant 
human rights standards.” (Paust 1993, p. 564.)  
192 For example, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union will not be discussed 
because the older European Convention is clearly more authoritative. 
193 One may also look at a right such as the one mentioned in Art. 13 of the ICCPR (“An alien lawfully 
in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of 
a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national 
security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case 
reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons 
especially designated by the competent authority.”) to contest a disguised extradition, as will be shown 








first official notification of a specific accusation, but in certain cases, this may also be 
as early as arrest [original footnotes omitted, ChP].194   
 
Going back to the more specific right to liberty and security and the right not to be 
arrested or detained arbitrarily, these rights are recognised, at least on paper, around 
the world, in both global and regional human rights treaties.195  
In addition, many countries have adhered to these legal provisions. For example, 
the ICCPR has currently196 165 States Parties.  
The fact that so many States have adhered to these provisions (State practice) 
plus the fact that States arguably have done this because they feel they have a legal 
                                                          
194 Nowak 1993, p. 244. Another interesting quotation can be found in ECtHR (Chamber), Case of 
Miailhe v. France (No. 2), Application No. 18978/91, ‘Judgment’, 26 September 1996, where the 
ECtHR stated in para. 43 that it must “satisfy itself that the proceedings as a whole were fair, having 
regard to any possible irregularities before the case was brought before the courts of trial and appeal and 
checking that those courts had been able to remedy them if there were any”. (Note, however, that this 
case dealt with the admissibility of evidence.) 
195 See for the right to liberty and security of person: Artt. 3 of the UDHR, 9 of the ICCPR, 5 of the 
ECHR, 7 of the ACHR, 6 of the ACHPR, 5 and 8 of the ARACHR and 5 of the CISCHR. See for the 
right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention/imprisonment: Artt. 9 of the UDHR, 9 of the 
ICCPR, 7 of the ACHR and 6 of the ACHPR. (Note that the three other conventions (ECHR, ARACHR 
and CISCHR) do not explicitly use the words “right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention” 
but that other rights could very well encompass this right, see Art. 5 of the ECHR (“[n]o one shall be 
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
law”), Art. 8 of the ARACHR (“no one shall be arrested, held in custody or detained without a legal 
warrant and without being brought promptly before a judge”) and Art. 5 of the CISCHR (“[n]o one shall 
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure established by 
national legislation”). What strikes is that there is no regional human rights treaty for Asia. Tomuschat 
explains this point as follows: “This failure is due not only to political difficulties, but also to the fact 
that Asia is a continent which lacks cultural homogeneity. The Arab countries are a world apart, and 
although their endeavours to produce a human rights instrument came to fruition in 1994, the Arab 
Charter of Human Rights, the outcome of their joint efforts has not attracted any ratifications to date. 
India views itself almost as a continent with a rich intellectual heritage, and China, the Middle 
Kingdom, has always considered that it is the true centre of the world. Japan, too, has a distinct cultural 
identity which can by no means be equated with Chinese culture. Not only do historical and ethnic 
traditions compete with one another. Asia is also divided by the different religions of its peoples. Given 
such divergencies, there is not the slightest prospect that one day an Asian convention on human rights 
reflecting a specific Asian civilization might see the light of the day [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
(Tomuschat 2003, pp. 33-34.) Note, however, that this might change in the future. One possible (but 
admittedly still restricted) sign could be the fact that on 20 November 2007, 10 Member States of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN (namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Cambodia) signed the 
ASEAN Charter, whose Art. 14 (‘ASEAN Human Rights Body’) states: “1. In conformity with the 
purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body. 2. This ASEAN 
human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms of reference to be determined by the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.” Moreover, on 23 October 2009, the inaugural ceremony of the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was held, see ‘AICHR unveiled, 
for the betterment of all ASEAN peoples’, available at: http://www.aseanhrmech.org/news/AICHR-
unveiled-for-betterment-of-ASEAN-people.htm. 








obligation under international law to do so (opinio iuris) means that these rights 
have customary international law status.197  
Furthermore, it could be asserted that this right can be seen as part of general 
international law,198 if not because of the great number of States which have ratified 
the ICCPR,199 then because of the provisions’ customary international law status.200 
                                                          
197 For further evidence of the assertion that these rights have customary international law status, see, for 
example, para. 8 of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 24: 
Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional 
Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, 4 November 1994, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6: “[P]rovisions in the Covenant that represent customary international law (and 
a fortiori when they have the character of peremptory norms) may not be the subject of reservations. 
Accordingly, a State may not reserve the right to engage in slavery, to torture, to subject persons to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to arbitrarily deprive persons of their lives, to 
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, to deny freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to presume a 
person guilty unless he proves his innocence, to execute pregnant women or children, to permit the 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred, to deny to persons of marriageable age the right to 
marry, or to deny to minorities the right to enjoy their own culture, profess their own religion, or use 
their own language. And while reservations to particular clauses of article 14 may be acceptable, a 
general reservation to the right to a fair trial would not be.” See also Rayfuse 1993, p. 891: “It would 
seem uncontroversial to suggest that the rights to liberty and security of the person and to freedom from 
arbitrary arrest are rights which (…) are now firmly rooted in the corpus of customary international 
law.” See also Higgins 1994, p. 70 and De Zayas 2005 p. 22: “The above international norms [De Zayas 
refers hereby to international and regional human rights protecting the liberty and security of person, 
ChP] reflect a universal consensus that an individual cannot be deprived of liberty except pursuant to 
specific legislative authority and with respect for procedural safeguards.” See finally De Londras 2007, 
p. 240: “As well as being protected in specific conventions as outlined above, the right to be free from 
arbitrary detention also forms part of customary international law. By analysis under the two relevant 
considerations – ‘the material facts, that is, the actual behaviour of states, and the psychological or 
subjective belief that such behaviour is ‘law’’ – it is clear that the right to be free from arbitrary 
detention is a customary international law right. In particular, the establishment of the UN Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, the production of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Those 
in Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment and the conclusion of the Draft International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance testify to this assertion [original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].” 
198 See Rodley 1999, p. 264 where he explains that the right to liberty and security is “a right which (...) 
is recognized by general international law”. See also ibid., p. 341: “There are also strong indications that 
the International Court of Justice considers that violation of the right to liberty and security of person 
and the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention is a violation of general international law (...). Here 
the statement of the World Court in the Tehran Hostages case will be recalled: “Wrongfully to deprive 
human beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in 
itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as with 
the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” This statement 
appears to have been a specification of the more general finding that, by keeping the hostages 
effectively imprisoned at the US embassy in Tehran, Iran had committed ‘successive and continuing 
breaches of the obligations laid upon it by the ... applicable rules of general international law’. The 
language hardly admits of an interpretation that does not cover the principles concerning arbitrary arrest 
and detention and liberty and security of person [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” Cf. finally the still-
to-discuss Barayagwiza case before the ICTR (see Subsection 3.2.1 of Chapter VI) where the judges 
held even more generally that “[t]he International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is part of 
general international law”. (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, 








Now that the status of these articles has been clarified to a certain extent, it is 
worth looking at their content. Even though it will be shown that the two rights are 
not exactly the same, the following pages will address them in concert, because they 
are mentioned almost everywhere in one and the same article.201  
What is the exact meaning of this right to liberty and security/the right not to be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention? It would go beyond the scope of the 
present study to examine all the different versions of this right in detail but some 
important aspects should be addressed. Attention will hereby be paid to arguably the 
two most important human rights treaties for the field of international criminal law, 
namely the ICCPR (see Article 9, paragraph 1)202 and the ECHR (see Article 5, 
paragraph 1).203 204 Alongside a more theoretical examination of both provisions (in 
                                                                                                                                              
199 See Brownlie 2003, p. 4: “[T]reaties binding a few states only are dubbed ‘particular international 
law’ as opposed to ‘general international law’ comprising multilateral ‘law-making’ treaties to which a 
majority of states are parties [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
200 Cf. Tunkin, presenting the prevailing theory (in 1993) as follows: “General international law is 
customary law only. Conventional norms, even if all States are parties to a treaty, need the opinio juris 
of these States to become norms of general international law. In other words, treaty provisions must be 
converted into customary norms, in order for them to become norms of general international law.” 
(Tunkin 1993, p. 535.) Note, however, that Tunkin himself was of the opinion that multilateral treaties 
(and not only customary law) could also lead to general international law, see ibid., p. 541: “I believe 
that international lawyers should accept that general international law now comprises both customary 
and conventional rules of international law.” 
201 See n. 195.  
202 “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest 
or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law.” 
203 “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save 
in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of 
a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-
compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation 
prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him 
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it 
is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; 
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful 
detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention 
of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, 
alcoholics or drug addicts, or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his 
effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a 
view to deportation or extradition.” 
204 See, for example, the following words from the ICTR Appeals Chamber in the Barayagwiza case on 
‘Applicable and Authoritative Provisions’: “The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is 
part of general international law and is applied on that basis. Regional human rights treaties, such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, and the 
jurisprudence developed thereunder, are persuasive authority which may be of assistance in applying 
and interpreting the Tribunal’s applicable law. Thus, they are not binding of their own accord on the 
Tribunal. They are, however, authoritative as evidence of international custom.” (ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 
November 1999, para. 40.) Although the American Convention is also mentioned here, it can be argued 
that the ECHR is more authoritative. Cf. in that respect, for example, Sluiter 2003 B, p. 940, n. 20 when 








Subsections 2.2.1 and 2.2.3), how the human rights bodies supervising the ICCPR 
(namely the HRC, see Subsection 2.2.2) and the ECHR (namely the (now defunct) 
ECmHR and the ECtHR, see Subsection 2.2.4) have interpreted these provisions in 
the context of alleged male captus cases will also be examined. It should be 
emphasised that most of the cases from these supervisory bodies do not go into the 
real male captus discussion as they do not need to analyse the effect of the specific 
male captus on the jurisdiction of the court. They are ‘only’ there to determine 
whether a violation of their instruments has occurred.205 As a result, most of these 
cases will be discussed in this part of the book and not in Part 3. Nevertheless, some 
decisions of the supervisory bodies will also be found in Chapters V and VI, for 
example, because it may be interesting to see how an inter-State/tribunal case, after 
being addressed at the national level/the level of the tribunals, was continued at the 
level of these supervisory bodies, or because the supervisory body seemed to do 
more than just determine whether or not a certain act had led to a violation of the 
human rights instrument in question (see the Al-Moayad case, to be addressed in 
Subsection 2.2 of Chapter V).  
 
2.2.1 Article 9, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR 
 
Nowak, in his commentary to this article, explains that “it is not the deprivation of 
liberty in and of itself that is disapproved of but rather that which is arbitrary and 
unlawful.”206  
 
It obligates a State’s legislature to define precisely the cases in which deprivation of 
liberty is permissible and the procedures to be applied and to make it possible for the 
independent judiciary to take quick action in the event of arbitrary or unlawful 
deprivation of liberty by administrative authorities or executive officials.207  
                                                                                                                                              
international law. It is true that this is only a regional convention and therefore the ensuing State practice 
is by definition limited, but this Convention dates from 1950 and served as a model for the ICCPR.”  
205 See also Currie 2007, p. 360 (also writing on male captus case law from (inter)national(ised) courts): 
“Decisions of the human rights supervisory bodies are not exactly on point with the current discussion, 
as they fulfil different functions than either the national courts or the international criminal tribunals. 
While abduction and illegal rendition may cause jurisdictional inquiries in the latter fora, being the very 
courts which can try the individuals, bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights and the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee have a supervisory function. At their most specific these courts will 
adjudge whether a particular prosecution undertaken in spite of abduction or illegal rendition was itself a 
violation of its constitutive human rights instrument, or at least whether the mode of apprehension itself 
was offensive.” See also ibid.: “As might be expected, these cases rest on the illegal acts themselves as 
human rights violations, rather than speaking to the inherent process of the court.” See finally IACtHR, 
Velásquez Rodríguez, ‘Judgment’, 29 July 1988, Ser. C., No. 4 (1988), available at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_12d.htm, para. 134: “The international protection of human 
rights should not be confused with criminal justice. States do not appear before the Court as defendants 
in a criminal action. The objective of international human rights law is not to punish those individuals 
who are guilty of violations, but rather to protect the victims and to provide for the reparation of 
damages resulting from the acts of the States responsible.” 
206 Nowak 2005, p. 211. 








Thus, a person’s deprivation of liberty must not only be “on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law” (lawful); it must not be 
arbitrary either.208 The first condition encompasses the principle of 
lawfulness/legality and has two dimensions: a substantive one (“on such grounds 
(…) as are established by law”) and a procedural one (“in accordance with such 
procedure as [is] established by law”)209 and the second condition contains the 
prohibition on arbitrariness.210  
How do these conditions, which will be further examined infra, relate to each 
other? It is clear from the above that if, for example, a police official maintains that 
an arrest or detention did not violate Article 9, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR, then he 
has to prove both conditions, meaning that he must show that the arrest violated 
neither the principle of legality nor the prohibition of arbitrariness. Consequently, 
this also means that any arrest which does not comply with one of the conditions can 
be seen as violating Article 9, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR. Hence, if it is established 
that an arrest violated the principle of legality (for example because it was not “in 
accordance with such procedure as [is] established by law”), there is already a 
violation of Article 9, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR. It is not necessary in that case to 
also prove that the arrest was arbitrary because the principle of legality was already 
violated. As a result, the arrest can never comply with both conditions (and only that 
will lead to the conclusion: no violation of Article 9, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR). 
Likewise, a violation of Article 9, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR can also be established 
if the arrest did not violate the principle of legality, but was ‘merely’ arbitrary.211  
Focusing now on these conditions and looking first at the principle of legality, it 
must be clarified that the word “law” primarily refers to national law.212 
Nevertheless, from the remainder of the article, it becomes clear that an arrest or 
detention must not only be lawful according to national law but also according to 
international law. For example, in his discussion on paragraph 5 of this article 
(which will be further discussed in Subsection 4.2), Nowak writes:   
 
Arrest or detention is unlawful when it contradicts one of the provisions in Art. 9(1) 
to (4) and/or a provision of domestic law. (…) [A]n arrest may be consistent with 
                                                          
208 See ibid., p. 223. See also ibid., p. 224: “It is not enough for deprivation of liberty to be provided for 
by law. The law itself must not be arbitrary, and the enforcement of the law in a given case must not 
take place arbitrarily.”  
209 See ibid., pp. 223-224. 
210 See ibid., pp. 224-228. 
211 See in that respect Nowak’s presentation of the Van Alphen case: “In van Alphen v. The Netherlands, 
concerning a Dutch solicitor who was detained for more than nine weeks in order to force him to waive 
his professional obligation to secrecy and to solicit evidence which could be used in the criminal 
investigations against his clients, the [ICCPR’s Human Rights] Committee gave a general legal opinion 
about the factors that may render arbitrary an otherwise lawful detention. In conformity with the drafting 
history, the Committee held that remand in custody pursuant to a lawful arrest must not only be lawful 
but reasonable and necessary in all circumstances, for example, to prevent flight, interference with 
evidence or the recurrence of crime. After carefully balancing the different arguments, it found a 
violation of Art. 9(1) [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid., p. 227.) 








domestic laws but nevertheless unlawful under international law, regardless of 
whether this is arbitrary or in violation of the procedural guarantees in paras. 2 to 4 
[emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].213 
 
The same goes for paragraph 4 (which will also be examined in detail in Subsection 
4.2):  
 
In decisions concerning the mandatory detention of immigrants and asylum seekers 
who enter the territory of Australia without a valid entry permit, the [ICCPR’s Human 
Rights] Committee held that judicial review of the lawfulness of detention under Art. 
9(4) must also include the compatibility with international law, above all the 
Covenant itself [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].214  
 
Returning to the prohibition of arbitrariness, what does it entail? Nowak, writing on 
the negotiations of Article 9 of the ICCPR, explains: 
 
Whereas some delegates were of the view that the word “arbitrary” (“arbitraires”) 
meant nothing more than unlawful, the majority stressed that its meaning went 
beyond this and contained elements of injustice, unpredictability, unreasonableness, 
capriciousness and unproportionality, as well as the Anglo-American principle of due 
process of law [emphasis in original and original footnotes omitted, ChP].215   
 
Hence, arbitrariness covers the notion of unlawfulness, but is in fact much more 
than that.216 This additional element is, of course, to be welcomed; otherwise, there 
                                                          
213 Ibid., p. 238. 
214 Ibid., p. 224. 
215 Ibid., p. 225. 
216 Cf. also the 1964 United Nations Committee ‘Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free from 
Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, and Exile’. According to Marcoux, Jr. (1982, p. 366), this committee 
“provides one of the most important interpretations of “arbitrary” [original footnote omitted, ChP]”. 
And indeed, if one looks at the material examined by the committee, one can only agree with this. 
Marcoux, Jr. explains the committee’s methodology and outcome as follows (ibid.): “During the course 
of its study, the United Nations Committee consulted the preparatory works and legislative history of the 
Universal Declaration and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee also referred to 
the reports of the United Nations Seminars on the Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Law or 
Procedure, and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners adopted in 1955 by the first 
United Nations Congress for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders. In addition, the 
Committee examined documents of the League of Nations and work undertaken by regional 
organizations, such as the Organization of American States and the Council of Europe. Finally, the 
Committee collected information relating to the laws and practices concerning arrest and detention in 
“as many countries as possible.” After this exhaustive study, the Committee concluded that “‘arbitrary’ 
is not synonymous with ‘illegal’ and … the former signifies more than the latter. It seems clear that, 
while an illegal arrest or detention is almost always arbitrary, an arrest or detention which is in 
accordance with law may nevertheless be arbitrary.” Accordingly, the Committee adopted the following 
definition of “arbitrary”: “Arrest or detention is arbitrary if it is (a) on grounds or in accordance with 
procedures other than those established by law or (b) under the provisions of a law, the purpose of 
which is incompatible with the right to liberty and security of person” [original footnotes omitted, 








would be nothing wrong with a deprivation of liberty which may be based on a law 
but which may nevertheless be clearly arbitrary (for example because the law on 
which it is based is also manifestly unreasonable).  
The word “unproportionality” in the previous quotation shows that the 
requirement of non-arbitrariness is relative in nature:217 it will depend on the 
specific situation and the circumstances of the case whether a certain case of 
deprivation of liberty will be viewed as arbitrary or not. Nowak also notes this when 
he states: 
 
Cases of deprivation of liberty provided for by law must not be manifestly 
disproportional, unjust or unpredictable, and the specific manner in which an arrest is 
made must not be discriminatory and must be able to be deemed appropriate and 
proportional in view of the circumstances of the case [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].218  
 
This quotation shows that one should not only look at the correctness of the law on 
which the arrest and detention was based, but also at the correctness of the 
enforcement of the law in this specific case.219 A couple of pages earlier, however, 
Nowak explained: 
 
At this stage, a further limit on the scope of personal liberty should be mentioned. The 
traditional view is that it relates solely to the fact of deprivation of liberty and the 
observance of the minimum guarantees specifically formulated in this context, and 
not to the manner in which liberty is deprived. For example, if a person is arrested 
and not informed of the reasons, this is a violation of personal liberty; if he is 
mistreated in the process, this has nothing to do with personal liberty [emphasis in 
original, ChP].220  
                                                                                                                                              
almost always, see supra) arbitrary because it will fall under the first category of arbitrary 
arrests/detentions. 
217 See also Marcoux, Jr. 1982, p. 374: “The more a law operates to deprive individuals of the right to 
personal liberty, the more such a law becomes arbitrary. At the same time, the state has a 
correspondingly greater duty to justify its actions. In this manner, “arbitrary” is not an absolute concept 
with a single, ascertainable meaning. Rather, it is as a relative concept: a law may be more or less 
arbitrary as it more or less derogates from the fundamental right to personal liberty. “Arbitrary” may 
thus be conceptualized as a continuum, at one end of which is complete maximization of the right to 
personal liberty, and at the other, complete minimization of the right to personal liberty. According to 
this analysis, one may judge a law or proposed law by the greater or lesser extent to which it places a 
restriction upon the right to personal liberty. The state may be able to justify impositions on the right to 
personal liberty by referring to other universally recognized goal values, and by arguing that factors 
such as necessity and proportionality justify its action. However, the state has the burden of justifying its 
derogation. This burden becomes greater as infringement upon the personal liberty value increases.” 
218 Nowak 2005, p. 225.  
219 See also n. 208. In that respect, Nowak’s quotation seems to go further than the (admittedly also quite 
old) 1964 United Nations Committee ‘Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, 
Detention, and Exile’ (see n. 216) which did not seem to look at the specific manner in which the arrest 
was made. (The 1964 Study focused on the question whether the arrest and detention were lawful and 
whether the purpose of the law on which the arrest and detention were based was compatible with the 
right to liberty and security.) 








Although it indeed seems clear that other problems which may come with 
deprivation of liberty, such as mistreatment of the arrested person, are not within the 
scope of the right to liberty and security, the fact that the second quotation states that 
one should not look at “the manner in which liberty is deprived” appears to 
contradict the first quotation where one can read that one may look at “the specific 
manner in which an arrest is made”. It looks like the last-mentioned idea (in the first 
quotation) is, however, Nowak’s view. This may be discerned from the fact that the 
second quotation speaks of the “traditional view” with which Nowak may not 
agree.221 Another argument in favour of looking at the specific manner in which the 
arrest was made is that this view can also be found in Nowak’s statement that “the 
enforcement of the law in a given case must not take place arbitrarily”.222 
Whatever the case may be, this study will follow, as others seem to do as well,223 
the first quotation in that one should also look at the correctness of the specific 
manner in which an arrest is made. That one should take into account the specific 
manner in which an arrest was made in the determination of whether the arrest was 
proportional (to come back to that point) seems logical. One can imagine that the 
arrest of a high-level person who, it is known, will do anything to evade justice may 
justify other methods of arrest than in the case of the arrest of a ‘normal’ suspect 
who, it is known, will cooperate with the police. However, it may be the case that 
applying the arrest methods of the first suspect to the second suspect (where this is 
absolutely not necessary and, in fact, disproportional for the goal of arrest) may 
render the otherwise perfectly legal arrest arbitrary. Hence, applying certain 
methods of arrest may not lead to a violation of a person’s right to liberty and 
security in one case but may lead to a violation in another case.  
Paust, however, goes one step further (and arguably one step too far) when he 
asserts: 
 
What is “arbitrary,” otherwise “unlawful,” or “unjust” will have to be considered in 
context and with reference to other legal policies at stake. (…) [I]t may not be 
incompatible with principles of justice, “unjust,” “unlawful” or otherwise “arbitrary” 
to abduct or capture an international criminal in a context when action is reasonably 
necessary to assure adequate sanctions against egregious international criminal 
activity [original footnote omitted, ChP].224  
 
Although one can imagine that the same legal arrest is non-arbitrary in one case and 
arbitrary in the other, it is allegedly not so that an operation that is so often labelled 
as unlawful and arbitrary that one may assert that it is always, in every case, 
                                                          
221 However, it must be admitted that if this is indeed the case, Nowak does not clearly present it as 
such. 
222 Nowak 2005, p. 224. See also n. 208.  
223 See, for example, Chapter IV (‘Overview of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
Standards’) of the Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring (available at: 
http://hrlibrary.ngo.ru/monitoring/chapter4.html) under D 2 (a). 








unlawful or arbitrary (such as an abduction, see Subsections 2.2.2 and 2.2.4),225 may 
become less unlawful or arbitrary under certain circumstances.  
After having reviewed this theory, one would think that all three basic male 
captus situations (disguised extradition, luring and abduction) violate Article 9, 
paragraph 1 of the ICCPR.226 (Whether the law in practice agrees with this will be 
disclosed in a few moments when the actual case law of the HRC is addressed.) 
After all, they all involve operations in which the normal route of bringing a person 
from State B to State A, namely extradition, is circumvented. Hence, such 
apprehensions are arguably not “in accordance with such procedure as [is] 
established by law” because one can assume that States will not draft legislation 
explicitly approving disguised extradition/luring/abduction. However, even if they 
did, such legislation would arguably be arbitrary in nature. That would seem logical 
with respect to abduction, but the same can be argued for disguised extradition and 
luring.227 
In the first case (disguised extradition), procedures in place for other purposes 
are used to extradite a person to another State. Although these procedures as such 
may be procedurally correct, their use as a means to extradite a person to another 
State is arguably not in conformity with the principle of legality. However, even if 
that argument were to be rejected, one could assert that the deprivation of liberty is 
                                                          
225 Cf. also Shearer 1971, p. 75 (see also Gilbert 1998, pp. 358 and 362, referring to Shearer): 
“[A]bduction is such a manifestly extra-legal act, and in practice so hazardous and uncertain, that it is 
unworthy of serious consideration as an alternative method to extradition in securing custody of fugitive 
offenders.” See also Nowak 2005, pp. 227-228: “[O]bvious examples of arbitrary arrest and detention 
include the practice of enforced disappearances and incommunicado detention, as well as kidnappings 
by secret service agents abroad [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” With respect to incommunicado 
detention, this remark should, however, be refined, see Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and International Bar Association 2003, pp. 210-211: “The practice of holding detainees 
incommunicado, that is to say, keeping them totally isolated from the outside world without even 
allowing them access to their family and lawyer, does not per se appear to be outlawed by international 
human rights law, although the Human Rights Committee has stated in its General Comment No. 20, on 
Article 7 of the Covenant, that “provisions should ... be made against incommunicado detention”. What 
is clear from the jurisprudence, however, is that incommunicado detention is not allowed to interfere 
with the effective enforcement of the legal guarantees of people deprived of their liberty. In a case 
where the authors had been held incommunicado during the first 44 days of detention, the Committee 
concluded that both articles 9(3) and 10(1) of the Covenant had been violated because they had not been 
brought promptly before a judge and because of the incommunicado detention. (…) Brief 
incommunicado detention, that is, deprivation of liberty for a short period of time in complete isolation 
from the outside world, including family and lawyer, does not per se appear to be illegal under 
international human rights law, but it cannot be used in order to bar the detainee from exercising his or 
her rights as an arrested or detained person [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
226 Cf. also Van der Wilt 2004, p. 276, arguing that the three methods violate a person’s right not to be 
arrested or detained arbitrarily. 
227 See also Currie 2007, p. 360: “[A]bduction and forms of rendition that are not prescribed by law are 
generally viewed as being human rights violations.” See also Gilbert 1998, pp. 358-359 (whose words 
can arguably also be applied to luring): “[S]ince abduction and collusive deportation clandestinely avoid 








more generally to be seen as arbitrary.228 It seems, in any case, hard to state that in 
such a case, there is nothing wrong with the deprivation of liberty.  
Now, it is true that the ICCPR provision appears to focus on the actions of a 
State’s own investigating authorities and that it does not refer to actions of 
authorities from other States which may execute the actual disguised extradition. 
Nevertheless, as already explained,229 one can imagine that in many cases, the 
‘receiving’ State may very well collude with the sending State in the disguised 
extradition operation. In addition, even if this is not the case, one could argue that a 
person’s right to liberty and security/right not to be arrested or detained arbitrarily 
has been violated by some State and that it is the responsibility of the receiving State 
(which in a way profits from the violation of the sending State) to determine that, in 
the more general process of depriving a person of his liberty and bringing him to the 
jurisdiction of the court in the receiving State, the person’s right to liberty and 
security/right not to be arrested or detained arbitrarily was violated.230 If that were 
not done, then a person whose liberty was factually unlawfully/arbitrarily deprived 
could not exercise the human right he is entitled to, thereby ending up in a legal 
vacuum caused by the fragmentation of the deprivation of liberty over two legal 
systems.231 That is obviously to be prevented. Sluiter, writing on the context of the 
tribunals, states: “It is imperative that the defendant receives the full protection of 
human rights instruments and should not be the victim of the fragmentation of the 
criminal procedure over two or more jurisdictions.”232 That reasoning should 
arguably also count for the inter-State context.  
What can be said about the second case: luring? Can a luring operation be seen 
as a deprivation of liberty not in violation of the right to liberty and security/the 
right not to be arrested or detained arbitrarily? It seems that it can. In Subsection 2.1, 
where whether luring could violate a State’s sovereignty was examined, a passage 
from a resolution from the International Association of Penal Law was quoted. This 
resolution also looked at the question as to whether the practice of luring violates a 
person’s human rights and arguably answered this in the affirmative by stating that 
“[t]he violation entails liability in respect of the person concerned and the State 
whose sovereignty has been violated, without prejudice to any criminal liability of 
the persons responsible for the abduction.”233 Perhaps the following quotation by 
Paust who refers to the position of another international organisation, the 
International Law Association (which is also of the opinion that luring can be seen 
as a form of abduction, see Subsection 1.5) is clearer: 
                                                          
228 Cf. also Sluiter 2003 C, p. 648: “Both disguised extradition and abductions are generally considered 
violations of the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention [original footnote omitted, ChP]. 
229 See n. 49. 
230 Cf. also Frowein 1994, p. 182 (writing on the European context): “[O]ne should recognize that it is a 
violation of Article 5 of the Convention if European countries work together to circumvent the 
guarantee of personal liberty enshrined in Article 5 of the Convention.” 
231 For more information about the negative effects of two overlapping legal systems, see Sjöcrona and 
Orie 2002, pp. 18 and 270.  
232 Sluiter 2001, p. 156. 








The International Law Association recognizes that kidnapping by deception is a form 
of abduction, and abduction to another State to stand trial violates the territorial 
sovereignty of the state from which the person is abducted. The abduction is also a 
violation of the human rights of the abductee. The abductee is unlawfully arrested and 
detained, which is a direct violation of several international human rights conventions 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].234 
 
Before turning to the case law, one important point must still be made. It was argued 
above (when discussing disguised extradition) that even though Article 9 of the 
ICCPR appears to focus on the actions of a State’s own police, a judge confronted 
by a male captus committed by another State should also look at these allegations so 
that he can avoid a potential legal vacuum for the victim of such a male captus. The 
same can be argued with respect to extraterritorial police actions by a certain State. 
Although one may argue that Article 9 of the ICCPR only looks at the arrest 
proceedings within a certain State and hence only covers illegal domestic arrests 
(and not inter-State disguised extraditions (to the extent that State A is colluding in 
such an operation), luring and abduction operations), such a view is arguably too 
restricted. Again, in order to ensure that suspects do not become the victim of a legal 
vacuum, of proceedings that are fragmented over several jurisdictions, the judge 
reviewing the legality of the arrest and detention should look at the entire 
deprivation of liberty proceedings, including those preparatory parts abroad which 
made it possible to, in the end, effectuate the arrest.235  
 
2.2.2 Case law from the HRC 
 
Although the Human Rights Committee, the body supervising the ICCPR, has not 
clearly pronounced itself on the method of luring and disguised extradition, it has 
decided several cases involving abductions, of which four will now be examined.236 
                                                          
234 Paust et al. 1996, pp. 436-437. See also International Law Association 1994, pp. 162-163. 
235 See also the HRC’s General Comment No. 31: “States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, 
to respect and to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all 
persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid 
down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not 
situated within the territory of the State Party.” (HRC’s General Comment No. 31 [80]: ‘Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 of 26 
May 2004, para. 10.) 
236 In addition to these cases, there is another case by the HRC not clearly falling within the different 
male captus situations but still often referred to (see, for example, Rayfuse 1993, p. 892, Michell 1996. 
p. 441, Costi 2003, p. 70 and Loan 2005, p. 272) when these matters are examined: HRC, Pierre Giry v. 
Dominican Republic, Communication No. 193/1985 (20 July 1990), UN Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/193/1985 
(1990), available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session39/193-1985.html. In this case, the 
author of the complaint, the French citizen Pierre Giry, stated that he stayed for two days in the 
Dominican Republic and then went to the airport to buy a ticket to Saint-Barthélemy (ibid., para. 3.1). 
On the airport, however, he was taken to a police office, searched and (two hours and forty minutes 
later) put on a plane bound for Puerto Rico (ibid.). It was there where he was arrested, charged with 
conspiracy and attempt to smuggle drugs into the US, tried before a US District Court, convicted, 
sentenced to 28 years’ imprisonment and fined $ 250,000 (ibid., paras. 3.1-3.3). (Puerto Rico is US 








In Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay,237 Lilian Celiberti de Casariego, a Uruguayan 
citizen by birth and Italian national, was arrested in Brazil on 12 November 1978 by 
Uruguayan agents with the connivance of two Brazilian police officials.238 After a 
detention of seven days in her apartment, she was driven to the Uruguayan border 
and forcibly abducted into Uruguayan territory, where she was detained again.239 
The Committee first explained that the ICCPR can have extraterritorial force: 
 
Article 2 (1) of the Covenant places an obligation upon a State party to respect and to 
ensure rights “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”, but 
it does not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held accountable for 
violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of 
another State, whether with the acquiescence of the Government of that State or in 
opposition to it.240  
 
After this remark, which confirms the above-mentioned idea that a provision such as 
Article 9, paragraph 1 should have extraterritorial force so as to avoid a legal 
vacuum for the male captus victim and which should hence be welcomed, the HRC 
concluded that Uruguay had violated, among other things, “article 9 (1), because the 
                                                                                                                                              
Republic had violated, among other things, Artt. 9 and 13 (see n. 193) of the ICCPR (ibid., para. 2). The 
Committee, limiting itself to an examination of Art. 13 (ibid., para. 5.4), found that there was indeed a 
violation and stated: “The Committee notes that, while the State party has specifically invoked the 
exception based on reasons of national security for the decision to force him to board a plane destined 
for the jurisdiction of the United States of America, it was the author’s very intention to leave the 
Dominican Republic at his own volition for another destination. In spite of several invitations to do so, 
the State party has not furnished the text of the decision to remove the author from Dominican territory 
or shown that the decision to do so was reached “in accordance with law” as required under article 13 of 
the Covenant. Furthermore, it is evident that the author was not afforded an opportunity, in the 
circumstances of the extradition, to submit the reasons against his expulsion or to have his case 
reviewed by the competent authority.” (Ibid., para. 5.5.) Four members of the Committee, in an 
individual opinion (available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/1c06d841819e0385c1256acb00449e95?Opendocument), noted that 
it was not Art. 13, but Artt. 9 and 12 (right to liberty of movement) of the ICCPR that should have been 
looked at. With respect to the most important article here, Art. 9, the four members stated: “In the 
present case, the Dominican Republic was not able to produce or refer to any administrative act ordering 
the expulsion or extradition of Mr. Giry before or after his arrest at the airport. Had there been an 
administrative act, even an irregular one, this might have been a case of expulsion falling within the 
scope of article 13. In the absence of such an act, identifiable, inter alia, by its date, by the authority 
taking the decision and by its nature, it appears to the signatories that the arrest of Mr. Giry and his 
enforced boarding of an Eastern Airlines flight when he wished to travel to Saint-Barthélemy constitute 
unlawful and arbitrary arrest within the meaning of article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.” This case 
could be seen as evidence that the HRC is of the opinion that male captus cases which do not qualify as 
proper abductions may nevertheless violate Art. 9, para. 1 of the ICCPR. 
237 HRC, Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.13/56 (29 July 1981), UN 
Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 185 (1981), available at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session36/13-56.htm. 
238 Ibid., para. 9. 
239 Ibid. 








act of abduction into Uruguayan territory constituted an arbitrary arrest and 
detention.”241    
The second case is also against Uruguay. In Sergio Ruben Lopez Burgos v. 
Uruguay, the author of the complaint asserted that her husband, the Uruguayan 
national Lopez Burgos, was kidnapped on 13 July 1976 in Buenos Aires by 
members of the ‘Uruguayan security and intelligence forces’ in cooperation with 
Argentine para-military groups.242 After two weeks of secret detention in Buenos 
Aires, he was illegally transported to Uruguay, where he was again secretly detained 
until his official arrest on 23 October 1976.243 The Committee agreed with these 
facts.244 As in Celiberti de Casariego, the Committee explained that the ICCPR can 
have extraterritorial force245 and then concluded that Uruguay had violated, among 
other things, “article 9 (1), because the act of abduction into Uruguayan territory 
constituted an arbitrary arrest and detention.”246  
And the third case, which even led to the suspension of diplomatic relations, is 
also against Uruguay. In María del Carmen Almeida de Quinteros et al. v. 
Uruguay,247 the Uruguayan national Almeida de Quinteros submitted a 
communication on her own behalf (not related to the right to liberty and security) 
and on behalf of her daughter Elena (among other things related to Article 9 of the 
ICCPR). According to Almeida de Quinteros, Elena was arrested on 24 June 
1976.248 Four days later, she was taken by military personnel to a specific place in 
Montevideo near the Embassy of Venezuela.249 Almeida de Quinteros explained: 
“My daughter would appear to have told her captors that she had a rendezvous at 
that place with another person whom they wished to arrest.”250  
The following appalling details were then provided by Almeida de Quinteros 
about her daughter’s subsequent kidnapping: 
 
                                                          
241 Ibid., para. 11. 
242 See HRC, Sergio Ruben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.12/52 (29 July 1981), UN 
Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 176 (1981), available at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session36/12-52.htm, para. 2.2. 
243 See ibid., paras. 2.2-2.3. 
244 See ibid., para. 11.2: “As regards the whereabouts of Lopez Burgos between July and October 1976 
the Committee requested precise information from the State party on 24 March 1980. In its submission 
dated 20 October 1980 the State party claimed that it had no information. The Committee notes that the 
author has made precise allegations with respect to her husband’s arrest and detention in Buenos Aires 
on 13 July 1976 by the Uruguayan security and intelligence forces and that witness testimony submitted 
by her indicates the involvement of several Uruguayan officers identified by name. The State party has 
neither refuted these allegations nor adduced any adequate evidence that they have been duly 
investigated.” 
245 See ibid., para. 12.1. 
246 Ibid., para. 13. 
247 HRC, María del Carmen Almeida de Quinteros et al. v. Uruguay, Communication No. 107/1981 (21 
July 1983), UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 138 (1990), available at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/newscans/107-1981.html. 
248 See ibid., para. 1.2. 









Believing that Elena was going to denounce someone, her captors brought her near to 
the Embassy, allowing her freedom of movement so that she could go to the supposed 
rendezvous. Elena, who had already given thought to the possibility, went into the 
house next to the Embassy. From there she managed to jump over the dividing wall, 
thus landing in Venezuelan territory. She shouted “Asylum!” and stated her name and 
occupation. When they realized what was happening, the policemen escorting her 
came through the gate giving access to the gardens of the Embassy, without being 
stopped by the four policemen on guard. When they heard Elena shouting, the 
Ambassador and his secretary, as well as other officials, ran towards her and were 
able to see her being beaten and dragged by the hair by the policemen who were 
trying to remove her by force from Venezuelan territory. The Counsellor of the 
Embassy, Mr. Frank Becerra, and the Secretary, Baptista Olivares, tried to prevent the 
woman seeking refuge from being removed from the Embassy garden before she 
could enter the residence itself. While Elena was being dragged outside, the two 
diplomats were grappling with the police, grabbing hold of Elena’s legs. One of the 
policemen struck Mr. Becerra, who fell, thus enabling them to take Elena away and 
put her in a greenish Volkswagen (…). In their anger, the police even went to the 
inhuman lengths of slamming the car door hard against Elena’s legs while she was 
being bundled into the car, certainly causing a fracture. The car then moved off at 
high speed, with its doors still open, against the oncoming vehicles and despite the 
heavy traffic to be found at that hour (…).251  
 
Again, the Committee agreed with these facts as Uruguay did not furnish the 
Committee with satisfactory evidence to the contrary. As a result, the Committee 
concluded that Uruguay had violated, among other things, Article 9 of the 
ICCPR.252 
The last case is Cañón García v. Ecuador.253 On 22 July 1987, the Colombian 
citizen Edgar A. Cañón García, together with his wife, travelled to Guayaquil in 
Ecuador.254 
 
At around 5 p.m. the same day, while walking with his wife in the reception area of 
the Oro Verde Hotel, they were surrounded by 10 armed men, reportedly Ecuadorian 
police officers acting on behalf of Interpol and the United States Drug Enforcement 
Agency (D.E.A.), who forced them into a vehicle waiting in front of the hotel.255  
 
After half a day of detention in what appeared to be a private residence, Cañón 
García was brought to the airport of Guayaquil, “where two individuals, who had 
participated in his “abduction” the previous day, identified themselves as agents of 
the D.E.A. and informed him that he would be flown to the United States on the 
                                                          
251 Ibid., para. 10.3. 
252 See ibid., para. 13. 
253 HRC, Cañón García v. Ecuador, Communication No. 319/1988 (5 November 1991), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/43/D/319/1988 at 90 (1991), available at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/dec319.htm. 
254 See ibid., para. 2.1. 








basis of an arrest warrant issued against him in 1982.”256 Cañón García’s complaint 
to Ecuador257 was that “in the light of the existence of a valid extradition treaty 
between the State party and the United States at the time of his apprehension, he 
should have been afforded the procedural safeguards provided for in said treaty.”258 
In contrast to Uruguay, Ecuador was frank and conceded that things had gone 
wrong.259 Notwithstanding this, the Committee concluded that Ecuador had violated, 
among other things, Article 9 of the ICCPR.  
What strikes is that in three of these cases,260 the State of residence colluded in 
the operation. Notwithstanding the fact that there was hence consent from the State 
of residence and thus no problem from a classical (inter-State) international law 
point of view, the HRC still found that an abduction had taken place and that this 
abduction violated modern (human rights) international law. As a result, “[t]he 
Committee reinforced the customary international law rule prohibiting forcible 
abduction and transplanted the rule into the human rights context, protecting 
individuals qua individuals.”261 
 
2.2.3 Article 5, paragraph 1 of the ECHR 
 
Like Article 9, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR, Article 5, paragraph 1 of the ECHR 
requires that a deprivation of liberty must be in accordance with the law. 
Comparable with the ICCPR context is that this requirement has both a substantive 
aspect – related to the grounds of the deprivation – and a procedural aspect, in that 
                                                          
256 Ibid., para. 2.2. 
257 With respect to the role of the US authorities, the Committee “observed that several of the author’s 
allegations appeared to be directed against the authorities of the United States, and deemed the relevant 
parts of the communication inadmissible, since the United States had not ratified, or acceded to, the 
Covenant or the Optional Protocol.” (Ibid., para. 5.1.) 
258 Ibid., para. 3. 
259 See ibid., para. 4.1: “Since it is the basic policy of the Ecuadorian Government to monitor the 
application of and respect for human rights, especially by the law enforcement authorities, a thorough 
and meticulous investigation of the act has been conducted which has led to the conclusion that there 
were indeed administrative and procedural irregularities in the expulsion of the Colombian citizen, a fact 
which the Government deplores and has undertaken to investigate in order to punish the persons 
responsible for this situation and to prevent the recurrence of similar cases in the country.” 
260 Namely in Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Sergio Ruben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay and Cañón 
García v. Ecuador. 
261 Michell 1996, p. 442. See also Loan 2005, p. 282: “The right to be free from abduction exists 
independently of whether there is also a breach of the host-state’s sovereignty. To make a breach of an 
individual’s rights dependant on there first being a breach of state sovereignty is to effectively limit the 
scope of the right to being no more than a derivative of a state’s right to territorial inviolability. If the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention is to be an effective human right it must also be available to protect an 
individual in situations where the host-state consents to their abduction. This approach is endorsed by 
Harry Blackmun, a dissenting Supreme Court Justice in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, who 
commented, “even [with] the consent of the foreign sovereign, [kidnaping] a foreign national flagrantly 
violates peremptory human rights norms.” [See also n. 434 and accompanying text, ChP.] Such a view 
recognizes that the rights of an abducted individual will be affected in the same manner whether the 








certain procedures must be followed.262 In this context, the ECHR, again just like 
the ICCPR, essentially refers back to national law.263 Hence, it is clear that both 
rights are almost identical. Nevertheless, there are some differences. For example, 
the ECHR, in contrast to the ICCPR, does not contain an explicit prohibition of 
arbitrariness. However, notwithstanding this, Trechsel claims that the ECHR still 
offers more protection than the ICCPR.264 This is, according to him, because in 
paragraph 1 of Article 5 ECHR, one can find an exhaustive list mentioning the only 
possible exceptions to the right of liberty (“No one shall be deprived of his liberty 
save in the following cases”). Conversely, the ICCPR is more open and states in 
paragraph 1 of Article 9 that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his liberty except on 
such grounds (…) as are established by law.”265 In addition to this, the prohibition of 
arbitrariness has already been explicitly mentioned in case law as a purpose of 
Article 5, paragraph 1 which, of course, must be complied with:  
 
[T]he “lawfulness” of detention under domestic law is not always the decisive 
element. The Court must in addition be satisfied that detention during the period 
under consideration was compatible with the purpose of Article 5 § 1 of the 
Convention, which is to prevent persons from being deprived of their liberty in an 
arbitrary fashion. The Court must moreover ascertain whether domestic law itself is in 
conformity with the Convention, including the general principles expressed or 
implied therein (...).266  
                                                          
262 See Trechsel 2005, p. 406. 
263 See ibid., p. 420. 
264 See ibid., p. 407. Cf. also n. 195. 
265 See, however, Marcoux, Jr. (1982, pp. 371-372) for another view: “By its limitationist approach, the 
European Convention provides a substantially lower standard of protection than do the Universal 
Declaration and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because the word “lawful” qualifies all the 
limitations to the right to personal liberty found in Article 5. To the extent, therefore, that “arbitrary” 
should protect against arbitrary laws, the United Nations prohibitions provide a higher standard or 
protection than does the European Convention [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
266 ECtHR (Third Section), Case of Stašaitis v. Lithuania, Application No. 47679/99, ‘Judgment’, 21 
March 2002, para. 58 (referring to ECtHR (Third Section), Case of J÷čius v. Lithuania, Application No. 
34578/97, ‘Judgment’, 31 July 2000, para. 56). See also ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Winterwerp v. The 
Netherlands, Application No. 6301/73, ‘Judgment’, 24 October 1979, paras. 39 and 45, in which the 
Court first focused on national substantive and procedural law respectively, law which is in principle to 
be decided by national authorities (para. 40 and 46), but then stated that “no detention that is arbitrary 
can ever be regarded as “lawful”.” (para. 39) and “the domestic law must itself be in conformity with the 
Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied therein. The notion underlying the 
term in question is one of fair and proper procedure, namely that any measure depriving a person of his 
liberty should issue from and be executed by an appropriate authority and should not be arbitrary.” 
(para. 45) and that that is something the ECtHR can surely look into. See also the already briefly 
mentioned (see n. 27 and accompanying text) and still further to discuss (see Subsection 2.2.4) decision 
ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Bozano v. France, Application No. 9120/80, ‘Judgment’, 18 December 
1986, para. 54: “The Convention here refers essentially to national law and establishes the need to apply 
its rules, but it also requires that any measure depriving the individual of his liberty must be compatible 
with the purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” See finally the (still-to-discuss, see Subsection 2.2 of Chapter V) 2007 decision in the 
case Al-Moayad against Germany, para. 78: “The Convention lays down the obligation to conform to 








This quotation shows as well that although the focus of this article is on national 
law, international law, namely the Convention itself, should also be looked at in 
establishing whether a deprivation of liberty is lawful or not (cf. the ICCPR), see the 
last sentence of the above-mentioned quotation.267  
Before turning to the case law of the European institutions related to male captus 
situations, it can again be argued that also in the context of the ECHR, Article 5 
should be able to have extraterritorial force, even though it is admitted that the rights 
of the Convention are in principle territory-based.268 As explained already in the 
context of the ICCPR, in order to ensure that suspects do not become the victim of a 
legal vacuum, of proceedings that are fragmented over several jurisdictions, the 
judge reviewing the legality of the arrest and detention should look at the entire 
deprivation of liberty proceedings, including those preparatory parts abroad which 
are executed by officials from the State party to the Convention and which made it 
possible to, ultimately, effectuate the arrest.  
 
2.2.4 Case law from the ECmHR and the ECtHR 
 
What is the ECmHR and ECtHR’s position on alleged male captus situations? Are 
disguised extradition, luring and abduction in violation of Article 5 of the ECHR?  
Starting with disguised extradition and recalling the already-mentioned Bozano 
case (see Subsection 1.3, where it was explained what a disguised extradition in fact 
entails), the defendant in this case brought applications against the three relevant 
countries: France,269 Italy270 and Switzerland.271 The application against the 
                                                                                                                                              
deprivation of liberty should be consistent with the purpose of Article 5, namely to protect individuals 
from arbitrariness”. (With reference to, among other things, ECtHR (Third Section), Case of Čonka v. 
Belgium, Application No. 51564/99, ‘Judgment’, 5 February 2002, para. 39, cf. also n. 605 of Chapter 
V, and ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 
May 2005, para. 83, see Subsection 2.2.4.) 
267 This point can already be found in the passages from the Winterwerp, Bozano and Al-Moayad cases 
as can be found in the previous footnote (referring to the Convention), but in (para. 78 of) the Al-
Moayad case, the ECtHR stated even more generally: “The Court reiterates that on the question whether 
detention is “lawful”, including whether it complies with “a procedure prescribed by law” within the 
meaning of Article 5 § 1, the Convention refers back essentially to national law, including rules of 
public international law applicable in the State concerned”. 
268 See ECtHR (Grand Chamber), ‘Decision as to the Admissibility of Application No. 52207/99 by 
Vlastimir and Borka Banković, Živana Stojanović, Mirjana Stoimenovski, Dragana Joksimović and 
Dragan Suković against Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom’, 12 December 2001, para. 61: “The Court is of the view (…) that Article 1 of the Convention 
[“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section I of this Convention.”, ChP] must be considered to reflect this ordinary and 
essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring 
special justification in the particular circumstances of each case”. 
269 ECmHR (Plenary), Bozano v/France, Application No. 9990/82, ‘Decision of 15 May 1984 on the 
admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 39, pp. 119-146. The English translation 








deporting State, France, was declared admissible with respect to Bozano’s complaint 
concerning the alleged disguised extradition and the ECtHR, in its decision of 18 
December 1986, concluded that   
 
the applicant’s deprivation of liberty in the night of 26 to 27 October 197[9] was 
neither ‘lawful’ within the meaning of Article 5 (1)(f)[272] nor compatible with the 
‘right to security of person’. Depriving Mr. Bozano of his liberty in this way 
amounted in fact to a disguised form of extradition designed to circumvent the 
negative ruling of 15 May 1979 by the Indictment Division of the Limoges Court of 
Appeal, and not to ‘detention’ necessary in the ordinary course of ‘action ... taken 
with a view to deportation’.273 
 
Before further discussing this important decision of the European Court, it may first 
be good to point out that both the application against Switzerland, the State which 
extradited Bozano, after his disguised extradition from France, to Italy, and the 
application against Italy, the State where Bozano was eventually brought to justice, 
were found inadmissible.274 The fact that Bozano could be brought to justice in 
                                                                                                                                              
270 ECmHR (Plenary), Bozano v/Italy, Application No. 9991/82, ‘Decision of 12 July 1984 on the 
admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports. No. 39, pp. 147-157. The English translation 
can be found at pp. 153-157. 
271 ECmHR (Plenary), Bozano v/Switzerland, Application No. 9009/80, ‘Decision of 12 July 1984 on the 
admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 39, pp. 58-70. The English translation can 
be found at pp. 65-70; ECmHR (Plenary), Bozano v/Switzerland, Application No. 9009/80, ‘Decision of 
13 December 1984 on the admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 39, pp. 71-74. 
The English translation can be found at pp. 73-74. 
272 Which reads: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of 
his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (…) the 
lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of 
a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.” 
273 ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Bozano v. France, Application No. 9120/80, ‘Judgment’, 18 December 
1986, para. 60. It hereby attached great weight to the findings of the presiding judge of the Paris 
Tribunal de Grande Instance and of the Limoges Administrative Court. The first stated that “[t]he 
various events between Bozano’s being apprehended and his being handed over to the Swiss police 
disclose manifest and very serious irregularities (...). Moreover, it is surprising that precisely the Swiss 
border was chosen as the place of deportation although the Spanish border is nearer Limoges. [See also 
n. 45, ChP.] Lastly, it may be noted that the courts have not been given an opportunity of making a 
finding as to the possible infringements of the deportation order issued against him, because as soon as 
the order was served on him, Bozano was handed over to the Swiss police, despite his protests. The 
executive thus itself implemented its own decision. It therefore appears that this operation consisted, not 
in a straightforward expulsion on the basis of the deportation order, but in a prearranged handing over to 
the Swiss police ...” (Ibid., para. 31.) The Limoges Administrative Court stated: “[I]n reality, the 
executive sought, not to expel the applicant from French territory, but to hand him over to the Italian 
authorities via the Swiss authorities, with whom Italy had an extradition agreement; the executive was 
therefore seeking to circumvent the competent judicial authority’s negative ruling which was binding on 
the French Government; ... the impugned decision was [therefore] an abuse of powers ...”. (Ibid., para. 
35.) 
274 See Michell 1996, p. 443, n. 307: “Bozano brought an application against Switzerland complaining 
of his arrest on French territory by Swiss police. (…) The Commission considered the application to be 
partly admissible and partly inadmissible, but held that Switzerland could not have avoided its treaty 








Italy, notwithstanding the fact that he had been brought from France to Switzerland 
via the method of a disguised extradition, could be seen as support for the male 
captus bene detentus reasoning.275 Furthermore, the fact that Switzerland could 
extradite Bozano to Italy, notwithstanding the fact that Bozano was brought from 
France to Switzerland through a disguised extradition, can be seen as support for a 
concept which is sometimes referred to as male captus bene deditus: one can 
extradite a person to a third State (bene deditus), even if that person arrived in the 
extraditing State in an irregular way (male captus).276  
Returning to the European Court’s decision with respect to France, Van den 
Wyngaert has qualified this decision as “a great step forward in that it contains the 
first unequivocal international judicial condemnation of deprivation of liberty for the 
purposes of disguised extradition [original footnote omitted, ChP].”277 Nevertheless, 
others were less enthusiastic. One such was Judge Schermers, who wrote a 
dissenting opinion to this case. He first noted that “both parties brought convincing 
arguments before the Commission”278 and that “[i]n a case of doubt where two 
interpretations are possible, it is justifiable to give priority to that interpretation that 
best suits the long term purpose of the Convention.”279 This was, according to him, 
“that interpretation of the provisions on extradition inside Western Europe that best 
facilitates co-operation between the legal systems.”280 After having pointed to the 
fact that in Europe, criminals can easily move from one jurisdiction to another, he 
stated that this necessarily means that they “should be brought before the courts of 
the jurisdiction affected with a[s] few formalities as possible.”281  
 
It does not serve (…) the unity of Europe or the rule of law for a person to get greater 
protection when he moves from one national jurisdiction to another than when he 
stays within one jurisdiction. Special legal protection against extradition may be 
sound when the extradition is to a foreign country, but for re-extradition within 
Europe (one could call it intradiction) such protection should not be necessary. (…) 
[I]t should be normal for a person lawfully convicted in one Western European State 
                                                                                                                                              
from France. (…) Bozano also brought an application against Italy (…). Bozano’s allegations that the 
Italian authorities had corroborated with their counterparts in France and Switzerland to secure his 
return were deemed to be “manifestly ill-founded.”” 
275 See also Warbrick 2000, p. 495, writing on Bozano’s applications against France and Italy: “[I]t is 
the case that detention for the purposes of disguised extradition violates the obligations of the detaining 
State under Article 5(1)(f) but, equally, that the State to which such a person is returned has no 
Convention obligation not to put him on trial [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See also ibid., p. 496: 
“Convention law does not require an automatic abstention from trial of a defendant simply because there 
were defects in the way in which custody over him was obtained.” Cf. also n. 293 and accompanying 
text and n. 351. 
276 This point will be returned to in Chapter V, for example, in cases like X, Schmidt and Al-Moayad. 
277 Van den Wyngaert 1990, p. 774. 
278 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schermers to the ECtHR’s decision of 18 December 1986 in Bozano, 
available at 9 European Human Rights Reports 326-327, p. 326. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid. 








to be brought to the prisons of that State from any of the other Western European 
States without further formalities.282   
 
Focusing on this case, Schermers was hence of the opinion that “[t]he factual 
deprivation of liberty by the French authorities was justified by the need to bring a 
convicted criminal to prison and, therefore, permitted by Article 5(1)(a).”283 This 
view, which clearly favours cooperation over procedural correctness, is arguably too 
much focused on lex ferenda: one may, of course, be of the opinion that a detention 
is justified by a certain need, but that does not also mean (see the word “therefore”) 
that the detention is also legally correct (both substantively and procedurally). One 
can agree with the European Court that not Article 5, paragraph 1 (a), but in fact 
Article 5, paragraph 1 (f) of the ECHR had to be looked at in this case.284  
Whatever one may think of this case, it must be repeated (see Subsection 1.3) 
that it will be quite difficult for a suspect to prove abuse of power (détournement de 
pouvoir) on the part of the deporting/expelling State. After all, the fact that someone 
is wanted abroad does not mean that he cannot be deported, even if his extradition is 
impermissible.285 However, recalling the different purposes of extradition and 
                                                          
282 Ibid.  
283 Ibid., p. 327. Art. 5, para. 1 (a) of the ECHR reads: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law: (…) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent 
court”. 
284 See ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Bozano v. France, Application No. 9120/80, ‘Judgment’, 18 
December 1986, para. 53: “The applicant, the Government and the majority of the Commission were of 
the view that only sub-paragraph (f) applies in the instant case in addition to the first sentence of 
paragraph 1 and the beginning of the second sentence. The Court shares this view. The issue before it is 
not the sentence of life imprisonment Mr. Bozano is serving in Italy after his “conviction by [the] 
competent court” within the meaning of sub-paragraph (a), but the deprivation of liberty he suffered in 
France during the night of 26 to 27 October 1979. The impugned forcible removal was effected “after” 
the aforementioned conviction only in a chronological sense. In the context of Article 5 § 1 (a) (art. 5-1-
a), however, the preposition “after” denotes a causal link in addition to a succession of events in time; it 
serves to designate detention “consequent upon” and not merely “subsequent to” the criminal court’s 
decision (…). This was not so in the instant case, since it was not incumbent on the French authorities 
themselves to execute the judgment delivered by the Genoa Assize Court of Appeal on 22 May 1975 
(…). Nor was it for the French authorities to ensure that that judgment was executed, since the 
Indictment Division of the Limoges Court of Appeal had, by its negative ruling of 15 May 1979 (…), 
caused the Italian extradition request to be refused. The disputed deprivation of liberty was, 
consequently, not undergone as part of “action ... with a view to extradition”; rather, it was the means 
chosen for giving effect to the ministerial [deportation, ChP] order of 17 September 1979, the final stage 
of “action ... with a view to deportation...”. Sub-paragraph (f) therefore applies only in respect of the 
latter words.” 
285 See Van der Wilt 2004, p. 285. Nevertheless, as already stated (see n. 45), it would be easier for a 
suspect to prove such abuse of power if he is not deported to the most obvious country such as the 
country whose borders are closest to the place from which the person is deported. In the Bozano case, 
for example, one can wonder why Bozano was deported to Switzerland and not to Spain (a country 
closer to Limoges than Switzerland), see also ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Bozano v. France, 








deportation,286 the suspect should have a chance to prove that his deportation is not 
used as a tool to remove him from a State – for example because he is endangering 
the public order and security of his State of residence – but as a tool to bring him to 
another State because that State is, for example, interested in prosecuting him. 
However, the following two cases from the ECmHR and the ECtHR seem to 
contradict this idea.    
The first case is C. v. the Federal Republic of Germany.287 According to the facts 
of the case, the applicant, a German citizen, was convicted of criminal offences 
including insulting the constitution and dissemination of propaganda for 
unconstitutional organisations and sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment. When 
he fled to Belgium, Germany did not request his extradition because his convictions 
did not concern extraditable offences under the German-Belgium treaty. On 26 
August 1983, he was arrested in Belgium, brought to the German border and handed 
over to the German police. The applicant claimed that the German authorities had 
instigated his arrest and unlawful expulsion by the Belgian authorities. However, 
according to the Court of Appeal of Schleswig-Holstein, which confirmed a regional 
court’s decision, the applicant had not submitted concrete evidence to show this: 
“The circumstance that the applicant had been expelled to Germany as an 
undesirable alien was to be seen as a simple fact.”288 When the applicant made a 
constitutional complaint, a committee of the Constitutional Court decided not to 
accept it and stated that the Basic Law (the Constitution) did not “prevent the 
German authorities from asking a foreign State to extradite a convicted person even 
though there existed no legal obligation for that State to extradite the person in 
question under an extradition treaty.”289 The applicant subsequently went to 
Strasbourg and claimed, among other things, that Article 5 of the ECHR had been 
violated. The Commission first stated  
 
that there existed no rule of international law preventing the German authorities from 
seeking the applicant’s extradition from Belgium despite the fact that the offences for 
which he had been convicted were not extraditable under the German-Belgian 
extradition treaty.290  
 
Thus, even if Belgium could not extradite him under the German-Belgian 
extradition treaty, it was up to the Belgian authorities to decide on the basis of 
national law whether he could nonetheless be extradited in another way.291 Hence, 
                                                          
286 See n. 24: “Unlike the case where an alien is expelled or deported (…), the motive for the return of a 
fugitive from justice [by extradition, ChP] is not the maintenance of domestic public order or security, 
but the furtherance of foreign criminal proceedings.” (Stein 1995, p. 327.) 
287 ECmHR (Plenary), C. v/the Federal Republic of Germany, Application No. 10893/84, ‘Decision of 2 
December 1985 on the admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 45, pp. 198-204. 
288 Ibid., p. 200. 
289 Ibid., p. 201. 
290 Ibid., p. 203.  
291 Ibid.: “In principle, the question whether or not the offences in question were extraditable or whether 
they were political offences justifying a refusal of extradition was a matter to be judged by the Belgian 








“[a]s there was no right for the applicant not to be extradited there could be no 
question in this case of an inadmissible extradition being circumvented by an 
expulsion procedure.”292 The Commission then distinguished this case from the 
Bozano case but arguably confirmed the male captus bene detentus/deditus 
reasoning underlying that case (with respect to the applications against Italy and 
Switzerland):  
 
In this respect the case can be clearly distinguished from Application No. 9990/82 v. 
France, where the courts had already established the inadmissibility of extradition and 
the authorities nevertheless proceeded to the expulsion of the applicant to a third 
country obliged under a treaty to extradite him to his home country. As the 
Commission found, this way of proceeding might raise an issue under Article 5 para. 
1 (f) read in conjunction with Article 18 of the Convention as to the lawfulness of the 
detention of the expelling state (…). However, as the Commission also found in its 
decisions concerning that applicant’s subsequent detention in the third country 
involved (No. 9009/80 v. Switzerland (...)) and in his home country (No. 9991/82 v. 
Italy (...)), its lawfulness was not affected by the possible unlawfulness of the actions 
of the expelling State. Similarly in the present case, the lawfulness of the applicant’s 
detention in the Federal Republic of Germany could not be affected even if his 
previous detention and expulsion by Belgium might have been unlawful [emphasis 
added, ChP].293 
 
Then, the Commission made the following general statement:  
 
There is nothing in the Convention to prevent a State from expelling a person to his 
home country even if criminal proceedings are pending against him in that country or 
if he has already been convicted in that country. Nor does the Convention prevent 
cooperation between the States concerned in matters of expulsion, provided that this 
does not interfere with any specific rights recognised in the Convention.294 
 
It is submitted that these last words, namely that the Convention does not prevent 
cooperation between States in matters of expulsion, are rather strange. After all, the 
nature of expulsion/deportation has arguably nothing to do with cooperation 
between two States but only with a unilateral action of one State, namely to remove 
an unwanted person from its territory. In the context of expulsion/deportation, the 
destination of the removed person is in principle295 not relevant (whereas it is, of 
                                                                                                                                              
that a person can be extradited on another basis if extradition on the basis of an extradition treaty is not 
possible. That would hence not only be the case if there is no extradition treaty at all, but also if the 
existing extradition treaty does not cover the crime with which the person in question is charged. 
However, if a treaty would explicitly prohibit extradition for a certain crime, this prohibition can, of 
course, not be circumvented by extraditing that person on another basis.) 
292 Ibid., p. 203. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Ibid. 
295 This may, of course, be different when a domestic law states that the expelled/deported person shall 
be expelled/deported to the State, for example, of which that person has a passport or of which that 








course, in the context of extradition, where a person is removed to a specific 
location, namely to the State interested in that person); all that matters is that the 
person is removed from the expelling/deporting State’s territory. Although these 
words may not have the truly ‘colluding’ meaning as they appear to have (perhaps 
the words merely refer to the simple cooperative situation that the unilaterally 
deporting/expelling State informs the State to which the person is being 
deported/expelled that he is coming), another, more famous, case arguably confirms 
the above-mentioned conjecture that the European institutions may view deportation 
and expulsion as means, not so much to remove a person from a State’s territory but 
to bring a person into the power of the authorities of a State which is interested in 
prosecuting that person.  
This is the famous296 Öcalan case.297 In this case, the leader of the Workers’ 
Party of Kurdistan (PKK) and one of Turkey’s greatest enemies,298 Abdullah 
Öcalan, claimed, among other things, that Turkey had violated Article 5 of the 
ECHR because of his alleged abduction from Kenya. What had happened? On 9 
October 1998, Öcalan was expelled from Syria, where he had lived for many 
years.299 After a rather complicated trip to several places where the authorities 
denied his application for political asylum (Greece, Russia, Italy and then back to 
Russia and Greece), he was taken to Kenya where “[h]e was met at Nairobi Airport 
by officials from the Greek Embassy and put up at the Greek Ambassador’s 
residence.”300 He also lodged an application for political asylum with this 
Ambassador, but he never received an answer from him.301 The Kenyan authorities 
were obviously not happy with Öcalan’s presence, which, according to them, 
                                                          
296 See Künzli 2004, p. 141 (commenting on the (comparable) decision of the ECtHR’s Chamber of the 
First Section, which was referred to the Grand Chamber): “This case has been referred to as ‘one of the 
most significant and high-profile cases ever to come before the European Court’ and understandably so. 
It deals with Turkey’s most wanted man, with terrorism, with the death penalty, and with fundamental 
human rights as laid down in Articles 2, 3, 5, and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (…). 
The case also fits in with a whole series of cases dealing either with the relationship between the fight 
against terrorism and the rights under the Convention – right to a fair trial, prohibition of arbitrary 
detention – or with violations of human rights by Turkish officials [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
297 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 
2005. 
298 See ibid., para. 18: “The Turkish courts had issued seven warrants for Mr Öcalan’s arrest and a 
wanted notice (“red notice”) had been circulated by Interpol. In each of those documents the applicant 
was accused of founding an armed gang in order to destroy the territorial integrity of the Turkish State 
and of instigating various terrorist acts that had resulted in loss of life.” The Turkish Court of Cassation, 
upholding the death penalty imposed by the Ankara State Security Court which tried Öcalan after his 
arrest, held that “[a]s a result of the acts of violence carried out by the PKK from 1978 until the 
applicant’s arrest (in all, 6,036 armed attacks, 3,071 bomb attacks, 388 armed robberies and 
1,046 kidnappings) 4,472 civilians, 3,874 soldiers, 247 police officers and 1,225 village guards had 
died” (ibid., para. 49) and that “the PKK, founded and led by the applicant, represented a substantial, 
serious and pressing threat to the country’s integrity.” (Ibid., para. 50.) (Almost three years after the 
decision of the Court of Cassation, the Ankara State Security Court commuted Öcalan’s death penalty to 
life imprisonment because of an amendment to Turkey’s Constitution, see ibid., para. 51.) 
299 See ibid., para. 14. 
300 Ibid., para. 15. 








constituted “a major security risk”,302 and the fact that the Greek authorities had 
organised this whole operation without informing them.303     
On the last day of his stay in Kenya, Öcalan was informed by the Greek 
Ambassador “that he was free to leave for the destination of his choice and that the 
Netherlands was prepared to accept him.”304 However, things went a little different 
in practice. When the Kenyan officials went to the Embassy to bring Öcalan to the 
airport,  
 
[t]he Greek Ambassador said that he wished to accompany the applicant to the airport 
in person and a discussion between the Ambassador and the Kenyan officials ensued. 
In the end, the applicant got into a car driven by a Kenyan official. On the way to the 
airport the car in which the applicant was travelling left the convoy and, taking a 
route reserved for security personnel in the international transit area of Nairobi 
Airport, took him to an aircraft in which Turkish officials were waiting for him. The 
applicant was then arrested after boarding the aircraft at approximately 8 p.m.305 
 
After the domestic proceedings in Turkey,306 the case went to Strasbourg. There, 
Öcalan challenged before the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR the decision of the 
Chamber of the ECtHR of 12 March 2003,307 in which the judges had held “that his 
detention by Turkish officials was lawful and that his interception by Kenyan 
officials and transfer to the Turkish aircraft where Turkish officials were waiting for 
him could not be regarded as a violation of Kenyan sovereignty or international 
law.”308 According to Öcalan, “there was prima facie evidence that he had been 
abducted by the Turkish authorities operating overseas, beyond their jurisdiction, 
and that it was for the Government to prove that the arrest was not unlawful.”309 
Öcalan also stressed, referring to the above-mentioned Bozano case, “the 
individual’s liberty and security from arbitrariness”310 and argued that “his forced 
expulsion had amounted to extradition in disguise and had deprived him of all 
procedural and substantive protection.”311 Because Öcalan used both the concepts of 
abduction and disguised extradition, his arguments are not very clear. This is 
because, as was shown earlier, a disguised extradition is mainly a method used by 
the State in which the suspect is residing and which hence does not lead to a 
violation of that State’s sovereignty whereas in the case of a classical abduction, the 
                                                          
302 Ibid., para. 16. 
303 See ibid.  
304 Ibid., para. 17. 
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306 See n. 298. 
307 ECtHR (First Section), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 March 
2003. 
308 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 
2005, para. 74. 
309 Ibid.  









forum State violates the sovereignty of the State of residence.312 Be that as it may, 
Öcalan also argued that the 1996 decision of the ECmHR in the Illich Ramirez 
Sánchez case was not relevant and was thus not to be followed. In this case,313 
whose national case history will be addressed in Subsection 2.2 of Chapter V and in 
which Ramirez Sánchez314 also complained of a male captus situation related to the 
way he was brought from Sudan to France,315 the Commission, underlining the 
importance of inter-State cooperation, especially in the context of serious crimes,316 
stated:  
 
[T]he Convention contains no provisions either concerning the circumstances in 
which extradition may be granted, or the procedure to be followed before extradition 
may be granted. It follows that even assuming that the circumstances in which the 
applicant arrived in France could be described as a disguised extradition, this could 
not, as such, constitute a breach of the Convention.317  
 
Öcalan argued that this case was not to be followed as Sudan and France had 
cooperated with one another whereas there had been no cooperation between Kenya 
and Turkey in Öcalan.318 
Although the above-mentioned quotation seems to run counter to the decision of 
the European Court in Bozano (where it was, after all, found that the disguised 
extradition of Bozano from France to Switzerland constituted a violation of Article 5 
of the ECHR), it must be remembered that the basis for determining that Bozano’s 
deportation was in fact an extradition in disguise was founded in the law of France, 
                                                          
312 See also n. 21 where it was explained that this case may perhaps also be seen as an informal return. 
313 ECmHR (Plenary), Illich Sánchez Ramirez v/France, Application No. 28780/95, ‘Decision of 24 
June 1996 on the admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 86-B, pp. 155-162. 
314 Note that the European Commission speaks of Sánchez Ramirez whereas Ramirez Sanchéz is more 
often used, see for example: ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Ramirez Sanchez v. France, Application 
No. 59450/00, ‘Judgment’, 4 July 2006 (which involved a decision related to another complaint). 
315 See ECmHR (Plenary), Illich Sánchez Ramirez v/France, Application No. 28780/95, ‘Decision of 24 
June 1996 on the admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 86-B, p. 156: “He alleged 
that, while he was staying lawfully in Khartoum, Sudanese police officers had seized, bound, drugged 
and hooded him and handed him over to French police officers, who had put him, by force, into a 
French military plane bound for Villacoublay military base”. 
316 See ibid., p. 162: “It does not appear to the Commission that any cooperation which occurred in this 
case between the Sudanese and French authorities involved any factor which could raise problems from 
the point of view of Article 5 of the Convention, particularly in the field of the fight against terrorism, 
which frequently necessitates cooperation between States.” It can be argued that this is not a very clear 
sentence as the specifics of this case (the first part of the sentence) are connected to a general statement 
that cooperation is highly needed in the field of the fight against terrorism (the second part of the 
sentence). In any case, the fact that the importance of an effective fight against terrorism is stressed may 
be viewed as evidence for the idea that the seriousness of a suspect’s alleged crimes may play a role in 
the male captus discussion, see also Cazala 2007, pp. 859-860. 
317 ECmHR (Plenary), Illich Sánchez Ramirez v/France, Application No. 28780/95, ‘Decision of 24 
June 1996 on the admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 86-B, p. 162. 
318 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 








a State Party to the Convention over which the Court has jurisdiction.319 This was 
not the case in the Ramirez Sánchez decision as Sudan is not a State Party to this 
treaty. The same can be said of Kenya and that could be a reason for the Court in 
Öcalan to follow Ramirez Sánchez and not Bozano. (This point will be returned to 
when discussing the views of the Court itself.)  
Alongside these international decisions, Öcalan referred to national male captus 
male detentus case law such as the to-be-discussed Bennett, Hartley and Toscanino 
cases320 and argued  
 
that the arrest procedures that had been followed did not comply with Kenyan law or 
the rules established by international law, that his arrest amounted to an abduction 
and that his detention and trial, which were based on that unlawful arrest, had to be 
regarded as null and void.321 
 
                                                          
319 Cf. also Frowein 1994, p. 180: “In several cases the Commission has decided that where the 
expelling state was not a member of the Convention it was impossible to argue before the Commission 
that this state had circumvented extradition proceedings.” However, if the ‘receiving’ State is a party to 
the European Convention, and if there is prima facie evidence supporting his case, a suspect could 
perhaps argue that the receiving State colluded in the operation, hereby violating the provisions of the 
Convention. See also ibid., p. 175: “Where the country from which the applicant was extradited or 
expelled is a country not bound by the European Convention on Human Rights it can only be argued 
that accepting him in a country bound by the Convention is in violation of his rights.”  
320 Reference was also made to the South African case “[Mohamed] and Dalvie v. The President of the 
Republic of South Africa and others, (CCT 17/01, 2001 (3) SA 893 CC)”, decided by the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa on 28 May 2001 and available at: 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2001/18.html. In this case, the Constitutional Court decided that 
the removal of Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, one of the suspects of the bombings of the US Embassy in 
Dar Es Salaam (Tanzania) in 1998, from South Africa to the US, was unlawful, see para. 69 of that 
decision: “Here South African government agents acted inconsistently with the Constitution in handing 
over Mohamed without an assurance that he would not be executed and in relying on consent obtained 
from a person who was not fully aware of his rights and was moreover deprived of the benefit of legal 
advice. They also acted inconsistently with statute in unduly accelerating deportation and then 
despatching Mohamed to a country to which they were not authorised to send him.” However, as 
Mohamed was already transported to the US, the South African judges could not do more than make a 
declaration that the handing over of Mohamed from South Africa to the US was unlawful and that the 
American judge now trying the case had to be informed of this declaration as a matter of urgency. (See 
ibid., para. 74.) In the American case in which this declaration was the subject of proceedings (US 
District Court, Southern District of New York, United States v. Bin Laden, 23 July 2001, No. S(7) 98 
CR 1023 LBS (156 F.Supp.2d 359)), “Mohamed’s request that the Court direct the Government to 
discontinue its capital case against him (…) [was] denied and his request that he be permitted to present 
the decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa as a mitigating factor (…) [was] granted”. (See 
ibid., under V. (‘Conclusion’).) In the end, “[o]n July 10, 2001, after deliberating for approximately two 
days, the jury informed the Court that they were “unable to reach a unanimous verdict either in favor of 
a life sentence or in favor of a death sentence, for any of the capital counts” and indicated that they 
understood “that the consequence of this is that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed will be sentenced to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of release.” (…) There is no way to gauge the significance that the 
jury attached (…) to the decision of the Constitutional Court during the weighing process.” (See ibid., 
under IV. (‘Addendum’).) 
321 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 








The Turkish Government, in response, argued that Öcalan was arrested by Kenyan 
authorities and handed over to Turkish authorities in the framework of cooperation 
between two States confronted by terrorism and that this could not be seen as an 
extradition in disguise violating the Convention.322  
The European Court, after having explained that a deprivation of liberty cannot 
be arbitrary (see the already discussed Bozano case)323 and that “[a]n arrest made by 
the authorities of one State on the territory of another State, without the consent of 
the latter, affects the person concerned’s individual rights to security under Article 5 
§ 1”324 (see the still-to-discuss Stocké case infra), noted – and this was the point 
under discussion before this case was presented in this study – that “[t]he 
Convention does not prevent cooperation between States, within the framework of 
extradition treaties or in matters of deportation, for the purpose of bringing fugitive 
offenders to justice, provided that it does not interfere with any specific rights 
recognised in the Convention [emphasis added, ChP]”.325 As mentioned earlier,326 
this is arguably rather strange as the aim of expulsion/deportation is to remove a 
person from a State’s territory and not to bring that person into the hands of the 
authorities of a foreign State.327   
The Court then turned to the fact that in this case, one of the States (Kenya) was 
not a State Party to the Convention (leading to the observation that possible 
irregularities in Kenya could not be reviewed by the Court).328 It explained that 
                                                          
322 See ibid., paras. 81-82. 
323 See ibid., para. 83. 
324 Ibid., para. 85. 
325 Ibid., para. 86. This general statement was also made by the ECmHR in the still-to-discuss Stocké 
case (which will be examined in a few moments when discussing the method of luring/abduction), see n. 
374. See also the report Extradition. European standards. Explanatory notes on the Council of Europe 
convention and protocols and the minimum standards protecting persons subject to transnational 
criminal proceedings, Council of Europe, December 2006, p. 104. 
326 See n. 24. 
327 See also Michell 1996, p. 391: “Extradition and deportation are conceptually distinct procedures with 
different purposes. The purpose of deportation is to expel unwanted immigrants. In theory, a state which 
deports an individual has no preference as to her destination – it simply wants her to leave. Extradition, 
by contrast, is concerned with the transfer of an individual to a specific foreign state so that she may be 
prosecuted there for specified offenses.” See, however, Frowein 1994, pp. 181-182: “No problem under 
the Convention arises where the expulsion procedure is used to bring a person before the judicial 
authorities of a foreign country if, under the laws of the expelling state, there are proper reasons for 
expulsion. Those reasons might exist in connection with a generally unlawful entry and stay in the 
country or criminal or other unlawful behaviour. (…) [T]he notion of disguised extradition (…) should 
only be seen in the context of the national law concerned. Deportation cannot be used in the cooperation 
between different national authorities only where national law makes it unlawful. Where, however, such 
deportation is fully in line with domestic law, no reason exists to [compel] states only to use a 
formalized extradition procedure [emphasis added, ChP].” 
328 See ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 
May 2005, para. 90: “Irrespective of whether the arrest amounts to a violation of the law of the State in 
which the fugitive has taken refuge – a question which only falls to be examined by the Court if the host 
State is a party to the Convention – the Court …”. See on this point also the report Extradition. 
European standards. Explanatory notes on the Council of Europe convention and protocols and the 
minimum standards protecting persons subject to transnational criminal proceedings, Council of 








[a]s regards extradition arrangements between States when one is a party to the 
Convention and the other not, the rules established by an extradition treaty or, in the 
absence of any such treaty, the cooperation between the States concerned are also 
relevant factors to be taken into account for determining whether the arrest that has 
led to the subsequent complaint to the Court was lawful.[329] The fact that a fugitive 
has been handed over as a result of cooperation between States does not in itself make 
the arrest unlawful or, therefore, give rise to any problem under Article 5 (…).330 
 
Before commenting on this remark by the European Court, it is worth briefly 
discussing the case to which the judges, among other things, refer here, namely the 
Barbie (or Altmann) decision. After the national proceedings in France (which will 
be discussed in Subsection 2.2 of Chapter V), Barbie filed a complaint with the 
ECmHR,331 claiming to have been the victim of a disguised extradition in violation 
of Article 5 of the ECHR.332 
First, the Commission made the general statement (comparable with the one 
made in the Ramirez Sánchez case, see footnote 317 and accompanying text)  
 
that the Convention contains no provisions either on the condition under which 
extradition may be granted or on the procedure to be applied before the extradition 
may be granted. It follows that, even if the applicant’s expulsion could be described 
as a disguised extradition, this would not, as such, constitute a breach of the 
Convention.333  
 
However, the Commission also noted that the question nevertheless arose “of 
whether any concerted action between the two Governments, or the fact that he was 
expelled rather than extradited, would constitute grounds for considering the 
applicant’s imprisonment after he was handed over to the French authorities as 
illegal.”334 After having referred to the Winterwerp jurisprudence of the ECtHR (see 
footnote 266), namely that the lawfulness of a person’s detention is essentially a 
reference to domestic law, in the first place to be decided by national authorities, but 
that the European institutions should also check whether the detention is in 
                                                          
329 It must be noted that “[t]he Convention contains no provisions concerning the circumstances in 
which extradition may be granted, or the procedure to be followed before extradition may be granted.” 
(ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 
2005, para. 89.) See also the report Extradition. European standards. Explanatory notes on the Council 
of Europe convention and protocols and the minimum standards protecting persons subject to 
transnational criminal proceedings, Council of Europe, December 2006, p. 105.  
330 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 
2005, para. 87. 
331 See ECmHR (Plenary), Klaus Altmann (Barbie) v/France, Application No. 10689/83, ‘Decision of 4 
July 1984 on the admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 37, pp. 225-235. (The 
English translation of this decision can be found at pp. 230-235.) 
332 In the application, it is even said that Barbie complained “that his arrest in Bolivia and his subsequent 
transfer from Bolivia to French [Guiana], were effected under an illegal procedure for which the French 
authorities were responsible. He considers that he was virtually kidnapped on the initiative of the French 
Government with the complicity of the Bolivian authorities.” (Ibid., p. 232.) 
333 Ibid., p. 233. 








conformity with the prohibition of arbitrariness,335 the Commission turned to the 
facts of this case and concluded, without any real motivation, that 
 
it forms no part of its task to examine whether the Court of Cassation correctly 
interpreted the French law in this case in arriving at the conclusion that the 
applicant’s detention complied with this law. In the context of the Commission’s 
examination, it is sufficient to state that the Court of Cassation did not apply the law 
in an arbitrary manner and that there is no other ground for concluding that the 
detention had not been ordered “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”, 
or that it was not “lawful”, within the meaning of Article 5 (1) (c) of the 
Convention.336     
 
As a result, the application was declared inadmissible.337 The case’s legacy within 
the context of the European human rights dimension will be discussed at the end of 
this subsection.  
Returning to the Öcalan case and the remark by the ECtHR that “[t]he fact that a 
fugitive has been handed over as a result of cooperation between States does not in 
itself make the arrest unlawful or, therefore, give rise to any problem under Article 
5”, the Court further clarified that in the context of cooperation, even an atypical 
extradition could not as such be seen as being contrary to the Convention, “provided 
that the legal basis for the order for the fugitive’s arrest is an arrest warrant issued 
by the authorities of the fugitive’s State of origin”.338 This quotation, of course, very 
much resembles the excerpts already presented in the context of the Ramirez 
Sánchez and Barbie cases mentioned supra,339 although the words “atypical 
extradition” are probably better chosen than the words “disguised extradition”.340 
These observations were clearly inspired by the following ‘Schermers’-like 
argument (see the discussion of the Bozano case) made by the Court, which stressed 
the importance of cooperation in the fight against crime: 
 
Inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. As movement about the world 
becomes easier and crime takes on a larger international dimension, it is increasingly 
in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee abroad should be 
brought to justice. Conversely, the establishment of safe havens for fugitives would 
                                                          
335 See ibid.  
336 Ibid., p. 235. 
337 See ibid. 
338 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 
2005, para. 89. See also the report Extradition. European standards. Explanatory notes on the Council 
of Europe convention and protocols and the minimum standards protecting persons subject to 
transnational criminal proceedings, Council of Europe, December 2006, p. 107. 
339 See ns. 317 and 333 and accompanying text. 
340 Note that the Chamber of the First Section of the ECtHR (before the case was referred to the Grand 
Chamber) used the expression “extradition in disguise”, see ECtHR (First Section), Case of Öcalan v. 








not only result in danger for the State obliged to harbour the protected person but also 
tend to undermine the foundations of extradition (…).341  
 
After having explained these general principles, the Court considered the facts of 
this specific case and noted first that the Convention was applicable to Turkey, even 
though Turkish officials had operated outside their territory342 – this point was 
already argued in the final words of Subsection 2.2.3. It then turned to the question 
as to whether the arrest was lawful under Turkish law. With respect to the 
substantive element of lawfulness, it noted that, among other things, the seven 
Turkish warrants for Öcalan’s arrest ensured that “his arrest and detention complied 
with orders that had been issued by the Turkish courts “for the purpose of bringing 
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having 
committed an offence””.343 The Court then turned to the procedural element of 
lawfulness and stated that it had to find out  
 
whether the applicant’s interception in Kenya immediately before he was handed over 
to Turkish officials on board the aircraft at Nairobi Airport was the result of acts by 
Turkish officials that violated Kenyan sovereignty and international law (as the 
applicant submitted) or of cooperation between the Turkish and Kenyan authorities in 
the absence of any extradition treaty between Turkey and Kenya laying down a 
formal procedure (as the Government submitted).344 
 
The Court agreed with the Turkish Government. Important reasons to reach that 
conclusion were, for example, the fact that “[t]he car in which the applicant was 
travelling was driven by a Kenyan official, who took him to the aircraft in which 
                                                          
341 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 
2005, para. 88. These words were used for the first time in the famous Soering case, see ECtHR 
(Plenary), Case of Soering v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, 7 July 1989, para. 89. 
342 See ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 
May 2005, para. 91: “The Court notes that the applicant was arrested by members of the Turkish 
security forces inside an aircraft registered in Turkey in the international zone of Nairobi Airport. It is 
common ground that, directly after being handed over to the Turkish officials by the Kenyan officials, 
the applicant was under effective Turkish authority and therefore within the “jurisdiction” of that State 
for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, even though in this instance Turkey exercised its 
authority outside its territory. It is true that the applicant was physically forced to return to Turkey by 
Turkish officials and was under their authority and control following his arrest and return to Turkey”. 
The Court referred here, among other things, to the Ramirez Sánchez case, where the ECmHR held: 
“[T]he applicant is essentially complaining about the deprivation of his liberty by the French authorities. 
According to the applicant, he was taken into the custody of French police officers and deprived of his 
liberty in a French military aeroplane. If this was indeed the case, from the time of being handed over to 
those officers, the applicant was effectively under the authority, and therefore the jurisdiction, of France, 
even if this authority was, in the circumstances, being exercised abroad”. (ECmHR (Plenary), Illich 
Sánchez Ramirez v/France, Application No. 28780/95, ‘Decision of 24 June 1996 on the admissibility 
of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 86-B, pp. 161-162.) 
343 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 
2005, para. 92. 








Turkish officials were waiting to arrest him”345 and the fact that “[t]he Kenyan 
authorities did not perceive the applicant’s arrest by the Turkish officials on board 
an aircraft at Nairobi Airport as being in any way a violation of Kenyan 
sovereignty.”346 As a result, the Court found that Öcalan had not proven that 
“Turkey failed to respect Kenyan sovereignty or to comply with international law in 
the present case”347 and hence concluded that his arrest and his detention “were in 
accordance with “a procedure prescribed by law” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 of 
the Convention.”348 The final conclusion was thus that this provision was not 
violated.349  
Besides the fact that the Court only mentions350 and does not address the element 
of non-arbitrariness here, it still appears strange that the Court concludes that 
Öcalan’s arrest and detention were not only substantively but also procedurally 
correct under Turkish law, even though the arrest and detention were made in the 
context of mere cooperation and “in the absence of any extradition treaty between 
Turkey and Kenya laying down a formal procedure”.351   
                                                          
345 Ibid., para. 94. 
346 Ibid., para. 95. See also ibid.: “The Kenyan authorities did not lodge any protest with the Turkish 
Government on these points or claim any redress from Turkey, such as the applicant’s return or 
compensation.” This latter point, however, could mean that if Kenya would have protested and would 
have asked for the return of Öcalan, the Court might have decided that the arrest of Öcalan was unlawful 
and that he had to be returned to Kenya. See also the report Extradition. European standards. 
Explanatory notes on the Council of Europe convention and protocols and the minimum standards 
protecting persons subject to transnational criminal proceedings, Council of Europe, December 2006, 
p. 108: “This means that in case of a violation of Kenya’s sovereignty, the Court would consider a 
request of return as a logical means of redress. Therefore, the continuity of the inter-state proceedings in 
Turkey would be impaired; the proceedings would have been enforced against a person, which would 
not be lawful under the jurisdiction of that state, especially in view of the fact that the return of the 
person is considered a means of reparation.” 
347 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 
2005, para. 98. Currie 2007, p. 362, referring to this paragraph and para. 90 of the decision, notes that 
“the Court confirmed its jurisprudence to the effect that violation of either the sovereignty of the 
“refuge” state or of an existing extradition or other cooperative arrangement between the two states is 
required for the arrest to be deemed illegal [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
348 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 
2005, para. 99. 
349 Ibid. Hence, if there is no extradition treaty or other formal cooperation regime in force between two 
States, the handing over of a person does not in itself make the arrest unlawful under Art. 5 of the 
ECHR. In such circumstances, there are two requirements, namely that the substantive and procedural 
domestic rules regarding arrest and detention have been followed by the requesting State and 
furthermore that the requesting State’s actions did not violate the sovereignty of the requested State. See 
the report Extradition. European standards. Explanatory notes on the Council of Europe convention and 
protocols and the minimum standards protecting persons subject to transnational criminal proceedings, 
Council of Europe, December 2006, p. 107. 
350 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 
2005, para. 83. 
351 See the above-mentioned quotation at n. 344 and accompanying text and n. 21. See also Künzli 2004, 
p. 147, commenting on the (comparable) decision of the ECtHR’s Chamber of the First Section: “[I]t is 
remarkable that the Court could find a ‘procedure described by law’ in the absence of an extradition 
treaty or even an extradition agreement between Turkey and Kenya.” (Cf. also De Sanctis 2004, p. 554.) 








One can agree with Borelli (who at that time commented on the (comparable) 
decision of the Chamber of the First Section of the European Court) that there is a 
clear difference between the HRC and the ECtHR regarding the point to what extent 
the statal dimension must be taken into account in the process of establishing a 
human rights violation:  
 
[W]hile according to the Human Rights Committee the attitude of the state whose 
territorial sovereignty has been violated is irrelevant, the European Court of Human 
Rights still seems inclined to consider that the forcible abduction of a fugitive 
constitutes per se a violation of the rights protected by the Convention only in the 
case where the authorities of the territorial state do not consent to the abduction, and 
where the procedures put in place by any existing extradition treaty have not been 
followed.352  
 
It indeed seems bizarre to make a violation of a human right dependent on the 
‘injured’ State’s attitude towards the male captus:353 is it not odd that one cannot 
                                                                                                                                              
arrest and in the arrest itself, the Court left the door open for ‘co-operation’ between states in order to 
arrest suspects of crimes by means of extradition in disguise or abduction. With the current fear of 
terrorism and the development of communication technologies, certain forms of co-operation might 
seriously endanger individual liberty and security and indeed lead to arbitrary arrest and detention. 
Herewith the Court apparently adheres to the male captus bene detentus doctrine, notwithstanding 
efforts to prohibit abduction and even raise this prohibition to the level of peremptory norms of 
international law [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid., p. 148.) See also Trechsel 2005, p. 432 (see 
n. 388 and accompanying text). 
352 Borelli 2003, p. 807.  
353 See also Künzli 2004, p. 146, (as earlier explained) also commenting on the (comparable) decision of 
the ECtHR’s Chamber of the First Section: “[C]o-operation does not necessarily legitimize the 
abduction itself. Although it no longer violates the principle of territorial sovereignty and non-
intervention, it can still lead to arbitrary detention and arrest, and ultimately result in a denial of justice, 
since the abducted person is not able to challenge the abduction and to prevent it by legal means. (…) 
[I]n the present case the European Court did consider the violation of territorial sovereignty in case of 
abduction, and concluded that Kenya had consented and thereby taken away the illegality, but the Court 
refrained from judging on abduction in itself as a violation of human rights law, in particular Articles 5 
and 6 of the Convention [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Trechsel 2005, p. 433 (like Borelli 
and Künzli commenting on the (comparable) decision of the ECtHR’s Chamber of the First Section): 
“[I]t is not quite convincing that the respect of the applicant’s rights under Article 5 of the Convention 
should depend on the question whether the sovereignty of Kenya has been respected. Kidnapping 
suspects abroad cannot be compatible with the rule of law.” See also Clapham 2003, pp. 478-479 (like 
Borelli, Künzli and Trechsel also commenting on the (comparable) decision of the ECtHR’s Chamber of 
the First Section): “While the Court’s reasoning with regard to the possible violation of Kenyan 
sovereignty seems incontrovertible, one may ask why the Court, in determining the legality of the 
detention, only looks at the possible violation of sovereignty by Turkey, and not the possible violation of 
human rights by the Kenyan authorities. (…) It is true that the Court cannot determine the legality of the 
arrest in Kenya under the law of Kenya or indeed under the ECHR; but the Court could try to determine 
whether the detention is in conformity with international human rights law. If a European state 
knowingly received a detainee subsequent to an illegal arrest procedure, in international law, that 
European state in assisting, abetting, facilitating or benefiting from a violation of international law such 
complicity would normally incur responsibility in general international law [emphasis in original and 
original footnote omitted, ChP].” Although one can agree with Clapham that the Court focuses too much 
on the issue of State sovereignty here, one can wonder whether Clapham’s test regarding State 








speak of a human rights violation if the suspect has clearly been the victim of a male 
captus, only because the ‘injured’ State – for whatever dubious reasons – has 
consented to the operation?354 Furthermore, this also creates the situation that 
comparable male captus cases can lead to different outcomes, something which is, 
of course, to be avoided from the point of view of legal certainty.355  
Whether the European human rights bodies were of the opinion that the other 
two techniques, namely luring and abduction, violate Article 5 of the ECHR was 
addressed in the Stocké luring case.356 In this case, Walter Stocké, a German citizen, 
was held in custody because he was suspected of tax offences.357 He was 
provisionally released, but when the Ludwigshafen District Court found that he had 
not complied with the conditions of this release, his redetention was ordered.358 At 
that moment, in November 1977, Stocké fled to Switzerland and from there to 
Strasbourg in France.359 In 1978, a certain Köster, a police informer who himself 
was the subject of criminal proceedings, offered Hoff, a police officer, his assistance 
in finding Stocké because he knew a certain Werner, a former colleague of 
                                                                                                                                              
DARS which states that “[a] State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) that State does 
so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be 
internationally wrongful if committed by that State.” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third 
session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 65.) The 
commentary to this article even mentions, as an example of conduct falling under this article, 
“facilitating the abduction of persons on foreign soil”. (Ibid., p. 66.) However, this would seem to 
require active assistance in the conduct, see ibid.: “Article 16 limits the scope of the responsibility for 
aid or assistance in three ways. First, the relevant State organ or agency providing aid or assistance must 
be aware of the circumstances making the conduct of the assisted State internationally wrongful; 
secondly, the aid or assistance must be given with a view to facilitating the commission of that act, and 
must actually do so; and thirdly, the completed act must be such that it would have been wrongful had it 
been committed by the assisting State itself.” Hence, merely benefiting from a violation of international 
would not seem to fall under this article.  
354 Cf. also Mowbray 2003, p. 317 (like Borelli, Künzli, Trechsel and Clapham also commenting on the 
(comparable) decision of the ECtHR’s Chamber of the First Section): “The judgment of the Chamber 
displayed a united resolve to support States in their legitimate attempts to bring suspected offenders, 
who have fled to another country, back to face trial in the territory where their alleged crimes occurred. 
(…) [T]he Chamber determined that extra-territorial actions taken in a non-member State by a party to 
the Convention would violate the fugitive’s right to liberty (Article 5) if they were proven, beyond 
reasonable doubt, to have infringed the sovereignty of the host State and thereby contravened 
international law. This approach allows member States considerable latitude in devising and applying 
strategies to secure the return of wanted suspects.” Cf. also the warning of Künzli mentioned in n. 351. 
355 See the report Extradition. European standards. Explanatory notes on the Council of Europe 
convention and protocols and the minimum standards protecting persons subject to transnational 
criminal proceedings, Council of Europe, December 2006, p. 109: “The breach of sovereignty may 
impair the arrest and detention of the individual, but the motion of the state, where he or she was 
previously located, proves the existence of a breach. It may be noted that in this way uncertainty is 
created in the exercise of the individual’s right.” 
356 ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Stocké v. Germany, Application No. 11755/85, ‘Judgment’, 19 March 
1991. 
357 See ibid., para. 9. 
358 See ibid. 








Stocké.360 At a meeting with Hoff’s superiors, the prosecutor in charge of Stocké’s 
investigation told Köster that although his department did not have the funds to 
reward individuals helping the police, his assistance might play a role at his own 
trial.361 It was emphasised, however, “that any action had to be lawful and designed 
either to discover the applicant’s whereabouts abroad, for the purpose of extradition 
proceedings,362 or to induce him to return to the Federal Republic of Germany of his 
own accord”.363 Köster introduced Hoff to Werner to talk about a business proposal 
but it was decided to meet again in Luxembourg because Hoff wished to talk to 
Stocké in person.364 The ‘Luxembourg’ plan failed, however, and a new meeting 
was set up in Strasbourg. It was there that Köster, Werner and Stocké met on 7 
November 1978. Köster told Werner and Stocké that the other parties had not been 
able to make it to Strasbourg but were waiting in Luxembourg for them and that he 
had chartered a plane to get there.365 Köster secretly asked one of the two pilots to 
touch down at Saarbrücken (Germany) and it was there that Stocké was arrested by 
the German police.366     
The ECmHR stated that the applicant’s arrest was effected on the basis of a valid 
warrant of arrest and was as such justified under Article 5, paragraph 1 (c) of the 
ECHR.367 However, the Commission also (and arguably correctly) looked at the pre-
arrest phase.368 It stated that the words “within their jurisdiction” from Article 1 of 
the ECHR, which stipulates that “[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention [namely Articles 2-18, ChP]” are not limited to the territory of the State 
Party.369 It “extends to all persons under its actual authority and responsibility, 
whether this authority is exercised on its own territory or abroad.”370 These words, 
                                                          
360 See ibid., paras. 10-11. 
361 See ibid., para. 11. 
362 In November 1977, an international request for the location of Stocké’s whereabouts was issued, but 
this had not led to any results. (See ibid., para. 9.) After Köster become involved in the case, “the 
Kaiserslautern public prosecutor’s office had renewed the international request for the location of Mr 
Stocké’s whereabouts (…) for the purpose of seeking his extradition from France.” (Ibid., para. 16.) 
363 Ibid. para. 11. 
364 See ibid., para. 12. 
365 See ibid., para. 18. 
366 That this case involved a luring operation was assumed from the outset, see ECmHR (Plenary), 
Walter Stock[é] against the Federal Republic of Germany, Application No. 11755/85, Report of the 
Commission (Adopted on 12 October 1989), para. 173: “The Commission, like the parties, starts from 
the assumption that K [Köster, ChP] tricked the applicant into boarding an aeroplane allegedly destined 
for Luxembourg, whereas K had arranged for a landing at Saarbrücken-Ensheim airport [emphasis 
added, ChP].” The parties even referred to the term abduction so now and then, see ibid., paras. 183-
185. 
367 See ibid., para. 164. 
368 See ibid., para. 165: “However, the lawfulness of the applicant’s deprivation of liberty must also be 
established in the light of the events resulting in this act, namely the alleged activities of German 
authorities before the arrest of the applicant who was resident in France.” 
369 See ibid., para. 166. See also ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary 
Objections), Application No. 15318/89, ‘Judgment’, 23 March 1995, para. 62. 
370 ECmHR (Plenary), Walter Stock[é] against the Federal Republic of Germany, Application No. 








which are a reminder of the above-mentioned communications of the HRC (see 
Subsection 2.2.2) and of the ECtHR’s decision in Öcalan (see footnote 342 and 
accompanying text), are, of course, to be welcomed because they avoid the legal 
gaps in which victims of male captus situations can fall if such a situation takes 
place in several legal systems. The Commission then clarified that “a person, who is 
on the territory of a High Contracting Party may only be arrested according to the 
law of that State.”371 Conversely, 
 
[a]n arrest made by the authorities of one State on the territory of another State, 
without the prior consent of the State concerned, does not, therefore, only involve the 
State responsibility vis-à-vis the other State, but also affects that person’s individual 
right to security under Article 5 para. 1.372 
    
This statement, which is reminiscent of the one made in the Öcalan case (see 
footnote 324 and accompanying text), clearly spells out that the more serious 
technique of abduction violates Article 5 of the ECHR, but says nothing of the 
technique of luring, where the arrest is not made on the territory of another State. 
Nevertheless, in its determination of what the effect of the involvement of a private 
police informer would be on the responsibility of the prosecuting State, the 
Commission stated more generally:  
 
In the case of collusion between State authorities, i.e. any State official irrespective of 
his hierarchical position, and a private individual for the purpose of returning against 
his will a person living abroad, without consent of his State of residence, to its 
territory where he is prosecuted, the High Contracting Party concerned incurs 
responsibility for the acts of the private individual who de facto acts on its behalf. The 
Commission considers that such circumstances may render this person’s arrest and 
detention unlawful within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 of the Convention 
[emphasis added, ChP].373    
 
                                                          
371 Ibid., para. 167. 
372 Ibid. To an extent, the ECmHR decoupled this right from the classical (inter-State) international law 
context when it continued stating: “The question whether or not the other State claims reparation for 
violation of its rights under international law is not relevant for the individual right under the 
Convention.” (Ibid.) See also Michell 1996, p. 445. However, one must not forget either that the 
ECmHR still demands a statal element for a human rights violation to materialise, namely that there was 
no prior consent of the injured State. (An element which was lacking in the context of the HRC case 
law, where violations were established, even when the injured State cooperated in the male captus.) 
373 ECmHR (Plenary), Walter Stock[é] against the Federal Republic of Germany, Application No. 








Thus, according to the Commission,374 merely (colluding for the purpose of) 
returning against his will a person living abroad, without the consent of his State of 
residence, to the territory of a High Contracting Party where the latter State can 
prosecute that person (this is arguably broader than the technique of abduction 
where the person is actually arrested on the territory of the State of residence) can 
also entail the responsibility of the prosecuting State and can also lead to an 
unlawful arrest/detention within the meaning of Article 5 of the ECHR.  
The question now is, of course, whether a luring operation can be seen as an 
operation against the will of the person. It is clear that this is a difficult matter,375 but 
at first sight, it appears not to be an operation against the will of the person. Recall 
in that respect the facts of the Yunis and Stocké cases. It is true that the defendants 
were lied to so that they could be apprehended. It is also true that they would never 
have agreed to board the motor boat and the aeroplane respectively if they had 
known that this would lead to their arrest. Nevertheless, even if they were tricked, 
they boarded the boat and aeroplane voluntarily and not against their will. It is 
important to distinguish this situation from an abduction where a person is, for 
example, held at gun-point and summoned to board a boat or aeroplane. One could 
argue that in that case also, a person is not physically dragged into the boat or 
aeroplane and hence makes a ‘voluntary’ move. However, the quotation marks say 
enough: this person, even though he enters the boat or aeroplane by himself, does 
not act voluntarily but under duress, for example, because he does not want to 
experience the possible physical injuries of his refusal to enter the boat or aeroplane. 
This is clearly different from a normal luring operation as, in the abduction 
situation, the person does not want to follow his abductors but does it anyway 
because he fears the consequences of his refusal, whereas in most situations of 
luring, a person truly wants to join his (unknown) arresting authorities because he 
has been tricked and he does not know what he can expect. (Otherwise, he would 
not have wanted to follow them.) However, as already explained, much will depend 
on the circumstances. For example, if agents of another State call the suspect and 
threaten to kill him if he does not come to the luring State, and if the suspect, 
pressured by these threats, agrees in the end, it can be argued that the suspect’s 
coming to that State was clearly against his will.  
Although it can be argued that in this case, Stocké’s luring can probably not be 
seen as being against his will, the Commission appeared to take another view of this 
                                                          
374 Which, by the way, continued saying: “The Commission would add that the Convention does not 
prevent co-operation between States, within the framework of extradition treaties or in matters of 
deportation, for the purpose of bringing fugitive offenders to justice, provided that it does not interfere 
with any specific rights recognised in the Convention (…). A problem under Article 5 para. 1 may, 
however, arise in exceptional circumstances, e.g. if a deportation amounting to a disguised form of 
extradition is designed to circumvent a domestic court ruling against extradition”. (Ibid., para. 169.) (Cf. 
the holding of the ECtHR in the Öcalan case (also speaking about deportation) and the holding of the 
ECmHR in the C. v. the Federal Republic of Germany case (speaking about expulsion).) 
375 See Paust et al. 1996, p. 426: “Unlike abduction by force, weapons are not used to get the suspect to 
the location where the arrest will occur. However, whether tricks can overbear the will of an individual 








matter. In its finding that there was no collusion between the German authorities and 
the private individual Köster in the luring operation – the main focus of the 
Commission376 – it arguably took for granted that the luring operation was in fact a 
forcible operation, an operation against the will of the suspect.377 However, even if 
the operation was indeed against the will of Stocké, and notwithstanding the fact 
that German officials cooperated with Köster in the phase before the arrest of 
Stocké,378 Germany did not collude in the luring operation itself and hence did not 
violate Article 5 of the ECHR.379 Nevertheless, if the German authorities had 
colluded in the luring operation, this would arguably have constituted a violation of 
this provision.380     
On appeal, the ECtHR agreed with the Commission that Stocké was lured to 
Germany by Köster.381 The Court then noted that French inquiries vis-à-vis the 
luring operation had not shown that Stocké’s boarding of the plane was against his 
will: 
 
In a letter of 30 October 1980 the public prosecutor’s office in Strasbourg informed 
the office in Kaiserslautern that it had discontinued the proceedings initiated on the 
                                                          
376 “In the present case, the Commission has to determine (…) whether there was collusion between the 
German authorities and K to return the applicant, against his will and without knowledge of the French 
authorities, to the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany in order to effect his arrest, thereby 
incurring the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Germany.” (ECmHR (Plenary), Walter Stock[é] 
against the Federal Republic of Germany, Application No. 11755/85, Report of the Commission 
(Adopted on 12 October 1989), para. 170.) 
377 See not only the previous footnote but also ibid., paras. 178 (“[T]here is no conclusive evidence 
about an agreement with K concerning the applicant’s forced return to the Federal Republic of 
Germany”), 191 (“[T]he Commission finds that the payment of K’s expenses (…) does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that the prosecution authorities had known beforehand about K’s plan to return 
the applicant against his will”), 192 (“The Commission (…) finds that (…) it has not been established 
that German authorities had known about the applicant’s return against his will from France and 
consented to this plan, and that there was thus a particular collusion in this respect”), 193 (“The 
Commission has next examined whether the general concept of co-operation between the German 
prosecution authorities and K in the search for the applicant was such as to cover also the applicant’s 
involuntary return from France”) and 197: “It follows that it has not been established that the co-
operation between German authorities and K in general also covered the applicant’s return against his 
will from France.” 
378 That was certainly the case, see ibid., para. 174: “The Commission finds that the applicant’s arrest at 
Saarbrücken-Ensheim airport was preceded by a close co-operation between German prosecution 
authorities and the police informer K.” 
379 The Commission came to the conclusion “that the facts found do not show that the co-operation 
between the German prosecution authorities and K also covered unlawful activities abroad such as to 
return the applicant against his will from France to the Federal Republic of Germany.” (Ibid., para. 202.) 
Another argument by Stocké, namely that his trial was unfair under Art. 6, para. 1 of the ECHR because 
of the circumstances of his arrest and detention, was also rejected. (Ibid., para. 212.) 
380 See again (see also n. 373 and accompanying text) ibid., para. 168. See also Rayfuse 1993, p. 892: 
“[T]he Commission was quite clear in its reasons that if involvement on the part of the German 
authorities has been proved then a violation of the Convention would have been established [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” 
381 ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Stocké v. Germany, Application No. 11755/85, ‘Judgment’, 19 March 
1991, para. 49: “The Court notes at the outset that the applicant was induced by a trick to board a plane 








complaint [lodged by Stocké, alleging false imprisonment, ChP], as no offence has 
been committed on French soil; the inquiries that had been made had shown that the 
applicant had boarded the plane of his own free will and not under duress (…).382     
 
After having stated that several witnesses examined by the Commission “all denied 
having known about Mr Köster’s plan to bring Mr Stocké back to the Federal 
Republic of Germany against his will or having agreed to such a plan being carried 
out”,383 the Court concluded:  
 
Neither the facts found by the Commission nor the circumstances of the case as a 
whole established that the cooperation that there had unquestionably been between 
the German prosecuting authorities and Mr Köster had extended to “unlawful 
activities abroad such as [returning] the applicant against his will from France to the 
Federal Republic of Germany”.384 
 
A number of issues are now clear: there was a luring operation and there was 
cooperation between the German authorities and Köster. Nevertheless, this 
cooperation did not extend to unlawful activities abroad such as returning Stocké 
against his will from France to the Federal Republic of Germany. However, the 
exact stance of the Court with respect to luring remains obscure because the 
statement that the cooperation between the German authorities and Köster did not 
extend to unlawful activities abroad such as returning the applicant against his will 
from France to the Federal Republic of Germany can be read in two different ways.  
The first reading is that Germany did not commit unlawful activities abroad, not 
because the Germans did not cooperate in the luring operation, but because a luring 
operation in general cannot be seen as an inter-State return of a person against that 
person’s will. Proof for that reading may be found in the fact that the Court referred 
to the findings of the French authorities that Stocké had boarded the plane of his 
own free will. That may mean that the Court, seemingly in contrast to the 
Commission, is of the opinion that luring a person to another State is not against that 
person’s will and hence can never constitute an unlawful activity, even if German 
authorities cooperated in it.  
The second reading is that the Court concurs with what is arguably the 
Commission’s finding that a luring operation constitutes an inter-State return against 
the will of the deceived person and hence an unlawful activity.385 However, because 
in this case, the German authorities did not cooperate ‘enough’ in this illegality, it 
                                                          
382 Ibid., para. 50. 
383 Ibid., para. 51. 
384 Ibid. See also ibid., para. 54: “Like the Commission, the Court considers that it has not been 
established that the cooperation between the German authorities and Mr Köster extended to unlawful 
activities abroad.” 
385 See in that respect also the fact that the Court referred to the denials of the Commission’s witnesses 
that they had known about “Mr Köster’s plan to bring Mr Stocké back to the Federal Republic of 
Germany against his will or having agreed to such a plan being carried out [emphasis added, ChP]”. 








cannot be concluded that Germany, as a State, committed an unlawful activity.386 In 
short, the first reading represents the view that Germany did not commit an unlawful 
activity because luring in general cannot be seen as an inter-State return of a person 
against that person’s will and the second reading represents the view that Germany 
did not commit an unlawful activity because it was not involved ‘enough’ in the 
luring operation, which nevertheless has to be seen as an inter-State return of a 
person against that person’s will (and hence as an unlawful activity). 
One final point has to be made here. The above has shown that whether or not 
luring can be seen as an unlawful activity in general (the following does not concern 
the point whether or not it can be seen as an unlawful activity by the State (of 
Germany)) depends on the question whether it can be seen as a technique of 
returning a person against his will from one State to another.387  
That implies that as long as the deceived person boards the plane (Stocké) or boat 
(Yunis) of his own free will and not under duress, he comes voluntarily to a 
jurisdiction where the arrest can be executed. In that view, there is nothing wrong 
with this technique as long as that person arrives voluntarily in the jurisdiction 
where the arrest is effected.  
However, one can wonder whether this view is not too restrictive and does not 
lead to unfair results: one can also argue that even if a lured person voluntarily 
enters a jurisdiction, his deprivation of liberty may nevertheless be viewed as 
violating Article 5 of the ECHR. That may be the case because the operation 
involves a circumvention of an impossible extradition (and hence cannot be seen as 
an apprehension “in accordance with such procedure as [is] established by law”) or 
because such an operation may not withstand the test of non-arbitrariness in general.  
This may also be the reason why Trechsel writes, referring to this case (and to 
Öcalan and Barbie): “[D]oes the Convention support the thesis of male captus bene 
detentus (or judicatus)? It would seem that it does [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].”388 Although it must not be forgotten that the Commission/Court in principle 
                                                          
386 Cf. also Rayfuse 1993, p. 892 who states: “[T]he Commission was quite clear in its reasons that if 
involvement on the part of the German authorities has been proved then a violation of the Convention 
would have been established. Given its decision with respect to lack of State involvement the Court did 
not find it necessary to comment on this point. The Commission’s reasoning, therefore, still stands 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
387 Recall (see n. 384 and accompanying text) the words: “Neither the facts found by the Commission 
nor the circumstances of the case as a whole established that the cooperation that there had 
unquestionably been between the German prosecuting authorities and Mr Köster had extended to 
“unlawful activities abroad such as [returning] the applicant against his will from France to the Federal 
Republic of Germany” [emphasis added, ChP].” 
388 Trechsel 2005, p. 432. See also n. 275 (with respect to the Bozano case) and n. 293 and 
accompanying text (with respect to the case C. v. The Federal Republic of Germany). Cf. also Van den 
Wyngaert 1990, p. 778 (referring to Barbie): “Neither the European Commission nor the Court has 
unequivocally condemned the practice based on the maxim male captus, bene detentus [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Künzli 2004, p. 148, referring to the Öcalan case (see also n. 351): 
“By not finding any violation of the Convention in the circumstances leading to the arrest and in the 
arrest itself, the Court left the door open for ‘co-operation’ between states in order to arrest suspects of 
crimes by means of extradition in disguise or abduction. With the current fear of terrorism and the 








only focuses on the question of whether certain conduct constitutes a violation of the 
Convention, and not on the question of whether certain conduct would deprive a 
court of jurisdiction, it is true that the European institutions, arguably more than the 
ICCPR’s HRC, appear not only to take into account the human rights dimension of a 
case, but also the other interest by which domestic courts are confronted, namely the 
importance of bringing suspects to justice. The following, above-mentioned words 
from the Öcalan case nicely illustrate this:  
 
Inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. As movement about the world 
                                                                                                                                              
individual liberty and security and indeed lead to arbitrary arrest and detention. Herewith the Court 
apparently adheres to the male captus bene detentus doctrine, notwithstanding efforts to prohibit 
abduction and even raise this prohibition to the level of peremptory norms of international law [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” See finally the report Extradition. European standards. Explanatory notes on 
the Council of Europe convention and protocols and the minimum standards protecting persons subject 
to transnational criminal proceedings, Council of Europe, December 2006, pp. 112-113: “As regards 
extradition treaties between states, when both are parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the issue of “continuity of criminal procedure” is more acute. The Court recently dealt with a case in 
which a violation of Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 4, arose regarding the extraditing state. However, it 
mentioned nothing relating to the issue of continuity in the sense of the maxim male captus, male 
detentus. More specifically, in the Chamaïev judgment, in which the Court had the chance to examine 
the responsibility of both the extraditing and the receiving states, it did not deal with this specific issue. 
One could infer from the Court’s silence that the responsibility of the extraditing state arises under the 
respective articles, but the establishment of jurisdiction over the person concerned by the receiving state 
remains lawful. Following this interpretation, the principle of male captus, bene detentus seems to 
apply, but there are no straightforward arguments by the Court to support this reasoning unequivocally. 
On the contrary, given the fact that the procedural rights stipulated in Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 4, of 
the Convention are an integral part of the extradition procedure concerning the arrest and detention of 
the individual – even in the absence of a specific treaty between the states parties – in the event that they 
are not respected by the requested state, the lawfulness of the subsequent detention in the receiving state 
may be called into question. It would constitute a violation of the law of extradition of the requested 
state and, therefore, unlawful conduct under the European Convention on Human Rights. Room for this 
interpretation has been left opened by the Court in the Öcalan judgment, which stated that the question 
of the violation of the requested state’s legislation would be examined only if the latter were a 
contracting state. There may, therefore, be a violation of Article 5, if the lawful conditions of arrest in 
the requested state are not complied with. Moreover, the European Convention on Human Rights is not 
a common multilateral treaty; on the contrary, it creates a space of “European public order” and the 
obligations created therein are “obligations erga omnes partes”. This means that a state’s obligations are 
not only to individuals under their jurisdiction, but also to the community of states that have signed the 
Convention. The right to inter-state petition itself stems from this particular nature of the Convention. 
Such a community of obligations would be endangered if gaps were to be left in cases of co-operation 
between the states parties; it would legitimise breaches of common obligations and at the same time it 
would undermine the inter-state petition system, in the sense that the receiving state would be estopped 
from using the inter-state petition scheme in view of its acceptance of an unlawful act by the extraditing 
state. Additionally, the dictum ex iniuria ius non oritur, which is part of the principle of good faith and 
refers to the rule of law, which is an inherent principle in the system of the Council of Europe, 
reinforces the argument of illegality of arrest and detention by the requesting state of a person in breach 
of international obligations; not only concerning sovereignty issues, but also international human rights 
commitments stemming from several sources. It, therefore, circumvents the maxim male captus, bene 








becomes easier and crime takes on a larger international dimension, it is increasingly 
in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee abroad should be 
brought to justice. Conversely, the establishment of safe havens for fugitives would 
not only result in danger for the State obliged to harbour the protected person but also 
tend to undermine the foundations of extradition (…).389  
 
2.2.5 Exception: war or other public emergency 
 
If a State is at war or in another state of public emergency,390 certain human rights 
may be curtailed under strict circumstances.391 See in that respect, for example, 
Article 4, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR392 and Article 15, paragraph 1 of the ECHR.393  
                                                          
389 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 
2005, para. 88. See also n. 341. For criticism with respect to such a balancing exercise in the context of 
Art. 5 of the ECHR, see De Sanctis 2004, p. 555. (Note that De Sanctis is not focusing here on para. 4 of 
this article, a crucial provision which will be returned to in this study.) 
390 One could hereby also think of actions taken in self-defence, see Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its 
fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), 
p. 74: “Human rights treaties contain derogation provisions for times of public emergency, including 
actions taken in self-defence.” 
391 Note that in principle this does not go for humanitarian law obligations. See in that respect Meron 
1989, pp. 215-216: “It is now generally accepted that humanitarian instruments, having been adopted to 
govern situations of armed conflict, are not subject to derogations on such grounds as public emergency 
except in the rather narrow context of such provisions as Article 5 of Geneva Convention No. IV 
[“Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an individual protected 
person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such 
individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the present Convention 
as would, if exercised in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such 
State. Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a 
person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power, such person 
shall, in those cases where absolute military security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights 
of communication under the present Convention. In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated 
with humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed 
by the present Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person 
under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent with the security of the State or Occupying 
Power, as the case may be.”, ChP] and Article 45(3) of Protocol I [“Any person who has taken part in 
hostilities, who is not entitled to prisoner-of-war status and who does not benefit from more favourable 
treatment in accordance with the Fourth Convention shall have the right at all times to the protection of 
Article 75 of this Protocol. In occupied territory, any such person, unless he is held as a spy, shall also 
be entitled, notwithstanding Article 5 of the Fourth Convention, to his rights of communication under 
that Convention.”, ChP]. These provisions parallel the limitation clauses of human rights instruments 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].”  
392 “In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is 
officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from 
their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under 
international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion or social origin.” 
393 “In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting 








This point may also be of relevance to the context of the international criminal 
tribunals, as many cases and situations considered by these tribunals take place 
during public emergencies and wars. This does not mean that the judges or 
prosecutors of these tribunals should be less concerned about certain rights because 
they are dealing with suspects possibly originating from a State which is in a state of 
public emergency or war,394 but it may perhaps influence the legality of certain 
actions at the national level (on which the international tribunals, in turn, may 
depend).395 
Should an illegal arrest by national forces in times of public emergency or war 
be looked at differently than an illegal arrest effected in times of (relative) peace? 
This may depend on the question of whether the right to liberty and security/the 
right not to be arrested or detained is a non-derogable human rights provision: 
although it is true that certain human rights can be curtailed in these harsh contexts, 
some rights are considered so important that they have a non-derogable status: they 
have to be respected at all times, even in the case of a public emergency or war.396  
Which rights are non-derogable and is the right to liberty and security/the right 
not to be arrested or detained arbitrarily one of them?  
In that connection, it is worth looking at paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned 
Articles 4 of the ICCPR and 15 of the ECHR. Article 4, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR 
states: “No derogation from articles 6,[397] 7,[398] 8 (paragraphs I[399] and 2),[400] 
                                                                                                                                              
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its 
other obligations under international law.” 
394 Cf. also Sluiter 2003 B, p. 938, writing on the conditions of derogation: “These conditions (…) 
concern the application of human rights within national societies and may not fit easily into the 
application of human rights by international criminal tribunals.” See also ibid., p. 940: “[W]hereas 
States are permitted to derogate from certain human rights on limited and specific grounds, one can 
hardly imagine how these grounds could apply to the Tribunals [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See 
finally Stapleton 1999, p. 600, writing on the ICTY and ICC: “The concept of derogation, justifications 
for derogation, and the standards for review applied to derogation all rely on the premise that in a state 
of emergency a government must maintain the flexibility to deal with a crisis without losing control of 
the state. In the Decision on the Motion for Protective Measures [this is the criticised Tadić case, see n. 
132 of Chapter VI, ChP], the ICTY implied that the fact that a national government can derogate from 
the rights of the accused in a state of emergency indicates that “these rights are not wholly without 
qualification.” What the Tribunal does not say is that qualification of these rights is strictly limited to 
situations where national sovereignty is endangered and, even then, derogation is subject to review by 
international human rights bodies. Obviously, the ICC is not a state, and as such, it does not face the 
same dangers as a national government and cannot justify derogation [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
395 See also n. 202 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII. 
396 Note that in the case of an international armed conflict/non-international (or internal) armed conflict, 
one must, of course, also look at the specific rules of international humanitarian law, such as the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977 (international armed conflict) and 
common Art. 3 to the above-mentioned four Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II of 1977 
(non-international/internal armed conflict). For example, and focusing here on an international armed 
conflict, if combatants of State A capture and detain a combatant of State B (the enemy of State A), then 
that deprivation of liberty must be executed in accordance with the provisions stemming from the Third 
Geneva Convention (related to the treatment of prisoners of war). See, for example, Art. 13 of that 
Convention: “Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated.” 
397 The right to life. (Note that the following descriptions (from both the International and European 








11,[401], 15,[402] 16[403] and 18[404] may be made under this provision.” The 
European paragraph states: “No derogation from Article 2,[405] except in respect of 
deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3,[406] 4 (paragraph 1)[407] 
and 7[408] shall be made under this provision.”  
It thus seems that the right to liberty and security/the right not to be arrested or 
detained arbitrarily, even though it can be seen as having customary international 
law and general international law status (see Subsection 2.2), is not a non-derogable 
right and can be curtailed in times of emergency.409  
And indeed, “[i]n the context of the “war on terror” the United Kingdom has 
derogated from Article 5 of the ECHR, as it did with regard to Article 9 of the 
ICCPR.”410 
Notwithstanding this, the HRC, in its General Comment No. 29 (‘States of 
Emergency (Article 4)’), has also clarified: 
 
In those provisions of the Covenant that are not listed in article 4, paragraph 2, there 
are elements that in the Committee’s opinion cannot be made subject to lawful 
derogation under article 4. Some illustrative examples are presented below. (...) (b) 
The prohibitions against taking of hostages, abductions or unacknowledged detention 
are not subject to derogation. The absolute nature of these prohibitions, even in times 
of emergency, is justified by their status as norms of general international law 
[emphasis added, ChP].411 
 
                                                                                                                                              
398 The right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
399 The right not to be held in slavery.  
400 The right not to be held in servitude.  
401 The right not to be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation. 
402 The right not to be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did 
not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. 
403 The right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. 
404 The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
405 The right to life. 
406 The right not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
407 The right not to be held in slavery or servitude. 
408 The right not to be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did 
not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. 
409 See also Rodley 1999, pp. 342-343: “[U]nder the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, articles 9 (...) and 10 (humane treatment) are derogable. The same is true for the articles 
analogous to Covenant article 9 in the European Convention on Human Rights (article 5) and the 
American Convention on Human Rights (article 7).”  
410 De Zayas 2005, p. 22. Note, however, that this derogation was later deemed invalid by the House of 
Lords, see its ruling of 16 December 2004 (Belmarsh prison), see ibid. 
411 HRC’s General Comment No. 29: ‘States of Emergency (Article 4)’ CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 of 31 
August 2001, para. 13. It is interesting to note that the HRC qualifies the prohibition against abductions 
as an absolute prohibition, as a norm of general international law, even though there is no general treaty 









An interesting document to which reference can be made here is the 1995 
Declaration of Turku,412 which  
 
affirms minimum humanitarian standards which are applicable in all situations, 
including internal violence, disturbances, tensions, and public emergency, and which 
cannot be derogated from under any circumstances. These standards must be 
respected whether or not a state of emergency has been proclaimed.413 
 
This declaration lists amongst these standards the prohibition of abduction414 and 
also a specific part of the human right to liberty and security, namely the already 
briefly mentioned415 right to habeas corpus: the right to challenge the lawfulness of 
one’s detention and to be released if the detention is found to be unlawful, see, for 
example, Article 9, paragraph 4 of the ICCPR and Article 5, paragraph 4 of the 
ECHR (this right will be examined in more detail in Subsection 4.2).416  
It seems logical to qualify this part of the right to liberty and security as non-
derogable. After all, how can the fact that a person cannot challenge the lawfulness 
of his detention be viewed as “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” 
(see footnotes 392 and 393)?  
                                                          
412 Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, reprinted in Report of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its Forty-sixth Session, Commission on 
Human Rights, 51st Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 19, at 4, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/116 (1995) 
(Declaration of Turku), available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1990b.htm. 
413 Art. 1 of the Declaration of Turku.  
414 Art. 3, para. 2 (d) of the Declaration of Turku. 
415 See n. 42 of Chapter II. 
416 See Art. 4, para. 3 of the Declaration of Turku: “Everyone who is deprived of his or her liberty by 
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of the detention shall be 
decided speedily by a court and his or her release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”. See also UN 
Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/19, 18 June 1996, Commission on Human 
Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Forty-eighth 
session, Item 10 (a) of the provisional agenda: The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of 
Detainees: Questions of Human Rights and States of Emergency, Ninth annual report and list of States 
which, since 1 January 1985, have proclaimed, extended or terminated a state of emergency, presented 
by Mr Leandro Despouy, Special Rapporteur appointed pursuant to Economic and Social Council 
resolution 1985/37, para. 13, where it is stated that the remedy of habeas corpus is “a guarantee which is 
not derogable at any time or under any circumstance”. Although Rodley had already indicated that he 
viewed the general right to liberty and security to fall under general international law (see n. 198), he 
more explicitly confirms this with respect to the right to habeas corpus, see Rodley 1999, p. 340: “That 
the Covenant and at least two of the regional human rights conventions have the above elements in 
common is strong evidence that they express a rule of general international law. These elements may be 
defined as: (a) the right in criminal cases of a detained person to be brought promptly before a judge and 
(b) the right of anyone deprived of liberty to challenge the lawfulness of detention and to be released if 
the detention is found to be unlawful.” These words of Rodley were confirmed by Zappalà 2003, p. 68. 
Cf. also Principle 32, para. 1 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form 
of Detention or Imprisonment (UNGA Res. 43/173 of 9 December 1988, available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/bodyprinciples.htm): “A detained person or his counsel shall be 
entitled at any time to take proceedings according to domestic law before a judicial or other authority to 








In the words of Rodley (writing on prolonged incommunicado detention and 
denial of the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention):  
 
[I]t may well be that measures are necessary to prevent an arrested or detained person 
from pursuing violent conspiracies, or colluding with alleged co-offenders, or 
warning them of the interest of the authorities; it may even be that administrative 
internment is not yet beyond the bounds of international law and that it may have a 
certain preventive utility, but none of this requires that the detained person be barred 
from all contact with the outside world, legal, medical, and family, or that the 
detention not be effected according to the terms and procedures established by the law 
authorizing it [original footnote omitted, ChP].417 
 
Rodley explains that cases from the ECtHR “tend to confirm this approach”418 but 
more explicit in that respect are the two Advisory Opinions of the IACtHR on this 
subject. In the first, of 30 January 1987, the Court held, unanimously, “[t]hat (...) the 
legal remedies guaranteed in Articles 7(6)[419] and 25(1)[420] of the Convention may 
not be suspended because they are judicial guarantees essential for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms whose suspension Article 27(2)[421] prohibits.”422 In the 
                                                          
417 Rodley 1999, p. 344. See also Nowak 1993, p. 85, who points to para. 70 of the ‘Siracusa Principles’ 
(UN, Economic and Social Council, UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, ‘Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, Annex, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984)), which, 
among other things, stresses the fundamental importance of habeas corpus: “Although protections 
against arbitrary arrest and detention (Art. 9) and the right to a fair and public hearing in the 
determination of a criminal charge (Art. 14) may be subject to legitimate limitations if strictly required 
by the exigencies of an emergency situation, the denial of certain rights fundamental to human dignity 
can never be strictly necessary in any conceivable emergency. Respect for these fundamental rights is 
essential in order to ensure enjoyment of non-derogable rights and to provide an effective remedy 
against their violation. In particular: (…) (d) where persons are detained without charge the need of their 
continued detention shall be considered periodically by an independent review tribunal”.  
418 Rodley 1999, p. 344. See on this point also De Londras 2007, pp. 253ff. 
419 “Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in order that 
the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release if 
the arrest or detention is unlawful. In States Parties whose laws provide that anyone who believes 
himself to be threatened with deprivation of his liberty is entitled to recourse to a competent court in 
order that it may decide on the lawfulness of such threat, this remedy may not be restricted or abolished. 
The interested party or another person in his behalf is entitled to seek these remedies.” 
420 “Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a 
competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by 
the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may 
have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.” 
421 “The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the following articles: Article 3 
(Right to Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 
6 (Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of 
Conscience and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article 19 
(Rights of the Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in 
Government), or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights.” 
422 IACtHR, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, ‘Advisory Opinion OC-8/87’, 30 January 1987, 








second, of 6 October 1987, the Court confirmed this reasoning, holding 
unanimously  
 
[t]hat the “essential” judicial guarantees which are not subject to derogation, 
according to Article 27(2) of the Convention, include habeas corpus (Art. 7(6)), 
amparo,[423] and any other effective remedy before judges or competent tribunals 
(Art. 25(1)), which is designed to guarantee the respect of the rights and freedoms 
whose suspension is not authorized by the Convention.424  
 
Finally, the HRC has also confirmed the importance of habeas corpus in times of 
emergency. Here, one can refer to paragraph 16 of its above-mentioned General 
Comment No. 29: 
 
Safeguards related to derogation, as embodied in article 4 of the Covenant, are based 
on the principles of legality and the rule of law inherent in the Covenant as a whole. 
As certain elements of the right to a fair trial are explicitly guaranteed under 
international humanitarian law during armed conflict, the Committee finds no 
justification for derogation from these guarantees during other emergency situations. 
The Committee is of the opinion that the principles of legality and the rule of law 
require that fundamental requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state of 
emergency. Only a court of law may try and convict a person for a criminal offence. 
The presumption of innocence must be respected. In order to protect non-derogable 
rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide 
without delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a State 
party’s decision to derogate from the Covenant [original footnote omitted, ChP].425 
 
Now that there is support for the idea that the right to habeas corpus not only has 
customary international law/general international law status, but can also be seen as 
non-derogable,426 that other term often affiliated with non-derogability comes into 
sight: ius cogens (see also the last footnote). This term stems from Articles 53 and 
64427 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The first article reads: 
                                                          
423 See ibid., para. 32: ““[A]mparo,” (...) is a simple and prompt remedy designed for the protection of 
all of the rights recognized by the constitutions and laws of the States Parties and by the Convention.” 
424 IACtHR, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, ‘Advisory Opinion OC-9/87’, 6 October 1987, 
Ser. A., No. 9 (1987), available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4i.htm, para. 41 (1). 
425 HRC’s General Comment No. 29: ‘States of Emergency (Article 4)’ CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 of 31 
August 2001, para. 16. 
426 See also more generally De Londras 2007, pp. 250-251: “[C]ertain rights (including, but not limited 
to, jus cogens rights) are incapable of derogation. No international covenant expressly deems the right to 
challenge the lawfulness of detention as one that is non-derogable. That notwithstanding, international 
institutions have developed a position whereby this right appears to have become accepted as a non-
derogable right as a result of both its role in ensuring the Rule of Law and principle of legality, and its 
fundamentality to the protection of individuals from the violation of their other expressly non-derogable 
freedoms. Thus, emergencies may justify the introduction of legislation allowing for a longer period of 
detention without charge, but cannot result in the absolute prohibition of a means to challenge the 
lawfulness of that detention.” 
427 “If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in 








A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory 
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only be a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character. 
 
Although it thus seems that ius cogens can be equated with non-derogable rights, the 
latter category is arguably broader than the former: while every norm of ius cogens 
must be non-derogable (see the above-mentioned provision of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties), not every non-derogable right is ius cogens.428 
Although the right to liberty and security/the right not to be arrested or detained 
arbitrarily can arguably be seen as customary international law/general international 
law and part of that right as a non-derogable norm, it is unclear whether (parts of) 
the right to liberty and security can be seen as ius cogens as well, a term which 
requires not just any norm of general international law as such, but a peremptory 
norm of general international law. This is because this term has often been reserved 
for such core norms as the unlawful use of force, genocide, slave trading and 
piracy,429 norms which makes one doubt whether (parts of) the right to liberty and 
security is also included.430  
Notwithstanding this, the right to liberty and security has also been linked with 
the term ius cogens, although the exact threshold differs and is thus unclear. 
Seiderman, for instance, is of the opinion that arbitrary detention can be seen as a 
                                                          
428 See Meron 1986, pp. 15-16: “The relationship between jus cogens and derogability is an interesting 
one. The principal human rights instruments (the Political Covenant, the American Convention, the 
European Convention) contain the same hard core of nonderogable rights, yet different lists of 
nonderogable rights. Rights that are nonderogable under such instruments are not necessarily jus cogens 
(e.g., the right not to be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation, 
which is stated in Article 11 of the Political Covenant, or perhaps the more important nonderogable right 
to participate in government, which is stated in Article 23 of the American Convention) and some of 
them may not even have attained the status of customary law. Conversely, can a right whose derogation 
is permitted by a primary international human rights agreement (the Political Covenant) be regarded as 
jus cogens in light of the statement of the principle of jus cogens in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention 
(a norm from which no derogation is permitted)?” 
429 See Shaw 2003, p. 117. 
430 See also the Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the 
Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York 
and Geneva, 2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 85: “Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention requires not merely that the norm in question should meet all the criteria for recognition as a 
norm of general international law, binding as such, but further that it should be recognized as having a 
peremptory character by the international community of States as a whole. So far, relatively few 
peremptory norms have been recognized as such. (...) Those peremptory norms that are clearly accepted 
and recognized include the prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes 
against humanity and torture, and the right to self-determination [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See 
also Lamb 2000, p. 202 (writing on “individual rights such as liberty and due process” in the context of 
the ICTY): “Such due process rights of an accused, while doubtless important, are not of the same non-
derogable or indelible character as are jus cogens or peremptory norms of international law [original 








peremptory norm.431 Arbitrary detention is also considered to be ius cogens by the 
Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, but then only 
if it is prolonged.432 Knoops argues more generally that “the right to liberty is 
recognized as a jus cogens norm”433 and Blackmun is of the opinion, focusing on 
one specific male captus situation, that “kidnaping a foreign national flagrantly 
                                                          
431 See Seiderman 2001, p. 121: “While the identification of jus cogens in the human rights has never 
approached an international consensus, it is possible to extract a minimum core by reference to 
analogous non-derogable treaty rights, international criminal law, and judicial and scholarly 
pronouncements. Thus, safely included among these peremptory norms are: the right to life, including 
the prohibitions against genocide, summary and extrajudicial executions and the application of the death 
penalty to juveniles and the prohibitions on torture; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment; arbitrary detention; disappearances; racial and other forms of discrimination; slavery and 
the slave trade; and criminal violations of humanitarian law, including crimes against humanity and 
some war crimes.” 
432 See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, 1987, para. 702 (‘Customary International Law of Human Rights’), comment under ‘n’ 
(‘Customary law of human rights and jus cogens’): “Not all human rights norms are peremptory norms 
(jus cogens), but those in clauses (a) to (f) of this section are, and an international agreement that 
violates them is void.” Clauses (a) to (f) consist of: (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the 
murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention and (f) systematic racial discrimination. It 
may be interesting to note that para. 11 (‘Human rights law and jus cogens’) of the Reporters’ Notes to 
the Restatement also goes into the just-discussed point that, on the one hand, prolonged arbitrary 
detention is considered ius cogens, but, on the other hand, is not recognised as a non-derogable norm. It 
explains: “It has been suggested that a human rights norm cannot be deemed jus cogens if it is subject to 
derogation in time of public emergency; see, for example, Art. 4 of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (...). Nonderogability in emergency and jus cogens are different principles, responding to 
different concerns, and they are not necessarily congruent. In any event, the rights recognized in clauses 
(a) to (f) of this section are not subject to derogation in emergency under the Covenant. Article 4 of the 
Covenant explicitly excludes from derogation the right to life and freedom from slavery and from 
torture, as well as from racial discrimination. Freedom from arbitrary detention is not included among 
the nonderogable provisions, but since derogation is permitted only “in time of public emergency which 
threatens the life of the nation,” and only “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation,” detentions that meet those standards presumably would not be arbitrary.” Although one can 
agree with the idea that some derogable provisions can still be ius cogens, the remark that a detention 
which meets the criteria “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” and “to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” would presumably not be arbitrary can be 
criticised. Meron, for example, counters: “It is suggested that detentions occurring during a time of 
emergency and that comply with the requirements of Article 4 of the Political Covenant are not 
arbitrary. (…) But the requirements of Article 4 are addressed primarily to the conditions for the 
proclamation of an emergency, not the standards governing detention procedures (due process). The 
notion of arbitrariness must refer to the character of the procedures of detention themselves, rather than 
only to the legality of the state of emergency under which they are authorized.” (Meron 1986, p. 15, n. 
62.) Note that although the Restatement was still being drafted when Meron wrote his article, the above-
mentioned reasoning of the Restatement is almost the same as in the draft. However, there is one 
important difference. Meron notes that the draft Restatement suggested that “detentions occurring 
during a time of emergency and that comply with the requirements of Article 4 of the Political Covenant 
are not arbitrary” whereas the Draft itself is more hesitant: “detentions that meet those standards 
presumably would not be arbitrary [emphasis added, ChP].” 
433 Knoops 2003, p. 220. See also Knoops 2002, p. 260: “The protection against forcible abduction and 








violates peremptory human rights norms.”434 Finally, one could also refer to 
paragraph 11 of the above-mentioned HRC’s General Comment No. 29: 
 
The enumeration of non-derogable provisions in article 4 is related to, but not 
identical with, the question whether certain human rights obligations bear the nature 
of peremptory norms of international law. The proclamation of certain provisions of 
the Covenant as being of a non-derogable nature, in article 4, paragraph 2, is to be 
seen partly as recognition of the peremptory nature of some fundamental rights 
ensured in treaty form in the Covenant (e.g., articles 6 and 7). However, it is apparent 
that some other provisions of the Covenant were included in the list of non-derogable 
provisions because it can never become necessary to derogate from these rights 
during a state of emergency (e.g., articles 11 and 18). Furthermore, the category of 
peremptory norms extends beyond the list of non-derogable provisions as given in 
article 4, paragraph 2. States parties may in no circumstances invoke article 4 of the 
Covenant as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian law or peremptory 
norms of international law, for instance by taking hostages, by imposing collective 
punishments, through arbitrary deprivations of liberty or by deviating from 
fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence [emphasis 
added, ChP].435 
 
Given these mixed views, one may argue that it is perhaps still too early to assert 
unequivocally that the right to liberty and security has attained ius cogens status, but 
the fact that this position has nevertheless been supported underlines the importance 
of this right, a right of which it was already established that it had customary 
international law/general international law status. 
 
2.3 The rule of law 
 
The rule of law is a rather abstract concept and is differently used in literature and 
case law. For example, in her article ‘Establishing a Rule-of-Law International 
Criminal Justice System’, Bhattacharyya stated that  
 
[t]he rule of law is traditionally defined by four maxims: (1) freedom from the fear of 
arbitrary punishment, (2) formal justice, (3) due process of law, and (4) at a 
                                                          
434 See n. 261. For another opinion, see US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, United States v. Matta-
Ballesteros, 1 December 1995, No. 91-50336 (71 F.3d 754), p. 764, n. 5: “Kidnapping (…) does not 
qualify as a jus cogens norm, such that its commission would be justiciable in our courts even absent a 
domestic law. Jus cogens norms, which are nonderogable and peremptory, enjoy the highest status 
within customary international law, are binding on all nations, and can not be preempted by treaty. (…) 
While Art. 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does state that no one “shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile,” (...) kidnapping does not rise to the level of other jus cogens norms, 
such as torture, murder, genocide, and slavery.” 
435 See also Paust 2003 pp. 13-14: “The Human Rights Committee has also recognized that freedom 
from arbitrary detention is a peremptory norm jus cogens and thus a right of customary, fundamental, 








fundamental level, social existence non sub homine sed sub Deo et lege, that is, “not 
under men but under God and the law” [original footnote omitted, ChP].436 
 
However, in the well-known Bennett case (which will be addressed in detail in 
Chapter V), Lord Bridge of Harwich wrote that there is 
 
no principle more basic to any proper system of law than the maintenance of the rule 
of law itself. When it is shown that the law enforcement agency responsible for 
bringing a prosecution has only been enabled to do so by participation in violations of 
international law and of the laws of another state in order to secure the presence of the 
accused within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, I think that respect for the rule 
of law demands that the court take cognisance of that circumstance.437 
 
Therefore, in this book, it will be used as a sort of safety net or residual category to 
assemble the arguments in male captus cases other than those specifically related to 
human rights and State sovereignty.  
One could think here of the more general idea that the prosecuting authorities 
must respect (inter)national438 (procedural) law/due process/fairness in general – 
such as respect for an applicable extradition treaty – and that the courts should 
respond in the case of non-compliance to ensure that the integrity of the executive 
and judicial process is not undermined.439  
However, notwithstanding this ‘delimitation’, it is clear that one should not 
follow the different categories too strictly. After all, they have blurring boundaries; a 
certain violation can fit both the category of human rights and the more general 
category of the rule of law.440  
                                                          
436 Bhattacharyya 1996, p. 62. 
437 House of Lords, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and 
another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 155. 
438 For the international dimension of the rule of law, see also Costi 2003, p. 96: “[T]he rule of law 
should not be interpreted as being confined solely to domestic boundaries. (…) [T]here is increasing 
recognition that the rule of law permeates the international sphere.” 
439 Cf. also Michell 1996, p. 387: “The rule of law (…) is used in this Article to describe three related 
concepts. The first is a traditional concern with the prevention of executive unlawfulness under domestic 
law. Simply put, the courts must be prepared to exercise judicial review to ensure that the domestic 
executive acts according to the ordinary law of the land. The second strand of the rule of law embodies a 
concern that the domestic authorities comply with international legal norms. This element of the rule of 
law is the one most directly connected with the proposal that domestic courts must take more seriously 
their rule as agents of the international legal system. The third component of the rule of law relates to 
the concern domestic courts should display in ensuring that the domestic executive does not violate 
individual human rights, derived as they are from both international and domestic law.” See also Choo 
1994 B, p. 629: “Central to the decision of the House of Lords was the notion that a criminal court 
should not be concerned solely with accurate fact-finding or, to put it another way, the determination of 
the ‘truth’. A court also has a duty to protect the moral integrity of the criminal process. The judiciary 
must – in the words of Lord Griffiths [see also n. 282 of Chapter V and accompanying text, ChP] 
‘accept a responsibility for the maintenance of the rule of law that embraces a willingness to oversee 
executive action and to refuse to countenance behaviour that threatens either basic human rights or the 
rule of law.’” 
440 See the previous footnote. Cf. also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision 








Because of its linkage with the other values441 and its rather vague scope, the rule 
of law (and possible exceptions to its violation) will not be further addressed in this 
chapter. Nevertheless, it will definitely be returned to in the remainder of the book.  
 
3 WHO VIOLATES? 
 
3.1 States/State officials 
 
The duty to respect State sovereignty, human rights and the rule of law prima facie 
address States: it is up to States not to intervene in another State’s sovereignty and 
up to the signatories of human rights treaties, namely States, to respect human rights 
of individuals under its control. In the previous pages, however, individuals did play 
a role in the different male captus situations. Recall in that respect, for example, the 
abduction of Nikolić by the individuals who handed him over to SFOR (see 
Subsection 1.1) and the roles of Jamal Hamdan and Köster in the luring cases of 
Yunis and Stocké respectively (see Subsections 1.4 and 2.2.4). This prompts two 
questions. The first and most controversial one is whether private individuals 
themselves can violate values such as State sovereignty and human rights (since 
these are the two clearest categories, the focus will be on them) (see Subsection 3.2) 
and the second is under which circumstances a State can be held responsible for 
conduct of private individuals more generally (see Subsection 3.3). 
 
3.2 Private individuals 
 
The question as to whether private individuals themselves can violate values like 
State sovereignty and human rights is not just some academic exercise. The above-
mentioned Nikolić case illustrates this perfectly. In this case, part of the Defence’s 
submissions was summarised by the Trial Chamber as follows:  
 
that the forcible removal of the Accused from the FRY [by the private individuals 
prior to the handing over to SFOR, ChP] entailed a breach of both the sovereignty of 
the FRY and the Accused’s individual due process guarantees; and that although such 
breaches occurred prior to the delivery of the Accused into the custody of SFOR and 
the Tribunal, these breaches were of such magnitude that even absent the involvement 
of SFOR or Prosecution, the release of the Accused from the custody of this Tribunal 
and the dismissal of the indictment against him is the only appropriate remedy 
[emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].442     
                                                                                                                                              
October 2002, para. 106: “The Defence also argues that the arrest and transfer of the Accused amounts 
to a violation of internationally recognised human rights and a violation of the fundamental principle of 
due process of law. (…) As both arguments are closely connected to each other, they will be discussed 
here together.” 
441 See also Van der Wilt 2004, p. 282. 
442 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 25. It must be 
noted that the reference of the Trial Chamber (to para. 9 of the first Defence motion) is incorrect as that 








Thus, the Defence claimed that the kidnapping of Nikolić by the private individuals 
prior to the moment he was handed over to SFOR constituted not only a breach of 
the sovereignty of the FRY but also of Nikolić’s personal (human) rights.443 This 
may seem quite strange at first sight for it is normally believed that only States can 
violate such values. However, if the judge accepts the view that private individuals 
can indeed also violate them, then the consequences could be considerable. For 
example, and using the more specific example of the human right to liberty and 
security/the right not to be arrested or detained arbitrarily, it will be shown infra that 
one of the remedies in the case of a violation of this human right is release. It is 
clear that this is potentially a very interesting remedy for a suspect and that the latter 
will thus try to convince the judge that it is not so important who violated his human 
right but more the fact that his right was violated and thus that he is entitled to the 
remedy of release. However, the judge may also be of the opinion that the 
kidnappers of Nikolić, private individuals, cannot violate such a right and that what 
is involved here is ‘merely’ the domestic crime of kidnapping. Smeulers, in her 
                                                                                                                                              
was of the opinion that the acts of the private individuals constituted a violation of the FRY’s 
sovereignty and of Nikolić’s rights. With respect to the concept of State sovereignty, see the following 
words from the first Defence motion: “[T]he assumptive facts must amount to a violation of 
sovereignty”. (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion for Relief Based Inter 
Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the 
Accused and Co-Related Abuse of Process Within the Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional 
Relief Under Rule 72’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 17 May 2001, para. 11.) This was arguably confirmed in 
the Defence’s second Motion, although it must be admitted that the following quotation is not very 
clear: “While evidence of direct or material complicity by a state in the abduction of an individual can, it 
is submitted, raise a legitimate action for the violation of state sovereignty, where the abduction has 
been perpetrated by private individuals, the law remains unsettled and thus, the remedy for (…) such a 
breach also remains unresolved.” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion 
to Determine Issues As Agreed Between the Parties And the Trial Chamber As Being Fundamental to 
the Resolution of the Accused’s Status Before the Tribunal in Respect of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
Under Rule 72 and Generally, the Nature of the Relationship Between the OTP and SFOR and the 
Consequences of Any Illegal Conduct Material to the Accused, his Arrest and Subsequent Detention’, 
Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 29 October 2001, para. 15.) However, taking into account the statement from the 
first Defence motion, it appears that the Defence is claiming that private individuals can violate the 
sovereignty of another State, but that it is unclear whether an abduction, executed by private individuals, 
can raise a legitimate action with respect to this violation. As a result, it is also unclear what kind of 
remedy for the violation of State sovereignty (the words “for (…) such a breach” also imply that private 
individuals can violate a State’s sovereignty) should be granted. With respect to the concept of human 
rights, see, for example, the following passage from Nikolić’s first Defence motion: “The central 
argument is that in this case, and any case involving, in effect, kidnapping, the taint of that degree of 
illegality and breach of fundamental human rights is so pernicious, and the dangers of the appearance of 
condoning it to any degree so much a hostage to unpredictable consequence and fortune, that a judicial 
body set up with, inter alios, the objectives of preserving human rights can have no proper option but to 
make it plain that jurisdiction will not be entertained in such circumstances.” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, 
Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest Following 
Upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-Related Abuse of 
Process Within the Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 72’, Case No. IT-
94-2-PT, 17 May 2001, para. 11.) 
443 Although the words ‘human rights’ are not explicitly mentioned in this excerpt (‘only’ the words 
“individual due process guarantees” are used (which seem to mean however the same)), it is clear that 








commentary to the ICTY Trial Chamber’s decision in the Nikolić case, for example 
stated: 
 
[O]nly if violations can be attributed to State authorities can the infringements on a 
person’s life and liberty be considered human rights violations. Infringements which 
cannot be attributed to State authorities should be considered ordinary criminal 
offences and not human rights violations.444  
 
In that case (and assuming for a moment that the kidnapping could not be attributed 
to other entities possibly leading to a violation of the right to liberty and security/the 
right not to be arrested or detained arbitrarily), Nikolić would not be able to invoke 
the remedy of release as his right was not violated in the first place. Hence, it is 
clear that this question may have important practical ramifications and thus should 
be examined in more detail.  
 
3.2.1 Human rights 
 
Before trying to find an answer to the question as to whether private individuals 
themselves can violate human rights, it should be clearly understood that private 
individuals not only have international rights (think of all the human rights that can 
be found in documents such as the ICCPR) but also international duties. The clearest 
example of the latter idea can, of course, be found in the context of international 
criminal law.445  
Now, it is true that human rights law has played and still does play an important 
role in this specific field of law, but the above-mentioned example of Nikolić’s 
kidnapping (and the question of whether this operation is to be seen as a domestic 
crime or a human rights violation) has nothing to do with international criminal law 
but with human rights law in general.  
What one should focus on here is whether private individuals can also violate 
provisions in the field of general human rights law (as can be found in, for example, 
the ICCPR).  
As stated above, it is usually understood that such human rights provisions only 
operate in the relationship between State and individual (the vertical context) and 
thus that only States can violate human rights provisions.  
This idea is founded on the assumption that the direct cause for the creation of 
these general human rights treaties (namely WW II in which millions of individuals 
suffered from mainly State action) implies that only States are their addressees.  
                                                          
444 Smeulers 2007, p. 110. See, however, Michell 1996, pp. 484-485: “Where a fugitive is abducted from 
one state and brought to another by private individuals acting without the knowledge of the latter state, 
(…) there may be (…), of course, a possible violation of international human rights law”. 
445 See, for example, Cryer et al. 2007, p. 5: “[T]he subject matter of international criminal law, as we 
use it, deals with the liability of individuals, irrespective of whether or not they are agents of a State. In 
the definition of the crimes which we take as being constitutive of substantive international criminal 
law, the status of the perpetrator is irrelevant, with the exception of the crime of aggression [original 








In that view, individuals are to be seen as the beneficiaries of the rights 
mentioned in these documents whereas States, the signatories, have to provide these 
rights. As a consequence, only States can violate human rights.  
The opposite view is that provisions of general human rights law can also 
operate in the relationship between non-State actors (for example individuals and 
corporations) and thus that these actors can also violate human rights provisions. 
This is often referred to as third-party applicability (or Drittwirkung) of human 
rights.446  
There are two main arguments which can be used in this context.  
The first is a linguistic one. In his article ‘The Other Side of Right: Private 
Duties Under Human Rights Law’, Paust claims that many of these human treaties 
in fact contain language showing that the drafters may not have intended to limit 
human rights obligations to States:  
 
[H]uman rights instruments demonstrate the existence of private duties in at least two 
ways. First, provisions in various instruments explicitly affirm, or at least imply, that 
individuals can owe duties. Second, rights are generally set forth without any 
reference to those who owe a corresponding duty and can be understood to impose 
duties on individuals. Courts that limit the scope of application of human rights 
instruments by adding limiting words, such as “the state” or “state action,” 
improperly insert terms that the treatymakers did not choose [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].447 
 
To start with the last assertion, it is indeed true that some rights are so generally 
drafted that the addressees are not very clear and may encompass individuals as 
well.448  
With respect to the first assertion, it is also true that some provisions could be 
read to mean that private individuals can violate them.449 On the other hand, it must 
                                                          
446 For more information on this topic, see, for example, Alkema 1988, Van Dijk and Van Hoof 1998, 
pp. 22-26 and Jägers 2002, pp. 36-44 (writing about human rights obligations for that other well-known 
non-State actor: the corporation). Note that in this subsection, Drittwirkung is only viewed as horizontal 
applicability (and not horizontal enforceability) of certain norms. It will not be examined here whether a 
private individual can enforce a human rights norm against another person. The goal of this subsection 
is merely to find out whether (certain) human rights norms can be applied in the horizontal context and 
thus whether a private person can, for example, violate another person’s human right to liberty and 
security. (Cf. Van Dijk and Van Hoof 1998, p. 23.) 
447 Paust 1992, pp. 52-53. 
448 An example from the ICCPR is Art. 8: “No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade 
in all their forms shall be prohibited.” An interesting quote in this respect to which Paust refers comes 
from Chen(’s book An Introduction to Contemporary International Law (1989, p. 215)): “[M]ost 
[human rights prescriptions] are documented in terms of the right of persons and not in terms of 
participation in or protection from the state. They are, in the words of the International Court of Justice, 
obligatio erga omnes (owing by and to all humankind).” (Paust 1992, p. 53, n. 12.) 
449 See, for example, Art. 30 of the UDHR (“Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying 
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.”) and comparable articles in, for example, 
the ICCPR (Art. 5, para. 1) and ECHR (Art. 17). Jägers, referring to Van Dijk and Van Hoof, has, 








be stated as well that many human rights provisions are formulated in such a way 
that they are clearly not applicable to the horizontal context. An example is Article 
13 of the ICCPR, a provision which deals with the expulsion of a lawfully present 
alien.450 It is evident that this article only has a State as its addressee (for only States 
can expel a person). Here, Drittwirkung is not possible.  
The second and probably stronger argument in favour of Drittwirkung has to do 
with the underlying purpose of these human rights treaties. One could argue that, 
even if the drafters of these treaties were probably not thinking about horizontal 
application of their provisions at all, this does not mean that, if one is confronted by 
an ambiguous provision, one may not take into account the purpose of human rights 
law when interpreting it. And looking at this purpose, which is arguably not limited 
to the fact that States should refrain from human rights violations but more that the 
individual is to be protected against human rights violations in general,451 one could 
argue that it does not exclude the possibility of Drittwirkung for the simple reason 
                                                                                                                                              
of the right to complain. Prohibiting any abuse, however, cannot be equated with the general obligation 
for individuals to respect the rights of others in their private legal relations [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].” (Jägers 2002, p. 44.) Attention may also be paid in this respect to the title of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and a passage from the Preamble of the ICCPR: “Realizing 
that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is 
under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant”. Paust writes about these words: “Such private duties and responsibilities cannot be fulfilled 
if an individual violates the rights of other individuals or groups, and the preamble to the Covenant 
clearly states that, with respect to human rights, individuals have “duties to other individuals.” Thus, at a 
minimum, an individual must not deny or violate the human rights of others.” (Paust 1992, p. 55.) 
450 “An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom 
only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling 
reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion 
and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or 
a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority.” 
451 The fact that the importance of the statal concept is diminishing in today’s world may be additional 
fuel for this assertion. That the present-day situation can be taken into account when interpreting a 
(human rights) treaty was confirmed by the ICJ in ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970), ‘Advisory Opinion’, 21 June 1971, when it wrote about the Covenant of the League of 
Nations: “Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in accordance with the 
intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion, the Court is bound to take into account the fact that 
the concepts embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant – “the strenuous conditions of the modern world” 
and “the well-being and development” of the peoples concerned – were not static, but were by definition 
evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the “sacred trust”. The parties to the Covenant must 
consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such. That is why, viewing the institutions of 1919, 
the Court must take into consideration the changes which have occurred in the supervening half-century, 
and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law, through the 
Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law. Moreover, an international instrument has 
to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of 
the interpretation.” (Ibid., para. 53.) The word “moreover” shows that such a contemporary 
interpretation can thus also be used if the international instrument in question does not already contain 
non-static, evolutionary concepts such as “the modern world” and “development”. See also Glashausser 








that it will further enhance respect for human rights.452 Van Dijk and Van Hoof, 
writing on the European Convention, state on this matter:  
 
It is beyond doubt that the problem of Drittwirkung was not taken into account when 
the Convention was drafted, if it played any part at all in the discussions. One can 
infer from the formulation of various provisions that they were not written with a 
view to relations between private parties. On the other hand, the subject-matter 
regulated by the Convention – the fundamental rights and freedoms – lends itself 
eminently to Drittwirkung. Precisely on account of the fundamental character of these 
rights it is difficult to appreciate why they should deserve protection in relation to the 
public authorities, but not in relation to private parties. It is submitted that it is not 
very relevant whether the drafters of the Convention had in mind Drittwirkung. Of 
greater importance is what conclusions may be drawn for the present situation from 
the principles set forth in the Convention, and specifically in its Preamble.453  
 
If one concurs with that view, then one can interpret these provisions broadly, even 
if they originate from the above-mentioned statal context. In the words of Meron: 
“[B]road interpretations of rights are necessary for the effective protection of human 
dignity, which is the goal of human rights law.”454 
Other factors (alongside purpose and language) may also play a role here and it 
is clear that all these aspects should be looked at if one wants to find out whether a 
specific provision has Drittwirkung or not.455  
What if these observations are applied to one of the most important human rights 
provisions for the context of this book, Article 9 of the ICCPR? Can this provision 
be violated by private individuals?456 Whereas paragraphs 2,457 3,458 4459 and 5460 of 
                                                          
452 See also Jägers 2002, p. 51: “It is concluded that, in general, the object and purpose of the 
International Bill of Rights [the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, ChP] is to promote the observance 
of and respect for human rights not only by States but also by non-State entities”. 
453 Van Dijk and Van Hoof 1998, pp. 24-25. 
454 Meron 1989, p. 170. See also Alkema 1988, p. 33: “The principle of third-party effect is hardly 
controversial when human rights are considered as deriving from the law of nature. In that line of 
thought they are so fundamental and essential that they deserve protection against any encroachment, be 
it private or public.”   
455 See Meron 1989, p. 169: “Whether a particular human right stated in an international human rights 
instrument must be respected not only by public but also by private actors depends on the interpretation 
of the provision, i.e. its language, context, purpose, and object.” 
456 For an affirmative answer, see ibid., p. 162, where Meron confers Drittwirkung on the right to liberty 
and security on the basis of the purpose behind human rights law: “Although contemporary human 
rights law focuses on the duty of governments to respect the human rights of individuals, human rights 
violations committed by one private person against another (e.g. deprivation of life and liberty or the 
perpetration of acts of egregious discrimination) cannot be placed outside the ambit of human rights law 
if that law is ever to gain significant effectiveness [emphasis added, ChP].”  
457 “Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall 
be promptly informed of any charges against him.” 
458 “Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other 
officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time 
or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but 
release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, 








this article arguably address States/State organs (and hence cannot be violated by 
private individuals), paragraph 1 is less clear.  
The first paragraph reads: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law.” The first of the three sentences is a general 
statement and could be addressed to any entity. However, the two other sentences 
seem to bring in a more statal dimension. That is clear with respect to the last 
sentence (“except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are 
established by law”) but one can also wonder whether the second sentence (“[n]o 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention”) can be applied to the 
horizontal context. After all, words like (non-arbitrary) “arrest” and “detention” 
appear to have a statal connotation. Nowak, for example, explains that if one looks 
at their ordinary meaning, both arrest and detention “refer only to acts of State 
officials”.461 That would then also mean that paragraphs 4462 and 5463 of Article 9 of 
the ICCPR only apply to deprivations of liberty effected by State officials, for these 
paragraphs only speak about arrest and detention. According to Nowak, however, 
that cannot be right:  
 
However, this logical-systematic interpretation leads to absurd results, which do not 
comport with the object and purpose of this provision. In the 3d Committee of the 
GA, the French delegate mentioned that kidnapping by private persons represented a 
case of deprivation of liberty that was neither arrest nor detention (…). In other 
words, should a State law expressly permit cases of kidnapping by private security 
companies, these would be cases of deprivation of liberty that – even though arbitrary 
– are expressly allowed by Art. 9 and to which the guarantees under Art. 9(4) and (5) 
are inapplicable. (…) Even though it may be grammatically, logically and 
                                                                                                                                              
459 “Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings 
before a court, in order that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order 
his release if the detention is not lawful.” 
460 “Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to 
compensation.” Although one could argue that a private person can violate this provision as well, 
namely when he does not agree to pay compensation if he has unlawfully arrested or detained a person 
(whether this is possible in the first place will be addressed in a few moments). It seems, however, that 
this paragraph is far and foremost a procedural right. The word “enforceable” appears to be essential 
here. A victim of an unlawful arrest or detention (whoever committed it) has not just any right to 
compensation, it has an enforceable right to compensation, meaning that a victim has the right to go to 
court and demand that the responsible person will pay him compensation. In this view, para. 5 actually 
provides for a procedural mechanism. As this mechanism can only be made available by a State, the 
provision can arguably only be violated by a State (namely if the State does not provide a victim of an 
unlawful arrest or detention the mechanism to go to court and ask for compensation). 
461 Nowak 2005, p. 219. However, one can also argue that private individuals can also arrest and detain 
persons under certain circumstances, such as in flagrante delicto. Nevertheless, that would almost never 
be the case in the relevant case law of this book, in which the suspect is apprehended some time after 
(and not during the time) he allegedly committed the crimes. Cf. also Lamb 2000, p. 228, n. 218, writing 
on “citizen’s arrest”. 
462 See n. 459. 








systematically correct, such an interpretation is not compatible with the object and 
purpose of the Covenant in the sense of Art. 31(1) of the VCLT. It thus must be 
assumed that the narrow majority of 30 States (against 27) that voted in favour of the 
above-mentioned British motion in the 3d Committee of the GA supported a broad 
interpretation of the terms “arrest” and “detention” [emphasis in original and 
original footnote omitted, ChP].464  
 
Hence, it may be that the words “arrest” and “detention” are the only possible 
deprivations of liberty according to Article 9 of the ICCPR, but then these words 
must include all sorts of deprivations of liberty, including kidnappings by private 
individuals:  
 
This means that Art. 9 does not recognize any other forms of deprivation of liberty 
beyond these two cases. Therefore, the holding of minors, mentally ill persons, 
alcohol or drug addicts or vagrants, as well as deprivation of liberty by private 
persons, are to be understood as arrest or detention, making the guarantees in paras. 
1, 4 and 5 fully applicable. Only paras. 2 and 3 are of limited applicability. Any other 
interpretation would contradict the comprehensive protection afforded by the right to 
liberty and security of person in the first sentence of para. 1. The word “arrest” 
(“arrestation”) refers to the act of depriving personal liberty and generally covers the 
period up to the point where the person is brought before the competent authority. 
The word “detention” (“détention”), on the other hand, refers to the state of 
deprivation of liberty, regardless of whether this follows from an arrest (custody, pre-
trial detention), a conviction (imprisonment), kidnapping or some other act [first 
emphasis added and original footnotes omitted, ChP].465 
 
Paust chooses a middle position when he writes: “It should also be stressed that 
although the word “arrest” implies action by State officials, officers, or agents, 
arbitrary “detention” of individuals in violation of relevant human rights norms 
could be perpetrated by private actors.”466  
Hence, unfortunately, it is rather difficult to give a definite answer to the 
question as to whether private individuals can violate a provision such as Article 9 
of the ICCPR. Although the first-mentioned remark by Smeulers (namely that 
private individuals cannot violate human rights) is clear and does not lead to any 
potential problems related to the correlation between a human rights violation and a 
violation of domestic criminal law,467 the above-mentioned information has also 
shown some arguments why a provision such as Article 9 of the ICCPR could, 
under certain circumstances, be violated by private individuals as well.  
                                                          
464 Nowak 2005, p. 220. 
465 Ibid., pp. 220-221. 
466 Paust 1993, p. 562, n. 48. 
467 Smeulers argues that a certain infringement is either a human rights violation (if the infringement can 
be attributed to the State) or a violation of domestic criminal law (if the infringement cannot be 
attributed to the State). If one believes that it is possible that a private individual violates a human right, 









It appears that there is no clear-cut answer to this question and that much will 
also depend on one’s view of the nature of these kinds of human rights provisions. 
Maybe both sides can use the above-mentioned information to sharpen their views 
on this difficult issue.  
However, perhaps one does not need to take a certain stance. Focusing on the 
context of the tribunals now and the example that a suspect is kidnapped by private 
individuals before being handed over to the tribunal, one could also argue that, even 
if one is of the opinion that private individuals, in principle, cannot violate a 
person’s right to liberty and security, it seems hard to view that abduction as purely 
private either. Because the abduction is the reason why the suspect is now standing 
before his judges, it has gained a certain public dimension, which is, for example, 
absent in the case of a father kidnapping his children, a situation in which the father 
has clearly only violated domestic criminal law and not human rights law. Thus, and 
without maintaining that the tribunal, in the above-mentioned example, has violated 
the person’s right to liberty and security, one could argue that a violation of that 
person’s right to liberty and security has nonetheless occurred, because he was not 
brought to justice as he should have been. If they want to avoid the above-
mentioned and complicated discussion, the judges could also more generally argue 
that a wrong much akin to a violation of the right to liberty and security has 
occurred in the context of their case and that that should be taken into account. 
Before turning to the next subsection, it must be stressed that these observations, of 
course, do not mean that the judges cannot also take into account the fact that it was 
private individuals who abducted this person in the context of their case and that that 
may/should have an influence on the determination of the consequences of such a 
violation/wrong. This will be further discussed in Section 4. 
 
3.2.2 State sovereignty 
 
Another question, prompted by the earlier presented quotation from the ICTY 
Nikolić case, see footnote 442 and accompanying text, is whether private individuals 
can violate a State’s sovereignty or whether this violation is ‘reserved’ for other 
States only. 
Like the above-mentioned idea that human rights can be violated by private 
individuals, the idea that sovereignty can be violated by them is not uncontroversial 
either.468 The standard view appears to be that the sovereignty of States can only be 
violated by other States. This may already have become clear in Subsection 2.1 
                                                          
468 See also the doubt expressed by Smeulers: “[O]ne may doubt whether individuals acting on their own 
initiative can ever violate a State’s sovereignty.” (Smeulers 2007, p. 108.) Note that Michell, who was 
of the opinion that an abduction by private individuals could violate human rights (see n. 444), this time 
agrees with Smeulers that such an abduction would not violate the sovereignty of the ‘injured’ State, see 
Michell 1996, pp. 484-485: “Where a fugitive is abducted from one state and brought to another by 
private individuals acting without the knowledge of the latter state, there is no violation of customary 
international law. However, there may be a violation of the domestic law of the injured or abducting 









where the internal and external dimension of State sovereignty was discussed and in 
which it was explained that the internal dimension means that State A is the only 
one having authority over the territory of State A (meaning, for example, that it does 
not have to tolerate authority over its territory by State B) and that the external 
aspect signifies that State A must also respect the sovereignty of other States, 
meaning that it cannot intervene in the domestic affairs of State B. Likewise, 
Steinberger notes:   
 
Sovereignty in the sense of contemporary public international law denotes the basic 
international legal status of a State that is not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, 
to the governmental, executive, legislative, or judicial jurisdiction of a foreign State 
or to foreign law other than public international law. 469 
 
Nevertheless, it has also been argued that violations of State sovereignty are not 
merely ‘reserved’ for States, but can also be committed by private individuals. 
Seaman, in his article on bounty hunters,470 for examples asserts:   
 
The injury that results from an abduction on foreign soil is one to the sovereignty of 
the asylum State. This injury will be the same whether committed by a State agent or 
a bountyhunter. (…) The same injury principle was recognized by the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Villareal v. Hammond. In this case, the court considered the 
extradition of a bountyhunter who had abducted a person on Mexican soil and 
returned him to the United States to stand trial for an alleged crime. The court held 
that the bountyhunter had violated Mexico’s sovereignty and found it insignificant 
that the abductor was not a State agent. The Court recognized that injury to the 
sovereignty of the asylum State occurs regardless of the actor’s status (…) [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].471  
 
Those in favour of that stance could perhaps use the same broad rationale which was 
also used in the human rights context: one could assert that the essence of 
sovereignty is not per se statal, but in essence means that State A has 
supreme/sovereign power over its territory and that, as a result of this, it more 
generally does not have to tolerate outside472 interference in matters which are 
                                                          
469 Steinberger 1987, p. 408. 
470 Note, however, that there is an important public dimension in the nature of the bounty hunter’s work 
as well. See Supernor 2001, p. 232: “In the United States, in order to be released after arrest, most 
defendants hire a bail bondsman to post a bond with the court. The State then delivers custody of the 
defendant to the bail bondsman who must return the defendant to the court to receive a refund of his 
bond. When the State transfers custody of the defendant to the bail bondsman, it also transfers powers to 
search for and arrest the defendant. To guarantee a defendant’s presence in court, bail bondsmen hire 
bountyhunters who are fully vested with the bail bondsmen’s broad powers over the defendant [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
471 Seaman 1985, pp. 408-409. See also ibid., p. 400, n. 35: “Private persons are capable of violating 
sovereignty.”  
472 Note that this does not mean that the kidnappers themselves may not come from the State where the 
suspect is residing, see n. 444 in Chapter VI. It may very well be that foreign actors use local persons to 








essentially that State’s prerogative, whether that interference comes from a foreign 
State or from another foreign entity.473 A kidnapping could then be seen as an 
outside interference into the executive prerogative of the State of residence to arrest 
and extradite a person according to the normal procedures. However, one could also 
counter this reasoning, arguing that “interference into the executive prerogative of 
the State of residence to arrest and extradite” implies that the interference itself is 
also of a public nature. See also in that respect the references in the previous 
footnotes to Steinberger and Kovac, who write about a certain authority.474 This 
would mean that a truly private individual (not one backed up by some foreign 
authority), who kidnaps a person from another State, cannot violate that State’s 
sovereignty (although his kidnapping can, of course, violate domestic law). In that 
view, there can only be a violation of State sovereignty if another State (or perhaps 
another entity with public force such as a tribunal)475 is responsible for the 
kidnapping.  
However, possibly, one could use the same solution here as presented in the 
human rights context. Recall in that respect the situation of the father kidnapping his 
children. If he were to kidnap his children in State B and bring them over to State A 
(a cross-border abduction), this would not be seen as a violation of State B’s 
sovereignty but merely as a violation of domestic criminal law. However, and again 
focusing on the context of the tribunals, if private individuals kidnap a person from 
                                                                                                                                              
also Steinberger 1987, p. 397, writing on territorial sovereignty: “[J]urisdiction over a delimited territory 
to the exclusion of foreign authorities [emphasis added, ChP].” 
473 Cf. in that respect also the quite general definition of the term ‘sovereignty’ as introduced by Jean 
Bodin’s famous book Les Six Livres De La République (1576). In the opening sentence of Book 1, 
Chapter 8, one can read: “La souveraineté est la puissance absoluë et perpetuelle d’une Republique”. 
(Bodin 1986, p. 179.) (“Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth”. (Bodin 
1992, p. 1.)) In the Latin translation of Bodin’s book (entitled De republica libri sex (1586)) these words 
were translated as follows: “Maiestas est summa in cives ac subditos legibusque soluta potestas”: 
“Sovereignty is supreme and absolute power over citizens and subjects”. (Bodin 1992, p. 1.) See also 
Friedmann 1967, pp. 573-574: “Bodin, the founder of the modern doctrine of sovereignty, was mainly 
concerned with securing and consolidating the legislative power of the monarch in France against the 
rival claims of estates, corporations, and the Church.” That would mean that the idea was created in 
order to enable a State to protect itself from any interference, whether it came from a statal or non-statal 
entity. (Note that the idea of sovereignty existed already before Bodin’s famous book. See Steinberger 
1987, p. 399: “The term “sovereign” and similar terms were already used in ancient times by Aristotle to 
identify the supreme authority within a community”.) See further also Kovac 2002, p. 622: “As 
embodied in customary international law, the term “sovereignty” describes the power of a state to 
exercise supreme legal authority over all persons and activities within its borders, independent of any 
other authority [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” Cf. finally Van der Wilt 2004, p. 
293, writing that the effort of others – States or private individuals – to exercise coercive criminal law 
measures within a State’s territory constitutes a violation of that State’s territorial integrity. 
474 See Steinberger 1987, p. 397, writing on territorial sovereignty: “[J]urisdiction over a delimited 
territory to the exclusion of foreign authorities [emphasis added, ChP].” See Kovac 2002, p. 622: “As 
embodied in customary international law, the term “sovereignty” describes the power of a state to 
exercise supreme legal authority over all persons and activities within its borders, independent of any 
other authority [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
475 One could also think here of terrorist organisations. (See in that respect also the discussion supra (n. 
116) whether acts of terrorists can lead to an armed attack, as a result of which a State can exercise its 








State B and bring him over to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the abduction has 
arguably attained a certain public dimension. This is so even if the main reason for 
the abduction may have been private, for example, because the individuals were 
promised financial rewards.476 Again stressing that this does not necessarily mean 
that the tribunal is responsible for the violation of State B’s sovereignty, the judges 
could nevertheless argue that a violation of State sovereignty, or, if they want to 
play it safe, a wrong akin to a violation of State sovereignty, has occurred in the 
context of their case and that that should be taken into account. Likewise, it must be 
emphasised that the fact that such a violation/wrong has been perpetrated by private 
individuals may/should, of course, also be taken into account when determining the 
consequences of that violation/wrong, cf. the final words of Subsection 3.2.1.  
Because this book will soon turn to the aftermath of Eichmann’s kidnapping (in 
the context of explaining the matter of State responsibility for conduct of private 
individuals), it may be interesting to mention the following words from the 
Eichmann case, which also touch upon the issues addressed in this subsection.  
During the discussions in the UNSC in the aftermath of Eichmann’s abduction 
from Argentina, Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir stated, referring to the note of 
3 June from the Israeli Ambassador in Argentina, Aryeh Levavi, to the Argentine 
Foreign Minister, Diogenes Taboada: 
 
I wish to say we recognize that the persons who took Eichmann from Argentina to 
Israel broke the laws of Argentina. For this the Israel Government has apologized to 
the Argentine Government in its note dated 3 June 1960 (…) stating: “If the volunteer 
group violated Argentine law or interfered with matters within the sovereignty of 
Argentina, the Government of Israel wishes to express its regret (…) [emphasis 
added, ChP].”477 
 
This statement could be seen as evidence for the assertion that private individuals 
may indeed also violate a State’s sovereignty,478 but it could also be seen as a mere 
apology which does not prove anything, especially as it does not say that those 
volunteers did violate the sovereignty of Argentina, only that the Israeli Government 
                                                          
476 See ns. 281-283 and accompanying text of Chapter VI (in the context of the Todorović case). 
477 UNSC OR, fifteenth year, 866th meeting, 22 June 1960, UN Doc. S/P.V. 866 (1960), para. 18 (p. 4), 
quoting from Levavi’s note of 3 June.  
478 See also UNSC OR, fifteenth year, 865th meeting, 22 June 1960, UN Doc. S/P.V. 865 (1960), para. 
24 (p. 5) where Mr Amadeo from Argentina (also in the aftermath of the Eichmann abduction) 
explained: “The State must punish and make reparation for violations of territorial sovereignty 
committed by its nationals abroad, even if they were acting for private reasons. For example, in the case 
of a girl who was kidnapped by her father, a Mr. His of Swiss nationality, in United States territory at 
the end of the nineteenth century, the United States Government protested to Switzerland and claimed 
that the kidnapping of the girl constituted a violation of the territorial sovereignty of the United States 
and that the United States was entitled to request the return of the child by the Swiss Government. The 
Swiss Government recognized the justice of the claim [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Although it 
must be noted that this may provide additional evidence for the idea that private individuals can violate 
another State’s sovereignty, the point that a State must also make reparation for such a violation, not 









wants to apologise for a possible violation. In addition, and to bring in a more 
Inspector Morse-like argument, it would not be that strange if the author of the note 
of 3 June 1960 (the Israeli Ambassador to Argentina, Aryeh Levavi) had been aware 
of the Mossad operation and hence was aware of the fact that those volunteers were 
not just private individuals with which the State of Israel had no connection, but 
were in fact agents of the State of Israel. That could mean that when Levavi wrote 
this note, he had the following information in the back of his head, namely that 
Eichmann’s kidnappers were in fact agents of the State of Israel and that they had 
indeed, by kidnapping Eichmann from Buenos Aires, violated the sovereignty of 
Argentina. That may explain why Levavi did not stop where he, perhaps, should 
have stopped (namely after the words: “[i]f the volunteer group violated Argentine 
law” – private individuals can, of course, perfectly well violate the domestic laws of 
another State)479 but (accidentally?) continued writing “or interfered with matters 
within the sovereignty of Argentina” – a violation which, according to many, is 
reserved for States only.  
 
3.3 States through private individuals 
 
In the previous subsection, the question as to whether private individuals, alongside 
States, could also violate values such as human rights and State sovereignty was 
addressed. In this subsection, a less controversial topic will be examined, namely 
how States can be held responsible for actions of private individuals. Although it is 
always possible that purely private persons resort to abduction (this may, for 
example, be the case when (family members of) victims of a suspect of international 
crimes feel that they must do something to bring that person to justice if the State of 
residence remains passive), one can assume that there will normally be a State 
behind those “private individuals”. Nevertheless, it is also clear that this will very 






                                                          
479 It may be interesting to note that Gold Meir herself did stop here, see Subsection 3.3.2 where the 
deliberations in the UNSC after the Eichmann abduction are discussed. 
480 Cf. also Townsend 1997, p. 661: “An “abducting” state may deny responsibility based on the 
apparent lack of a legal link between the abductor and the state, but in reality these are acts of de facto 
agents and attributable to the state. Often, de facto agents of the state abduct persons under the guise of 
being “volunteers,” or private persons acting on their own initiative. Their true factual link to the state, 
should engage the state’s responsibility. If the abductors, however, cover their tracks well enough, 
proving a factual link between them and the state may be nearly impossible, and the state may elude 
responsibility. Abductions are a particularly unclear area of state responsibility because of the obscure 
involvement of states’ secret security agencies. The international community unfortunately cannot 
expect a state to reveal the involvement of its agents or organs safeguarding “national security.” The 
state has a spurious alibi when its secret agents abduct enemies under the cloak of a “purely private” 








3.3.1 Draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts (Part 
I) 
 
The central article of the DARS, Article 1, reads: “Every internationally wrongful 
act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.” What an 
internationally wrongful act is can be found in Article 2: “There is an internationally 
wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is 
attributable to the State under international law; and (b) Constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of the State.” Such an international obligation can consist of, 
for example, the already-mentioned duties to refrain from exercising police 
authority on a State’s territory or the duty to respect the human rights of individuals 
under the State’s control. To establish the international responsibility of the State, it 
is thus necessary to attribute conduct that violates such international obligations to 
the State. How conduct can be attributed to the State (and is thus to be seen as an act 
of State) can be found in Chapter II of the DARS. 
The most evident article here is Article 4, which explains that “[t]he conduct of 
any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law”. 
Consequently, acts by, for example, (agents of) the secret service of a State are to be 
seen as acts of that State.  
Nevertheless, under certain conditions, other conduct can be considered an act of 
State as well. This can include acts of private individuals – see in that respect, for 
example, Articles 8 (conduct directed or controlled by a State) and 11 (conduct 
acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own) of the DARS: 
 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State 
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the 
conduct.481 
 
Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall 
nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law if and to the 
extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.482 
                                                          
481 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission to 
the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 
2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 47. See in that respect also the well-known Nicaragua 
(ICJ) and Tadić (ICTY) cases in which the ‘effective control’ and the (less strict) ‘overall control’ test 
respectively, were addressed, see ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), ‘Judgment’, 27 June 1986, para. 
115 and ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, ‘Judgement’, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 
July 1999, para. 145. 
482 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission to 
the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 
2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 52. A famous case in that respect is the Tehran case, 
which dealt with the seizure of the US Embassy, including its personnel, in Tehran, Iran, by militants. 
The ICJ stated: “The approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the 
Iranian State, and the decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the Embassy and 








Interestingly, but surprisingly, the Eichmann case is used in the ILC’s commentary 
to the latter article to explain the meaning of the words ‘acknowledges and adopts 
the conduct as its own’. This means that the commentary views the kidnapping as an 
act by private individuals,483 which, as was shown supra, is not accurate.484 One 
should not look at Article 11 here but rather at Article 4 of the DARS.485  
Notwithstanding this inaccuracy, it is, of course, true that at the time of the 
affair, it was not clear/admitted yet that State agents of Mossad had kidnapped 
Eichmann from Argentina. As shown in footnote 477 and accompanying text, the 
Israeli Ambassador in Argentina, Aryeh Levavi, spoke about a “volunteer group”. 
As promised in footnote 10 of Chapter I (and in the previous subsection), the 
aftermath of the Eichmann’s abduction in Argentina will now be examined in more 
detail to clarify these issues.  
 
3.3.2 Intermezzo: the Eichmann case revisited 
 
As stated supra, at the time of the capture, it was not clear yet that Israeli agents had 
kidnapped Eichmann from Argentina.  
Nevertheless, that Israel was involved somehow in the operation was soon 
unveiled: on 23 May 1960, Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion informed the Knesset, 
the Israeli Parliament, that Eichmann “was found by the Israel Security Services”.486  
                                                                                                                                              
hostages, had now become agents of the Iranian State for whose acts the State itself was internationally 
responsible.” (ICJ, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United 
States of America v. Iran), ‘Judgment’, 24 May 1980, para. 74. 
483 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission 
to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 
2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 53: “[T]he capture and subsequent trial in Israel of Adolf 
Eichmann may provide an example of the subsequent adoption of private conduct by a State.” 
484 There are more errors in this commentary, for example, the fact that the kidnapping took place on 10 
May 1960 (this must be: 11 May 1960) and the fact that Eichmann was held in captivity in Buenos Aires 
for some weeks (see also Fawcett 1964, p. 182) before being flown to Israel. This must be: for a little 
more than nine days (Eichmann was kidnapped on 11 May 1960, some time after 20:05 (see Harel 1975, 
pp. 165-166), and the El Al plane carrying Eichmann and the Israeli agents left Buenos Aires on 21 May 
1960 at 00:05, see Harel 1975, p. 261. See also Baade 1961, p. 400. 
485 Even if (quod non) the agents had acted ultra vires, beyond their powers, that would not have had 
any influence on this matter. After all, Art. 7 of the DARS explicitly states: “The conduct of an organ of 
a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be 
considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, 
even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.” One could, of course, argue that the 
kidnappers were perhaps agents from the Mossad but not acting in that capacity when seizing Eichmann, 
but even the website of the Mossad (see n. 3 of Chapter I) is clear on this: the Eichmann kidnapping was 
performed by the Mossad as such and not by mere Mossad agents acting privately. 
486 UNSC OR, fifteenth year, 868th meeting, 23 June 1960, UN Doc. S/P.V. 868 (1960), para. 11 (p. 3) 
(where Claude Corea (of Ceylon) quotes Ben-Gurion (from the Israel Digest of 10 June 1960): “I have 
to inform the Knesset that a short time ago one of the greatest of the Nazi war criminals, Adolf 
Eichmann, who was responsible together with the Nazi leaders for what they called ‘the final solution of 
the Jewish question’, i.e. the extermination of six million of the Jews in Europe, was found by the Israel 
Security Services”). See also Liskofsky 1961, p. 199: “On the following day, Police Inspector-General 
Joseph Nahamias, the head of Israel’s security service, stated at a news conference that Eichmann had 








In addition, on 27 May 1960, the Israeli newspaper Davar published a letter from 
Ben-Gurion to Galili, an Israeli politician. Here, one could read the following 
words:  
 
In my opinion, the importance of the capture of Adolf Eichmann and his trial in Israel 
lies not in the extraordinary resource and skill of the staff of the Security Services 
(though it would be difficult to exaggerate the praise they have earned), but in the 
privilege – which has been afforded through them – of having the entire story of the 
holocaust revealed in an Israeli court.487  
 
It was, however, not clear by that time where the capture had taken place. When 
Argentina learned from reports in the media that “volunteer groups” had in fact 
captured Eichmann from Argentina, the latter’s Government asked the Israeli 
Government for information on this issue.488  
On 3 June, the Israeli Ambassador to Argentina, Aryeh Levavi, sent a note to 
Diogenes Taboada, Foreign Minister of Argentina.489  
Levavi explained that after WW II, “Jewish volunteers, including some Israelis 
began the search for Eichmann”490 and that “[a] few months ago, one of these 
volunteer groups engaged in the search received information that Eichmann was 
hiding in Argentina”.491  
The volunteers traced him to his home, made contact with him and asked him 
whether he would be prepared to face justice in Israel.492  
After Eichmann had agreed to this,493 “[t]he volunteer group (…) removed 
Eichmann from Argentina with his full consent and handed him over to the Israel 
security services.”494  
On 23 May, the security services informed the Israel Government that Eichmann 
was in their custody.495  
                                                          
487 O’Higgins 1961, p. 296. 
488 See ‘Letter dated 15 June 1960 from the representative of Argentina to the President of the Security 
Council’, UN Doc. S/4336, para. 1 of the Explanatory Memorandum. 
489 See Note verbale dated 3 June 1960 from the Embassy of Israel in Buenos Aires to the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs and Religion of the Argentine Republic (in: UN Doc. S/4342: ‘Letter dated 21 June 
1960 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council’).  
490 Ibid., para. 1. 
491 Ibid., para. 3. 
492 See ibid., para. 4. 
493 See ibid. Eichmann’s letter goes as follows: “I, the undersigned, Adolf Eichmann, declare of my own 
free will that, since my true identity has been discovered, I realize that it is futile for me to attempt to go 
on evading justice. I state that I am prepared to travel to Israel to stand trial in that country before a 
competent court. I understand that I shall receive legal aid, and I shall endeavour to give a 
straightforward account of the facts of my last years of service in Germany so that a true picture of the 
facts may be passed on to future generations. I make this declaration of my own free will. I have been 
promised nothing, nor have any threats been made against me. I wish at last to achieve inner peace. As I 
am unable to remember all the details and am confused about certain facts, I ask to be granted assistance 
in my endeavours to establish the truth by being given access to documents and evidence.” (Ibid., para. 
6.) 
494 Ibid., para. 5. 








“Not until later was the Government informed that Eichmann had come from 
Argentina.”496  
Levavi concluded, referring to the monstrousness of Eichmann: 
 
If the volunteer group violated Argentine law or interfered with matters within the 
sovereignty of Argentina, the Government of Israel wishes to express its regret. The 
Government of Israel requests that the special significance of bringing to trial the man 
responsible for the murder of millions of persons belonging to the Jewish people be 
taken into account, and asks that due weight be given to the fact that the volunteers, 
who were themselves survivors of that massacre, placed this historic mission above 
all considerations. The Government of Israel is fully confident that the Argentine 
Government will show understanding of these historical and ethical factors.497 
 
This above-mentioned (see Subsection 3.2.2) explanation,498 including the personal 
letter written by Ben-Gurion to Argentine President Frondizi on 7 June (in which 
one can find similar formulations),499 constituted enough evidence for Argentina to 
                                                          
496 Ibid. 
497 Ibid., para. 7. 
498 In which one can find the words “interfered with matters within the sovereignty of Argentina” (the 
possible slip of Levavi’s pen, see the end of Subsection 3.2.2), “regret” and “historic mission”.  
499 See Letter dated 7 June 1960 from Mr Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel, to Mr Frondizi, 
President of Argentina (in: UN Doc. S/4342: ‘Letter dated 21 June 1960 from the representative of 
Israel to the President of the Security Council’): “This man, Eichmann, was the person directly 
responsible during the years of the Second World War for the execution of Hitler’s orders for the “final 
solution” of the Jewish problem in Europe, i.e., for the physical destruction of any Jew whom the Nazis 
were able to seize in the vast areas of Europe which they had conquered. Six millions of our people were 
massacred, and it was Eichmann who organized this mass extermination on a gigantic and 
unprecedented scale throughout the whole of Europe.” (Para. 3.) “It is practically impossible to find 
anywhere a Jew whose family does not include its victims of the Nazis. Hundreds of thousands of the 
survivors are living among us, and there are hundreds of Jews in Israel and other countries who had 
known no peace since the end of the War until the moment when the man who had directed these 
horrible massacres was found. The aim of their lives was to bring the man responsible for these 
unparalleled crimes to trial before the Jewish people; and such a trial can take place only here in Israel.” 
(Para. 4.) “I do not underestimate the seriousness of the formal violation of Argentine law committed by 
those who at last ended their long search with the capture of Eichmann; but I am confident that there can 
be very few people in the world who have failed to understand the profound motives and the supreme 
moral justification for this act. This incident cannot be judged solely from a purely formal angle. The 
obligation of all countries to respect scrupulously the laws of other countries is beyond all doubt; but 
one cannot, nevertheless, fail to appreciate the lofty motives underlying the imperative moral force by 
which those who found Eichmann and with his consent brought him to Israel were impelled, or the 
depth of the feelings which moved them.” (Para. 5.) “I am convinced that you will understand the 
supreme moral force of these aspects of the problem. You yourself fought dictatorship untiringly, and 
have constantly displayed your profound respect for human values. I am sure that no one will 
understand better than yourself our true feelings; that you will accept the expression of our most sincere 
regret for any violation of the laws of the Argentine Republic which may have been committed at the 
bidding of an irresistible inner moral force; and that, together with all friends of justice throughout the 
world, who view the trial of Eichmann in Israel as an act of supreme historical justice, you will see to it 
that the friendly relations between the Argentine Republic and Israel suffer no harm.” (Para. 6.) It may 
be interesting to note that Arendt touched upon the issue of presumption of innocence in the context of 
the Eichmann case as follows when she wrote, commenting on Ben-Gurion’s words mentioned in para. 








hold Israel responsible for the operation, even if the men executing the operation 
were to be considered private individuals,500 even if Eichmann had consented to his 
transportation to Israel (as both Levavi and Ben-Gurion had asserted)501 and even if 
Eichmann was to be considered an illegal resident in Argentina.502 As a result of 
this, Argentina, on 8 June  
                                                                                                                                              
be substantial and reasonable but not beyond reasonable doubt – that is the task of the ensuing trial – 
Eichmann’s illegal arrest could be justified, and was justified in the eyes of the world, only by the fact 
that the outcome of the trial could be safely anticipated.” (Arendt 1994, p. 210.) (Cf. also n. 25.) 
500 See UNSC OR, fifteenth year, 865th meeting, 22 June 1960, UN Doc. S/P.V. 865 (1960), para. 23 (p. 
5) (Mr Amadeo from Argentina): “This justification of the incident and the need to apologize for it 
constitute a full confession of responsibility and make the production of further evidence unnecessary. 
No one feels obliged to apologize for an incident for which he does not consider himself responsible. 
This responsibility is not affected by the Government of Israel’s contention that the act was done by 
private individuals who acted without prior consent.” See also ibid., para. 25 (p. 5): As far as the present 
case is concerned, those involved had no doubt whatever about the illegality of the act, as is proved by 
the clandestine way they acted both in capturing Eichmann and in removing him from Argentine 
territory. Eichmann, once captured, was handed over to the Government of Israel, and from that moment 
– that is, the State of Israel’s knowledge – of the illegal way in which he had been removed to Israel 
territory is incontestable. Thus, by accepting the act and by announcing its intention to try the prisoner, 
the Government of Israel ipso facto became an accessory to, and ultimately responsible for, the act 
itself. If we consider in addition the subsequent official expressions of approval of those who effected 
the capture, there is, we believe, no need for further proof.” 
501 See ibid., paras. 26-27 (pp. 5-6): “Eichmann’s supposed consent to his removal to Israel does not 
alter the fact that a violation of Argentine sovereignty was committed. I leave it to each of you to decide 
what weight is to be attached to the letter attributed to Eichmann giving his consent, and I cannot 
forbear from expressing my regret that such a document should have been included in a diplomatic note. 
But even if Eichmann gave his consent, it does not alter the fact that he was removed by force. In fact, 
Eichmann would have been taken to Israel whether he was willing or not. This is clear from Israel’s 
attitude throughout the affair. Since he had no choice in the matter, the fact that he may have consented 
is completely irrelevant. This is the view taken by Professor Hambro, who has said that if Israel agents 
in fact seized Eichmann in Argentina, their action was in itself a violation of international law, since 
such a thing cannot be done without the consent of the other State. [It must be noted that Mr Amadeo 
here refers to a statement which assumes that Eichmann was kidnapped by agents of the State of Israel. 
However, from the previous footnote, it can be deduced that Mr Amadeo made the claim that Israel was 
responsible for the kidnapping, even if the kidnappers were private individuals. Because of that, one can 
wonder what the added value is of this reference to Professor Hambro’s position. The same 
inconsistency is noted by Silving (1961, p. 315, n. 22) who writes: “Dr. Amadeo cites Professor 
Hambro’s opinion “that if Israel agents in fact seized Eichmann in Argentina, their action was in itself a 
violation of international law, since such a thing cannot be done without the consent of the other State.” 
(Doc S/P.V. 865, par. 26.) But how can this statement be taken to support Amadeo’s contention, implied 
in the context in which the statement is used, that the same applies if the “abductors” were private 
citizens and not “Israeli agents.””, ChP.] The Israel contention that Eichmann consented to his removal 
had therefore, in Professor’s Hambro’s opinion, no bearing on the question. It would therefore appear 
that the word “capture” was correctly used by Mr. Ben Gurion in his letter to President Frondizi 
[S/4342, sec. II] to refer to Eichmann’s arrest, since it emphasizes the essentially coercive nature of the 
act. In fact, according to the dictionary definition, the word “capture” means the apprehension of a 
person who is, or is suspected to be, an offender. When an offender is apprehended, his consent – 
assuming that he gives his consent – is completely immaterial.” 
502 See ibid., para. 28 (p. 6): “The fact that an inhabitant of the country may be living there in breach of 
its national laws is a purely domestic question which the Argentine authorities alone are empowered to 
investigate and adjudicate. No foreign Power has the right to take the place of the national authorities 








made the most formal protest against the illegal act committed to the detriment of a 
fundamental right of the Argentine State, and requested appropriate reparation for the 
act, namely the return of Eichmann, for which it set a time-limit of one week, and the 
punishment of those guilty of violating Argentine territory. The Argentine 
Government stated that, failing compliance with this request, it would refer the matter 
to the United Nations.503  
 
When Argentina felt that reparation was not forthcoming through direct negotiations 
with Israel,504 the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the UN, Mario 
Amadeo, on the instructions of his Government, requested the President of the 
UNSC  
 
to call an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the violation of the 
sovereign rights of the Argentine Republic resulting from the illicit and clandestine 
transfer of Adolf Eichmann from Argentine territory to the territory of the State of 
Israel, contrary to the rules of international law and the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and creating an atmosphere of insecurity and mistrust 
incompatible with the preservation of international peace.505 
 
The UNSC discussions took place on 22 (meetings 865-866) and 23 (meetings 867-
868) June 1960.  
After having discussed the history of the affair and the reasons why it believed 
Israel was responsible for the abduction, Mr Amadeo submitted a draft resolution to 
the UNSC in which the violation of Argentina’s sovereignty was recognised and in 
which Israel was requested to make appropriate reparation (but in which, 
importantly, the return of Eichmann was not explicitly mentioned).506 
Then, it was time for Israel – in the person of its Foreign Minister Golda Meir – 
to react to Argentina’s view on the case. Like Levavi’s note of 3 June and Ben-
Gurion’s letter of 7 June, Meir defended the operation of the individuals, again 
referring to the monstrousness of Eichmann.  
Some very illustrative examples of this reasoning can be found in the following 
excerpts: 
 
[M]y Government sincerely believes that this isolated violation of Argentine law must 
be seen in the light of the exceptional and unique character of the crimes attributed to 
Eichmann, on the one hand, and the motives of those that acted in this unusual 
                                                                                                                                              
tolerate such interference in its internal affairs would have ceased to be independent and worthy of 
respect.” 
503 ‘Letter dated 15 June 1960 from the representative of Argentina to the President of the Security 
Council’, UN Doc. S/4336, para. 3 of the Explanatory Memorandum. 
504 See Baade 1961, p. 407. 
505 ‘Letter dated 15 June 1960 from the representative of Argentina to the President of the Security 
Council’, UN Doc. S/4336, para. 1. 
506 See UNSC OR, fifteenth year, 865th meeting, 22 June 1960, UN Doc. S/P.V. 865 (1960), paras. 46-








manner, on the other hand. These men belong, as do I, to a people whose tragedy in 
the Second World War is unmatched in history.507 
 
This is 1960 – fifteen years after Nazi Germany was defeated. Is it not inconceivable 
that Eichmann has enjoyed freedom during all these years? That he has not been 
brought to trial? Is not this a violation of the sovereignty of the spirit of man and of 
humanity’s conception of justice?508   
 
What wonder that many Jews could find no rest until they ascertained whether he was 
alive and tracked him down.509 
 
Jews, some of whom personally are the victims of his brutality, found no rest until 
they located him and brought him to Israel – to the country to whose shores hundreds 
of thousands of the survivors of the Eichmann horror have come home (…).510 
 
Again I want to stress that if citizens of Israel broke the law of Argentina they broke it 
not in tracking down any ordinary criminal, but in tracking down Adolf Eichmann.511 
 
The representative of Argentina expressed anxiety that this, if not dealt with by the 
Security Council, might constitute a precedent. But modern history knows of no such 
monster as Adolf Eichmann. The representative of Argentina has sought to contrast 
the norms of ordinary legal procedure, on the one hand, with resort to lynching and 
mob violence on the other. In so far as he sought, in the latter connexion, to draw an 
analogy to the apprehension of Eichmann, there is no analogy. Far from lynching 
Eichmann or hanging him on the nearest tree, those who pursued him over fifteen 
years and finally seized him have handed him over to the process and judgement of 
the courts of law. The reference to mob passions and lawless justice in this context, I 
must say, is unwarranted and provocative. This is not only my view and that of the 
Government of Israel; it is also shared by prominent people all over the world. In an 
article by a well-known Argentine publicist, Ernesto Sabato, published in the 
important newspaper El Mundo of 17 June, under the suggestive title “Sovereignty 
for Butchers”, we read: 
 
“How can we not admire a group of brave men who have, during the years, 
endangered their lives in searching throughout the world for this criminal and who 
had yet the honesty to deliver him up for trial by judicial tribunals instead of being 
impelled by an impulse of revenge to finish him off on the spot.”512 
 
Will not our Argentine friends see the exceptional nature and uniqueness of this case? 
I am sure that their conception of right and justice must place this isolated incident in 
its proper perspective. I again ask: is this a problem for the Security Council to deal 
with? This is a body that deals with threats to the peace. Is this a threat to peace – 
                                                          
507 UNSC OR, fifteenth year, 866th meeting, 22 June 1960, UN Doc. S/P.V. 866 (1960), para. 19 (p. 4). 
508 Ibid., para. 36 (p. 8). 
509 Ibid., para. 39 (p. 8). 
510 Ibid., para. 40 (p. 9). 
511 Ibid., para. 42 (p. 9). 








Eichmann brought to trial by the very people to whose total physical annihilation he 
dedicated all his energies, even if the manner of his apprehension violated the laws of 
Argentina? Or did the threat to peace lie in Eichmann at large, Eichmann unpunished, 
Eichmann free to spread the poison of his twisted soul to a new generation?513 
 
Notwithstanding this, she clearly refused to accept the idea that the State of Israel 
had violated the sovereignty of Argentina: 
 
A considerable part of the address we heard this morning was devoted to elaborating 
the charge that the State of Israel has violated the sovereignty of Argentina. I 
emphatically deny this charge. The State of Israel has not violated the sovereignty of 
Argentina in any manner whatsoever, and there is nothing in the record to enable the 
Security Council to make any such findings. The Government of Israel has made 
clear in official communications to the Argentine Government, which appear now on 
the record of the Security Council, that certain of its nationals in the course of their 
efforts to bring Eichmann to justice may have committed infringement of the law of 
Argentina, and it has already twice expressed its regret for this. I wish to repeat in all 
solemnity before this Council my Government’s regrets at any infringement of the 
law of Argentina which may have been committed by any national of Israel. But with 
the greatest respect for the representative of Argentina, I think that he is in complete 
error, as a basic legal proposition, in confusing the illegal actions of individuals, for 
which regrets have been expressed, with the non-existent intentional violation of the 
sovereignty of one Member State by another. This distinction is so fundamental and 
so well established in international law that I am at a complete loss to understand how 
it could be expected that the Security Council should make so far-reaching a finding 
as is implicit in the statement we heard this morning, without any adequate basis in 
fact and in law.514 
 
Hence, in contrast to the (possible) slip of Levavi’s pen (see the final words of 
Subsection 3.2.2), Golda Meir was clear in her opinion that the kidnappers might 
have violated the laws of Argentina but not the sovereignty of Argentina as that 
requires statal involvement. After Israel’s speech, the views of the other members of 
the UNSC, of which many referred to both the seriousness of the crimes with which 
Eichmann was charged and the importance of the concept of State sovereignty, were 
heard at this 866th meeting and the two meetings (867 and 868) the next day.515 
                                                          
513 Ibid., paras. 47-48 (p. 10). 
514 Ibid., para. 41 (p. 9). 
515 See, for example, the following words of Mr Sobolev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): “In 
order to understand the nature of the Argentine Government’s complaint, the Security Council must, 
above all, bear in mind that this question is directly related to the case of one of the major Nazi war 
criminals who committed the most heinous crimes against humanity during the Second World War. (…) 
The peoples of the world, who have lived through the tragedy of the Second World War and have 
themselves felt the full weight of the Nazi crimes, have always vigorously demanded and continue to 
demand that all war criminals, without exception, be brought to justice. Obviously, this applies in full 
measure to the war criminal Eichmann, who has on his conscience the lives of some millions of human 
beings, including 6 million Jews. (…) As far for Argentina’s complaint concerning the violation of its 
sovereignty by Israel, the Soviet delegation must make it clear that the Soviet Union has always stood 








Arguably one of the most interesting exposés on the matter was provided by Claude 
Corea of Ceylon,516 who did not share Meir’s view and who believed that Israel had 
violated the sovereignty of Argentina:  
 
The Foreign Minister of Israel has informed the Council that (...) Eichmann was in 
fact apprehended by “Jewish volunteers including some Israelis”. We infer from that 
that these were not “agents” of the Israel Government. We concede that the acts of 
enthusiastic individual citizens cannot always properly be attributed to the 
Governments to whom they owe allegiance. We appreciate that sovereign 
Governments are seldom responsible for the conduct of isolated persons acting on 
their own accord, impelled by “the depth of the feelings which move them”; we 
understand the deep stirring in human souls which sometimes drives men to action 
regardless of the embarrassments they may cause to their Governments. These 
situations we understand and can even overlook. We cannot, however, completely 
overlook the express approval given by the Government of Israel to the actions of the 
individuals concerned in this case. The only reasonable inference we can draw from 
the statements of the various members of the Israel Government soon after the 
transfer of Eichmann is that the Government endorsed and condoned the act, thus 
adopting it more or less as its own. (...) It is a clear breach of international law for a 
State to send its agents to the territory of another State to apprehend persons accused 
of having committed a crime. We find it difficult to resist the logical inference from 
that proposition that it is just as much a breach of international law for a State to 
condone or endorse the acts of those who go into the territory of another State and 
there apprehend persons. For these reasons the Government of Ceylon cannot but 
subscribe to the view that there has been on the part of the Israel Government a 
violation of the sovereign rights of Argentina.517    
                                                                                                                                              
States and deems inadmissible any action designed to violate this principle. On the question of 
sovereignty the Soviet Union shares the Argentine position, since the violation of State sovereignty is 
inadmissible under any circumstances and can in no way be justified.” (Ibid., paras. 51, 62 and 68 (pp. 
11, 12 and 13).) See also the following words of Mr Tsiang of China: “The case of Eichmann by itself 
may excuse to a certain extent the irregular methods of his captors, but here a great principle is involved, 
namely, the principle of respect for national sovereignty. If this principle should be weakened in any 
way, the consequences for international order would be very grave indeed. My delegation wishes to 
register its disapproval of the irregular methods used by the captors of Eichmann.” (UNSC OR, fifteenth 
year, 868th meeting, 23 June 1960, UN Doc. S/P.V. 868 (1960), para. 28 (p. 7).) 
516 See ibid., paras. 2-23 (pp. 1-6). 
517 Ibid., paras. 10 and 12 (p. 3). With respect to the aspect of the seriousness of the suspect’s alleged 
crimes, Corea warned (ibid., para. 18 (p. 5)):  “[W]e hope we will be understood if we state definitely 
and categorically that we are not able to subscribe to a doctrine which would seek to justify a breach of a 
fundamental rule of law – a rule of law which is not a mere technicality but the very basis of the 
carefully constructed and delicate edifice of international order – on concepts as subjective and as 
indefinite as “historical justice” or “irresistible inner force”. The case of Eichmann is of course so 
staggering in its wickedness and its criminality that it may furnish a strong case for the advocates of this 
doctrine. Yet cases which may follow, or indeed cases which have preceded this in the not-too-distant 
past, may not be so easy of classification in terms of moral imperatives. Could it not be argued that the 
“security” or “vital interests” of one State provide a moral justification for acts by it constituting a 
violation of another State’s sovereign rights? Or that the kidnapping of a notorious traitor of one country 
who has escaped into another country, could be committed by patriotic citizens at the “bidding of an 








After the USSR and US had battled out a small but typical cold-war fight on a 
completely different issue,518 the Council adopted Resolution 138 of 23 June 1960. 
The UNSC declared that abductions, such as the one of Eichmann, violate the 
sovereignty of the suspect’s State of residence. In addition, it requested Israel to 
make “appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the rules of international law”.519 This implies that the abduction was indeed 
viewed as an internationally wrongful act from Israel. After all (and arguing a 
contrario): if Israel was not responsible, then reparation would, of course, not have 
been necessary.520 Interestingly, even though the UNSC clearly condemned the 
abduction, it did not state that Eichmann had to be returned. The Council thus 
followed the draft Resolution suggested by Argentina, which did not ask for the 
return of Eichmann either. One can certainly assert that the seriousness of 
Eichmann’s alleged crimes has played a role here, as evidenced by the following 
words from the Resolution’s Preamble:   
 
Mindful of the universal condemnation of the persecution of the Jews under the Nazis, 
and of the concern of people in all countries that Eichmann should be brought to 
appropriate justice for the crimes of which he is accused, Noting at the same time that 
this resolution should in no way be interpreted as condoning the odious crimes of 
which Eichmann is accused (...) [emphasis in original, ChP]. 
 
Thus, it could be argued that the UNSC took Eichmann’s alleged crimes into 
account to, in a way, condone the fact that he was now going to face justice in Israel, 
even though he was irregularly brought there.521 
                                                          
518 Namely on the alleged occupation by ex-nazis of important positions in West Germany and NATO 
(according to the USSR) and Eastern Germany (according to the US). See ibid., paras. 69-88 (pp. 13-
16). 
519 The entire resolution reads as follows: “The Security Council, Having examined the complaint that 
the transfer of Adolf Eichmann to the territory of Israel constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of the 
Argentine Republic, Considering that the violation of the sovereignty of a Member State is incompatible 
with the Charter of the United Nations, Having regard to the fact that reciprocal respect for and the 
mutual protection of the sovereign rights of States are an essential condition for their harmonious 
coexistence, Noting that the repetition of acts such as that giving rise to this situation would involve a 
breach of the principles upon which international order is founded, creating an atmosphere of insecurity 
and distrust incompatible with the preservation of peace, Mindful of the universal condemnation of the 
persecution of the Jews under the Nazis, and of the concern of people in all countries that Eichmann 
should be brought to appropriate justice for the crimes of which he is accused, Noting at the same time 
that this resolution should in no way be interpreted as condoning the odious crimes of which Eichmann 
is accused, 1. Declares that acts such as that under consideration, which affect the sovereignty of a 
Member State and therefore cause international friction, may, if repeated, endanger international peace 
and security; 2. Requests the Government of Israel to make appropriate reparation in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law; 3. Expresses the hope that the 
traditionally friendly relations between Argentina and Israel will be advanced [emphasis in original and 
original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
520 See also Subsection 1.1 of Chapter I. 
521 See also Kovac 2002, p. 643: “Since the resolution emphasized the heinous nature of Eichmann’s 
crimes (it also warned of the possibly destabilizing effects of such sovereignty violations if repeated), 








3.3.3 Draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts (Part 
II)  
 
Hence, taking the perspective from the time of the affair, when it was not yet clear 
that Israeli agents had kidnapped Eichmann from Argentina, Article 4 of the DARS 
should indeed not be used. Returning to the commentary to Article 11 of the DARS, 
the drafters explain that  
 
Security Council resolution 138 of 23 June 1960 implied a finding that the Israeli 
Government was at least aware of, and consented to, the successful plan to capture 
Eichmann in Argentina. It may be that Eichmann’s captors were “in fact acting on the 
instructions of or under the direction or control of” Israel, in which case their conduct 
was more properly attributed to the State under article 8. But where there are doubts 
about whether certain conduct falls within article 8, these may be resolved by the 
subsequent adoption of the conduct in question by the State. 522 
 
The commentary continues by explaining that the phrase “acknowledges and adopts 
the conduct in question as its own” means more than mere support or 
endorsement.523 What is required is “that the State identifies the conduct in question 
and makes it its own.”524 Nevertheless, this acknowledgment and adoption by a 
State does not need to be express; it may also be inferred from its conduct.525  
This adoption theory seems to have been expanded by some legal writers. For 
example, Costi asserts that  
 
while the responsibility of the state is not prima facie engaged following a private 
kidnapping, continued custody of the abducted individual and the ensuing prosecution 
does in fact entail ratification of the abduction by the state and the latter assumes 
responsibility for the violation of the sovereignty and integrity of the state of refuge 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].526  
 
By the same token, Mann argues: 
 
[A] State can only act through agents. Even if their activity is not authorized ab initio, 
it is the State that acts as soon as it fails to return the abducted person, but arrests and 
prosecutes him and thus ratifies the originally unauthorized acts. (...) Even if the 
person acting in the foreign territory is not a police officer but a private one, 
subsequent adoption by the State entails its responsibility. For this reason the 
suggestion that the infamous Eichmann was abducted by private volunteers is 
                                                                                                                                              
carefully worded language to the contrary [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Lasok 1962, p. 
355. 
522 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission to 
the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 
2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 53. 
523 See ibid. 
524 Ibid. 
525 See ibid., p. 54. 








irrelevant in law, for even if it had been factually correct (which it does not seem to 
have been), the essential fact is that Eichmann was imprisoned, prosecuted, convicted 
and executed by the State of Israel which thus endorsed the acts of any private person 
involved [original footnotes omitted, ChP].527  
 
It appears as if the State of Ceylon’s view on the idea of adoption within the context 
of State responsibility is more accurate than the views of Costi and Mann.528 Ceylon 
explained that Israel was responsible for the ‘private’ abduction because it gave 
“express approval” to it. However, does a State also “acknowledge and adopt as its 
own” if it clearly rejects the abduction of a person by private individuals (but 
nevertheless continues the prosecution of the suspect because he is now in its 
custody)? This is arguably hard to accept.529  
 
                                                          
527 Mann 1989, p. 408. See also Hamid 2004, pp. 83-84. 
528 The Prosecution in the still-to-discuss Nikolić case before the ICTY, see Subsection 3.1.4, did not 
agree with Mann’s interpretation of the concept of adoption, which is also supported by Shen (1994, p. 
63), and which was relied upon by the Defence in Nikolić (see ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor 
v Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion to Determine Issues As Agreed Between the Parties And the Trial Chamber 
As Being Fundamental to the Resolution of the Accused’s Status Before the Tribunal in Respect of the 
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Under Rule 72 and Generally, the Nature of the Relationship Between the 
OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of Any Illegal Conduct Material to the Accused, his Arrest and 
Subsequent Detention’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 29 October 2001, para. 15, n. 24) either, see ICTY, Trial 
Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to “Defence Motion for Relief 
Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and 
Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-Related Abuse of Process Within the Contemplation of 
Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 72” filed 17 May 2001’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 31 May 
2001, para. 36 or (the almost identical words in) ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Dragan 
Nikolić, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to Defence “Motion to Determine Issues as Agreed Between the Parties 
And the Trial Chamber…and the Consequences of Any Illegal Conduct Material to the Accused, His 
Arrest and Subsequent Detention”, filed 29 October 2001’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 12 November 2001, 
para. 7: “Nor should the fact that the Prosecutor subsequently proceeds to place the Accused on trial be 
construed as amounting to the de facto “adoption and approval” of any prior unlawful acts committed by 
other bodies, on the grounds that in so doing, the Prosecution does not ratify or endorse any 
international illegality but instead, merely carries out its ordinary mandated functions of subjecting those 
accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law to trial.” The Trial Chamber in the end 
agreed with the Prosecutor’s reasoning based on the DARS that the conduct of SFOR/OTP could not be 
seen as an adoption or acknowledgement of the illegal conduct of the private individuals (see ICTY, 
Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise 
of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, paras. 66-67), a point which was 
attacked by the Defence on appeal, see ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, 
‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 
2003, para. 6: “The Defence asserts that the Trial Chamber’s use of the International Law Commission’s 
(…) Draft Articles on State Responsibility to determine whether the conduct of third parties can be 
attributed to SFOR or the OTP was inappropriate because the Draft Articles are not recognised as 
customary or treaty law. The Defence argues that the Appeals Chamber should apply a different test. 
The Defence contends that SFOR knew that the Accused had been the victim of an unlawful and violent 
abduction and that by taking the Accused into custody, SFOR colluded in the original crime [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” (The Appeals Chamber itself did not go into this matter as it found that the 
violations, even if they could be attributed to SFOR (here, one could perhaps read: “SFOR/OTP”, see 
ibid., paras. 3 and 18), did not warrant the requested remedy, see ibid., paras. 27 and 33.) 








3.3.4 Due diligence 
 
Another important concept through which a State can be held responsible in 
connection with private conduct is ‘due diligence’ (or ‘due care’),530 a concept 
which was not addressed by the ILC in the DARS. Blomeyer-Bartenstein, writing on 
the codification of State responsibility after WW II, explains: 
 
In the new round of codification which began in 1963, the draft rules were no longer 
limited to the responsibility of States for injuries caused on their territory to aliens; 
the future convention was designed to define the general rules governing the 
international responsibility of the State. The ILC decided for that purpose to strictly 
limit the draft articles to secondary rules, i.e. rules determining the legal 
consequences of a failure to fulfil obligations established by primary rules, customary 
as well as conventional. Due diligence was considered as an element of an obligation, 
i.e. a primary rule, and therefore banned from the draft.531 
 
Notwithstanding this, the commentary to the DARS sporadically refers to its 
existence and meaning. See, for example, the following words, where it refers to the 
Tehran case:532 
 
[A] State may be responsible for the effects of the conduct of private parties, if it 
failed to take necessary measures to prevent those effects. For example a receiving 
State is not responsible, as such, for the acts of private individuals in seizing an 
embassy, but it will be responsible if it fails to take all necessary steps to protect the 
embassy from seizure, or to regain control over it [original footnote omitted, ChP].533 
 
A State may not only become responsible in connection with acts such as a seizure 
of an embassy by private individuals, it may also become responsible in connection 
with acts related to human rights violations.  
The already briefly mentioned534 Velásquez Rodríguez case, which concerned the 
role of the State of Honduras in the abduction and subsequent disappearance of 
                                                          
530 See generally Pisillo-Mazzeschi 1993, Hessbruegge 2004 and Barnidge, Jr. 2006. 
531 Blomeyer-Bartenstein 1987, pp. 141-142. See also Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third 
session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 34: 
“Whether responsibility is “objective” or “subjective” in this sense depends on the circumstances, 
including the content of the primary obligation in question. The articles lay down no general rule in that 
regard. The same is true of other standards, whether they involve some degree of fault, culpability, 
negligence or want of due diligence. Such standards vary from one context to another for reasons which 
essentially relate to the object and purpose of the treaty provision or other rule giving rise to the primary 
obligation.” 
532 Which was also used in Subsection 3.3.1 to explain the term ‘conduct acknowledged and adopted by 
a State as its own’. 
533 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission to 
the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 
2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 39. 








Honduran student leader Angel Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez, may be illustrative 
here.  
After having stated, as the HRC (see Subsection 2.2.2) and the ECmHR/ECtHR 
(see Subsection 2.2.4), that an abduction violates the human right to personal 
liberty,535 the IACtHR examined whether it could be established in this particular 
case that Honduras had violated, among other things, this human right.536 In its 
examination, the Court also turned to Article 1, paragraph 1 of the ACHR, the 
‘respect and ensure’ provision,537 and explained with regard to the ‘ensure’ part: 
 
The second obligation of the States Parties is to “ensure” the free and full exercise of 
the rights recognized by the Convention to every person subject to its jurisdiction. 
This obligation implies the duty of the States Parties to organize the governmental 
apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power is exercised, 
so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human 
rights. As a consequence of this obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and 
punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if 
possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted 
for damages resulting from the violation.538  
 
The words “any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention [emphasis 
added, ChP]”, of course, includes violations by State officials, but may not be 
limited to them. The State’s due diligence obligation (to prevent, investigate and 
punish) also appears to apply to human rights violations caused by private actors:  
 
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly 
imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because 
the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility 
of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to 
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.539 
 
A few remarks should be made here. First, it should be noted that this case might 
have a broader scope than just an American one. Meron explains:  
 
                                                          
535 IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez, ‘Judgment’, 29 July 1988, Ser. C., No. 4 (1988), available at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_12d.htm, para. 155: “The kidnapping of a person is an 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, an infringement of a detainee’s right to be taken without delay before a 
judge and to invoke the appropriate procedures to review the legality of the arrest, all in violation of 
Article 7 of the Convention which recognizes the right to personal liberty”. 
536 See ibid., paras. 159-160. 
537 “The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein 
and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and 
freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.” 
538 IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez, ‘Judgment’, 29 July 1988, Ser. C., No. 4 (1988), available at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_12d.htm, para. 166. 








Because of the similarity of Article 1 of the American Convention to Article 2 of the 
Political Covenant and, in this context, to Article 1 of the European Convention, the 
jurisprudence of the American Court is of general importance for the international 
law of human rights.540 
 
Secondly, it should be mentioned that in the last-quoted paragraph of the Velásquez 
Rodríguez case, one may find additional evidence for the view that private 
individuals can violate human rights (see Subsection 3.2.1).  
The fact that the IACtHR talks about “[a]n illegal act which violates human 
rights” may be seen as such proof.541 However, one may also disagree and argue that 
the IACtHR only states that the private individual can commit an illegal act (which 
in turns violates a human right) but that the private individual is not directly linked 
with the human rights violation itself. This notwithstanding, whether the private 
individual is directly or indirectly linked does not seem to matter. What matters is 
that because of an action from a private individual, a human right is violated.  
In any case, it must be clearly understood that the State does not become 
responsible because of the initial human rights violation itself, but because of its 
inaction with respect to that violation; the State incurs responsibility because it 
breaches its own (due diligence) obligation to prevent or respond to the violation. 
Although in the Velásquez Rodríguez case, the IACtHR found that the 
disappearance of the Honduran student leader “was carried out by agents who acted 
under cover of public authority”,542 meaning that the State of Honduras itself 
violated, among other things, the human right to personal liberty,543 it also clearly 
showed the difference between violating these specific human rights provisions and 
violating the general due diligence provision of Article 1, paragraph 1 of the 
American Convention: 
 
The Court is convinced, and has so found, that the disappearance of Manfredo 
Velásquez was carried out by agents who acted under cover of public authority. 
However, even had that fact not been proven, the failure of the State apparatus to act, 
which is clearly proven, is a failure on the part of Honduras to fulfill the duties it 
                                                          
540 Meron 1989, p. 164. 
541 See for another example also IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez, ‘Judgment’, 29 July 1988, Ser. C., No. 
4 (1988), available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_12d.htm, para. 177: “Where the acts 
of private parties that violate the Convention are not seriously investigated, those parties are aided in a 
sense by the government, thereby making the State responsible on the international plane [emphasis 
added, ChP].” See in that respect also Meron 1989, pp. 163-164 (again referring to the underlying goal 
of human rights law): “Because the purpose of human rights law is to protect human dignity, and 
because some essential human rights are often breached by private persons, the obligation of states to 
observe and ensure respect for human rights and to prevent violations cannot be confined to restrictions 
upon governmental powers but must extend to at least some private ‘interferences’ with human rights 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
542 IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez, ‘Judgment’, 29 July 1988, Ser. C., No. 4 (1988), available at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_12d.htm, para. 182. 








assumed under Article 1 (1) of the Convention, which obligated it to ensure Manfredo 
Velásquez the free and full exercise of his human rights.544 
 
In conclusion, a State violates the right to liberty and security itself if, for example, 
its own agents kidnap a person or if the kidnapping by private individuals can be 
attributed to the State (for example, because the State directed or controlled the 
private conduct or because it acknowledged and adopted the conduct as its own). In 
these cases, the kidnapping/violation of the right to liberty and security is attributed 
to the State: it can be seen as an act of State. Conversely, if private individuals 
kidnap a person (and the State has, for instance, not directed or controlled this 
conduct or acknowledged and adopted it as its own) the kidnapping/violation of the 
right to liberty and security itself is not attributed to the State. Nevertheless, if such 
a (truly private) kidnapping does occur and a State has done nothing to prevent it, or 
does nothing to punish the private kidnappers, the State can be held responsible 
anyway. In that case, it does not violate the right to liberty and security itself; it 
violates a due diligence provision as can, for example, be found in Article 1, 
paragraph 1 of the ACHR.545  
 
4 WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH VIOLATIONS? 
 
Before turning to Part 3 of this book, to the actual male captus case law of courts 
and tribunals other than the ICC, only one further point still needs to be addressed. 
In this chapter, which male captus situations exist (Section 1), what is violated by 
these male captus situations (Section 2) and who violates (Section 3) has been 
examined.546  




The second part of the already discussed DARS (‘Content of the international 
responsibility of a State’) is devoted to the legal consequences of an internationally 
wrongful act of a State.  
Besides the fact that the responsible State is under an obligation to cease that act 
and to offer guarantees of non-repetition,547 it must also make full reparation for the 
                                                          
544 Ibid., para. 182.  
545 See Wolfrum 1987, p. 275: “[W]hen there is a duty to exercise (...) due diligence in some particular 
respect, State responsibility may arise when the failure to exercise due diligence occurred in the context 
of violent acts by private individuals. Thus, the State is responsible only for the act or omission of its 
organs where they are guilty of not having done everything within their power to prevent the injurious 
act of the private individual or to punish it suitably if it has occurred. The State is responsible for having 
breached not the international obligation with which the individual’s act might be in conflict, but the 
general or special obligation imposed on its organs to provide for protection.” 
546 In addition, it was also explained (but not in a specific subsection) why these male captus situations 
may occur, see n. 25 and accompanying text.  








injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.548 Article 33 explains in its first 
paragraph that the obligations of the responsible State arising from the second part 
of the DARS may be owed (only) to “another State, to several States, or to the 
international community as a whole”. This entails, for example, that the obligation 
to make reparation is of a horizontal, inter-State nature549 and that it cannot be 
invoked by a private individual. Nevertheless, paragraph 2 of Article 33 states that 
“[t]his Part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international 
responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other 
than a State.” The idea formulated in this last quote will be addressed in the next 
subsection where the issue of remedies in international human rights law will be 
examined. Thus, when addressing the horizontal context (between States), the term 
‘reparation’ will be used,550 whereas the term ‘remedies’ will be used for the vertical 
context (between an individual and the State).551  
                                                          
548 See Art. 31, para. 1 of the DARS. 
549 The relationship between the international community as a whole (which can be seen as a collection 
of States) and a State will – for reasons of clarity – also be viewed as a horizontal relationship. 
550 Thus, the word reparation is here connected with the entity invoking its right and not so much with 
the sort of violation. For example, State B can very well ask State A for reparation because State A 
causes harm to a national of State B (for instance, because of acts from a State A official or because of 
private acts which State A cannot prevent). According to the traditional doctrine in the law on State 
responsibility for injury to aliens (which “can be viewed as a precursor to international human rights 
law” (Shelton 2005, p. 59)), “a state that injures an individual indirectly injures the state of nationality 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) However, international human rights law has changed this 
perspective as the purpose of human rights is “to guarantee the enjoyment of individual human beings of 
those rights and freedoms rather than to establish reciprocal relations between States”. (IACtHR, “Other 
Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court, ‘Advisory Opinion OC-1/82’, 24 
September 1982, Ser. A., No. 1 (1982), available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4a.htm, 
para. 24.) Shelton explains: “Traditional inter-state responsibility for breaches of international law, 
designed for reciprocal obligations, thus does not correspond exactly to the needs of the objective 
human rights regime. For example, when the state committing the breach does not directly injure 
another state, an issue arises of standing to make a claim. The International Law Commission has 
responded to this problem in its rules on state responsibility by expanding the concept of ‘injured state’ 
when the breach concerns a multilateral treaty or rule of customary international law created or 
established for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Every other state party to the 
convention or bound by the relevant rule is deemed affected by the interests protected by human rights 
provisions; hence all must be considered injured states in case of a breach of obligation [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” (Shelton 2005, p. 98.) Shelton notes, however, that “it is rare to find inter-state 
human rights complaints invoking the law of state responsibility because states often view the political 
and economic costs of complaints as too high in the absence of a specific injury. In addition, accusations 
of human rights violations may be deemed unfriendly acts.” (Ibid., pp. 98-99.)       
551 Cf. ibid., pp. 7-8: “In the law of state responsibility, ‘reparation’ is most frequently used in the 
context of inter-state claims, and it is maintained for that purpose in this volume. (...) In this book, the 
terms ‘remedies’ and ‘redress’ refer to the range of measures that may be taken in response to an actual 
or threatened violation of human rights.” Note, however, that a term like reparation is also often used in 
the context of an individual claiming to be the victim of a human rights violation. See, for example, the 
‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law’. (See the Annex to UNGA Res. 60/147 of 16 December 2005.) See also Art. 75 of the ICC Statute 








Returning to the subject of reparation, Article 34 of the DARS reads: “Full 
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the 
form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, 
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.” The very first form of reparation 
is restitution. In that case, the responsible State must 
 
re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, 
provided and to the extent that restitution: (a) Is not materially impossible; (b) Does 
not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution 
instead of compensation.552 
 
The commentary to the DARS explains that restitution comes first among the forms 
of reparation because it “most closely conforms to the general principle that the 
responsible State is bound to wipe out the legal and material consequences of its 
wrongful act by re-establishing the situation that would exist if that act had not been 
committed”.553 This can also be derived from Article 36, paragraph 1 of the DARS 
which stipulates that “[t]he State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is 
under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such 
damage is not made good by restitution [emphasis added, ChP].” The last form of 
reparation (not only in order but also in importance)554 is satisfaction. This “may 
consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal 
apology or another appropriate modality.”555 One could hereby also think of the 
extradition or punishment of the persons responsible for the violation.556 
Even though restitution is thus in theory the most appropriate form of reparation, 
the attitude of the injured State, among other things, may also play a role in 
determining which form of reparation should be granted in a specific case.557  
                                                          
552 Art. 35 of the DARS. 
553 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission to 
the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 
2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 96. (With reference to PCIJ, Case Concerning The 
Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits), ‘Judgment’, 13 September 1928, Publications of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A. – No. 17, Judgment No. 13, p. 48.) Perhaps even 
more interesting is ibid., p. 47: “The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act – 
a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of 
arbitral tribunals – is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal 
act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value 
which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would 
not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it – such are the principles which should 
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law.” 
554 See Art. 37, para. 1 of the DARS: “The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under 
an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by 
restitution or compensation [emphasis added, ChP].” 
555 Art. 37, para. 2 of the DARS. 
556 See Hamid 2004, pp. 82-83. 
557 See also the Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the 
Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York 








Applying these considerations to the male captus technique which most clearly 
violates another State’s sovereignty (abduction), this would mean that, in principle, 
a State which violates another State’s territory by kidnapping a suspect therefrom 
should bring the situation back as it was before the kidnapping (the status quo 
ante)558 implying that the suspect should be released559 and returned to the State of 
residence.  
This obligation to return is with the prosecuting State. Normally, the Executive 
will do what it is supposed to do and return the suspect. However, it can be argued 
that, if the Executive does not do so, the court now trying the case (which is, of 
course, also part of that prosecuting State) should take responsibility for the failures 
of its Executive, refuse jurisdiction and order the return of the suspect to the injured 
State.560 In short, in such a situation, it appears that the court should issue a male 
captus male detentus decision. This point will be further discussed in the following 
chapters, when the actual male captus decisions will be addressed.  
Although the obligation to return the abducted suspect would in principle thus be 
the most appropriate reaction of the prosecuting State, one must not forget that the 
attitude of the injured State should also be taken into account in determining which 
form of reparation is to be granted. One can assume that this means that the 
‘abducting’ State would only be required to return the abducted suspect if the 
injured State protests the kidnapping and requests the return of the suspect.561 
Whether this assumption is correct will be examined in Chapter V in which the 
actual inter-State male captus decisions will be addressed.  
                                                                                                                                              
restitution is not available or where its value to the injured State is so reduced that other forms of 
reparation take priority.” 
558 See ibid., p. 96. A restitution by which a situation is brought back to the status quo ante is called a 
restitutio in integrum. See Jennings and Watts 1992, p. 388, Costi 2003, p. 62 and Shelton 2005, p. 65. 
559 Cf. Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, Report of the Commission 
to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 
2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 96: “In its simplest form, (...) [restitution] involves such 
conduct as the release of persons wrongly detained”. 
560 See also Shen 1994, p. 63: “Since an abducting State has a duty to return illegally abducted 
individuals to their country of refuge or residence, courts of the abducting State must refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction on the merits.” 
561 A fortiori, the return would not be necessary if there was no violation in the first place, for example, 
because the wrongfulness of the violation is precluded by exceptions like self-defence and consent. 
Furthermore, a return would not be necessary either in the case of an abduction executed by private 
individuals if one is of the opinion that private individuals cannot violate another State’s sovereignty 
(because in that case, there is, of course, no violation in the first place either), see Preuss 1936, p. 507:  
“When a fugitive has been kidnaped by private persons, and, having been brought by force to the 
territory of a foreign state, is there arrested, there appears to be no obligation to release the prisoner. 
International responsibility is incurred only through official complicity. A fortiori, there is no obligation 
to surrender the prisoner when officials of the state of asylum have participated in the irregular seizure 
or arrest [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” For another opinion, see, for example, Hamid 2004. He 
believes that “[f]orcible abductions conducted by purely private individuals without government 
involvement give rise to no violation of international law” (Hamid 2004, p. 83), but nevertheless argues 
that “in both government-sponsored and non-government-sponsored abductions, the offending State has 








Only one case may already be mentioned here; the discussions in the UNSC on 
Eichmann’s abduction, for instance, have shown that ‘lesser’ forms of reparation 
than restitution may also be accepted.562 In the Council’s discussion on the meaning 
of the term ‘appropriate reparation’ (to be found in its draft resolution), the US and 
British representatives stated, for example, that the final adoption of the resolution 
by the UNSC, including the apology by Israeli Foreign Minister Meir, constituted 
enough reparation.563 The representative of the Soviet Union clearly stated that, 
whatever these words meant exactly, they could never result in the return of 
Eichmann to Argentina.564 Notwithstanding these views, Argentina reserved its right 
to interpret the meaning of ‘appropriate reparation’ at a later stage: 
 
[M]y delegation does not consider that either Argentina or any other member of the 
Council has a special obligation to supply an interpretation of the resolutions adopted 
by the Council. We may each have our own interpretation of the texts placed before 
us. They will be personal interpretations and have legal force only for those who 
make them. Once a resolution has been adopted by the Security Council, the parties 
concerned will have to consider the question and take the necessary steps to ensure 
that it is interpreted properly and applied in accordance with law.565  
 
                                                          
562 In her commentary to the ICTY Trial Chamber’s decision in Nikolić, see n. 444 and accompanying 
text, Smeulers refers to the resolution of the Security Council in the aftermath of Eichmann’s abduction 
to argue that “the return of the abducted person to the State whose rights have been violated (...) is (...) 
neither the most obvious [solution] nor a requirement under international law.” (Smeulers 2007, p. 108.) 
See also ibid. where she states that the idea that the return of the person would be the only appropriate 
remedy in the case of a violation of State sovereignty “is not in line with national case law or State 
practice.”   
563 UNSC, 15th Year, OR, 867th meeting, 23 June 1960, UN Doc. S/PV.867, para. 5 (pp. 1-2): “The 
United States considers that appropriate reparation will have been made by the expression of views by 
the Security Council in the pending resolution taken together with the statement of the Foreign Minister 
of Israel making apology on behalf of the Government of Israel. We therefore think that when we have 
adopted the pending resolution, appropriate resolution will have been made, and that the incident will 
then be closed. Normal, friendly relations between the two Governments can then progress.” UNSC, 15th 
Year, OR, 868th meeting, 23 June 1960, UN Doc. S/PV.868, para. 36 (p. 8): “The representative of the 
United States has drawn attention to the important satisfaction which will be accorded to Argentina if 
this draft resolution is adopted by the Council. In addition, the regrets of the Government of Israel for 
any violation of Argentine laws are on the record. The United Kingdom delegation shares the view that 
these satisfactions can reasonably be regarded as appropriate reparation and should enable the incident 
before us to be terminated without danger to the relations, hitherto so amicable, between the two 
countries concerned.” 
564 Ibid., para. 67 (p. 13): “I wish to make it quite clear that, like other members of the Council, we are 
entirely of the opinion that operative 2 of the Council’s resolution can in no circumstances be interpreted 
as giving grounds for the submission of any claims for the return of Eichmann to the country in which 
for many years he has evaded just trial for the crimes he has committed. At the same time we cannot 
consider the deliberately vague wording of this paragraph satisfactory.” 








Although the diplomatic battle still raged ‘behind the scenes’ for quite some time, in 
the end – as was already mentioned above – Israel and Argentina declared the 
incident closed.566  
It must be emphasised that although the discussions in the UNSC on the 
Eichmann abduction (and its aftermath) can indeed be seen as evidence for the fact 
that ‘lesser’ forms of reparation may be accepted in practice as well, one can argue 
that it does not seem to have imperilled the above-mentioned assumed rule that the 
suspect must be returned if the injured State protests and demands the return of the 
suspect; although Argentina did initially request “appropriate reparation for the act, 
namely the return of Eichmann [emphasis added, ChP]”,567 the specific demand for 
Eichmann’s return was deleted in the context of the UNSC proceedings when 
Argentina, in its proposal for a UNSC resolution, asked merely for “appropriate 
reparation”.568 After the incident was closed and the case went to trial, the Israeli 
Judiciary no longer had, of course, an obligation to return Eichmann on the basis of 
the violation of Argentina’s sovereignty because that matter had been settled.569  
A final point must be made here and that is that the return of the suspect, 
especially if that suspect is charged with very serious crimes, should not be 
considered the same as impunity for that suspect. Hence, even though the Executive 
(or if that entity fails, the Judiciary) of the forum State is obliged to return the 
suspect after an abduction, the State of residence also has an obligation to prosecute 
suspects of international crimes. If that State is not willing or able to do so, his 
demand for return should fail.570 However, that does not mean that the suspect 
                                                          
566 See Liskofsky 1961, p. 204: “On June 28 Argentina sent Israel a note asking for an official statement 
of intent regarding the council’s recommendation for “adequate reparation.” On July 5, Israel replied 
with a note citing the “understanding” of the major supporters of the council resolution and asking that 
Argentina consider the case closed. On July 22, Argentina declared Israeli Ambassador Levavi persona 
non grata. On July 23, Israel expressed official “regret” over the expulsion of its ambassador. On July 
25, Shabbethai Rosenne, legal adviser to the Israel Foreign Ministry, arrived in Argentina to try to 
rectify relations between the countries. On August [3], both governments issued a joint statement 
announcing that the “incident” between them was closed. The statement said that the two governments 
had been “animated by the wish to comply with the resolution of the Security Council of June 23, in 
which the hope was expressed that the traditional friendly relations between the two countries will be 
advanced.” The statement made no reference to the “adequate reparation” that Argentina had been 
demanding. On October 17, 1960, diplomatic relations between Argentina and Israel were officially 
resumed after a four-month break, with Joseph Avidar as Israel’s new ambassador to Argentina, and 
Rogelio Iristany as the new Argentine ambassador to Israel.” 
567 See n. 503 and accompanying text. 
568 See n. 506 and accompanying text. See also De Schutter 1965, p. 106: “[T]he Argentine waived the 
most logical reparation and declared itself satisfied with the official Israel apology. The Argentine had a 
right to claim liberation on the grounds of its sovereign liberty and independence; on the grounds of the 
same liberty it waived this privilege. Therefore, the Eichmann incident doesn’t alter this rule [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” Baade notes that after the UNSC deliberations (and before the incident was 
finally settled in August 1960), “Argentina nevertheless repeatedly demanded the return of Eichmann”. 
(Baade 1961, p. 407, n. 28.) 
569 See also Michell 1996, p. 422 who categorises the Eichmann case under the heading “The Injured 
State Does not Consent, But Does Not Request the Individual’s Return”. 
570 Cf. in that respect Fawcett 1964, pp. 199-200: “[I]t might perhaps be said, in the case of irregular 








should stay in the forum State because that jurisdiction, because of the male captus, 
has arguably forfeited its right to prosecute the suspect. It would be better in such a 
case to send the suspect to another jurisdiction which is willing and able to 
prosecute the suspect and which has nothing to do with the male captus.  
Turning to that other male captus technique which may violate another State’s 
sovereignty:571 luring,572 one could use the same arguments. If a luring operation 
violates another State’s sovereignty, the injured State may protest and request the 
return of the suspect. In that case, one could argue, the ‘luring’ State (if not the 
Executive then the Judiciary) should also return the suspect to the injured State. 
However, even though this form of reparation has been supported,573 it must also be 
recalled that luring is normally seen as a less serious violation of international law, 
which may perhaps have its effect on the exact form of reparation. This point should 









                                                                                                                                              
demand his reconduction if two conditions are satisfied: that that State is the forum conveniens for his 
trial, and that it declares an intention to put him on trial. If these conditions are not satisfied, then the 
State must accept reparation in another form, since otherwise the interest of justice would be defeated.” 
571 See Subsection 2.1. 
572 It is not necessary to discuss the technique of disguised extradition here as that technique does not 
lead to a violation of State sovereignty, see Subsection 2.1. Notwithstanding this, one may, of course, be 
of the opinion that also in the case of a disguised extradition, the suspect should be returned to the State 
from where he was deported, see Michell 1996, p. 392. 
573 See, for example, Preuss 1935, pp. 505-506 (who also confirms the above-mentioned assumed rule 
that the ‘abducting’ State must return the suspect to the injured State if that latter State protests and 
requests the return of the abducted suspect): “The clearest case of state responsibility is found where 
state agents have seized the individual by violence upon the territory of the state of asylum. Such a 
violation of foreign territory undoubtedly engages the responsibility of the state of arrest, which is under 
a clear duty to restore the prisoner and to punish or extradite the offending officers. This obligation 
appears to have been almost uniformly acknowledged in cases where the injured state has made a 
diplomatic reclamation. (…) There likewise appears to be an obligation to restore to the state of asylum 
a fugitive who has been arrested on its territory, or induced by fraud to leave its territory, by individuals 
acting with the complicity of agents of the arresting state [emphasis added and original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].” See also the remaining words of the already partly quoted Resolution No. 9 relevant to 
the topic ‘The Protection of Human Rights in International Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ 
(unanimously approved at the closing session of the XV Congress of the International Association of 
Penal Law in Rio de Janeiro, 4-10 September 1994) (see n. 82 and accompanying text): “Abducting a 
person from a foreign country or enticing a person under false pretences to come voluntarily from 
another country in order to subject such a person to arrest and criminal prosecution is contrary to 
public international law and should not be tolerated and should be recognized as a bar to prosecution 
[emphasis added, ChP].” (Schomburg 1995, p. 105.) Note that this quotation is rather far-reaching in 
that it views luring in general (whether agents from State A are operating on State B’s territory or not) 










Returning to the human rights context574 and specifically the human right to liberty 
and security and the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, two 
remedies in the case of violations are discernible.575  
The first is financial compensation and can be found in, for example, paragraph 5 
of Article 9 of the ICCPR576 and of Article 5 of the ECHR.577 Looking at the 
language of these almost identical578 provisions, it seems clear that in each and 
every case of an unlawful arrest/detention, compensation must be given (see the 
words: “shall”).  
The second is release and can be found in paragraphs 4 of both articles which are 
also virtually identical.579 These paragraphs start with the right of a person to go to 
court. The words that follow are somewhat different, but they both stipulate the 
same, namely that that court 1) must decide on the lawfulness of (the arrest (see 
infra) and) the detention and 2) must release the person if (the arrest or) the 
detention is deemed unlawful.  
These provisions regulate what is called in common law habeas corpus. This 
term was already briefly mentioned in footnote 42 of Chapter II and has been 
addressed earlier in the present chapter as well, see Subsection 2.2.5. Although the 
ICCPR paragraph speaks of “may” (“in order that that court may decide…”), it is 
clear that a person has not only the right to go to court but consequently that court 
                                                          
574 While not forgetting, however, that human rights violations can also fit in the inter-State ‘tool’ of 
reparation, see the previous subsection. 
575 Note also the more general right to an effective remedy, as can be found in, for example, Art. 2, para. 
3 (a) of the ICCPR: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person 
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity (…).” 
See also Art. 13 of the ECHR: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” 
576 “Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to 
compensation.” 
577 “Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this 
article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.” 
578 The only difference is that para. 5 of Art. 9 of the ICCPR speaks of “[a]nyone who has been the 
victim of unlawful arrest or detention” whereas para. 5 of Art. 5 of the ECHR speaks of “[e]veryone 
who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this article”. See 
Nowak 2005, p. 238: “Whereas the analogous provision in Art. 5(5) of the ECHR guarantees 
compensation only in the event of a violation of Art. 5, the claim set down in Art. 9(5) is available to 
every victim of unlawful arrest or detention (“victime d’arrestation ou de détentions illégales”). Arrest 
or detention is unlawful when it contradicts one of the provisions in Art. 9(1) to (4) and/or a provision of 
domestic law [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
579 Art. 9, para. 4 of the ICCPR reads: “Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall 
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the 
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.” Art. 5, para. 4 of the 
ECHR reads: “Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release 








has discretion as to whether or not to review the lawfulness of his (arrest or) 
detention. See in that respect also the description by Nowak, which confirms that the 
ICCPR states that a judge must review the lawfulness of the detention: “All persons 
who have been deprived of their liberty of person are – regardless of the reasons – 
entitled to a right to have the detention reviewed in court without delay [emphasis 
added, ChP].”580 (It does not say: to possibly have the detention reviewed if the 
court deems this appropriate.) In that respect, the ECHR paragraph is much clearer: 
“proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by 
a court [emphasis added, ChP]”. In any case, once the court reviews the lawfulness 
of the detention, it must release a person if his detention is found to be unlawful.581 
It is important to understand that this remedy is not discretionary in nature but part 
of the human right to liberty and security, a right which is applicable to everyone. 
This means that in principle,582 any person, whether he is charged with fraud or 
genocide, must be released if the judge finds that that person’s (arrest and) detention 
is unlawful.  
To come back to all the brackets supra in which one could find the word “arrest” 
(see also the last sentence), it is submitted that the judge must not only decide on the 
lawfulness of the detention but also on the lawfulness of the arrest and, furthermore, 
that he must release a person not only if his detention is unlawful but also if his 
arrest is unlawful.583 Such an interpretation is supported by the whole context of this 
article, in which not only the detention but in fact the deprivation of liberty in 
general, thus including the arrest, is considered.584  
                                                          
580 Nowak 2005, p. 235. 
581 See, for example, Rodley 1999, p. 338: “[I]n the event that the detention is found to be unlawful, the 
court must order release [emphasis added, ChP].” See also Swart 2001 pp. 204 (“Article 9, paragraph 4 
of the ICCPR and Article 5, paragraph 4 of the ECHR require that a court order the release of the person 
deprived of his liberty where that person’s detention is not lawful [emphasis added, ChP].”) and 206: 
“[B]oth Article 9 of the ICCPR and Article 5 of the ECHR make it imperative that a person be released 
if his detention was unlawful.” 
582 Nevertheless, see Subsection 4.4 for problems surrounding this remedy and a proposal to evade them. 
583 Such an interpretation can also be found in a document preceding the ICCPR. In the 1964 UN 
Commission on Human Rights’ ‘Study of the Right to Everyone to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, 
Detention and Exile’ (see also n. 216), the Commission prepared so-called “Draft Articles” on the right 
to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention. These Draft Articles were sent to UN Member States for 
commentary. Quite some provisions were acceptable to all the 48 States submitting comments. One of 
these provisions was summarised by Maki as follows: “Anyone who is arrested or detained shall be 
entitled to initiate proceedings before an authority in order to challenge the legality of his arrest or 
detention and obtain his release from that authority without delay if it is unlawful [emphasis added, 
ChP].” (Maki 1980, p. 295.) Maki notes on the same page: “It is significant that none of the countries 
submitting comments to the Draft Articles suggested that the result of the proceeding be anything but 
the detainee’s release, if the arrest or detention is unlawful [emphasis added, ChP].” 
584 Note, however, that old interpretations of the concept of habeas corpus indeed seemed to be focused 
on the legality of the detention alone. See in that respect also the already-mentioned (see Chapter II) 
Scott case from 1829 in which Brougham and Platt showed cause and argued: “On the return to a writ of 
habeas corpus, the gaoler [this is the jailer, ChP] is only bound to shew [this means to show, ChP] the 
warrant for the detention of the party, and not the caption.” (Court of King’s Bench, Lord Chief Justice 
Tenterden, Ex parte Susannah Scott, 19 May 1829, 9 Barnewall & Cresswell’s King’s Bench Reports 








In his commentary to the ICCPR provisions, Nowak arguably supports this view 
as well. In the context of the more general concept of deprivation of liberty (which 
covers both the arrest and detention),585 he states:  
 
The decision in remand proceedings relates exclusively to the lawfulness of 
deprivation of liberty. If this is not the case [namely when the deprivation of liberty is 
unlawful, ChP], then the court must order the immediate release of the person 
concerned [emphasis in original, ChP].586 
 
Indeed, in the ACHR’s version of this article,587 one can read: “Anyone who is 
deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in order that 
the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and 
order his release if the arrest or detention is unlawful [emphasis added, ChP]”.588 
                                                          
585 Although the word deprivation, in an earlier quotation, appears to be more linked with the concept of 
‘detention’ (see Nowak 2005, p. 221: “The word “arrest” (“arrestation”) refers to the act of depriving 
personal liberty (…). The word “detention” (“détention”), on the other hand, refers to the state of 
deprivation of liberty (…) [emphasis in original, ChP].”), it is clear that the deprivation of liberty also 
encompasses the arrest in the following quotation. When writing about Art. 9, para. 5 of the ICCPR 
(which stipulates that “[a]nyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation”), Nowak (ibid., p. 237) refers to “[t]he claim to compensation for 
unlawful deprivation of liberty”. 
586 Nowak 1993, p. 179. (This passage is arguably clearer than the one from Nowak’s book in 2005. 
There, he states: “The decision in remand proceedings relates exclusively to the lawfulness of 
deprivation of liberty, i.e., the compatibility of the detention with domestic and international law. If the 
court finds that detention is unlawful, it is under an obligation to order the immediate release of the 
person concerned [emphasis in original, ChP].” (Nowak 2005, p. 236.) Although he writes here that a 
court must order the release of a person in the case of an unlawful detention (and not in the case of an 
unlawful deprivation of liberty), the word detention is linked in the previous sentence to the deprivation 
of liberty, which, in turn, encompasses not only the detention, but also the arrest, see the previous 
footnote.) See also Knoops 2003, p. 216, writing on the European provision: “Where someone has been 
deprived of his or her liberty, he or she is entitled by Article 5, paragraph 4, to a speedy decision by a 
national court as to whether the deprivation of liberty is lawful and to an order for his or her release if it 
[namely the deprivation of liberty, ChP] is not lawful [emphasis in original, ChP].” See, likewise, Dhont 
2004, p. 350 (also writing on Art. 5, para. 4 of the ECHR): “If the judge is of the opinion that the 
deprivation of liberty [she uses the Dutch term vrijheidsberoving here, ChP] is not lawful, the person in 
question must be released immediately [own translation, ChP].” See finally also more generally (and 
writing about arbitrariness) De Zayas 2005, p. 22: “The above international norms [De Zayas refers here 
to international and regional human rights protecting the liberty and security of person, ChP] reflect a 
universal consensus that an individual cannot be deprived of liberty except pursuant to specific 
legislative authority and with respect for procedural safeguards. Nevertheless, the reality is that not only 
military dictatorships but also democracies detain political opponents, refugees and aliens, sometimes 
indefinitely, under a variety of pretexts. It is for domestic and international tribunals to test the legality 
of such detentions and to ensure the release and compensation of persons who have suffered arbitrary 
arrest and detention [emphasis added, ChP].” 
587 Note that “[t]he ACHR is substantially modelled on the ICCPR”.  (De Londras 2007, p. 239, n. 111.) 
588 Art. 7, para. 6 of the ACHR (‘right to personal liberty’). For a concrete example, see IACtHR, 
Castillo Páez, ‘Judgment’, 3 November 1997, Ser. C., No. 34 (1997), available at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/34-ing.html. El Zeidy (2006, p. 455, n. 28) explains that in this 
case, the Court “found violation of Art. 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights on several 
bases including unlawful arrest of the accused and consequently a violation of the domestic law which 








Thus, what is arguably important is that the judge looks at the deprivation of liberty 
in general (arrest and detention)589 and that he releases a person who is unlawfully 
deprived of his liberty. Articles 9 of the ICCPR and 5 of the ECHR probably only 
mention detention in the final words of their paragraphs 4590 because it has to be 
seen as the most important part of the deprivation of liberty.591 Now, it can very well 
be that there is nothing wrong with the arrest but that the detention is unlawful (in 
that case the person unlawfully detained must, of course, be released) but if the 
arrest is unlawful, then the detention should be automatically seen as unlawful as 
well (leading to a release).592 In conclusion, a judge must review the lawfulness of a 
person’s deprivation of liberty,593 including the arrest,594 and release that person if 
the arrest/detention/deprivation of liberty is deemed unlawful.  
                                                                                                                                              
(writing about habeas corpus): “A writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to 
ensure that the party’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal (…). (…) In addition to being used to test 
the legality of an arrest or commitment, the writ may be used to obtain review of (…) [emphasis added, 
ChP].” 
589 Cf. in that respect also the view of ICTY Judge Robinson in his separate opinion to the still-to-
discuss (see Subsection 3.1.2 of Chapter VI) Todorović case where he stated that “[i]t is immaterial 
whether SFOR’s action is characterised (…) as a detention, rather than an arrest; its action resulted in a 
deprivation of liberty, and it is the legality of that deprivation which is being challenged.” (ICTY, Trial 
Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan Todorović and Simo 
Zarić, ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 2000, para. 5.) 
590 Note, however, that these paragraphs (and the same goes for their paras. 5) do mention the word 
“arrest” in the beginning. 
591 The arrest in that sense is only the act of deprivation of liberty whereas the detention is the state of 
deprivation of liberty immediately following the arrest. See Nowak 2005, p. 221 for the difference 
between an arrest and a detention in the context of the ICCPR. (See ns. 465 and 585.) 
592 Note that one could argue that this reasoning contravenes the idea of the maxim male captus bene 
detentus. After all, an unlawful arrest (male captus) does not automatically lead to an unlawful detention 
(male detentus). Two remarks should be made here. First, the above-mentioned definition of male 
captus bene detentus is much more literal than the one followed in this study. Arguably the ‘real’ 
meaning behind male captus bene detentus is that a judge can exercise jurisdiction over a suspect (bene 
detentus), even if that suspect was irregularly brought within the jurisdiction of the now prosecuting 
court (male captus). Hence, the captus can encompass in fact any pre-trial irregularity and is not limited 
to the arrest; it can also include an unlawful detention. (See also Subsection 1.1 of this chapter.) Thus, 
the remark that an unlawful arrest should automatically lead to an unlawful detention is not in any way 
denying the existence of the maxim male captus bene detentus for in some jurisdictions, a pre-trial 
irregularity (whether it is an unlawful arrest or detention) does indeed not lead to a refusal to exercise 
jurisdiction. Secondly, even if the person is released, one can wonder whether this is actually the same 
as the counterpart of male captus bene detentus: ex iniuria ius non oritur (or male captus male detentus). 
This important point will be further addressed in Subsection 4.4. 
593 See also ECtHR (Plenary), Case of Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 
11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; 11386/85, ‘Judgment’, 29 November 1988, para. 65 (writing on Art. 5, 
para. 4 of the ECHR): “By virtue of paragraph 4 of Article 5 (art. 5-4), arrested or detained persons are 
entitled to a review bearing upon the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the 
“lawfulness”, in the sense of the Convention, of their deprivation of liberty.” 
594 Cf. also ECtHR (Plenary), Case of Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, Application No. 7906/77, 
‘Judgment’, 24 June 1982, para. 48: “[F]or the purposes of Article 5 par. 4 (art. 5-4), the “lawfulness” of 
an “arrest or detention” has to be determined in the light not only of domestic law but also of the text of 
the Convention, the general principles embodied therein and the aim of the restrictions permitted by 
Article 5 par. 1 (art. 5-1) (…) [emphasis added, ChP]”. See also ECtHR (Plenary), Case of Brogan and 








It is hereby also submitted that the words arrest and detention should have 
extraterritorial effect, an interpretation which, as was shown earlier in Celiberti de 
Casariego v. Uruguay and Sergio Ruben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, see Subsection 
2.2.2, has been supported by the HRC.595  
A judge should not only release a person who has been unlawfully arrested or 
detained in his own State but also if the male captus occurred abroad. Any other 
interpretation would lead to the danger of a legal vacuum.596 Suppose a person is 
unlawfully arrested or detained in State B by agents of State A (for example by 
kidnapping) and brought to State A, where he is officially/formally arrested and 
detained and brought to court. If a judge then finds the arrest and detention of this 
person to be lawful, he in a way profits from the fact that the deprivation of liberty 
was fragmented over two systems. The suspect should not become the victim of this 
fragmentation.  
                                                                                                                                              
29 November 1988, para. 65 (writing on Art. 5, para. 4 of the ECHR): “[W]hether an “arrest” or 
“detention” can be regarded as “lawful” has to be determined in the light not only of domestic law, but 
also of the text of the Convention, the general principles embodied therein and the aim of the restrictions 
permitted by Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) (…) [emphasis added, ChP].” 
595 Although the ECtHR (in Öcalan) and the ECmHR (in Stocké) also held that the ECHR can have 
extraterritorial effect, the European institutions – it was already explained earlier (see n. 388) – 
nevertheless seem more focused on the national arrest and detention procedures, hereby providing room 
for the male captus bene detentus principle to flourish, see Trechsel 2005, p. 432 (referring to Stocké, 
Öcalan and Barbie cases): “Until now, the question whether a deprivation of liberty was ‘in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by law’ was only examined with regard to the law of the Contracting State 
where the applicant had been deprived of his or her liberty. What if a person is detained in state B after 
having been apprehended in state A in a way which is not in accordance with the law of that state? In 
other words, does the Convention support the thesis of male captus been detentus (or judicatus)? It 
would seem that it does [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
596 Nevertheless, in male captus bene detentus cases, courts which were confronted by a habeas corpus 
claim (see, for instance, the Scott and Elliott cases, see Subsection 1.1 of Chapter V) have argued that 
the (arrest and) detention in the State of the now prosecuting court was perfectly legal (and that they did 
not have to look into the manner as to how the suspect was brought into their jurisdiction). See also 
generally Kiss (1965, p. 936), commenting on the decision of the Court of State Security in the Re 
Argoud case (see Subsection 2.1 of Chapter V), where the same reasoning was followed, even though 
Argoud did not file a habeas corpus claim (a concept which, it is reminded, stems from the common law 
context): “La Cour (...) évoque la jurisprudence en Grande-Bretange où, dit-elle, malgré l’invocation de 
l’habeas corpus les juges décident que la capture à l’étranger d’un citoyen britannique ne les prive pas 
du droit et de la compétence de le juger, en citant à l’appui l’affaire Elliott de 1949. Cette jurisprudence, 
affirme la Cour, est encore constamment celle des Etats-Unis où les tribunaux la formulent sous l’adage 
male captus, bene detentus. (...) En définitive, la Cour constate que l’accusé a été trouvé sur le territoire 
français et mis en état d’arrestation au vu du mandat d’arrêt régulier dont il était l’objet. Cette arrestation 
sur le territoire français était donc légale et la Cour de sûreté de l’Etat est légalement saisie de la 
poursuite.” See finally Cowling 1992, p. 244 (discussing some older male captus cases): “It would (...) 
appear that in the interests of international relations there is a tendency on the part of courts 
conveniently to turn a blind eye to blatant irregularities that might have been perpetrated in order to 
bring a fugitive offender before a criminal court. Arrest is interpreted extremely narrowly to embrace 
only the final act of the official taking into custody a fugitive once the latter has been returned to the 
territory of the requesting State (...). What went on before this is considered to be irrelevant [original 








It is submitted that the judge should be mainly concerned with the way the 
actual, and not the official/formal deprivation of liberty by the State agents took 
place.597  
Furthermore, it must also be clarified that the reviewing judge of paragraph 4 
does not need to review every detail of a person’s detention.598  
For example, if the decision-making authority, in its discretion, has decided that 
the most appropriate place of detention for a certain person is facility A, then it is 
not up to the reviewing judge to query that discretionary decision.599  
The “lawfulness” of paragraph 4 is in fact the same as the “lawfulness” of 
paragraph 1 (whose exact scope was already earlier examined).600 Hence, the 
reviewing judge, on the basis of both national and international law (such as the 
ECHR601 or the ICCPR)602 must check the essential603 points concerning the 
                                                          
597 It is to be noted that this stance is not a rejection of the male captus bene detentus reasoning. As will 
be explained in Subsection 4.4, a release on the basis of habeas corpus does not preclude the re-arrest of 
a person (and is thus not the same as a male detentus: a refusal of jurisdiction). 
598 See ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8225/78, 
‘Judgment’, 28 May 1985, para. 52: “Article 5 para. 4 (art. 5-4) does not guarantee a right to judicial 
control of the legality of all aspects or details of the detention (…).” 
599 See ECtHR (Chamber), Case of X. v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 7215/75, ‘Judgment’, 5 
November 1981, para. 58 (“Article 5 par. 4 (art. 5-4) (…) does not embody a right to judicial control of 
such scope as to empower the court, on all aspects of the case, to substitute its own discretion for that of 
the decision-making authority.”) and ECtHR (Plenary), Case of Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, 
Application No. 7906/77, ‘Judgment’, 24 June 1982, para. 49: “It is true that Article 5 par. 4 (art. 5-4) 
does not guarantee a right to judicial control of such scope as to empower the court, on all aspects of the 
case, including questions of pure expediency, to substitute its own discretion for that of the decision-
making authority.” See finally ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 
Application No. 8225/78, ‘Judgment’, 28 May 1985, para. 52: “[I]n his domestic litigation the applicant 
did not challenge the legal basis for his detention as a person of unsound mind under the 1959 Act or 
seek his release from the reality of detention: he was claiming an entitlement to accommodation and 
treatment in the more “appropriate” conditions of a different category of psychiatric hospital, a matter 
not covered by para. 1 (e) of Article 5 (art. 5-1-e) (…).” 
600 See ibid.: “The scheme of Article 5 (art. 5), when read as a whole as it must be, implies that in 
relation to one and the same deprivation of liberty the notion of “lawfulness” should have the same 
significance in paragraphs 1 (e) [this was the specific sub-paragraph under discussion in this part of the 
decision, ChP] and 4 (…).” See also ECtHR (Chamber), Case of X. v. the United Kingdom, Application 
No. 7215/75, ‘Judgment’, 5 November 1981, para. 57: “Article 5 (art. 5) must be read as a whole and 
there is no reason to suppose that in relation to one and the same deprivation of liberty the significance 
of “lawfulness” differs from paragraph 1 (e) (art. 5-1-e) [this was the specific sub-paragraph under 
discussion in this part of the decision, ChP] to paragraph 4 (art. 5-4).” See finally also ECtHR (Plenary), 
Case of Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; 
11386/85, ‘Judgment’, 29 November 1988, para. 65: “According to the Court’s established case-law, the 
notion of “lawfulness” under paragraph 4 (art. 5-4) has the same meaning as in paragraph 1 (art. 5-1) 
(…).” 
601 See ECtHR (Chamber), Case of X. v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 7215/75, ‘Judgment’, 5 
November 1981, para. 57: “Although X had access to a court which ruled that his detention was 
“lawful” in terms of English law, this cannot of itself be decisive as to whether there was a sufficient 
review of “lawfulness” for the purposes of Article 5 par. 4 (art. 5-4). In paragraph 1 (e) of Article 5 (art. 
5-1-e) as interpreted by the Court (…), the Convention itself makes the “lawfulness” of the kind of 
deprivation of liberty undergone by X subject to certain requirements over and above conformity with 
domestic law.” See also ECtHR (Plenary), Case of Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, Application No. 








lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty, namely 1) are there substantive grounds for 
the deprivation;604 2) is the deprivation in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law605 and 3) is the deprivation non-arbitrary?606  
                                                                                                                                              
“lawfulness” of an “arrest or detention” has to be determined in the light not only of domestic law but 
also of the text of the Convention, the general principles embodied therein and the aim of the restrictions 
permitted by Article 5 par. 1 (art. 5-1) (…).” (See also n. 605.) See finally also ECtHR (Plenary), Case 
of Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; 
11386/85, ‘Judgment’, 29 November 1988, para. 65 (writing on Art. 5, para. 4 of the ECHR): 
“[W]hether an “arrest” or “detention” can be regarded as “lawful” has to be determined in the light not 
only of domestic law, but also of the text of the Convention, the general principles embodied therein and 
the aim of the restrictions permitted by Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) (…).” (See also n. 604.) 
602 See Nowak 2005, p. 236: “In a number of decisions, the [ICCPR’s Human Rights] Committee has 
found a violation of Art. 9(4): “Judicial review of the lawfulness of detention under article 9, paragraph 
4, is not limited to mere compliance of a detention with domestic law but must include the possibility to 
order release if the detention is incompatible with the requirements of the Covenant, in particular those 
of article 9, paragraph 1 [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
603 For example, a small technical error in the arrest warrant will not lead to an unlawful arrest. Cf. in 
that respect also the Brima case before the SCSL, where Judge Itoe clarified that “having been taken 
into custody, a mere technical flaw in the warrant of arrest neither renders the said arrest nor the 
detention based on that arrest, illegal.” (SCSL, Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor against Tamba Alex 
Brima, ‘Ruling on the Application for the Issue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus Filed by the Applicant’, 
Case No. SCSL-03-06-PT, 22 July 2003, p. 14.) Cf. also Van der Kruijs (in his practical book on pre-
trial detention in the Netherlands), who explains that detention is not often labelled as unlawful in the 
first place: “The investigating/examining judge (rechter-commissaris) does not often feel inclined to 
qualify the detention as unlawful. Many irregularities are deemed to be too minor to meet that 
qualification. The criterion appears to be that one must have acted flagrantly in violation of (the 
meaning of) the law [own translation, ChP].” (Van der Kruijs 2004, p. 8.) Although one can understand 
that small technical flaws should not lead to the qualification ‘unlawful arrest/detention’, the test that 
one must have acted flagrantly in violation of (the meaning of) the law appears to be too strict. In fact, 
one can argue that if the prosecuting authorities have acted flagrantly in violation of (the meaning of) 
the law, the judge should not only qualify the detention as unlawful (leading to a mere release which 
does not preclude an immediate new arrest, see Subsection 4.4); it must in fact dismiss the case, leading 
to the real ending of the case. If the investigating/examining judge has no such power (the power to 
dismiss a case may be reserved for proper courts), then he should arguably advise the court to dismiss 
the case. See also n. 617. 
604 It is not very clear whether Knoops (2003, p. 217) is of the opinion that only this point should be 
examined by the reviewing judge when he states: “In the view of the European Court, Article 5, 
paragraph 4, only requires a review of the essential grounds of a detention.” 
605 After the quotation of the Van Droogenbroeck case in n. 601, the ECtHR refers to para. 57 of the 
case X. v. the United Kingdom, to be read in conjunction with paras. 39 and 45 of the Winterwerp case. 
These paragraphs show 1) the already explained point that the word “lawfulness” in Art. 5, para. 4 of the 
ECHR is the same as the one in Art. 5, para. 1 of the ECHR (see the quotation in para. 57 of the case X. 
v. the United Kingdom as presented in n. 600 and 2) that “lawfulness” in Art. 5, para. 1 of the ECHR 
(and thus also the word “lawfulness” in Art. 5, para. 4 of the ECHR) includes both substantive and 
procedural lawfulness and non-arbitrariness: “The next issue to be examined is the “lawfulness” of the 
detention for the purposes of Article 5 para. 1 (e) (art. 5-1-e). [In this part of the decision, Art. 5, para. 1 
(e) of the ECHR was being examined, ChP.] Such “lawfulness” presupposes conformity with the 
domestic law in the first place and also (…) conformity with the purpose of the restrictions permitted by 
Article 5 para. 1 (e) (art. 5-1-e); it is required in respect of both the ordering and the execution of the 
measures involving deprivation of liberty (…). As regards the conformity with the domestic law, the 
Court points out that the term “lawful” covers procedural as well as substantive rules. There thus exists a 
certain overlapping between this term and the general requirement stated at the beginning of Article 5 








For example, “a failure to promptly inform the person of the reasons for his 
arrest and of any charges against him makes his detention illegal”,607 which will thus 
lead to a release.608  
 
4.3 Abuse of process 
 
The exact contours of this concept, which originated from the common law context 
and which can also – cf. the concept of rule of law – be seen as a sort of residual 
category,609 will be discussed in the following chapters. However, for now, it 
suffices to mention the often-used definition of Lord Lowry in the English Bennett 
case: 
 
[A] court has a discretion to stay any criminal proceedings on the ground that to try 
those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process either (1) because it will 
be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) 
                                                                                                                                              
expressions reflect the importance of the aim underlying Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) (…): in a democratic 
society subscribing to the rule of law (…), no detention that is arbitrary can ever be regarded as 
“lawful”. The Commission likewise stresses that there must be no element of arbitrariness (…). The 
Court for its part considers that the words “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” 
essentially refer back to domestic law; they state the need for compliance with the relevant procedure 
under that law. However, the domestic law must itself be in conformity with the Convention, including 
the general principles expressed or implied therein. The notion underlying the term in question is one of 
fair and proper procedure, namely that any measure depriving a person of his liberty should issue from 
and be executed by an appropriate authority and should not be arbitrary.” (ECtHR (Chamber), Case of 
Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, Application No. 6301/73, ‘Judgment’, 24 October 1979, paras. 39 and 
45.) See also ECtHR (Plenary), Case of Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 
11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; 11386/85, ‘Judgment’, 29 November 1988, para. 65 (writing on Art. 5, 
para. 4 of the ECHR): “By virtue of paragraph 4 of Article 5 (art. 5-4), arrested or detained persons are 
entitled to a review bearing upon the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the 
“lawfulness”, in the sense of the Convention, of their deprivation of liberty.” 
606 See the quotation of the Winterwerp case in the previous footnote. That the prohibition of 
arbitrariness falls under the concept of the lawfulness in the context of the ECHR (which does not 
contain an explicit reference to non-arbitrariness) was already established. At first sight, this may be 
different for the ICCPR which contains an explicit prohibition of non-arbitrariness. It could be asserted, 
now that paras. 4 and 5 of Art. 9 of the ICCPR only refer to “lawfulness”, that a court does not need to 
release or compensate a person who has been the victim of an arbitrary (but lawful) arrest and detention. 
However, that view, of course, would contradict the whole purpose of Art. 9 of the ICCPR which is to 
fight not only unlawful, but also arbitrary arrests and detentions. Thus, the word “lawfulness” in paras. 4 
and 5 of Art. 9 of the ICCPR arguably also includes non-arbitrariness. In the words of Nowak (writing 
on para. 5): “Arrest or detention is unlawful when it contradicts one of the provisions in Art. 9(1) [which 
encompasses the prohibition of arbitrariness, ChP] to (4) and/or a provision of domestic law. (…) [A]n 
arrest may be consistent with domestic laws but nevertheless unlawful under international law, 
regardless of whether this is arbitrary or in violation of the procedural guarantees in paras. 2 to 4 
[emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Nowak 2005, p. 238.) Hence, if a person is 
‘merely’ arbitrarily arrested or detained, he can also seek his release or claim compensation under the 
ICCPR. 
607 Swart 2001, p. 204 (writing on both Art. 9, para. 4 of the ICCPR and Art. 5, para. 4 of the ECHR). 
608 See ibid. 








because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the 
accused in the circumstances of a particular case.610  
 
Hence, the – discretionary – abuse of process doctrine can be used by judges to stop 
the proceedings because continuing with the case would amount to an abuse of the 
judges’ own process. That would be the case in two situations, namely 1) where the 
suspect can no longer receive a fair trial (in the strict sense of the word) or 2) where 
a fair trial (in the strict sense) would be possible, but where the judges are 
nevertheless of the opinion that to continue the case, considering certain 
circumstances, would offend the court’s sense of justice and propriety/the concept of 
a fair trial more broadly perceived. Thus, in the latter situation, the situation on 
which this book will focus (as one can argue that a male captus will normally not 
jeopardise the fairness of the trial in the courtroom), some pre-trial irregularities, 
which may have violated any concept addressed in this chapter (State 
sovereignty/human rights/due process/the rule of law more generally), may have 
occurred which are deemed so serious that the judges cannot proceed with the case, 
even if the suspect can still receive a fair trial in court. In short, in such cases, the 
judges do not refuse jurisdiction because the suspect would be unfairly tried, but 
because it would be unfair to try the suspect in the first place.  
 
4.4 The final outcome: bene detentus or male detentus (or something in 
between)? 
 
Whether a male captus leads to either a bene detentus or a male detentus (or to 
something in between) depends on many aspects which cannot be addressed in one 
short subsection. The following chapters of this book will examine all the different 
observations from judges confronted by a male captus to find out the circumstances 
that made them choose bene detentus, male detentus, or something in between.  
For now, it suffices to clarify the relationship between the different male 
detentus-like consequences which have been reviewed in this chapter (release 
(violation of the right to liberty and security), return (violation of State sovereignty) 
and a stay of the proceedings as a result of the abuse of process doctrine (violation 
of the rule of law)) and the real male detentus outcome, which means that, because 
of a serious male captus, a court lacks jurisdiction to try the case. It can be argued 
that the male detentus outcome entails the final ending of the case before the court 
in question (in that the Prosecutor cannot restart the case in the future). After all, it 
would be very strange if the judge would first decide, because of the serious male 
captus involved, that jurisdiction must be refused but that, after the suspect is 
released from custody, the case can be restarted anew. 
Now, a release pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 4 of the ICCPR or Article 5, 
paragraph 4 of the ECHR may have a male detentus ‘look’ – this is also because a 
male detentus will always lead to a release because, of course, one cannot continue 
                                                          
610 House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 








to detain a suspect if one has decided that jurisdiction cannot be exercised in the 
suspect’s case – but such a release does not preclude a new arrest on the spot and a 
new exercise of jurisdiction by the court. This is because the provisions simply 
speak of a release (as such) and not of, for example, a release/dismissal of the case 
with prejudice to the Prosecutor (meaning that the Prosecutor is barred from starting 
a new trial against the suspect after the latter’s release).611  
A male detentus, however, will definitely lead to the ending of the case because 
the judge is of the opinion that jurisdiction in this case cannot be exercised (a 
statement which, it must be repeated, would become meaningless if the person were 
immediately re-arrested and brought to trial anew).612 However, it is also true that 
                                                          
611 See, for example, the following discussion of the Prosecution in the still-to-discuss (see Subsection 
3.2.2 of Chapter VI) Semanza case before the ICTR on this remedy: “In the Barayagwiza Decision, the 
Appeals Chamber cited Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as 
a source of established international law. That article provides for three remedies: release, release with 
guarantees [for the remedy ‘release with guarantees’, see Article 9, para. 3 of the ICCPR: “Anyone 
arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to 
release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but 
release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, 
and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement [emphasis added, ChP].”, ChP], and 
compensation, as the remedies available if a person is not tried within a reasonable time or if the 
detention is not lawful. Nowhere in the ICCPR is dismissal with prejudice mentioned as a remedy. (...) 
In the Barayagwiza Decision, the Appeals Chamber also cited Article 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), being a regional treaty, as a source of persuasive authority. The article provides 
for the same three remedies: release, release with guarantees, and compensation, as the remedies 
available if a person is not tried within a reasonable time or if the detention is not lawful. Nowhere in 
that convention is dismissal with prejudice mentioned as a remedy. (...) The Chamber also cited Article 
7 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) in the Barayagwiza Decision. Paragraph 5 of 
that article provides for release and release with guarantees as the remedies available to a person who is 
not tried within a reasonable time. Paragraph 5 [“Any person detained shall be brought promptly before 
the judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within 
a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to continuation of the proceedings. His release may 
be subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for trial.”, ChP] specifically negates dismissal with 
prejudice as a remedy. Paragraph 6 provides that release is the remedy for unlawful arrest or detention. 
Nowhere in that convention is dismissal with prejudice provided as a remedy. (...) As can be seen from 
the above, dismissal with prejudice is not provided for, in fact is not even mentioned, in major sources 
of international law cited by the Chamber. Dismissal with prejudice is even specifically prohibited by 
the American Convention on Human Rights [emphasis in original, ChP].” (TPIR, Chambre d’Appel, Le 
Procureur contre Laurent Semanza, ‘Réponse du Procureur au Mémoire Préalable [à] l’Appui de l’Acte 
d’Appel du 12 Octobre 1999 contre l’Ordonnance du 6 Octobre 1999 de la Chambre de Premi[è]re 
Instance III Relative [à] la Requête de la Défense en Annulation de la Procédure d’Arrestation et de 
Détention de Laurent Semanza pour Cause d’Illégalité’, Affaire No. ICTR-97-20-I, 21 janvier 2000, pp. 
22-25, 214bis – 211bis. (Section D (“Choice of Remedy”) of this French response was written in 
English due to the short time available to the Prosecution, see also ibid., p. 19, 217bis.)) 
612 Cf. for this difference also Zappalà 2003, pp. 71-72 (writing on the still-to-discuss ICTY cases of 
Dokmanović, Todorović and Nikolić): “Does a violation of the rights of the defendant at the stage of 
arrest imply that the Tribunals forfeit their jurisdiction? (...) In all instances the defendants sought the 
dismissal of their cases on the grounds that their rights had been violated. Their submissions were 
incorrect and inappropriate for two main reasons. First, none of those alleged violations was really 
imputable to the Tribunal, unless one proved that the order of the Tribunal implied the need to resort to 








both consequences are related. Not only the above-mentioned fact that a male 
detentus decision will always lead to a release plays a role in that respect, but one 
can also assume that a judge may very well state that he will refuse jurisdiction 
(male detentus) because a serious613 male captus has occurred and that that male 
captus may consist of a serious violation of the above-mentioned human rights 
provisions. Hence, although the release of Article 9, paragraph 4 of the ICCPR or 
Article 5, paragraph 4 of the ECHR does not preclude a re-arrest, a serious violation 
of these human rights provisions may nevertheless lead to a male detentus result, not 
because these provisions say so but because the judge may decide so in his 




                                                                                                                                              
and/or, where applicable exclusion of the evidence collected in violation of fundamental rights; instead, 
he had no right to dismissal of the proceedings [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
613 Here, the intent may also play a role, see Swart 2001, p. 206:  “Dismissal of criminal cases as a result 
of official misconduct is a remedy accepted by the courts of many States. There is, of course, 
considerable variation in the way national legal systems make use of that remedy. Among other things, 
the choice will depend on the availability of other effective remedies for correcting the wrongs done to 
the accused. Usually, a relevant consideration is also whether unlawful conduct on the part of law 
officers shows an intent to prejudice the rights of the accused or instead constituted negligence.” 
614 See also ibid: “To date, international human rights conventions and the subsequent case law of 
international bodies have had surprisingly little to say about the dismissal of criminal cases as a remedy 
for the violation of human rights. Meanwhile, both Article 9 of the ICCPR and Article 5 ECHR make it 
imperative that a person be released if his detention was unlawful. I take it for granted that, in the case 
of more serious violations of these Articles, the nature of this particular remedy rules out any possibility 
of re-arresting the suspect or the accused.” In that respect, one cannot agree with Zappalà (see n. 612) 
that the submissions of the three ICTY suspects were incorrect and inappropriate. A judge may very 
well agree with the suspect filing the submission that the latter, if his right to liberty and security has 
been seriously violated (irrespective of who was responsible for these violations), should not only be 
released; the judge may also be of the opinion that jurisdiction in that case should be refused, thus 
leading to the real ending of the case. Cf. also Rayfuse 1993, p. 882, who argues that certain (serious) 
violations of these human rights must lead to a male detentus outcome (even though these human rights 
do not mention this outcome): “It will be argued that State-sponsored abductions are a violation of the 
internationally recognised fundamental human rights to liberty and security of the person and freedom 
from arbitrary arrest and detention and that courts lack jurisdiction to try defendants who are brought 
before them in violation of these rights.” Rayfuse founds her arguments on an analogy to the “poison 
fruit” doctrine, see ibid., pp. 894ff. Although the word used is rather neutral (“liberate”), it appears that 
Frowein would also be of the opinion that an abduction would have to lead to a male detentus outcome, 
see Frowein 1997, p. 294: “There is no doubt that the abduction of a person from foreign territory by 
state organs is a violation of the right to personal liberty, since only the organs of that foreign state can 
lawfully deprive the person of his or her liberty. As soon as national courts are willing to enforce these 
rules of international law by reaching the only possible conclusion, namely to liberate the person, the 
practice of state-organized abduction will become less attractive.” Note finally that Zappalà (2003, p. 
72) also admits that refusal of jurisdiction may be appropriate, but only in the specific situation where 
the problem has become structural: “Of course, the problem would be far more serious if one could 
prove a consistent pattern of violations of the rights of individuals by State or international authorities 
performing arrests at the request of ad hoc Tribunals. In this case it could be argued that the Tribunals 
should react vigorously, for example by adopting a specific rule providing for the quashing of 








It can be argued that the remedy of release pursuant to paragraph 4 of Articles 9 
of the ICCPR and 5 of the ECHR is not without its problems; if a person has been 
the victim of an unlawful arrest/detention (but not one which is so serious that it 
leads to the ending of the case), he must, strictly speaking, be released. However, as 
explained, that does not preclude re-arrest on the spot and being brought to trial.615 
(This will especially be the case if the suspect is charged with serious crimes and 
prosecution is considered to be of utmost importance.) In such a case, the 
prosecuting authorities could assert that this ‘remedy’ (the ‘release’) has repaired the 
initial iniuria of the irregularity and that the trial can continue as normal. However, 























                                                          
615 Cf. also the following words from Lord Lowry in the still-to-discuss Bennett case, seemingly writing 
about a ‘normal’ unlawful arrest: “A person wrongfully arrested here can seek release by applying for a 
writ of habeas corpus but, once released, can be lawfully arrested, charged and brought to trial. His 
earlier wrongful arrest is not essentially connected with his proposed trial and the proceedings against 
him will not be stayed as an abuse of process.” (House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry 
Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 164.) This may 
be different when the judge in question does not only decide that the suspect, because of the human 
rights violations, has to be released, but also that he suspect must be permitted to leave the prosecuting 
State. In cases where the suspect is not charged with serious crimes or in cases where one can wonder 
whether there should have been a trial in the first place, this release will then constitute a de facto male 
detentus outcome, for one can imagine that this release will be the ending of the case, see, for example, 
the cases of Celiberti de Casariego and Lopez Burgos before the HRC, where the Committee stated that 
Uruguay, among other things, had to release Celiberti de Casariego and Lopez Burgos and to permit 








does not comport with the idea that a remedy must be real and effective, see also 
Article 2, paragraph 3 (a) of the ICCPR and Article 13 of the ECHR.616  
In addition, the pro forma release does not take account of the exact seriousness 
of the irregularity. In other words: it is not only a pro forma remedy but also an 
over-simplified remedy.  
It would arguably be better if a judge would therefore avoid this problematic 
remedy of release and would, if he determines that a person’s arrest/detention is 
unlawful, simply grant the most appropriate remedy which takes into account all the 












                                                          
616 See also the still-to-discuss (see Subsection 3.2.1 of Chapter VI) Barayagwiza case where the ICTR 
judges held: “[T]o order the release of the Appellant without prejudice – particularly in light of what we 
are certain would be his immediate re-arrest – could be seen as having cured the prior illegal detention. 
That would open the door for the Prosecutor to argue (assuming arguendo the eventual conviction of the 
Appellant) that the Appellant would not then be entitled to credit for that period of detention (...) on the 
grounds that the release was the remedy for the violation of his rights. The net result of this could be to 
place the Appellant in a worse position than he would have been in had he not raised this appeal. This 
would effectively result in the Appellant being punished for exercising his right to bring this appeal.” 
(ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-
19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 110.) Cf. also the following discussion in the still-to-discuss (see 
Subsection 3.1 of Chapter V) Sinclair case. In this case, the Lord Justice-Clerk (Lord MacDonald) 
argued: “I fail to see what benefit the complainer could obtain by being liberated. There is nothing to 
prevent him from being re-apprehended at once.” (High Court of Justiciary, Sinclair v. Her Majesty’s 
Advocate and Another, 20 March 1890, 17 R. (Just. Cas.) 42, British International Law Cases, Vol. 3: 
jurisdiction (1965), p. 8.) Lord Adam, however, replied: “I cannot say that I agree with your Lordship in 
thinking that the suspender would be no better if we granted this suspension. The same reasons which 
would have moved us to that course might be sufficient to prevent his re-apprehension, and so enable 
him to get off altogether. I think he would be entitled to have sufficient time allowed him to return to the 
place from which he had been illegally brought.” (Ibid., p. 9.) Such a release and permission to leave the 
forum State is reminiscent of the HRC’s position in the cases of Celiberti de Casariego and Lopez 
Burgos (see the previous footnote). (Note that Lord Adam, however, does not preclude that the suspect 
might be re-arrested if he stays in the forum State: “After a certain time, no doubt, he would be held to 
be staying here of his own free will, and so liable to be apprehended.” (Ibid., p. 9.)) The third and final 
lord, Lord M’Laren argued: “I may say further that, as the Lord Advocate might have the suspender 
immediately re-apprehended, I should on this ground also be indisposed to sustain this bill, because the 
liberation obtained under it would not be effective. If the suspender were liberated now he would be in 
the same position as that of an accused person under an indictment that had been found irrelevant, or 








seriousness of the suspect’s alleged crimes and the importance of having the case 
continued.617 If one follows that route, then one can still satisfy the common sense 
                                                          
617 Cf. in that respect the remarks of Groenhuijsen and Knigge 2004, writing more generally on the legal 
consequences of illegalities in the Dutch criminal investigation (in the context of their research project 
Criminal Procedure 2001). They state (at pp. 153-155 [the following is a(n unofficial) translation of the 
most important points from the original Dutch text, ChP]) that already because of the divergent aims of 
connecting consequences to the observation that certain rules have been violated (such as reparation, 
prevention and compensation), it is not obvious to create, in the law, an abstract balancing of interests 
and to apply fixed sanctions to the non-compliance of certain formal requirements. Moreover, there will 
also be several circumstances of the individual case which should play a role in determining the most 
appropriate reaction to such non-compliance. Groenhuijsen and Knigge then turn to the study written by 
Baaijens-van Geloven (see Baaijens-van Geloven 2004, p. 341ff) and note that it considered, among 
other things, the following factors to be of importance: - the nature of the formal requirement, the 
interest served by the requirement, the suspect’s concrete defence interest, the nature and seriousness of 
the violation (which is determined by, among other things, the length and degree by which the principles 
of proper procedure have been infringed), the seriousness of the criminal offence (which is of 
importance in view of assessing the proportionality and subsidiarity of the investigative acts), the extent 
to which the investigative agency in question can be reproached (did one act intentionally or with gross 
negligence of official duty or did one act bona fides) and the causal connection between the unlawful act 
and the result of investigation. [The last factor specifically dealt with ‘tainted’ evidence and will hence 
not be mentioned here. Before returning to the words of Groenhuijsen and Knigge, it must be noted that 
they mention the factor ‘seriousness of the criminal offence’ here in the context of assessing the 
proportionality and subsidiarity of the investigative acts. However, that has to do with the question as to 
whether, in view of the seriousness of the alleged crimes, the investigative acts can be seen as lawful. 
That is, of course, a very important point (some far-going investigative acts can only be lawfully applied 
to suspects of serious crimes), but not the point in which this study is interested, namely whether one 
can take into account the seriousness of the alleged crimes when determining the consequences of 
(established) unlawful conduct. However, it can be argued that Groenhuijsen and Knigge take the 
seriousness of the alleged crimes also into account in the context of that second question. This can not 
only be deduced from the study by Baaijens-van Geloven, which mentions (see Baaijens-van Geloven 
2004, pp. 358-359, see also n. 160 of Chapter VII) the factor in the context of both questions (when 
determining the consequences of established unlawful conduct and when determining whether the 
investigative acts can be seen as proportional/subsidiary/lawful), and to which Groenhuijsen and Knigge 
refer, but also from the remainder of their text, see the italicised words infra, ChP.] On the basis of these 
factors, it is to be assumed that the judge needs to determine, on a case-by-case-basis, the most 
appropriate sanction for an established illegality. However, Groenhuijsen and Knigge continue, this 
balancing of applicable interests must then be legally ‘pre-structured’. In the system of the Dutch Code 
of Criminal Procedure, the judge needs to have a tool which ensures that the outcome of a concrete case 
is both predictable and understandable. According to Groenhuijsen and Knigge, this tool is included, in 
particular, in the so-called decision-scheme of Artt. 348 and 350 of the Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure. [For those proficient in Dutch, these articles read: “De rechtbank onderzoekt op den 
grondslag der telastlegging en naar aanleiding van het onderzoek op de terechtzitting de geldigheid der 
dagvaarding, hare bevoegdheid tot kennisneming van het telastegelegde feit en de ontvankelijkheid van 
den officier van justitie en of er redenen zijn voor schorsing der vervolging.” (Art. 348.) “Indien het 
onderzoek in artikel 348 bedoeld, niet leidt tot toepassing van artikel 349, eerste lid [This provision 
reads (again in Dutch): “Indien het onderzoek in het voorgaande artikel bedoeld, daartoe aanleiding 
geeft, spreekt de rechtbank uit de nietigheid der dagvaarding, hare onbevoegdheid, de niet-
ontvankelijkheid van den officier van justitie of de schorsing der vervolging.” ChP.], beraadslaagt de 
rechtbank op den grondslag der telastlegging en naar aanleiding van het onderzoek op de terechtzitting 
over de vraag of bewezen is dat het feit door den verdachte is begaan, en, zoo ja, welk strafbaar feit het 
bewezen verklaarde volgens de wet oplevert; indien wordt aangenomen dat het feit bewezen en strafbaar 
is, dan beraadslaagt de rechtbank over de strafbaarheid van den verdachte en over de oplegging van straf 








idea behind the immediate re-arrest mentioned above, namely that suspects of 
serious crimes must be prosecuted if possible – although a male detentus must, of 
course, also not be excluded for these suspects – but one will also avoid the strange 
pro forma release and immediate re-arrest and replace it with real remedies, such as 
a reduction of the sentence and/or compensation. The judge can then take the exact 
seriousness of the irregularity into account – including, perhaps, the fact that it was 
                                                                                                                                              
inadmissibility of the Prosecution is especially then the appropriate answer when the non-compliance 
entails that one can no longer speak of a fair trial. Groenhuijsen and Knigge are of the opinion that the 
question is not whether the non-compliance seriously violates the principles of proper procedure but 
whether initiating or continuing a prosecution in spite of such non-compliance would violate 
fundamental principles of law. In this context, a suspect’s right to a fair trial and the principle of fair 
balancing emerge as central criteria. [Groenhuijsen and Knigge then turn to the sanction of exclusion of 
evidence, but this is less interesting for the present study, ChP.] Another possibility is a reduction of the 
sentence, which can be seen as a sort of residual sanction and which can be applied if the rights of the 
suspect have been violated by illegality, but not to such an extent that one needs to resort to the 
inadmissibility of the Prosecution. This can, for example, be the case because the investigating 
authorities have acted bona fides, or because the non-compliance of the legal requirements or the 
violation of the principles of proper procedure are of minor gravity in view of the criminal offence. [See 
the argument made supra that Groenhuijsen and Knigge also take the seriousness of the alleged crimes 
into account when determining the consequences of unlawful conduct, ChP.] Finally, one must let in the 
possibility of connecting no concrete legal consequence whatsoever to a legal error in the pre-trial 
phase. Such a declaratory statement is not without importance, but as it does not bring about redress or 
reparation, the judge should acknowledge this option with some restraint. It must be clarified that the 
above-mentioned information from Groenhuijsen and Knigge, which applies to Dutch courts, will, in 
principle, not be used in the context of arrest (aanhouding) and police custody (inverzekeringstelling) as 
in the Netherlands, it is not the court, but the examining/investigating judge (rechter-commissaris) who 
is supervising the legality of those means of coercion. (See Baaijens-van Geloven 2004, p. 347. See also 
the critical remarks of Franken 2004, pp. 18-19 on this point.) The examining judge, if he is of the 
opinion that a person’s detention is unlawful, can only release the suspect. (Cf. Art. 9, para. 4 of the 
ICCPR and Art. 5, para. 4 of the ECHR.) Nevertheless, as already stated, such a release does not 
preclude an immediate new arrest. It is submitted that if that happens, if the examining judge releases a 
suspect and that suspect is immediately re-arrested, or if the examining judge, after such an order for 
release has been ordered, nevertheless decides to continue to detain the suspect on the basis of another 
request from the Prosecution, for example, because of the seriousness of the alleged crimes, the court in 
the end trying the case should take into account the findings of the examining judge on the unlawful 
arrest/detention (which may include international, cross-border elements) and should grant an 
appropriate remedy. If the court would not do so, then irregularities are arguably not properly remedied. 
Cf. in that respect the following words (again unfortunately only in Dutch) from a rather recent (and 
purely domestic) case before the District Court of Rotterdam: “Gelet op het voorgaande en het feit dat 
de verdachte in laatstgenoemde belangen wel degelijk is geschaad dient de inverzekeringstelling 
onrechtmatig te worden geoordeeld en dient de verdachte (in formeel juridische zin) onmiddellijk in 
vrijheid te worden gesteld. Gezien het feit dat thans echter ook een vordering tot inbewaringstelling 
voorligt, de ernst van de in die vordering omschreven strafbare feiten, alsmede de daarin door de officier 
van justitie opgevoerde (onderzoeks)gronden wordt feitelijk van de invrijheidstelling van de verdachte 
afgezien en wordt overgegaan tot de (rauwelijkse) inbewaringstelling van de verdachte. Met 
vooromschreven gang van zaken wordt in strikt juridische zin door de volgens vaste jurisprudentie 
daartoe bij uitstek geschikt geachte functionaris, de rechter-commissaris, het juiste en enig mogelijke 
rechtsgevolg, de onmiddellijke invrijheidstelling, verbonden aan een verzuim dat kleeft aan een bevel 
tot toepassing van een vrijheidsbenemend dwangmiddel. Hierdoor ontstaat echter ook de op zichzelf 
genomen onwenselijke situatie dat het verzuim (thans) de facto zonder enig rechtsgevolg blijft.” 









perpetrated by private individuals (see the final words of Subsection 3.2.1) – in 
determining how much the sentence should be reduced or how much compensation 
one should accord the suspect. Such a solution would arguably be fairer to the 
suspect and more capable of putting flexibility into the system. 
Furthermore, this solution also avoids the (justified) criticism one may expect 
from various actors if a suspect of serious crimes is released for an irregularity 
which is not so serious as to lead to the ending of the case (in such serious cases, the 
public must understand that the court has no option but to refuse jurisdiction and to 
release (but now in a ‘real’ way) the suspect), but which nevertheless ensures that 
the detention must be qualified as unlawful618 and that, strictly speaking, the suspect 
must be released. Even if that suspect, given his alleged serious crimes, will 
probably be re-arrested on the spot, one can assume that the public/the international 
community/the victims will not grasp how, for example, a suspect of genocide can 
be released because he has not been promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest, 
especially if that person is not re-arrested and flees.619  
As will be shown in the remainder of this book, these important points will often 
recur. 
Returning to the second consequence (return in the case of a violation of State 
sovereignty) and its relationship with the male detentus outcome, a judge may order 
the return of the suspect to his State of residence if that State has protested the 
abduction620 executed by agents of the forum State and has demanded the suspect’s 
return and if the Executive of the forum State has not yet returned the person itself. 
This will normally lead to the ending of the case before that court of the forum State 
as one can imagine that the State which was injured by the abduction, the State of 
residence, will not readily cooperate with the forum State, the State which abducted 
the suspect without consent from the territory of the State of residence, in a new 
handover.621 In addition, it may also be the case that extradition is not possible (this 
may have been the reason why the forum State had resorted to abduction in the first 
place). And even if that State had nevertheless been capable of handing the suspect 
over, had forgiven the forum State’s actions and had transferred the suspect back to 
the forum State, the judges in the latter State may still be of the opinion that the 
                                                          
618 Swart, for example, explains that “a failure to promptly inform the person of the reasons for his arrest 
and of any charges against him makes his detention illegal.” (Swart 2001, p. 204.)   
619 Note that this does not mean, however, that such a suspect cannot be released in certain cases 
(besides the situation that he is released because the judge is of the opinion that the case must be 
stopped). If a judge reviewing a suspect’s detention feels that the suspect will appear at trial, there is no 
longer a need to hold him in detention while awaiting trial. In such a case, the suspect can, of course, be 
provisionally released pending trial, with or without conditions. 
620 As explained, a judge may, of course, also order the return of the suspect who has been the victim of 
a luring operation, but one can imagine that judges will do so less often than in the case of an abduction 
as the violation of international law in the latter case can be seen as more serious than in the case of a 
luring operation (if there was a violation of State sovereignty at all). 
621 Nevertheless, it can, of course, be tried, see also Rayfuse 1993, p. 896 (writing on an individual 
whose presence has been secured in violation of international law): “Principle therefore suggests that the 
individual must be returned to the place from whence he came and from whence his presence before the 








return of the suspect to his State of residence may have healed the wrong against the 
State of residence, but not the violations of the suspect’s human rights and the due 
process requirements, and that as a result of that, they must again refuse jurisdiction.  
With respect to the third consequence: although the words stay/discontinue (the 
proceedings) strictly speaking may not mean a final end to the case, one can assume, 
if a court decides, for example, to stay the proceedings because of a serious male 
captus, for instance, a violent abduction executed by authorities from the forum 
State, that that stay is normally final and does mean the absolute ending of the 
case.622 This may, however, be different with respect to other irregularities which 
are more easily reparable. In those cases, the stay of the proceedings can be 
conditional and may be lifted.623  
                                                          
622 See, for example, the following words from the still-to-discuss (see Subsection 1.2 of Chapter V) 
Latif case: “[P]roceedings may be stayed in the exercise of the judge’s discretion not only where a fair 
trial is impossible but also where it would be contrary to the public interest in the integrity of the 
criminal justice system that a trial should take place.” (House of Lords, Lord Steyn, Regina v. Latif; 
Regina v. Shazad, 18 January 1996, 1 W.L.R. 112-113 [1996].) If the judges have established that a fair 
trial is impossible or that it would be contrary to the public interest in the integrity of the criminal justice 
system that a trial should take place, then a suspect cannot, of course, be tried anew after being released 
from custody. After all, that would arguably contradict the entire rationale why he was released in the 
first place. See also these words from the still-to-discuss (see also Subsection 1.2 of Chapter V) Bennett 
case: “[A] court has a discretion to stay any criminal proceedings on the ground that to try those 
proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process either (1) because it will be impossible (usually 
by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) because it offends the court’s sense of justice 
and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of a particular case.” (House of Lords, 
Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All 
England Law Reports 161.) (See also n. 610 and accompanying text.) 
623 Cf. also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor 
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial 
Chamber I entitled “Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered 
by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with 
certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008”’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-
01/06 OA 13, 21 October 2008, para. 75: “It is clear that the Trial Chamber intended to impose a stay 
that was conditional and therefore potentially only temporary: as set out above, the Trial Chamber 
imposed the stay of the proceedings because it had come to the conclusion that in the circumstances of 
the case, where a large number of potentially exculpatory information or information material to the 
preparation of the defence had neither been disclosed to the accused person nor to the Chamber, there 
was no prospect of a fair trial. The Trial Chamber acknowledged, however, that circumstances might 
change, in particular should the information providers alter their position and give their consent to the 
disclosure of the documents in question. At paragraph 91 of the Impugned Decision, the Trial Chamber 
underlined that “on the information before the Chamber, [there is no prospect] that the present 
deficiencies will be corrected” (emphasis added). At paragraph 94 of the Impugned Decision, the Trial 
Chamber referred to its “authority or legal competence” to lift the stay. The Trial Chamber also stated at 
paragraph 97 of the Impugned Decision that it would address certain other issues that had been pending 
“if the stay of the proceedings is lifted hereafter”. Already at the status conference on 10 June 2008, the 
Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber distinguished “a final decision halting the proceedings ... forever” 
from “imposing a stay ... which doesn’t terminate the proceedings once and for all but which recognises 
[that] at present it is not possible for there to be a fair trial, but in due course, depending on changed 
circumstances, it may be possible for there to be a fair trial” (ICC-01/04-01/06-T-89-ENG, page 40, 
lines 8 to 13). Thus, the Trial Chamber envisaged that the stay it imposed may not be irreversible and 
absolute.” Choo (1993, p. 7) writes on the nature of the stay: “A stay typically takes the form of an order 








A final point which must be stressed in this chapter is that a male captus male 
detentus outcome is indeed the ending of the case before the court of the forum 
State, but this is not the same as impunity for the suspect as he might be tried before 
a court in another State which has nothing to do with the male captus. Although a 
transfer to another jurisdiction would heal the problem that the State whose 
authorities were involved in the male captus takes advantage of their wrongdoing, it 
will probably not be of much help to the suspect, whose only ‘remedy’ for the male 
captus would be that he is tried by another court. One could therefore argue that in 
such cases, it would be appropriate if the new trying forum would also take into 
account the fact that the suspect had earlier been the victim of a male captus, even if 
the authorities of the State of that court had nothing to do with the male captus. 
                                                                                                                                              
technically an acquittal, although for all practical purposes it may have the same effect. The revival of a 
stayed prosecution, without the leave of the court, is likely itself to be considered an abuse of process 























In contrast to the other parts of this book, Part 3 needs a separate introduction to 
explain in more detail how this part, the biggest part of the book,1 is to be tackled 
                                                          
1 Admittedly, the following two chapters contain many cases and the most important ones are very 
extensively examined, following the original texts of the decisions as often as possible. However, there 
is a reason for this. Overviews of male captus case law by national courts and tribunals are often 
criticised for being selective/not complete enough or simply incorrect(ly summarised). See in that 
respect, for example, Sloan (2006, p. 328), criticising the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision in the 
Nikolić case (which will be discussed in Chapter VI): “It is, of course, perfectly appropriate for the 
ICTY to turn to national law where there are gaps in international criminal law – a relatively young part 
of international law – and it has done so many times in the past. But it must be acknowledged that this 
gap-filling process vests in the ICTY judges a tremendous discretion in deciding what national 
jurisdictions to consult (it would be impractical to consult the national jurisdictions of each and every 
state in the world), what the characteristics of national law in the jurisdictions consulted are and which 
particular aspects of this national law are applicable to the ICTY in view of its many differences from a 
national system. While this discretion is necessary and desirable, with it must come a duty on the part of 
the judges to be balanced and comprehensive (or at least relatively so) in their analysis of the national 
law and clear in their reasoning as to why the law of one national jurisdiction is apposite – and why that 
of another is not. Unfortunately, in the Nikolić decision the Appeals Chamber’s treatment of national 
case law was flawed; it was neither comprehensive – giving the impression of selectivity – nor clearly 
reasoned, at times relying on cases that are either inappropriate or controversial, and at times failing to 
cite a source at all [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also ibid., p. 338: “[T]he analysis of the 
Appeals Chamber regarding the impact on its jurisdiction of the violation of sovereignty and of human 
rights is inadequate. It leaves the impression of selectivity. Of course, an Appeals Chamber is not in a 
position to consult every jurisdiction of the world before filling the gaps that exist in international 
criminal law. But a more thoroughgoing approach is called for, particularly as regards such an important 
and controversial issue.” See further the following comments of Sluiter with respect to the ICTY Trial 
Chamber’s decision in the Dokmanović case (which will also be discussed in Chapter VI): “In terms of 
international law, the ad hoc Tribunals are bound by those domestic rules and practices which may be 
considered general principles of law recognized by civilized nations[.] If the Chamber wishes to 
establish the existence of such principles with respect to the arrest of indicted persons, it has not 
succeeded through this comparative legal exercise. The Trial Chamber believed that [s]trong support for 
a certain view could be derived from national systems. What followed, however, was a very rudimentary 
and selective analysis of domestic jurisprudence, in which the focus lay with jurisprudence from one 
particular jurisdiction, that of the United States.” (Sluiter 2001, p. 155.) As will also be shown in the 
following pages, this study is often critical of such overviews as well. Nevertheless, it must also be 
understood that judges (and their staff) have many cases to decide and do not have as much time as the 
author of this study has had to delve into this topic. Because the aim of this study is not to criticise but to 








methodologically.2 Part 3 is devoted to the question of how other courts than the 
ICC have dealt with the dilemmas male captus cases can engender. It is submitted 
that, on the basis of the material presented in this part, one should be able to make a 
comparative assessment of the ICC’s current male captus position. However, which 
courts should be looked at here? As already stated in the first chapter of this study, 
the two main categories are courts dealing with inter-State cases and international 
and internationalised (or hybrid) criminal tribunals other than the ICC. 
The second category is the least problematic: as their ‘stock’ of male captus 
cases appears to be limited, an analysis of all the ‘real’3 male captus cases from this 
context will be undertaken. This will be done in Chapter VI. 
The first category is a different question, though, as there is a huge amount of 
case law discernible here. Hence, although it might be regrettable from the point of 
view of thoroughness, it is necessary from the point of practical feasibility to make a 
selection.4 This study has chosen to look mainly at the (adversarial) common law 
system and the (inquisitorial) romano-germanic or civil law system.5  
The prime reason for this choice is that the common and civil law systems are 
not only the main legal families in the world,6 but they are arguably also (or perhaps 
because of the fact that they are the main legal families in the world?) the two legal 
                                                                                                                                              
overview of male captus case law from both the inter-State context and the context of the 
international(ised) criminal tribunals, following the original texts of the decisions as often as possible, 
may be useful for judges who do not have much time but who are nevertheless in need of more 
information on the male captus discussion. Although this study, of course, cannot guarantee that 
Chapter VII, which presents the principles distilled from Chapters V and VI, is faultless, it has in any 
case tried to minimize the risk of making mistakes by addressing many cases (in considerable detail). 
2 See also n. 55 of Chapter I. 
3 That is: the cases where the alleged male captus played an important role in the proceedings (whether 
or not the tribunal in question determined that there was a male captus). As will be shown in Chapter 
VI, however, a number of unlawful arrest/detention claims was withdrawn or immediately rejected and 
no longer paid attention to, see, for example, ns. 138, 801 and 1286 of that chapter. These cases cannot 
and thus will not be addressed in the same manner as the ‘real’ male captus cases, although some 
attention may nevertheless be paid to them. 
4 In the words of Zweigert, Kötz and Weir: “[A]lthough making a selection may be painful, it is 
unavoidable on practical grounds.” (Zweigert, Kötz and Weir 1998, p. 42.) This remark was made in the 
context of their own field of research, namely comparative law (methodology). 
5 See Zappalà 2003, p. 16 for more information on these two models.  
6 See Raimondo 2008, pp. 179 and 194. See also Zappalà 2003, p. 17: “It is true that there are forms of 
criminal procedure other than those based on these two models. In this respect it may be admitted that 
the choice made is not necessarily acceptable. However, the main reasons for this choice are the belief 
and awareness that these are the most common paradigms in legal science. (…) At present the 
accusatorial-inquisitorial dichotomy still prevails [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Although this study 
has principally chosen for these systems, it is aware of the fact that such a categorisation may be viewed 
to be a little artificial as countries’ legal systems nowadays are often a mix of common and civil law. 
See also Swart 2002 B, pp. 1598-1599: “Simplifying matters considerably, one may say that, in the 
present world, two models of conducting criminal proceedings dominate the international scene: the 
adversarial model of common-law systems of justice and the inquisitorial model of civil-law systems. 
(...) [C]ommon-law systems do not form a monolithic block, and the same is even more true for civil-
law systems [emphasis added, ChP].” That is also the reason why this study does not want to look at 
cases which clearly derive from these two systems only; it will also look at interesting cases not clearly 








systems most interesting for the purpose of comparison with the ICC.7 See in that 
respect the following words of Schabas:  
 
The procedural regime of the International Criminal Court is largely a hybrid of two 
different systems: the adversarial approach of the English common law and the 
inquisitorial approach of the Napoleonic code and other European legislations of the 
Romano-Germanic tradition (often described as the ‘civil law’ system).8  
 
The reviews of the common – in particular9 – and civil law systems will not only 
look at more recent cases but also at some older ones in the hope of seeing more 
clearly whether the maxim is developing in a certain direction or not. In addition, 
attention will be paid to both ‘ordinary’ suspects and suspects of the more serious 
                                                          
7 See also Zappalà 2003, p. 17: “[T]hese models have to an overwhelming extent dominated the debates 
in the relevant international fora in which the Statutes and Rules of the Tribunals and the Court were 
drafted.” 
8 Schabas 2004, p. 117. See also Arsanjani 1999, p. 25 (“[T]he provisions dealing with general 
principles and procedural issues are a hybrid of the common and the civil law.”) and Gallant 2003 B, p. 
557, n. 16: “[T]he International Criminal Court will use a hybrid of common law and civil law 
processes”. See in that respect also the Appeals Chamber’s decision in the Lubanga Dyilo case (see ICC, 
Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision 
on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 
October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006) where the judges, after 
having discussed the common law concept of abuse of process, looked at the Romano-Germanic 
systems of law. Note finally that there are also writers such as Kress who do not believe that the ICC’s 
procedural law is a hybrid of these two legal systems but that the former is a truly unique, sui generis 
system. Nevertheless, even in that case, Kress, in his efforts to grasp the nature of this unique system, 
still compares the ICC system with the common/adversarial and civil/inquisitorial law systems: “I would 
suggest that neither common law nor civil law can be seen as the main reference point for establishing 
the law governing the procedure before the ICC. Moreover, I would also argue that there actually is no 
other major point of reference outside the law of the ICC. The ICC negotiators neither copied any of the 
so-called mixed adversarial – inquisitorial systems that one increasingly finds all over the world, nor did 
they choose to follow the hybrid process that has evolved over time before the ICTY and ICTR. Taken 
as a whole, the procedural law of the ICC is, thus, not only new but also truly unique. (…) Where, then, 
on the sliding scale between the pure models of adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings can we locate 
ICC procedural law [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP]?” (Kress 2003, p. 605.) 
9 See Cassese 1999, p. 168: “Although the common law system has been basically adopted, a number of 
fundamental elements typical of the civil law approach have been incorporated.” See also Stapleton 
1999, p. 551. See further Swart 2002 B, p. 1601: “A comparison of the Rome Statute with the Statutes 
of the ad hoc Tribunals reveals that in the Statute, too, there is a mixture of adversarial and inquisitorial 
elements. Again, the adversarial elements largely prevail, although there is stronger contribution of the 
inquisitorial tradition, especially where the structure of pre-trial investigations is concerned.” See also 
ibid., p. 1604: “[T]he Rome Statute has in common with the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals that 
proceedings are predominantly shaped after the example of adversarial systems.” See further Zappalà 
2002 B, p. 1320: “International criminal law has been deeply influenced by the adversarial system, 
which is generally considered the most appropriate system in terms of protection of the rights of 
defendants. The systems of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, as well as the UN ad hoc Tribunals, 
essentially hinged on the adversarial model. The ICC model, although some elements of the inquisitorial 
model are present, is also essentially adversarial.” See finally Sluiter 2006 C, p. 616 (and 2007, p. 8). 
The more practical reason that one will find much more cases and literature in the common law context 








international crimes such as torture, terrorism, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. This will be done in order to see whether judges react differently when 
confronted by suspects of different ‘qualities’.10 Furthermore, addressing a 
considerable number of decisions from supreme courts will be attempted as those 
decisions have de iure and de facto the most legal authority (although important 
cases from the male captus discussion which were not decided by a supreme court (a 
good example is the Toscanino case) will, of course, also be examined). Moreover, 
with respect to the different male captus situations introduced in Chapter III, an 
attempt will be made to cover them all. Nevertheless, most attention will hereby be 
paid to the cases dealing with irregular arrests such as (alleged) kidnappings.  
Although Chapter V will focus on cases from the common and civil law systems, 
it will also look, as a sort of safety net, at cases which do not clearly fall under both 
legal systems but which are nevertheless often mentioned in the male captus 
discussion (see also footnote 6).  
Finally, it should be noted that Chapters V and VI, as well as describing and 
analysing the male captus decisions, will also discuss, where necessary for a better 
understanding of the problem, reactions from doctrine and from other States 
regarding these decisions. 
After the review of these two categories – the cases from the inter-State context 
(whether decided by national or international institutions) and the cases from the 
context of the international and internationalised (or hybrid) criminal tribunals – the 
final chapter of this part, Chapter VII, will summarise and discuss the principles 
derived from these overviews. 
 
                                                          
10 Cf. also Shaw 2003, p. 605: “A final distinction may be drawn as between cases depending upon the 
type of offences with which the offender is charged, so that the problem of the apprehension interfering 
with the prosecution may be seen as less crucial in cases where recognised international crimes are 









1 CASES FROM THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM 
 
1.1 Older cases 
 
In Section 4 of Chapter II, the English case Ex Parte Susannah Scott1 from 1829 
was presented to the reader. When the English police officer Ruthven apprehended 
Scott, who was indicted for perjury, in Brussels, Scott vainly applied to the English 
Ambassador in that city for assistance. In England, Judge Tenterden of the Court of 
King’s Bench refused her discharge (release), stating: 
 
The question, therefore, is this, whether if a person charged with a crime is found in 
this country, it is the duty of the Court to take care that such a party shall be amenable 
to justice, or whether we are to consider the circumstances under which she was 
brought here. I thought, and still continue to think, that we cannot inquire into them. 
If the acts complained of were done against the law of a foreign country, that country 
might have vindicated its own law. If it gave her a right of action, she may sue upon it 
[emphasis added, ChP].2 
 
Thus, an irregular arrest abroad will not imperil the exercise of jurisdiction in 
another State for it is not within the power of the judges (see the word “cannot”) to 
examine the circumstances of the apprehension. What one can see here is that the 
judge does not deny that something irregular may have happened abroad, but that 
this is not something this judge can look into. Perhaps the person who claims to 
have been unlawfully arrested can sue the arresting actor3 and perhaps the State 
                                                          
1 Court of King’s Bench, Lord Chief Justice Tenterden, Ex parte Susannah Scott, 19 May 1829, 9 
Barnewall & Cresswell’s King’s Bench Reports (1829), pp. 446-448; 109 English Reports (1829), pp. 
166-167. 
2 Ibid., 9 Barnewall & Cresswell’s King’s Bench Reports (1829), p. 448; 109 English Reports (1829), p. 
167. 
3 A very interesting example of this reasoning can also be found in the following case. Although this 
decision should not be included in the overview itself because the suspect was not brought from one 
national jurisdiction to another, the more general (and ‘international’) quotation of the judge is very 
illustrative for the present discussion and hence deserves to be mentioned here. In the 1867 case R. v. 








whose laws were breached by the arrest can demand the extradition of the arresting 
party, but these are separate proceedings with which this judge has nothing to do. 
One could call this the non-inquiry doctrine:4 the judge will not look at the way in 
which a person came into the power of the now prosecuting State. The reason for 
this may be found in the fact that many judges in those days5 were of the opinion 
that the judge should only focus on the regularity of the proceedings in the 
courtroom, hence adhering to an arguably rather restricted version of the concept of 
fair trial,6 namely excluding entirely how the suspect came into the jurisdiction of 
                                                                                                                                              
Chief Justice Sir Alexander Cockburn was asked to instruct the Grand Jury at the Central Criminal 
Court in London concerning the 1865 Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica. In reaction to this revolt, the 
Governor of Jamaica, John Edward Eyre, proclaimed the whole county in which the rebellion occurred 
under martial law, with the exception of its capital Kingston. One of the alleged leaders of the uprising 
was George William Gordon who normally lived just outside Kingston but stayed in the capital during 
the events. When warrants for his arrest were issued, he went to the house of the Governor in Kingston 
and gave himself up. After the Governor and the Custos (the principal magistrate of Kingston) had 
apprehended him (in a place where martial law was not declared), Gordon was put on a war steamer and 
brought to Morant Bay (where martial law was in force). There, by the orders of Colonel Nelson, he was 
tried before a court martial, presided over by Lieutenant Brand. Gordon was convicted, sentenced to 
death and hanged. This event and the cruelly way in which the revolt was suppressed aroused public 
opinion in England, where both Nelson and Brand were indicted for murder. Although Cockburn 
instructed the Jury to ignore the bill of indictment against Nelson and Brand (“[O]n the grounds that 
there was no evidence that they had acted from a corrupt and dishonest desire to get rid of an obnoxious 
individual, that the initiative had been taken by the Governor and the Custos, and that the sentence of 
death passed upon Gordon had received official ratification.” (Wood Renton 1898, p. 405)), he sharply 
criticised the way in which the prosecution of Gordon had been conducted. Nevertheless, in the context 
of the issue whether a court martial has jurisdiction when the person tried is brought within its 
jurisdiction in violation of municipal law (see O’Higgins 1961, p. 285), Cockburn said: “Suppose a man 
were to commit a crime in this country, say murder, and that before he can be apprehended he escapes 
into some country with which we have not got an extradition treaty, so that we could not get him 
delivered up to us by the authorities, and suppose that an English police officer were to pursue the 
malefactor, and finding him in some place where he could lay his hands upon him, and from which he 
could easily reach the sea, got him on board a ship and brought him before a magistrate, the magistrate 
could not refuse to commit him. If he were brought here for trial, it would not be a plea to the 
jurisdiction of the Court that he had escaped from justice, and that by some illegal means he had been 
brought back. It would be said, ‘Nay, you are here; you are charged with having committed a crime, 
and you must stand your trial. We leave you to settle with the party who may have done an illegal act in 
bringing you into this position; settle that with him’ [emphasis added, ChP].” (Ibid.) That such a remedy 
may not be very effective became clear in the extradition case of Xavier Auguste Parisot (Queen’s 
Bench Division, In re Parisot, 9 March 1889, 5 T.L.R. 344-345, British International Law Cases, Vol. 5: 
the individual in international law (continued) aliens: extradition: fugitive offenders (1967), pp. 314-
315.). In this case, in which the Scott reasoning was upheld with respect to extradition procedures, 
Baron Huddleston “mentioned a case in which he was counsel many years ago, in which the well-known 
officers, the Foresters, had illegally arrested criminals in Brussels without any extradition treaty, and 
they were tried at the Old Bailey, before Mr. Justice Maule, and were loud in their complaints of the 
illegality of their custody. But the judge said, “No doubt you may have a good action of trespass, and 
after the end of your 20 years’ transportation, to which I propose to sentence you, you may bring your 
action.”” (Ibid., 5 T.L.R. 344, British International Law Cases, Vol. 5: the individual in international law 
(continued) aliens: extradition: fugitive offenders (1967), p. 314.) 
4 Cf. also Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 645-646, Borreli 2004, p. 354 and Birkett 1991, pp. 609-610. 
5 See, however, the still-to-discuss Jolis case (from the civil law system). 
6 See also the first traditional rationale of the male captus bene detentus rule presented by Michell 1996, 








the now prosecuting State in the first place.7 The judges, in their opinion, could not 
sensibly comment on what happened abroad. As a result, they were also not to look 
into the violations which allegedly occurred there. They simply had to ensure that 
suspects of crimes were tried.8   
On a more normative note: one can understand that judges cannot be experts in 
the laws of foreign States and thus cannot (and in fact, should not) pronounce on the 
question whether certain conduct indeed constituted a violation of a foreign law 
system.9 However, in such cases, judges could, of course, invoke the help of foreign 
judges to determine these issues. It would then be up to the now prosecuting judge 
to decide whether or not certain irregularities abroad (if any) should have an effect 
on the proceedings in the forum State.10 Nevertheless, besides this question of 
foreign law, there is, of course, also the question of international law. One can argue 
that every judge should know that if a police officer of the forum State arrests a 
suspect on the territory of another State without that latter State’s consent, a 
violation of international law has occurred. The judge in Scott can be criticised for 
not having looked into the international law violation which seemed11 to have 
occurred in his case.12 (Note, however, that this does not necessarily mean that the 
                                                                                                                                              
guarantees. According to this view, a criminal defendant is entitled only to a fair trial, and forcible 
abduction does not affect the fairness of the trial itself.” See also Rayfuse 1993, p. 883. 
7 Nevertheless, this focus does not exclude that the judge will not look at pre-trial irregularities at all 
and that the judge is hence only concerned about what happens in the courtroom. The Scott reasoning 
does not exclude the possibility that a judge may look at pre-trial irregularities in England itself. It only 
states that a judge will not look at the way a person was brought into the State which is now prosecuting 
the case: “The question, therefore, is this, whether if a person charged with a crime is found in this 
country, it is the duty of the Court to take care that such a party shall be amenable to justice, or whether 
we are to consider the circumstances under which she was brought here [namely “into this country”, 
ChP].” (Court of King’s Bench, Lord Chief Justice Tenterden, Ex parte Susannah Scott, 19 May 1829, 9 
Barnewall & Cresswell’s King’s Bench Reports (1829), p. 448; 109 English Reports (1829), p. 167.) See 
also the still-to-discuss (see Subsection 3.2) Vervuren case where it was stated that “the approach 
adopted by the United Kingdom courts in the past was that it was irrelevant how a person arrived on the 
airport tarmac: all that mattered was, once the person was in the United Kingdom, was he subject to due 
process, to fair proceedings. All the courts had been concerned about was the propriety of the domestic 
procedure.” (High Court of Justiciary, HM Advocate v. Vervuren, 12 April 2002, 2002 S.L.T. 558.) 
8 See also the second traditional rationale of the male captus bene detentus rule presented by Michell 
1996, p. 392 (the first was already mentioned in n. 6): “Second, there is a strong public interest in the 
prosecution of crime. The rule ensures that alleged offenders are brought to trial.” 
9 See also n. 149 and accompanying text. 
10 See also n. 150 and accompanying text. 
11 It may, of course, be the case that there was consent from the Netherlands (which was by that time in 
charge of the State now known as Belgium, see also n. 46 of Chapter II), with the result, see Chapter III, 
that there was no violation of international law, but this cannot be derived from the (short) report of this 
case, see also Morgenstern 1953, p. 273, n. 2. 
12 See also ibid., p. 273: “[T]here is a residue of cases in which there has been a seizure of a fugitive by 
authorized officials of the pursuing state on the territory of the state of refuge in clear violation of one of 
the most fundamental rules of customary international law. The fact that some courts have in this 
connexion also refused to consider the manner in which an accused individual was brought before them 
has sometimes been due to an imperfect appreciation of the implications of the exercise of jurisdiction 
after an illegal seizure. In the early English case Ex parte Susannah Scott the accused had been arrested 








judge should also refuse jurisdiction and return the suspect to the injured State. As 
explained in Chapter III, it is assumed that a judge must only return the suspect to 
the injured State if that latter State protests and requests the return of the suspect 
(and the Executive does not do what it should do).13 If there is no protest, the 
violation of State sovereignty would not hinder the trial. Nevertheless, in that case, 
the judge can, of course, still refuse jurisdiction on other grounds not related to the 
violation of State sovereignty, for example on grounds related to due process/human 
rights considerations.) Perhaps, the judge in Scott was of the opinion that matters 
related to alleged violations of another State’s sovereignty had to be resolved at the 
political level, between the Executives of the two States,14 or that, now that there did 
not appear to be any protest from the Netherlands, this issue had become 
insignificant.15  
The non-inquiry rule from Scott was also upheld (albeit for other reasons) in the 
next male captus bene detentus decision, that of Ker v. Illinois, which was decided 
by the US Supreme Court in 1886.16 
In this case, a US citizen, Frederick M. Ker, fled to Lima, Peru, after he had been 
charged in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, with larceny and 
embezzlement from a Chicago bank. The following is what Ker argued happened 
subsequently. After Ker’s flight, Governor Hamilton of Illinois made a requisition to 
                                                                                                                                              
Tenterden held that the Court could not inquire into the circumstances of the arrest. It is significant, 
however, that the learned Judge seems to have thought only in terms of a violation of Belgian law, not 
of international law [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” Note again that in 1829, the State of Belgium 
did not exist yet (but was part of the Netherlands). 
13 See ns. 560-561 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
14 See also the third and last traditional rationale of the male captus bene detentus rule presented by 
Michell 1996, p. 392 (the first two were already mentioned in ns. 6 and 8, respectively): “Finally, the 
judiciary traditionally has held the view that courts are not the appropriate forum to adjudicate alleged 
violations of public international law by the executive. Instead, courts have adopted the position that any 
difficulties arising from an irregular arrest are best resolved diplomatically.” 
15 And, as already explained, it could also be the case that there was no violation of international law at 
all (because of a possible consent from the Netherlands, see n. 11). 
16 US Supreme Court, Ker v. Illinois, 6 December 1886 (119 US 436). This case is part of the so-called 
Ker-Frisbie doctrine which, at least until the still-to-discuss Alvarez-Machain case of 1992, was seen as 
the US version of the male captus bene detentus rule. (Cf., for example, Cherif Bassiouni 1999, p. 253 
and Wilske 2000, p. 261.) Note that the other case of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, the 1952 case Frisbie v. 
Collins (US Supreme Court, Frisbie v. Collins, 10 March 1952, No. 331 (342 US 519)), will not be 
discussed here in detail as it concerned a case within one and the same country (namely the US). Be that 
as it may, the most famous words of this case (from Justice Black, delivering the opinion of the Court) 
go as follows: “This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois (…) that the 
power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the 
court’s jurisdiction by reason of a “forcible abduction.” No persuasive reasons are now presented to 
justify overruling this line of cases. They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied 
when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against 
him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the 
Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because 
he was brought to trial against his will [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid., p. 522.) Reading the 
text, one cannot escape the conclusion that Frisbie adheres to a very restricted idea of a fair trial/due 
process, namely a fair trial in the courtroom. Nevertheless, it has also been argued that Frisbie’s view of 








the US Secretary of State for an extradition warrant.17 The latter agreed and on 1 
March 1883, US President Arthur issued the warrant which was directed to Henry 
G. Julian, an agent from the Pinkerton Detective Agency hired by the Chicago 
bank,18 “to receive the defendant from the authorities of Peru, upon a charge of 
larceny, in compliance with the treaty between the United States and Peru on that 
subject”.19 Probably because of the chaotic situation in Peru caused by the War of 
the Pacific,20 Julian,  
 
without presenting [the necessary papers] to any officer of the Peruvian government, 
or making any demand on that government for the surrender of Ker, forcibly and with 
violence arrested him, placed him on board the United States vessel Essex (…), kept 
him a close prisoner until the arrival of that vessel at Honolulu, where after some 
detention, he was transferred in the same forcible manner on board another vessel 
(…) to San Francisco, in the State of California.21     
 
From California, he was extradited to Illinois where he was tried in Cook County for 
embezzlement and larceny. Ker protested, of course, to what had happened and 
brought forward, among other things, the following objections.  
The first was that his arrest in Peru and subsequent extradition were not in 
accordance with due process of law.22 The Supreme Court assumed that Ker hereby 
implicitly referred to Section 1 of Amendment XIV of the US Constitution, which 
states:  
 
                                                          
17 See US Supreme Court, Ker v. Illinois, 6 December 1886 (119 US 436), p. 438. 
18 See Lowenfeld 1990, p. 460. 
19 US Supreme Court, Ker v. Illinois, 6 December 1886 (119 US 436), p. 438. 
20 See DiMento and Geis 2006, p. 50. This war, also called the Saltpeter War, was fought between Chile 
on the one hand and Bolivia and Peru on the other hand between 1879 and 1884. See also Fairman 1953, 
p. 685, quoting Hunt, the Attorney General of the State of Illinois: “At this time, a state of things existed 
in Peru which rendered the treaty between the United States and that government inoperative. There was 
no Peru. The government had a nominal existence at Ariquipa, back in the mountains, eighty-five miles 
from Lima, but General Lynch, of the Chilian forces, was in military occupation of the capital. 
Pinkerton’s man had no passport to go through the lines to present our demand at the mountain camp of 
the Peruvian government, but did what was perhaps the best thing, applied to General Lynch. This 
officer, doubtless thinking that security to criminals was no part of his mission in Peru, dispatched an 
officer to aid the detective in putting Ker on his way back to the United States.” Fairman argues that, if 
this account is indeed true, the apprehension of Ker was actually not breaching the sovereignty of Peru 
at all: ““The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant,” the 
military governor was indeed the authority competent to surrender a fugitive present in the occupied 
territory. It is obvious that to obtain custody of a fugitive one deals with the power that can put its hands 
upon him. If that power is willing to make delivery, it is immaterial whether there is a treaty obligation 
to do so, or whether the receiving government would be in a position to reciprocate. Accepting as 
accurate the factual recital of the Attorney General, there was no invasion of Peruvian sovereignty or 
other breach of international law [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Fairman 1953, pp. 685-686.) See 
also n. 102 and accompanying text of Chapter III where it was explained that no sovereignty can be 
violated if there is no effective government present in the country where the alleged kidnapping took 
place. 
21 US Supreme Court, Ker v. Illinois, 6 December 1886 (119 US 436), p. 438. 








All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws [emphasis added, ChP]. 
 
Justice Miller, who delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, pointed out that this 
section may indeed have a pre-trial dimension,23 but that a suspect could not argue 
that, because of “mere irregularities in the manner in which he may be brought into 
the custody of the law”24 (which thus includes the forcible abduction of this case), 
he should not be tried at all.25  
Hence, even though judges can look at pre-trial irregularities abroad (in that 
sense, this case is different from the Scott case), they will not look at them within 
the context of the question as to whether the forcible abduction should lead to a 
male detentus, for this is futile. After all, such an abduction will never lead to a male 
detentus. Interestingly, Justice Miller also referred to the seriousness of the charge, 
                                                          
23 In that respect, this case seems to be different from the Frisbie v. Collins case, see n. 16. However, it 
has also been noted in the same footnote that it has been argued that Frisbie may also be viewed as a 
case recognising that the concept of due process encompasses a pre-trial dimension, see Anonymous 
1975, p. 816: “Ker and Frisbie reflect a judgment not that due process is limited to the guarantee of a 
fair trial, but that interstate or international abduction is not misconduct sufficiently egregious to justify 
releasing the defendant [original footnote omitted, ChP].” The author explains with respect to Frisbie 
(ibid., p. 817, n. 22): “In Frisbie the Court did use language to the effect that due process is satisfied by 
a fair trial, 342 U.S. at 522, but that language was immediately followed by the assertion that “[t]here is 
nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape 
justice because he was brought to trial against his will.” Id. That the broad language in Frisbie limiting 
the scope of due process should be read in light of the specific factual situation before the Court in that 
case is supported by the fact that the Court had advanced a very different view of due process some 
months earlier in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (due process requires exclusion of evidence 
derived from police misconduct which shocks the conscience).” 
24 US Supreme Court, Ker v. Illinois, 6 December 1886 (119 US 436), p. 440. 
25 See ibid.: “The “due process of law” here guaranteed is complied with when the party is regularly 
indicted by the proper grand jury in the State court, has a trial according to the forms and modes 
prescribed for such trials, and when, in that trial and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights to which he 
is lawfully entitled. We do not intend to say that there may not be proceedings previous to the trial, in 
regard to which the prisoner could invoke in some manner the provision of this clause of the 
Constitution, but, for mere irregularities in the manner in which he may be brought into the custody of 
the law, we do not think he is entitled to say that he should not be tried at all for the crime with which he 
is charged in a regular indictment. He may be arrested for a very heinous offence by persons without 
any warrant, or without any previous complaint, and brought before a proper officer, and this may be in 
some sense said to be “without due process of law.” But it would hardly be claimed, that after the case 
had been investigated and the defendant held by the proper authorities to answer for the crime, he could 
plead that he was first arrested “without due process of law.” So here, when found within the 
jurisdiction of the State of Illinois and liable to answer for a crime against the laws of that State, unless 
there was some positive provision of the Constitution or of the laws of this country violated in bringing 
him into court, it is not easy to see how he can say that he is there “without due process of law,” within 








hereby implicitly suggesting that this reasoning is especially relevant for suspects 
charged with serious crimes (who should thus in any case be tried).26  
The second objection of Ker was that he could only have been forcibly removed 
from Peru in accordance with the provisions of the 1870-1874 Extradition Treaty 
between Peru and the US,27 thereby asserting a right (of asylum)28 under this 
treaty.29  
The Supreme Court, however, deemed this argument to be absurd as the treaty 
was not drafted to provide a safe haven for fugitives from justice.30  
It thereby made a clear distinction with the United States v. Rauscher case,31 
decided on the very same day (6 December 1886), in which the fugitive Rauscher 
could rely on a right deriving from an extradition treaty (in this case the 1842 
Ashburton Treaty between Great Britain and the US), namely the right not be tried 
for offences other than those for which extradition was sought (this is an articulation 
of the well-known speciality rule in extradition proceedings).32  
If formal extradition proceedings had been instigated to deliver Ker to the US, he 
might have used the Rauscher argument.33 However, in this case, the extradition 
                                                          
26 See also Anonymous 1975, pp. 816-817, n. 23: “The Court warned in Ker that it did “not intend to say 
that there may not be proceedings previous to the trial, in regard to which the prisoner could invoke in 
some manner … [the due process clause]; but for mere irregularities in the manner in which he may be 
brought into the custody of the law, we do not think he is entitled to say that he should not be tried at all 
…” 119 U.S. at 440. This warning hardly suggests that the Court considered due process to be limited to 
the guarantee of a fair trial; it does suggest that the Court doubted the wisdom of allowing one who has 
committed a serious offense to avoid trial altogether because his arrest was constitutionally defective 
[emphasis added, ChP].” 
27 The treaty was negotiated in 1870 but only proclaimed by the US President in 1874, see US Supreme 
Court, Ker v. Illinois, 6 December 1886 (119 US 436), p. 439. 
28 The use of the word asylum is rather odd and may have helped the US Supreme Court in quashing 
Ker’s argument. See also Fairman 1953, p. 681. 
29 See US Supreme Court, Ker v. Illinois, 6 December 1886 (119 US 436), p. 441. 
30 See ibid., p. 442: “There is no language in this treaty, or in any other treaty made by this country on 
the subject of extradition, of which we are aware, which says in terms that a party fleeing from the 
United States to escape punishment for crime becomes thereby entitled to an asylum in the country to 
which he has fled; indeed, the absurdity of such a proposition would at once prevent the making of a 
treaty of that kind. (…) The right of the government of Peru voluntarily to give a party in Ker’s 
condition an asylum in that country, is quite a different thing from the right in him to demand and insist 
upon security in such an asylum. The treaty, so far as it regulates the right of asylum at all, is intended to 
limit this right in the case of one who is proved to be a criminal fleeing from justice, so that, on proper 
demand and proceedings had therein, the government of the country of the asylum shall deliver him up 
to the country where the crime was committed. And to this extent, and to this alone, the treaty does 
regulate or impose a restriction upon the right of the government of the country of the asylum to protect 
the criminal from removal therefrom.” See, however, the Spanish Fiscal v. Samper case, to be discussed 
in Subsection 2.1. 
31 US Supreme Court, United States v. Rauscher, 6 December 1886 (119 US 407). Rauscher was 
extradited for murder but tried for cruel and unusual punishment. See Rogers 1887 for more information 
on his case. 
32 See US Supreme Court, Ker v. Illinois, 6 December 1886 (119 US 436), p. 443. See, however, 
Michell 1996, pp. 395-396, who is of the opinion that Ker contradicts the reasoning of Rauscher. 
33 See US Supreme Court, Ker v. Illinois, 6 December 1886 (119 US 436), p. 443: “If Ker had been 
brought to this country by proceedings under the treaty of 1870-74 with Peru, it seems probable, from 








treaty was not to be looked at at all. This was because Julian acted not under the 
authority of the US Government and its treaty with Peru, but in fact on his own 
accord.34  
Turning to the abduction itself, the Supreme Court made the following male 
captus bene detentus statement, referring, among other things, to Scott:  
 
The question of how far his forcible seizure in another country, and transfer by 
violence, force, of fraud, to this country, could be made available to resist trial in the 
State court, for the offence now charged upon him, is one which we do not feel called 
upon to decide, for in that transaction we do not see that the Constitution, or laws, or 
treaties, of the United States guarantee him any protection. There are authorities of 
the highest respectability which hold that such forcible abduction is no sufficient 
reason why the party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the 
court which has the right to try him for such an offence, and presents no valid 
objection to his trial in such court.35 
 
As already shown above, one can see here that judges can perhaps look at pre-trial 
irregularities abroad, but that they will not consider the question as to what extent 
such pre-trial irregularities can bar the trial altogether as a male captus will never 
lead to a male detentus.   
Like Judge Tenterden in Scott, the Supreme Court emphasised, however, that 
this did not mean that Ker or Peru did not have any remedy at all, for Ker could sue 
                                                                                                                                              
for larceny, and convicted by the verdict of a jury of embezzlement; for the statement in the plea is, that 
the demand made by the President of the United States, if it had been put in operation, was for an 
extradition for larceny, although some forms of embezzlement are mentioned in the treaty as subjects of 
extradition.” 
34 See ibid., pp. 442-443: “In the case before us, the plea shows, that, although Julian went to Peru with 
the necessary papers to procure the extradition of Ker under the treaty, those papers remained in his 
pocket and were never brought to light in Peru; that no steps were taken under them; and that Julian, in 
seizing upon the person of Ker and carrying him out of the territory of Peru into the United States, did 
not act nor profess to act under the treaty. In fact, that treaty was not called into operation, was not relied 
upon, was not made the pretext of arrest, and the facts show that it was a clear case of kidnapping within 
the dominions of Peru, without any pretence of authority under the treaty or from the government of the 
United States.” The exact status of Julian himself is unclear. He was a private detective, hired by a 
Chicago bank, and is as such often characterised as a private kidnapper. (See, for example, the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in the Alvarez-Machain case, to be discussed infra: US Supreme 
Court, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 15 June 1992, No. 91-712 (504 US 655), pp. 670ff, see n. 213 
and accompanying text.) However, it should also be mentioned that Julian received the arrest warrant 
for Ker from US President Arthur and that Wilske argues that Julian, in light of modern international 
law, can in fact be seen as a de facto State organ: “Als „de facto Staatsorgan“ müßte nach heutigem 
Völkerrechtsverständnis auch der Pinkteron-Detektiv Julian verstanden werden, der von der US-
Bundesregiering 1883 beauftragt wurde, die Auslieferung von Frederick Ker aus Peru zu bewirken. Bei 
der Detektivagentur Pinkerton handelte es sich um ein privates Unternehmen, das als Vorläufer des US-
amerikanischen Geheimdienstes verstanden werden kann. Die Agentur hatte ein weitgespanntes 
Tätigkeitsfeld, das von militärischer Aufklärungsarbeit im Sezessionskrieg, über die Bekämpfung von 
Streiks, Schutz von Politikern, der Mafiabekämpfung bis hin zur Verfolgung legendärer 
Eisenbahnräuber wie der James-Younger Gang und den „Wild Bunch Riders“ um Butch Cassidy und 
Sundance Kid reichte [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Wilske 2000, p. 73.) 








Julian for trespass and false imprisonment and Peru could demand the extradition of 
Julian to have him tried in Peruvian courts for kidnapping.36 
This case shows very clearly that an irregular arrest abroad, even though it may 
have some influence on the court, is no sufficient reason for the suspect not to be 
tried at all, for the court to opt for a refusal of jurisdiction, a male detentus. In this 
case, the judges did not argue, as Tenterden did in Scott, that they could not look at 
the pre-trial irregularities. They could (and these irregularities may even have some 
influence on the court), but they were also convinced that such irregularities would 
never lead to a refusal of jurisdiction. Hence, the question as to whether such 
irregularities should lead to a male detentus was irrelevant. As a consequence, they 
did not find it useful to consider it.37  
Hence, the non-inquiry rule is founded on (at least) two rationales. A judge may 
state that he will not look at pre-trial irregularities abroad because he cannot look at 
them or because he may have the power to do so but does not want to examine them, 
for example, because he deems this to be a futile exercise.38   
In contrast to the Scott case, where one could argue, although that is not certain 
either,39 that a violation of the injured State’s sovereignty had occurred (and thus 
that one could criticise Lord Tenterden for not having looked into that matter), there 
does not seem to have been a violation of Peru’s sovereignty in this case.  
This was not only because one can have one’s doubts as to whether there was 
actually a Peru at that time,40 but also because one could argue, although that is – 
again – not certain either, that Julian must be considered a private individual (an 
entity which is normally not viewed as being able to violate a State’s sovereignty)41 
and not a State organ.42  
Hence, it is uncertain how the Supreme Court would have reacted if there had 
been such a violation (and a protest and request for the return of Ker).43 
                                                          
36 See ibid. 
37 See the words “which we do not feel called upon to decide”. (See n. 35 and accompanying text.) Cf. 
also Pearlman 1963, pp. 108-109. 
38 See also Lord M’Laren’s judgment in the still-to-discuss, see Subsection 3.1, 1890 Scottish Sinclair 
case, where he seemingly combined the two rationales, stating: “With regard to the competency of the 
proceedings in Portugal, I think this is a matter with which we really have nothing to do. The extradition 
of a fugitive is an act of sovereignty on the part of the state who surrenders him. Each country has its 
own ideas and its own rules in such matters. Generally it is done under treaty arrangements, but if a state 
refuses to bind itself by treaty, and prefers to deal with each case on its merits, we must be content to 
receive the fugitive on these conditions, and we have neither title nor interest to inquire as to the 
regularity of proceedings under which he is apprehended and given over to the official sent out to 
receive him into custody [emphasis added, ChP].” (High Court of Justiciary, Sinclair v. Her Majesty’s 
Advocate and Another, 20 March 1890, 17 R. (Just. Cas.) 43, British International Law Cases, Vol. 3: 
jurisdiction (1965), p. 9.)  
39 See n. 11. 
40 See n. 20. 
41 See Subsection 3.2.2 of Chapter III. 
42 See n. 34.  
43 See also Sheely 2003, p. 432: “[T]he common law basis for the Ker opinion, and the Ker opinion 
itself, left open the question of valid jurisdiction in the face of a violation of international law [original 








Nevertheless, it may very well be possible that in such a situation, the judges would 
have also adhered to the non-inquiry rule and would have stated that this was not 
something they were going to look into as these matters should be resolved at the 
political level, between the Executives of the two States concerned.  
Another old well-known male captus bene detentus case which should be 
discussed here is the 1949 case R. v. O./C. Depot Battalion, R.A.S.C., Colchester, Ex 
parte Elliott.  
This case is about the British deserter Richard Arthur Elliott, who was arrested in 
Antwerp, Belgium, by British officers accompanied by Belgian policemen. 
 
On Dec. 22, 1948, the applicant applied for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he 
was not the person subject to military law and that he was wrongfully held in custody. 
The writ issued, and on the return it was submitted that the arrest and subsequent 
detention of the applicant by the military authorities was illegal because (i) he was 
arrested in Belgium contrary to Belgian law and (ii) his arrest was not in compliance 
with the provisions of s. 154 of the Army Act. It was also contended that the delay in 
bringing the applicant to trial was oppressive.44 
 
Chief Justice Lord Goddard of the King’s Bench Division, after having confirmed 
the Scott case and the Sinclair case,45 which will be discussed in Subsection 3.1, 
stated that although the unlawful arrest abroad may not lead to a release,46 it may 
nevertheless have some influence on the court:  
                                                          
44 King’s Bench Division, R. v. O./C. Depot Battalion, R.A.S.C., Colchester, Ex parte Elliott, 18 and 19 
January 1949, [1949] 1 All England Law Reports 373.  
45 “It shows that the law of both countries is exactly the same on this point and that we have no power to 
go into the question, once a prisoner is in lawful custody in this country, of the circumstances in which 
he may have been brought here. The circumstances in which the applicant may have been arrested in 
Belgium are no concern of this court.” (Ibid., pp. 377-378.) Note, however, that there is a tiny difference 
discernible between the views of the English and Scottish judges in this respect. In the Scott case, Chief 
Justice Lord Tenterden stated that judges cannot investigate these pre-trial irregularities. As will be 
shown in the discussion of the Sinclair case, this reasoning was followed by Lord MacDonald (“[W]e 
cannot be the judges of the wrongdoing of the Government of Portugal” (High Court of Justiciary, 
Sinclair v. Her Majesty’s Advocate and Another, 20 March 1890, 17 R. (Just. Cas.) 41, British 
International Law Cases, Vol. 3: jurisdiction (1965), p. 8)) and Lord Adam (“I am of opinion with your 
Lordship that we cannot go behind the perfectly regular warrant under which the suspender was 
apprehended and brought before a competent court. If there was anything irregular and illegal in the 
mode in which the suspender was brought here, he will have his remedy against the wrongdoer” (Ibid., 
17 R. (Just. Cas.) 42-43, British International Law Cases, Vol. 3: jurisdiction (1965), p. 9)). However, 
another Lord in the Sinclair case, Lord M’Laren, stated that the judges had neither title nor interest to 
inquire into the way a person came into the power of the court. (See also n. 38.) 
46 See King’s Bench Division, R. v. O./C. Depot Battalion, R.A.S.C., Colchester, Ex parte Elliott, 18 and 
19 January 1949, [1949] 1 All England Law Reports 376: “If a person is arrested abroad and he is 
brought before a court in this country charged with an offence which that court has jurisdiction to hear, 
it is no answer for him to say, he being then in lawful custody in this country: “I was arrested contrary to 
the laws of the State of A or the State of B where I was actually arrested.” He is in custody before the 
court which has jurisdiction to try him. What is it suggested that the court can do? The court cannot 
dismiss the charge at once without its being heard. He is charged with an offence against English law, 








If he has been arrested in a foreign country and detained improperly from the time 
that he was first arrested until the time he lands in this country, he may have a remedy 
against the persons who arrested and detained him, but that does not entitle him to be 
discharged, though it may influence the court if they think there was something 
irregular or improper in the arrest [emphasis added, ChP].47 
 
Nevertheless, also here, the exact scope of this quotation is not clear as Lord 
Goddard also stated in a more straightforward way a few sentences later:  
 
[W]e have no power to go into the question, once a prisoner is in lawful custody in 
this country, of the circumstances in which he may have been brought here. The 
circumstances in which the applicant may have been arrested in Belgium are no 
concern of this court.48 
 
It is quite difficult to deduce clear conclusions from these three cases as they appear 
to send out different signals, but generally speaking, one could possibly assert that 
judges felt that they either had no power or simply were not interested in an 
examination of the way in which a person was brought from one jurisdiction to 
another. Perhaps the court could provide some redress but whether this would also 
encompass a male detentus outcome is not entirely clear (and arguably not very 
likely). It is also important to stress that Ker (and the same goes for Elliott) cannot 
be seen as evidence for the idea that courts can try suspects captured in violation of 
the injured State’s sovereignty because in these cases, no such violation appears to 
have occurred.49 (As already explained, this point is not entirely clear with respect to 
the Scott case, see footnote 11 and accompanying text.) Thus, it is uncertain how the 
judges would have reacted in the case of a clear international law violation. 
Nevertheless, as already explained, given their preference for the non-inquiry rule, it 
would not be very surprising if they had refused to look into these matters as well 
and had stated that these are to be resolved by the Executives of the two States 
involved.50  
                                                          
47 Ibid. One could hereby think of a provisional release pending trial. The quotation is namely followed 
by the following sentence (ibid.): “Once he is before the court, it can hold him to bail until his trial and 
conviction.” See also ibid., p. 373: “[I]f, in military proceedings, there had been such delay in bringing a 
man to trial as to amount to oppression the High Court could interfere, and admit him to bail.” 
48 Ibid., pp. 377-378. 
49 Cf. also Morgenstern 1953, pp. 269-270 and 273 (making this point with respect to the Ker case). In 
that respect, one cannot agree with, for example, Lamb when she writes, referring, among other things, 
to “Eliot[t]” (Lamb 2000, p. 230, n. 230), that “[t]he courts of some States have been willing to exercise 
jurisdiction over a defendant who has been forcibly abducted by agents of the forum State from the 
territory of another State, in violation of the sovereignty of that State.” (Ibid., p. 230.)   
50 Cf. also Michell 1996, p. 450 (writing on the Scott, Sattler (see for more information on this case the 
end of this footnote), Sinclair (this case will be discussed in Subsection 3.1) and Elliott cases): “[I]n all 
four cases, there was little awareness or discussion of the international law dimension to the abductions 
at issue. No effort was made to determine whether the foreign state had protested, although in each case 
the fact that the abduction had been made in concert with local police [it must be noted that this is 
unclear with respect to the Scott case, ChP] suggests that the abductions were made with the consent of 








1.2 More recent cases 
 
In the 1974 United States v. Toscanino case,51 the first real crack in the fundament 
of the US version of the male captus bene detentus rule (the Ker-Frisbie doctrine)52 
seemed to appear. Francisco Toscanino, an Italian citizen, alleged that US agents 
were responsible for the fact that he was kidnapped in Uruguay, brought to Brazil 
(where he was detained, interrogated and tortured for nearly three weeks) and again 
abducted to the US.53 In America, he was charged with conspiracy to import 
                                                                                                                                              
them. There would thus seem to have been no violation of international law. [As explained, this is not 
entirely sure with respect to the Scott case, ChP.] Moreover, the cases echo the American approach in 
their view that resolution of any international conflict was best achieved at the diplomatic level. A very 
different result might have obtained had one of the arrests been followed by a protest and demand for 
the return of the abducted individual. It is also important to note that none of the cases provide support 
for Alvarez-Machain [a case which will be discussed in Subsection 1.2, ChP]; not one affirms a court’s 
jurisdiction to try the defendant in the face of a foreign protest.” To provide some information on the 
Sattler case: in this case (Court for Crown Cases Reserved, Regina v. Christian Sattler, 23 January 
1858, Dears. & Bell 525 and 539-547, British International Law Cases, Vol. 3: jurisdiction (1965), p. 
576 and pp. 582-586), the foreigner Christian Sattler committed larceny in England and fled to 
Hamburg. “The owner of the property gave information to the London police, and the deceased [the 
remainder of the case will clarify this word, ChP], who was a detective officer of that force and an 
English subject, proceeded to Hamburgh and there, with the assistance of the Hamburgh police, arrested 
the prisoner and brought him against his will on board an English steamer trading between Hamburgh 
and London in order that he might be tried for larceny.” (Ibid., Dears. & Bell 539, British International 
Law Cases, Vol. 3: jurisdiction (1965), p. 582.) The Court for Crown Cases Reserved held: “[W]here a 
foreigner, who was arrested in a foreign town and forced on board an English ship, while kept in 
custody in such ship on the high seas, killed the officer who arrested him out of malice prepense and not 
with a view to escape, it was held that, even assuming such arrest and detention to be illegal, he was 
guilty of murder, and was properly tried for such offence at the Central Criminal Court within whose 
jurisdiction he was brought.” (Ibid., Dears. & Bell 525, British International Law Cases, Vol. 3: 
jurisdiction (1965), p. 576.) Note, however, that it was not discussed in this case whether the potentially 
illegal arrest and detention had any effect on the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to the original 
charge of larceny. See in that respect also Michell 1996, p. 449: “The court did not determine whether 
Sattler could be tried for larceny; indeed, it is arguable that his illegal arrest would prevent his trial on 
the count of larceny.” One can wonder whether Michell’s words after the semicolon are correct. In the 
question presented by Baron Samuel Martin to the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, one can namely 
read: “The question which I desire to be answered is, whether there was any jurisdiction to try the 
prisoner at the Old Bailey Sessions. If the answer be in the affirmative, the judgment which has been 
already given is to be affirmed. If in the negative, the judgment is to be reserved; but the prisoner is to 
remain in custody to be tried on the indictment which has been found by the grand jury for the larceny.” 
(Court for Crown Cases Reserved, Regina v. Christian Sattler, 23 January 1858, Dears. & Bell 539, 
British International Law Cases, Vol. 3: jurisdiction (1965), p. 582.) 
51 US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 73-
2732 (500 F 2d 267). 
52 See n. 16. One could add the (still-to-discuss) Alvarez-Machain case here, see also Knoops 2002, p. 
247. 
53 See US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 
73-2732 (500 F 2d 267), pp. 268-270. As will be shown infra, the alleged involvement of US agents in 
the operation is quite important in this case. The Court of Appeals summarised Toscanino’s allegations 
in that respect as follows: “He contends that the court acquired jurisdiction over him unlawfully through 
the conduct of American agents who kidnapped him in Uruguay, used illegal electronic surveillance, 
tortured him and abducted him to the United States for the purpose of prosecuting him here [emphasis 








narcotics into the US54 and sentenced to, among other things, 20 years’ 
imprisonment.55 Judge Mansfield, writing the opinion of the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, compared the due process concept under the old Ker-Frisbie 
doctrine56 with the new concept57 and concluded, after having stated that “[s]ociety 
                                                                                                                                              
the US role in his abduction and torture: ““On or about January 6, 1973 Francisco Toscanino was lured 
from his home in Montevideo, Uruguay by a telephone call. This call had been placed by or at the 
direction of Hugo Campos Hermedia. Hermedia was at that time and still is a member of the police in 
Montevideo, Uruguay. In this effort, however, and those that will follow in this offer, Hermedia was 
acting ultra vires in that he was the paid agent of the United States government (...) [emphasis added, 
ChP].”” (Ibid., p. 269.) (As explained in n. 101 and accompanying text of Chapter III, such a situation 
(in which local officials cooperate (ultra vires) in the abduction can arguably not lead to valid consent 
from the State where the abduction took place.) ““Toscanino was placed in another vehicle and whisked 
to the border. There by pre-arrangement and again at the connivance of the United States government, 
the car was met by a group of Brazilians who took custody of the body of Francisco Toscanino 
[emphasis added, ChP].”” (Ibid., pp. 269-270.) ““Later that same day Toscanino was brought to Brasilia 
(...). For seventeen days Toscanino was incessantly tortured and interrogated. Throughout this entire 
period the United States government and the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York 
prosecuting this case was aware of the interrogation and did in fact receive reports as to its progress. 
Furthermore, during this period of torture and interrogation a member of the United States Department 
of Justice, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs was present at one or more intervals and actually 
participated in portions of the interrogation (...) [emphasis added, ChP].”” (Ibid., p. 270.) ““Incredibly, 
these agents of the United States government attached electrodes to Toscanino’s earlobes, toes, and 
genitals. Jarring jolts of electricity were shot throughout his body, rendering him unconscious for 
indeterminate periods of time but again leaving no physical scars. Finally on or about January 25, 1973 
Toscanino was brought to Rio de Janeiro where he was drugged by Brazilian-American agents and 
placed on Pan American Airways Flight #202 destined for the waiting arms of the United States 
government. (...) At no time during the government’s seizure of Toscanino did it ever attempt to 
accomplish its goal through any lawful channels whatever. From start to finish the government 
unlawfully, willingly and deliberately embarked upon a beazenly [this should probably be “brazenly”, 
ChP] criminal scheme violating the laws of three separate countries [emphasis added, ChP].”” (Ibid., p. 
270.) 
54 See ibid., p. 268. 
55 See ibid. 
56 See ibid., p. 272: “Thus, under the [s]o-called “Ker-Frisbie” rule, due process was limited to the 
guarantee of a constitutionally fair trial, regardless of the method by which jurisdiction was obtained 
over the defendant. Jurisdiction gained through an indisputably illegal act might still be exercised, even 
though the effect could be to reward police brutality and lawlessness in some cases.” 
57 See ibid.: “Since Frisbie the Supreme Court, in what one distinguished legal luminary describes as a 
“constitutional revolution,” (…) has expanded the interpretation of “due process.” No longer is it limited 
to the guarantee of “fair” procedure at trial. In an effort to deter police misconduct, the term has been 
extended to bar the government from realizing directly the fruits of its own deliberate and unnecessary 
lawlessness in bringing the accused to trial.” Judge Mansfield hereby also referred to the very famous 
words of Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in the case Olmstead v. United States (US Supreme 
Court, Olmstead et al. v. United States (No. 493), Green et al. v. Same (No. 532) and McInnis v. Same 
(No. 533), 4 June 1928 (277 US 438). As the words are quite generally drafted, it may be good to 
reproduce them here as well, although it should also be noted that this case was not about an unlawful 
arrest but about unlawfully obtained evidence: “Decency, security and liberty alike demand that 
government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In 
a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law 
scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the 
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds 
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that 








is the ultimate loser when, in order to convict the guilty, it uses methods that lead to 
decreased respect for the law”:58  
 
Faced with a conflict between the two concepts of due process, the one being the 
restricted version found in Ker-Frisbie and the other the expanded and enlightened 
interpretation expressed in more recent decisions of the Supreme Court, we are 
persuaded that to the extent that the two are in conflict, the Ker-Frisbie version must 
yield. Accordingly we view due process as now requiring a court to divest itself of 
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it has been acquired as the result of 
the Government’s deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused’s 
constitutional rights.59  
 
Although it must be stressed that the judges in Ker (and the same may be argued for 
Frisbie) in fact recognised that the concept of due process also had a pre-trial 
dimension,60 the quotation from Toscanino, of course, goes much further in that it 
argues that such pre-trial irregularities may lead to the ending of the case. 
Reading the decision, one can argue that this new concept of due process does 
not mean that a court can only refuse jurisdiction if a person is kidnapped by the 
government and, in the course of that kidnapping, was seriously mistreated (as was 
the case here). The threshold is that jurisdiction must be refused “where it has been 
acquired as the result of the Government’s deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable 
invasion of the accused’s constitutional rights”. That appears also to be the case 
when a person has been the victim of a ‘normal’ abduction (without any serious 
mistreatment). See in that respect the following words of the Court of Appeals just 
before it presented its new concept of due process: 
 
[W]e are satisfied that the Ker-Frisbie rule cannot be reconciled with the Supreme 
Court’s expansion of the concept of due process, which now protects the accused 
against pretrial illegality by denying to the government the fruits of its exploitation of 
any deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness on its part. (…) [W]e must be guided by 
the underlying principle that the government should be denied the right to exploit its 
own illegal conduct (…) and when an accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought 
                                                                                                                                              
may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal – would bring terrible 
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.” (US Court of 
Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 73-2732 (500 F 2d 
267), p. 274, referring to Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States.) 
58 Ibid. This famous phrase is sometimes said to stem from the case United States v. Archer (US Court 
of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Archer, 12 July 1973, Nos. 1039, 1040, 1041, Dockets 73-
1527, 73-1528, 73-1711 (486 F.2d 670)), see, for example, the still-to-discuss (see Subsection 3.2) case: 
Supreme Court of Namibia, The State v. Mushwena and Others, ‘Appeal judgment’, 21 July 2004, Case 
No. SA6/2004 (available at: 
http://www.superiorcourts.org.na/supreme/docs/judgments/Criminal/Mushwena.pdf), p. 129. However, 
this is incorrect. It was Judge Mansfield from the Toscanino case himself who expressed these words, 
words which will not be found in United States v. Archer. 
59 US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 73-
2732 (500 F 2d 267), p. 275. 








within the jurisdiction, the court’s acquisition of power over his person represents the 
fruits of the government’s exploitation of its own misconduct. Having unlawfully 
seized the defendant in violation of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees “the 
right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . 
seizures,” the government should as a matter of fundamental fairness be obligated to 
return him to his status quo ante [original footnote omitted, ChP].61 
 
Thus, even though Toscanino was the victim of an abduction involving serious 
mistreatment, the male detentus test stemming from this decision does not seem to 
require such a high standard.  
This can be welcomed for it would be rather strange to demand from a suspect 
who has been abducted by authorities which can be linked to the prosecuting forum 
that he also needs to prove that he was seriously mistreated in the course of that 
abduction. The fact that these authorities resorted to the method of abduction 
(whether or not that abduction included serious mistreatment) should alone be 
enough for the judge to refuse jurisdiction if he still cares about, for example, the 
integrity of his court, which arguably demands such illegal practices should not be 
condoned by continuing the case.  
Alongside this (on constitutional law/due process/rights of the accused focused) 
reason for refusing jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals also stated more generally that 
it could rely on its “supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in 
the district courts within our jurisdiction”,62 holding that “a federal court’s criminal 
process is abused or degraded where it is executed against a defendant who has been 
brought into the territory of the United States by the methods alleged here.”63 This 
quotation shows that the facts of this case would in any case lead to the ending of 
the case, but it is unclear whether this would also go for a ‘normal’ abduction 
(without serious mistreatment). However, given the above-mentioned words in the 
context of the concept of due process, one might think that the Court of Appeals 
would also refuse jurisdiction on this abuse of process basis in the case of a ‘normal’ 
abduction.  
The third reason to dismiss jurisdiction would also point in that direction. This 
third reason was linked to international law64 and here, the case can be clearly 
discerned from the older above-mentioned cases.  
                                                          
61 US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 73-
2732 (500 F 2d 267), p. 275. 
62 Ibid., p. 276: “In any event, since Ker and Frisbie involved state court convictions only, the views 
expressed in those cases would not necessarily apply to the present case, which is an appeal from a 
judgment entered by a federal district court. Here we possess powers not available to a federal court 
reviewing a state tribunal’s resolution of constitutional issues. In this case we may rely simply upon our 
supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in the district courts within our 
jurisdiction.” 
63 Ibid. 
64 See also Anonymous 1975, pp. 814-815: “The decision that the district court was bound to dismiss the 
case for lack of jurisdiction if defendant’s allegations of kidnapping and torture [one can wonder, given 
the remarks mentioned in the main text and the (correct) explanation of the three reasons to dismiss 








Judge Mansfield explained that “international kidnappings such as the one 
alleged here violate the U.N. Charter”.65  
He hereby referred to the Eichmann case, stating that the UNSC Resolution 138 
of 23 June 1960, discussed in Chapter III, “merely recognized a long standing 
principle of international law that abductions by one state of persons located within 
the territory of another violate the territorial sovereignty of the second state and are 
redressable usually by the return of the person kidnapped.”66  
This is correct; ‘normal’ abductions violating international law, not necessarily 
those accompanied by serious mistreatment, can lead to the ending of the case. 
However, it must be repeated (see also Chapter III) that it would seem that a return 
would only be necessary if the injured State protests and requests the return of the 
suspect.  
The Eichmann case does not contradict this view as in that case, Argentina, 
ultimately (in the context of the UNSC proceedings) did not request the return of 
Eichmann.  
As there was apparently no protest and request for the return of Toscanino in this 
case, the Court of Appeals would not have been required to dismiss the case from 
the standpoint of the violation of State sovereignty.67  
Nevertheless, as already explained, that does not mean that there are not reasons 
enough to refuse jurisdiction on the basis of other considerations, such as those 
related to due process, a concept which this decision seemingly considers to be 
already violated in the case of a ‘normal’ abduction.68  
                                                                                                                                              
Toscanino also had to proof the torture part, ChP] were substantiated was based on three alternative 
holdings: that due process requires dismissal where jurisdiction has been acquired as a result of a 
“deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused’s constitutional rights,” that federal 
courts should, as a matter of proper administration of criminal justice, decline to accept jurisdiction that 
is the fruit of illegal government action, and that American courts may not accept jurisdiction obtained 
as a result of the Government’s violation of a treaty guaranteeing the sovereignty of another nation 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
65 US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 73-
2732 (500 F 2d 267), p. 277. Assuming that Toscanino’s allegations were in fact true (see, however, 
infra), one could argue that Toscanino’s abduction indeed violated Uruguayan sovereignty (and hence 
the UN Charter). For example, Toscanino argued that the central Government of Uruguay did not 
consent to the operation. (See ibid., pp. 269-270.) Although consent from local officials (even acting 
ultra vires) may be enough, it was explained in n. 101 and accompanying text of Chapter III (see also n. 
53 of the present chapter) that this would not be the case in a situation where a local official cooperated 
ultra vires in the operation for, for example, financial reasons. In such a case, the local official is not 
acting with the idea on his mind that he is operating on behalf of his State. In fact, he knows that he is 
operating on behalf of another State. 
66 Ibid., p. 278. 
67 See also Anonymous 1975, p. 823: “Because Uruguay did not request Toscanino’s return, there was 
no reason to refuse jurisdiction in the interest of international harmony.” 
68 See also the concurring opinion of Judge Anderson, who argues that a violation of the standards laid 
down in the US-Uruguay Extradition Treaty or the Charters of the OAS and the UN is “indicative of the 
denial of due process”. (US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, 








In the end, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court “for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion”.69 More specifically, it stated:  
 
Our remand should be construed as requiring an evidentiary hearing with respect to 
Toscanino’s allegations of forcible abduction only if, in response to the government’s 
denial, he offers some credible supporting evidence, including specifically evidence 
that the action was taken by or at the direction of United States officials. Upon his 
failure to make such an offer the district court may, in its discretion, decline to hold 
an evidentiary hearing.70  
 
This is exactly what happened. The District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York refused to hold a hearing as it was not convinced that there was enough 
evidence to believe that US officials participated in the abduction of Toscanino.71   
Although this ruling was welcomed by, for example, the still-to-discuss Ebrahim 
case as one supporting principles which “testify to a healthy legal system of high 
standard”,72 its scope has been seriously narrowed down by, for instance, the case 
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,73 also decided by the (differently constituted) 
US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. The facts of this case, which, according to 
Chief Judge Kaufman, “present elements one might expect to encounter in a grade-
B film scenario”,74 centred around the Argentine citizen Julio Juventino Lujan, who 
was charged “with conspiracy to import and distribute a large quantity of heroin”.75 
                                                          
69 Ibid., p. 281. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Strangely, the summary by the District Court of the allegations in the affidavit of Toscanino is quite 
different than Toscanino’s allegations in the decision of the Court of Appeals (and indeed may not 
evidence the participation of US agents in the abduction and mistreatment of Toscanino), see US 
District Court, Eastern District of New York, United States v. Toscanino, 10 July 1975, No. 73 CR 194 
(398 F.Supp. 916), p. 917: “In his affidavit, defendant alleges that he was abducted from his home in 
Montevideo, Uruguay on January 6, 1973, by members of the [Uruguayan] police, who were disguised 
as guerilla fighters. It is then alleged that this group crossed the Brazilian border. Defendant says he was 
lodged in a prison cell in the City of Porto Alegre, and apparently turned over to the Brazilian police. 
The affidavit alleges that he was then taken to a prison in Brazilia where he was alternately interrogated 
and tortured. The affidavit relates that [he] was then taken to an office where ‘high police or army 
officials’ were present, and he was then told that they had made a mistake. According to defendant, 
these officials advised him that he could not return to Uruguay, but that he could return to Italy. He 
claims that he was sedated and flown to the United States in the company of two Brazilian policemen. 
When he arrived in the United States, he was placed in the custody of special agents of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration. Assuming all the allegations of the affidavit to be true, there is no claim of 
participation by United States officials in the abduction of torture of the defendant. The defendant has 
not submitted any credible evidence which would indicate any participation on the part of United States 
officials prior to the time the defendant arrived in this country. Nor is there any evidence which shows 
that the abduction was carried out at the direction of United State officials. The court declines to hold an 
evidentiary hearing.” 
72 Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 International 
Legal Materials (1992), p. 896. 
73 US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 8 January 1975, No. 
449, Docket 74-2084 (510 F.2d 62). 









An arrest warrant for him was issued but enforced in a rather “unconventional 
manner”76 as he was lured from Argentina to Bolivia from where he was abducted to 
the US.77 After the Court of Appeals had decided the above-mentioned Toscanino 
case, Lujan saw his chance and challenged the way he was brought to the US as 
well.78 The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed his motion after having concluded 
that the alleged facts in Toscanino were very different and much more serious79 than 
the alleged facts in Lujan. The Court clarified: 
                                                          
76 Ibid. 
77 See ibid. for more factual information: “Accepting, as we must for purposes of this appeal, that 
Lujan’s allegations are true, the arrest warrant was enforced in an unconventional manner. Lujan, a 
licensed pilot, was hired in Argentina by one Duran to fly him to Bolivia. Although Duran represented 
that he had business to transact there with American interests in Bolivian mines, he in fact had been 
hired by American agents to lure Lujan to Bolivia. When Lujan landed in Bolivia on October 26, 1973, 
he was promptly taken into custody by Bolivian police who were not acting at the direction of their own 
superiors or government, but as paid agents of the United States. Lujan was not permitted to 
communicate with the Argentine embassy, an attorney, or any member of his family. On the following 
day the Bolivian police, commanded by Police Major Guido Lopez, took Lujan from Santa Cruz to La 
Paz, where he was held until November 1, 1973. On that date a Lieutenant Terrazas and other Bolivian 
police, acting together with American agents, brought Lujan to the airport and placed him on a plane 
bound for New York. Upon his arrival at Kennedy Airport Lujan was formally arrested by federal 
agents.” 
78 See ibid. 
79 A part of the alleged mistreatment of Toscanino has already been mentioned earlier (see n. 53) but this 
is the entire story of what Toscanino alleged to have happened to him, see US Court of Appeals, Second 
Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 73-2732 (500 F 2d 267), pp. 269-
270: “On or about January 6, 1973 Francisco Toscanino was lured from his home in Montevideo, 
Uruguay by a telephone call. This call had been placed by or at the direction of Hugo Campos 
Hermedia. Hermedia was at that time and still is a member of the police in Montevideo, Uruguay. In this 
effort, however, and those that will follow in this offer, Hermedia was acting ultra vires in that he was 
the paid agent of the United States government. (...) The telephone call ruse succeeded in bringing 
Toscanino and his wife, seven months pregnant at the time, to an area near a deserted bowling alley in 
the City of Montevideo. Upon their arrival there Hermedia together with six associates abducted 
Toscanino. This was accomplished in full view of Toscanino’s terrified wife by knocking him 
unconscious with a gun and throwing him into the rear seat of Hermedia’s car. Thereupon Toscanino, 
bound and blindfolded, was driven to the Uruguayan-Brazilian border by a circuitous route. (...) At one 
point during the long trip to the Brazilian border discussion was had among Toscanino’s captors as to 
changing the license plates of the abductor’s car in order to avoid detection by the Uruguayan 
authorities. At another point the abductor’s car was abruptly brought to a halt, and Toscanino was 
ordered to get out. He was brought to an apparently secluded place and told to lie perfectly still or he 
would be shot then and there. Although his blindfold prevented him from seeing, Toscanino could feel 
the barrel of the gun against his head and could hear the rumbling noises of what appeared to be an 
Uruguayan military convoy. A short time after the noise of the convoy had died away, Toscanino was 
placed in another vehicle and whisked to the border. There by pre-arrangement and again at the 
connivance of the United States government, the car was met by a group of Brazilians who took custody 
of the body of Francisco Toscanino. (...) Once in the custody of Brazilians, Toscanino was brought to 
Porto Alegre where he was held incommunicado for eleven hours. His requests to consult with counsel, 
the Italian Consulate, and his family were all denied. During this time he was denied all food and water. 
Later that same day Toscanino was brought to Brasilia. (...) For seventeen days Toscanino was 
incessantly tortured and interrogated. (...) (Toscanino’s) captors denied him sleep and all forms of 
nourishment for days at a time. Nourishment was provided intravenously in a manner precisely equal to 
an amount necessary to keep him alive. Reminiscent of the horror stories told by our military men who 








[I]n recognizing that Ker and Frisbie no longer provided a carte blanche to 
government agents bringing defendants from abroad to the United States by the use of 
torture, brutality and similar outrageous conduct, we did not intend to suggest that any 
irregularity in the circumstances of a defendant’s arrival in the jurisdiction would 
vitiate the proceedings of the criminal court.80 
 
The Court in Lujan then81 referred to passages from the cases Rochin v. California 
and United States v. Russell,82 which were also used by the Court in Toscanino 
(namely in its presentation of the first reason why a court could refuse jurisdiction) 
and in which one can indeed find words which may be seen as requiring a higher 
threshold to refuse jurisdiction than the words “the Government’s deliberate, 
unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused’s constitutional rights”83 may 
suggest: “conduct that shocks the conscience”84 (Rochin) and “conduct so 
                                                                                                                                              
hours at a time. When he could no longer stand he was kicked and beaten but all in a manner contrived 
to punish without scarring. When he would not answer, his fingers were pinched with metal pliers. 
Alcohol was flushed into his eyes and nose and other fluids (...) were forced up his anal passage. 
Incredibly, these agents of the United States government attached electrodes to Toscanino’s earlobes, 
toes, and genitals. Jarring jolts of electricity were shot throughout his body, rendering him unconscious 
for indeterminate periods of time but again leaving no physical scars. Finally on or about January 25, 
1973 Toscanino was brought to Rio de Janeiro where he was drugged by Brazilian-American agents and 
placed on Pan American Airways Flight #202 destined for the waiting arms of the United States 
government. On or about January 26, 1973 he woke in the United States, was arrested on the aircraft, 
and was brought immediately to Thomas Puccio, Assistant United States Attorney.” 
80 US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 8 January 1975, No. 
449, Docket 74-2084 (510 F.2d 62), p. 65. 
81 See ibid. 
82 The 1952 case Rochin v. California (US Supreme Court, Rochin v. California, 2 January 1952, No. 83 
(342 US 165) was a case about illegally obtained evidence: “[S]tate police officers had frustrated a 
defendant’s efforts to swallow two morphine capsules in his possession by taking the defendant, 
handcuffed, to a hospital where a doctor was induced to force “an emetic solution through a tube into 
(the defendant’s) stomach against his will.” When the solution produced vomiting the capsules were 
recovered and subsequently introduced at defendant’s trial.” (US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 
United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 73-2732 (500 F 2d 267), p. 273.) Here, the 
Supreme Court, in the words of Justice Frankfurter stated: “Regard for the requirements of the Due 
Process Clause ‘inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of 
the proceedings (resulting in a conviction) in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of 
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward 
those charged with the most heinous offenses.’” “Applying these general considerations to the 
circumstances of the present case, we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this 
conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism 
about combating crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience.” (US Supreme 
Court, Rochin v. California, 2 January 1952, No. 83 (342 US 165), pp. 169 and 172.) In the 1973 case 
United States v. Russell (US Supreme Court, United States v. Russell, 24 April 1973, No. 71-1585 (411 
US 423)), the Supreme Court approved alleged entrapment activities by the US Government, 
explaining: “While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law 
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government 
from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf. Rochin v. California (…), the instant case is 
distinctly not of that breed.” (Ibid., pp. 431-432.) 
83 See n. 59 and accompanying text. 
84 US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 73-








outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from 
invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction”85 (Russell). However, it must be 
noted that Toscanino also referred in this context to the 1973 case United States v. 
Archer: “In United States v. Archer (…), while basing our decision on other 
grounds, we referred to Olmstead and Rochin for the proposition that due process 
principles might be invoked to bar prosecution altogether where it resulted from 
flagrantly illegal law enforcement practices [emphasis added, ChP].”86 In addition, 
less extreme words were also used in the Rochin case, see the following words of 
Justice Frankfurter in that case: “Due process of law, as a historic and generative 
principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of conduct 
more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that 
offend a ‘sense of justice.’”87 Hence, even though the words “shocking” and 
“outrageous” may be seen as requiring a higher threshold than the words “the 
Government’s deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused’s 
constitutional rights” may suggest, one can find support in the Toscanino case that 
serious illegal enforcement practices, such as a ‘normal’ forcible abduction (not 
necessarily one accompanied by serious mistreatment)88 falls within its male 
detentus test.  
However, the Court in Lujan clearly restricted this male detentus test by focusing 
on the specifics of the Toscanino case, which, as was shown, allegedly involved 
serious mistreatment:   
 
The cruel, inhuman and outrageous treatment allegedly suffered by Toscanino 
brought his case within the Rochin principle (…). But the same cannot be said of 
Lujan. It requires little argument to show that the government conduct of which he 
complains pales by comparison with that alleged by Toscanino. Lacking from Lujan’s 
petition is any allegation of that complex of shocking governmental conduct sufficient 
to convert an abduction which is simply illegal into one which sinks to a violation of 
due process. Unlike Toscanino, Lujan does not allege that a gun blow knocked him 
unconscious when he was first taken into captivity, nor does he claim that drugs were 
administered to subdue him for the flight to the United States. Neither is there any 
assertion that the United States Attorney was aware of his abduction, or of any 
interrogation. Indeed, Lujan disclaims any acts of torture, terror, or custodial 
interrogation of any kind. (…) We scarcely intend to convey approval of illegal 
government conduct. But we are forced to recognize that, absent a set of incidents 
like that in Toscanino, not every violation by prosecution or police is so egregious 
                                                                                                                                              
Circuit, United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 8 January 1975, No. 449, Docket 74-2084 (510 F.2d 62), 
p. 65.  
85 US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 73-
2732 (500 F 2d 267), p. 274 (referring to the Russell case). See also US Court of Appeals, Second 
Circuit, United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 8 January 1975, No. 449, Docket 74-2084 (510 F.2d 62), 
p. 65. 
86 US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 73-
2732 (500 F 2d 267), p. 274. 
87 Ibid., p. 273 (quoting Justice Frankfurter in the Rochin case). 








that Rochin and its progeny requires nullification of the indictment [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].89 
 
Hence, the Court in Lujan restricted the male detentus test from Toscanino (which, 
reading its decision, could include a ‘normal’ abduction, without serious 
mistreatment) to a test which would demand an abduction with serious mistreatment.  
The Court in Lujan also looked at another reason for the Toscanino Court to 
dismiss the case, namely the violation of international law. However, after it had 
stated that the Court in Toscanino had suggested that “a defendant might be able to 
interpose the violations of those charters [the Charters of the OAS and of the UN, 
ChP] as a defense to a criminal prosecution”,90 it opined that “unlike Toscanino, 
Lujan fails to allege that either Argentina or Bolivia in any way protested or even 
objected to his abduction [original footnote omitted, ChP].”91 As explained earlier, 
one must clearly differentiate between a violation of State sovereignty/a violation of 
international law and the idea that a State must return the suspect to the injured State 
in the case of a protest and request for the return of the suspect. That Argentina or 
Bolivia did not protest/object to the abduction does not mean that there was no 
violation of international law in this case. Whether there was a violation of State 
sovereignty here depends on the question as to whether it can be said that the 
operation took place without the consent of these two States. If there was no valid 
consent, one must assume a violation of international law, whether or not the injured 
States protested/objected to the operation. However, it is true that a State would only 
be required to return the suspect (and thus to dismiss the case) on the basis of the 
violation of another State’s sovereignty if there had been a protest and request for 
the return of the abducted suspect (which does not seem to have occurred in this 
case), although the fact that there might, nevertheless, have been a violation of 
international law may influence the judge in arguing that other concepts, such as due 
process, have been violated92 and hence that a dismissal of the case is in order. 
Of course, one can wonder how the Court would have reacted if it had been of 
the opinion that there was a violation of international law. Would that, in itself, have 
been enough to divest jurisdiction, even if Lujan was not the victim of serious 
mistreatment?  
As stated before, there is support in the Toscanino decision for a ‘normal’ 
abduction, not accompanied by serious mistreatment which violates international 
law93 – and in fact, also one which does not violate international law94 – to lead to 
                                                          
89 US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 8 January 1975, No. 
449, Docket 74-2084 (510 F.2d 62), p. 66. 
90 Ibid., p. 67. 
91 Ibid.  
92 See n. 68. 
93 See the Toscanino Court’s third reason to dismiss jurisdiction. 
94 See the Toscanino Court’s first reason to dismiss jurisdiction. It is very well be possible that the 
prosecuting authorities execute an abduction without violating traditional (inter-State) international law. 
As explained in Chapter III, although this book focused on the traditional abduction without the consent 








the ending of the case. Even though one can argue that a violation of international 
law as such (without a protest and request for the return of the suspect) would not 
require a judge to refuse jurisdiction, the fact that the prosecuting authorities 
resorted to a method which violated another State’s sovereignty may convince the 
judge that the authorities have brought this case to trial without due process of law 
and hence that jurisdiction must be refused. However, the Court in Lujan did not 
want to pronounce on this matter: 
 
We do not have to decide here whether, in the absence of a claim of torture or of 
similar reprehensible conduct, the violation of international law alone would require 
dismissal of an indictment. We hold only that given Lujan’s failure to allege that 
Argentina or Bolivia protested his abduction or that the abduction involved abuse of 
the type we condemned in Toscanino, there is no justification for ordering the district 
court to divest itself of jurisdiction over him [original footnote omitted, ChP].95 
 
Hence, Lujan did not overrule the idea which can arguably be found in the 
Toscanino decision, namely that an abduction violating international law (but not 
one involving serious mistreatment) may also lead to the ending of the case, for it 
simply did not look into that matter. However, it did not agree with the idea, not 
taking into account the international law dimension now,96 that resort to the method 
of abduction as such (without serious mistreatment) would already be enough to 
violate a concept such as due process to such an extent that jurisdiction must be 
refused. This stance of Lujan – and it has, in fact, been asserted that this was also the 
stance of the judges in Toscanino itself97 – can be criticised for it basically means 
                                                                                                                                              
all the legal procedures but not violating traditional (inter-State) international law, see the term official 
abduction and ns. 21 and 63 of that chapter. See also n. 782 of the present chapter. 
95 US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 8 January 1975, No. 
449, Docket 74-2084 (510 F.2d 62), p. 68. 
96 See n. 94: authorities may also resort to the method of abduction without violating (traditional inter-
State) international law.  
97 See the concurring opinion of Circuit Judge Anderson in the Lujan case: “The discussion in the 
majority opinion in Toscanino of the due process issue, as well as the mention of this court’s 
supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in this Circuit read, in my opinion, as if 
the kidnapping from his own country and the forcible delivery into the United States of a non-fugitive 
foreign national, standing alone, would be sufficient to deprive the district court of jurisdiction (…). 
After Toscanino was decided, however, a motion was made for a hearing in banc. A majority of the 
active members of the court voted to deny the petition for a hearing in banc, three judges dissenting.  In 
so doing the majority obviously interpreted the decision in Toscanino as resting solely and exclusively 
upon the use of torture and other cruel and inhumane treatment of Toscanino in effecting his kidnapping 
and it rejected the proposition that a kidnapping of a foreign national from his own or another nation and 
his forcible delivery into the United States against his will, but without torture, would itself violate due 
process.” (US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 8 January 1975, 
No. 449, Docket 74-2084 (510 F.2d 62), pp. 68-69.) That may, of course, very well be the case, but then 
the judges in Toscanino can be criticised for having written their decision in such a general way that it 
can easily be interpreted as holding that a normal abduction (not necessarily one accompanied by 
serious mistreatment) might also lead to the ending of the case. However, even if Judge Anderson is 
right, it must not be forgotten that Lujan has not overruled Toscanino with respect to the international 
law argument. Hence, an abduction violating international law (which the ‘normal’ abductions will do) 








that a court cannot refuse jurisdiction in the case of an abduction, which 1) does not 
violate international law (because the State of residence consented to the operation); 
2) does not involve serious mistreatment but 3) nevertheless flouts all the regular 
procedures in obtaining custody over a person.98 It can be argued that a judge should 
also be able to refuse jurisdiction in ‘normal’ abduction cases (not necessarily those 
in which serious mistreatment has taken place) if it wants, for example, to deter the 
prosecuting authorities from resorting to illegal methods and to protect the integrity 
of its own proceedings.99 
Whatever may be the true meaning and scope of Toscanino, Michell explains 
that 
 
[s]ubsequent decisions held that a fugitive must establish three elements for the 
Toscanino prohibition against the exercise of jurisdiction to apply. First, the 
governmental conduct in question, i.e., the abduction, must amount to “grossly cruel 
and unusual barbarities” or “shock the conscience.” Second, the abduction must have 
been the work of state agents.[100] Third, there must be a protest by the injured 
state[101] [original footnotes omitted, ChP].102  
                                                          
98 See also the following words of Circuit Judge Anderson (concurring with the outcome of Lujan): 
“[W]henever a foreign national is abducted or kidnapped from outside of the United States and is 
forcibly brought into this Country by United States agents by means of torture, brutality or similar 
physical abuse the federal court acquires no jurisdiction over him because of a violation of due process. 
Otherwise the holdings of the Supreme Court in Ker v. Illinois (…) and Frisbie v. Collins (…) govern.” 
(Ibid., p. 69.)   
99 It may be interesting to note that Mann (1989, p. 409) believed that the Lujan opinion “is likely to 
count among the least ingenuous judicial pronouncements ever made.” 
100 See in that respect, for example, the Yousef case. In this terrorism case, one of the suspects of, among 
other things, the first attack on the World Trade Center in New York City (on 26 February 1993), Ramzi 
Ahmed Yousef, claimed in an affidavit dated 15 January 1996 that he was kidnapped in Pakistan in 
November 1994, that he was tortured during his detention before being turned over to US officials in 
Islamabad in February 1995 and that this torture could be attributed to the US “because the Pakistanis 
who captured and tortured him were acting as agents to the United States or, in the alternative, because 
the United States and Pakistan were engaged in a joint venture to “track and trap” him.” (US Court of 
Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Yousef, 4 April 2003, Docket Nos. 98-1041L, 98-1197, 98-
1355, 99-1544, 99-1554 (327 F.3d 56), p. 138.) According to Yousef, as a result of this 
Toscanino/‘shock the conscience’ exception, his indictment had to be dismissed. (See ibid.) However, 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected the torture allegations as incredible. Furthermore, 
the Court of Appeals found that there was no error in the District Court’s conclusion that “even taking 
Yousef’s factual assertions as true, Yousef had failed to allege United States involvement in his 
kidnapping, captivity, or torture sufficient to make them attributable to the United States.” (Ibid., p. 
139.) See also the still-to-discuss Yunis case (see n. 104 and n. 176 and accompanying text). 
101 Note that Toscanino did not appear to request a protest, see the discussion in that case of the Court’s 
third reason to dismiss jurisdiction. See also Michell 1996, p. 403, n. 99: “Some commentators suggest 
that this requirement is difficult to find in Toscanino itself.” See finally also Shen 1994, p. 76: “[A] fair 
reading of the Toscanino case does not lead to the conclusion that the court intended to divest itself of 
jurisdiction only where the offended State had lodged a protest [emphasis in original and original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” 
102 Michell 1996, pp. 402-403. See also the still-to-discuss (see Subsection 3.1.4 of Chapter VI) ICTY 
Trial Chamber’s decision of 9 October 2002 in the Nikolić case: “The Toscanino rule therefore appears 
to apply only when (i) the abduction itself amounts to “grossly cruel and unusual barbarities” or “shock 








Although it is true that the aftermath of Toscanino can be summarised by the rule 
that, if there is no abduction by State agents accompanied by serious mistreatment, 
and no protest from the injured State (one could call this the Toscanino exception), 
the trial can go ahead, it is arguably not so that the suspect, if there were a protest 
from the injured State, would also have to prove that he was seriously mistreated 
(by State agents) during the abduction (as the presentation of these three 
requirements seem to suggest). After the third requirement, Michell refers to cases 
such as Lujan, but these cases only support the idea that, as there was no protest 
from the alleged injured State, the international law dimension did not have to be 
looked at.103 However, those cases can arguably not be used to assert that, if there 
were a protest from the injured State, the suspect would also have to prove that he 
was seriously mistreated during his abduction (by State agents).104  
                                                                                                                                              
injured State [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, 
‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-
94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 81.) 
103 See Michell 1996, p. 403, n. 99. Another case referred to by Michell is Reed, but also in that case, the 
Lujan test was applied, meaning that international law did not have to be looked at because there was no 
protest from the Bahamas (from where Reed was allegedly abducted). See US Court of Appeals, Second 
Circuit, United States v. Reed, 27 January 1981, Nos. 224, 227 and 228, Docket 80-1236, 80-1240 and 
80-1264 (639 F.2d 896), p. 902: “The Bahamian government has not sought his return or made any 
protest nor is it likely to, since Reed is an American citizen. As we pointed out in Lujan, absent protest 
or objection by the offended sovereign, Reed has no standing to raise violation of international law as an 
issue.” 
104 However, Michell (1996, p. 403) also notes that “several cases have suggested in dicta that evidence 
of a protest by a foreign state would preclude application of the Ker-Frisbie rule [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” That would mean that a protest alone would be enough to divest jurisdiction, even if the 
suspect was not seriously mistreated. He refers here to US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 22 July 1991, No. 88-5462 (939 F.2d 1341), where it was decided (see 
ibid., pp. 1342-1343): “This case presents the question whether the United States breaches its 
obligations under its extradition treaty with Mexico if it authorizes or sponsors the forcible taking of a 
Mexican national from that country without the consent of the Mexican government. We hold that it 
does. We further hold that if the Mexican government formally objects to the treaty breach and a 
defendant timely raises that breach in a pending criminal proceeding the courts of the United States may 
not exercise personal jurisdiction over that defendant, provided the Mexican government is willing to 
accept repatriation. In short, under such circumstances a district court may not subject the defendant to 
trial, and a conviction obtained must be vacated.” See also ibid., pp. 1346 (“[N]umerous cases have 
suggested that were the government of the country from which an individual was kidnapped to lodge a 
formal protest with the United States, that protest might defeat jurisdiction”) and 1349: “[T]he (...) view 
of Ker does not apply to cases in which the government of the nation from which a defendant has been 
kidnapped protests the kidnapping [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See finally also the still-to-discuss 
Yunis case for a presentation of the Toscanino threshold not mentioning the third requirement: 
“Although most circuits have acknowledged the exception carved out by Toscanino, it is highly 
significant that no court has ever applied it to dismiss an indictment. They have uniformly treated 
Toscanino as a very narrow exception to Ker-Frisbie. (...) Two distinct grounds have been relied upon in 
refusing to dismiss an indictment under the Toscanino exception: either courts conclude that the 
torturous activity did not rise to the level of outrageousness warranting dismissal, or conclude that 
United States officials were not directly involved in the torturous activity. (...) Several of the above 
cases involved serious allegations of torture and abuse. The fact that not one of the courts relied on 
Toscanino to dismiss the indictment highlights the extreme narrowness of that exception and 








Be that as it may and not looking at the international law question for now, it can 
be repeated that it is arguably strange (and, perhaps,105 also in violation of some 
reasonings in the Toscanino decision) that a suspect would have to prove that he was 
seriously mistreated during his abduction.106 It is submitted that resorting to the 
reprehensible method of abduction alone should already be enough to divest 
jurisdiction. In addition, it may also be possible that a court may want to refuse 
jurisdiction if a suspect had been seriously mistreated before being brought into the 
jurisdiction of the court, whether this serious mistreatment was committed by State 
agents or other entities. To again quote Michell (after his presentation of the three 
requirements):  
 
[T]hese later interpretations suggest incorrectly that Toscanino was primarily a 
“torture” case rather than a “forcible abduction” case. This view imposes a virtually 
insuperable evidentiary burden upon the fugitive, as he will rarely be able to advance 
conclusive evidence of torture, or to demonstrate that government agents were 
directly responsible for his abduction. More importantly, it is entirely unclear why a 
fugitive should have to demonstrate that he was tortured [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].107       
 
One can wonder how a court, on the one hand, can accept the Lujan outcome and, 
on the other hand, assert that it wishes to deter illegal governmental conduct.108 The 
outcome of Lujan might very well encourage enforcement agents not to use regular 
extradition proceedings but to use other, less burdensome/costly/complicated ways 
to bring a suspect into the jurisdiction of another State (as long as they do not 
seriously mistreat that suspect). This is arguably to be avoided as these ways still 
circumvent the normal procedures. The Court could have brought in more flexibility 
by stating that illegal pre-trial conduct would not be tolerated and be remedied via 
another route if the illegality was not so serious as to refuse jurisdiction. However, 
as stated, one can even wonder if the sole fact that US agents kidnap a person from 
abroad (even if there is no serious mistreatment of the abductee and even if there is 
no protest from the State where the arrest took place) is not already serious enough 
for a court to refuse jurisdiction. After all, the person was not brought into the 
jurisdiction of the now prosecuting State through the official channels available. 
                                                                                                                                              
District of Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, Crim. No. 87-0377 (681 F.Supp. 909), 
pp. 919-920.) 
105 See, however, n. 97. 
106 See also US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, United States v. Lovato, 14 July 1975, No. 74-3088 
(520 F.2d 1270), p. 1271: “The Lujan case makes it clear that even in the light of Toscanino, the Second 
Circuit continues to follow the Ker-Frisbie line of cases unless the person claiming that he was 
kidnapped makes a strong showing of grossly cruel and unusual barbarities inflicted upon him by 
persons who can be characterized as paid agents of the United States.” 
107 Michell 1996, p. 403. 
108 See US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 8 January 1975, 









A couple of years after the US Toscanino and Lujan cases, another common law 
Court of Appeal(s) was confronted by a male captus situation. In the 1977 New 
Zealand R v. Hartley case,109 a certain Hartley was charged with murder. In the 
context of this case, the police of New Zealand interviewed a man called Bennett 
(not to be confused with the suspect from the 1993 English case, see infra),110 whom 
they believed was an accomplice of Hartley.111 However, during the interview, the 
policemen “learned nothing from him and agreed that there was no reason why he 
should not proceed with plans he had made to leave the Auckland district with his 
wife for a short holiday.”112 After his holiday and his return to Auckland, he went to 
Melbourne, Australia, to stay with his wife’s sister and to “think things out” until his 
return to New Zealand – he claimed that he wished to recommence his work some 
two weeks after his stay in Australia.113 However, within two days of his arrival in 
Australia, he was apprehended by local Australian policemen who were instructed 
by their colleagues in New Zealand to put him aboard the first flight back to New 
Zealand.114 He was taken into custody in Wellington and interrogated at length.115 
After that, he was tried by a trial chamber and convicted for murder. Bennett 
appealed his conviction and presented the following two claims: 
 
First, that by reason of his arbitrary and unlawful detention in Australia and removal 
from that country back to New Zealand the Courts did not have, or should have 
declined, jurisdiction to accept the indictment and have him brought forward for trial. 
This was supplemented at the hearing by adopting the suggestion that, assuming there 
was jurisdiction, nevertheless the Court should have discharged the accused in the 
exercise of a discretion to prevent abuse of its own process. Second, that in any event 
the oral and written statements made by him to the police in New Zealand after his 
return should have been excluded in terms of fairness and justice either because of 
                                                          
109 Court of Appeal, R v. Hartley, 5 August 1977, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 199 (International Law Reports, 
Vol. 77 (1988), pp. 330-335). 
110 See ibid., [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 213 (International Law Reports, Vol. 77 (1988), p. 331). 
111 See Court of Appeal, R v. Hartley, 5 August 1977, International Law Reports, Vol. 77 (1988), p. 
330. 
112 Court of Appeal, R v. Hartley, 5 August 1977, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 213 (International Law Reports, 
Vol. 77 (1988), p. 331). 
113 See ibid. 
114 See ibid. See also ibid., [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 214 (International Law Reports, Vol. 77 (1988), p. 332): 
“Concerning the method and manner adopted by the police to remove him from Australia and have him 
returned to New Zealand there is evidence by a detective inspector who appears to have been in charge 
of the police inquiries. He said quite plainly that he “was instrumental in having Bennett returned to this 
country from Australia”. He said that on Tuesday 6 January he had become aware that Bennett had left 
New Zealand and was then in Melbourne; that he had telephoned the criminal investigation branch at 
Melbourne to tell officers there “of our interest in him”; and that as a result of his discussions action was 
taken by the Australian police to ensure that Bennett would be returned to New Zealand. He also said 
that after those arrangements were made he gave instructions for Bennett to be met by police officers at 
the Wellington airport.” 
115 See ibid., [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 213 (International Law Reports, Vol. 77 (1988), p. 331). For more 
information on this point, see ibid., [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 213-214 (International Law Reports, Vol. 77 








breach of the Judges’ Rules or because of the illegality in bringing him back to New 
Zealand and thus obtaining evidence; or for both reasons in combination.116   
 
The Court of Appeal, whose judgment was delivered by Judge Woodhouse, 
disapproved of the way in which Bennett was brought into the jurisdiction of New 
Zealand.  
After having explained the regular proceedings through which a person is to be 
brought from one Commonwealth country to another,117 it criticised the “illegal 
transaction”118 in this specific case, stating: 
 
[O]n the present occasion all the relevant statutory precautions were blithely 
disregarded by the police in both countries. Not a move was made to get lawful 
authority for what was contemplated. Indeed in the absence of any direct admission 
by Bennett before he had left for Melbourne it is probable that the police in New 
Zealand could not have obtained the warrant which alone could initiate any lawful 
proceedings for his extradition from Victoria. So a telephone call to Melbourne was 
used instead. And as a result the man was removed from his bed and bustled back to 
the New Zealand police on the next flight.119   
  
Notwithstanding the unlawful way in which Bennett was brought into the 
jurisdiction of the now prosecuting Court, the latter was also of the opinion that 
Bennett was lawfully arrested in New Zealand and thus that the Court had 
jurisdiction to try him, hereby referring to the already-discussed observations of 
Lord Goddard (in the Elliott case)120 and the still-to-discuss121 observations of Lord 
M’Laren (in the Sinclair case).122  
                                                          
116 Ibid., [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 214-215 (International Law Reports, Vol. 77 (1988), p. 333). 
117 See ibid., [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 214 (International Law Reports, Vol. 77 (1988), p. 332: “The lawful 
means by which a person may be extradited or delivered from one Commonwealth country to another is 
provided by the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 (UK). (As to which see now the Fugitive Offenders 
Amendment Act 1976 enacted in New Zealand on 15 July 1976.) The statute permits a rather simpler 
procedure than is usually applicable in the case of extradition to or from a foreign State; but as one 
would expect it specifically provides safeguards that are intended to give ample protection to individual 
citizens against any possible risk of arbitrary arrest or any unwarrantable interference by officials or 
others with their right to liberty and to move about freely. If for the purposes of extradition a man is to 
be lawfully arrested or detained or surrendered there must be the sanction of an endorsed or provisional 
warrant; and every step taken in the one country or the other must have the authority of processes 
recognised by the Courts”. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 See n. 46. 
121 See Subsection 3.1 (but see also n. 45 and accompanying text). 
122 See Court of Appeal, R v. Hartley, 5 August 1977, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 215 (International Law 
Reports, Vol. 77 (1988), pp. 333-334): “[W]e are of the opinion that if a person is found within New 
Zealand and is then lawfully arrested and brought before the Court it must follow, considering the 
matter merely in terms of jurisdiction, that he can certainly be tried. (…) As to the bare question of 
jurisdiction, we think that the observations of Lord Goddard and of Lord M’Laren must be accepted as 
applicable to this country. It is the presence within the territorial boundaries that is the answer to the 








Thus, this case seems to repeat the old male captus bene detentus rule.  
However, the New Zealand Court was not finished yet. It noted that Lord 
MacDonald, in the Sinclair case, had focused on alleged irregularities committed by 
foreigners, for example, when he stated that “[t]here has been no improper dealing 
with the complainer by the authorities in this country, or by their officer”.123 
Woodhouse explained: “It may be implicit in those last remarks that if there had 
been evidence of improper dealings by the authorities in Scotland then the Court 
might well have take some appropriate action in regard to the matter.”124  
One can wonder whether this is correct as it will be shown infra that Lord 
MacDonald also argued that the Court should continue to exercise jurisdiction, even 
if there was something irregular about the proceedings in Scotland.125  
Be that as it may, it is obvious that Woodhouse wanted to emphasise that in the 
Hartley case, it was clearly the New Zealand’s own Executive that had done 
something wrong and that that had to be the focus of this case.126  
After having referred, among other things, to the consideration of Lord Devlin in 
the English case Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions127 about the “inherent 
jurisdiction of the Court to prevent abuse of its own process”,128 Woodhouse stated:       
  
There are explicit statutory directions that surround the extradition procedure. (…) 
And in our opinion there can be no possible question here of the Court turning a blind 
eye to action of the New Zealand police which has deliberately ignored those 
imperative requirements of the statute. Some may say that in the present case a New 
Zealand citizen attempted to avoid a criminal responsibility by leaving the country: 
that his subsequent conviction has demonstrated the utility of the short cut adopted by 
the police to have him brought back. But this must never become an area where it will 
be sufficient to consider that the end has justified the means. The issues raised by this 
affair are basic to the whole concept of freedom in society.129  
 
                                                                                                                                              
was eventually lawfully arrested within the country and then by due process of law he was brought 
before the Court. The Court was accordingly in a position to exercise jurisdiction in respect of him.” 
123 Ibid., [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 216 (International Law Reports, Vol. 77 (1988), p. 334). See also n. 615. 
124 Ibid. 
125 See n. 616. 
126 See Court of Appeal, R v. Hartley, 5 August 1977, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 216 (International Law 
Reports, Vol. 77 (1988), p. 334: “[I]f the Courts are faced, as in this case, by a deliberate decision of one 
of the executive arms of Government to promote in a direct way the very illegality that has had a person 
returned to this country, then the question does arise as to what might be done.” See also Cowling 1992, 
p. 250 (commenting on the Hartley case): “[I]t appears that the discretion not to exercise jurisdiction 
will not apply in regard to irregularities and illegalities on the part of authorities in the surrendering state 
(...). Thus the enquiry is restricted to the actions of the receiving state”. 
127 See Court of Appeal, R v. Hartley, 5 August 1977, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 216 (International Law 
Reports, Vol. 77 (1988), p. 334: “Are the courts to rely on the Executive to protect their process from 
abuse? Have they not themselves an inescapable duty to secure fair treatment for those who come or are 
brought before them? To questions of this sort there is only one possible answer. The courts cannot 
contemplate for a moment the transference to the Executive of the responsibility for seeing that the 
process of law is not abused”. 
128 Ibid. 








It is clear that this male detentus test is much broader than, for example, the one 
accepted in the aftermath of the Toscanino case and can therefore be applauded. 
Woodhouse concluded that “if application had been made at the trial on this ground 
(…) the Judge would probably have been justified in exercising his discretion (…) 
to direct that the accused be discharged.”130  
However, as that was not the case,131 the Court proceeded to the other claim of 
Bennett (the one related to the admissibility of evidence) and finally quashed his 
conviction for that reason.132 However, because of that, it is not sure whether the 
Court of Appeal would also have nullified the conviction on the discretionary 
ground alone.133  
Nine years after this case, New Zealand’s neighbouring State Australia was 
confronted by the male captus case Levinge v Director of Custodial Services, 
Department of Corrective Services.134  
In this case, Walter Alexander Levinge, who was facing “a large number of 
charges for crimes of dishonesty”135 in Australia, was apprehended in Mexico by 
Mexican officers, deported to the US, where he was arrested by FBI agents, and 
from there extradited to Australia.136 Although Levinge also claimed that his 
extradition from the US to Australia was unlawful,137 his main argument focused on 
the role of the Australian officials in his unlawful removal from Mexico to the US. 
He argued that “the relevant Australian authorities were aware of, connived in and at 
the very least took the fruits of”138 the illegal operation in Mexico, during which he 
was also submitted to “extreme physical and mental trauma”.139 As a result of this, 
he 
 
                                                          
130 Ibid., [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 217 (International Law Reports, Vol. 77 (1988), p. 335). 
131 See ibid. 
132 See ibid. 
133 See ibid. In that respect, the following views of the ICTY Trial Chamber in Nikolić (“The Court used 
its discretionary power to stay the case as it considered the conduct of the police to be an abuse of 
power”, ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
88) and the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Barayagwiza (“In R. v. Hartley, the Wellington Court of Appeal 
relied on the abuse of process doctrine in quashing a conviction that rested on an unlawful arrest and the 
illegally obtained confession that followed [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].”, 
ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, 3 November 1999, 
para. 75) are incorrect. Who is correct, however, is Schabas (2000, p. 567), when he writes in his 
commentary to the Barayagwiza case that “contrary to what the appeals chamber contends, a conviction 
was not quashed based on abuse of process. Although the Court of Appeal of Wellington was harsh in 
its criticism of an illegal rendition, the court explicitly refrained from ordering a stay for abuse of 
process, and overturned the conviction because of an illegally obtained confession [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” 
134 New South Wales Court of Appeal, Levinge v Director of Custodial Services, Department of 
Corrective Services, 23 July 1987, 89 FLR 133.  
135 Ibid., p. 134. 
136 See ibid., p. 133. 
137 See ibid., p. 134. 
138 Ibid., p. 138. 








sought an order from the Court (…) that he be immediately released from custody and 
permitted to leave the jurisdiction. Alternatively, he sought an order prohibiting the 
continuance of the proceedings against him on the ground that they were an abuse of 
process of the Court.140 
 
President Kirby of the New South Wales Court of Appeal first examined the two 
versions of exactly what had happened in Mexico (besides the uncontested facts)141 
and concluded that he did not believe Levinge’s “inherently improbable”142 
account.143 With respect to the alleged Australian involvement in the operation, 
Kirby noted that, although it was likely that the Australian inspector in charge of 
returning Levinge to Australia (Detective Chief Inspector Adams) “would have been 
in the closest contact”144 with the FBI agents, a cablegram from the US to Australia 
on which Levinge relied145 in no way showed that Australian officials knew of the 
                                                          
140 Ibid., p. 134. 
141 See ibid., p. 135: “This much appears clear. The appellant was resident in Mexico on 25 January 
1985. At about 11.00 am on that day he was taken into custody by Mexican police. Soon thereafter three 
persons identified as FBI agents, one of whom was Mr W [Lamar], arrived at the police station in 
Mexico where the appellant was being held. Thereafter the appellant was taken in one car driven by the 
Mexican officers, the FBI agents following in another car. It seems that the border was a very short 
distance from the police station. At the border, the appellant was handed over to the custody of the FBI 
agents.” 
142 Ibid., p. 137. 
143 See for the account of FBI agent Lamar ibid., p. 136: “Mr Lamar’s declaration asserted that the 
Mexican State judicial police had advised him that they were going to take the appellant and his 
daughter to the international border crossing at San Ysidro, California “and deport him from Mexico as 
an undesirable citizen” (sic). Mr Lamar denied that any instructions or directions were given by himself 
or other FBI agents to Mexican police. He stated that he and other United States federal agents had 
simply followed the car carrying the Mexican police, the appellant and his daughter, in a separate 
vehicle. He concluded: “[At no stage] during the period when Levinge was subject to observation by 
United States Federal agents while in Mexican custody, was there any indication of mistreatment by 
Mexican authorities. Furthermore, no United States Federal agent spoke with Levinge during this 
period. Special agents of the FBI neither directed nor ordered the Mexican officials to conduct any type 
of activity. The actions of the Mexican police, including Levinge’s deportation, were initiated by them 
with United States involvement.”” See for the account of Levinge himself, ibid., p. 137: “The appellant 
claimed that, following his arrest, he was denied contact with a legal representative. He stated that his 
amparo known as a “writ of protection” (apparently an internal passport) was torn up by the Mexican 
Chief of Police. (...) He also stated that he observed Mr Lamar go to the boot of the FBI car. From it he 
saw him take an attach[é] case which he opened and passed to a named Mexican official a sum of 
money claimed to be $40,000 United States currency. Immediately thereafter the appellant stated that he 
was taken to his car, again denied access to lawyers, submitted to “extreme physical and mental trauma” 
and delivered across the United States border against his will. He stated that he was refused inspection 
of any warrant and specifically refused extradition procedure under Mexican law or the protection of the 
Mexican Constitution whose protection he claimed by reference to his amparo.” 
144 Ibid., p. 139. 
145 See ibid., p. 137: “Most important is a cable apparently issued from Los Angeles on 21 [this should 
probably be 25, see n. 146 (“cable, sent on the very day of the appellant’s arrest”) and n. 141 (which 
clarifies that the arrest was on 25 January 1985), ChP] January 1985 and directed for action to the 
federal police in Australia. The relevant parts of this cable read: “Further to refcable of 23 January 1985 
Detective Inspector Adams met with case officers handling the inquiry into the whereabouts of Levinge 
... at the San Diego office of the FBI. It has now been established that Levinge is identical with the 








operation itself.146 Kirby admitted that this did not dismiss the fact that the removal 
of Levinge from Mexico to the US was in contravention of the regular extradition 
procedures147 but this was only interesting for the question as to whether the arrest 
and detention of Levinge in the US was lawful. As the courts in the US, now that the 
Toscanino exception did not apply (in that there was no abduction by State agents 
accompanied by serious mistreatment, and no protest from the ‘injured’ State),148 
could rely on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine (and as it was not up to the Australian courts 
to review whether the US courts were in fact justified to do so),149 this problem was 
now taken care of. Nevertheless, what happened in Mexico and the US was not 
totally irrelevant in the courts of Australia either.150 As a result, Kirby examined 
more generally whether an irregularity in the process of bringing a suspect to court 
had any impact on the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. After a review of case law 
from common law countries other than the US,151 showing both views of how to 
react to an irregularity in the process of bringing a suspect to justice,152 Kirby 
concluded:    
                                                                                                                                              
difficulties on the question of extradition, however it is considered probable by the FBI agents that he 
commutes regularly across the Mexican border through Tijuana into San Diego where he is known to 
have a number of associates and therefore a decision has been taken at this time to allow inquiries to 
proceed along the present lines of attempting to secure their [his] arrest in the United States.”” (Ibid.) 
146 See ibid., p. 139: “So far as the cable is concerned, it will be remembered that it simply indicated that 
the FBI had reported that the appellant crossed the border into the United States from time to time so 
that the decision was made to secure his arrest at some time when he was in the United States. Nothing 
in the terms of the cable, sent on the very day of the appellant’s arrest, indicates that the dramatic 
delivery of the appellant was imminent. On the contrary, the cable is entirely consistent with a decision 
by Detective Chief Inspector Adams to wait patiently until the appellant came across the Mexican 
border into the United States. As this could be anticipated from time to time, because of the clear 
connections the appellant had with the United States, why would the Australian authorities promote, 
participate in or condone the telescoping of the procedures which were readily available?” 
147 See ibid., p. 139. 
148 See the discussion of the aftermath of the Toscanino case.  
149 See New South Wales Court of Appeal, Levinge v Director of Custodial Services, Department of 
Corrective Services, 23 July 1987, 89 FLR 140: “It would be absurd for this Court to decide that, 
notwithstanding the considered judgment of the United States appellate judges, who have so much 
closer knowledge and understanding of the relevant United States law, that the appellant had been 
denied due process of law in the United States, anterior to his extradition here. That is not a question 
with which we are legitimately concerned. Our only concern is whether relief will be granted in this 
Court according to the law applicable in this jurisdiction. It is true that what has occurred in Mexico and 
the United States forms the factual background against which the application of our law will be 
considered. But it is erroneous to suggest that we have some function to reconsider the reasoned 
conclusions of the United States courts in the application of their law. No reason being shown as to why 
we should do so, we should not tread that uncertain path. For it leads to no relevant destination.” See 
also n. 9 and accompanying text. 
150 See the previous footnote: “It is true that what has occurred in Mexico and the United States forms 
the factual background against which the application of our law will be considered.” See also n. 10 and 
accompanying text. 
151 See New South Wales Court of Appeal, Levinge v Director of Custodial Services, Department of 
Corrective Services, 23 July 1987, 89 FLR 140-143. 
152 See ibid., pp. 140-141: “Some such decisions suggest that, once a person is within the jurisdiction, a 
court should not be troubled to examine how he came there; but should proceed to the substance of the 








Where a person, however unlawfully, is brought into the jurisdiction and is before a 
court in this State, that court has undoubted jurisdiction to deal with him or her. But it 
also has a discretion not to do so, where to exercise its discretion would involve an 
abuse of the court’s process. Such an abuse may arise by reason of delay on the part 
of prosecuting authorities. But delay is only one variety of unfair or wrongful conduct 
on the part of those authorities. Other such conduct may exist, including wrongful and 
even unlawful involvement in bypassing the regular machinery for extradition and 
participating in unauthorised and unlawful removal of criminal suspects from one 
jurisdiction to another.153 
 
Kirby, also explaining the two possible rationales behind this abuse of process 
doctrine,154 decided that in this particular instance, the judge first dealing with 
Levinge’s arguments was justified in having decided not to refuse jurisdiction.155 
Nevertheless, it is clear that his male detentus test is much broader than the one 
accepted in the aftermath of the Toscanino case. 
Kirby’s colleagues, Judge of Appeal McHugh156 and Acting Judge of Appeal 
McLelland,157 also dismissed the appeal. Interestingly, McHugh, in his examination 
                                                                                                                                              
law jurisdictions which suggests that courts will assume the obligation, when asked, to scrutinise the 
circumstances by which a person was brought into the jurisdiction and, where appropriate, offer relief if 
it is shown that the means used to get him there were unlawful or otherwise wrongful.” 
153 Ibid., p. 142.  
154 See ibid., pp. 142-143: “It still remains to be determined whether the conceptual basis of the relief 
(...) is to prevent prosecuting authorities from taking or securing advantage from their own misconduct 
or that of their servants or agents or is to assert the entitlement of the courts to protect the integrity of 
their own process and to uphold that integrity and the perception of it in the eyes of the parties, of the 
community and of the judges themselves. The first view has, as its conceptual basis, a principle akin to 
estoppel. The second view is grounded more fundamentally in a conception of the necessary purity of 
the “temples of justice” and the undesirability that the administration of justice itself should become 
contaminated by involvement (or the perception of involvement) in unlawful or wrongful activities on 
the part of the authorities (...). Most of the case law appears to be expressed in terms of the former 
justification. For my own part, I incline towards a preference for the latter. Perhaps the two concepts are 
simply dual aspects of the one consideration. However that may be, it is not necessary to resolve that 
controversy in this case.”  
155 See ibid., p. 143: “It is sufficient to dispose of the appeal by saying that, whilst the Court has 
jurisdiction over the appellant and may provide him with relief of the kind he has sought, no proper 
basis has been shown to indicate that Smart J erred in declining to exercise that relief in this case. Upon 
the same facts I would reach the same conclusion as his Honour did.” 
156 Who also stressed the fact that the prosecuting authorities had to be, in some way or another, 
involved in the alleged male captus, see ibid., p. 151: “[T]he Court has the power in an appropriate case 
to stay proceedings on the ground that the accused has been brought unlawfully into the jurisdiction. 
However, before a stay can be granted the prosecution must have been either a party to the unlawful 
conduct or connived at it.” See also ibid.: “In the present case there is no evidence that the Australian 
police were involved in or connived at the expulsion of the plaintiff from Mexico. His Honour found 
that, shortly after the plaintiff’s arrest in the United States, the Australian police officers became aware 
of the fact that he had been expelled from Mexico as a consequence of the FBI informing Mexican 
officials that he was wanted in the United States for extradition to Australia. But there is no evidence 
that before his arrest by the FBI the Australian officers knew that the expulsion of the plaintiff from the 
United States was the result of the payment of bribes by FBI officers or that his expulsion was 
unlawful.” (See also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence 
Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 








of the case, looked at the role of the seriousness of the charges in the context of the 
abuse of process doctrine. He hereby made a distinction between cases in which 
delay had prejudiced the fairness of the trial itself and irregularities not necessarily 
prejudicing the fairness of the trial (strictly viewed).  
 
[I]n the “delay” cases there is not in my opinion any question of weighing up 
competing aspects of the public interest. If by reason of the conduct of the 
prosecution or complainant the fair trial of the defendant is prejudiced by delay to the 
extent that it constitutes an abuse of the process of the court, it is irrelevant that there 
is a strong case against the accused or that he is the subject of a serious charge or 
complaint. However, in the case of a “forcible abduction” there is no unfairness in the 
trial itself. So it is necessary to balance the public interest in preventing the unlawful 
conduct against the public interest in having the charge or complaint determined. This 
is not to say that the end can justify the means and that the more serious the charge 
the greater is the scope for the prosecution to engage in unlawful conduct. But 
conduct which might be regarded as constituting an abuse of process in respect of a 
comparatively minor charge may not have the same character in respect of a serious 
matter.158 
 
One can indeed agree with this reasoning. In principle, the abuse of process doctrine 
is a discretionary remedy, meaning that the judges can take every element of the 
case into account (including the seriousness of the alleged crimes) when deciding 
whether or not jurisdiction should be refused.159 However, this discretion is relative 
in certain cases. For example, when it is clear that the suspect can no longer receive 
a fair trial in the strict sense of the word (this is the first situation as explained in 
Subsection 4.3 of Chapter III), a judge should refuse jurisdiction, whether the person 
tried is charged with very serious crimes or not. After all, a trial which is not fair is 
                                                                                                                                              
process by the executive or to protect the integrity of the court processes. This, however, according to 
the Court, should be done only where the executive had been a direct or indirect party to the unlawful 
conduct. As an involvement of the Australian executive could not be identified, the Court decided not to 
stay the proceedings against him.”)  
157 Who, like his colleagues, also emphasised the importance of the involvement of the prosecuting 
authorities in the male captus, see New South Wales Court of Appeal, Levinge v Director of Custodial 
Services, Department of Corrective Services, 23 July 1987, 89 FLR 153: “It is impossible to conclude 
from the evidence in this case that any New South Wales or Federal police officer was involved in any 
illegality or irregularity which may have occurred in the means by which the appellant was taken from 
Mexico to the United States. In these circumstances there is in my opinion no factual basis for the 
invocation of the proposition for which R v Hartley; R v Bow Street Magistrates; Ex parte Mackeson 
and R v Guildford Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte Healy are relied on, to the effect that improper activities 
on the part of the prosecuting authorities in procuring an alleged offender to be brought within the 
jurisdiction to answer criminal charges could be the basis of a finding that continuation of the 
prosecution is an abuse of process.” 
158 Ibid., p. 151. 
159 This is in principle different for the context of the habeas corpus human rights provisions – 
applicable to anyone – which dictate the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention. 
However, it was explained in Subsection 4.4 of Chapter III that this remedy is problematic and that 
because of that, it would be better if the judge avoids it and simply grants the most appropriate remedy, 








not a proper trial and only proper trials can be held in a society based on law. 
However, there is more room to weigh the seriousness of the alleged crimes in the 
second situation (see again Subsection 4.3 of Chapter III), the situation in which this 
book is mostly interested. If a suspect is the victim of a male captus situation, this 
fact does normally not affect the fairness of the trial in the strict sense (in court). 
After all, the male captus only has to do with how that suspect arrived in the court, 
not with the proceedings in the courtroom themselves. As a result, the judges must 
determine, taking all the elements of the case into account (including the seriousness 
of the alleged crimes), whether it would undermine the court’s integrity/the judges’ 
sense of justice/the concept of a fair trial broadly perceived to continue the case 
notwithstanding that male captus. Nevertheless, also here, the abuse of process 
doctrine can be relative. This is because it can be argued that if the prosecuting 
forum’s own authorities are involved in a serious male captus, such as an abduction, 
the judges should refuse jurisdiction, even if the suspect is charged with serious 
crimes and even if the fairness of his trial in the courtroom is not jeopardised by this 
abduction. This argument will be returned to infra.    
A male captus situation that has not so far been mentioned very often in this 
overview is the method of luring. The Yunis case,160 decided by the US District 
Court in the District of Columbia one year after Levinge, is an interesting example 
of (the position of a US court towards) this technique. In Subsection 1.4 of Chapter 
III, the luring operation of Yunis was briefly addressed, but it will be repeated here 
as an introduction to the more substantive issues of the case. 
In Yunis, the US Government sought to arrest and bring to justice the leader of a 
group of men who hijacked and later blew up a Jordanian aircraft in Beirut.161 After 
months of investigation, the US identified Lebanese citizen Fawaz Yunis as the 
leader of this group.162 It was with help of a former friend of Yunis and now US 
informant, Jamal Hamdan, that this identification was made possible.163 A detailed 
plan was made to lure Yunis, under the promise of a lucrative narcotics deal, from 
Lebanon to a location in international waters off the coast of Cyprus.164 On 13 
September 1987, the FBI-led operation ‘Goldenrod’ began: that morning, Hamdan 
and Yunis boarded a small motor boat off the coast of Cyprus which brought the 
men to a motor yacht anchored in international waters.165  
 
Immediately upon boarding the yacht, defendant was greeted, given a routine pat 
down and then offered a beer by one of the FBI agents. S.A. [Special Agent, ChP] 
George Gast, who assumed the role of one of the narcotic contacts, escorted Yunis to 
the stern of the boat where he and Yunis joined S.A. Donald Glasser. At a 
prearranged signal – a slight nod – the two agents, who were then positioned 
                                                          
160 US District Court, District of Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, Crim. No. 87-
0377 (681 F.Supp. 909). 
161 See ibid., p. 912. 
162 See ibid. 
163 See ibid. 
164 See ibid. 








alongside Yunis, engaged in a “take down”. Together, they grasped the defendant’s 
arms, “kick[ed] his feet out from underneath him, and [took] him down to the deck 
and put handcuffs on him [original footnote omitted, ChP].”166   
 
This ‘taking down’ caused fractures to Yunis’ wrists.167 Yunis’ counsel argued, 
among other things, that the indictment against Yunis, who was charged with 
hostage taking and aircraft piracy,168 had to be dismissed on two grounds: “first, the 
government’s actions contravened its extradition treaty obligations with Lebanon 
and Cyprus, and second, the government used excessive and outrageous force when 
arresting defendant in violation of his fifth amendment rights to due process.”169 The 
Court held that individuals alone are not empowered to enforce extradition treaties 
(neither Lebanon nor Cyprus objected to the operation).170 As a result, the issue of 
the possible extradition treaty violations did not have to be looked at.171 With 
respect to Yunis’ claims regarding his fifth amendment rights, the Court concluded 
that the Constitution indeed does apply abroad to aliens. However, it then examined, 
among other things, the (now probably well-known) Ker-Frisbie doctrine and the 
serious mistreatment exception of Toscanino.172 In doing so, it gave some very 
interesting examples of cases where this exception had not been applied.173 From 
                                                          
166 Ibid., p. 913.  
167 See ibid., p. 913. 
168 See ibid., p. 911. 
169 Ibid., p. 915. 
170 See ibid., p. 916. 
171 See ibid., p. 915. It must be noted that if Lebanon and Cyprus had objected to the operation, this 
would not necessarily have led to a refusal of jurisdiction (as is arguably the only appropriate form of 
reparation in the case of an abduction followed by a protest and request for the return of the abducted 
suspect). Although the sovereignty of Lebanon might indeed have been violated by this luring operation, 
it was stated in Chapter III that a luring operation is normally viewed as a less serious violation of 
international law than, for example, an abduction. This may also have its effect on the exact form of 
reparation. 
172 The Court hereby noted that “[a]lthough most circuits have acknowledged the exception carved out 
by Toscanino, it is highly significant that no court has ever applied it to dismiss an indictment [emphasis 
in original, ChP].” (Ibid., p. 919.) (See also n. 104.) 
173 See ibid., p. 919: “U.S. v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 
107 S.Ct. 1377, 94 L.Ed.2d 692 (1987) (defendant abducted from Bahamas on narcotic charges, the 
court declined to adopt the Toscanino exception but even if applicable, found no evidence of conduct 
which shocked the conscience); U.S. v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 
1004, 105 S.Ct. 2322, 2323, 85 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (Honduran citizen abducted from Honduras, driven 
at gunpoint to airport, and forced on plane for trial in United States; court held that defendant had not 
“alleged the sort of cruel, inhuman and outrageous treatment” to warrant dismissal); U.S. v. Reed, 639 
F.2d 896 (2d Cir.1981) (Bahamian defendant, residing in the Bahamas, deceitfully enticed by CIA 
agents to board a plane bound for Bimini; agents placed cocked gun at his head and forced him to lie on 
aircraft floor for the duration of the flight and then twisted his arm as he exited plane; court found that 
use of revolver and threatening language not “gross mistreatment” warranting dismissal) [this case was 
already briefly mentioned earlier, see n. 103, ChP]; U.S. v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.1981) 
(defendants arrested, abducted in Venezuela to face drug charges in Puerto Rico. In refusing to dismiss 
the indictment, the court concluded that although defendants were subjected to poor treatment, insulted 
and slapped when abducted and while in jail were poorly fed and forced to sleep on the floor, those 








these cases, one can conclude that what is apparently needed before the indictment 
can be dismissed is actual torture, in other words severe mistreatment intentionally 
inflicted upon the person. ‘Normal’ abductions in which, for example, the suspect is 
poorly treated or slapped are not serious enough to dismiss the indictment. Luring 
cases as such, in which no violence but only tricks are used to bring a suspect from 
one jurisdiction to another, are even less troublesome.174 Nevertheless, Yunis also 
appears to show that if a luring case were accompanied by Toscanino-like serious 
mistreatment, a court may also refuse jurisdiction. In that respect, even though this 
exception, because of the facts of the Toscanino case, was linked in the previous 
pages with the male captus situation abduction, it could be argued that other male 
captus situations (such as luring and disguised extradition), accompanied by serious, 
Toscanino-like mistreatment, may also lead to the ending of the case.175 This can 
also be derived from the following, rather generally formulated, test in Yunis: 
 
Two distinct grounds have been relied upon in refusing to dismiss an indictment 
under the Toscanino exception: either courts conclude that the torturous activity did 
not rise to the level of outrageousness warranting dismissal, or conclude that United 
States officials were not directly involved in the torturous activity.176  
 
In the end, the Court concluded that the arrest of Yunis did not warrant the dismissal 
of the case:  
 
In this action, there is no dispute that United States law enforcement officers were 
fully involved in the planning and execution of defendant’s arrest. However, 
defendant has failed either to allege or to show any actions committed by these 
officers that meet the standard of outrageousness established by Toscanino and its 
progeny requiring this Court to divest itself of jurisdiction. The record in this 
proceeding has been reviewed with care and the Court fails to find the type of cruel, 
inhumane and outrageous conduct that would warrant dismissal under Toscanino.177 
 
                                                          
174 See ibid., p. 920: “In cases where defendants have urged the court to dismiss the indictment solely on 
the grounds that they were fraudulently lured to the United States, courts have uniformly upheld 
jurisdiction.” 
175 The other Toscanino exception (violation of State sovereignty followed by a protest and request for 
the return of the suspect) will probably not so easily lead to a male detentus. This is because a disguised 
extradition cannot lead to a violation of the sovereignty of the State of residence and because a luring 
operation, even if it can (it was argued in Chapter III that this might be possible under certain 
circumstances), is often seen as a less serious violation of international law, which may also have its 
effect on the exact form of reparation. 
176 US District Court, District of Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, Crim. No. 87-
0377 (681 F.Supp. 909), p. 919. The Court also explained the reason behind the latter requirement, see 
ibid., p. 920: “The purpose underlying the Toscanino rule is to deter police misconduct by barring the 
government from using the fruits of its deliberate lawlessness. When the United States is not involved in 
the torturous activity, no purpose would be served by dismissing the indictment.” See also ns. 100 and 
104. 








The Court hereby noted that the fact that Yunis’ arrest may have involved too much 
force, that Yunis may not have received the best or even adequate medical attention 
for his broken wrists and that the way in which Yunis was transported to the US was 
in extreme confinement did not change that conclusion.178 Notwithstanding this, the 
Court concluded that the operation had been executed in a far from perfect manner. 
It concluded that “the FBI failed to comply fully with constitutional restraints and 
precedential Supreme Court decisions.”179 As a result of this, Yunis’ confession 
made after his arrest had to be suppressed.180  
The most important male captus case in the US181 came four years later, when 
the US Supreme Court decided the (in)famous Alvarez-Machain case.182 In this 
case, the respondent, a Mexican citizen called Humberto Alvarez-Machain, was 
indicted 
 
for participating in the kidnap and murder of United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) special agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar and a Mexican pilot 
working with Camarena, Alfredo Zavala-Avelar. The DEA believes that the 
respondent, a medical doctor, participated in the murder by prolonging Agent 
Camarena’s life so that others could further torture and interrogate him [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].183 
 
                                                          
178 See ibid., pp. 920-921: “That is not to say that the Court accepts the government’s representations in 
its December 1, 1987 response to defendant’s pretrial motion that Yunis “was treated with the greatest 
care and with due deference to whatever personal requests he made during the voyage from the 
Mediterranean to the United States.” Even the government has admitted that “there may well have been 
in hindsight too much force brought upon Mr. Yunis’ wrists” when he was forced down and thrown to 
the deck during the course of his arrest. (…) Indeed, the two agents immediately involved believed that 
the amount of force and method used in effectuating the arrest were necessary to ensure that the 
defendant did not attempt to jump overboard. Similarly, although the defendant may not have been 
given the best or even adequate medical care, the treatment provided was not so poor as to be “cruel and 
inhumane.” (…) Finally, even if the procedure employed in transporting the defendant by airplane from 
the Saratoga [this is the carrier from which Yunis was flown to the US, ChP] to the United States was 
extremely confining, it did not rise to the level of outrageousness that shocks the conscience. S.A. David 
Johnson, who was primarily responsible for the hostage rescue team, testified that it was necessary to 
tranquilize the defendant and place him in the Stokes litter [See ibid., p. 912, n. 4: “A Stokes litter is 
commonly used by the Navy to carry injured personnel. Occupants are strapped into the litter and 
immobilized in a prone position.”, ChP.] due to the size of the plane and the need to protect the aircraft 
and the personnel on board. (…) Even if the Court were to accept each and every allegation of 
excessiveness made by the defendant, taken together, they simply do not rise to the deliberate torture 
and abuse alleged in Toscanino.” 
179 Ibid., p. 929. 
180 See ibid.  
181 See also Michell (1996, p. 404), who called it “the leading U.S. case on forcible abduction by 
government agents”. See also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on 
Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 
October 2002, para. 82 (referring to Michell). 
182 US Supreme Court, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 15 June 1992, No. 91-712 (504 US 655). 








On 2 April 1990, Alvarez-Machain was abducted from Mexico by six armed men184 
and, after being held in a motel for one night, flown to El Paso, Texas, where he was 
arrested by DEA officials.185 Although the latter were not involved in the actual 
kidnapping, the District Court concluded that they were nevertheless responsible for 
it.186 Mexico protested the violation of its sovereignty and demanded that Alvarez-
Machain be returned to Mexico.187 This element was not present in the Lujan case. 
As a result, it is interesting to see how the Court coped with this international law 
issue and how it might affect the US male captus discussion.  
Alvarez-Machain himself argued that his indictment had to be dismissed, 
claiming that the abduction constituted outrageous governmental conduct and that 
the District Court had no jurisdiction to try him because the abduction was a 
violation of the extradition treaty between the US and Mexico.188  
Although Alvarez-Machain’s former point was rejected by the District Court, the 
latter was accepted.189 Hence, the Court discharged Alvarez-Machain and ordered 
his repatriation to Mexico.190  
The Court of Appeals concurred with this reasoning, hereby relying on its 
decision in the already briefly mentioned (see footnote 104) case United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez.191 This is arguably the proper interpretation of the Lujan case: 
even though Alvarez-Machain was not seriously mistreated during his abduction, 
the exercise of jurisdiction could still be refused because of a violation of 
international law. 
                                                          
184 One of these was a man called Sosa, a former Mexican policeman who was hired by the DEA. (The 
name Sosa can be found back in the civil suit filed by Alvarez-Machain after the criminal case, see 
infra). 
185 See US Supreme Court, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 15 June 1992, No. 91-712 (504 US 655), 
p. 657. 
186 See ibid. 
187 See ibid., pp. 670-671: “Mexico has formally demanded on at least two separate occasions that he be 
returned to Mexico, and has represented that he will be prosecuted and, if convicted, punished for his 
offense [original footnote omitted, ChP].” In addition, Mexico requested the extradition of two of 
Alvarez-Machain’s alleged kidnappers, see ibid., p. 669, n. 16. 
188 See ibid., p. 658. 
189 See ibid. 
190 See ibid. 
191 See ibid. See also ibid., pp. 658-659 for information on the Verdugo case: “United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (CA9 1991), cert. pending, No. 91-670. 946 F.2d 1466 (1991). In Verdugo, the 
Court of Appeals held that the forcible abduction of a Mexican national [who was also indicted for the 
murder of Camarena, see US Supreme Court, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 15 June 1992, No. 91-
712 (504 US 655), p. 658, n. 3, ChP] with the authorization or participation of the United States violated 
the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico. Although the Treaty does not expressly 
prohibit such abductions, the Court of Appeals held that the “purpose” of the Treaty was violated by a 
forcible abduction, 939 F.2d, at 1350, which, along with a formal protest by the offended nation, would 
give a defendant the right to invoke the Treaty violation to defeat jurisdiction of the District Court to try 
him. The Court of Appeals further held that the proper remedy for such a violation would be dismissal 








Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivering the “surprisingly curt judgment”192 of the 
majority of the Supreme Court Justices, discussed, among other things, the Ker 
case193 and noted that  
 
[t]he only differences between Ker and the present case are that Ker was decided on 
the premise that there was no governmental involvement in the abduction (…) and 
Peru, from which Ker was abducted, did not object to his prosecution [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].194   
 
Rehnquist observed that Alvarez-Machain (like the Court of Appeals in the case 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez) found these differences dispositive as they 
showed that his prosecution violated the implied terms of a valid extradition 
treaty.195  
Hence, Rehnquist continued,  
 
our first inquiry must be whether the abduction of respondent from Mexico violated 
the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico. If we conclude that the 
Treaty does not prohibit respondent’s abduction, the rule in Ker applies, and the court 
need not inquire as to how respondent came before it.196 
 
This appears to contradict earlier cases discussed, for if the Supreme Court were not 
to find the abduction to constitute a violation of the extradition treaty (which would 
arguably be very strange), one could still assert that the Court would have to 
examine whether the abduction violated (customary) international law (namely 
through the violation of the sovereignty of Mexico) and if not, that it would still 
have to determine whether Alvarez-Machain was the victim of serious mistreatment 
during his abduction, see Lujan. (The fact that the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals did not believe that Alvarez-Machain was the victim of outrageous 
governmental conduct does not mean that the Supreme Court could not have a 
different opinion on this.)197    
Be that as it may, Rehnquist first noted that: 1) “[t]he Treaty says nothing about 
the obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions 
of people from the territory of the other nation, or the consequences under the 
                                                          
192 Rayfuse 1993, p. 886. 
193 See US Supreme Court, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 15 June 1992, No. 91-712 (504 US 655), 
pp. 660-661. 
194 Ibid., p. 662. 
195 See ibid.  
196 Ibid. 
197 With respect to the alleged physical abuse of Alvarez-Machain, see, for example, Aceves 1996, pp. 
107-108: “During his capture and detention, Alvarez was physically and verbally abused. Alvarez 
testified that he was “shocked six or seven times through the soles of his shoes with ‘an electric shock 
apparatus’” and “injected twice with a substance that made him feel ‘light-headed and dizzy’” [original 








Treaty if such an abduction occurs”;198 2) the mechanism in the extradition treaty 
“does not purport to specify the only way in which one country may gain custody of 
a national of the other country for the purposes of prosecution”199 and 3) “[t]he 
history of negotiation and practice under the Treaty also fails to show that 
abductions outside of the Treaty constitute a violation of the Treaty.”200  
He then turned to the question of “whether the Treaty should be interpreted so as 
to include an implied term prohibiting prosecution where the defendant’s presence is 
obtained by means other than those established by the Treaty”201 and examined the 
argument of Alvarez-Machain “that the Treaty must be interpreted against the 
backdrop of customary international law, and that international abductions are “so 
clearly prohibited in international law” that there was no reason to include such a 
clause in the Treaty itself.”202     
Although this seems obvious, the majority of the Court, amazingly, did not 
agree: 
 
[T]o imply from the terms of this Treaty that it prohibits obtaining the presence of an 
individual by means outside of the procedures the Treaty establishes requires a much 
larger inferential leap, with only the most general of international law principles to 
support it. The general principles cited by respondent simply fail to persuade us that 
we should imply in the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty a term prohibiting 
international abductions.203  
 
Thus, even though the judges focused on the treaty, they also indirectly looked at 
international law more generally, namely to find out whether it was so strong on this 
particular topic that it had to be read into the treaty. That was not the case, although 
that did not mean that international law was not violated at all. That could very well 
have been the case:  
 
Respondent and his amici may be correct that respondent’s abduction was 
“shocking,” (...), and that it may be in violation of general international law 
principles. Mexico has protested the abduction of respondent through diplomatic 
notes (...), and the decision of whether respondent should be returned to Mexico, as a 
matter outside of the Treaty, is a matter for the Executive Branch. We conclude, 
however, that respondent’s abduction was not in violation of the Extradition Treaty 
between the United States and Mexico, and therefore the rule of Ker v. Illinois is fully 
applicable to this case. The fact of respondent’s forcible abduction does not therefore 
prohibit his trial in a court in the United States for violations of the criminal laws of 
the United States [original footnote omitted, ChP].204  
                                                          
198 US Supreme Court, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 15 June 1992, No. 91-712 (504 US 655), p. 
663. 
199 Ibid., p. 664. 
200 Ibid., p. 665. 
201 Ibid., p. 666. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid., p. 669. 








Hence, because the abduction did not violate the extradition treaty, the Supreme 
Court did not find it necessary to look further into the international law dimension. 
It held that the violation of international law, if there was any – this is, of course, 
obvious, given the fact that Mexico did not consent to the abduction for which the 
US was responsible – had to be solved at the political level. Furthermore, the other 
element of the Toscanino exception prima facie did not appear relevant at all. After 
all, the Court issued a male captus bene detentus decision while holding that 
“[r]espondent and his amici may be correct that respondent’s abduction was 
“shocking””. This is also the reason why some commentators believe that Alvarez-
Machain effectively quashed the Toscanino exception.205 If this is indeed true 
(which, however, can be seriously doubted),206 then this would be very alarming for 
                                                          
205 See, for example, Rayfuse 1993, p. 893 (focusing on the mistreatment element): “[T]he Supreme 
Court ruled in Machain that regardless of the “shocking” nature of the government’s acts, Machain was 
subject to the jurisdiction of the US courts and any relief to be afforded was at the discretion of the 
executive branch only. The “shocking and outrageous” exception thus appears to have been put to rest 
by the Supreme Court, once and for all.” See also ibid., p. 896. See also Sheely 2003, p. 439: “The 
Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain reaffirmed the application of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to an 
abduction that was, arguably, both “shocking” and in violation of international law, seemingly 
disavowing the “Toscanino Exception.” Later, in United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit commented upon both the applicability of the Ker-Frisbie 
doctrine to cases in which the manner a defendant is brought before the court is questioned and upon the 
very limited holding and questionable precedential value of Toscanino. In Matta-Ballesteros, a 
Honduran national was kidnapped from his home [by the ‘Cobras’ (Honduran special troops) and US 
Marshals, see US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 1 December 
1995, No. 91-50336 (71 F.3d 754), p. 761, ChP] and flown to Illinois where he was subsequently tried 
and convicted on narcotic charges. One of Matta-Ballesteros’ challenges to his conviction was that his 
abduction was “shocking,” invoking the “Toscanino Exception.” [“Matta-Ballesteros claims that while 
being transported bound and hooded to the United States Air Force Base he was beaten and burned with 
a stun gun at the direction of the Marshals. He claims that during his flight he was once again beaten and 
tortured by a stun gun applied to various parts of his body, including his feet and genitals.” (Ibid.), ChP.] 
The court dismissed this allegation, noting that “[i]n the shadow cast by Alvarez-Machain, attempts to 
expand due process rights into the realm of foreign abductions, as the Second Circuit did in United 
States v. Toscanino (…), have been cut short.” (Ibid., p. 763.) It may finally be interesting to note that 
Matta-Ballesteros, like Alvarez-Machain, was also charged with being involved in the Camarena case. 
In fact, many more were charged in connection with the case of the murdered DEA agent: 22 persons 
were charged, of whom seven were tried in federal court. Three of those seven (namely Alvarez-
Machain, Matta-Ballesteros and the already discussed Verdugo-Urquidez) were abducted from their 
home countries and brought to the US. (See US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Alvarez-Machain v. 
United States et al. (No. 99-56762) and Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa et al. (No. 99-56880), 3 June 2003 
(331 F.3d 604), p. 623, n. 23.) The Alvarez-Machain and the Matta-Ballesteros cases differ in at least 
two important points and that is that 1) the Mexican Government did protest the abduction of Alvarez-
Machain, whereas the Honduran Government did not protest the abduction of Matta-Ballesteros and 2) 
the US had not sought extradition from Mexico whereas the US had tried to have Matta-Ballesteros 
extradited from Honduras to the US before it abducted him. (For this last point, see US Court of 
Appeals, Ninth Circuit, United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 1 December 1995, No. 91-50336 (71 F.3d 
754), p. 761 and Nadelmann 1993, p. 871.) For more information on the Matta-Ballesteros case, see, for 
example, Michell 1996, pp. 430-434. 
206 Although the words from Matta-Ballesteros mentioned in n. 205 (“In the shadow cast by Alvarez-
Machain, attempts to expand due process rights into the realm of foreign abductions, as the Second 
Circuit did in United States v. Toscanino (…), have been cut short.”) do not support this assertion, the 








it would mean that a court in the US could continue a case, even if that abduction 
may have been accompanied by serious mistreatment and even if that abduction was 
in violation of the sovereignty of another State which protested and requested the 
return of the suspect. The only avenues leading to the ending of the case would then 
be if the Extradition Treaty/or another treaty signed between the two States were to 
explicitly forbid an abduction207 or if the Executives of the two States are of the 
                                                                                                                                              
like circumstances nonetheless, namely in the context of another concept (the concept of supervisory 
powers), see US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 1 December 1995, 
No. 91-50336 (71 F.3d 754), p. 764: “The only way we could exercise our supervisory powers in this 
particular case is if the defendant could demonstrate governmental misconduct “of the most shocking 
and outrageous kind,” so as to warrant dismissal. (…) Matta-Ballesteros has not. His alleged treatment, 
even if taken as true, does not meet this rigorous standard, and the acts alleged were not nearly as 
egregious as those committed in Toscanino.” Thus, one can assert that US courts, in Toscanino-like 
circumstances, would still refuse jurisdiction, even after Alvarez-Machain. See also ICTY, Trial 
Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of 
Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 83: “The Court [in Matta-
Ballesteros, ChP] did not exclude the possible application of the Toscanino rule but held that the 
circumstances of the accused’s abduction did not meet the level of seriousness required.” Note finally 
that the Toscanino exception thus appears to be extremely high. After all, in Matta-Ballesteros, the 
judges stated that the suspect’s treatment, “even if taken as true” (it is reminded, see n. 205, that Matta-
Ballesteros claimed that he was beaten and tortured by a stun gun), does not meet the required standard. 
207 See Sheely 2003, p. 438. See also ibid., p. 437: “The majority opinion of Alvarez-Machain was later 
cited as standing for the proposition that, in order for a defendant to successfully rely upon an 
extradition treaty to divest jurisdiction, the treaty must affirmatively state that citizens of a signator 
country will not be seized by another signator country [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Sheely hereby 
refers to the Noriega case, where Judge Kravitch wrote: “Under Alvarez-Machain, to prevail on an 
extradition treaty claim, a defendant must demonstrate, by reference to the express language of a treaty 
and/or the established practice thereunder, that the United States affirmatively agreed not to seize 
foreign nationals from the territory of its treaty partner.” (US Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, United 
States v. Noriega, 7 July 1997, Nos. 92-4687, 96-4471 (117 F.3d 1206), p. 1213.) Noriega was a special 
male captus case because General Noriega, the commander of the Panamanian Defence Forces, was 
brought to the US after that latter State had intervened militarily in Panama. This military invasion was 
triggered by Noriega’s declaration on 15 December 1989 that a state of war existed between Panama 
and the US. Less than a week later, on 20 December 1989, “President Bush ordered U.S. troops into 
combat in Panama City on a mission whose stated goals were to safeguard American lives, restore 
democracy, preserve the Panama Canal treaties, and seize General Noriega to face federal drug charges 
in the United States.” (US District Court, Southern District of Florida, United States v. Noriega, 8 June 
1990, No. 88-79-CR (746 F.Supp. 1506), p. 1511.) In the US, Noriega was subsequently tried and 
convicted for involvement in cocaine trafficking. An important dictum of the Noriega case which should 
be mentioned here is that it followed the already discussed Eichmann and still-to-discuss Argoud cases 
in arguing that a person cannot plead a violation of classical international law, see ibid., p. 1533: “As a 
general principle of international law, individuals have no standing to challenge violations of 
international treaties in the absence of a protest by the sovereign involved.” Returning to the Alvarez-
Machain case and the point made supra, it may finally be interesting to note (see also n. 187 of Chapter 
III) that after the Alvarez-Machain case, a treaty on transborder abductions was, in fact, drafted, see 
Baker 2004, pp. 1389-1390: “[N]egotiations between the United States and Mexico led to the signing of 
the Transborder Abduction Treaty in 1994, which suggests an effort by both countries towards 
improvement in extradition policies. Most importantly, the remedy for a violation of the Treaty is 
repatriation of the abductee [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” This Treaty Between the Government of 
the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America to Prohibit Transborder 
Abductions (which can be found in Abbell 2001, at A-303-A-306) stipulates (in Art. 5, para. 2) that 








opinion that international law demands that the suspect must be returned to the 
injured State, in which case, of course, the judge cannot exercise jurisdiction.  
As expected, the decision attracted a lot of criticism from around the world. The 
first reaction came, however, from the US itself, through the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Stevens (writing for the minority). He stated that “[t]he Government’s claim 
[upheld by the Supreme Court, ChP] that the Treaty is not exclusive, but permits 
forcible governmental kidnaping, would transform (…) provisions [of the 
extradition treaty, ChP] into little more than verbiage.”208 To clarify this, Justice 
Stevens ridiculed the Court’s a contrario reasoning that because the treaty does not 
say that kidnapping is not allowed, it is in fact allowed to kidnap:  
 
If the United States, for example, thought it more expedient to torture or simply to 
execute a person rather than to attempt extradition, these options would be equally 
available, because they, too, were not explicitly prohibited by the Treaty [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].209 
 
According to Stevens, “[i]t is shocking that a party to an extradition treaty might 
believe that it has secretly reserved the right to make seizures of citizens in the other 
party’s territory [original footnote omitted, ChP].”210  
He used the same word when referring to the Court’s “disdain for customary and 
conventional international law principles”,211 which, as was shown already in 
Chapter III, stipulate that it is a breach of international law to perform acts of 
sovereignty on a State’s territory without the latter’s consent and that the forum 
State must repatriate the abductee if the injured State protests and requests his 
return.212  
                                                                                                                                              
repatriation, or (b) the abducted person opposes repatriation.” (Ibid., A-305.) As explained earlier, 
although both Mexico and the US signed the treaty on 23 November 1994, it was never submitted to the 
US Senate for advice and consent to ratification. As a result, it has never entered into force. 
208 US Supreme Court, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 15 June 1992, No. 91-712 (504 US 655), p. 
673. See also ibid., pp. 673-674: “For example, provisions requiring “sufficient” evidence to grant 
extradition (Art. 3), withholding extradition for political or military offenses (Art. 5), withholding 
extradition when the person sought has already been tried (Art. 6), withholding extradition when the 
statute of limitations for the crime has lapsed (Art. 7), and granting the requested Country discretion to 
refuse to extradite an individual who would face the death penalty in the requesting country (Art. 8), 
would serve little purpose if the requesting country could simply kidnap the person. As the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized in a related case, “[e]ach of these provisions would be utterly 
frustrated if a kidnapping were held to be a permissible course of governmental conduct.” United States 
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349 (1991). In addition, all of these provisions “only make sense 
if they are understood as requiring each treaty signatory to comply with those procedures whenever it 
wishes to obtain jurisdiction over an individual who is located in another treaty nation.” Id., at 1351.” 
209 Ibid., p. 674. 
210 Ibid., pp. 678-679. 
211 Ibid., pp. 685-686: “The Court’s admittedly “shocking” disdain for customary and conventional 
international law principles (…) is (…) entirely unsupported by case law and commentary.” 
212 See ibid., pp. 680-681. Stevens hereby referred, among other things, to Oppenheim’s International 
Law (“A State must not perform acts of sovereignty in the territory of another State. ..… It is … a 
breach of International Law for a State to send its agents to the territory of another State to apprehend 








Stevens, distinguishing Alvarez-Machain from Ker213 and explaining that a 
feeling of vengeance should not lead to a misinterpretation of the law,214 even used 
stronger words in the following passage, which have now become famous:  
 
I suspect most courts throughout the civilized world (…) will be deeply disturbed by 
the “monstrous” decision the Court announces today. For every nation that has an 
interest in preserving the Rule of Law is affected, directly or indirectly, by a decision 





                                                                                                                                              
offending State is to hand over the person in question to the State in whose territory he was 
apprehended.”) and to a quotation by the chief reporter for the American Law Institute’s Third 
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States: “When done without consent of the 
foreign government, abducting a person from a foreign country is a gross violation of international law 
and gross disrespect for a norm high in the opinion of mankind. It is a blatant violation of the territorial 
integrity of another state; it eviscerates the extradition system (established by a comprehensive network 
of treaties involving virtually all states).” 
213 See ibid., p. 682: “A critical flaw pervades the Court’s entire opinion. It fails to differentiate between 
the conduct of private citizens, which does not violate any treaty obligation, and conduct expressly 
authorized by the Executive Branch of the Government, which unquestionably constitutes a flagrant 
violation of international law, and in my opinion, also constitutes a breach of our treaty obligations. 
Thus, at the outset of its opinion, the Court states the issue as “whether a criminal defendant, abducted 
to the United States from a nation with which it has an extradition treaty, thereby acquires a defense to 
the jurisdiction of this country’s courts.” (…) That, of course, is the question decided in Ker v. Illinois 
(…); it is not, however, the question presented for decision today [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See 
also ibid., pp. 684-685: “The arresting officer in Ker did not pretend to be acting in any official capacity 
when he kidnaped Ker. As Justice Miller noted, “the facts show that it was a clear case of kidnapping 
within the dominions of Peru, without any pretence of authority under the treaty or from the government 
of the United States.” (…) The exact opposite is true in this case”. See also n. 34. 
214 See ibid., pp. 686-688: “As the Court observes at the outset of its opinion, there is reason to believe 
that respondent participated in an especially brutal murder of an American law enforcement agent. That 
fact, if true, may explain the Executive’s intense interest in punishing respondent in our courts. Such an 
explanation, however, provides no justification for disregarding the Rule of Law that this Court has a 
duty to uphold. That the Executive may wish to reinterpret the Treaty to allow for an action that the 
Treaty in no way authorizes should not influence this Court’s interpretation. Indeed, the desire for 
revenge exerts “a kind of hydraulic pressure . . . before which even well settled principles of law will 
bend,” (…), but it is precisely at such moments that we should remember and be guided by our duty “to 
render judgment evenly and dispassionately according to law, as each is given understanding to 
ascertain and apply it.” (…) As Thomas Paine warned, an “avidity to punish is always dangerous to 
liberty” because it leads a nation “to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws.” To 
counter that tendency, he reminds us: “He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his 
enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself” 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 








Alongside the dissent of the minority, “[t]he judgement was criticised in legal 
literature,[216] condemned by most states and denounced by international human 
rights organizations[217] [original footnotes omitted, ChP].”218  
                                                          
216 See, for example, the following articles with the much-saying titles: ‘The Supreme Court Sanctions 
Transborder Kidnapping in United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Does International Law Still Matter?’ 
(Schneebaum 1992), ‘International Abduction and the United States Supreme Court: The Law of the 
Jungle Reigns’ (Rayfuse 1993), ‘Monstrous Decision. Kidnapping is Legal’ (Ruiz-Bravo 1993), ‘“The 
Treaty Doesn’t Say We Can’t Kidnap Anyone” – Government Sponsored Kidnapping as a Means of 
Circumventing Extradition Treaties’ (Ré 1993) and ‘A Global Paradigm Shattered: The Jurisdictional 
Nihilism of the Supreme Court’s Abduction Decision in Alvarez-Machain’ (Strauss 1994). For another 
sound, see, for example, the article ‘In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain’ 
(Halberstam 1992).  
217 For a good overview of the reactions from foreign governments and international organisations (and 
also from within the US), see Zaid 1997. To give three examples of positions from international 
organisations, the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the OAS noted, among other things: “a) By 
upholding the jurisdiction of United States courts to try the Mexican citizen, Humberto Alvarez 
Machain, forcibly abducted from his country of origin, the United States is ignoring its obligation to 
return him to the country from whose jurisdiction he was abducted. b) By maintaining that it is free to 
try persons abducted by the action of its government in the territory of another state, unless this is 
expressly prohibited by a treaty in effect between the United States and the country in question, the 
United States is ignoring a fundamental principle of international law which is respect for the territorial 
sovereignty of states.” (OAS, Inter-American Juridical Committee, ‘Legal Opinion on the Decision of 
the Supreme Court of the United States’, 15 August 1992, Rio de Janeiro, 4 Criminal Law Forum 
(1993), pp. 119-134, at p. 125.) Interesting for this study is also the following remark of the Juridical 
Committee (not mentioned, for example, by Zaid, who also refers to the above-mentioned words from 
the Juridical Committee, see Zaid 1997, pp. 845-855, n. 133): “The Committee should likewise 
underscore the incompatibility of the practice of abduction with the right of due process to which every 
person is entitled, no matter how serious the crime they are accused of, a right protected by international 
law [emphasis added, ChP].” (OAS, Inter-American Juridical Committee, ‘Legal Opinion on the 
Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States’, 15 August 1992, Rio de Janeiro, 4 Criminal Law 
Forum (1993), pp. 119-134, at p. 125.) See in that respect also the ‘Explanation of Concurring Vote of 
Doctor Jorge Reinaldo A. Vanossi’, who tries to offer a solution for the problems by suggesting the 
establishment of an “international or regional criminal court with full jurisdiction to take up and rule on 
criminal cases involving extremely serious crimes against humanity, such as terrorism and drug 
trafficking (furthermore, crimes that are closely interrelated)”. (Ibid., p. 129.) He then writes (ibid., p. 
130): “[T]he end does not justify the means. Accordingly, the struggle for justice against these crimes 
against humanity should unfold through law, developing and perfecting existing mechanisms (such as 
extradition treaties) and creating others with both imagination and decisiveness (for example, an inter-
American or an international court for criminal matters). Once again, we adduce as truth the 
overwhelming fact that this warning about the ends and the means contains. In the struggle against 
cannibals, we are not allowed to eat the cannibals! In effect, if cannibalism were fought with 
cannibalism, we would lose the moral legitimacy for our struggle against this crime.” In the second 
international organisation to be mentioned here, the UNGA, it was agreed, among other things, that: “(1) 
international law prohibits a state from exercising its criminal jurisdiction beyond its territory as 
contrary to the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states, unless the other state concerned has 
given its consent; (2) the use of unilateral measures, such as the abduction of a suspected criminal from 
another state for trial before the national courts of the abducting state, undermines existing mechanisms 
for international cooperation in the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, as well as treaty 
obligations to prosecute or extradite such offenders”. (Morris and Bourloyannis-Vrailas 1994, p. 357.) 
The third organisation which could be mentioned here is the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, which concluded that Alvarez-Machain’s deprivation of liberty was arbitrary because it was 
in violation of the extradition treaty between the US and Mexico (see Commission on Human Rights, 








This means that not only was the fact that US authorities had resorted to the tool 
of abduction criticised, but also the fact that the Supreme Court, by upholding 
jurisdiction in these circumstances, legally ‘approved’ this technique.219  
This implies that many States are thus seemingly of the opinion that the Supreme 
Court should not have stated that the exercise of jurisdiction be continued in the case 
of a situation in which it was clear that there was an abduction followed by a protest 
and request for the return of the suspect by the injured State.  
                                                                                                                                              
Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/27, 17 December 1993, Decision No. 48/1993 (United States of 
America), p. 138) and because it was in violation of customary international law (see ibid., p. 139 and n. 
74 of Chapter III). Next to these inter-State considerations, the Working Group also looked at the human 
rights dimension (see ibid., pp. 139-140) and concluded that Alvarez-Machain’s detention was arbitrary. 
Note that the Working Group, in its decision, also made the following intriguing statement. After having 
addressed the two (inter-State) elements which had to be taken into account in determining whether 
Alvarez-Machain’s deprivation of liberty was to be considered arbitrary or not (namely “(1) Whether 
international treaty law governing relations between the United States of America and Mexico permits 
or prohibits the abduction of one person from the territory of one country to the territory of another, in 
order for him to be tried; (2) If the matter is not resolved in treaty law, whether customary international 
law permits or prohibits abduction of this kind.” (Ibid., pp. 136-137.)), the Working Group stated: “It 
should however be noted that those two issues arise only in the context of acts of abduction of persons 
accused of common crimes and not when such acts are committed against persons accused of crimes 
against humanity, as accepted by the international community.” (Ibid., p. 137.) What this means is not 
very clear. It appears that the UN Working Group is of the opinion that in the case of suspects of crimes 
against humanity, other elements play a role in determining whether a deprivation of liberty is arbitrary 
or not. This is very much reminiscent of the statement of Paust, as presented in Chapter III (see n. 224 
and accompanying text of that chapter), that “[w]hat is “arbitrary,” otherwise “unlawful,” or “unjust” 
will have to be considered in context and with reference to other legal policies at stake. (…) [I]t may not 
be incompatible with principles of justice, “unjust,” “unlawful” or otherwise “arbitrary” to abduct or 
capture an international criminal in a context when action is reasonably necessary to assure adequate 
sanctions against egregious international criminal activity [original footnote omitted, ChP]”. However, 
as also argued in that chapter, although one can imagine that the same legal arrest is non-arbitrary in one 
case and arbitrary in the other, it is allegedly not so that an operation, which is so often labelled as 
unlawful and arbitrary that one may assert that it is always, in every case, unlawful or arbitrary (such as 
an abduction) may become less unlawful or arbitrary under certain circumstances. With respect to the 
inter-State context (in which context this statement of the Working Group was made), one can argue the 
same, namely that an abduction violating another State’s sovereignty does not become less arbitrary 
because one is dealing with suspects of crimes against humanity. The Working Group should not forget 
its own reference to the Eichmann case (which involved a suspect who was charged, among other 
things, with crimes against humanity) that “intervention by one Power in the territory of another is not 
only a breach of international law but, in addition, if it is repeated, it may “endanger international peace 
and security” (United Nations Security Council, Claim by Argentina in the Eichmann case, resolution 
138 (1960)).” (Ibid., p. 139, see also n. 74 of Chapter III.) Thus, an abduction of a suspect charged with 
crimes against humanity is not less arbitrary than an abduction of a suspect charged with ordinary 
crimes, although the ‘quality’ of the suspect may influence the question as to how the arbitrariness must 
be repaired. 
218 Costi 2003, pp. 86-87. Bush (1993, p. 941) notes that only “[f]ar-right columnists and a handful of 
major papers supported the decision [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
219 See also Loan 2005, p. 281: “The abduction of Alvarez-Machain by the United States and the 









One could assert the same with respect to the idea expressed above that Alvarez-
Machain may have meant the end of the mistreatment exception of Toscanino, but 
one can seriously doubt whether Alvarez-Machain quashed that male detentus 
situation in the first place, see footnote 206.  
In other words, one can assert that the mistreatment exception of Toscanino is 
probably still valid in US courts, but to the extent that States are of the opinion that 
Alvarez-Machain has quashed both male detentus situations, one can argue that the 
immense criticism towards this decision in general is proof of the idea that many 
States are of the opinion that in those two situations (an abduction followed by a 
protest and request for the return of the suspect and an abduction accompanied by 
serious mistreatment), jurisdiction must be refused.220 See in that respect also Baker, 
who writes that “most of the criticisms revolved around the fact that the United 
States domestic legal system should have provided a defensive remedy for Alvarez-
Machain by dismissing the indictment.”221  
Notwithstanding this criticism, the Alvarez-Machain case is still to be considered 
“the leading U.S. case on forcible abduction by government agents”.222 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the case proceeded to trial, but after the 
Government’s case was heard, Alvarez-Machain was acquitted due to a lack of 
sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict.223  
Back in his homeland Mexico, and contemplating the words of the Justices of the 
Supreme Court that “[r]espondent and his amici may be correct that respondent’s 
                                                          
220 Although much criticism was general in nature (meaning that the decision in its totality was attacked, 
including the possible quashing of the mistreatment exception of Toscanino), it must be noted that most 
criticism was directed towards the situation most clearly present in that case, namely an abduction 
followed by a protest and request for the return of the suspect by the injured State, see Canada’s amicus 
curiae brief in the Alvarez-Machain case: “Canada and its component governments do not hold to a 
policy of abductions from American territory, and if abductions occur, they could not reasonably expect 
the United States to acquiesce in Canadian courts’ disrespect of U.S. sovereignty through exercise of 
jurisdiction over abducted individuals. The Government of Canada would, upon protest, cooperate to 
obtain the return of an abducted fugitive.” (US Supreme Court: Brief of the Government of Canada as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 4 March 1992, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), pp. 923-924.) See also ibid., p. 924: “[H]ereafter, we set forth the 
law, customs and usages of civilized nations which suggest that official abductions [note that the term 
‘official abduction’ is used differently in this study, see ns. 21 and 63 of Chapter III and ns. 94 and 782 
of the present chapter, ChP] are unlawful and require restitution of the status quo ante. (...) Hereafter, 
Canada sets forth a survey of some of the incidents and expressions of policy which show the 
understanding in international law that abducted persons must be returned to a nation when it protests 
the infringement of its sovereignty.” See also ibid., p. 925: “[T]he Canadian Department of External 
Affairs queried competent officials of other nations and requested their comments concerning official 
transborder abductions. (…) If an abducted person were returned to their territory, and brought before 
their courts, Austria, Finland, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland would consider that 
the abducted person should be returned.” 
221 Baker 2004, p. 1375. 
222 Michell 1996, p. 404. 
223 US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Alvarez-Machain v. United States et al. (No. 99-56762) and 
Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa et al. (No. 99-56880), 3 June 2003 (331 F.3d 604), p. 610. See ibid.: “The 
court concluded that the case against Alvarez was based on “suspicion and ... hunches but ... no proof,” 








abduction was “shocking,” (...), and that it may be in violation of general 
international law principles”, Alvarez-Machain decided to file a civil suit against his 
abductors (among whom was a man called Sosa, whose name is now used to refer to 
the civil case of Alvarez-Machain), the responsible DEA agents and the US 
Government.  
Although this study focuses on criminal cases, the civil case of Alvarez-Machain 
may nevertheless be interesting to examine in greater detail as it addressed, in 
contrast to its criminal counterpart, the international law dimension of a 
phenomenon central in this study: kidnapping.  
In addition, it has already been mentioned earlier that male captus bene detentus 
courts have claimed that the remedy of setting aside jurisdiction may not be 
appropriate but that the suspect could always sue his kidnappers in a civil case. For 
once, it may be interesting to look into these matters in more detail. 
Alvarez based his civil suit on the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)224 and the 
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), and alleged a number of conventional and 
constitutional torts claims such as kidnapping, torture and false arrest.225  
Because of its international law dimension, the ATCA (which was enacted as 
early as 1789) is the most interesting one for this study. It reads: “The district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”226 The 
exact scope of this provision (including the words “the law of nations”) was an 
important issue in this case. 
The District Court entered summary judgment against Sosa with respect to 
Alvarez-Machain’s ATCA claims for kidnapping and arbitrary detention,227 thereby 
                                                          
224 The FTCA consists of US Code, Title 28, Section 1346(b)(1) (“Subject to the provisions of chapter 
171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the 
Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions 
on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for 
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the 
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”) and Chapter 171 
(Sections 2671-2080) of the same title (explaining the Tort Claims Procedure), see US Court of 
Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Alvarez-Machain v. United States et al. (No. 99-56762) and Alvarez-Machain v. 
Sosa et al. (No. 99-56880), 3 June 2003 (331 F.3d 604), p. 608. 
225 Ibid., p. 610. See ibid., n. 1: “Specifically, Alvarez alleged the following conventional tort claims: (1) 
kidnapping; (2) torture; (3) cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment; (4) arbitrary 
detention; (5) assault and battery; (6) false imprisonment; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 
(8) false arrest; (9) negligent employment; and (10) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Alvarez 
alleged constitutional torts under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments for the acts of kidnapping, 
torture, cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, denial of adequate medical 
treatment, and arbitrary detention.” 
226 US Code, Title 28, Section 1350. See ibid., p. 608. 








holding “that both state-sponsored, transborder abductions and arbitrary detentions 
violated customary international law [original footnote omitted, ChP].”228  
The reasoning behind this holding was that Alvarez-Machain’s kidnapping 
violated the sovereignty of Mexico, that this was a violation of “the law of nations” 
and finally that Alvarez-Machain could personally invoke this violation of 
sovereignty under the ATCA.229  
The other ATCA claims, for example, those related to the physical abuse, were, 
however, rejected.  
In addition to this, Alvarez-Machain’s FTCA claims were dismissed; the Court 
concluded “that Alvarez’s apprehension was privileged and was not a false arrest 
under California law.”230    
The Court of Appeals, which saw the term ‘customary international law’ (and 
not the more restrictive term used by Sosa: ius cogens)231 as a direct descendent of 
the term ‘law of nations’232 and which recalled that it had earlier limited “actionable 
violations to those international norms that are “specific, universal, and 
obligatory””,233 first looked at the approved (by the District Court) contention of 
Alvarez-Machain that his kidnapping violated the sovereignty of Mexico, that it was 
a violation of “the law of nations” under the ATCA and hence that he was entitled to 
a remedy.234 The Court of Appeals disagreed. Although Alvarez-Machain’s 
kidnapping indeed might have been a violation of the well-known international law 
principle that a State cannot perform acts of sovereignty on the territory of another 
State without the latter’s consent, Alvarez-Machain himself had no standing to 
invoke this matter.235 Although this may seem logical, it should be stressed that it is 
not always the case that an individual does not have ius standi to make such a claim, 
                                                          
228 Ibid. The Court also held “that Alvarez could recover damages under the ATCA only for his 
detention in Mexico prior to his arrival in the United States.” (Ibid., p.  611.) 
229 See ibid., p. 615: “Alvarez claims that his arrest violated Mexico’s sovereign rights because Mexico 
had not granted the United States permission to exercise police power on its soil. Because such an 
encroachment on Mexico’s sovereignty violates “the law of nations” within the meaning of the ATCA, 
Alvarez reasons, he is entitled to relief under that statute. The district court agreed and rejected Sosa’s 
objection that Alvarez lacks standing to invoke Mexico’s sovereignty rights.” 
230 Ibid., p. 611. 
231 See ibid., pp.  612-614. 
232 See ibid., p. 613. 
233 Ibid., p. 612, referring to p. 1475 of the case “Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, 
Human Rights Litig.) (“Marcos II”), 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.1994)”. (Ibid.) 
234 See US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Alvarez-Machain v. United States et al. (No. 99-56762) and 
Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa et al. (No. 99-56880), 3 June 2003 (331 F.3d 604), p. 615. 
235 See ibid., pp. 616-617: “The legal rights on which Alvarez bases his claim, and which the ATCA 
recognizes, are those that protect the individual from tortious conduct. By its terms, the ATCA provides 
only for suits by individual aliens; it does not allow for an individual to vindicate the rights of a foreign 
government. To allow state-on-state injuries like the one Alvarez alleges here to be vindicated by a third 
party not only would read too much into the ATCA, but would lead to the judiciary’s intrusion into 
matters that are appropriately reserved for the Executive branch. Although international human rights 
litigation under the ATCA inevitably raises issues implicating foreign relations, sovereigns’ prerogatives 
are ordinarily and traditionally handled through diplomatic channels. The right of a nation to invoke its 
territorial integrity does not translate into the right of an individual to invoke such interests in the name 








although the success of this claim, of course, depends on the reaction of the State 
whose sovereignty was violated.236 Secondly, the Court of Appeals looked at 
Alvarez-Machain’s alternative theory,  
 
that, notwithstanding any infringements upon Mexico’s sovereignty, the act of 
transborder kidnapping was, in itself, a violation of customary international human 
rights law. This norm, as defined by Alvarez, creates a personal right under the law of 
nations.237  
 
That argument was also unsuccessful. The Court of Appeals found that there was no 
clear and universally recognised norm prohibiting transborder abduction under 
customary international human rights law.238 Nevertheless, the third point of 
Alvarez-Machain was accepted: according to the Court of Appeals, there was such a 
norm with respect to the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention239 and “[t]he 
unilateral, nonconsensual extraterritorial arrest and detention of Alvarez were 
arbitrary and in violation of the law of nations under the ATCA.”240  
Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed Sosa’s liability under the ATCA, but on 
other grounds.241   
Although the Court of Appeals may have been correct in stating that, in contrast 
to the right not to be arrested or detained arbitrarily, there is no explicit human right 
in customary international law which prohibits a transborder abduction and which 
                                                          
236 See also n. 186 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
237 US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Alvarez-Machain v. United States et al. (No. 99-56762) and 
Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa et al. (No. 99-56880), 3 June 2003 (331 F.3d 604), p. 617. 
238 See ibid., pp. 619-620: “[O]ur review of the international authorities and literature reveals no specific 
binding obligation, express or implied, on the part of the United States or its agents to refrain from 
transborder kidnapping. Nor can we say that there is a “universal” consensus in the sense that we use 
that term to describe well-entrenched customs of international law. (…) Because a human rights norm 
recognizing an individual’s right to be free from transborder abductions has not reached a status of 
international accord sufficient to render it “obligatory” or “universal,” it cannot qualify as an actionable 
norm under the ATCA. This is a case where aspiration has not yet ripened into obligation [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].”     
239 See ibid., p. 620: “Unlike transborder arrests, there exists a clear and universally recognized norm 
prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention. This prohibition is codified in every major comprehensive 
human rights instrument and is reflected in at least 119 national constitutions.” This statement, of 
course, constitutes additional evidence for the assertion made in Chapter III of this book that the 
prohibition of arbitrary arrest/detention has attained customary international law status. The fact that this 
norm has also been included in such a great number of constitutions shows that the norm might be seen 
as a general principle of law as well. 
240 Ibid. See also ibid., p. 631: “Wishful thinking is no substitute for clear congressional authority. 
Congress surely knows how and when to expand the reach of its laws beyond our borders. There is little 
doubt that Congress has the authority to do so; there is also little doubt that it has not done so here. 
Thus, although we recognize that the kidnapping and murder of DEA agents abroad necessitates the 
exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, absent a clear directive, we cannot conclude that 
Congress has given the DEA unlimited enforcement powers abroad. Finding no basis in law for the 
DEA’s actions, and left only with a warrant issued by a United States court, we conclude that Alvarez’s 
arrest, and hence his detention, were arbitrary because they were not “pursuant to law.” Consequently, 
Alvarez established a tort committed in violation of the law of nations.” 








may be of use in ATCA litigation,242 one can argue more generally that there is an 
implicit human right with customary international law status prohibiting transborder 
kidnapping.243  
A short explanation for this assertion: there is a general human right to liberty 
and security/a right not to be arrested or detained arbitrarily.244 That right has 
arguably customary international law/general international law status (see also 
Chapter III, where some authorities were presented which even qualified this right 
as a ius cogens norm). Any violation of that right is hence, at least, a violation of 
customary international law. There are many ways to violate this right, but one of 
the possibilities is to kidnap a person from the territory of another State without the 
latter’s consent. (Here, one can see the connection between inter-State law and 
human rights law:245 because of a violation of the inter-State norm against non-
intervention, an arrest is deemed to be unlawful or arbitrary under human rights 
law.) As already shown, the HRC has qualified an abduction, even irrespective of 
the attitude of the ‘injured’ State, as an arbitrary arrest and detention, violating 
Article 9, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR.246 Hence, such kidnappings constitute 
violations of customary international law. This arguably means that it is not 
necessary to look if there exists an additional right in customary international law 
not to be kidnapped for this right is already part of the human right to liberty and 
security/the right not to be arrested or detained arbitrarily.  
With respect to Alvarez-Machain’s FTCA claims, the Court of Appeals, in 
contrast to the District Court, ruled that Alvarez-Machain could seek a remedy 
pursuant to the FTCA because DEA agents had authorised a false arrest against 
Alvarez-Machain.247 Although the FTCA has a so-called ‘foreign activities’ 
                                                          
242 See also ibid., p. 618: “[N]o authority cited by Alvarez recognizes an explicit prohibition against 
forcible abduction [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
243 Cf. also Loan (2005, p. 255), arguing that individuals have a customary international law right to be 
free from extraterritorial abduction. See also ibid., p. 282: “While the international denunciation of 
forcible abductions will often focus on any breach of state sovereignty, there is sufficient state practice 
and opinio juris to suggest that a customary norm exists whereby the human rights of an individual 
require states to refrain from extraterritorial abduction. Cumulatively, the decisions by the Human 
Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, the recognition of international human 
rights instruments, and the practice of states provide enough evidence of consistent state practice and 
opinio juris to establish a customary norm protecting individuals from extraterritorial abduction.” Cf. 
also n. 188 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
244 See also US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Alvarez-Machain v. United States et al. (No. 99-56762) 
and Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa et al. (No. 99-56880), 3 June 2003 (331 F.3d 604), p. 618, where the right 
to freedom of movement is mentioned as well. 
245 Cf. also Loan (2005, p. 269): “[T]he international law prohibition on violating state sovereignty 
through the use [of] extraterritorial abduction is relevant to the issue of whether individuals possess an 
international right to be free from abductions.” 
246 See also Michell 1996, p. 442: “The Committee reinforced the customary international law rule 
prohibiting forcible abduction and transplanted the rule into the human rights context, protecting 
individuals qua individuals.” See also n. 261 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
247 See US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Alvarez-Machain v. United States et al. (No. 99-56762) and 
Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa et al. (No. 99-56880), 3 June 2003 (331 F.3d 604), pp. 640-641: “Our earlier 
discussion of liability under the ATCA applies with equal force to our analysis of the FTCA claims 








exception, which “bars recovery for “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country””,248 
the Court of Appeals held that “a claim can still proceed under the headquarters 
doctrine if harm occurring in a foreign country was proximately caused by acts in 
the United States.”249 According to the Court of Appeals, that was the case here.250     
Then, it was again up to the Supreme Court.251  
Twelve years after its decision in the criminal case, it reversed the decision of the 
Court of Appeals252 on both the ATCA (the Supreme Court used another 
abbreviation here: ATS (Alien Tort Statute)) and FTCA points.253  
The FTCA point was dismissed because the Supreme Court overruled the 
headquarters doctrine,254 holding that the “FTCA’s foreign country exception bars 
all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the 
tortious act or omission occurred.”255  
With respect to the ATS point, the Justices of the Supreme Court first delved into 
the past.  
                                                                                                                                              
or otherwise, to effect an extraterritorial arrest. Nor did their minions across the border, who could no 
more claim a lawful privilege to arrest Alvarez than could the DEA agents themselves under the same 
circumstances. The district court that issued Alvarez’s arrest warrant had no jurisdiction to issue a 
warrant for an arrest in Mexico. (…) Accordingly, the DEA agents authorized a false arrest against 
Alvarez.” 
248 Ibid., p. 638. 
249 Ibid.  
250 See ibid., pp. 638-639: “Alvarez’s abduction fits the headquarters doctrine like a glove. Working out 
of DEA offices in Los Angeles, Berellez and his superiors made the decision to kidnap Alvarez and, 
through Garate, gave Barragan precise instructions on whom to recruit, how to seize Alvarez, and how 
he should be treated during the trip to the United States. DEA officials in Washington, D.C., approved 
the details of the operation. After Alvarez was abducted according to plan, DEA agents supervised his 
transportation into the United States, telling the arrest team where to land the plane and obtaining 
clearance in El Paso for landing. The United States, and California in particular, served as command 
central for the operation carried out in Mexico.” With respect to another FTCA exception, the 
‘intentional tort’ exception, the Court found: “Although the waiver of sovereign immunity under the 
FTCA excludes intentional torts such as false arrest, this exclusion (…) does not apply if the intentional 
tort is committed by an “investigative or law enforcement officer.” (Ibid., p. 639.) That was also the case 
here, see ibid., p. 640: “The DEA agents who orchestrated Alvarez’s arrest are law enforcement officers 
as defined by the FTCA because they are “empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or 
to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” (…) Because the primary tortious act was the initiation 
and planning of Alvarez’s abduction by the DEA agents, his claim falls squarely within this law 
enforcement proviso, and thus the intentional tort exclusion does not apply.” 
251 See US Supreme Court, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain et al. (No. 03-339) and United States v. Alvarez-
Machain et al. (No. 03-485), 29 June 2004 (542 US 692). 
252 According to Loan (2005, p. 254), “the decision was substantially influenced by the current war on 
terrorism.” See also ibid., pp. 290ff.    
253 Arguably, the duration of these proceedings also shows that the civil remedy (which is often referred 
to by those who are in favour of the male captus bene detentus rule) may not always be very easy to 
pursue. See also n. 3 of this chapter (and the reference to the Parisot case). 
254 See US Supreme Court, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain et al. (No. 03-339) and United States v. Alvarez-
Machain et al. (No. 03-485), 29 June 2004 (542 US 692), p. 710, where the Court stated that the 
“headquarters analysis should have no part in applying the foreign country exception”. 








After having referred to the three ‘Blackstone crimes’, the sort of violations that 
were probably on minds of those who drafted the ATS in the 18th century,256 the 
Supreme Court stated: 
  
[W]e think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to 
rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have 
recognized.257 
 
Recalling the previously mentioned formula that “[a]ctionable violations of 
international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory”,258 
and focusing on customary international law,259 the Supreme Court refused to look 
at the norm against transborder abduction altogether260 and rejected Alvarez-
                                                          
256 See ibid., p. 715: “There was, finally, a sphere in which (…) rules binding individuals for the benefit 
of other individuals overlapped with the norms of state relationships. Blackstone referred to it when he 
mentioned three specific offenses against the law of nations addressed by the criminal law of England: 
violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. (…) It was this narrow 
set of violations of the law of nations, admitting of a judicial remedy and at the same time threatening 
serious consequences in international affairs, that was probably on minds of the men who drafted the 
ATS with its reference to tort.” 
257 Ibid., p. 725. 
258 Ibid., p. 732. See also n. 233 and accompanying text. It is worth mentioning that the Supreme Court 
thus seems to agree, with the Court of Appeals, that the ATS, in contrast to what is often argued (see, for 
example, the arguments of Sosa (and the rejection of these arguments by the Court of Appeals) at the 
end of this footnote), is hence not restricted to ius cogens norms. See Steinhardt 2004, pp. 2265-2267: 
“The Supreme Court’s analysis in Alvarez-Machain II forecloses (…) the argument that the category of 
actionable claims under the ATS is limited to violations of jus cogens, or peremptory norms of 
international law from which no derogation is permitted. (…) The very language of the ATS, with its 
reference to “the law of nations or a treaty of the United States” shows that Congress adopted a high, but 
not the highest and most controversial, jurisdictional threshold. No court that has been offered the jus 
cogens gloss on the statute has adopted it, other than to observe that a jus cogens violation may be 
sufficient to satisfy the “specific, universal, and obligatory” standard, but is not a necessary precondition 
for the actionability of the norm. To the contrary, the “specific, universal, and obligatory” standard 
enables courts to distinguish genuinely customary norms from merely idiosyncratic or aspirational 
norms, and the first courts to articulate that test did so precisely to guide these sometimes difficult 
judgments [original footnotes omitted, ChP.” For Sosa’s arguments (and the rejection of these 
arguments by the Court of Appeals), see US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Alvarez-Machain v. 
United States et al. (No. 99-56762) and Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa et al. (No. 99-56880), 3 June 2003 
(331 F.3d 604), pp. 612-613: “Sosa urges a narrow reading of the “law of nations” and a 
correspondingly strict interpretation of the “specific, universal, and obligatory” requirement. He argues 
that only violations of jus cogens norms, as distinguished from violations of customary international 
law, are sufficiently “universal” and “obligatory” to be actionable as violations of “the law of nations” 
under the ATCA. We decline to embrace this restrictive reading, as we are guided by the language of the 
statute, not an imported restriction.” 
259 Alvarez-Machain also relied on international instruments (such as the UDHR and the ICCPR) but 
that part of Alvarez-Machain’s argument was quickly disposed of, see US Supreme Court, Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain et al. (No. 03-339) and United States v. Alvarez-Machain et al. (No. 03-485), 29 June 
2004 (542 US 692), pp. 734-735.   
260 See ibid., p. 734: “Here, it is useful to examine Alvarez’s complaint in greater detail. As he presently 
argues it, the claim does not rest on the cross-border feature of his abduction [original footnote omitted, 








Machain’s claim with respect to the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and (non-
prolonged) arbitrary detention.261 Warning that the practical implications of an 
acceptance of such a prohibition would be far-reaching262 and relying on the words 
of the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,263 the 
Court held:  
 
Any credible invocation of a principle against arbitrary detention that the civilized 
world accepts as binding customary international law requires a factual basis beyond 
relatively brief detention in excess of positive authority. Even the Restatement’s 
limits are only the beginning of the enquiry, because although it is easy to say that 
some policies of prolonged arbitrary detentions are so bad that those who enforce 
them become enemies of the human race, it may be harder to say which policies cross 
that line with the certainty afforded by Blackstone’s three common law offenses. In 
any event, the label would never fit the reckless policeman who botches his warrant, 
even though that same officer might pay damages under municipal law. (…) 
Whatever may be said for the broad principle Alvarez advances, in the present, 
imperfect world, it expresses an aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule 
having the specificity we require. Creating a private cause of action to further that 
aspiration would go beyond any residual common law discretion we think it 
                                                                                                                                              
by reference his arguments on cross-border abductions before the Court of Appeals. (…) That is not 
enough to raise the question fairly, and we do not consider it.” 
261 See ibid., p. 736: “Alvarez thus invokes a general prohibition of “arbitrary” detention defined as 
officially sanctioned action exceeding positive authorization to detain under the domestic law of some 
government, regardless of the circumstances. (…) Alvarez cites little authority that a rule so broad has 
the status of a binding customary norm today [original footnote omitted, ChP].” For criticism on this 
presentation of Alvarez’s claim, see Steinhardt 2004, p. 2253: “Nor was the Court convinced that the 
prohibition of arbitrary arrest as applied to Alvarez-Machain had attained the status of customary 
international law. To arrive at this conclusion it had to deploy a strategic recharacterization of Alvarez-
Machain’s claim, viewing it as the assertion that the arrest was arbitrary solely because no applicable 
law authorized it and not because it infringed the sovereignty of Mexico”.  
262 See US Supreme Court, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain et al. (No. 03-339) and United States v. Alvarez-
Machain et al. (No. 03-485), 29 June 2004 (542 US 692), pp. 736-737: “Alvarez thus invokes a general 
prohibition of “arbitrary” detention defined as officially sanctioned action exceeding positive 
authorization to detain under the domestic law of some government, regardless of the circumstances. 
(…) He certainly cites nothing to justify the federal courts in taking his broad rule as the predicate for a 
federal lawsuit, for its implications would be breathtaking. His rule would support a cause of action in 
federal court for any arrest, anywhere in the world, unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which 
it took place, and would create a cause of action for any seizure of an alien in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment (…). It would create an action in federal court for arrests by state officers who simply 
exceed their authority; and for the violation of any limit that the law of any country might place on the 
authority of its own officers to arrest.” See also ibid., pp. 732-733: “[T]he determination whether a norm 
is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an 
element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the 
federal courts [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
263 See ibid., p. 737: “Alvarez’s failure to marshal support for his proposed rule is underscored by the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (198[7]), which says in its discussion 
of customary international human rights law that a “state violates international law if, as a matter of state 
policy, it practices, encourages, or condones ... prolonged arbitrary detention.” (…) Although the 
Restatement does not explain its requirements of a “state policy” and of “prolonged” detention, the 








appropriate to exercise. It is enough to hold that a single illegal detention of less than 
a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt 
arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as to 
support the creation of a federal remedy [original footnotes omitted, ChP].264 
 
It is not entirely clear what the Supreme Court means here. On the one hand, it 
asserts that a relatively brief illegal detention cannot be seen as a violation of the 
principle against arbitrary detention that the civilised world accepts as binding 
customary international law. However, on the other hand, it makes the remark that 
such a detention cannot be seen as a violation of customary international law so well 
defined that it can be used in the context of the ATS. It may indeed be true that a 
brief illegal detention does not reach the threshold of the ATS (although the latter 
speaks of “the law of nations”, the exact scope of the act appears to be primarily a 
matter of domestic law) but to the extent that the Supreme Court claims that a brief 
illegal arrest or detention does not violate customary international law, the Court 
(and the same goes for the Restatement)265 is arguably incorrect. After all, the right 
to liberty and security/the right not to be arrested or detained arbitrarily – a right 
with customary international law status – does not require a temporal element.266 
Hence, any – and not only a prolonged – violation of this right (whether this is 
caused by a simple illegal/arbitrary arrest within a State or through a crossborder 
abduction violating the international law principle that a State cannot violate another 
State’s sovereignty without the latter’s consent) constitutes a violation of customary 
international (human rights) law.  
                                                          
264 Ibid., pp. 737-738. 
265 See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, 1987, para. 702 (‘Customary International Law of Human Rights’), comment under ‘b’ (‘State 
policy as violation of customary law’): “The violations of human rights cited in this section (...) [which 
includes prolonged arbitrary detention, ChP] are violations of customary international law only if 
practiced, encouraged, or condoned by the government of a state as official policy.” See also ibid., 
comment under ‘h’ (‘Prolonged arbitrary detention’): “A single, brief, arbitrary detention by an official 
of a state party to one of the principal international agreements might violate that agreement; arbitrary 
detention violates customary law if it is prolonged and practiced as state policy.” 
266 See also US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Alvarez-Machain v. United States et al. (No. 99-56762) 
and Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa et al. (No. 99-56880), 3 June 2003 (331 F.3d 604), p. 621: “Sosa 
acknowledges the prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention, but he contends that for ATCA 
liability to attach, Alvarez’s detention must be “prolonged” in addition to being arbitrary. We can divine 
no such requirement in our precedent or in the applicable international authorities. Rather, as the 
language of the international instruments demonstrates, the norm is universally cited as one against 
“arbitrary” detention and does not include a temporal element. Other authorities reflect this 
understanding.” See also ibid., p. 622: “We simply hold, consistent with international law, that there is 
no freestanding temporal requirement nor any magical time period that triggers the norm.” See finally 
also Paust 1993, p. 563: ““Prolonged arbitrary detention” is the curious phrase found in the Restatement, 
but, as recognized in federal court opinions, both customary and treaty-based human rights law prohibit 
“arbitrary detention” as such [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” Note, however, that the prolonged 
period can be of influence but then in another context: a legal detention can become arbitrary if it is 
unduly prolonged, see De Zayas 2005, pp. 16-17: “In its jurisprudence the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee, the body responsible for monitoring compliance by States party to the ICCPR, has 
made it clear that detention which may be initially legal may become “arbitrary” if it is unduly 








To give a few examples: as already shown earlier, the HRC has held that the act 
of abduction as such (which may take less than a day) constitutes an arbitrary arrest 
and detention and a violation of Article 9, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR, arguably (a 
provision with) customary international law (status).267  
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has also examined Alvarez-
Machain’s deprivation of freedom from a human rights perspective, see also 
footnote 217.  
Although it looked at the total amount of time involved in the case (987 days), 
starting with Alvarez-Machain’s abduction on 8 April 1990268 and ending with his 
release on 14 December 1992,269 it stated that  
 
no legal basis whatsoever can be found to justify the deprivation of freedom from the 
date of the abduction – 2 April 1990 – until his release on 14 December 1992 since 
this deprivation of freedom took place without the orders of any authority whatsoever 
and, indeed, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals declared it unlawful. In 
the circumstances, the deprivation of freedom is a breach of article 9 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and principle 2 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. Accordingly, the detention is 
arbitrary (...) [emphasis added, ChP].270 
 
Hence, even though the Working Group is of the opinion that Alvarez-Machain’s 
entire deprivation of freedom was arbitrary, it also notes that it was already arbitrary 
on day one (“from the date of the abduction – 2 April 1990”).271  
                                                          
267 See, for example, the cases of Lopez Burgos and Celiberti de Casariego. Although in these cases, the 
victims were detained for longer periods before and after the cross-border abduction, the HRC qualified 
“the act of abduction into Uruguayan territory” (thus arguably irrespective of its duration) as an arbitrary 
arrest and detention and hence as a violation of Art. 9, para. 1 of the ICCPR (see para. 13 of the Lopez 
Burgos communication and para. 11 of the Celiberti de Casariego communication). 
268 The reference to 8 April 1990 as the starting point of this period is a little odd. Although this 
reference may be explained by the fact that the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention refers to 
Alvarez-Machain’s complaint that his abduction took place on 7 April (however, in that case, one can 
wonder why the period did not start on that day and only on the day after), the UN Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention itself uses another date, see Commission on Human Rights, Fiftieth session, Item 10 
of the provisional agenda, Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1994/27, 17 December 1993, Decision No. 48/1993 (United States of America), p. 135, where 
the Working Group writes that Alvarez-Machain was abducted “on 2 April 1990 (the complaint says 7 
April), at his medical office in Guadalajara, Mexico, and forcibly taken to the United States”. (See also 
ibid., p. 139.) 
269 See ibid., p. 136. See also ibid., p. 139. 
270 Ibid. 
271 The Supreme Court was, however, not impressed: “Alvarez also cites (…) a finding by a United 
Nations working group that his detention was arbitrary under the Declaration, the Covenant, and 
customary international law. See Report of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/27, pp. 139-140 (Dec. 17, 1993). That finding is not addressed, however, to our 
demanding standard of definition, which must be met to raise even the possibility of a private cause of 








In the past, the ATS has been accepted to cover such serious violations as 
torture, genocide and war crimes.272  
It is clear that a simple illegal detention (for example, caused by a “reckless 
policeman who botches his warrant”, to use the words of the Supreme Court) is not 
as serious as those violations.  
Nevertheless, if the Supreme Court wants the ATS to be restricted to these kinds 
of violations, it should clearly say so. Conversely, if it argues more broadly that 
“[a]ctionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, 
universal, and obligatory”, then it should not be surprised that norms with customary 
international law status (such as the right to liberty and security/the right not to be 
arrested or detained arbitrarily) may enter the ATS nevertheless.273  
Returning to the criminal law context and crossing the Atlantic: after some lack 
of clarity with respect to the modern position of the law of England towards male 
captus bene detentus,274 the law was (somewhat) illuminated by the House of Lords 
in Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another.275  
                                                                                                                                              
address his request to Congress.” (US Supreme Court, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain et al. (No. 03-339) and 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain et al. (No. 03-485), 29 June 2004 (542 US 692), p. 738, n. 30.) 
272 See, for example, US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Alvarez-Machain v. United States et al. (No. 
99-56762) and Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa et al. (No. 99-56880), 3 June 2003 (331 F.3d 604), p. 611: 
“Although enacted in 1789 as part of the first Judiciary Act, the ATCA received little attention until 
1980 when the Second Circuit, in a comprehensive analysis of the statute, held that the ATCA provided 
subject matter jurisdiction over an action brought by Paraguayan citizens for torture – a violation of the 
law of nations – committed in Paraguay. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (Filartiga I), 630 F.2d 876 (2d 
Cir.1980). Since the Filartiga I decision, the ATCA has been invoked in a variety of actions alleging 
human rights violations. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir.1996) (affirming 
judgment under ATCA against former Ethiopian official for torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.1995) (concluding that alleged war crimes, genocide, 
torture, and other atrocities committed by a Bosnian Serb leader were actionable under the ATCA) 
[original footnote omitted, ChP]”. 
273 See also Roth 2004, p. 803: “The Sosa decision seems to have been calculated to bring a sharp halt to 
the expansion of the scope of ATS-enabled claims. It nonetheless appears to confirm the main current of 
ATS jurisprudence that has been allowed to develop without Supreme Court review in the lower courts 
over the course of twenty-four years. The precise consequences of Sosa for future Filártiga litigation are 
unclear. The Court emphasized that any norm actionable under the ATS must have levels of specificity 
and acceptance comparable to norms that were understood to be actionable in the eighteenth century. 
The decision might thus be read as repudiating human-rights-era innovations in international law 
methodology that have given more weight to the rhetorical practice of international organisations. 
Nonetheless, the Court cast no aspersions on the overall pattern of Filártiga-inspired human rights 
decisions that have issued from the lower federal courts. Indeed, Justice Scalia complained that the 
Court’s endorsement of “the very formula that led the Ninth Circuit to its result” – the requirement that 
actionable norms be “specific, universal, and obligatory” – “hardly seems to be a recipe for restraint in 
the future” [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
274 In the 1981 case Mackeson (Court of Appeal, Divisional Court, R v. Bow Street Magistrates ex parte 
Mackeson, 25 June 1981 (1982) 75 Cr. App. R. 24, see generally Choo 1994 B, p. 627), the Court 
applied Elliott (that the Court had in principle jurisdiction) and Hartley (that the Court had a discretion 
not to exercise this jurisdiction) and granted the application of the suspect (a UK citizen sought for fraud 
charges) to stop the hearing of the committal proceedings against him because his return from 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to the UK had to be seen as an “extradition by the back door” (Court of Appeal, 
Divisional Court, R v. Bow Street Magistrates ex parte Mackeson, 25 June 1981 (1982) 75 Cr. App. R. 








Paul James Bennett, a New Zealand citizen, was accused of having purchased a 
helicopter by a series of false pretences in England in 1989 and of having defaulted 
on the repayments.276  
The English police traced Bennett and his helicopter to South Africa but as there 
were no formal extradition provisions in force between the two countries, no 
proceedings for his extradition were initiated, even though special extradition 
arrangements could have been made under Section 15 of the Extradition Act 
1989:277 “It is the appellant’s case that, having taken the decision not to employ the 
extradition process, the English police colluded with the South African police to 
have the appellant arrested in South Africa and forcibly returned to this country 
against his will.”278 
Lord Griffiths first noted that this account was indeed to be assumed in this 
case.279 He then recapitulated the lack of clarity in present-day English law280 and 
noted the position of the English authorities concerning the role of the judge in the 
criminal process, namely that he should only focus on the forensic process, and 
concerning the concept of abuse of process, namely that a judge must only ensure 
                                                                                                                                              
enthusiasm, certainly not due to any conscious intent to do wrong”. (Ibid., p. 33.) This shows that even 
the non-intentional circumvention of regular extradition procedures may lead to the ending of the case.) 
This case was followed by the Divisional Court in the case R v Guilford Magistrates’ Court, ex p Healy 
[1983] 1 WLR 108. In this case, the Court accepted the idea in Mackeson that a court has a discretion not 
to exercise its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the fact of the case did not warrant this outcome as “there had 
been no attempt in Healy to circumvent the provisions of the relevant extradition treaty.” (Choo 1994 B, 
p. 627.) Thus, the aspect ‘intention’ (to circumvent the procedures) became important again: “Following 
Healy, therefore, where extradition had been deliberately avoided at the instigation of British authorities, 
the courts could exercise their discretion, but not otherwise.” (Gilbert 1998, p. 356.) The authority of 
Mackeson and Healy was, however, broken down by the decision of the Queen’s Bench Division in R. v 
Plymouth Magistrates’ Court and others, ex parte Driver (see generally Choo 1994 B, p. 628). In this 
case, the Queen’s Bench Division followed Scott, Sinclair and Elliott and concluded “that the court has 
no power to inquire into the circumstances in which a person is found in the jurisdiction for the purpose 
of refusing to try him.” (Queen’s Bench Division, R. v Plymouth Magistrates’ Court and others, ex 
parte Driver, 3 April 1985 [1985] 2 All England Law Reports 697.) The Court was of the opinion that 
Mackeson and Healy had been decided per incuriam (a decision which a subsequent court finds to be a 
mistake, and therefore not of binding precedent). See for more information on these cases, for example, 
Michell 1996, p. 462-464 and Gilbert 1998, pp. 354-356. 
275 See House of Lords, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 1993, 
[1993] 3 All England Law Reports 138ff. 
276 See House of Lords, Lord Griffiths, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 
June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 141. 
277 See ibid.  
278 Ibid. 
279 See ibid., p. 142: “It is not for your Lordships to pass judgment on where truth lies at this stage of the 
proceedings, but for the purpose of testing the submission of the respondents that a court has no 
jurisdiction to inquire into such matters it must be assumed that the English police took a deliberate 
decision not to pursue extradition procedures but to persuade the South African police to arrest and 
forcibly return the appellant to this country, under the pretext of deporting him to New Zealand via 
Heathrow so that he could be arrested at Heathrow and tried for the offences of dishonesty he is alleged 
to have committed in 1989. I shall also assume that the Crown Prosecution Service were consulted and 
approved of the behaviour of the police.” 








that the process of the court is not abused such that the trial itself is unfair.281 After 
that, he presented the position of Bennett, with which he agreed: 
 
Your Lordships are now invited to extend the concept of abuse of process a stage 
further. In the present case there is no suggestion that the appellant cannot have a fair 
trial, nor could it be suggested that it would have been unfair to try him if he had been 
returned to this country through extradition procedures. If the court is to have the 
power to interfere with the prosecution in the present circumstances it must be 
because the judiciary accept a responsibility for the maintenance of the rule of law 
that embraces a willingness to oversee executive action and to refuse to countenance 
behaviour that threatens either basic human rights or the rule of law. My Lords, I have 
no doubt that the judiciary should accept this responsibility in the field of criminal 
law. (...) [I]f it comes to the attention of the court that there has been a serious abuse 
of power it should, in my view, express its disapproval by refusing to act upon it.282  
 
                                                          
281 See House of Lords, Lord Griffiths, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 
June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 148: “Your Lordships have been urged by the 
respondents to uphold the decision of the Divisional Court and the nub of its submission is that the role 
of the judge is confined to the forensic process. The judge, it is said, is concerned to see that the accused 
has a fair trial and that the process of the court is not manipulated to his disadvantage so that the trial 
itself is unfair; but the wider issues of the rule of law and the behaviour of those charged with its 
enforcement, be they police or prosecuting authority, are not the concern of the judiciary unless they 
impinge directly on the trial process.” 
282 Ibid., p. 150. Note that Lord Griffiths’ position is different with respect to magistrates (who deal with 
small cases and who may not even have had a legal training): “I would (…) affirm the power of the 
magistrates, whether sitting as committing justices or exercising their summary jurisdiction, to exercise 
control over their proceedings through an abuse of process jurisdiction. However, in the case of 
magistrates this power should be strictly confined to matters directly affecting the fairness of the 
particular accused with whom they are dealing, such as delay or unfair manipulation of court 
procedures. (…) [I]f a serious question arises as to the deliberate abuse of extradition procedures a 
magistrate should allow an adjournment so that an application can be made to the Divisional Court, 
which I regard as the proper forum in which such a decision should be taken.” (Ibid., p. 152.) Cf. also 
House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 
1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 169: “It would (…) be convenient (as well as correct, in my 
view) if the examining magistrates could not stay for abuse of process [emphasis in original, ChP]”. See 
for criticism on this view, Choo 1994 B, pp. 634-635: “It is submitted that, contrary to the view of Lord 
Griffiths, magistrates (whether sitting in committal proceedings or summary proceedings) should have 
the power to stay proceedings even if no ‘fair trial’ issue is involved. The distinction which Lord 
Griffiths attempts to draw between situations in which stays are ordered because a fair trial is 
impossible, and other cases, is not as clear-cut as might first appear. Lord Griffiths appears to have 
assumed, for example, that the sole reason for staying proceedings on account of delay is to ensure that 
the accused is afforded a fair trial. Yet, as I have argued elsewhere, proceedings brought after a delay 
may be stayed to ensure a fair trial and/or to protect the moral integrity of the criminal process. Thus, 
even if there is no danger of wrongful conviction, the delay may, by causing the accused to suffer 
oppression, anxiety and concern, have compromised the moral integrity of the criminal process to such 
an extent that a stay of the proceedings is justified. (…) To put an accused through the delay of applying 
to the Divisional Court for a stay, rather than allowing the accused the simple expedient of seeking a 
stay from the magistrates, ignores the fact that ‘a plea of abuse should be open to the accused subject at 








After having detailed on the specific context of extradition,283 he concluded as 
follows: 
 
The courts, of course, have no power to apply direct discipline to the police or the 
prosecuting authorities, but they can refuse to allow them to take advantage of abuse 
of power by regarding their behaviour as an abuse of process and thus preventing a 
prosecution. In my view your Lordships should now declare that where process of 
law is available to return an accused to this country through extradition procedures 
our courts will refuse to try him if he has been forcibly brought within our jurisdiction 
in disregard of those procedures by a process to which our own police, prosecuting or 
other executive authorities have been a knowing party.284  
 
Although the threshold presented here by Lord Griffiths seems quite clear285 (if the 
Executive had been a knowing party to a process which disregards the proper 
extradition proceedings, the courts would refuse jurisdiction), the automatism 
captured in the words “will refuse” is replaced by a discretion a couple of sentence 
later286 (showing that judges should arguably try harder to write in such a way that 
the message they want to get across also gets across).  
Lord Bridge of Harwich agreed with Lord Griffiths. However, it can be argued 
that his test is a little stricter, as, in his view, the domestic authorities really have to 
do something irregular (and not only be a knowing party to the irregular conduct by, 
for example, foreign authorities).287  
After having stressed the importance of the Judiciary protecting the law,288 he 
wrote the following (and now oft-quoted) words:  
                                                          
283 See House of Lords, Lord Griffiths, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 
June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 150-151: “Let us consider the position in the context of 
extradition. Extradition procedures are designed not only to ensure that criminals are returned from one 
country to another but also to protect the rights of those who are accused of crimes by the requesting 
country. (...) If a practice developed in which the police or prosecuting authorities of this country 
ignored extradition procedures and secured the return of an accused by a mere request to police 
colleagues in another country they would be flouting the extradition procedures and depriving the 
accused of the safeguards built into the extradition process for his benefit. It is to my mind unthinkable 
that in such circumstances the court should declare itself to be powerless and stand idly by”. 
284 Ibid., p. 151. 
285 It is, however, not clear from these words whether the non-use of the extradition procedures has to be 
intentional or not. It seems however that it has. See, for example, the words “serious abuse of power” 
(see the final sentence of n. 282 and accompanying text) and the words “deliberate abuse of extradition 
procedures” (see n. 282). 
286 See House of Lords, Lord Griffiths, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 
June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 152: “The High Court in the exercise of its supervisory 
jurisdiction has power to inquire into the circumstances by which a person has been brought within the 
jurisdiction and if satisfied that it was in disregard of extradition procedures it may stay the prosecution 
and order the release of the accused [emphasis added, ChP].” 
287 See also Arnell 2004, p. 257: “The position in England and Wales (...) appears to be that the courts 
will inquire into renditions where UK authorities have participated in wrongdoing and, perhaps, where 
they had knowledge of it.” 
288 See House of Lords, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and 
another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 155: “In the Connelly case [Connelly v DPP 








There is, I think, no principle more basic to any proper system of law than the 
maintenance of the rule of law itself. When it is shown that the law enforcement 
agency responsible for bringing a prosecution has only been enabled to do so by 
participating in violations of international law[289] and of the laws of another state in 
order to secure the presence of the accused within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court, I think that respect for the rule of law demands that the court take cognisance of 
that circumstance. To hold that the court may turn a blind eye to executive 
lawlessness beyond the frontiers of its own jurisdiction is, to my mind, an insular and 
unacceptable view. Having then taken cognisance of the lawlessness it would again 
appear to me to be a wholly inadequate response for the court to hold that the only 
remedy lies in civil proceedings at the suit of the defendant or in disciplinary or 
criminal proceedings against the individual officers of the law enforcement agency 
who were concerned in the illegal action taken. Since the prosecution could never 
have been brought if the defendant had not been illegally abducted, the whole 
proceeding is tainted. (…) It is apt, in my view, to describe these circumstances (…) 
as an ‘abuse of the criminal jurisdiction in general’ or indeed (…) as a ‘degradation’ 
of the court’s criminal process. To hold that in these circumstances the court may 
decline to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground that its process has been abused may 
be an extension of the doctrine of abuse of process but is, in my view, a wholly proper 
and necessary one.290 
 
The third Lord, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, disagreed with the first two.  
He was of the opinion that a person whose rights were violated by executive 
action has a civil remedy, and that this remedy, even though it may not be an ideal 
one, an easy available one or an adequate one, is the one provided by the law.291 The 
way of repairing these wrongs proposed by Bennett, namely by refusing jurisdiction, 
would in his eyes lead to undesirable results.292  
                                                                                                                                              
(…) said that “the courts cannot contemplate for a moment the transference to the Executive of the 
responsibility for seeing that the process of law is not abused” … Those remarks involve an important 
statement of constitutional principle. They assert the independent strength of the judiciary to protect the 
law by protecting its own purposes and function. It is essential to keep in mind that it is “the process of 
law”, to use Lord Devlin’s phrase, that is the issue. It is not something limited to the conventional 
practices or procedures of the Court system. It is the function and purpose of the Courts as a separate 
part of the constitutional machinery that must be protected from abuse rather than the particular 
processes that are used within the machine. It may be that the shorthand phrase “abuse of process” by 
itself does not give sufficient emphasis to the principle that in this context the Court must react not so 
much against an abuse of the procedure that has been built up to enable the determination of a criminal 
charge as against the much wider and more serious abuse of the criminal jurisdiction in general.” (See 
for the Connelly case also n. 127 and accompanying text.) 
289 Michell notes that Lord Bridge of Harwich’s point concerning the violation of international law 
“suggests an international human rights dimension to the case [original footnote omitted, ChP]” 
(Michell 1996. p. 472) because the case itself “involved no violations of either customary international 
law or of a treaty”. (Ibid.) 
290 House of Lords, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and 
another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 155-156. See also n. 437 and accompanying 
text of Chapter III. 
291 See ibid., p. 156. 
292 See ibid.: “The results of the assumption of such a jurisdiction are threefold; and they are surprising. 








He thereby specifically focused on the public interest in the prosecution and 
punishment of crime, a point which is reminiscent of Judge Schermers’ dissenting 
opinion in the Bozano case, see Subsection 2.2.4 of Chapter III.293  
The exact position of this Lord, like Lord Griffiths, is not clear, however.  
On the one hand, he seems to indicate that, notwithstanding the above-mentioned 
arguments, there may be a cogent reason that justifies a refusal of jurisdiction (but 
that only in this case, such a reason was not present).294 On the other hand, however, 
he makes a general remark which undermines that thought: 
 
I do not consider that, either as a matter of established law or as a matter of principle, 
a criminal court should be concerned to entertain questions as to the propriety of 
anterior executive acts of the law enforcement agencies which have no bearing upon 
the fairness or propriety of the trial process or the ability of the accused to defend 
himself against charges properly brought against him.295  
 
As this idea is expressed in other words elsewhere in his opinion,296 one can assume 
(although it is, due to the ‘cogent reason’ statement mentioned above, not entirely 
                                                                                                                                              
charged (if guilty) will escape a just punishment; secondly, the civil remedies available to that person 
will remain enforceable; and thirdly, the public interest in the prosecution and punishment of crime will 
have been defeated not by a necessary process of penalising those responsible for executive abuse but 
simply for the purpose of manifesting judicial disapproval. It is, of course, axiomatic that a person 
charged with having committed a criminal offence should receive a fair trial and that, if he cannot be 
tried fairly for that offence, he should not be tried for it at all. But it is also axiomatic that there is a 
strong public interest in the prosecution and punishment of crime.” 
293 See also Michell 1996, p. 444. 
294 See House of Lords, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and 
another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 156: “Absent any suggestion of unfairness or 
oppression in the trial process, an application to the court charged with the trial of a criminal offence 
(…), whether that application be made at the trial or at earlier committal proceedings, to order the 
discontinuance of the prosecution and the discharge of the accused on the ground of some anterior 
executive activity in which the court is in no way implicated requires to be justified by some very cogent 
reason. Making, as I do, every assumption in favour of the appellant as regards the veracity of the 
evidence which he has adduced and the implications sought to be drawn from it, I discern no such 
cogent reason in the instant case.” 
295 Ibid. 
296 See ibid., pp. 157-160: “It is not, of course, in dispute that the court has power to prevent the abuse of 
its own process and that must, I would accept, include power to investigate the bona fides of the charge 
which it is called upon to try and to decline to entertain a charge instituted in bad faith or oppressively 
(…). (…) Where, however, there is no suggestion that the charge is other than bona fide or that there is 
any unfairness in the trial process, the duty of the criminal court is simply to try the case and I can see 
no ground upon which it can claim a discretion, or upon which it ought properly to be invited, to 
discontinue the proceedings and discharge an accused who is properly charged simply because of some 
alleged anterior excess or unlawful act on the part of the executive officers concerned with his 
apprehension and detention. That is not for a moment to suggest that such abuses, if they occur, are 
unimportant or are to be lightly accepted; but they are acts for which, if they are unlawful, the accused 
has the same remedies as those available to any other citizen whose legal rights have been infringed. If 
they are not only unlawful but are criminal as well, they are themselves remediable by criminal 
prosecution. That a judge may disapprove of or even be rightly outraged by the manner in which an 
accused has been apprehended or by his treatment whilst in custody cannot, however, provide a ground 








clear) that this is in fact his opinion on these matters, namely that a judge should not 
look at alleged pre-trial irregularities which have nothing to do with the fairness of 
the trial itself.  
The next Lord, Lord Lowry, began his opinion with the words:  
 
I accept the conclusion of my noble and learned friends, Lord Griffiths and Lord 
Bridge of Harwich, that the court has a discretion to stay as an abuse of process 
criminal proceedings brought against an accused person who has been brought before 
the court by abduction in a foreign country participated in or encouraged by British 
authorities.297 
 
Although one can wonder whether that was indeed the conclusion reached by Lord 
Griffiths,298 it is immediately clear what Lord Lowry’s position is.  
                                                                                                                                              
according to law. (…) Experience shows that allegations of abusive use of executive power in the 
apprehension of those accused of criminal offences are far from rare. (…) So far as there is substance in 
such allegations, such abuses are disgraceful and regrettable and they may, no doubt, be said to reflect 
very ill on the administration of justice in the broadest sense of that term. But they provide no 
justification nor, so far as I am aware, is there any authority for the proposition that wrongful treatment 
of an accused, having no bearing upon the fairness of the trial process, entitles him to demand that he be 
not tried for an offence with which he has been properly charged. Indeed, any such general jurisdiction 
of a criminal court to investigate and adjudicate upon antecedent executive acts would be productive of 
hopeless uncertainty. It clearly cannot be the case that every excessive use of executive power entitles 
the accused to be exonerated. But then at what point and at what degree of outrage is the criminal court 
to undertake an inquiry and, if satisfied, to take upon itself the responsibility of refusing further to try 
the case? (…) [T]he arrest and detention of the accused are not part of the trial process upon which the 
criminal court has the duty to embark. Of course, executive officers are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
courts. If they act unlawfully, they may and should be civilly liable. If they act criminally, they may and 
should be prosecuted. But I can see no reason why the antecedent activities, whatever the degree of 
outrage or affront they may occasion, should be thought to justify the assumption by a criminal court of 
a jurisdiction to terminate a properly instituted criminal process which it is its duty to try.” 
297 House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 
1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 160. It is because of these words that Arnell (see n. 287) argues 
that Bennett probably supports the idea that the authorities in the UK must actually have done something 
improper themselves: “The term “knowing party” [see the quotation of Lord Griffiths at n. 284 and 
accompanying text, ChP] can be construed as referring to only the situation where the authorities 
participated in the wrongdoing or where they merely knew of wrongdoing as well. Lending weight to 
the former interpretation is the slightly different formulation suggested by Lord Lowry (...) “that the 
court has a discretion to stay as an abuse of process criminal proceedings brought before the court by 
abduction in a foreign country participated in or encouraged by British authorities”.” (Arnell 2004, p. 
257, n. 31.) 
298 As mentioned supra, Lord Griffiths does not only refer to a discretion (House of Lords, Lord 
Griffiths, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All 
England Law Reports 152: “The High Court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction has power to 
inquire into the circumstances by which a person has been brought within the jurisdiction and if satisfied 
that it was in disregard of extradition procedures it may stay the prosecution and order the release of the 
accused [emphasis added, ChP].”) but also to an automatism, see ibid., p. 151: “In my view your 
Lordships should now declare that where process of law is available to return an accused to this country 
through extradition procedures our courts will refuse to try him if he has been forcibly brought within 
our jurisdiction in disregard of those procedures by a process to which our own police, prosecuting or 
other executive authorities have been a knowing party [emphasis added, ChP].” The summary of Lord 








Lord Lowry, who first explained that abuse of process means “abuse of the 
process of the court which is to try the accused”,299 proposed the following, and 
indeed already presented (see footnote 610 and accompanying text of Chapter III), 
test:    
 
[A] court has a discretion to stay any criminal proceedings on the ground that to try 
those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process either (1) because it will 
be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) 
because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the 
accused in the circumstances of a particular case.300  
 
Lord Lowry hereby noted, however, that this discretion must be sparingly exercised 
– and that he is confident that this will happen301 – and that it should not be relied 
upon to disapprove of certain executive misconduct.302 (Nevertheless, one can 
understand that certain misconduct may offend the court’s sense of justice to be 
                                                                                                                                              
only referred to a discretion: “To hold that in these circumstances the court may decline to exercise its 
jurisdiction on the ground that its process has been abused may be an extension of the doctrine of abuse 
of process but is, in my view, a wholly proper and necessary one [emphasis added, ChP].” (House of 
Lords, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 
1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 155-156.) See also Michell 1996, p. 471: “[T]he Law Lords 
were ambiguous as to whether there is a duty to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over an individual who 
has been brought unlawfully before a court, or merely a discretion to do so.” 
299 House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 
1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 160. 
300 Ibid., p. 161. 
301 See also ibid., p. 163: “I regard it as essential to the rule of law that the court should not have to make 
available its process and thereby indorse (on what I am confident will be a very few occasions) 
unworthy conduct when it is proved against the executive or its agents, however humble in rank. And, 
remembering that it is not jurisdiction which is in issue but the exercise of a discretion to stay 
proceedings, while speaking of ‘unworthy conduct’, I would not expect a court to stay the proceedings 
of every trial which has been preceded by a venial irregularity. If it be objected that my preferred 
solution replaces certainty by uncertainty [cf. the words of Lord Oliver of Aylmerton in n. 296, ChP], 
the latter quality is inseparable from judicial discretion. And, if the principles are clear and, as I trust, the 
cases few, the prospect is not really daunting.” Note, however, that Lord Lowry also makes a remark 
which implicitly accepts that the possibility that judicial refusals to exercise jurisdiction may occur more 
often than his expectations reflect here (but that it is entirely up to the Executive to stop these by acting 
correctly): “No ‘floodgates’ argument applies because the executive can stop the flood at source by 
refraining from impropriety.” (Ibid.) Finally, it is worth mentioning that Michell (1996, p. 499), writing 
about the for this study very interesting factor ‘seriousness of the charges’ (in deciding whether or not 
there is an abuse of process) notes that this factor “might be implied from Lord Lowry’s suggestion that 
not every “venial irregularity” should result in a stay [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Although that 
might indeed be the case, it seems, however, that Lord Lowry is not focusing here on the seriousness of 
the suspect’s charges but rather on the seriousness of the irregularity itself. 
302 See House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 
June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 161: “I agree that prima facie it is the duty of a court to 
try a person who is charged before it with an offence which the court has power to try and therefore that 
the jurisdiction to stay must be exercised carefully and sparingly and only for very compelling reasons. 
The discretion to stay is not a disciplinary jurisdiction and ought not to be exercised in order to express 
the court’s disapproval of official conduct. Accordingly, if the prosecuting authorities have been guilty 
of culpable delay but the prospect of a fair trial has not been prejudiced, the court ought not to stay the 








asked to try the accused and furthermore that a stay of the proceedings will be seen 
as a disapproval of such misconduct.)303  
Hence, if the judges feel that to continue to exercise jurisdiction, even if there 
has been some executive misconduct, does not amount to an abuse of the court’s 
own process (for example, because a fair trial is still possible or because it does not 
offend the court’s sense of justice to be asked to try the accused in these 
circumstances), the judges can indeed continue to exercise jurisdiction.  
A final point of Lord Lowry’s opinion which should be mentioned here is that 
he, after having repeated the rationale behind the idea that a court has a discretion to 
refuse jurisdiction in certain cases,304 stressed the protection of international law in 
this matter.305  
Because this case involved neither a violation of an extradition treaty (although it 
could be seen as a circumvention of extradition arrangements) nor a violation of 
State sovereignty, this reasoning has to be viewed generally and not related to the 
specifics of this case. Nevertheless, one could argue that it could perhaps be seen as 
evidence for the idea that their Lordships are thinking about international human 
rights law here.306 
The last Lord, Lord Slynn of Hadley, was very concise and simply agreed  
 
with Lord Griffiths that the question should be answered in the way he proposes. It 
does not seem to me to be right in principle that, when a person is brought within the 
                                                          
303 See House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 
June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 163: “If proceedings are stayed when wrongful conduct is 
proved, the result will not only be a sign of judicial disapproval but will discourage similar conduct in 
future and thus will tend to maintain the purity of the stream of justice.”  
304 See ibid., pp. 162-163: “[T]he court, in order to protect its own process from being degraded and 
misused, must have the power to stay proceedings which have come before it and have only been made 
possible by acts which offend the court’s conscience as being contrary to the rule of law. Those acts by 
providing a morally unacceptable foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction over the suspect taint the 
proposed trial and, if tolerated, will mean that the court’s process has been abused. Therefore, although 
the power of the court is rightly confined to its inherent power to protect itself against the abuse of its 
own process, I respectfully cannot agree that the facts relied on in cases such as the present case (as 
alleged) ‘have nothing to do with that process’ just because they are not part of the process. They are the 
indispensable foundation for the holding of the trial.” 
305 See ibid., p. 163: “The implications for international law, as represented by extradition treaties, are 
significant. If a suspect is extradited from a foreign country to this country he cannot be tried for an 
offence which is different from that specified in the warrant and, subject always to the treaty’s express 
provisions, cannot be tried for a political offence. But, if he is kidnapped in the foreign country and 
brought here, he may be charged with any offence, including a political offence. If British officialdom at 
any level has participated in or encouraged the kidnapping, it seems to represent a grave contravention 
of international law, the comity of nations and the rule of law generally if our courts allow themselves to 
be used by the executive to try an offence which the courts would not be dealing with if the rule of law 
had prevailed. It may be said that a guilty accused finding himself in the circumstances predicated is not 
deserving of much sympathy, but the principle involved goes beyond the scope of such a pragmatic 
observation and even beyond the rights of those victims who are or may be innocent. It affects the 
proper administration of justice according to the rule of law and with respect to international law.” From 
ns. 289-290 and accompanying text, it became already clear that Lord Bridge of Harwich referred to the 
importance of respect for international law (through the concept of ‘rule of law’). 








jurisdiction in the way alleged in this case (which for present purposes must be 
assumed to be true) and charged, that the court should not be competent to investigate 
the illegality alleged, and if satisfied as to the illegality to refuse to proceed to trial.307  
 
As a result, the appeal of Bennett was allowed and the case was remitted to the 
Divisional Court for further consideration (it should be remembered that their 
Lordships decided this case on the basis of assumed facts only).308  
Although the opinions of the concurring Lords are not entirely identical – as was 
shown above, Lord Griffiths also suggested a mandatory sanction in that the courts 
must refuse jurisdiction in circumstances comparable to those of this case309 – it can 
be asserted that Lord Lowry’s statement that 
 
a court has a discretion to stay any criminal proceedings on the ground that to try 
those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process either (1) because it will 
be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) 
because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the 
accused in the circumstances of a particular case.310  
                                                          
307 House of Lords, Lord Slynn of Hadley, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 
24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 169. 
308 See n. 279. Michell (1996, p. 469) notes that “[i]n in the Divisional Court, the fugitive’s allegations 
were subsequently made out, although the court’s decision is rather unsatisfactory [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” Hence, the male captus in this case – a deliberate circumvention of the extradition 
procedures in which the authorities which can be connected to the prosecuting forum were involved – 
led to the refusal of jurisdiction. As a result, it can be argued that even though the decision quite often 
speaks of a discretion, a situation like the one here will, probably, normally lead to the ending of the 
case. See also Jones and Doobay 2004, p. 95: “Although the majority use the framework of the abuse of 
process doctrine, in which the word “discretion”, rightly or wrongly, is frequently employed, the 
trenchant words of Lord Griffiths and Lord Bridge, and to a lesser extent Lord Lowry, appear to leave 
little or no room for the operation of a discretion or balancing exercise, where an abduction abroad in 
breach of extradition procedures has been found.” (It must be emphasised that the observations in the 
Bennett case leave room for the view that this is so, even if one cannot speak of a proper abduction 
(without the consent of the injured State), which did not occur here.) Be that as it may, because Bennett 
also faced fraud charges in Scotland, a Scottish arrest warrant was issued against him and remained 
outstanding “after it was determined that the finding of the English divisional court on the merits of 
Bennett’s allegations did not bind a Scottish court. The Scottish court, while acknowledging the 
weakness of the male captus bene detentus rule after Bennett (…), interpreted the facts of the case 
differently than the English divisional court [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Michell 1996, p. 470.) 
Hence, it did not believe that there had been collusion between the English and the South African 
authorities. “Moreover, even had the English authorities acted improperly, there was no evidence that 
the Scottish authorities had also acted improperly. The unlawfulness of the actions of the English police 
under English law could not affect Scottish proceedings. Bennett’s jurisdictional challenge was 
dismissed.” (Ibid., p. 471.) This last position affirms that the prosecuting State’s own authorities must 
have done something irregular, see also n. 313 and accompanying text. 
309 See House of Lords, Lord Griffiths, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 
June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 151. See also Choo 1994 B, p. 631. 
310 House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 








may come close to the core of the Bennett case.311  
However, this statement is still rather generally formulated. A summary of the 
Bennett case312 showing more concretely what is needed was formulated in the 1998 
Westfallen case, discussed by Warbrick: 
 
The question is … whether it appears that the police or the prosecuting authorities 
have acted illegally or procured or connived at unlawful procedures or violated 
international law or the domestic law of foreign States or abused their powers in a 
way that should lead this court to stay the proceedings against the applicants [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].313 
 
According to the ICTY Trial Chamber in the 2002 Nikolić case (see Subsection 
3.1.4 of the next chapter), which used the summary of the All England Law Reports 
to clarify what their Lordships decided in this case,314 the Bennett approach “is now 
generally considered to be the ruling principle for cases where representatives of a 
State have been involved in a violation of international law and which amount to a 
violation of the rule of law.”315 That may indeed be the case, but it is arguably only 
a small part of what Bennett stands for (see the summary from the Westfallen case). 
                                                          
311 See, for example, ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, ‘Decision on 
Preliminary Motions’, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, 8 November 2001, para. 49. (See Subsection 3.1.3 of the 
next chapter for the discussion of this case.) 
312 Note, however, that this summary takes into account not only the English Bennett case but also the 
Scottish Bennett case, see n. 308. 
313 Warbrick 2000, p. 492, referring to the words of the Lord Chief Justice in this case. See also ibid., p. 
493: “In his concurring judgment [to the Westfallen case, ChP], Hooper J suggested that collusion 
between national authorities to circumvent extradition proceedings was the minimum threshold for a 
successful application under the Bennett principle [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See, however, 
Currie 2007, pp. 357-358: “The Law Lords concluded that by way of the abuse of process doctrine, 
courts may inquire into the manner in which an accused was brought before them and may stay the 
prosecution if the circumstances warrant. In this case, the authorities’ deliberate flouting of the 
extradition arrangements, inter alia, rendered such a remedy appropriate. It seems clear, however, that it 
was not the subverting of extradition procedures itself that was so offensive to the court; rather, the 
matter was one of respect for the rule of law in the global sense [original footnote omitted, ChP]”. 
314 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
87 or House of Lords, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 
3 All England Law Reports 138-139: “[t]he maintenance of the rule of law prevailed over the public 
interest in the prosecution and punishment of crime where the prosecuting authority had secured the 
prisoner’s presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court by forcibly abducting him or having 
him abducted from within the jurisdiction of some other state in violation of international law, the law of 
the state from which he had been abducted and his rights under the laws of that state and in disregard of 
available procedures to secure his lawful extradition to the jurisdiction of the court from the state where 
he was residing. It was an abuse of process for a person to be forcibly brought within the jurisdiction in 
disregard of extradition procedures available for the return of an accused person to the United Kingdom 
… [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
315 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 87. The 
statement of Lord Lowry is rather broad and can arguably encompass more situations than mere 
circumventions of extradition procedures (as was the case in this specific situation). See also Sloan 2003 








However, the following words of the Trial Chamber, namely that “[t]he rule of law 
is clearly interpreted here [namely in the Bennett case, ChP] as demanding only a 
fair trial for an accused”,316 are arguably incorrect as the rule of law may also be 
violated when the accused can still enjoy a fair trial but when “it offends the court’s 
sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of a 
particular case”, see the above-mentioned quotation of Lord Lowry at footnote 310 
and accompanying text.  
One point in this case still needs to be discussed. Although their Lordships state 
that judges may stay the proceedings if certain misconduct amounts to an abuse of 
process, they do not really clarify which aspects will probably be taken into account 
by the judges in their balancing exercise whether or not to stay the proceedings.  
In literature however, such forecasts have been made. Choo, in his commentary 
of the case, for example, predicts: 
 
If a stay were discretionary, the court would, in deciding whether to order a stay, 
presumably take into account considerations such as: (i) whether the illegal 
extradition of the accused was accompanied by physical violence (if so, this would 
weigh heavily in favour of a stay); (ii) whether the police were acting in 
circumstances of urgency (if so, this would weigh against a stay); and (iii) the 
seriousness of the offence with which the accused is charged (the more serious the 
offence, the less likely the court would be to stay the proceedings).317 
 
It is clear that this last argument, which Choo repeats when discussing the possible 
position of Lord Griffiths that a stay should always be ordered when a person has 
been illegally extradited,318 is, of course, very interesting for the context of the 
international criminal tribunals (see the next chapter) which have to deal with 
suspects of very serious crimes.  
                                                          
316 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 87. As will be 
shown in the next chapter, the ICTY Trial Chamber itself followed the correct test, recognising that 
jurisdiction can also be refused, even if the suspect can still enjoy a fair trial, see ibid., para. 111 and n. 
528 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
317 Choo 1994 B, p. 631. 
318 See ibid., p. 632: “It is possible, of course, that what Lord Griffiths meant to suggest in Bennett was 
that circumvention by the police of proper extradition procedures is such heinous misconduct that there 
are no circumstances in which it should ever be excused. Illegal extradition, it may be argued, can never 
be considered a venial irregularity. Thus, while in a normal case all relevant considerations ought to be 
weighed up to determine whether the proceedings should be stayed on account of the pre-trial executive 
impropriety, cases involving illegal extradition are sui generis. This is an attractive argument, but it is 
not entirely clear that there can never be situations where the heinousness of illegal extradition appears 
insignificant when viewed against the heinousness of the offence with which the accused is charged. We 
have seen that the Crown case against Bennett was that he had raised the finance to purchase a 
helicopter by a series of false pretences and had defaulted on the repayments. One wonders how willing 
a court would be to stay a prosecution for mass murder on the basis that the English police circumvented 
the relevant extradition procedures in securing the return of the accused to England. Yet a stay is 









Indeed, one should not forget that Bennett was merely charged with fraud. 
Would their Lordships have come to the same conclusion if Bennett was, for 
example, charged with mass murder or genocide?319 Choo believes that it is 
inappropriate “to hold that a mandatory stay should be ordered in every case where a 
prosecution has been commenced in consequence of an illegal extradition [emphasis 
in original, ChP]”,320 that a discretionary approach in which all the relevant 
considerations can be weighed is hence to be preferred321 and that two 
considerations in particular may lead to a bene detentus outcome:    
 
(i) the offence charged may be an especially heinous one; and (ii) it may be possible 
to excuse the illegal extradition of suspects whose continued freedom was considered 
to pose ‘a grave threat to national security (the foreign leader plotting for war against 
us, or the active terrorist).’ [original footnotes omitted, ChP]322  
 
However, that this view can be found in literature is one thing, but does it also 
appear in actual case law? It seems that it does.  
In the 1995 male captus bene deditus case In Re Schmidt,323 the way in which 
Norbert Schmidt was brought to England was the subject of proceedings. This 
German national, who was charged by the German authorities with serious drug 
offences,324 was lured from Ireland to England before being extradited to Germany 
to stand trial there. Schmidt, of course, protested, arguing that  
 
the ruse adopted by D.S. Jones [the English Detective Sergeant who set up the luring 
operation, ChP] to persuade him to come to the United Kingdom was an abuse of 
power by the executive and an abuse if process of the courts of England and Wales 
which vitiated the whole extradition proceedings.325  
                                                          
319 See the previous footnote (where Choo speculates about the position of Lord Griffiths in such a 
case). See also D. Baragwanath, ‘Liberty and Justice in the Face of Terrorist Threats to Society’, 
Address to Alumni, University of Auckland, 4 March 2006, available at: 
http://www.law.auckland.ac.nz/uoa/fms/default/law/news/docs/Terrorism_March%2006.pdf, p. 4: “But 
should the Horseferry Road case, which concerned simple dishonesty over acquiring a helicopter, be 
applied to an Eichmann?” See finally also McNeal and Field 2007, pp. 516-517. 
320 Choo 1994 B, p. 633. 
321 See ibid. 
322 Ibid. 
323 House of Lords, In Re Schmidt, 30 June 1994, [1995] 1 A.C. 339ff. (Decision of the Divisional Court 
of the Queen’s Bench Division: pp. 342-362. Decision of the House of Lords: pp. 362ff.) 
324 See House of Lords, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, In Re Schmidt, 30 June 1994, [1995] 1 A.C. 380: 
“The 58 German charges outstanding against the applicant suggest that he may be a substantial 
international dealer in drugs.” 
325 Ibid., p. 369. See ibid., pp. 368-369 for more information on the operation: “The appellant applicant, 
who is a German national, is accused by the prosecuting authorities in Mannheim of having on some 58 
occasions in Germany supplied and possessed cannabis which he had imported from Holland to a total 
of more than 386 kilograms between 1987 and 1991. Having moved his place of abode from Germany 
to Ireland he was arrested in the latter country on 12 August 1991 and charged with being in possession 
of drugs. On 13 August 1991 an international warrant of arrest was issued by the court in Mannheim and 
the German authorities proceeded to set in motion procedure in Ireland for extradition. On 24 September 








Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, with whom all the other Lords concurred, first stated 
that the Bennett principle was not valid in the circumstances of this case in which a 
person was not brought to England to stand trial but merely to be held there before 
being extradited to a third country. Although Schmidt argued that the House of 
Lords had to be aware not to create “an anomaly between a person who is kidnapped 
and brought into the country to be tried here and a person who is brought here not to 
be tried here”,326 Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, following the reasoning of the 
respondents,327 stated:        
 
My Lords, I am satisfied that Bennett has no such general application as the applicant 
contends. The issue in that case was whether the English courts should decline to try 
the accused by staying the prosecution. That the power to intervene, which was held 
to exist in the High Court, was related only to a trial is abundantly clear from the 
passages in the speeches to which I have referred. Indeed, there was no reason in that 
case to consider the power in any other context. (...) In my view the position in 
relation to a pending trial in England is wholly different to that in relation to pending 
proceedings for extradition from England. In the former case the High Court in its 
supervisory jurisdiction is the only bulwark against any abuse of process resulting in 
injustice or oppression which may have resulted in the accused being brought to trial 
in England. In the latter case, not only has the Secretary of State power to refuse to 
surrender the accused in such circumstances but the courts of the requesting authority 
are likely to have powers similar to those held to exist in Reg. v. Horseferry Road 
                                                                                                                                              
authorities informed the German authorities that the extradition warrant was not in order. No further 
steps towards extradition were thereafter taken by the German authorities. During 1992 New Scotland 
Yard received information that the applicant was living in Waterford and was making frequent visits to 
the United Kingdom using false British and E.E.C. passports to conceal his true identity. There was also 
information that he had visited Italy and Belgium using such passports. In September 1992 Detective 
Sergeant Jones, an officer of the extradition squad of the International and Organised Crime Branch of 
the Metropolitan Police, decided to investigate whether the applicant might be involved in terrorist 
activities and had committed offences in connection with forged passports. It is accepted that there was 
no evidence to connect the applicant with terrorist activities. D.S. Jones also obtained the authority of a 
senior officer to pass himself off as an officer investigating cheque fraud in the hope that he could 
thereby persuade the applicant to meet him in England, where the applicant could be arrested on a 
provisional warrant if the German Government were to request his extradition. Thereafter D.S. Jones 
telephoned the applicant and his solicitor in Ireland and explained that he was investigating a cheque 
fraud allegedly committed by a Mr. N. Schmidt and that he was anxious to exclude the applicant from 
his inquiries. He invited the applicant to come to England to be interviewed and on being asked by his 
solicitor what would happen if the applicant did not attend the interview he said that it would be the 
normal practice to circulate his name as that of a suspect and that he would be arrested when his 
presence in the United Kingdom next came to the notice of the authorities. The respondents accept that 
there was no truth in the cheque fraud suggestion and that this was simply a device to persuade the 
applicant to enter the United Kingdom. On 17 November 1992 D.S. Jones met the applicant’s solicitor 
by arrangement in Green Park and shortly thereafter he met the applicant who accompanied him to 
Charing Cross Police Station where he was arrested on a provisional warrant issued that morning.” 
326 House of Lords, In Re Schmidt, 30 June 1994, [1995] 1 A.C. 364. Schmidt hereby referred to an older 
decision, which, according to him, their Lordships were not to follow. 
327 Who argued that “[t]here is (...) nothing anomalous in the submission that Reg. v. Horseferry Road 
Magistrates’ Court, Ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 A.C. 42 does not apply to extradition proceedings, where, 
unlike domestic criminal proceedings, the courts are not called on to make any final determination of 








Magistrates’ Court, Ex parte Bennett.[328] An accused fugitive is thus likely to have 
not one but two safeguards against injustice and oppression before being brought to 
trial in the requesting state. It must also be remembered that the extradition 
procedures to which this appeal relates flow from the European Convention on 
Extradition and are designed to facilitate the return of accused or convicted persons 
from one contracting state to another. The removal of the requirement that the 
requesting state should provide prima facie evidence of the alleged crime 
demonstrates that extradition proceedings between contracting states were intended to 
be simple and speedy, each state accepting that it could rely upon the genuineness and 
bona fides of a request made by another one.[329] (...) To confer on the High Court a 
power such as the applicant contends for would be to inhibit the carrying out of this 
intention.330 
 
Although one will understand that a trial court is not the same as an ‘extraditing’ 
court, one can wonder whether the idea behind the above-mentioned passage may 
not lead to unfair situations. One can agree with Justice Sedley (of the Divisional 
Court in this case) that all courts (whether trial courts or ‘extraditing’ courts) have 
an obligation to prevent abuse of their process.331 If that were not the case, then a 
court would be powerless to stop the extradition of a person who was clearly 
abducted from another country before being brought before the ‘extraditing’ court. It 
can be argued that these situations need to be avoided.332  
Even though the above-mentioned conclusion of Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle 
was in itself enough to dismiss Schmidt’s appeal, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle also 
looked at the hypothetical situation that the Court would have a Bennett-like 
discretion. In other words: would the luring operation in this case call for a stay of 
                                                          
328 One can seriously wonder whether that would then lead to a dismissal of the case. It is not hard to 
agree with Michell when he writes: “Lord Jauncey’s argument that a court of the requesting state would 
take into account the manner in which the fugitive came before it is (...) open to some doubt. In Schmidt 
II, it would seem unlikely that a German court would stay the proceedings against the fugitive in 
Germany unless he could show that the German authorities had been responsible for his allegedly 
unlawful return to England.” (Michell 1996, p. 480.) See also Choo 1995, p. 874. 
329 This makes Michell wonder whether this means that judges should have more power to investigate 
these issues in cases where there is no such a system (of trust): “It may be (...) that Schmidt II is limited 
in its application to extradition proceedings under the European Convention on Extradition. In a case 
where extradition is sought by a non-Convention state there may be less room for the trust in the quality 
of foreign justice expressed in Schmidt. As a corollary, there should be a greater willingness on the part 
of the extraditing court to consider the circumstances by which the fugitive came before it [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Michell 1996, p. 478.) 
330 House of Lords, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, In Re Schmidt, 30 June 1994, [1995] 1 A.C. 377-378. 
Note that the Supreme Court of Ireland had earlier ruled in the case The State (Trimbole) v. The 
Governor of Mountjoy Prison (Supreme Court of Ireland, The State (Trimbole) v. The Governor of 
Mountjoy Prison, 26 March 1985 [1985] I.R. 550) that the illegal arrest of an Australian citizen had 
tainted (and stopped) the subsequent extradition process to Australia. (“[T]he Irish authorities had 
arrested him before they had established a legal basis to extradite him [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
(Michell 1996, p. 481).) See for more information on this case and its relationship with In Re Schmidt: 
Michell 1996, pp. 480-481. 
331 See House of Lords, In Re Schmidt, 30 June 1994, [1995] 1 A.C. 359 (Decision of the Divisional 
Court of the Queen’s Bench Division, Justice Sedley). 








the proceedings if the Court had that discretionary power? Lord Jauncey of 
Tullichettle first examined the opinions of Lord Justice Roch and Justice Sedley (of 
the Divisional Court in this case) on this issue.  
Although Lord Justice Roch stated that “a serious or grave abuse of power by the 
executive” fell under the Bennett principle and that this could even include a 
technique in which no force is used (for example, if threats or inducements of a 
serious and grave nature have been made),333 the technique adopted in this case did 
not meet that threshold.334 Before reaching that conclusion, however, Roch clearly 
referred to the seriousness of Schmidt’s charges:  
 
If there has to be a balancing between the gravity of the alleged offences for which 
the applicant is wanted by the German authorities and the improper conduct of the 
police, then the smuggling of substantial quantities of drugs across borders is a 
serious matter indeed.335 
 
Justice Sedley was of the opinion that subterfuge, even if that technique as such was 
possible in view of “the reality of police work in a dangerous and complex 
                                                          
333 See House of Lords, In Re Schmidt, 30 June 1994, [1995] 1 A.C. 353 (Decision of the Divisional 
Court of the Queen’s Bench Division, Lord Justice Roch): “In my opinion what has to exist before the 
court will intervene on the grounds of abuse of process is a serious or grave abuse of power by the 
executive as typified by kidnapping or forcible abduction in the territory of the foreign state as a means 
of circumventing extradition procedures which the executive could and should have used. The principle 
will not be confined to cases where there has been an application of physical force to the person of the 
detainee in the foreign country, but will embrace cases where there have been threats or inducements of 
a serious and grave nature.” (It is arguably not clear from these words whether Lord Justice Roch would 
only refuse jurisdiction in case an agent would, for example, visit the suspect and, while holding him at 
gunpoint, order him to come with him to the forum State – this would amount to an abduction – or also 
in case an agent from another State, for example, over the telephone, would seriously threaten him in an 
effort to induce him to come to the forum State – this can more likely be seen as a luring operation.) Cf. 
also House of Lords, In Re Schmidt, 30 June 1994, [1995] 1 A.C. 357 (Decision of the Divisional Court 
of the Queen’s Bench Division, Justice Sedley): “I do not accept his argument [the argument of the 
respondents’ QC, ChP] that only the use of physical force passes the threshold. Lawlessness can take 
many forms. In my judgment what the doctrine of Bennett’s case strikes at is an act on the part of the 
executive government of the United Kingdom: (a) which violates the laws of the foreign state, 
international law or the legal rights of the individual within that state, and thus offends against the 
principle of comity; (b) which circumvents extradition arrangements made with that state; (c) which 
instead brings the suspect by coercion into the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom’s courts; and (d) but 
for which the domestic proceedings could not have been initiated. (…) In total, the decision of the 
House of Lords enlarges the concept of abuse of process to embrace serious abuses of power where it is 
only by the abuse of power that legal process has become possible. It articulates the supervisory 
obligation of the High Court to maintain the rule of law as something different from and greater than the 
maintenance of individual rules of law.” (This quotation could arguably more easily include a luring 
operation from abroad (a violation of international law is not necessarily required), although the luring 
operation would then have to be accompanied by coercion, see also the main text. This point is 
reminiscent of the discussion in the context of the Stocké case where it was wondered whether a luring 
operation can be seen as an operation against the will of the suspect, see Subsection 2.2.4 of Chapter 
III.) 
334 See House of Lords, In Re Schmidt, 30 June 1994, [1995] 1 A.C. 354 (Decision of the Divisional 
Court of the Queen’s Bench Division, Lord Justice Roch). 








world”,336 should not amount to coercion. That, according to him, had occurred in 
this case.337 Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, however, did not agree:     
 
                                                          
336 House of Lords, In Re Schmidt, 30 June 1994, [1995] 1 A.C. 359 (Decision of the Divisional Court of 
the Queen’s Bench Division, Justice Sedley). 
337 As Justice Sedley’s opinion may be interesting for one’s views concerning the (il)legality of certain 
luring operations, it is worth displaying it here in its entirety, see ibid., pp. 358-359: “In my view the 
way in which the applicant was induced to come to England (...) is within the mischief to which the 
principle in Bennett’s case is directed. But for the deception practised on him, the applicant would not 
have come to England and so made his arrest and extradition possible. This deception amounted to more 
than temptation (to use D.S. Jones’ word) or inducement: it amounted to coercion, because it 
deliberately led the applicant to believe that D.S. Jones had sufficient evidence to justify his arrest for 
cheque frauds if and when he next entered the United Kingdom, but that by coming here voluntarily and 
surrendering himself to D.S. Jones he could clear himself. Since Jones knew that the whole cheque fraud 
story was bogus, he knew too that this was an offer that the applicant could not refuse: either he could 
come and establish what both he and Jones knew was his innocence of cheque frauds, or he could (so 
Jones led him to believe) face the prospect of arrest and possible trial for the frauds whenever he next 
chose to come to the United Kingdom, as he periodically did. To offer an ostensible choice between a 
serious limitation on movement (whether by having to stay away from the United Kingdom or by facing 
arrest for cheque frauds on entry) and a simple and certain way of removing that bogus limitation was in 
my judgment coercive both in intention and in effect. It was a baited trap, but it was a trap into which 
the applicant was driven by a mendacious threat of adverse consequences if he did not take the bait. To 
change the metaphor, without the use of the stick the carrot would have been of no help. The subterfuge 
was intended precisely to ensure that the applicant believed he had no worthwhile choice but to come to 
the United Kingdom and deliver himself to D.S. Jones, and that is what he did. (...) What is 
objectionable about fraud, actual or constructive, is that it robs the victim of the power of autonomous 
decision and action as surely as does physical coercion. In my judgment a fraud practised in and 
contrary to the law of a sovereign state, as this fraud was, and but for which the applicant would not and 
could not have been arrested on a provisional warrant as and when he was, would entitle this court to 
intervene to stay consequent criminal proceedings by parity of reasoning with Bennett’s case. 
Comparably, if the applicant were to have been present in the United Kingdom for another reason 
(including an invitation, true or false, from D.S. Jones to meet him in order, say, to discuss kites [In 
Ireland, Schmidt had a business in kites and model aeroplanes, ChP]) the objection would fall away 
because the element of coercion would be absent. Whatever the moral objections to the use of pure 
subterfuge, they have to be matched against the reality of police work in a dangerous and complex world 
(...). But the limit placed upon this by the House of Lords in Bennett’s case [1994] 1 A.C. 42, on 
grounds of constitutional principle, is that the use of subterfuge must not be such as to violate the rule of 
law by substituting coercion for established extradition procedures.” With respect to this last part, the 
circumvention of extradition procedures, it must be noted that the Detective Sergeant in charge of the 
operation stated that he did not intend to circumvent the extradition procedures between Ireland, 
Germany and the UK. (A possible circumvention could perhaps be deduced from the fact that Schmidt 
had been earlier arrested in Ireland for being in possession of drugs but that an attempt of the German 
authorities to have Schmidt extradited from Ireland to Germany was unsuccessful because the Irish 
authorities found that the extradition warrant was not in order, see House of Lords, In Re Schmidt, 30 
June 1994, [1995] 1 A.C. 345 (Decision of the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division, Lord 
Justice Roch): “D.S. Jones adds that he did not believe that the ruse he was suggesting would 
circumvent any extradition arrangements between the Republic of Eire, Germany and the United 
Kingdom as he was not intending to tempt the applicant to enter the United Kingdom in circumstances 
where he would never otherwise have come here. He was simply trying to persuade the applicant to get 
in touch with him when he came to the United Kingdom for his own purposes.” Note that “[n]o legal 
process existed by which the applicant could have been brought from Eire within the jurisdiction of this 








The only sanction attached to the ruse was that the applicant, if he did not attend a 
meeting with D.S. Jones in England, would be arrested when his presence in England 
was next detected by the authorities. In these circumstances to suggest that he had no 
alternative but to come to this country and was thereby coerced seems to me to be 
unrealistic. Had he chosen to remain in Ireland, there was nothing that the authorities 
here could have done about it. At the very worst, he was tricked into coming to 
England but not coerced.338 
 
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle also looked, although perhaps not as clearly as Lord 
Justice Roch of the Divisional Court (who used the word “balancing”), at the 
seriousness of the crimes with which Schmidt was charged before condoning the 
police conduct. After having referred to the findings of Lord Griffiths in another 
drug case (Somchai Liangsiriprasert v. Government of the United States of 
America),339 he concluded: 
 
The 58 German charges outstanding against the applicant suggest that he may be a 
substantial international dealer in drugs. As such, his frequent visits to England are 
unlikely to be in the public interest. To bring such a person to justice the police and 
other drug enforcement agencies may from time to time have to tempt him to enter 
their fief. In my view, what was done by D.S. Jones was far more akin to the 
enticement of the drug enforcement agent in Liangsiriprasert than to the [forcible] 
abduction in Reg. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, Ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 
A.C. 42. I agree with Roch L.J. that the detective sergeant’s conduct was not so grave 
or serious as would have warranted the intervention of the High Court had it 
possessed such a power.340 
 
                                                          
338 House of Lords, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, In Re Schmidt, 30 June 1994, [1995] 1 A.C. 379. 
339 Ibid., pp. 379-380: “In Somchai Liangsiriprasert v. Government of the United States of America 
[1991] 1 A.C. 225, a drug dealer was persuaded by a United States drug enforcement agent to travel 
from Thailand to Hong Kong in order to receive payment for drugs exported from Thailand to the 
United States. There was no extradition between the two countries for drug offences. On arrival in Hong 
Kong the applicant was arrested and proceedings for his extradition to the United States were 
commenced. He submitted, inter alia, that it would be oppressive and an abuse of process for a 
government agency to entice a criminal to a jurisdiction from which extradition was available. In answer 
to this submission Lord Griffiths said, at pp. 242-243: “As to the suggestion that it was oppressive or an 
abuse of process the short answer is that international crime has to be fought by international co-
operation between law enforcement agencies. It is notoriously difficult to apprehend those at the centre 
of the drug trade; it is only their couriers who are usually caught. If the courts were to regard the 
penetration of a drug dealing organisation by the agents of a law enforcement agency and a plan to 
tempt the criminals into a jurisdiction from which they could be extradited as an abuse of process it 
would indeed be a red letter day for the drug barons.... In the present case the applicant and S.C. 
[Sutham Chokvanitphong, the cousin of Somchai Liangsiriprasert, ChP] came to Hong Kong of their 
own free will to collect, as they thought, the illicit profits of their heroin trade. They were present in 
Hong Kong not because of any unlawful conduct of the authorities but because of their own criminality 
and greed. The proper extradition procedures have been observed and their Lordships reject without 
hesitation that it is in the circumstances of this case oppressive or an abuse of the judicial process for the 
United States to seek their extradition.”” 








As a result of this, Schmidt’s appeal was dismissed. Reading his words, it is not 
entirely clear whether Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle was of the opinion that every 
luring operation cannot lead to the ending of the case, or whether this specific luring 
operation (in which, according to him, no coercion had been used) could not lead to 
the ending of the case. After all, although he stated that the conduct was not so grave 
or serious as to warrant intervention (implying that the conduct may have been 
irregular, but not irregular enough to activate a stay), Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle 
also found the conduct in In Re Schmidt to be more akin to the enticement operation 
in Somchai Liangsiriprasert v. Government of the United States of America than to 
the captus of Bennett – and it should be remembered that in Somchai 
Liangsiriprasert v. Government of the United States of America, Lord Griffiths 
stated that the suspects came to the jurisdiction of the arresting officers “not because 
of any unlawful conduct of the authorities”.341 In addition, and given the fact that it 
seems (although this is, in contrast to the position of Lord Justice Roch, not that 
clear) that Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle looked at the seriousness of Schmidt’s 
charges before concluding that the conduct was not so grave or serious as to warrant 
intervention, it is not plain either whether their Lordships would approve a luring 
operation (such as the ones executed in In Re Schmidt and Somchai Liangsiriprasert 
v. Government of the United States of America) in any case brought before them or 
only if the ‘lured’ suspect is charged with serious crimes (such as in the two above-
mentioned cases).342 
Before turning to the civil law context, it may be worth pointing out that also in 
English cases after Schmidt, the seriousness of the suspects’ alleged crimes were 
taken into consideration in the balancing exercise of the judges confronted by a male 
captus situation. Two such cases are the 1996 case R. v. Latif and the 1999 case R. v. 
Mullen.343 It is not necessary to examine these cases in detail, but a few interesting 
quotations certainly deserve to be mentioned here. In the first case, R. v. Latif,344 
where a person suspected of serious drug offences was lured from Pakistan to the 
United Kingdom, Lord Steyn (providing the opinion of the House of Lords) very 
clearly spelled out why the strict application of both the male captus bene detentus 
and the male captus male detentus maxims in the context of entrapment (luring) 
would be undesirable:  
 
                                                          
341 Ibid., p. 379, referring to Lord Griffiths in the case Somchai Liangsiriprasert v. Government of the 
United States of America. See also n. 339. 
342 Note that Michell (1996, pp. 475-476) makes the general statement – not only focused on suspects of 
serious crimes – that “[i]n Schmidt II, the House of Lords determined that an individual who has been 
lured into England from abroad by the police under false pretenses may be lawfully extradited to face 
criminal charges in a third state. Schmidt II is also significant because Lord Jauncey left little doubt that 
the position he adopted in that case would also apply to the propriety of a criminal trial where an 
individual has been lured into the jurisdiction by fraud [original footnote omitted, ChP].” However, he 
concedes that Lord Justice Roch, in the first Schmidt case (at the Divisional Court) did consider the 
seriousness of the suspect’s charges to constitute a factor to be taken into account, see Michell 1996, p. 
499. 
343 See also Warbrick 2000. 








If the court always refuses to stay such proceedings, the perception will be that the 
court condones criminal conduct and malpractice by law enforcement agencies. That 
would undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system and bring it into 
disrepute. On the other hand, if the court were always to stay proceedings in such 
cases, it would incur the reproach that it is failing to protect the public from serious 
crime. The weakness of both extreme positions leaves only one principled solution. 
The court has a discretion: it has to perform a balancing exercise. If the court 
concludes that a fair trial is not possible, it will stay the proceedings. That is not what 
the present case is concerned with. It is plain that a fair trial was possible and that 
such a trial took place. In this case the issue is whether, despite the fact that a fair trial 
was possible, the judge ought to have stayed the criminal proceedings on broader 
consideration of the integrity of the criminal justice system. The law is settled. 
Weighing countervailing considerations of policy and justice, it is for the judge in the 
exercise of his discretion to decide whether there has been an abuse of process, which 
amounts to an affront to the public conscience and requires the criminal proceedings 
to be stayed: Reg. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, Ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 
A.C. 42.[345] Ex parte Bennett was a case where a stay was appropriate because a 
defendant had been forcibly abducted and brought to this country to face trial in 
disregard of extradition laws. The speeches in Ex parte Bennett conclusively establish 
that proceedings may be stayed in the exercise of the judge’s discretion not only 
where a fair trial is impossible but also where it would be contrary to the public 
interest in the integrity of the criminal justice system that a trial should take place. An 
infinite variety of cases could arise. General guidance as to how the discretion should 
be exercised in particular circumstances will not be useful. But it is possible to say 
that in a case such as the present the judge must weigh in the balance the public 
interest in ensuring that those that are charged with grave crimes should be tried and 
the competing public interest in not conveying the impression that the court will adopt 
the approach that the end justifies any means.346   
 
Applying these considerations to the facts of the case, Lord Steyn found that the 
allegations of the suspect had to be rejected.347 However, the balancing exercise may 
also turn out in favour of the suspect.  
                                                          
345 See also Shaw 2003, p. 606, who notes that the approach in Bennett was extended in Latif to cover 
entrapment. Note that the term ‘entrapment’ is often used for the national context only. However, in that 
case, entrapment must be discerned from luring, a real male captus situation involving how a person 
came from one jurisdiction to the other. 
346 House of Lords, Lord Steyn, Regina v. Latif; Regina v. Shazad, 18 January 1996, 1 W.L.R. 112-113 
[1996]. 
347 See ibid., p. 113: “In my view the judge took into consideration the relevant considerations placed 
before him. He performed the balancing exercise. He was entitled to take the view that Shahzad was an 
organiser in the heroin trade, who took the initiative in proposing the importation. It is true that he did 
not deal with arguments about the criminal behaviour of the customs officer. That was understandable 
since that was not argued before him. If such arguments had been put before him, I am satisfied that he 
would still have come to the same conclusion. And I think he would have been right. The conduct of the 
customs officer was not so unworthy or shameful that it was an affront to the public conscience to allow 
the prosecution to proceed. Realistically, any criminal behaviour of the customs officer was venial 
compared to that of Shahzad. In these circumstances I would reject the submission that the judge erred 








The 1999 decision of R. v. Mullen348 involved the disguised extradition of a 
suspect accused of (IRA) terrorism from Zimbabwe to England. In this case, Lord 
Justice Rose, referring to Latif, mentioned a few elements to be taken into account 
here, starting with the seriousness of the Mullen’s crimes (Mullen had already been 
convicted and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment for his crimes when he appealed 
his conviction on the basis of his pre-trial disguised extradition from Zimbabwe to 
England).349 Another important element Rose took into account was “the nature of 
the conduct of those involved in the deportation on behalf of the British 
Government”.350 Rose was clearly very critical of this conduct:    
 
[T]he British authorities initiated and subsequently assisted in and procured the 
deportation of the defendant, by unlawful means, in circumstances in which there 
were specific extradition facilities between this country and Zimbabwe. In so acting 
they were not only encouraging unlawful conduct in Zimbabwe, but they were also 
acting in breach of public international law.351 
 
However, was this conduct to be seen as conduct – to use the words of Lord Steyn, 
quoted above in the Latif case, see footnote 347 – “so unworthy or shameful that it 
was an affront to the public conscience to allow the prosecution to proceed”?352 
Lord Justice Rose, balancing these two above-mentioned elements, ultimately 
concluded that it was:  
 
This court recognises the immense degree of public revulsion which has, quite 
properly, attached to the activities of those who have assisted and furthered the 
violent operations of the I.R.A. and other terrorist organisations. In the discretionary 
exercise, great weight must therefore be attached to the nature of the offence involved 
in this case. Against that, however, the conduct of the security services and police in 
procuring the unlawful deportation of the defendant in the manner which has been 
described represents, in the view of this court, a blatant and extremely serious failure 
to adhere to the rule of law with regard to the production of a defendant for 
prosecution in the English courts. The need to discourage such conduct on the part of 
those who are responsible for criminal prosecutions is a matter of public policy to 
which, as appears from Reg. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, Ex parte Bennett 
[1994] 1 A.C. 42 and Reg. v. Latif [1996] 1 W.L.R. 104, very considerable weight 
must be attached. (…) In these circumstances, we have no doubt that the discretionary 
                                                          
348 Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, Regina v. Mullen, 4 February 1999, [2000] Q.B. 520ff. 
349 See Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, Lord Justice Rose, Regina v. Mullen, 4 February 1999, 
[2000] Q.B. 534: “As a primary consideration, it is necessary for the court to take into account the 
gravity of the offence in question. In the present case, the substance of the offence was the facilitating of 
a bombing campaign in the United Kingdom, which, but for the discovery by the police of the Battersea 
explosives and armaments cache, might well have caused loss of life and injury to members of the 
public and, more probably, substantial damage to property in this country. The sentence of 30 years’ 
imprisonment reflects the gravity of the offence. Although it was not at the very top of the range of 
seriousness of criminal activity, it was undeniably at a very high level in that range.” 
350 Ibid. 









balance comes down decisively against the prosecution of this offence. This trial was 
preceded by an abuse of process which, had it come to light at the time, as it would 
have done had the prosecution made proper voluntary disclosure, would properly 
have justified the proceedings then being stayed.353 
 
As a result, the Court concluded that “the prosecution and therefore the conviction 
of the defendant were unlawful”.354 In doing so, it emphasised, however, that the 
balancing exercise may turn out differently in other cases as everything depends on 
the exact circumstances.355 
 
2 CASES FROM THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 
 
2.1 Older cases 
 
In a number of old French cases, the judges held that the male captus in question 
could not lead to a trial. For example, the Court of Appeal of Douai decided on 15 
April 1891 in the Nollet case that the arrest of a certain Nollet, executed by French 
gendarmes on Belgian territory, was deemed not to have occurred.356  
Likewise, in the 1904 Jabouille case, where an accused, who had taken refuge in 
Spain, was expelled to France before he could be extradited, the Court of Appeal of 
Bordeaux held that “Jabouille could lawfully be apprehended only following 
extradition requested and obtained in the terms provided for by international 
agreements or after his voluntary return to the country.”357         
One case which is often mentioned in the male captus discussion is the 1933 In 
re Jolis case.358  
On 9 July 1933, a thirsty Belgian citizen, Pierre Jolis, visited a bar in the French 
town of Louvroil.359 However, Jolis was perhaps more than thirsty for after he left, it 
was discovered that 2200 francs were missing.360 The owner of the bar called two 
                                                          
353 Ibid., pp. 535-536. 
354 Ibid., p. 536. 
355 See ibid., pp. 536-537: “In arriving at this conclusion we strongly emphasise that nothing in this 
judgment should be taken to suggest that there may not be cases, such as Reg. v. Latif [1996] 1 W.L.R. 
104, in which the seriousness of the crime is so great relative to the nature of the abuse of process that it 
would be a proper exercise of judicial discretion to permit a prosecution to proceed or to allow a 
conviction to stand notwithstanding an abuse of process in relation to the defendant’s presence within 
the jurisdiction. In each case it is a matter of discretionary balance, to be approached with regard to the 
particular conduct complained of and the particular offence charged.” 
356 See Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, 
Vol. 45 (1972), p. 106 (Report of M. le Conseiller Comte). 
357 Ibid. 
358 See Tribunal Correctionnel d’Avesnes, In re Jolis, 22 July 1933, Annual Digest and Reports of 
Public International Law Cases, Vol. 7 (1933-1934), Case No. 77, pp. 191-192. 
359 See ibid., p. 191. 








gardes-champêtres, French village constables,361 and accompanied them to Mons 
(Belgium) where Jolis had apparently gone.362 It was there that the three arrested 
him on 10 July 1933.363 After having him brought back to France, he was 
imprisoned in Avesnes and charged with theft.364  
The Belgian Government, however, protested and demanded the return of Jolis 
because he had been illegally arrested on Belgian territory by French officers.365  
The Tribunal Correctionnel d’Avesnes (a criminal court of first instance)366 
concurred with this view; on 22 July 1933, it stated: “The Court (…) declares null 
and void the whole of the proceedings of July 10, 1933, especially the commitment 
to prison and the remand order; and orders the immediate release of Jolis, unless 
detained for any other matter.”367  
Although it is not clear from the report in the Annual Digest itself whether the 
French Court hereby relied on international law considerations,368 the fact that the 
French Court followed the (international law) view of the Belgian Government 
points to the fact that it did.369 In addition, one may also refer to the note of 
Professor Rousseau to this case who explained that “[t]he exercise by a State of any 
of its coercive powers in foreign territory, unless based on international convention, 
is prohibited by the law of nations.”370 
However, this male captus male detentus stance was not followed in the famous 
1964 re Argoud case by the French Supreme Court, a case which will now be 
addressed in more detail.371  
                                                          
361 See District Court of Jerusalem, The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf 
Eichmann, ‘Judgment’, 12 December 1961, Criminal Case No. 40/61, para. 48 (36 International Law 
Reports 1968, p. 68). 
362 See Tribunal Correctionnel d’Avesnes, In re Jolis, 22 July 1933, Annual Digest and Reports of 
Public International Law Cases, Vol. 7 (1933-1934), Case No. 77, p. 191. 
363 See ibid. 
364 See ibid.  
365 See ibid. 
366 See District Court of Jerusalem, The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf 
Eichmann, ‘Judgment’, 12 December 1961, Criminal Case No. 40/61, para. 48 (36 International Law 
Reports 1968, p. 68). 
367 Tribunal Correctionnel d’Avesnes, In re Jolis, 22 July 1933, Annual Digest and Reports of Public 
International Law Cases, Vol. 7 (1933-1934), Case No. 77, pp. 191-192. 
368 See, however, ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
91: “The Court considered that this was a violation of international law and released the person [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” 
369 See also Wilske 2000, p. 327: “Nicht ausdrücklich angesprochen wurde dabei die Frage, ob diese 
Rechtsfolge dem Völkerrecht oder dem nationalem Recht entnommen wurde. Es liegt aber nahe 
anzunehmen, daß die Rechtsfolge unmittelbar dem Völkerrecht entnommen wurde, da ein 
entsprechender Rechtssatz der nationalen Rechtsordnung nicht zitiert wurde und wohl auch nicht 
existiert. In früher entschiedenen Fällen [and here, Wilske refers to Nollet and Jabouille, ChP] war auch 
wegen Umgehung des Auflieferungsverfahrens die französische Gerichtsbarkeit verneint worden 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
370 Tribunal Correctionnel d’Avesnes, In re Jolis, 22 July 1933, Annual Digest and Reports of Public 
International Law Cases, Vol. 7 (1933-1934), Case No. 77, p. 192. 
371 This book has chosen to follow – as much as possible – a chronological order in this chapter, but as 








Antoine Argoud was an ex-colonel in the French Army who had been sentenced 
to death in absentia by the French High Military Court on 11 July 1961 for illegal 
political activities.372 As the convicted Argoud continued his activities, a new 
investigation was opened “for conspiracy against the authority of the State and 
complicity, by provocation and by giving instructions, in attempts against that 
authority.”373 In the context of this investigation, an arrest warrant was issued on 9 
December 1961. However, Argoud could not be apprehended.374  
 
Then, on 26 February 1963, the police, alerted by an anonymous telephone call, 
discovered Argoud in a motor-van parked on Quai de l’Archevêché, Paris. His face 
was swollen and his hands were handcuffed. According to his statements – which the 
judgment under appeal appears to find correct – he had been abducted during the 
course of the previous night, by some unidentified persons,[375] from a hotel in 
Munich, the city where he was living under a false name, and transported by force 
into France.376 
 
Argoud was subsequently brought before the Court of State Security where he 
argued that the Court was without jurisdiction because of his male captus.377 The 
Court, however, rejected his arguments; in an incidental decision of 28 December 
1963, the Court of State Security found that it had jurisdiction for a number of 
reasons, one of them being that Argoud “lacks the right or capacity to plead in 
judicial proceedings a violation of international law, a fortiori when the State 
                                                                                                                                              
addressed. The reason for the fact that Re Argoud is mentioned already now is that the In re Jolis and Re 
Argoud cases are often mentioned together in (legal) comparisons. 
372 See Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, 
Vol. 45 (1972), p. 90 (summary) and p. 98 (Report of M. le Conseiller Comte). Argoud was member of 
the OAS (Organisation de l’Armée Secrète), an insurrectional movement which tried to prevent the 
independence of Algeria and, in this context, attempted to assassinate, for example, the French President 
Charles De Gaulle. 
373 Ibid. 
374 See ibid.  
375 Wilske and Schiller explain that “there was no evidence that the French government participated in 
the abduction.” (Wilske and Schiller 1998, p. 227.) That may be the case, but there are, nevertheless, 
also signs that French officials might have been involved in the operation. For example, Lucchini (1964, 
p. 190), writes first that “le Procureur général de Munich a, dès le mois de mars, rendu publics les noms 
de cinq Français soupçonnés d’être les auteurs de l’enlèvement [emphasis in original, ChP].” Then, he 
turns to a letter written by Argoud himself, addressed to Chancellor Erhard: “[L]’enquête menée avec 
beaucoup de zèle dès ses premiers jours par les services fédéraux, a permis de préciser l’identité et les 
adresses de mes agresseurs. Des renseignements recueillis par la suite ont confirmé la participation à 
l’opération des services de la sécurité militaire française de Baden et de Strasbourg”. (Ibid.) See also 
Doehring 1965, pp. 209-210. See further De Schutter 1965, p. 101: “[T]he German authorities officially 
mentioned the name of Bernard Germès as the leader of the kidnapping. According to some papers the 
man in question was a member of the French Security Service. The intervention of the so-called 
“barbouzes” [French special intelligence agents used in the fight against the OAS, see n. 372, ChP] has 
also been mentioned, whereas Argoud, in his message to Chancellor Erhard, cites the French military 
security service of Baden and Strasbourg as co-responsible [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
376 Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, Vol. 45 
(1972), p. 98 (Report of M. le Conseiller Comte). 








concerned [this is the Federal Republic of Germany, ChP] makes no claim 
[emphasis in original, ChP].”378 On 30 December 1963, the Court of State Security 
sentenced Argoud to life imprisonment “for the direction and organization of an 
insurrectional movement, conspiracy against the authority of the State and 
complicity in attempts against that authority.”379 Argoud appealed his case so the 
French Cour de Cassation ultimately had to consider the matter.380 
The French Supreme Court agreed with the above-mentioned finding of the 
Court of State Security, stressing that  
 
[i]n the circumstances, on the plane of international law Argoud is still less well-
founded in complaining since he was living in Germany under a false name. The right 
of asylum pleaded by him is debatable, and ‘formal assurance has been given [today] 
by the Ministère public that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has received no note 
from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany asking for the return to the 
German authorities of ex-Colonel Argoud, although he has been detained in France 
for more than ten months [emphasis in original, ChP].’381  
 
However, the italicised quotation to which the Supreme Court refers (these are the 
words of the Court of State Security from its incidental decision of 28 December 
                                                          
378 Ibid., p. 94. 
379 Ibid., p. 91. It is recalled that Argoud was a member of the OAS, see n. 372. 
380 It must be remarked that in one of the submissions of Argoud, the latter explains the (in his eyes 
incorrect) male captus bene detentus view of the Court of State Security as follows: “The final ground 
[of the Court of State Security, ChP] was that the capture of a citizen abroad did not deprive the courts 
of his country of the right and competence to judge him.” (Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re 
Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, Vol. 45 (1972), p. 95.) It can be argued that these 
words from Argoud, explaining the reasoning of the Court of State Security, have, however, been 
incorrectly presented by the ICTY Trial Chamber’s decision in Nikolić (see Subsection 3.1.4 of the 
following chapter) as the words of the Supreme Court itself, see ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. 
Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the 
Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 91: “In re Argoud, (…) the Court (…) held that 
“[l]a capture à l’étranger d’un citoyen ne priverait pas les tribunaux de son pays du droit et de la 
compétence de le juger [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
381 Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, Vol. 45 
(1972), p. 94. Lucchini (1964, pp. 190-191) explains that there had been some demands for clarification 
from the Government and protests from the Parliament but no formal (written) protests and demands for 
the return of Argoud from the Government: “En dépit de quelques timides demandes d’explications, le 
Gouvernement allemand n’a pas présenté aux autorités françaises de demande de restitution d’Antoine 
Argoud. Pourtant le Procureur général de Munich a, dès le mois de mars, rendu publics les noms de 
cinq Français soupçonnés d’être les auteurs de l’enlèvement. Plus tard, le Parlement allemand a 
exprimé le 6 novembre 1963, la volonté qu’Argoud soit restitué aux autorités allemandes. Cette 
résolution adoptée à l’unanimité a été renvoyée à la Commission des Affaires étrangères et à celle de 
l’Intérieur. Mais cette manisfestation de volonté était tempérée par la déclaration faite le 18 novembre 
par le Ministre ouest allemand de la Justice, selon laquelle, si Argoud était renvoyé en Allemagne, “La 
République aurait à le rendre à la France” (Le Monde, 24 nov. 1963). (…) Au cours du procès, s’est 
produit un événement d’importance, qui menaçait de ruiner la thèse française. Le Gouvernement 
allemand s’était-il décidé à faire une demande officielle de restitution? La demande avait bien été 
formulée, mais verbalement et non pas selon la procédure diplomatique classique, qui aurait exigé la 
remise d’une note écrite du Ministère des Affaires étrangères allemand acheminée au Quai d’Orsay par 








1963), were attacked by the Defence in a hearing of 30 December 1963 (the day the 
Court of State Security sentenced Argoud to life imprisonment); it argued that 
“evidence [would be] given today of official representations made by the 
Government of the Federal Republic contrary to the statements of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs”.382 Nevertheless, these submissions were rejected by the Court of 
State Security. Although the Supreme Court did not agree with the reasons as to 
why the Court of State Security rejected these submissions,383 this would not help 
Argoud in his appeal  
 
since, in their previous decision, the judges fundamentally based themselves in 
justifying the regularity of the submission of the case to them, on other grounds (…)  
and which, in any case, would retain their validity even if the Court had decided to 
withdraw all or part of its first statements on the issue of fact in dispute.384       
 
Hence, this means that the Supreme Court was of the opinion that, even if it could 
be established that the Germans had officially protested the abduction and requested 
the return of Argoud, this would not have helped Argoud.385  
Although this point is not clearly386 addressed in the text of the decision itself, 
the report of rapporteur Comte387 does examine it in more detail.  
                                                          
382 Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, Vol. 45 
(1972), p. 94. De Schutter (1965, p. 90, n. 7) notes that on 30 December 1963, the German Government 
brought the matter to the attention of the French Government via a written note. On p. 106 of his article, 
he clarifies that this note contained a request for restitution and on p. 107, he writes about “Germany’s 
request for returning Argoud”. See also Doehring 1965, p. 210, who remarks that the note consisted of a 
request to Rückführung (return). The French Government, however, refused: “[D]e Gaulle has clearly 
implied that handing back the accused has never been considered”. (De Schutter 1965, p. 102.) “This is 
shown in the answer to the note of Bonn, December 30 and received in Paris on December 31, the day 
after the conviction of Argoud.” (Ibid., p. 102, n. 61.)    
383 See Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, 
Vol. 45 (1972), pp. 94-95: “It was not correct for the judges, in rejecting those submissions, to declare 
that their preceding decisions ‘could not be revoked, since the State Security Court is not an appellate 
jurisdiction in respect of its own decisions. A supervening new fact cannot be examined by the criminal 
jurisdiction which rendered the decision complained of, and it is only capable, under Article 622 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, of permitting an action for revision’. In fact, the Security Court was not 
bound by the considerations of pure fact which were given in the decision rendered previously. It 
retained full power until the hearings had been terminated to revise, in the light of such new information 
as might be produced, its statements of the material circumstances in question, which, moreover, did not 
imply any finding on the existence of the elements of the offence in law or as to the guilt of the accused. 
Secondly, the reference made in the judgment to Article 622 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to 
the possible institution of a later action for revision, was clearly without any bearing on the question at 
issue.” 
384 Ibid., p. 95. 
385 See also US Supreme Court: Brief of the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 4 March 1992, 31 International Legal Materials 
(1992), p. 925: “French courts also subscribe to the principle that official transborder abductions must 
be judicially rectified. (...) But see Re Argoud (...).” 
386 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did argue that “whatever be the decision which the Court will be 
led to pronounce with regard to Argoud, such as deprivation of liberty, that sentence could not be an 








However, before going into that issue, it is appropriate to first consider the 
Supreme Court’s explicit considerations with respect to the rejection of Argoud’s 
male captus claim. 
The Supreme Court looked at Argoud’s complaint from two perspectives, one 
focusing on international law and one focusing on domestic French law.388 With 
respect to international law, the Court observed that  
 
the State which is entitled to complain of damage suffered by one of its nationals or 
protected persons in violation of its territorial sovereignty exercises its own right 
when it claims reparation. Individuals have no capacity to plead in judicial 
proceedings a contravention of international law. The putting in issue of international 
responsibilities concerns only relations between State and State, without individuals 
being entitled to intervene.389  
 
Hence, Argoud could not complain about a possible violation of the sovereignty of 
the Federal Republic of Germany.  
This stance was defended earlier (see Eichmann)390 and later (see Noriega)391 but 
was not accepted, see also the next chapter, in the context of the international 
criminal tribunals.392  
However, with respect to internal law, the Court found that the domestic law 
violations involved in the male captus of Argoud393 may indeed have 
consequences.394 Nevertheless, “[s]uch an irregularity (…) is not of such a character 
as of itself to involve the nullity of the prosecution.”395 It hereby also referred to the 
                                                                                                                                              
of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, Vol. 45 (1972), 
p. 95.) This means that States may agree whatever they would like to agree with respect to the fate of 
Argoud, but it also implies that the Court can do its task without having to look at protests from foreign 
States; this is something those foreign States should solve with the Executive of the State under whose 
jurisdiction this court operates, see also ibid.: “The putting in issue of international responsibilities 
concerns only relations between State and State”.  
387 This is the man who made the remark that male captus bene detentus “is certainly not from Virgil”, 
see n. 7 and accompanying text of Chapter II. 
388 See also Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law 
Reports, Vol. 45 (1972), p. 102 (Report of M. le Conseiller Comte). 
389 Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, Vol. 45 
(1972), p. 96. 
390 See n. 178 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
391 See n. 207 of this chapter. 
392 See n. 178 of Chapter III. 
393 The Court noted that “[t]he acts of force of which the accused complains and which consisted in 
seizing his person and taking him, under constraint, across the frontier, are characterized as a violation 
of Article 124 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning the execution of warrants of the 
investigating magistrate.” (Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, 
International Law Reports, Vol. 45 (1972), p. 97.) 
394 See ibid.: “Such an irregularity, which is penalized by Article 136 (…) engages the responsibility – 
even the criminal responsibility – of those who have committed it”. 
395 Ibid. In addition, “none of the other provisions of that Code, which provide for the nullity of 
investigatory proceedings pursued in violation of the requirements which it decrees, is applicable to this 
case.” (Ibid.) M. le Conseiller Comte also emphasises that the irregularity involved here cannot lead to a 








fact that the proceedings themselves (in court) were not seriously hampered by the 
male captus, thus paying tribute to the restricted notion of a fair trial.396 As a result 
of these considerations, Argoud’s appeal was dismissed. 
It is now worth returning to the report of rapporteur Comte and the kind of effect 
a protest from the Federal Republic of Germany would have had.  
In his report, in which it is made clear, incidentally, that the French judges also 
referred to male captus bene detentus case law such as Scott,397 R. v. Nelson and 
Brand,398 Elliott399 and Eichmann,400 Comte explains that that would also have been 
irrelevant:  
 
[T]he Court of State Security, when the defence asked it to recognise the existence of 
the alleged official communications of the German Government regarding the Argoud 
case (…) could have limited itself to replying in the following terms: ‘Perhaps, but 
that changes nothing in the problem. For that would involve a purely diplomatic act 
which concerns the French Government and which is for it, and it alone, to envisage 
the consequences. The Court is here to judge a man, and for nothing but that, in 
accordance with the rules of French criminal law, which the protests of a foreign 
Government can neither change nor sway. The difference which has arisen between 
the two States arose outside our competence; it will be settled without our 
intervention. It cannot require, directly or indirectly, our decision any more than our 
responsibility.’401        
 
This indeed confirms more clearly what the Supreme Court appears to argue when it 
states that “[t]he putting in issue of international responsibilities concerns only 
relations between State and State”; perhaps a foreign State can complain, but it is 
not up to the court now trying the case to consider these international issues.402 
(However, the other side of the coin is also accepted by the Court: if the two 
Governments/Executives want to make an agreement on the fate of Argoud, the 
Court can do nothing about that either.)403  
                                                                                                                                              
the case of acts of violence, infringements of liberty or abuse of authority….” (Ibid., p. 104 (Report of 
M. le Conseiller Comte).)   
396 See Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, 
Vol. 45 (1972), p. 98: “[T]he circumstances in which an accused person who is the subject of a lawful 
prosecution (…) has been apprehended on a lawful warrant for arrest and handed over to justice, even if 
they constituted an infringement of the criminal law or the traditional principles of our law, are not of a 
character – however deplorable they may appear – to entail of themselves the nullity of the prosecution. 
For the investigation and the establishment of the truth are not fundamentally vitiated, nor is the defence 
placed in a position in which it is impossible for it to exercise its rights before the jurisdictions of 
investigation and judgment.”  
397 See Subsection 1.1 of this chapter. 
398 See n. 3 of this chapter. 
399 See Subsection 1.1 of this chapter. 
400 See Subsection 3.1 of this chapter. 
401 Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, Vol. 45 
(1972), p. 104 (Report of M. le Conseiller Comte). 
402 See also De Sanctis 2004, p. 537. 








This stance, that the Court can continue its case even if the Federal Republic of 
Germany had made an official protest and request for the return of Argoud, is 
reminiscent of the Alvarez-Machain case and arguably represents the position of the 
old-fashioned and ‘provincial’ court which does not want to be involved in 
international law issues, even if it profits from the origin of these problems.   
It is submitted that a court, as a part of one of the many States which form the 
international community, should take up its responsibility as one of the many 
guardians of the fragile international legal order based on the equality of States and 
should indeed take into account international law.404  
This also means that a court, if 1) it is clear that the prosecuting State has 
violated another State’s sovereignty and thus international law,405 2) the injured 
State has protested and requested the return of the suspect406 and 3) the Executive of 
the prosecuting State has not done what it should have done (namely return the 
suspect to the injured State),407 should refuse jurisdiction and order the return of the 
                                                          
404 These international law elements, of course, also include international human rights law but that 
concept, important as it is, has nothing to do with the concept under discussion here: the equality of 
States. (Note, by the way, that the concept of human rights law had not yet been developed to such an 
extent that it could play a role in Re Argoud.) See on the role of domestic courts as guardians of the 
international legal order Michell 1996, pp. 386-387. (See also n. 560 and accompanying text of Chapter 
III.)  
405 Note that this is not clear in this case given the fact that it was uncertain whether the kidnapping 
could be attributed to France, see n. 375. 
406 Although in this case, this only happened after the case was decided by the Court of State Security 
(see n. 382), the Supreme Court was arguably of the opinion that even if it could be established that the 
Germans had officially protested the abduction and requested the return of Argoud, this would not have 
helped Argoud either. 
407 There is another old and famous case from the civil law context which should be mentioned here in 
that respect, but as it did not lead to a decision of a judicial body, it will not be addressed in the 
overview itself, but merely here, in this footnote. In this 1935 Jacob-Salomon case, “an ex-German 
citizen, Herr Jacob-Salomon, was kidnaped on Swiss territory and taken to Germany, where he was held 
for trial on a charge of treason.” (Preuss 1936, p. 123.) In an article written one year earlier, Preuss gives 
a detailed account of the spectacular kidnapping: “According to the Swiss version of the case, Herr 
Jacob-Salomon, an ex-German political émigré, on March 9, 1935, came to Basel upon the invitation of 
one Dr. Hans Wesemann, a German national, who had gained his confidence through taking some of his 
articles for the English journals. At Basel, Jacob met Wesemann and another German national, who 
induced him to enter an automobile with them for the ostensible purpose of driving to the home of the 
latter at Riehen, Switzerland. As they approached the frontier at Petit-Huningue, the chauffeur, 
disregarding the order of the Swiss customs guards to stop, accelerated his speed to seventy kilometers 
per hour and dashed over the line into German territory. The barriers on the German side were open, 
although they were customarily closed before the hour (8:50 p.m.) at which the car crossed. Two 
hundred meters beyond the frontier, Jacob was arrested by German functionaries who had been awaiting 
his arrival [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Preuss 1935, p. 503.) The Swiss Government protested 
this alleged violation of its sovereignty, arguing “that German secret agents had participated in the 
seizure and that the police officers who made the arrest had been forewarned of the plan to kidnap Jacob 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Preuss 1936, p. 123.) Furthermore, the Swiss Government 
“demanded the immediate return of Jacob, the punishment of the guilty functionaries, and the taking of 
steps necessary to prevent the recurrence of like incidents.” (Preuss 1935, p. 503.) However, the 
Germans refused to return the suspect, denying official complicity in the case. (See ibid., p. 504.) One 
could argue that this implies that the Germans were also of the opinion that they would have to return 








suspect.408 One can assume (or, at least, hope) that such a harsh consequence may 
perhaps make the government in question think twice before it tries to undermine 
the fragile international legal order again. 
In that respect, the (genuinely provincial!) Court in In re Jolis, a ‘mere’ court of 
first instance in a small commune of Avesnes in northern France, has arguably acted 
less provincially than the metropolitan Supreme Court of France.409  
However, it must not be forgotten that, perhaps also here, the seriousness of 
Argoud’s charges (even if this point is not mentioned by the Supreme Court) may 
                                                                                                                                              
Chapter III that the ‘abducting’ State (if not the Executive then the Judiciary) must return the abducted 
person to the injured State if that State protests and requests the return of the suspect). The Swiss 
Government subsequently “re-affirmed its position and requested arbitration of the dispute”. (Preuss 
1935, p. 504.) Germany agreed with the request of the Swiss to have the case arbitrated (See Preuss 
1936, p. 123), as a result of which an arbitral tribunal was established, consisting of two national judges 
and three neutral judges. (See ibid.) Its mandate was to establish the exact circumstances of Jacob’s 
male captus and to determine whether the territorial sovereignty of Switzerland had indeed been 
violated by Germany. (See ibid.) If so, then it could also address the question of reparation. (See ibid.) 
However, when the proceedings began and Germany had received the (probably irrefutable) mémoire of 
the Swiss, it started to get anxious about the whole undertaking. (See ibid.) In any case, it proposed to 
abandon the arbitral procedure and to settle the case among the two States themselves. (See ibid.) On 18 
September 1935, the Swiss issued a communiqué whose last words read that the mémoires of the Swiss 
and the German Governments “have established the regrettable fact that a German functionary has acted 
in an inadmissible manner in this case, for which he was punished disciplinary some time ago. In these 
circumstances the two Governments are in accord in terminating the arbitral procedure by an agreement. 
Jacob has been surrendered to Swiss authorities [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Preuss 1936, pp. 
123-124.) It must be stressed that the “German functionary” referred to above was not one of the actual 
kidnappers; Preuss notes that, because Germany apparently refused to acknowledge that the actual 
kidnappers where German agents, “[t]he agreement may be construed only as an admission of 
responsibility for acts of complicity by State agents within their own territory in illegal seizures by 
private individuals on foreign soil.” (Ibid., p. 124.) 
408 Cf. also (the more general) statement of Shen 1994, p. 45: “This article advises that all domestic 
courts, being a part of the government of the State, should take judicial notice of and give effect to the 
rules and principles of both customary and conventional international law, and should refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction over individuals seized or abducted by means in violation of international law.” 
See also ibid., pp. 83-84. 
409 It may be interesting to note that Morgenstern (1953, p. 267) submitted that the In re Jolis case “is 
the only attitude consonant both with the requirements of international law and with the principles of the 
municipal law of most states regarding the enforcement of international law in municipal courts.” See 
also ibid., p. 279: “Principle demands that municipal courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction over 
persons or property which have been seized in violation of international law. In acting thus the courts 
would enforce the rule of international law prohibiting the seizure, and give effect to the general 
jurisprudential maxim ex injuria jus non oritur.” See further Garcia-Mora 1957, pp. 447-448. See also 
the criticism of Kiss (1965, pp. 937-938) towards the Argoud case: “Les vues qu’exprime cet arrêt 
semblent être contraires à la pratique française qui a toujours nié la validité des arrestations opérées en 
territoire étranger, même en l’absence de toute protestation émanant de l’Etat dont la compétence 
territoriale a été lésée. Elle sont aussi contraires à la conception de la supériorité du droit international 
sur le droit interne, conception pourtant affirmée par la Constitution de 1958 – à moins d’admettre que 
le droit international ne contient que des règles conventionnelles. Une infraction aux règles du droit 
international public existe indépendamment de la qualité de celui qui la dénonce – ou ne la dénonce pas. 
La circonstance qu’elle ne sera peut-être pas sanctionnée ou qu’aucune réclamation n’en naîtra sur le 
plan international est indifférente à ce point de vue. La violation du droit est là et il est curieux de 









have played a role; it should be remembered that Pierre Jolis was only suspected of 
having stolen 2200 francs whereas an investigation was opened against Argoud “for 
conspiracy against the authority of the State and complicity, by provocation and by 
giving instructions, in attempts against that authority.” This point is also reflected in 
the following words of Comte, where he, arguably in contrast to his earlier 
observation that international law problems will be settled without the intervention 
of the judges, asserts that courts must recognise the sovereignty of States:   
 
Rarely – perhaps never – has a problem more difficult, more complex, more 
disturbing, been put before the conscience of the judiciary. Account must be taken of 
the need for repression which the exceptional gravity of the crimes makes in the 
highest degree imperative; the maintenance of the principles sanctifying the rights of 
the human person and the liberty of the individual, of which the courts are the 
guardians and the guarantors, must be safeguarded; the sovereignty of States must be 
recognized and the nature and the limits of the sanctions which it postulates must be 
made explicit. Above all, it is necessary (…) to preserve the independence and the 
dignity of French justice [emphasis in original, ChP].410    
 
Wilske and Schiller also argue that there is another difference discernible, namely 
the fact that in In re Jolis, French officials undoubtedly played a role in the male 
captus, whereas this was not clear in the case of Argoud.411  
 
While it might be argued that Argoud stands for the proposition that a defendant 
cannot point to the circumstances of his apprehension to defend against the exercise 
of jurisdiction unless the State from which he was abducted makes an objection, it has 
not been interpreted that way. French legal authorities cite Argoud primarily as an 
example of a case in which jurisdiction was exercised over a defendant who was 
abducted by private parties and hold that the rule pronounced in Jolis regarding 
abductions by agents of the state is good law in France. This would mean that no 
jurisdiction may be exercised over a person abducted from abroad [emphasis in 
original and original footnote omitted, ChP].412 
 
However, one can doubt whether this is in fact true (besides the fact, of course, that 
it was indeed not very clear whether French agents were involved in the male 
captus, which was obviously the case in In re Jolis). After all, the Supreme Court 
argued that international law issues are the concern of States. Hence, even if there 
were a clear-cut violation of international law (for example, because it was 
established without a doubt that Argoud’s kidnappers were indeed agents of France, 
acting in that capacity,413 and violating the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of 
                                                          
410 Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, Vol. 45 
(1972), p. 107 (Report of M. le Conseiller Comte). 
411 See ns. 375 and 405. 
412 Wilske and Schiller 1998, p. 227. 
413 As already explained earlier (see n. 485 of Chapter III), only conduct of agents acting in that 
capacity shall be considered an act of State which may lead to State responsibility. See also the 








Germany), this would, according to the Supreme Court, have to be resolved by the 
Governments of the two States involved.414 Argoud cannot intervene in this and the 
same goes for the Court, which should only be concerned with applying French 
law.415 In fact, as was explained a few moments ago, it appears to be the opinion of 
the Supreme Court that even if the Federal Republic of Germany had made a formal 
protest, this would not have changed the matter either; it would be up to the French 
Executive (and not the French Judiciary) to solve the international law problem. 
Another older case from the civil law context which should be mentioned here is 
the case Fiscal v. Samper, decided by the Spanish Supreme Court in 1934.416 
Although this case appears to be a normal rule of speciality decision in the context 
of extradition (comparable with the already-mentioned (see Subsection 1.1 of this 
chapter) Rauscher case), the Supreme Court’s reasoning seems to go a little further 
than merely holding that Samper’s conviction had to be overturned because he was 
tried for offences other than those for which extradition was sought. 
                                                                                                                                              
des ressortissants français ou même, comme l’accusé le soutient, des agents soumis à l’autorité de l’Etat 
français, ce ne sont pas leurs actes mais seulement le fait que les organes étatiques n’auraient pas dans 
ce cas fonctionné conformément au droit des gens qui entraînerait la responsabilité de cet Etat”. 
(Lucchini 1964, p. 191.) Nevertheless, as was also explained in Chapter III of this book, acts of private 
individuals can lead to the responsibility of a State as well. According to De Schutter (1965, pp. 101-
102), that was the case here: “[E]ven if the intervention of agents of the State or officers or nationals 
acting on order or with permission of their government is not fully evident, there is not the slightest 
doubt about the responsibility of the French Government. The conduct of these individuals is approved 
by the French authorities, no attempt has been made to find the culprits or to grant reparation. Moreover, 
de Gaulle has clearly implied that handing back the accused has never been considered, which is a 
public and manifest approval of the breach; and for its part the Court evades the question. France 
thereby assumed full responsibility towards Germany for the kidnapping of Antoine Argoud [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” 
414 See Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, International Law Reports, 
Vol. 45 (1972), p. 97: “[E]ven accepting that Argoud had been abducted on the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in violation of the rights of that country and of its sovereignty [which would be 
the case if French agents had been involved in the operation, ChP], it would be for the Government of 
the injured State alone to complain and demand reparation.” 
415 Cf. in that respect Lucchini (1964, p. 192), commenting on the 28 December decision of the Court of 
State Security (which, like the Supreme Court, was also of the opinion that international law issues had 
to be resolved at the level of States): “Ainsi la Cour fonde essentiellement son raisonnement sur le fait 
que si toute mesure de contrainte d’un Etat sur le territoire d’un autre Etat présente un caractère 
d’illicéite, c’est à l’Etat victime de cette mesure d’apprécier en toute liberté s’il doit ou non présenter 
une réclamation. Autrement dit, l’enlèvement d’Argoud, même s’il a été accompli par des agents des 
services secrets français, constitue une violation de la souveraineté territoriale de la République 
fédérale, mais l’absence par l’Allemagne de toute plainte ou de toute demande officielle de restitution 
ôte toute qualité à un individu pour faire valoir ce manquement à une règle du droit de gens [emphasis 
in original, ChP].” See also Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Re Argoud, 4 June 1964, 
International Law Reports, Vol. 45 (1972), p. 102 (Report of M. le Conseiller Comte): “Following the 
defence up to a point and accepting for the purposes of discussion that Argoud had been abducted by 
French agents, the situation would remain the same. The responsibility of the French State could then be 
examined, but only at the request of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, in the name 
of a nation whose sovereignty had been infringed and which was entitled to plead the violation of a 
traditional principle governing relations between States.”   
416 Supreme Court, Fiscal v. Samper, 22 June 1934, Annual Digest and Reports of Public International 








In this case, Samper, the manager of the Federación Catòlica Agraria, a Madrid 
company in financial problems,   
 
drew eleven bills of exchange for a total of 327,635 pesetas payable to the Federation, 
with forged signatures and acceptances of persons who owed nothing to the 
Federation. He deposited them in the bank account of the Federation and entered 
them as assets in its books in order to make it appear in good financial condition so 
that he might continue as its manager.417 
 
Samper subsequently fled to Portugal where he was detained. When Spain requested 
his extradition for falsification of bills of exchange, Portugal refused, but when 
Spain asked for his extradition for falsification of a private document as a mean of 
swindling, extradition was granted.418 In Spain, “Samper was tried and found guilty 
by a Spanish Court in 1933 for the crime of falsification of a mercantile document 
which did not cause property loss to anyone and sentenced to imprisonment for two 
years.”419 Samper appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, 
“that he had been convicted of a crime different from that for which he had been 
extradited.”420 The Supreme Court agreed with this point and discharged Samper, 
reasoning that  
 
[t]his is so because delinquents who take refuge in a foreign country relying on a 
legislation which promises them protection have acquired a true right, disregard of 
which would tend to weaken the law of nations and to introduce lack of confidence 
into international relations.421 
 
Selleck notes that this reasoning “rejects the traditional Anglo-American rule that 
jurisdiction is not impaired by the circumstances attending a defendant’s arrest and 
capture on foreign territory.”422 Furthermore, “the court discarded the idea that 
individuals cannot plead a right of asylum or protection under an extradition treaty 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].”423 It should be remembered that this ‘right of 
asylum’ was also asserted by Ker in Ker v. Illinois, but was found to be absurd by 
the US Supreme Court.424 
The final decision which should be mentioned here is that of the Zurich Higher 
Court (Obergericht) of 11 April 1967 described by Wilske.425 In this case, a Swiss 
businessman who was suspected of forgery of documents and who was living 
abroad was lured by private individuals into Switzerland where he was subsequently 
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418 See ibid. 
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421 Ibid., p. 405. 
422 Selleck 1985, p. 259. 
423 Ibid. 
424 See ns. 28-30. 








arrested by the (in the meantime informed) Swiss authorities.426 The Obergericht, 
following the opinion of Professor Hans Schultz,427 refused to exercise jurisdiction 
over the person, finding “that the defendant’s apprehension violated national due 
process and principles of extradition law under which apprehension of a person by 
means of force or ruse was prohibited.”428 The Court found a limited form of 
cooperation by the Swiss authorities already enough to attribute the conduct of the 
private individuals to the State of Switzerland: “Ausreichend sei bereits, wenn die 
Strafverfolgungsorgane von dem Vorgehen der Privatpersonen Kenntnis gehabt und 
die so geschaffene Gelegenheit, den Angeklagten zu verhaften, ausgenützt hätten 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].”429 It is, therefore, already enough if the 
                                                          
426 See Wilske 2000, p. 323.  
427 See Schultz 1967.  
428 Wilske and Schiller 1998, p. 228. See also Wilske 2000, p. 323: “[D]er Zugriff auf eine Person 
[kann] nur statthaft sein (…), wenn dieser sich aus völlig freien, nicht durch Drohung oder List 
beeinflusstem Willen in den Bereich der hiesigen Gerichtsgewalt begeben hat.” (Referring to “Zürcher 
Obergericht, II. Strafkammer, App., 11 April 1967, Blätter für Zürcherische Rechtsprechung 65 (1967), 
Nr. 119, 248, 250.”) It may be interesting to note that Schultz, who defends the idea that judges cannot 
continue to exercise jurisdiction in the case of a serious male captus case violating international law (see 
Schultz 1967, p. 81: “Daraus folgt, daß die schweizerischen Gerichte eine Verletzung grundlegender 
Regeln des Völkergewohnheitsrechtes, wie das Gebot, Eingriffe in die Gebietshoheit eines fremden 
Staates durch Behörden zu unterlassen, berücksichtigen und diesen Grundsätzen widersprechende 
Handlungen schweizerischer Behörden als rechtswidrig betrachten müssen. Infolgedessen kann der 
Angeschuldigte in dem gegen ihn eingeleiteten Verfahren eine das allgemeine Völkerrecht verletzende 
Prozeßhandlung rügen und das gericht hat von Amtes wegen zu prüfen, ob ein solcher Mangel vorliegt. 
Gilt das allgemeine Völkerrecht als Teil der eigenen Rechtsordung, so ist damit unvereinbar, wenn ein 
in krasser Verletzung dieser Regeln begründetes Strafverfahren unbekümmert um diesen Mangel 
weitergeführt wird.”) and who defends the ex iniuria ius non oritur rule (see ibid., p. 83: “Gerade wenn 
der Staat Recht sprechen und demjenigen Strafe auferlegen will, der gegen das Recht verstieß, so muß er 
sich davor hüten, daß seinem Verfahren Unrecht anhafte. Nicht der Grundsatz, daß auf welche Weise 
auch immer jeder möglicherweise Schuldige zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden kann, ist die oberste 
Maxime wirklicher Strafrechtspflege, sondern der richtige Leitsatz lautet, daß die strafrechtliche 
Verantwortung nur den Grundsätzen des Rechts folgend geltend gemacht werden soll. Ex iniuria ius non 
oritur. Dies ist so wahr, daß, welche Ziele der Strafrechtspflege auch gesetzt werden, eine nicht selber 
streng das Recht achtende Strafjustiz diese Ziele nie erreichen wird.”) wondered whether another rule 
would be applicable in the context of more serious suspects such as perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity. However, unfortunately, he did not find this necessary to examine in further detail as this case 
did not deal with such a suspect, see ibid., p. 82: “Ob für die Urheber von Verbrechen gegen die 
Menschheit andere Regelen zu gelten haben, welche sich aus der völkerrechtlichen Eigenart dieser 
Straftaten ableiten, kann unerörtert bleiben, weil es such hier einzig um die Verfolgung gewöhnlicher 
Straftaten handelt.” However, in his article from 1984 (in which he comments on the still-to-discuss, see 
Subsection 2.2, 1982 decision of the Swiss Federal Court in the case of X), Schultz does make a general 
statement against male captus methods in which he mentions the fact that the suspects against whom 
such methods are used may be charged with serious crimes, see Schultz 1984, pp. 110-111: 
“Vorkommnisse, wie sie sich in dem hier geschilderten Auslieferungsfall abspielten, sind nicht nur eines 
Staates, der sich als Rechtsstaat ausgibt, unwürdig. Sie sind außerdem überaus bedauerlich, weil sie 
allen denen Auftrieb geben, die der zwischenstaatlichen Rechtshilfe jeder Art mit Mißtrauen begegnen 
und überall Mißbrauch wittern. Der kurzfristige Vorteil, einmal einen ins Ausland entwischten 
Angeschuldigten, der schwerer Delikte bezichtigt wird, auf eine solche Weise zur Strecke zu bringen, 
wiegt die dadurch hervorgerufene, lange nachwirkende Erschütterung des Vertrauens in dieses wichtige 
Mittel zwischenstaatlicher Zusammenarbeit nie auf [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 








prosecuting authorities were aware of the conduct of the private individuals and had 
used the arising opportunity to arrest the accused. Because the Court already 
decided not to exercise jurisdiction in this case on the basis of domestic law430 
(which was, however, interpreted in light of international law),431 it did not have to 
look at the ‘real’ international law dimension of this case.432  
 
2.2 More recent cases 
 
The first more recent male captus case from the civil law context which should be 
mentioned here is the Dutch Menten case from 1977. In 1976, the media in the 
Netherlands reported on the role allegedly played by Pieter Menten, a Dutch 
national, in the execution of a number of Jewish citizens in 1941 in what was then a 
Polish region.433 However, the day before the Public Prosecutor wished to start 
criminal proceedings, Menten fled to Switzerland.434 On 6 December 1976, Menten 
was arrested by the Swiss authorities and a little more than two weeks later, he was 
handed over to the Netherlands where he was charged with a war crime and/or a 
crime against humanity before the Extraordinary Penal Chamber of the District 
Court of Amsterdam.435  
Counsel for Menten, referring to an article written by Orie (who is now, among 
other things, a judge at the ICTY),436 argued that the Swiss and Dutch Governments 
had acted unlawfully in bringing Menten to justice and that as a result, the legal 
proceedings now being conducted were unacceptable.437 However, the District 
                                                          
430 See Wilske 2000, p. 324: “Folge dessen sei ein so schwer wiegender Verstoß gegen grundlegende 
rechtsstaatlichen Regeln, daß die derart begründete Gerichtsgewalt als nicht bestehend angesehen 
werden müsse [original footnote omitted, ChP].”  
431 See Wilske and Schiller 1998, p. 228. 
432 See Wilske 2000, p. 324. See also Schultz 1967, p. 85. 
433 See District Court of Amsterdam, Extraordinary Penal Chamber; Supreme Court; District Court of 
[T]he Hague, Extraordinary Penal Chamber; Supreme Court; District Court of Rotterdam, Extraordinary 
Penal Chamber; Supreme Court, Public Prosecutor v. Menten, 14 December 1977; 29 May 1978; 4 
December 1978; 22 May 1979; 9 July 1980; 13 January 1981, International Law Reports, Vol. 75 
(1987), pp. 331-332 (summary). 
434 See ibid., p. 332 (summary). 
435 See ibid. See also ibid.: “[T]hat on 7 July 1941, at Podhorodce, alone or together and in conjunction 
with one or more other persons, he intentionally and after calm consideration and quiet deliberation, in 
any case intentionally, took the life of at least one or more of approximately twenty or thirty, in any case 
a number of persons (…), all of whom belonged to the civilian population of this area, by shooting them 
dead or by shattering their skulls, or by burying them alive or at least having them buried by others after 
having fired at them or injured them otherwise. He was also charged with the murder of 125 to 200 
persons, the majority of them of Jewish origin, at Urycz on 27 August 1941.” 
436 See Orie 1978. See also Frowein 1994, p. 176: “When a Dutch national suspected of war-crimes 
during World War II was arrested in Switzerland in 1976, apparently the Netherlands Minister of Justice 
travelled to Bern. No formal request for extradition seems to have been presented to the Swiss 
authorities. The person concerned was subsequently expelled from Swiss territory and handed over to 
the Netherlands authorities [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See finally Poort 1988, p. 71: “The case of 
the war criminal Pieter Menten (…) is a clear example of a disguised extradition.” 
437 See District Court of Amsterdam, Extraordinary Penal Chamber, Public Prosecutor v. Menten, 14 








Court of Amsterdam was not of the opinion that a male captus had occurred. As a 
result, it was not necessary to determine the effect of the alleged male captus on the 
jurisdiction of the Court. In addition, it found that the present proceedings were not 
the appropriate place to discuss these matters:  
 
[T]he conclusion in Orie’s opinion does not go beyond the view, formed after ‘brief 
investigation’, that the transfer of the accused from Switzerland to the Netherlands in 
December 1976 ‘was almost certainly accomplished illegally’ because Switzerland 
had acted contrary to the operative rules of extradition and aliens law. A reservation is 
made as regards the possibility, doubted by the author, that the accused had been 
given an opportunity to ‘orientate’ himself towards another destination. Apart from 
this possibility, the Netherlands was alleged to have acted as an ‘instigator of’ or as 
an ‘accomplice in’ Switzerland’s unlawful conduct. Subsequently the question is 
raised – but left unanswered – of whether the judge who is now considering the 
offences charged must draw the conclusion that the prosecution which is based, inter 
alia, on this unlawful conduct, should equally be regarded as unlawful, and if so to 
what decision such a conclusion should lead. However, the Court has not reached this 
question since it has not been established that the accused’s transfer from Switzerland 
to the Netherlands was unlawful. Nor is it relevant to consider the question of 
unlawfulness within the limits of the present prosecution. This would require a 
procedure in which the State of the Netherlands was in a position to defend itself 
against the alleged unlawful conduct otherwise than through the Public Prosecutor, 
and in which it should above all be established whether Switzerland’s conduct 
towards the accused was unlawful and, if so, whether the conduct of the Netherlands 
should also be qualified as unlawful.438 
 
It must be said that it is a pity that the Court does not motivate its decision on these 
points. The Court, notwithstanding Orie’s article, can, of course, be of the opinion 
that it has not been established that Menten’s transfer to the Netherlands was 
unlawful, but on which basis does it found its conclusion?439 Furthermore, it can be 
argued that the Court’s motivation as to why the State, in these criminal proceedings 
and through the Public Prosecutor, cannot defend itself properly against the 
allegations of Menten, is also insufficient; cases discussed in this book show that 
both the Defence and the Prosecution could amply argue and defend their case with 
respect to alleged pre-trial irregularities, also in criminal cases in which the suspect 
(and not the alleged wrongdoing State) is the subject of the proceedings.  
In the other Menten decisions following that of the District Court of 
Amsterdam,440 the point of his male captus did not return.  
However, when Menten went to Strasbourg after the Dutch courts had 
pronounced themselves on his case, he complained “about the conditions under 
which he was expelled from Switzerland and that the expulsion was in fact a 
                                                          
438 Ibid. 
439 Cf. also the criticism of Orie (1978, pp. 154-157) in the ‘Post Scriptum’ of his article (written after 
the District Court had issued its decision). 








disguised extradition which enabled the Swiss authorities to disregard a number of 
judicial safeguards.”441  
The ECmHR, however, declared his application inadmissible,442 explaining that 
Menten  
 
has failed to show that the above complaint has been submitted to the Netherlands 
courts in the context of the criminal proceedings instituted against him and in 
particular to claim the illegality of his arrest, and can therefore not be considered 
having exhausted the remedies available to him under Dutch law. Moreover, an 
examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances 
which might have absolved the applicant, according to the generally recognised rules 
of international law, from exhausting the domestic remedies at this disposal.443 
 
The second case to be discussed here also has a link with Switzerland. After the 
Swiss Federal Court (Bundesgericht) had arguably issued a male captus bene 
deditus decision in the Bozano case (see footnote 276 and accompanying text of 
Chapter III), namely that Bozano could indeed be extradited to Italy, 
notwithstanding his alleged male captus – a disguised extradition – from France to 
Switzerland,444 the same Court in Switzerland issued a male captus male deditus 
decision two years later, in the case of X.445  
                                                          
441 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1982, 142, ‘Europese Commissie voor de rechten van de mens, 11 
december 1981, nr. 9433/81’ under complaint 6. (The document available via the ECtHR’s database 
Hudoc (available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-
Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+database), see ECmHR (Plenary), X. v/The Netherlands, Application No. 
9433/81, ‘Decision of 11 December 1981 on the admissibility of the application’, Decisions and 
Reports, No. 27, pp. 233-242) is incomplete and does not mention Menten’s male captus submission.) 
442 See also Swart 2002 C, p. 1655, n. 48. 
443 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1982, 142, ‘Europese Commissie voor de rechten van de mens, 11 
december 1981, nr. 9433/81’ under the European Commission’s point 6. 
444 Nevertheless, the Swiss Court did not see it that way. It noted that the view that ex iniuria ius non 
oritur takes precedence over male captus bene detentus had indeed been defended in doctrine, but that 
this point was not relevant in this case as there had been no manifest violation of human rights in the 
first place, see Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Lausanne, IIe Cour de droit public, arrêt du 13 juin 1980 
dans la cause Lorenzo Bozano contre Ministère public de la Confédération (opposition à une demande 
d’extradition), BGE 106 (1980), p. 406: “L’opinion a (...) été soutenue en doctrine qu’en cas 
d’enlèvement illicite dans un pays pour livrer la personne enlevée à un Etat étranger, ou en cas de 
recours à la procédure d’expulsion pour éluder les règles d’extradition, le principe traditionnel “male 
captus bene judicatus” devrait le céder devant la maxime “ex injuria jus non oritur”; l’Etat de jugement 
serait dès lors tenu d’examiner l’illicéité de l’extradition intervenue au regard du droit étranger et du 
droit des gens (...) On peut se dispenser en l’espèce de se déterminer sur les problèmes ainsi posés. En 
effet, tant le Tribunal fédéral que les auteurs susmentionnés subordonnent l’éventuelle application des 
principes qu’ils évoquent aux cas où les circonstances dans lesquelles l’intéressé est traduit devant la 
justice de l’Etat poursuivant constituent une violation manifeste du droit des gens (...), ce qui n’est 
nullement démontré en l’occurrence. En outre, ainsi que cela sera examiné plus bas, l’expulsion à 
l’égard d’un Etat tiers ne devrait en soi pas être tenue en droit des gens pour un succédané illicite de 
l’extradition.” Notwithstanding this, as was already explained in n. 273 and accompanying text of 
Chapter III, the ECtHR decided afterwards that Bozano had indeed been the victim of a disguised 
extradition, violating his human right to liberty and security. 
445 Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Lausanne, P 1201/81/fs, Urteil der II. öffentlichrechtlichen 








In this case, German officials tried to apprehend a Belgian national residing in 
Belgium, who was accused of fraud and forgery of documents.446 However, because 
Belgium does not extradite its own nationals, an extradition request would not have 
led to any result.447  
Hence, with help of a few telephone calls and under the pretext of arranging a 
business deal, a German agent lured X, who could not reckon that he was going to 
be arrested abroad,448 from Belgium to Zurich, Switzerland, where he was arrested 
by the Swiss authorities.449 Shortly afterwards, the Germans asked for his 
extradition.450 The Swiss Federal Court, basing itself on international law,451 
refused, however, holding “that Germany had violated the territorial sovereignty of 
Belgium, and therefore, Switzerland would be an accessory after the fact if it 
approved Germany’s extradition request.”452 Looking at the already in Chapter III 
                                                                                                                                              
und Polizeidepartement, Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 1983, pp. 435-438. See also Schultz 
1984. 
446 See Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Lausanne, P 1201/81/fs, Urteil der II. öffentlichrechtlichen 
Abteilung vom 15. Juli 1982, X, belgischer Staatsangehöriger, gegen Bundesanwaltschaft, Eidg. Justiz- 
und Polizeidepartement, Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 1983, p. 435. 
447 See Wilske and Schiller 1998, p. 228, n. 118. 
448 See Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Lausanne, P 1201/81/fs, Urteil der II. öffentlichrechtlichen 
Abteilung vom 15. Juli 1982, X, belgischer Staatsangehöriger, gegen Bundesanwaltschaft, Eidg. Justiz- 
und Polizeidepartement, Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 1983, p. 437: “Dass der Einsprecher mit 
seiner Verhaftung im Ausland hätte rechnen müssen, ist auszuschliessen, wusste er doch nichts von dem 
gegen ihn erhobenen Strafverfahren in der Bundesrepublik under der Existenz des Haftbefehls vom …”. 
449 See ibid., p. 435. 
450 See ibid. 
451 See Wilske 2000, p. 326: “Das Urteil des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts vom 15. Juli 1982 
argumentiert ausschließlich völkerrechtlich.” 
452 Wilske and Schiller 1998, p. 228. See for the original text: Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, 
Lausanne, P 1201/81/fs, Urteil der II. öffentlichrechtlichen Abteilung vom 15. Juli 1982, X, belgischer 
Staatsangehöriger, gegen Bundesanwaltschaft, Eidg. Justiz- und Polizeidepartement, Europäische 
Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 1983, p. 437: “Wird die verfolgte Person mittels der erwähnten Vorkehren in 
eines Drittstaat gelockt, von dem daraufhin die Auslieferung des Betreffenden verlangt wirde, trägt der 
ersuchte Staat mit der Auslieferung zum Erfolg, nämlich der Behändigung des Verfolgten under 
Missachtung der Souveränität, mindestens mittelbar bei. Der Grundsatz der Souveränität gilt indes 
absolut, d. h. gegen jedermann. Als Verletzung dieses Grundsatzes muss dehalb auch gelten, wenn der 
Staat, dessen Souveränität nicht verletzt wird, das völkerrechtswidrige Vorgehen dadurch begünstigt, 
dass er den Verfolgten ausliefert. Diesfall macht sich der ersuchte Staat zum Gehilfen der 
Souveränitätsverletzung. (…) Sinn und Geist der verschiedenen Abkommen verbieten dem ersuchten 
Staat daher, Personen auszuliefern, die unter Umgehung der allein massgebenden inner- und 
zwischenstaatlichen Auslieferungsbestimmungen und unter Verwendung völkerrechtswidriger Mittel ins 
Ausland gelockt wurden.” It must be noted that the Swiss Federal Court was hence also of the (arguably 
rather far-reaching, see ns. 79-80 and 82 and accompanying text of Chapter III) opinion that Belgium’s 
sovereignty had been violated by the telephone calls setting in motion the luring operation (an operation 
which did not involve police activities of foreign agents on the territory of Belgium in the strict sense), 
see ibid.: “Nach den Grundsätzen des Völkerrechts ist jeder Staat verpflichtet, die Souveränität anderer 
Staaten zu beachten; Handlungen eines Staates auf fremdem Staatsgebiet sind daher unzulässig. Soweit 
eine verfolgte Person sich im Ausland befindet, kann sie dem verfolgenden Staat nur mittels eines 
hoheitlichen Aktes des Staates, auf dessen Gebiet sie sich befindet, überstellt werden; werden Organen 
des verfolgenden Staates ohne Bewilligung auf dem Gebiet eines anderen Staates tätig, bemächtigen sie 
sich insbesondere des Verfolgten mittels Gewalt, List oder Drohung, verletzen sie die Souveränität (…). 








discussed DARS, such a refusal could now, under certain circumstances, perhaps be 
founded on Article 16 (‘Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act’), which stipulates:  
 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) that State 
does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.453  
 
Wilske and Schiller note that Schultz, in his legal opinion for X,454 “is of the opinion 
that this decision implicitly follows the principle ex iniuria ius non oritur and rejects 
the male captus, bene detentus principle [original footnote omitted, ChP].”455  
This case is rather special as it seems to be the only case in this overview (until 
now) where a court connects the non-continuation of the case with a male captus not 
executed by the authorities of the court’s own State.456  
However, it must also be noted that the continuation of the case was not linked 
with a trial in Switzerland itself, but with proceedings to determine whether or not 
extradition had to be granted to a third State. One could argue that, if the interests of 
the Swiss had been stronger (for example, if they sought to prosecute this person 
themselves for alleged crimes committed in Switzerland), the result might have been 
different.  
Nevertheless, one could also assert that the Swiss Court wished to send a signal 
on how to bring suspects to justice and that that signal not only applies if the court 
in question ‘merely’ has to decide on whether or not extradition should be granted, 
but that it applies a fortiori when that court seeks to prosecute the suspect itself.457  
Before turning to the next case in this overview, the 1983 French case of Barbie, 
it may be appropriate to mention that in other, more recent Swiss alleged male 
                                                                                                                                              
betreffenden Staates betätigt; es genügt, dass sein Verhalten den Taterfolg im Ausland bewirkt 
[emphasis added, ChP].” 
453 See also n. 353 of Chapter III. 
454 See Schultz 1984.  
455 Wilske and Schiller 1998, p. 228. See also Schultz 1984, p. 105: “Mit seinem Urteil vom 15. Juli 
1982 folgte das Bundesgericht, ohne es ausdrücklich zu sagen, dem Grundsatz ex iniuria ius non oritur 
und erteilte dem Grundsatze male captus bene deditus eine deutliche Absage [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” 
456 In the 1967 Swiss case, see the final case of Subsection 2.1, the Zurich Higher Court refused 
jurisdiction because of a male captus – a luring operation – executed by private individuals. As such, it 
seems to fall within the category of this 1982 case as well. However, in the 1967 case, the Court found 
that there had been some involvement of the Swiss authorities, although it must be admitted that the test 
regarding the level of cooperation between the authorities and the private individuals was very low: 
“Ausreichend sei bereits, wenn die Strafverfolgungsorgane von dem Vorgehen der Privatpersonen 
Kenntnis gehabt und die so geschaffene Gelegenheit, den Angeklagten zu verhaften, ausgenützt hätten 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” (See also n. 429 and accompanying text.) Hence, the prosecuting 
authorities only had to be aware of the conduct of the private individuals so that they could use the 
arising opportunity to arrest the accused. 
457 In any case, Mann (1989, p. 415) is of the opinion that “[t]his is a decision expressive of an 








captus cases from 2000458 and 2007,459 the general 1982 reasoning460 was upheld.461 
However, in both cases, the allegations by the victim of the alleged male captus 
were rejected.  
In the 2000 case, in which the suspect claimed that he had been lured into 
Switzerland, it was stressed that the 1982 case and the present one were different in 
that in the first one, the Belgian suspect could not reckon that he was going to be 
arrested abroad462 whereas the suspect of the 2000 case could. Notwithstanding this, 
the latter freely agreed to accompany the Swiss customs officers from German 
territory (where the customs office, at which the suspect’s car was stopped, was 
located)463 to Swiss territory to make a statement regarding the arrest of his female 
companion. Because of this, the Court held, he could not rightfully argue that he 
was lured into Switzerland.464  
                                                          
458 See Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Lausanne, 6P.64/2000/hev, Kassationshof in Strafsachen, 5. 




459 See Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Lausanne, T 0/2 1B_87/2007/fun, Urteil vom 22. Juni 2007, I. 
öffentlichrechtliche Abteilung, X. gegen Staatsanwaltschaft III des Kantons Zürich, Bezirksgericht 
Zürich, available at: http://jumpcgi.bger.ch/cgi-bin/JumpCGI?id=22.06.2007_1B_87/2007. 
460 “Nach den Grundsätzen des Völkerrechts ist jeder Staat verpflichtet, die Souveränität anderer Staaten 
zu beachten; Handlungen eines Staates auf fremdem Staatsgebiet sind daher unzulässig. Soweit eine 
verfolgte Person sich im Ausland befindet, kann sie dem verfolgenden Staat nur mittels eines 
hoheitlichen Aktes des Staates, auf dessen Gebiet sie sich befindet, überstellt werden; werden Organen 
des verfolgenden Staates ohne Bewilligung auf dem Gebiet eines anderen Staates tätig, bemächtigen sie 
sich insbesondere des Verfolgten mittels Gewalt, List oder Drohung, verletzen sie die Souveränität”. See 
also n. 452. 
461 See Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Lausanne, 6P.64/2000/hev, Kassationshof in Strafsachen, 5. 
Dezember 2000, X. gegen Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Aargau, Obergericht des Kantons Argau  
(available at: 
http://www.polyreg.ch/d/informationen/bgeunpubliziert/Jahr_2000/Entscheide_6P_2000/6P.64__2000.h
tml), under (D) (3) (a) and Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Lausanne, T 0/2 1B_87/2007/fun, Urteil 
vom 22. Juni 2007, I. öffentlichrechtliche Abteilung, X. gegen Staatsanwaltschaft III des Kantons 
Zürich, Bezirksgericht Zürich (available at: http://jumpcgi.bger.ch/cgi-
bin/JumpCGI?id=22.06.2007_1B_87/2007) under (D) (2.5.1). 
462 See also n. 448 and accompanying text. 
463 See Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Lausanne, 6P.64/2000/hev, Kassationshof in Strafsachen, 5. 
Dezember 2000, X. gegen Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Aargau, Obergericht des Kantons Argau 
(available at: 
http://www.polyreg.ch/d/informationen/bgeunpubliziert/Jahr_2000/Entscheide_6P_2000/6P.64__2000.h
tml), under (A): “Das Zollamt [Stein/Bad Säckingen, ChP] befindet sich aufgrund des Abkommens 
zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland über die 
Errichtung nebeneinanderliegender Grenzabfertigungsstellen und die Grenzabfertigung in 
Verkehrsmitteln während der Fahrt vom 1. Juni 1961 (…) auf deutschem Gebiet”. 
464 See ibid., under (D) (3) (a): “Daraus ergibt sich aber, dass auch dem guten Glauben dessen, der 
angeblich mit List ins Inland gelockt worden ist, entscheidende Bedeutung zukommt. Rechnete er mit 
einer möglichen Verhaftung, oder musste er damit rechnen, hat er selber auf den ihm zustehenden 
Schutz verzichtet und kann sich nicht mehr auf das Verhalten der Behörden berufen. So wurde die 
Einsprache im erwähnten Bundesgerichtsentscheid von 1982 nur geschützt, weil der Einsprecher nicht 
mit seiner Verhaftung rechnen konnte (BGE vom 15. Juli 1982, in EuGRZ 1983 S. 437 (…)). Nach den 








In the 2007 case, the suspect in question, a German citizen charged with 
investment fraud in Switzerland and other countries, was arrested on 9 August 2006 
in his place of residence, Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic), and was brought to 
Switzerland by Swiss police officials on 19 August 2006.465  
The suspect claimed that his case should be dismissed and that he should be 
released on the ground that he was abducted from Santo Domingo.466 He hereby 
referred to a report of Professor Wohlers from the University of Zurich, who 
concluded that, on the basis of the present findings, it was uncertain whether or not 
the handing over of the suspect was unlawful467 but that “[e]s spreche allerdings 
einiges dafür, dass die Überstellung als eine völkerrechtswidrige Entführung und die 
Inhaftierung damit als gegen Art. 5 Ziff. 1 Satz 2 EMRK verstossend einzustufen 
sei.”468  
Wohlers explained that the handing over had to be qualified as unlawful if the 
police authorities of the Dominican Republic, through actual conduct, had thwarted 
the regular extradition and deportation procedures and if the Swiss authorities had 
foreseen this and had exploited the resulting situation.469 Nevertheless, according to 
him, if this were indeed established, it does not lead to an obstacle to exercise 
jurisdiction, but ‘merely’ to a release.470 This point was already explained in 
Subsection 4.4 of Chapter III: according to human rights law, a violation of Article 5 
of the ECHR leads to a release, but not necessarily to the ending of the case, 
although granting the released person the opportunity to leave the State (see footnote 
470) may de facto lead to the ending of the case, see also footnote 615 of Chapter 
III. In addition, serious human rights violations can convince the judge that the male 
captus is so serious that jurisdiction must nonetheless be refused.  
                                                                                                                                              
seines Mietwagens und musste demzufolge mit der Entdeckung des versteckten Geldes und auch der 
Verhaftung rechnen (…). Gleichwohl erklärte er sich freiwillig bereit, auf den Polizeiposten Stein 
mitzugehen, um eine Aussage zur Verhaftung seiner Begleiterin zu machen. Damit kann er nicht mehr 
vorbringen, mittels einer völkerrechtswidrigen List in die Schweiz gelockt worden zu sein.” 
465 See Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Lausanne, T 0/2 1B_87/2007/fun, Urteil vom 22. Juni 2007, I. 
öffentlichrechtliche Abteilung, X. gegen Staatsanwaltschaft III des Kantons Zürich, Bezirksgericht 
Zürich (available at: http://jumpcgi.bger.ch/cgi-bin/JumpCGI?id=22.06.2007_1B_87/2007), under (A). 
466 See ibid., under (D) (2.1). 
467 See ibid., under (D) (2.3). 
468 Ibid. 
469 See ibid.: “Unrechtmässig sei die Überstellung dann, wenn die Polizeibehörden der Dominikanischen 
Republik gehandelt hätten, um die Regelung des Auslieferungs- und Ausweisungsrechts durch 
faktisches Verhalten zu unterlaufen. Soweit das Verhalten der Polizeibehörden der Dominikanischen 
Republik die Voraussetzungen für ein völkerrechtliches Delikt begründe und dies für die 
Strafverfolgungsbehörden der Schweiz erkennbar gewesen sei, führe das Ausnutzen dieser Situation 
dazu, dass auch das Handeln der schweizerischen Behörden als völkerrechtswidrig und damit 
unrechtmässig im Sinne von Art. 5 Ziff. 1 Satz 2 EMRK einzustufen wäre.” 
470 See ibid.: “Erweise sich die Überstellung als völkerrechtswidrige Entführung, bestehe nach 
Auffassung des Gutachters zwar kein Prozesshindernis, wohl aber ein Hafthinderungsgrund. Damit sei 
der Beschwerdeführer aus der Haft zu entlassen und sei ihm die Möglichkeit zu geben, die Schweiz zu 
verlassen. Soweit ihm dies mangels eigener finanzieller Ressourcen nicht möglich sein sollte, wäre er 
diesbezüglich zu unterstützen, da die Schweiz verpflichtet sei, einen von ihr mitverursachten 








The Court noted that the Swiss authorities had asked the authorities in Santo 
Domingo in March 2006 if the suspect could be extradited to Switzerland if he were 
to be arrested there. If so, Swiss officials would come to Santo Domingo to 
accompany the suspect back to Switzerland. On 9 August 2006, Interpol Santo 
Domingo sent a fax to Interpol Bern in which it was made clear that the suspect was 
in custody and that he would be deported, partly because there was no extradition 
treaty between the two States. However, according to Interpol Santo Domingo, 
Dominican officials had to escort the suspect back to Switzerland otherwise the 
suspect could argue that he had been kidnapped.471 On 14 August, the Swiss 
authorities notified their colleagues in Santo Domingo that the suspect could also be 
picked up at any time in Santo Domingo and one day later, Interpol Santo Domingo 
informed the Swiss:  
 
Dear colleagues, in ref. to your message dated Aug. 14/2006 please be advised that 
X.________ was taken to court today because his lawyers filed for a “Habeas 
Corpus” procedure for the judge to determine if the a/m person’s imprisonment was 
legal or not. The judge ruled in our favor and Mr. X.________ imprisonment was 
declared legal as of today. You have to send an escort team to pick up the fugitive as 
soon as possible because his lawyers are preparing an appeal to rule out the judge’s 
decision. We can only guarantee detainment of Mr. X.________ for 4 to 5 more days. 
After that we can’t guarantee that Mr. X.________ remains under custody because if 
his lawyers file for an appeal, he might be set free. Please advise your opinion on this 
matter.472 
 
As a result of this, on 18 August 2006, three Swiss police officials went to Santo 
Domingo and one day later, brought the suspect back to Switzerland.473 The Court, 
referring, among other things, to the already discussed Öcalan case before the 
ECtHR,474 explained that the Swiss authorities had not violated the sovereignty of 
the Dominican Republic.475 Furthermore, it was of the opinion that the Swiss could 
be accused of mala fide conduct neither.476 It would be different if the Swiss 
authorities, with the intent to circumvent an extradition procedure, had asked the 
                                                          
471 See ibid., under (D) (2.4): “Dear colleagues, please be advised that today at 08.25 local time Mr. 
X.________, born on ..., and wanted by the economic fraud section of the Zurich cantonal district 
attorney, was apprehended while coming out of his residence. He [is] actually under custody at 
Interpol’s office. Since he doesn’t have documents that can prove his legal status in our territory and 
there’s no extradition treaty between our nations a deportation is imminent. We were told that Swiss 
officers are to escort Mr. X.________ back to Switzerland. Bear in mind that if a deportation procedure 
is made [D]ominican officers have to escort him back to Switzerland otherwise Mr. X.________ could 
say it was a kidnapping. Let us know your comments on this matter. We can hold him under custody for 
48 hours after which we have to send him to the immigration facility so that he can wait there for the 
deportation procedure to be completed.” 
472 Ibid. 
473 See ibid. 
474 See ibid., under (D) (2.5.2). 
475 See ibid., under (D) (2.6). 








Dominican officials to deport the suspect to Switzerland instead.477 However, that 
was not the case here: “Vielmehr haben die dominikanischen Behörden von sich aus 
mitgeteilt, der Beschwerdeführer werde ausgewiesen.”478 In addition, there were not 
sufficient reasons for the Swiss authorities to assume that the conduct of the 
Dominican officials was evidently unlawful pursuant to the law of that State: “Dass 
ein Staat das Recht hat, Ausländer ohne gültige Aufenthaltspapiere auszuweisen, 
liegt auf der Hand und brauchte bei den schweizerischen Behörden keinen Argwohn 
zu erwecken.” 479  In these circumstances, there was no obstacle to the suspect’s 
arrest.480 Although the Court agreed with Schultz that the maxim ex iniuria ius non 
oritur must be followed (see footnote 428), the Swiss authorities had not committed 
any iniuria.481  
The next case to be discussed here is the 1983 French Barbie case. In 1952 and 
1954, Klaus Barbie, head of the Gestapo in Lyon from November 1942 to August 
1944, was sentenced to death in absentia for war crimes.482 After a number of years, 
it was discovered that he had fled to Bolivia but a request for his extradition by the 
French Government was rejected by the Supreme Court of Bolivia on 11 December 
1974 as there was no extradition treaty between the two States.483 In February 1982, 
new proceedings were instituted against Barbie, this time for crimes against 
humanity,484 and on 3 November 1982, an arrest warrant was issued.485 When a new 
Bolivian President was elected in December 1982, “the Bolivian authorities decided 
to expel Barbie on the ground that he had used a false identity to obtain Bolivian 
                                                          
477 See ibid. 
478 Ibid. 
479 Ibid. 
480 See ibid.: “Entscheidend ist, dass die Schweiz die Souveränität der Dominikanischen Republik 
beachtet und weder Zwang, List, Drohung noch sonst wie einen “üblen Polizeitrick” (…) angewandt 
hat, um des Beschwerdeführers habhaft zu werden. Bei dieser Sachlage ist ein Hafthinderungsgrund zu 
verneinen.” 
481 See ibid.: “Wie Hans Schultz ausführt, muss der Staat, gerade wenn er Recht sprechen und 
demjenigen Strafe auferlegen will, der gegen das Recht verstiess, sich davor hüten, dass seinem 
Verfahren Unrecht anhafte. Nicht der Grundsatz, dass auf welche Weise auch immer jeder 
möglicherweise Schuldige zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden kann, ist die oberste Maxime wirklicher 
Strafrechtspflege, sondern der richtige Leitsatz lautet, dass die strafrechtliche Verantwortung nur den 
Grundsätzen des Rechts folgend geltend gemacht werden soll. Es gilt der Satz: Ex iniuria ius non oritur 
[the Court refers here to Schultz 1967, p. 83, see n. 428, ChP]. Dem ist uneingeschränkt zuzustimmen. 
Nach dem Gesagten haben die schweizerischen Behörden jedoch kein Unrecht begangen, um den 
Beschwerdeführer verhaften und ihn – wie die Mitangeschuldigten – dem hiesigen Strafverfahren 
zuführen zu können. Wesentlich ist der gute Glaube der schweizerischen Behörden (…). Dafür, dass 
ihnen dieser gefehlt hätte, enthalten die Akten keine Anhaltspunkte.” 
482 See Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Barbie, 6 October 1983 and 26 January 1984, 
Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Résistants et Patriotes and Others v. Barbie, 20 
December 1985, International Law Reports, Vol. 78 (1988), p. 125 (summary).  
483 See ibid. 
484 See ibid.: “Barbie was accused of murder, torture and arbitrary arrests, detentions and imprisonment. 
In Lyons alone he was alleged to have been responsible for the murder of 4,342 persons, the deportation 
of 7,591 Jews and the arrest and deportation of 14,311 members of the French Resistance.”  








citizenship.”486 His deportation took place on 3 February 1983, when he was put on 
a plane bound for French Guiana, where he was subsequently arrested by French 
airport police and flown to metropolitan France.487 It was there that Barbie argued 
that he was the victim of a disguised extradition and that, as a result of that, the 
proceedings against him had to be stopped.488 The Chambre d’accusation of the 
Court of Appeal in Paris refused to release Barbie as a consequence of his disguised 
extradition. First, it noted that there could not be a disguised extradition as there was 
no extradition treaty between France and Bolivia.489 Then, it turned to the 
(seriousness of the) crimes with which Barbie was charged. The Supreme Court 
explained the reasoning of the Court of Appeal as follows:  
 
[The Court of Appeal held] that, by reason of their nature, the crimes against 
humanity with which Barbie is indicted do not simply fall within the scope of French 
municipal criminal law, but are subject to an international criminal order to which the 
notions of frontiers and extradition rules arising therefrom are completely foreign.490  
 
This quotation appears to mean that because of the seriousness of the crimes with 
which Barbie is charged, normal rules do not apply.  
If this general observation (not limited to this specific case) entails, for example, 
that States should be able to prosecute international crimes even if there is no clear 
jurisdictional link with the State, comparable to the universality principle, then the 
words quoted above are, of course, to be welcomed.  
However, they may also be interpreted more broadly to mean that suspects of 
international crimes are to be apprehended, irrespective of the means. That could 
mean even without the consent of the State where that suspect is residing and hence 
in disrespect of that State’s territorial sovereignty, see the notion that these crimes 
“are subject to an international criminal order to which the notions of frontiers (…) 
arising therefrom are completely foreign.”491 This point was arguably also raised by 
                                                          
486 Ibid. 
487 See ibid. 
488 See ibid. 
489 See Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Barbie, 6 October 1983, International Law Reports, 
Vol. 78 (1988), p. 128: “[The decision of the Court of Appeal was based] on the grounds that the 
execution of an arrest warrant against a person who has taken refuge abroad is not subject to his 
voluntary return to France or to the setting in motion of extradition proceedings. The accused certainly 
claims that his arrest was the result of a fraud arising from a concerted agreement between the French 
and Bolivian Governments for his disguised extradition. Disguised extradition is characterized, 
however, by the violation of the provisions of a treaty and there is no extradition treaty between France 
and Bolivia.” 
490 Ibid. 
491 Cf. also Michell 1996, p. 423, n. 205: “A possible “Eichmann exception” to the rule against the 
exercise of police power within another state’s territory might be grounded in the universality principle, 
which permits states to prescribe certain crimes and to try persons for them, regardless of where the 
offenses were committed, or the nationality of the offenders. (…) Although the universality principle is 
the basis for prescriptive and not enforcement jurisdiction, in cases where the fugitive is accused of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity, it is arguable that the presumption against enforcement jurisdiction 








Barbie himself. After attacking the first point of the Court of Appeal,492 he stated 
that  
 
the French Government is not empowered to express its adhesion to an international 
criminal order other than in accordance with constitutional rules. For its part the 
judiciary, as protector of individual freedom, is required by Article 66 of the 
Constitution to ensure respect for the principle that no one shall be arbitrarily 
detained. The judiciary is required to ensure respect for this principle under 
conditions laid down by the law and not by enforcing a so-called informal 
international law which has no permanent organizational structures and which 
furthermore, following the disappearance of temporary organizational structures 
which had been established, formally remitted the prosecution and judgment of 
crimes against humanity to the municipal legal orders of the States concerned. [The 
applicant therefore concludes] that, in relying on … the informal principles of a so-
called “international criminal order to which the notion of frontiers and the 
extradition rules arising therefrom are completely foreign”, the Court of Appeal 
violated the provisions mentioned above.493 
 
However, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the Court of Appeal.494 
With respect to the first point, it noted that  
                                                                                                                                              
another state and charge him with crimes under international law without incurring international 
responsibility for the violation of the latter’s territorial sovereignty, particularly where the asylum state 
has refused to either extradite or prosecute a fugitive accused of an international crime. (…) The 
abducting state’s violation of the injured state’s territorial sovereignty may be outweighed by both the 
abducting state’s and injured state’s jus cogens obligation to prosecute the fugitive for international 
crimes. (…) Such an approach is implied in Barbie (…).” 
492 See Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Barbie, 6 October 1983, International Law Reports, 
Vol. 78 (1988), p. 129: “[The applicant contends] however that, in the absence of any treaty, the 
conditions, procedure and effects of extradition are determined by the Law of 10 March 1927 (Article 1) 
[this Law is called ‘Loi du 10 mars 1927 relative à l’extradition des étrangers’, is available at: 
http://ledroitcriminel.free.fr/la_legislation_criminelle/anciens_textes/loi_extradition.htm and its Art. 1 
reads: “En l’absence de traité, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés 
par les dispositions de la présente loi. La présente loi s’applique également aux points qui n’auraient pas 
été réglementés par les traités.”, ChP] so that disguised extradition is present not only where a treaty has 
been violated but also where the provisions of the Law in question have been violated. It is not contested 
that the operation carried out corresponds exactly to the definition of extradition, which involves the 
surrender of an individual by the Government of the State of refuge to another Government which has 
requested his surrender, either to inflict a penalty upon him or to try him. By failing to examine, in 
application of Article 23 of the Law, whether the extradition of the applicant was a nullity [this article 
states, among other things: “L’extradition obtenue par le Gouvernement français est nulle, si elle est 
intervenue en dehors des cas prévus par la présente loi.”, ChP], in which case an order for his release 
would have been required under Article 25 [this article states: “Dans le cas où l’extradition est annulée, 
l’extradé s’il n’est pas réclamé par le gouvernement requis, est mis en liberté et ne peut être repris, soit à 
raison des faits qui ont motivé son extradition, soit à raison des faits antérieurs, que si, dans les trente 
jours qui suivent la mise en liberté, il est arrêté sur le territoire français.”, ChP], the Court of Appeal 
failed, in the applicant’s view, to give a proper legal basis to its decision.” 
493 Ibid., p. 130. 
494 See ibid.: “The Chambre d'accusation [of the Court of Appeal] held that it was competent to examine 
the submissions made in the application, according to which the detention of Barbie was a nullity since 








[e]xtradition proceedings had not been started at the time of the expulsion of Barbie 
by the Bolivian authorities. Furthermore, the acts for which he was sought are not 
excluded from the ambit of extradition by the Law of 10 March 1927 so that Articles 
23 and 25 of that Law[495] cannot be applied. There is therefore no obstacle to the 
bringing of a prosecution against the accused on national territory provided that the 
rights of the defence are fully and freely ensured before both the examining 
magistrate and the trial court.496  
 
Hence, the fact that normal extradition procedures (on the basis of an extradition 
treaty) had not been initiated between Bolivia and France does not preclude the 
prosecution of Barbie in France, because the acts for which Barbie are sought are 
not excluded by the French extradition law of 1927, which applies when no 
extradition treaty can be relied upon. This statement seems to imply that the Court – 
which, incidentally, appears to be especially interested in the concept of fair trial in 
the courtroom (“provided that the rights of the defence are fully and freely ensured 
before both the examining magistrate and the trial court”), cf. its decision in Argoud 
almost 20 years earlier (which, however, seems to go even further, see footnote 396 
and accompanying text) – is of the opinion that the transfer of Barbie from Bolivia 
to France can nevertheless be seen as a form of extradition as it argues that the law 
regulating extradition if there is no extradition treaty in place has not been violated 
and hence does not block a further prosecution. Thus, it seems that the Court is not 
asserting that it had jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that Barbie was the victim 
of a disguised extradition, but that it had jurisdiction because there was no disguised 
extradition.  
With respect to the second point, the Supreme Court referred to a number of 
provisions stemming from documents dealing with the prosecution of international 
crimes497 and explained that  
                                                                                                                                              
extradition request, the execution of an arrest warrant on national territory, against a person who has not 
[this negation must be deleted, see also n. 489, ChP] previously taken refuge abroad, is not subject to his 
voluntary return to France or to the institution of extradition proceedings. Furthermore, by reason of 
their nature, the crimes against humanity with which Klaus Barbie, who claims German nationality, is 
charged in France where those crimes were committed, do not simply fall within the scope of French 
municipal law but are subject to an international criminal order to which the notions of frontiers and 
extradition rules arising therefrom are completely foreign.” In giving this ruling … the Court of Appeal 
gave a proper legal basis to its decision, without inadequacy or contradiction.” It must be remarked that 
very often (see, for example, the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber’s decision of 5 June 2003 in the Nikolić case 
(see Subsection 3.1.4 of the following chapter), para. 23, n. 28, Lamb 2000, p. 227, n. 215 or Ülgen 
2003, p. 458, n. 88), the decision ‘Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Résistants et Patriotes 
and Others v. Barbie’ is mentioned as the source of this quotation. However, that case was decided on 
20 December 1985 and, reading its summary (which only starts at p. 136 of Vol. 78 of the International 
Law Reports), does not contain that quotation.) 
495 See n. 492. 
496 Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Barbie, 6 October 1983, International Law Reports, Vol. 78 
(1988), pp. 130-131. 
497 See, for example, UNGA Res. 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 (‘Extradition and Punishment of War 
Criminals’). In this resolution, the UNGA recommended “that Members of the United Nations forthwith 
take all the necessary measures to cause the arrest of those war criminals who have been responsible for 








[i]t results from these provisions that “all necessary measures” are to be taken by the 
Member States of the United Nations to ensure that war crimes, crimes against peace 
and crimes against humanity are punished and that those persons suspected of being 
responsible for such crimes are sent back “to the countries in which their abominable 
deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws 
of those countries”.498 
 
It can be argued that several positions can be discerned from the above-mentioned 
observations of the Supreme Court, which does not make it easy to distil the opinion 
of the Supreme Court on this issue.  
First, because it emphasises the importance of fair proceedings in the courtroom 
and because it notes that it is very important that persons such as Barbie, persons 
charged with very serious crimes, are brought to justice, it seems to argue that 
problems in the pre-trial phase (for example, a disguised extradition) are not really 
to be looked at in these kinds of cases.499 Nevertheless, there is arguably also room 
for the idea that the Supreme Court is of the opinion that there was nothing wrong 
with Barbie’s transfer500 and that it can in fact be seen as a sort of extradition (or in 
any case as a transfer not prohibited by the French extradition law of 1927).501 Swart 
                                                                                                                                              
which their abominable deeds were done, in order that they may be judged and punished according to 
the laws of those countries”. With respect to the “governments of States which are not Members of the 
United Nations”, the UNGA called upon them “also to take all necessary measures for the apprehension 
of such criminals in their respective territories with a view to their immediate removal to the countries in 
which the crimes were committed for the purpose of trial and punishment according to the laws of those 
countries.” 
498 Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Barbie, 6 October 1983, International Law Reports, Vol. 78 
(1988), p. 131. For a more refined resolution, see, for example, UNGA Res. 170 (II) of 31 October 1947 
(‘Surrender of war criminals and traitors’): “The General Assembly (…) Recommends Members of the 
United Nations, which desire the surrender of alleged war criminals or traitors (…) by other Members in 
whose jurisdiction they are believed to be, to request such surrender as soon as possible and to support 
their request with sufficient evidence to establish that a reasonable prima facie case exists as to identity 
and guilt”. 
499 Sluiter notes, for example, that “the French Cour de Cassation in the Barbie case recognised 
disguised extradition as lawful in relation to crimes against humanity, where the “ordinary extradition 
rules do not apply” [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 648-649.) It must be noted 
that these exact words (“ordinary extradition rules do not apply”) will not be found in this decision. 
Nevertheless, this does not seem to have been Sluiter’s position as the original text of his (misprinted) 
article (see on this point also n. 187 of Chapter VIII) does not contain double (but only single) quotation 
marks, which points to a paraphrase rather than to an exact quotation. See also Lamb 2000, p. 239: “It 
(...) appears that, implicitly at least, the basing of Barbie’s guilt upon crimes against humanity assisted 
the French court in overlooking any irregularities in Barbie’s arrest [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
See finally Conforti 1993, p. 157, referring to Barbie and writing: “[D]omestic case-law suggests that 
punishment may be carried on even if the culprit was illegally captured abroad, in breach of the 
sovereignty of the State where the capture took place”. Note however that in this case, no breach of 
sovereignty occurred. 
500 Cf. the opinion of the Court of Appeal on this point in n. 489 where it states that Barbie had not been 
the victim of a disguised extradition. 
501 Sloan (2006, p. 330), for example, is of the opinion that the Court “was not asserting that somehow, 
due to the universally condemned nature of the crimes attributed to the accused, the French courts would 
be less troubled by irregular capture or the violation of state sovereignty. Indeed, in Barbie there was no 








appears to take a middle position when he states that “on 6 October 1983, the French 
Cour de Cassation invoked Resolution 3(I) in ruling that the expulsion of Barbie 
from Bolivia to France did not amount to disguised extradition contrary to French 
law”.502  
Barbie also filed a complaint with the ECmHR, but as was already explained in 
Chapter III, his application was declared inadmissible. 
The next case under examination is the German 1985 Stocké case. To a certain 
extent, the decisions of the ECmHR and ECtHR in this case have already been 
discussed earlier, see Subsection 2.2.4 of Chapter III, but before the case went to 
Strasbourg, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
examined the case as well. The Court noted that the lower court, the Federal Court 
of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof),  
 
konnte (…) davon ausgehen, daß eine allgemeine regel des Völkerrechts nicht 
besteht, derzufolge die Durchführung eines Strafverfahrens gegen eine Person 
gehindert wäre, die unter Verletzung der Gebiethoheit eines fremden Staates in den 
Gebietsstaat verbracht worden ist (…).503 
 
Hence, the German Constitutional Court was of the opinion that there was no 
international law rule stating that a court cannot exercise jurisdiction in the case of a 
                                                                                                                                              
defence argued that because the crimes in question were not provided for in French law, they lacked a 
proper legal basis and the defendant could not be charged with them. Rejecting this assertion, the court 
emphasised the universal nature of the crimes attributed to the accused.” (See also Currie 2007, p. 370, 
n. 101, referring to Sloan 2006, p. 330, n. 77 (this must be: n. 78).) However, as was also shown in the 
main text, the Supreme Court did not only seem to link the seriousness of the crimes with the French 
jurisdiction ratione materiae; there are also signs that this element was connected with the French 
jurisdiction ratione personae. 
502 Swart 2002 C, p. 1646, n. 19. It may be interesting to note that Swart (ibid.) remarks after these 
words that “[a] similar ruling was given by the Buenos Aires Court of First Instance in the case of Jan 
Durcansky” (with reference to L.C. Green’s article ‘Political Offences, War Crimes and Extradition’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 11 (1962), p. 347.) However, it seems that this 
Court decided exactly the opposite of the Barbie Court, namely that extradition had to be refused 
notwithstanding these UNGA Resolutions, see Green’s article at p. 347: “The Buenos Aires Court of 
First Instance rejected a Czechoslovak request for the extradition of an individual charged with 
participating in mass murders of civilians in Czechoslovakia between November 1944 and the end of the 
war. (…) The fact that there had been Resolutions on the subject by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations affected the Argentine Court as much as it did the United States Court of Appeals in Karadzole 
v. Artukovic.” Namely: not at all. See the following observation by the US Court of Appeals in 
Karadzole v. Artukovic (as presented by Green at p. 344 of his article): “Appellant in essence argues that 
by virtue of resolutions taken in 1946 and 1947 by the United Nations General Assembly as to the 
surrender of alleged war criminals, it is incumbent on this court to hold that Artukovic is charged with 
an offence which is extraditable. We have examined the various United Nations Resolutions and have 
concluded that they have not sufficient force of law to modify long standing judicial interpretations of 
similar treaty provisions. Perhaps changes should be made as to such treaties” [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” However, perhaps, Swart is not making the comparison here between the Durcansky 
and Barbie cases but between the Durcansky and the Kardzole v. Artukovic cases. (Swart, at the 
beginning of his footnote, also refers to this latter case.) 
503 BVerfG (1. Kammer des Zweiten Senats), Beschl. v. 17.7 1985 – 2 BvR 1190/84. NJW 1986, Heft 








male captus violating the territorial sovereignty of a foreign State. It would be 
different if one could point to a general State practice and opinio iuris that the 
freedom of States in that respect is limited because of international law.504 However, 
that was not the case according to the Constitutional Court: 
 
Ein Blick auf die Staatenpraxis zeigt, daß Gerichte es nur dann allgemein ablehnen, 
ein Strafverfahren gegen einen völkerrechtswidrig Entführten zu betreiben, wenn der 
durch die Entführung verletzte Staat gegen die Unrechtshandlung protestiert und die 
Rückgabe des Entführten gefordert hat (…).505   
 
Thus, according to the Constitutional Court, State practice showed that courts 
generally only refuse to exercise jurisdiction in a case of an abduction violating 
international law if the injured State has protested the wrong and has demanded the 
return of the abducted person (which was not the case here). 
Nevertheless, after having referred to a few male captus bene detentus cases to 
support its stance,506 it also admitted that courts have decided male captus male 
detentus cases (in which no formal protest and request for the return of the suspect 
could be identified).  
However, this practice, the Court continued, is not sufficiently widespread as to 
amount to an established practice, limiting the jurisdiction of a State. Furthermore, it 
does not express with the necessary clarity the conviction that the discontinuation of 
the criminal proceedings against the person abducted in violation of international 
law is required because of international law; in several cases, it is rather explicitly 
                                                          
504 See ibid., p. 1428: “Eine solche Regel bestünde als allgemeine Regel nur, wenn eine entsprechende 
Staatenpraxis nachweisbar wäre, die allgemein und in der Überzeugung geübt würde, daß die Freiheit 
der Staaten, die in ihrem Hoheitsbereich befindlichen Personen ihrer Strafgerichtsbarkeit in bezug auf 
Sachverhalte zu unterwerfen, die eine gewisse Mindestbeziehung zum eigenen Hoheitsberech 
aufweisen, von Völkerrechts wegen in der genannten Weise eingeschränkt ist.”   
505 Ibid. 
506 The Court mentioned the cases of Eichmann and Argoud and stated that “[d]ie genannten 
Entscheidungen stimmen schließlich auch mit der Rechtsprechung britischer und amerikanischer 
Gerichte überein, die in zahlreichen Entscheidungen die Auffassung vertreten haben, daß die Umstände, 
unter denen ein Angeklagter vor die Schranken des Gerichts gelangt sie, die Durchführung des 
Verfahrens gegen ihn nicht hinderten”. (Ibid.) The reference to Eichmann is correct. It must be 
emphasised again (see also Chapter III) that, even though Argentina initially requested the return of 
Eichmann, it dropped its demand in the context of the UNSC deliberations. Thus, there was no need for 
the Israeli Executive to return Eichmann to Argentina. Furthermore, this issue had become insignificant 
when the Israeli Judiciary examined the case because by that time, the incident on the violation of the 
sovereignty of Argentina had been closed. (See also ibid., p. 1428: “Zwar hat der Gerichtshof seine 
Entscheidung auch auf die Erwägung gestützt, eine mögliche Völkerrechtsverletzung im 
Zusammenhang mit der Verbringung Eichmanns nach Israel sei durch einen Verzicht Argentiniens auf 
allfällige Ansprüche im Rahmen einer gemeinsamen Erklärung der Regierungen beider Staaten geheilt 
(…). Daß eine völkerrechtlichen Pflicht zur einstellung des Verfahrens gegen Eichmann bestanden 
hätte, wenn eine solche Erklärung nicht abgegeben worden wäre, hat der Gerichtshof indessen nicht 
festgestellt.”) However, the reference to the male captus bene detentus case of Argoud is less 
convincing because that case even went a step further when it arguably held that Argoud could be tried, 








stated that the principles of domestic law (rule of law, due process of law) are the 
ones obstructing the conduct of the proceedings.507  
Here, the Court referred to the previously mentioned (see Subsection 2.1) 
decision of the Swiss Obergerichts of 11 April 1967 (which, by the way, involved a 
luring operation and not an abduction) and to the 1974 Toscanino decision. As was 
shown earlier, the Swiss Court indeed focused on domestic law but the judges in 
Toscanino also based their decision on international law aspects.508  
Nevertheless, and taking into account that this study primarily focused on the 
practice of courts alone (although the reactions of other statal organs were 
sometimes also examined, see, for example, the reactions of governments in the 
context of the Alvarez-Machain case), there are indications that the German Court’s 
statement that there is evidence in State practice that courts will generally refuse 
jurisdiction in the case of an abduction followed by a protest and request for the 
return of the suspect, appears to be correct. 
The Constitutional Court also looked, among other things, into the human rights 
context and argued, as has been done in this book (and in the above-mentioned 
Swiss case from 2007), that a violation of the right to liberty and security/the right 
not to be arrested or detained arbitrarily does not automatically lead to the ending of 
the proceedings (but merely to a release).509  
Finally, the Court examined whether Stocké’s trial was barred because of 
domestic considerations, namely those related to the rule of law and to Article 1, 
paragraph 1 of the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law (or Constitution)), which states: 
“Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all 
state authority.”510 It found that the opinion of the Bundesgerichtshof, that the rule 
of law and Article 1, paragraph 1 did not oppose the conviction of the suspect, even 
if German State officials had acted unlawfully with respect to the events of Stocké’s 
                                                          
507 See ibid.: “Zwar sind in mehreren Staaten entscheidungen ergangen, denen offenbar die Ansicht 
zugrunde liegt, daß der mit einer Entführung verwirklichte Unrechtstatbestand ein Verfahrenshindernis 
zu begründen geeignet sei. Diese Praxis ist indessen weder hinlänglich verbreitet, um als gefestigte, die 
staatliche Gerichtsbarkeit einschränkende Übung angesehen werden zu können, nocht bringt sie mit der 
notwendigen Deutlichkeit die Überzeugung zum Ausdruck, daß die Einstellung eines Strafverfahrens 
gegen einen in völkerrechtswidriger Weise Entführten von Völkerrechts wegen geboten sei; in einigen 
Entscheidungen wird vielmehr ausdrücklich festgestellt, daß es Grundsätze des internen Rechts 
(Rechtsstaatlichkeit, due process of law) seien, die eine Verfahrensführung hinderten [emphasis in 
original, ChP]”. 
508 See n. 64 and accompanying text. 
509 See BVerfG (1. Kammer des Zweiten Senats), Beschl. v. 17.7 1985 – 2 BvR 1190/84. NJW 1986, 
Heft 22, p. 1428: “Schließlich bestanden und bestehen auch keine nach Art. 100 II GG [“Ist in einem 
Rechtsstreite zweifelhaft, ob eine Regel des Völkerrechtes Bestandteil des Bundesrechtes ist und ob sie 
unmittelbar Rechte und Pflichten für den Einzelnen erzeugt (Artikel 25), so hat das Gericht die 
Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes einzuholen.”, ChP.] erheblichen Zweifel daran, daß sich 
aus einem menschenrechtlichen Verbot der willkürlichen Festnahme Einzelner nicht schon eine Pflicht 
zur Einstellung eines Strafverfahrens gegen einen solchermaßen Festgenommenen ergibt.” (GG stands 
for Grundgesetz, the German Basic Law/Constitution, see also the main text in a few moments.)  
510 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. Promulgated by the Parliamentary Council on 23 
May 1949 as amended up to June 2008. Published by German Bundestag, Administration, Public 








male captus on 7 November 1978, can in any case, and taking everything into 
account, not be criticised.511  
A bar to the proceedings can at most be resorted to in extremely exceptional 
cases (“in extreme gelagerten Ausnahmefällen”),512 such as an excessively long trial 
(recall the first situation of the abuse of process doctrine in Bennett: “because it will 
be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial”), which is 
not the case here according to the Constitutional Court.513  
After all, the Court continued, assuming his account is accurate, Stocké was not 
brought to Germany with help of measures involving physical force (but with help 
of a trick), his arrest by German police officials did not take place on French 
territory (but in Germany), at the time of his arrest, a legally valid arrest warrant was 
issued against him, and finally, that according to the Public Prosecutor’s 
investigation regarding the possible cooperation of German State organs in the male 
captus of Stocké, the operation involved conduct of officials from a subordinate 
police station acting on their own authority, the conduct of which was made possible 
because of inadequate official supervision has not been established.514 In short, one 
cannot deduce from the Constitution that in these circumstances, the criminal claim 
of the State can be considered forfeited.515  
It should be noted that these avenues to the male detentus outcome are 
reminiscent of the Toscanino exception, although the domestic male detentus 
possibility of the latter concept appears to be more specific (a male captus 
                                                          
511 See BVerfG (1. Kammer des Zweiten Senats), Beschl. v. 17.7 1985 – 2 BvR 1190/84. NJW 1986, 
Heft 22, p. 1429: “Die Auffassung des BGH, das Rechtsstaatsprinzip oder Art. 1I GG hätten einer 
Verurteilung des Bf. auch dann nicht entgegengestanden, wenn sich Träger deutscher Hoheitsgewalt im 
Zusammenhang mit den Ereignissen vom 7. 11. 1978 strafbar gemacht haben sollten, ist jedenfalls im 
Ergebnis nicht zu beanstanden.” The formulation of such a hypothetical situation (“auch dann nicht (…) 
wenn sich Träger deutscher Hoheitsgewalt (…) strafbar gemacht haben sollten”) arguably shows that 
the Court is of the opinion that German State officials did not do anything wrong in this case. However, 
n. 514 (and accompanying text) seems to imply that German officials may have done something wrong, 
but that this point is immaterial as those officials came from a subordinate police station and were acting 
on their own authority.  
512 Ibid. 
513 See ibid.: “Denn ein solches Verfahrenshindernis könnte allenfalls in extrem gelagerten 
Ausnahmefällen eingreifen (in diesem Sinne auch der zuständige Vorprüfungsausschuß des Senats in 
einem Beschluß vom 24. 11. 1983 betreffend die überlange Dauer eines Strafverfahrens (…); einer 
wertende Betrachtung aller Gesichtspunkte, die für die Beurteilung des vom BGH als möglich 
understellten Hergangs der Ergreifung des Bf. von Bedeutung sind, ergibt indessen, daß ein solcher Fall 
hier nicht vorliegt.” 
514 See ibid.: “Der Bf. wurde – sein Vorbringen als zutreffend understellt – nicht mit Hilfe von 
Maßnahmen körperlichen Zwangs, sondern mittels List in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland verbracht; 
seine Festnahme durch deutsche Polizeibeambte erfolgte nicht auf französischem Hoheitsgebiet, 
sondern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Zum Zeitpunkt der Ergreifung des Bf. lag ein 
rechtswirksamer Haftbefehl vor (…). Hinzu kommt, daß es sich nach den Ermittlungen der 
Staatsanwaltschaft bei der möglichen Beteiligung staatlicher Organe an der Verbringung des Bf. in die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland um ein eigenmächtiges Verhalten von Beamten einer untergeordneten 
Polizeidienststelle handelte; daß dieses Verhalten durch unzulängliche dienstliche Aufsicht ermöglicht 
worden wäre, ist nicht festgestellt worden.” 
515 See ibid.: “Dem Grundgesetz kann nicht entnommen werden, daß auch bei einer solchen Lage der 








accompanied by serious mistreatment)516 than the rather general words employed 
here (extremely exceptional cases). Nevertheless, the German Court may very well 
have been thinking about situations which can be compared with the assumed facts 
of the Toscanino case.517  
As explained earlier, the case also went to the European human rights institutions 
but these did not take an explicit stance on the male captus bene/male detentus 
discussion, although they did not reject the statements on the male captus issue of 
the German Constitutional Court as presented at footnotes 503, 505 and 507 and 
accompanying text either.518  
The (national) Stocké judgment was followed one year later by the Constitutional 
Court deciding a case in which a German citizen was allegedly abducted from the 
Netherlands.519  
After having concluded that international law did not lead to an obstruction of 
the proceedings,520 the Constitutional Court looked at the domestic law context (rule 
of law and Article 1, paragraph 1 of the German Grundgesetz) and stated that this 
case was also not extremely exceptional, even though, in contrast to Stocké, “[d]er 
Bf. wurde (…) mit Hilfe von Maßnahmen körperlichen Zwangs auf 
niederländischem Hoheitsgebiet unter Verletzung seines strafrechtlich geschützten 
Freiheitsrechts (…) festgenommen.”521 Interestingly, in establishing whether or not 
there was such an extremely exceptional case which could lead to the ending of the 
case, it examined the concept of rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) and the 
                                                          
516 It is to be recalled that although Toscanino involved an abduction, the serious mistreatment exception 
does not seem to be confined to this male captus situation (see also Yunis). For example, if a luring 
operation would be accompanied by serious, Toscanino-like mistreatment, courts may decide to refuse 
the case. Notwithstanding this, it can be argued that the criticism towards the Alvarez-Machain case 
(which involved an abduction case) shows that it is only certain with respect to the male captus situation 
of abduction that courts around the world appear to be of the opinion that jurisdiction must be refused in 
these circumstances. 
517 See also Wilske 2000, p. 334, n. 413: “[D]as Gericht hatte hier möglicherweise die schweren 
Folterungen im Toscanino-Fall im Auge.” See also Grams 1994, pp. 70-71. 
518 See ECmHR (Plenary), Walter Stock[é] against the Federal Republic of Germany, Application No. 
11755/85, Report of the Commission (Adopted on 12 October 1989), para. 162: “The Federal 
Constitutional Court (...) found no general rule in international law according to which prosecution of a 
person was barred in a State to whose territory the person concerned had been taken in violation of the 
territorial sovereignty of another State.” See also ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Stocké v. Germany, 
Application No. 11755/85, ‘Judgment’, 19 March 1991, para. 37: “The [German Constitutional] court 
held that there was no rule of international law to prevent a State’s courts from prosecuting a person 
brought before them in breach of the territorial sovereignty of another State or of an extradition treaty. It 
was apparent from American, Israeli, French and British case-law that in such an event a court did not 
decline jurisdiction unless the other State had protested and sought the return of the person concerned. 
The fact that there were a few decisions in which courts had ordered that the proceedings should be 
stayed was not sufficient to establish a real practice to that effect.” 
519 BVerfG (3. Kammer des Zweiten Senats), Beschl. v. 3.6 1986 – 2 BvR 837/85. NJW 1986, Heft 48, 
pp. 3021-3022. 
520 See ibid., p. 3021: “Die Niederlande haben weder die unverzügliche Rücklieferung des Bf. gefordert 
noch einen vergleichbaren Anspruch geltend gemacht.” 








importance of effective prosecution in that respect.522 (This, again, is reminiscent of 
the abuse of process doctrine and the idea that even the smallest aspect, including 
the importance of prosecution – which, of course, weighs heavier in the context of 
serious crimes – should be taken into account when determining whether a certain 
irregularity must lead to the ending of the case or not. However, it must also be 
stressed that certain male captus techniques, such as the one here of an abduction by 
one’s own agents, are intrinsically so serious that jurisdiction should be refused, 
even if dealing with suspects of serious crimes.) 523 However, the Court even went a 
step further, when it appeared to weigh the wrong of the ‘kidnapping’ against the 
culpability (Schuld) of the suspect, an arguably rather unfortunate choice of words 
given the basic principle of the presumption of innocence, even if the suspect’s more 
general ‘criminal energy’ had already been proven by his previous convictions.524     
This case confirms the resemblance between the Stocké case and the Toscanino 
exception noted above and even specifies that not only a luring situation (Stocké) 
but also an abduction (as such) may not necessarily have to lead to the ending of the 
case. This seems to imply that German courts, in a case involving abduction, would 
only refuse jurisdiction if the abduction 1) is followed by a protest and request for 
the return of the suspect from the injured State525 or 2) is accompanied by serious 
mistreatment/serious human rights violations. (This last possibility is not clear but 
one can assume that such an abduction would fall under the concept of “extremely 
exceptional case”.)526  
The penultimate case to be discussed here is the already briefly mentioned (see 
Subsection 2.2.4 of Chapter III) 1995 French case of Illich Ramirez Sánchez. 
Ramirez Sánchez, better known as Carlos the Jackal,527   
 
alleged that, while he was staying lawfully in Khartoum, Sudanese police officers had 
seized, bound, drugged and hooded him and handed him over to French police 
                                                          
522 See ibid. 
523 Cf. also the criticism of Oehmichen (2007, pp. 230-231) on this case. In fact, Oehmichen, referring to 
the presumption of innocence, has serious reservations as concerns the element ‘seriousness of the 
alleged crimes’ in general (see ibid.). 
524 See BVerfG (3. Kammer des Zweiten Senats), Beschl. v. 3.6 1986 – 2 BvR 837/85. NJW 1986, Heft 
48, p. 3022: “Der (…) strafrechtliche Unrechtsgehalt der „Entführung“ wiegt weniger schwer gegenüber 
der Schuld des Bf. dessen hohe kriminelle Energie auch seine erheblichen Vorstrafen belegen.” 
525 Note that the German Court in the 1986 case did not explicitly confirm the reasoning it had made one 
year earlier in the Stocké case as it did not find it necessary to go into this point now that the 
Netherlands had not requested the return of the suspect, see ibid., p. 3021: “Die Niederlande haben 
weder die unverzügliche Rücklieferung des Bf. gefordert noch einen vergleichbaren Anspruch geltend 
gemacht. Offenbleiben kann daher die Frage, ob eine allgemeine Regel des Völkerrechts besteht, 
wonach die Durchführung eines Strafverfahren gegen eine Person, die in völkerrechtswidriger Weise in 
den Gerichtsstaat verbracht worden ist, gehindert ware, wenn der verletzte Staat ihre unverzügliche 
Rücklieferung fordert oder einen vergleichbaren Anspruch geltend macht”. 
526 See again (see also n. 517) Wilske 2000, p. 334, n. 413: “[D]as Gericht hatte hier möglicherweise die 
schweren Folterungen im Toscanino-Fall im Auge.” See also again Grams 1994, pp. 70-71. 
527 It may be interesting to note that this nickname was given to him, not because he was the man on 
whom Frederick Forsyth based his famous novel The day of the Jackal but merely because, reportedly, a 








officers, who had put him, by force, into a French military plane bound for 
Villacoublay military base (…).528 
 
However, in France, where “[h]e was charged with being an accessory to causing 
criminal damage to real and personal property (…), thereby killing one person and 
permanently maiming others, and also with murder and grievous bodily harm”,529 
the Indictments Division of the Paris Court of Appeal (Chambre d’accusation de la 
Cour d’Appel de Paris) issued a male captus bene detentus decision on 7 November 
1994. 
The Court first admitted that it appeared that Ramirez Sánchez “was indeed 
deported to France without any judicial extradition proceedings”.530 However, as 
there was no extradition treaty between France and Sudan, the Court continued, “it 
has not been established that the applicant was handed over by Sudan in breach of 
the provisions of a treaty, nor that he was the subject of a disguised extradition.”531 
The Court then repeated the Argoud reasoning532 that “the ability to take criminal 
proceedings against, and apply the criminal law in France to, someone who has fled 
abroad is not dependent on that person returning voluntarily to France or on 
extradition proceedings being taken”533 and explained that Ramirez Sánchez could 
not challenge the sovereign expulsion/deportation decision of Sudan before French 
courts.534 Subsequently, the Court presented the clearest male captus bene detentus 
reasoning of this decision, stating:   
 
Moreover, case-law also provides that the circumstances in which someone, against 
whom proceedings are lawfully being taken and against whom a valid arrest warrant 
has been issued, has been apprehended and handed over to the French legal 
authorities are not in themselves sufficient to render the proceedings void, provided 
that they have not vitiated the search for and process of establishing the truth, nor 
made it impossible for the defence to exercise its rights before the investigating 
authorities and the trial courts.535 
 
As a result, the application of Ramirez Sánchez was dismissed.  
‘Carlos the Jackal’ appealed, however, to the Supreme Court, arguing that it was 
too simple to consider the transfer of him to France as a sovereign act of Sudan 
which France had nothing to do with.536  
                                                          
528 ECmHR (Plenary), Illich Sánchez Ramirez v/France, Application No. 28780/95, ‘Decision of 24 
June 1996 on the admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 86-B, p. 156. 
529 In fact, Ramirez Sánchez has already been convicted in absentia two years earlier “on several counts 
of murder and one of attempted murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.” (Ibid.) 
530 Ibid., p. 157. 
531 Ibid., p. 158. 
532 See ns. 489 and 494. 
533 ECmHR (Plenary), Illich Sánchez Ramirez v/France, Application No. 28780/95, ‘Decision of 24 
June 1996 on the admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 86-B, p. 158. 
534 See ibid.  
535 Ibid. 
536 See ibid., p. 159: “The applicant had alleged, inter alia, that there had been a violation of Article 5 of 








Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in its decision of 21 February 1995, agreed 
with the above-mentioned quotation of the Court of Appeal,537 reiterated other male 
captus bene detentus reasonings538 and rejected the appeal.539 A subsequent 
application filed with the ECmHR was also unsuccessful, as became already clear in 
Chapter III.  
The final case to be discussed in this subsection dealing with more recent civil 
law decisions is Al-Moayad, a German terrorism case from 2003 involving luring.540  
The suspect, the Yemeni citizen Al-Moayad,541 was “an adviser of the Yemeni 
Minister for Religious Foundations in the rank of an undersecretary of state and 
imam of the Al-Ihsan Mosque in Sanaa/Yemen”542 and was arrested in Frankfurt am 
                                                                                                                                              
believe that an acting Chief Superintendent of the DST [the French Intelligence Service (Direction de la 
surveillance du territoire), see ibid., p. 156, ChP] had learned, at the very last moment, ‘from his 
superiors’ that the appellant was at Villacoublay, where he could be apprehended, without dealing with 
the appellant’s submissions (which, for good reason, have not been disputed) that he was not arrested at 
Villacoublay, but in Khartoum; that despite the absence of any international arrest warrant, he was 
handed over, on Sudanese territory, by the Sudanese police to French police officers flown over 
specially for that purpose by French military aeroplane; and that the appellant, while still under arrest, 
was put onto the aeroplane and taken, under guard, to Villacoublay military airbase where an arrest 
warrant valid within French territory was served on him. Thus, the court avoided ruling on the 
lawfulness of the appellant’s being held under arrest by representatives of the French State from 
Khartoum to Villacoublay. Yet this was precisely the ground on which it had been argued that Sánchez 
Ramirez’s detention was arbitrary. (…)”” 
537 See ibid., p. 160: “In so holding, the court [below] gave legal grounds for its decision and did not 
commit the errors alleged by the appellant in his grounds of appeal.” The final original French words of 
the Supreme Court preceding the words “[i]n so holding, …” (“[a]ttendu qu’en statuant ainsi, …”) were 
not printed in Decisions and Reports, No. 86-B, but they go as follows: “Que, selon l’arrêt, les 
conditions dans lesquelles une personne, faisant l’object d’une poursuite régulière et d’un titre légal 
d’arrestation, a été appréhendée et livrée à la justice française ne sont pas de nature à entraîner par elles-
mêmes la nullité des poursuites dès lors que la recherche et l’établissement de la vérité ne s’en sont pas 
trouvés viciés ni la défense mise dans l’impossibilité d’exercer ses droits devant la jurisdiction 
d’instruction et de jugement”. (Bulletin criminel 1995, No. 74 (21 février 1995, No. 94-85.626), p. 178.) 
538 See ECmHR (Plenary), Illich Sánchez Ramirez v/France, Application No. 28780/95, ‘Decision of 24 
June 1996 on the admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 86-B, p. 160: “It was 
correct in stating that the ability to take criminal proceedings against, and apply the criminal law to, a 
person who has fled abroad is in no way dependent on that person returning voluntarily to France or on 
extradition proceedings being taken. (…) Moreover, the national courts have no jurisdiction to examine 
the circumstances in which a person is arrested abroad by the local authorities, acting alone and in the 
exercise of their sovereign powers, and handed over to French police officers.” This is a good repetition 
of the position of the Court of Appeal but the Court of Cassation does arguably not really go into the 
complaint of Ramirez Sánchez that it cannot be maintained that the Sudanese authorities organised the 
entire operation themselves. 
539 See ibid. 
540 See German Federal Constitutional Court: In the Proceedings on the Constitutional Complaint of Mr. 
Al-M., and his Motion for a Temporary Injunction (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second 
Senate of 5 November 2003, 2 BvR 1506/03), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), pp. 774-788. 
541 Although his full name was not mentioned in the German decision, it can be found in the ECtHR’s 
decision of this case, which will be discussed after the national case. 
542 German Federal Constitutional Court: In the Proceedings on the Constitutional Complaint of Mr. Al-
M., and his Motion for a Temporary Injunction (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second Senate 








Main on 10 January 2003 on the basis of a US arrest warrant.543 The US prosecution 
authorities charged Al-Moayad “with having provided money, weapons and 
communications equipment to terrorist groups, in particular Al-Qaeda and Hamas, 
and with having recruited new members for these groups, between October 1997 
and his arrest”544 and transmitted a request to the German authorities to have him 
extradited to the US.545  
Al-Moayad challenged this extradition for several reasons. The most interesting 
one for this study546 was that he claimed that he had been abducted from Yemen to 
Germany (as one will see in a few moments, the operation in question should rather 
be seen as luring and not as abduction) and that because of that, his extradition to 
the US should be declared inadmissible.547 His State of residence, the State of 
Yemen, also protested the ‘abduction’ and requested that Al-Moayad be repatriated 
to Yemen.548 What had happened exactly? The decision explains: 
 
Instrumental in making the complainant travel to Germany were conversations that a 
Yemeni citizen maintained with the complainant in Yemen in an undercover mission 
of the United States investigation and prosecution authorities. The confidential 
informant convinced the complainant that he could bring him into contact with 
another person abroad who was willing to make a major financial contribution. In this 
context, it is controversial for what purposes the money was supposed to be donated. 
According to the statement made by the complainant’s secretary [who was arrested 
together with Al-Moayad, ChP] in his interrogation by the German investigation 
authorities in which he was heard as a person charged with a criminal offence, the 
decision to travel to Germany was based on the complainant’s voluntary decision.549 
 
The Frankfurt am Main Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) found his 
extradition admissible and was not impressed by Yemen’s protests and requests for 
repatriation because those had to be dealt with on a political and not on a judicial 
                                                          
543 See ibid. 
544 Ibid. 
545 See ibid. 
546 Another one was focused on the future, on what he feared would happen to him in the US, see ibid., 2 
BvR 1506/03, A., I., para. 6 a)), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), p. 775: “He (...) alleged that 
an extradition to the United States infringed the minimum standards that international law requires for a 
state governed by the rule of law. According to the complainant, United States authorities use, in the 
case of persons who are charged with an offence and who are suspected of terrorism, methods of 
interrogation that fall under the ban on torture pursuant to Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Torture.” 
547 See ibid.: “[T]he complainant sought to achieve (...) that the extradition (…) be declared 
inadmissible. The complainant put forward that he had been abducted from Yemen to Germany contrary 
to international law in order to circumvent Yemeni law on extradition.” 
548 See ibid., 2 BvR 1506/03, A., I., para. 4), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), p. 775: “In several 
diplomatic notes, the last one of which is dated 27 March 2003, the Embassy of the Republic of Yemen 
expounded to the Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) its opinion that the complainant had been 
abducted from Yemen to Germany contrary to international law, and circumventing the Yemeni 
constitution’s ban on the extradition of Yemen’s own citizens. The federal government was requested to 
repatriate the complainant to Yemen.” 








level.550 The Court explained (as paraphrased by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), which considered Al-Moayad’s constitutional 
complaint in this case): 
 
Even if the use of a Yemeni citizen in Yemen as a covert investigator of the United 
States were to be regarded as a violation of Yemen’s sovereignty that was contrary to 
international law, this would not be contrary to the complainant’s criminal 
prosecution. No general rule of international law existed that would oblige the state of 
the forum to withdraw the charge if a person had been induced to commit the offence, 
and to enter the state of the forum, by an agent provocateur, by means of trickery, and 
violating the territorial sovereignty of a foreign state. Such a rule would require the 
existence of a state practice to this effect. In state practice, however, different 
opinions concerning the legal consequences of an abduction that is contrary to 
international law could be found. This appraisal was confirmed by the existing 
literature on international law.551 
 
In this quotation, the Court did not go into the (un)desirability of the luring 
operation itself – it merely focused on the effect of such an operation on a court’s 
jurisdiction – but immediately after these words, it became clear that the Court was 
in fact in favour of such methods when the stakes are high and that national law 
dictated that it would only refuse jurisdiction in exceptional cases. This reference to 
the seriousness of the crimes with which Al-Moayad was charged is, of course, very 
interesting for this study and should thus be mentioned here as well:  
 
The court further stated that the use of confidential informants had not infringed the 
principle of a state governed by the rule of law and also not Article 1.1 of the Basic 
Law.[552] The use of such methods of investigation was necessary and required for the 
prosecution of particularly dangerous offences that were difficult to resolve. An 
obstacle precluding proceedings could only be assumed in extreme and exceptional 
cases if it became evident that considering all circumstances, requirements that are 
indispensable in a state governed by the rule of law had not been complied with. The 
present case was no such exceptional case.553 
 
                                                          
550 Ibid., 2 BvR 1506/03, A., I., para. 6 b)), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), p. 776: “The court 
further held that the request for repatriation that had been made by the Republic of Yemen in a 
diplomatic note to the federal government did not affect the admissibility of extradition. Because 
possible claims for reparation under international law exclusively existed between the two states.” 
551 Ibid.  
552 Art. 1, para. 1 of the Basic Law (or Grundgesetz) for the Federal Republic of Germany reads: 
“Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.” 
(Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. Promulgated by the Parliamentary Council on 23 May 
1949 as amended up to June 2008. Published by German Bundestag, Administration, Public Relations 
Division, Berlin, 2008, available at: https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf.) See also n. 
510 and accompanying text. 
553 German Federal Constitutional Court: In the Proceedings on the Constitutional Complaint of Mr. Al-
M., and his Motion for a Temporary Injunction (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second Senate 









A few remarks should be made about these statements. Confidential informants 
may, of course, be necessary in the fight against terrorism and States should 
definitely be able to use them in their own State and, if one cooperates with the State 
in which one is interested, in that latter State.  
However, neither must one forget that what confidential informants do is police 
work. And one State cannot do police work on another State’s territory without that 
State’s consent. That leads to a violation of State sovereignty and international law. 
If the work of the foreign confidential informants leads not to mere intelligence but 
to an arrest (even if that arrest did not take place on the territory of the injured 
State), the injured State may find out, protest and request the return of the suspect. If 
the police work on the other State’s territory leads to an apprehension on that 
territory (this is an abduction), then the ‘abducting’ State has to return the suspect. 
And if the Executive does not do what it should do in the aftermath of a violation of 
international law, the Judiciary should take its responsibility as guardian of the 
international law system, refuse jurisdiction and order the return of the suspect.  
It appears from the previous cases that this rule, which was already assumed in 
Chapter III,554 has quite some support in the practice of courts. The Alvarez-
Machain case can be seen as a clear break with that rule, but one should doubt 
whether that decision has really quashed the strength of that rule, at least in the rest 
of the world, given the immense criticism vented against that decision.  
However, the case may be different with respect to the technique of luring. As 
explained in Subsection 2.1 of Chapter III, this technique, in certain circumstances, 
could also be seen as violating another State’s sovereignty. That, in turn, would also 
mean that if the injured State protests and requests the return of the suspect, the 
‘luring’ State must repair the violation of State sovereignty, the most appropriate 
form, according to the DARS, being to bring the situation back as it was before the 
luring, namely to return the suspect to the injured State. Although there is some 
support for this view,555 it cannot be denied that luring is normally seen as a less 
serious violation of international law and that States and courts, as a result, may 
have turned to other, less far-reaching forms of reparation, even if the return would, 
according to the DARS, still be the most appropriate form of reparation for the 
violation of international law.  
In that respect, the German Court may be right in asserting that there is no 
general rule of international law obliging the forum State to withdraw the charge 
after a luring operation.556  
                                                          
554 See ns. 560-561 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
555 See n. 573 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
556 Note, however, that courts may nevertheless refuse jurisdiction if they are of the opinion that the 
luring operation, even if it did not violate another State’s sovereignty (so seriously), may constitute such 
reprehensible conduct under national law that it cannot be legally ‘approved’ by continuing the case. 
See, for example, the Schmidt case in which context Lord Sedley was of the opinion that subterfuge 
(which would not necessarily have to violate international law) could lead to the ending of the case: “I 
do not accept his argument [the argument of the respondents’ QC, ChP] that only the use of physical 
force passes the threshold. Lawlessness can take many forms. In my judgment what the doctrine of 








However, in the case of abductions, followed by a protest and request for the 
return of the injured State, it appears that most courts around the world would refuse 
jurisdiction and order the return of the suspect if the Executives of the ‘abducting’ 
States have not already done so. (Note, however, that this is not to say that a general 
rule of international law exists in that respect. It only means that State practice 
indicates that courts would refuse jurisdiction in such cases. This matter, the 
correlation between State practice and a general rule of international law, will be 
returned to infra.)  
A final point which must be made here is that the obligation to return on the 
basis of the violation of the sovereignty of Yemen would in principle only be valid 
for the abducting/luring State and not for Germany.  
However, as explained, that does not mean, of course, that the German Court 
may not be able to examine the way in which Al-Moayad came into its power and to 
refuse jurisdiction on the basis of national law if it is of the opinion that the pre-trial 
phase must be qualified as so irregular (even if Germany was not involved in it) that 
the judges, in their good conscience, cannot proceed with the case. In addition, the 
judges could also argue, if they are of the opinion that the US violated the 
sovereignty of Yemen, that they should not extradite the suspect to the former State 
for they would then support, in a way, that violation from the US, cf. also the 1982 
Swiss case of X and Article 16 of the DARS (discussed in that case).557  
                                                                                                                                              
which violates the laws of the foreign state, international law or the legal rights of the individual within 
that state, and thus offends against the principle of comity; (b) which circumvents extradition 
arrangements made with that state; (c) which instead brings the suspect by coercion into the jurisdiction 
of the United Kingdom’s courts; and (d) but for which the domestic proceedings could not have been 
initiated.” (House of Lords, In Re Schmidt, 30 June 1994, [1995] 1 A.C. 357 (Decision of the Divisional 
Court of the Queen’s Bench Division, Justice Sedley).) (Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, in a hypothetical 
exercise that he could use the Bennett discretion in the context of extradition procedures, did not refuse 
jurisdiction in the end, but it is not clear from his words whether he is of the opinion that every luring 
operation cannot lead to the ending of the case or whether this specific luring operation (in which, 
according to him, no coercion had been used) could not lead to the ending of the case.) However, even 
though courts may thus refuse jurisdiction if they are of the opinion that the luring operation, even if it 
did not violate another State’s sovereignty (so seriously), may constitute such reprehensible conduct 
under national law that it cannot be legally ‘approved’ by continuing the case, there have also been 
courts which were of the opinion that luring, not looking at international law issues now, cannot lead to 
the ending of the case (unless in the case of Toscanino-like mistreatment situations). See, for example, 
the following words from Yunis (explaining the US position on this technique): “In cases where 
defendants have urged the court to dismiss the indictment solely on the grounds that they were 
fraudulently lured to the United States, courts have uniformly upheld jurisdiction.” (US District Court, 
District of Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, Crim. No. 87-0377 (681 F.Supp. 909), 
p. 920.) A court, in determining whether jurisdiction must be refused or not, may hereby also look at 
human rights considerations. See in that respect also the discussion in the context of the Stocké case in 
Chapter III and the question as to whether a luring operation can be seen as a technique against the will 
of the suspect (this may lead to a human rights violation).   
557 See n. 453 and accompanying text. See also German Federal Constitutional Court: In the Proceedings 
on the Constitutional Complaint of Mr. Al-M., and his Motion for a Temporary Injunction 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second Senate of 5 November 2003, 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., 
para. 2, 43 International Legal Materials (2004), pp. 781-782: “On the German side, an obstacle 
precluding extradition could possibly result from this if the action of the Yemeni confidential informant 








Al-Moayad, of course, did not agree with the outcome of his case before the 
Frankfurt am Main Higher Regional Court. As a result, he filed a constitutional 
complaint with the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht).  
He thereby pointed to the 1982 case of the Swiss Federal Court mentioned earlier 
in this chapter because this Court, according to Al-Moayad, had confirmed the 
existence of a “general rule of international law pursuant to which no one may be 
extradited who has been abducted from his or her state of origin to the requested 
state in order to circumvent the ban on extradition that is valid in the state of 
origin”.558     
In its examination of whether the general rule of international law as alleged by 
Al-Moayad existed, the Court first explained what a general rule of international law 
in fact is and how it can be found.  
                                                                                                                                              
international law. The territorial sovereignty of a state, which is an expression of its sovereignty, 
prohibits, in principle, sovereign acts by other states or by organs of state authority, on the territory of 
the state affected. In this context, private individuals’ acts can be attributed to a state if, for instance, 
such acts are controlled by this state. Tortious action on the part of the United States would establish 
their responsibility under international law vis-à-vis Yemen. In such a case, there would be the risk that 
by extraditing the complainant, Germany would support a United States’ action that is possibly contrary 
to international law, which would make Germany itself responsible under international law vis-à-vis 
Yemen. That such state responsibility can, under specific preconditions, be established by the support of 
third parties’ action that is contrary to international law is shown by Article 16 of the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Convention on State Responsibility, which codifies customary international law in 
this field”. 
558 Ibid., 2 BvR 1506/03, A., II., para. 1), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), p. 778. Cf. also n. 
452 where one can read: “Nach den Grundsätzen des Völkerrechts ist jeder Staat verpflichtet, die 
Souveränität anderer Staaten zu beachten; Handlungen eines Staates auf fremdem Staatsgebiet sind 
daher unzulässig. Soweit eine verfolgte Person sich im Ausland befindet, kann sie dem verfolgenden 
Staat nur mittels eines hoheitlichen Aktes des Staates, auf dessen Gebiet sie sich befindet, überstellt 
werden; werden Organen des verfolgenden Staates ohne Bewilligung auf dem Gebiet eines anderen 
Staates tätig, bemächtigen sie sich insbesondere des Verfolgten mittels Gewalt, List oder Drohung, 
verletzen sie die Souveränität (…). Wird die verfolgte Person mittels der erwähnten Vorkehren in eines 
Drittstaat gelockt, von dem daraufhin die Auslieferung des Betreffenden verlangt wirde, trägt der 
ersuchte Staat mit der Auslieferung zum Erfolg, nämlich der Behändigung des Verfolgten under 
Missachtung der Souveränität, mindestens mittelbar bei. Der Grundsatz der Souveränität gilt indes 
absolut, d. h. gegen jedermann. Als Verletzung dieses Grundsatzes muss dehalb auch gelten, wenn der 
Staat, dessen Souveränität nicht verletzt wird, das völkerrechtswidrige Vorgehen dadurch begünstigt, 
dass er den Verfolgten ausliefert. Diesfall macht sich der ersuchte Staat zum Gehilfen der 
Souveränitätsverletzung. (…) Sinn und Geist der verschiedenen Abkommen verbieten dem ersuchten 
Staat daher, Personen auszuliefern, die unter Umgehung der allein massgebenden inner- und 
zwischenstaatlichen Auslieferungsbestimmungen und unter Verwendung völkerrechtswidriger Mittel ins 
Ausland gelockt wurden.” (Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Lausanne, P 1201/81/fs, Urteil der II. 
öffentlichrechtlichen Abteilung vom 15. Juli 1982, X, belgischer Staatsangehöriger, gegen 









It stated that “[t]he general rules of international law are primarily customary 
international law that is of universal validity and that is complemented by accepted 
general principles of law”.559  
It then explained in more detail the two elements of customary international law, 
where it used a broad concept of practice (not limited to State practice): 
 
[I]ts evolution depends on two preconditions: firstly, on conduct that is continuous in 
time and as uniform as possible, and which takes place with a broad and 
representative participation of states and other subjects of international law with law-
making authority; secondly on the opinion that is behind this practice “to act in the 
framework of what is required and permitted or necessary under international law” 
(opinio iuris sive necessitatis (...)).560  
 
Focusing on State practice, the Court explained that one could, for example, look at 
the acts of courts “to the extent that their conduct is directly relevant under 
international law”.561 In addition, it stated that it would examine the “acts of bodies 
of international organisations, and in particular of international courts”.562 Although 
it may appear rather odd to look at the decisions of international courts to find out 
what States do, decisions of international courts often include overviews of national 
case law, for example, if the international judges want to find out whether a certain 
rule has support in State practice. It is, of course, unproblematic if those overviews 
(and hence the decisions which contain those overviews) are examined by judges to 
find out the position of States regarding a certain rule. However, decisions of 
international courts as such (which do not delve into the practice of States) arguably 
have nothing to do with State practice, although they may show how international 
practice more generally (a practice in which more actors that just States are active, 
see also the quotation from the Court at footnote 560 and accompanying text) copes 
with a certain rule.  
It is not entirely clear whether the Federal Constitutional Court acts correctly in 
that respect as there are indications that the Court, when addressing the concept of 
State practice,563 is not only interested in the references – in international decisions – 
to national case law564 but also in decisions of international courts as such.565  
                                                          
559 German Federal Constitutional Court: In the Proceedings on the Constitutional Complaint of Mr. Al-
M., and his Motion for a Temporary Injunction (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second Senate 
of 5 November 2003, 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., para. 3 a)), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), p. 782. 
560 Ibid. 
561 Ibid.: “The Federal Constitutional Court ascertains the existence and scope of general rules within the 
meaning of Article 25 of the Basic Law [“The general rules of international law shall be an integral part 
of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the 
inhabitants of the federal territory.”, ChP] by consulting the relevant state practice”. 
562 Ibid., 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., para. 3 a)), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), p. 783. 
563 See ibid., 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., para. 3 b), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), p. 783: “The 
examination of state practice shows that the general rule of international law that is alleged by the 
complainant does not exist.” 
564 The first two times the Federal Constitutional Court refers to international decisions are: 1) “[C]f 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Decision of 5 








Be that as it may, the German Federal Constitutional Court concluded that “[t]he 
examination of state practice shows that the general rule of international law that is 
alleged by the complainant does not exist”566 because case law regarding the 
question of whether luring is an obstacle to extradition is heterogeneous.567  
It also made a more general statement on the status of male captus bene detentus, 
asserting that “[t]he majority of decisions even does not regard the circumstances 
that preceded the arrest as an obstacle precluding criminal prosecution in the state of 
the forum”,568 although it also admitted that there is an exception with respect to the 
                                                                                                                                              
U.S. Federal Court of Appeal, United States v. Toscanino, 500 Federal Reporter, Second Series 267 
[1974]” (ibid., 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., para. 3 b) aa)), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), p. 783) 
and 2) “After a comprehensive examination of state practice (...), the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia came to the conclusion that the criminal prosecution of a person who had been 
persuaded by deception to enter an area that was accessible to seizures by foreign organs of criminal 
prosecution can, in state practice, at any rate only be regarded as a violation of international law or of 
individual fundamental rights if an effective extradition treaty was circumvented or if the prosecuted 
person was subjected to the use of force in an unjustifiable manner (International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dokmanovic [Motion for Release], Trial Chamber, decision of 22 
October 1997 - IT-95-13a-PT -, International Law Reports Vol. 111 [1998], p. 459 [at p. 490]; 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest of 5 June 2003, IT-94-2-AR73, numbers 20 et 
seq.).” (Ibid., B., I., para. 3 b) bb) (1), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), p. 784.) 
565 After all, some references are so general and indeterminate that they could also be seen as including 
the views of international decisions as such. For example, although para. 24 of the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber’s decision in the Nikolić case (see the previous footnote) refers to the conclusions reached by 
the ICTY after having reviewed national State practice, and although the following paragraphs of that 
decision (25, 26 and 27) continue on these conclusions, they also contain views of the ICTY itself. See 
also the explicit reference by the Federal Constitutional Court to para. 26 of the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber’s decision in the Nikolić case (the third time the Federal Constitutional Court refers to an 
international decision): “Moreover, recent state practice also takes the seriousness of the crime with 
which the person is charged into account, which means that in this respect, it takes proportionality into 
consideration. The protection of high-ranking legal interests, which has been intensified on an 
international level in recent years, can lend itself to justifying the violation of a state’s personal 
sovereignty that possibly goes along with the use of trickery (cf. International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, loc. cit., number 26).” (German Federal 
Constitutional Court: In the Proceedings on the Constitutional Complaint of Mr. Al-M., and his Motion 
for a Temporary Injunction (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second Senate of 5 November 
2003, 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., para. 3 b) bb) (3)), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), p. 785.) It 
must be noted that the two decisions in the Nikolić case which the ICTY uses to back its view that the 
seriousness of the crimes with which the suspect is charged is relevant in the male captus discussion are 
the Eichmann and Barbie cases which date from 1962 and 1983, respectively. One can wonder whether 
the Federal Constitutional Court is referring to these cases (whose recentness can be doubted, see also n. 
590) when it says that recent State practice takes the seriousness of the crime with which the person is 
charged into account or whether it is in fact referring to the 2003 ICTY case itself. Again, it is 
unproblematic to refer to such international decisions as such if one is interested in international practice 
more generally (see n. 560 and accompanying text) but one can arguably not refer to these decisions as 
such if one is examining the concept of State practice. 
566 German Federal Constitutional Court: In the Proceedings on the Constitutional Complaint of Mr. Al-
M., and his Motion for a Temporary Injunction (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second Senate 
of 5 November 2003, 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., para. 3 b)), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), p. 783. 









male captus situation of abduction (which, however, was not applicable in this 
luring case):  
 
In this context, it need not be decided whether a national obstacle precluding criminal 
proceedings or extradition results from customary international law if the prosecuted 
person has been taken from his or her state of origin to the state of the forum or to the 
requested state by use of force. Admittedly, more recent state practice, in particular as 
a consequence of dealing with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Alvarez-
Machain case (…) indicates that the principle male captus, bene detentus is rejected 
at any rate if the state of the forum got hold of the prosecuted person by committing 
serious human rights violations, and if the state whose territorial sovereignty was 
violated protested against such procedure (cf. International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Decision of 5 June 2003 – IT-94-
2-AR73, Appeals Chamber, numbers 24 et seq. with reference to the decision of the 
U.S. Federal Court of Appeal, United States v. Toscanino, 500 Federal Reporter, 
Second Series 267 [1974]; see also Wilske, Die völkerrechtliche Entführung und ihre 
Rechtsfolgen, 2000, pp. 272 et seq., at p. 336, with further references). The facts of 
the present case, however, differ from these cases in important details.569  
 
Before turning to the remainder of this decision, it is interesting to examine in 
greater detail the Court’s conclusion on the status of the male captus bene detentus 
maxim. It appears that the Court is of the opinion that State practice shows that there 
are two distinct grounds which must lead in any event to the rejection of the male 
captus bene detentus rule.  
At first, the words “against such procedure” seem to refer to the words “if the 
state of the forum got hold of the prosecuted person by committing serious human 
rights violations”. That would mean that there is only one situation which leads to 
the male captus male detentus result, namely when the State of the forum gets hold 
of the prosecuted person by committing serious human rights violations and the 
State whose territorial sovereignty was violated (by this male captus, which 
engendered serious human rights violations) protested against this male captus 
(which engendered serious human rights violations and which violated its territorial 
sovereignty). However, it can be argued that “against such procedure” does not refer 
to the words “if the state of the forum got hold of the prosecuted person by 
committing serious human rights violations”, but to the words “if the prosecuted 
person has been taken from his or her state of origin to the state of the forum or to 
the requested state by use of force” mentioned earlier (see the first sentence of the 
quotation). That would mean that the more recent State practice indicates that there 
are two situations which, in any event, must lead to a male captus male detentus 
result, namely in the case of 1) an abduction (the taking of the person from his State 
of residence/origin to the forum/requested State by use of force) accompanied by 
serious human rights violations (as one could argue that an abduction as such can 
already be seen as a serious violation of the human right to liberty and security, the 
                                                          








Court probably means serious violations/mistreatment in the course of the abduction 
here) or 2) an abduction followed by a protest from the injured State.  
The Court’s sources support the idea that the German judges assume the 
existence of two situations here. With respect to the reference to Toscanino (in the 
still-to-discuss (see Chapter VI) Nikolić case): until the Alvarez-Machain case was 
issued, US courts, confronted by an abduction, were arguably of the opinion that 
Toscanino and its aftermath stood for the idea that a court had to refuse jurisdiction 
in two situations, namely if that abduction 1) was followed by a protest (and a 
request for the return of the abducted person) from the injured State, see, for 
example, Verdugo-Urquidez570 or 2) was accompanied by serious mistreatment, 
whether or not there was a protest from the injured State, see, for example, Lujan.571  
It is true that Alvarez-Machain (in which the Supreme Court did not refuse 
jurisdiction in the case of an abduction which was followed by a protest and request 
for the return of Alvarez-Machain and about which the judges even stated that it 
may be “shocking”) quashed the male detentus situation of Toscanino with respect 
to an abduction followed by a protest and request for the return of the suspect by the 
injured State.  
Although the word “shocking” is reminiscent of the second male detentus 
situation of Toscanino (namely an abduction accompanied by serious mistreatment), 
                                                          
570 See also, more generally, American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States, 1987, para. 432 (‘Measures in Aid of Enforcement of Criminal Law’), 
comment ‘c’ (‘Consequences of violation of territorial limits of law enforcement’): “If a state’s law 
enforcement officials exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the latter’s consent, 
that state is entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to receive reparation from the offending state. If 
the unauthorized action includes abduction of a person, the state from which the person was abducted 
may demand return of the person, and international law requires that he be returned. If the state from 
which the person was abducted does not demand his return, under the prevailing view the abducting 
state may proceed to prosecute him under its laws.” Note that this specific male captus male detentus 
situation was also already recognised by the German Federal Constitutional Court 17 years earlier in the 
Stocké case: “Ein Blick auf die Staatenpraxis zeigt, daß Gerichte es nur dann allgemein ablehnen, ein 
Strafverfahren gegen einen völkerrechtswidrig Entführten zu betreiben, wenn der durch die Entführung 
verletzte Staat gegen die Unrechtshandlung protestiert und die Rückgabe des Entführten gefordert hat”. 
(BVerfG (1. Kammer des Zweiten Senats), Beschl. v. 17.7 1985 – 2 BvR 1190/84. NJW 1986, Heft 22, 
p. 1428.) 
571 See also, more generally, American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States, 1987, para. 433 (‘External Measures In Aid Of Enforcement Of Criminal 
Law: Law Of The United States’, para. 2: “A person apprehended in a foreign state, whether by foreign 
or by United States officials, and delivered to the United States, may be prosecuted in the United States 
unless his apprehension or delivery was carried out in such reprehensible manner as to shock the 
conscience of civilized society.” Cf. also the 1986 decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(BVerfG (3. Kammer des Zweiten Senats), Beschl. v. 3.6 1986 – 2 BvR 837/85. NJW 1986, Heft 48, pp. 
3021-3022), which involved an abduction without a protest and request for the return of the abducted 
suspect from the injured State. Here, the Court stated that jurisdiction could also be refused under 
domestic law if the situation could be qualified as an “extremely exceptional case”. The meaning of this 
rather general concept is not clear, but one may argue that it involves Toscanino-like circumstances, see 
also Wilske 2000, p. 334, n. 413 (commenting on this concept): “[D]as Gericht hatte hier 









it is arguably not so that that exception is no longer valid in US courts, see footnote 
206.  
However, to the extent that States are of the opinion that Alvarez-Machain has 
quashed both male detentus situations, one can argue that the immense criticism 
towards this decision in general is proof of the idea that many States are of the 
opinion that in those two situations (an abduction followed by a protest and request 
for the return of the suspect, and an abduction accompanied by serious 
mistreatment) jurisdiction must be refused. 
Before turning to the reference to Wilske, it must again be emphasised that the 
serious mistreatment exception may also be applied to other male captus situations, 
meaning that a luring operation accompanied by serious mistreatment may perhaps 
also lead to the ending of the case, see, for example, Yunis.572  
However, even if there are courts which will refuse to exercise jurisdiction in the 
case of a luring operation accompanied by serious mistreatment – arguably a good 
thing – it is less clear whether there is also general support in State practice for that 
idea. The Alvarez-Machain case does not shed further light on this issue for that 
case did not involve a luring, but an abduction operation.  
With respect to the reference to page 336 of Wilske’s book: on this page, where 
the author writes about the worldwide protests against the Alvarez-Machain case (in 
whose aftermath the German Court seems also very interested),573 one can read:  
 
Gerade diese Entscheidung [namely the Alvarez-Machain decision, ChP] ist der 
Schlüssel zu einer geänderten Staatenpraxis, die die male captus, bene detentus-Regel 
zumindest im Fall eines Staatenprotestes wie auch bei schweren 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen eindeutig ablehnt.574  
 
Hence, Wilske also concludes that there are two situations in more recent State 
practice which, in any event, must lead to the male captus male detentus outcome, 
namely if the male captus (Wilske arguably refers here to an abduction) 1) is 
followed by a protest from the injured State or (“wie auch”) 2) engenders serious 
human rights violations.  
In addition, the point mentioned above, that the Court probably writes about 
‘serious mistreatment in the course of the abduction’ (when it refers to “if the state 
of the forum got hold of the prosecuted person by committing serious human rights 
violations”) not only finds support in the Toscanino exception, but also in Wilske. 
Although his above-mentioned words do not indicate this (“bei schweren 
                                                          
572 See also the 1985 Stocké case, which involved a luring case and where the German Federal 
Constitutional Court stated that jurisdiction would be refused under national law if the situation could be 
seen as an “extremely exceptional case”. As explained in the previous footnote, although the meaning of 
this concept is not clear, one may argue that it involves Toscanino-like circumstances, see again Wilske 
2000, p. 334, n. 413 (commenting on this concept): “[D]as Gericht hatte hier möglicherweise die 
schweren Folterungen im Toscanino-Fall im Auge.” See also again Grams 1994, pp. 70-71. 
573 The German Court namely writes about “more recent state practice, in particular as a consequence of 
dealing with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Alvarez-Machain case”. 








Menschenrechtsverletzungen” is still rather general), another (and broader!)575 
formulation of Wilske’s conclusion, which, again, stresses that there are two male 
detentus situations, is clearer in that respect: “Ein Strafverfahrenshindernis aus 
Völkerrechts ist immer dann anzunehmen, wenn der verletzte Staat protestiert hat. 
Dies gilt aber auch, wenn die Entführung von schweren 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen begleitet war [emphasis added, ChP].”576 
It must be emphasised that the above-mentioned situations concern cases where 
male captus bene detentus is rejected at any rate, in any event. That does not mean, 
however, that courts may not utilise a lower male captus male detentus threshold. 
There have also been male captus cases (not necessarily involving abductions) 
where the court refused/would refuse jurisdiction where the suspect was not 
seriously mistreated and where there was no protest from the injured State, see, for 
example, the cases of Hartley, Levinge, Bennett and the still-to-discuss cases of 
Ebrahim and Beahan. And rightly so (to add a normative note here). After all, why 
should a suspect have to prove, for example, that the injured State protested the 
abduction if it has been established that he was abducted by agents from the now 
prosecuting State? Likewise, why should a suspect have to prove that he was 
seriously mistreated during this abduction, or that he was abducted at all? Should the 
fact that authorities of a State have resorted to a serious male captus (one should not 
limit oneself to an abduction here) in circumvention of available procedures not 
already suffice to divest jurisdiction, whether or not there was a protest from the 
injured State and whether or not the suspect was seriously mistreated in the course 
of this male captus?577 Is not the fact that State agents have turned to such illegal 
methods already enough for a court to refuse jurisdiction?578 One could argue that 
the (lower) tests produced by Hartley, Levinge, Bennett, Ebrahim and Beahan are 
much more appropriate if the court wants to protect values like State sovereignty, 
human rights, due process of law/the rule of law, including the integrity of the 
judicial and executive proceedings. Only a lower male detentus standard can 
effectively deter the prosecuting authorities from using dubious methods in bringing 
                                                          
575 After all, on p. 336 of his book (see the previous footnote and accompanying text), Wilske writes 
about State practice (which, it is reminded, is only one element of customary international law) whereas 
on p. 340 (and p. 349) of his book (see the next footnote and accompanying text), he argues that these 
two situations are not only recognised by more recent State practice, but in fact by international 
(customary) law more generally. (Wilske uses the word “Völkerrecht” here, but it is clear that he means 
“Völkergewohnheitsrecht”. See, for example, Wilske 2000, p. 338: “Ziel der hier dargestellten 
Staatenpraxis war, eine Antwort auf die Frage zu erhalten, ob Völkergewohnheitsrecht einem 
Strafverfahren gegen völkerrechtswidrig entführte Personen entgegensteht [emphasis added, ChP].”) 
576 Wilske 2000, p. 340. See also ibid., p. 349: “Nach Auswertung der Staatenpraxis ist ein 
Strafverfahrenshindernis aus Völkerrechts immer dann anuznehmen, wenn der verletzte Staat protestiert 
hat oder wenn die Entführung von schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen begleitet war [emphasis 
added, ChP].” 
577 See also Michell 1996, p. 403. 
578 See also Hamid 2004, p. 85: “It is a long established legal principle that an illegal act does not give 
rise to any right; ex injuria jus non oritur. Since the act of abduction itself is illegal and invalid under 
international law, the abducting State does not have a right to subject the abducted individual to its laws 








a suspect to trial. However, it must also be remarked that these tests assume the 
involvement of the prosecuting State’s authorities in the male captus. One can 
imagine that there might also be judges who will refuse jurisdiction if they deem the 
male captus so serious that they feel that jurisdiction must be refused, even if the 
authorities from the now prosecuting State were not involved in the male captus (for 
example, if the suspect were seriously mistreated in the process of his arrest and 
detention). 
Returning to the decision in Al-Moayad itself (which seemingly rejected an 
earlier decision from 19 October 1994),579 as explained in the final sentence of the 
Court’s quotation mentioned above, the judges were of the opinion that this case did 
not meet the two situations which State practice recognises as undisputed male 
detentus avenues. This was because both situations require at least an abduction by 
the forum State, which was not the case here (Al-Moayad was lured but not 
abducted from Yemen and in addition, Germany was not responsible for the male 
captus).580 According to the German Court, “[i]t cannot be ascertained that a 
                                                          
579 In that decision, the German Federal Constitutional Court did not identify a general rule of 
international law, forbidding the exercise of jurisdiction in the case of a luring operation followed by a 
protest and request for the return of the suspect by the injured State (the Netherlands). That reasoning is 
still in conformity with the earlier-mentioned German cases and this case of Al-Moayad, which, after 
all, at least demand an abduction. However, the Court also noted, in an obiter dictum: “Selbst bei 
Vorliegen einer völkerrechtswidrigen Entführung, die wegen der Gewaltanwendung einen stärkeren 
Eingriff in die Gebietshoheit des Aufenthaltsstaates darstellen dürfte als das Herauslocken mit List, 
bestehen sowohl in der Staatenpraxis wie auch in der völkerrechtlichen Literatur unterschiedliche 
Auffassungen zu der Frage, ob bei Protest des verletzten Staates die völkerrechtswidrige Ergreifung ein 
Strafverfahren im Gerichtsstaat aus Gründen des Völkerrechts hindert”. See Wilske 2000, p. 335, with 
reference to BVerfG NStZ 1995, 96. (Oehmichen (2007, p. 236) also refers to this case, with the 
reference BVerfG 2 BvR 435/87, 48 NJW 651 f (1995).) However, Wilske notes that the judges referred 
here to literature stemming from the 1980s (with the exception of a 1992 study from Oppenheim) which 
do not shed light on the more recent State practice, in particular the reactions from States in the 
aftermath of the Alvarez-Machain decision. (See Wilske 2000, p. 335.) Nevertheless, the German Court 
did look at the US decision itself and commented that “[o]bwohl im Verfahren auch die Frage einer das 
Strafverfahren hindernden Norm des Völkergewohnheitsrechts aufgeworfen wurde, ging der Supreme 
Court in seiner Entscheidung nicht vom Bestehen einer solchen Regel aus”. See ibid. Wilske notes (see 
ibid., p. 336) that this is not correct as the Supreme Court only looked at the treaty and not at customary 
international law. However, even though the Supreme Court indeed focused on the treaty, it did 
seemingly also indirectly look at international law, namely to find out whether international law was so 
strong on this particular topic that it had to be read into the treaty. As that was not the case, there was no 
treaty violation and it was deemed not necessary to look at the international law dimension more 
generally, see n. 203 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding this, one can agree with Wilske that it is 
surprising that the German Court did not take into account the “weltweiten Protestes gegen diese 
Entscheidung” (ibid.). 
580 See German Federal Constitutional Court: In the Proceedings on the Constitutional Complaint of Mr. 
Al-M., and his Motion for a Temporary Injunction (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second 
Senate of 5 November 2003, 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., para. 3 b) aa)), 43 International Legal Materials 
(2004), p. 783: “The facts of the present case, however, differ from these cases in important details. 
Because the complainant’s decision to leave Yemen was based on the complainant’s voluntary decision. 
According to the statement of his secretary, the complainant himself suggested Frankfurt am Main as the 
venue of a meeting that was supposed to serve fundraising on account of the favourable visa regulations 
for Yemeni citizens in Germany and of the good traffic connections. Admittedly, the complainant has 








practice under international law has evolved for these facts of the case that would 
make the extradition appear to be an infringement of customary international 
law.”581  
This, again, appears to be a correct observation of the law. Several (international) 
cases show that luring as such and not committed by the forum State is no obstacle 
to a subsequent extradition or criminal prosecution.582  
Although at least one case can be mentioned which contradicts that view, namely 
the 1982 Swiss case of X, the German Federal Constitutional Court is arguably 
correct when it states that “[s]uch practice (...) is not sufficiently widespread as to be 
regarded as consolidated practice that creates customary international law.”583 
However, even though the situations which must definitely lead to the ending of 
the case do not apply in this case, one can wonder whether the luring operation of 
Al-Moayad did not involve a violation of international law and whether that 
violation, if any, should then not lead to another, less far-reaching remedy. The 
Court also touched upon this point, stating:  
 
[I]t cannot be left out of consideration that it is even doubtful under which 
preconditions the luring of a prosecuted person out of his or her state of residence by 
means of trickery – unlike the use of force – can be regarded as an act that is contrary 
to international law at all (...). To the extent that in the case of the use of trickery, the 
prosecuted person’s intended border crossing is also motivated by his or her own 
interests, and to the extent that the possibility exists that the prosecuted person 
decides against departure, the prosecuted person, as a general rule, is not object of 
state coercion. Admittedly, the boundary between luring someone out of a state by 
means of trickery and breaking someone’s will by the use of force can be fluid in a 
                                                                                                                                              
deception. However, he was not subjected to direct force aimed at bending his will, and he was also not 
threatened with the use of force, and the trickery did not facilitate a subsequent forceful abduction. The 
acts of deception were not performed by German authorities, and they are also not attributable to them. 
Finally, there are no indications that would permit the assumption that the German authorities 
cooperated with the United States criminal prosecution and investigation authorities in a collusive 
manner in order to induce the complainant to travel exactly to Germany.”   
581 Ibid., 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., para. 3 b) bb)), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), p. 783. 
582 See also ibid., 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., para. 3 b) bb) (1)), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), pp. 
783-784. Cases mentioned by the German Federal Constitutional Court are the English Schmidt case 
(see Subsection 1.2), the US United States v Wilson case (see the end of this footnote for more 
information), the Canadian Hartnett case (see again the end of this footnote for more information) and 
two cases from the ICTY, namely the Dokmanović (see Subsection 3.1.1 of the following chapter) and 
Nikolić (see Subsection 3.1.4 of the following chapter) case. Although this latter case did not involve a 
luring operation, the decision did refer to, among other things, the luring cases of Stocké and 
Dokmanović. For more information on the Wilson and Hartnett cases, see ibid., p. 784: “In the United 
States v Wilson case, the U.S. Federal Court of Appeal upheld the indictment of the prosecuted person, 
who had been persuaded by an agent to leave his refuge in Libya on the grounds that he had merely 
become the victim of “a non-violent trick” (U.S. Federal Court of Appeal, 721 Federal Reporter, Second 
Series 967 [1983]). The Canadian Ontario High Court of Justice ruled in the Hartnett proceedings that 
the arrest of two United States citizens for fraud-related offences, who had been invited to Canada under 
the pretext of being examined as witnesses there, did not justify the assumption of an obstacle 
precluding proceedings (Ontario High Court of Justice, Re Hartnett and the Queen, decision of 20 
September 1973, 14 Canadian Criminal Cases 6).” 








borderline area, for instance if someone is deluded into believing something that has 
the effect of an irresistible coercion on the person affected. Such circumstances, 
however, do not exist here. Instead, the complainant travelled to the federal territory 
on account of an autonomous decision in order to pursue specific own interests 
there.584  
 
It is, of course, true that luring operations differ and that an operation in which 
coercion is used and in which someone leaves his State of residence clearly against 
his will can be seen as more serious than a luring operation in which a person comes 
to another State because he has merely been deceived. This may more easily lead to 
a violation of someone’s human rights585 and even to a court’s refusal to exercise 
jurisdiction.586 However, this does not mean that in each case, the sovereignty of a 
State (and hence classical international law) may not have been breached.  
It is arguably very well possible that a luring operation is non-coercive in nature, 
but nevertheless violates the sovereignty of the State where the ‘luring’ agent was 
executing the police work which ultimately led to the arrest outside of the territory 
of the injured State.587 As explained above, the most appropriate reparation in the 
case of a violation of another State’s sovereignty is restitution and would hence 
mean the return of the lured suspect if the injured State protests and requests his 
return. However, it is also clear that there does not seem to be a general rule in the 
practice of courts that judges refuse jurisdiction after a luring operation, arguably 
because luring is not seen as such a serious violation of international law that a 
return is required. However, in that case, it would arguably be appropriate if the 
court now handling the case would nevertheless repair the wrong caused by this 
violation of State sovereignty. (In addition to granting remedies to the suspect if his 
human rights were violated by the luring operation.) 
Although the German Federal Constitutional Court was of the opinion that both 
situations which must in any event lead to a rejection of male captus bene detentus 
were not applicable here and although it can be assumed, see the first words of the 
quotation at footnote 584 and accompanying text, that the Court would not refuse 
jurisdiction in the case of normal luring executed by German agents (and perhaps 
followed by a protest), one still wonders how the German Court would react in the 
case of a normal abduction executed by German agents but without a protest from 
the injured State and not accompanied by serious violations/mistreatment, or in the 
case of a luring operation executed by German agents and accompanied by serious 
mistreatment. Perhaps, the two earlier German cases from 1985 (Stocké) and 1986 
(see footnote 519 and accompanying text) may provide the answers here. The first 
can be read to imply that a luring operation executed by German agents and 
accompanied by serious mistreatment could lead to the ending of the case whereas 
                                                          
584 Ibid., 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., para. 3 b) bb) (3)), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), pp. 784-
785. 
585 See the discussion on this issue in the context of the Stocké case.   
586 See the discussion on this issue in the context of the Schmidt case. 








the case from 1986 entails that an abduction as such, without protest or 
mistreatment, would not lead to a refusal.  
Very interestingly, the German Federal Constitutional Court also referred to the 
seriousness of the crimes with which the suspect is charged as an element to take 
into consideration in the male captus discussion. Although a court is, of course, 
entitled to deem such an element important – in fact there is no reason why a judge 
should not take that important aspect of the case into account if some generally 
accepted rule does not already dictate a certain remedy in the case of a violation 
(which does not seem the case here) – the Court’s references to back its view are 
arguably weak. It stated: 
 
[R]ecent state practice also takes the seriousness of the crime with which the person is 
charged into account, which means that in this respect, it takes proportionality into 
consideration. The protection of high-ranking legal interests, which has been 
intensified on an international level in recent years, can lend itself to justifying the 
violation of a state’s personal sovereignty that possibly goes along with the use of 
trickery (cf. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. 
Dragan Nikolic, loc. cit., number 26). To the extent that the fight of most serious 
crimes such as the support of international drugs trade and of terrorism is concerned, 
luring someone out of a state’s territorial sovereignty by means of trickery is not, at 
any rate to the extent that would be required to demonstrate state practice, regarded as 
an obstacle precluding criminal prosecution. Nothing different can apply as regards 
the existence of an obstacle precluding extradition.588 
 
Although the German Federal Constitutional Court speaks of “recent state practice”, 
paragraph 26 of the Appeals Chamber’s decision in the Nikolić case589 essentially 
concerns the ICTY’s own views on this problem.  
As already stated, see footnote 565, one can wonder whether the views of the 
ICTY can be seen as evidence of State practice but perhaps, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court is mainly interested in the cases on which the ICTY relies to 
support its view.  
However, in that case, one might wonder whether the word “recent (state 
practice)” is well chosen as the two cases mentioned by the ICTY were not decided 
that recently (namely in 1962 (the Eichmann case) and 1983 (the Barbie case)).590 In 
addition to this, although it was shown that there are indeed indications that the 
                                                          
588 German Federal Constitutional Court: In the Proceedings on the Constitutional Complaint of Mr. Al-
M., and his Motion for a Temporary Injunction (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second Senate 
of 5 November 2003, 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., para. 3 b) bb) (3)), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), 
p. 785. 
589 Although it must be noted that this case did not involve a luring operation, the observation made here 
is arguably of a more general nature. 
590 It is to be noted that this book is also of the opinion that Barbie is not a recent case. The fact that it 
nevertheless has been included in the subsection ‘more recent cases’ (note, however, that the subsection 
is not called ‘recent cases’) must be seen in light of the fact that there are many (very) old male captus 
cases and that the Toscanino case of 1974 has been chosen as the dividing line between the older cases 








Supreme Court of France may have taken into account the seriousness of the crimes 
with which Barbie was charged in its decision whether or not jurisdiction had to be 
declined, it will be shown in Subsection 3.1 of this chapter and Subsection 3.1.4 of 
the next chapter that the ICTY’s reliance on the Eichmann case is incorrect as the 
Israeli courts did not continue with the exercise of jurisdiction because of 
Eichmann’s alleged heinous crimes, but because the male captus bene detentus 
maxim was in those days an accepted rule of law, applicable to anyone, whether that 
‘anyone’ was charged with fraud or with crimes against humanity.  
It must be noted that one could argue, now that the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s 
reference to the Eichmann case (as support for the idea that the seriousness of the 
alleged crimes must be taken into account in the male captus discussion) is found to 
be incorrect, that the German Court’s reference to Nikolić is also incorrect. 
However, as already explained,591 the ICTY Appeals Chamber also made some 
observations of its own concerning this issue, after it had discussed the inter-State 
context. And there is, of course, no problem if the German Court wants to refer to 
those observations if it is interested in international practice more generally, see also 
footnote 560 and accompanying text. (Note, however, that in that case, it should not 
refer to “recent state practice”.) 
Finally, the Court also rejected Al-Moayad’s claims that German law was 
violated by the operation, hereby again referring to the seriousness of the crimes 
with which he was charged.592 
On the same day that his extradition to the US was authorised by the German 
Government (14 November 2003),593 Al-Moayad lodged an application with the 
ECtHR, in which he, among other things, claimed that his detention pending 
extradition was unlawful pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 1 of the ECHR, “as his 
placement under surveillance in and abduction from Yemen had breached public 
international law”,594 and that for the same reasons the extradition  proceedings in 
                                                          
591 See n. 565. 
592 See, for example, German Federal Constitutional Court: In the Proceedings on the Constitutional 
Complaint of Mr. Al-M., and his Motion for a Temporary Injunction (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order 
of the Second Senate of 5 November 2003, 2 BvR 1506/03, B., IV., para. 3, 43 International Legal 
Materials (2004), pp. 786-787: “Also against the standards of German law, the use of confidential 
informants in order to prevent or to resolve criminal offences with a terrorist background does not meet 
with reservations with a view to the proportionality of the means employed (as concerns the prosecution 
of particularly serious crimes, which are difficult to resolve, in particular in the drugs trade”. 
593 In the US, Al-Moayad was sentenced by the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
“to 75 years’ imprisonment, the statutory maximum sentence, for conspiracy to support Al Qaeda and 
Hamas, for having provided material support to Hamas and for having attempted to provide material 
support to Al Qaeda.” (ECtHR (Fifth Section), ‘Decision as to the Admissibility of Application No. 
35865/03 by Mohammed Ali Hassan Al-Moayad against Germany’, 20 February 2007, para. 28.) 
However, on 2 October 2008, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the conviction, 
arguing that the District Court had improperly admitted evidence during the trial which had prejudiced 
the jury. Almost a year later, on 7 August 2009, a plea agreement was reached: Al-Moayad pleaded 
guilty to conspiring to provide financial support to Hamas and was subsequently sentenced to time 
served. As a result, Al-Moayad (and the same goes for his secretary) were released and deported back to 
Yemen. 








Germany had not been fair and were to be considered a breach of Article 6, 
paragraph 1 of the ECHR.595  
The Court, which rendered its decision a little more than three years later,596 first 
confirmed its Illich Ramirez Sánchez and Öcalan jurisprudence (see Subsection 
2.2.4 of Chapter III) that “[t]he fact that a fugitive has been handed over as a result 
of cooperation between States does not in itself make the arrest unlawful or, 
therefore, give rise to any problem under Article 5”.597  
However, the Court also reiterated its views in cases such as Bozano and Stocké 
(see again Subsection 2.2.4 of Chapter III) that “lawfulness” also implies absence of 
any arbitrariness and hence that  
 
extra-territorial measures of a respondent State resulting in the applicant’s detention 
which entailed clear violations of international law, for instance in the case of forcing 
an applicant against his will to enter the respondent State in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the sovereignty of his host State, raise an issue under Article 5 § 1 
of the Convention (…).598  
 
With respect to this specific case, the Court noted that the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, “in a thoroughly reasoned decision”,599 had disagreed with Al-
Moayad and secondly that it (the European Court itself), “[h]aving reviewed the 
national courts’ finding that domestic law, including the rules of public international 
law applicable in the respondent State, authorised the applicant’s detention pending 
extradition”,600 discerned “no issues that raise doubts about the compatibility of the 
applicant’s detention with German law.”601  
However, it also looked at what had happened prior to Al-Moayad’s arrest and 
detention in Germany, see also the above-mentioned quotation at footnote 598 and 
accompanying text.602  
                                                          
595 See ibid.  
596 See ECtHR (Fifth Section), ‘Decision as to the Admissibility of Application No. 35865/03 by 
Mohammed Ali Hassan Al-Moayad against Germany’, 20 February 2007. 
597 Ibid., para. 80. 
598 Ibid., para. 81. 
599 Ibid., para. 84. 
600 Ibid., para. 85. 
601 Ibid., para. 85. 
602 See ibid., para. 86: “With “lawfulness” under Article 5 implying also the absence of arbitrariness, the 
Court moreover attaches weight to the circumstances which led to the applicant’s arrest and detention”. 
The Court referred here to para. 59 of its 2002 decision in Čonka v. Belgium (ECtHR (Third Section), 
Case of Čonka v. Belgium, Application No. 51564/99, ‘Judgment’, 5 February 2002), where it stated: 
“The Court reiterates its case-law whereby collective expulsion, within the meaning of Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 4, is to be understood as any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a country, 
except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the 
particular case of each individual alien of the group (…). That does not mean, however, that where the 
latter condition is satisfied the background to the execution of the expulsion orders plays no further role 
in determining whether there has been compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 [emphasis added, 
ChP].” See also ibid., paras. 41-42, where this point also comes back in the more specific context of Art. 
5 of the ECHR: “[A]cts whereby the authorities seek to gain the trust of asylum-seekers with a view to 








Two aspects were highlighted in that respect, namely the non-involvement of 
Germany in the luring operation603 and the absence of the use of force.604 It was 
already noted earlier that some decisions from the European institutions could be 
seen as support for the male captus bene detentus rule.605 However, it was only now, 
in this case of Al-Moayad, that the Court explicitly pronounced itself on the status 
of the maxim in State practice (albeit in a case of bene deditus rather than in a case 
of bene detentus); it agreed with the German Federal Constitutional Court’s position 
that “if a State apprehends a suspect by committing serious human rights violations 
and if the State whose territorial sovereignty is violated protests, State practice 
indicates that there is an obstacle to extradition and, consequently, to detention 
pending extradition.”606  
Furthermore, it found that “[i]n such cases, the detention also raises an issue 
under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.”607  
Nevertheless, as no abduction occurred in this case, and as Germany was not 
involved in the male captus, the German Court’s test which must in any event lead 
to the rejection of male captus bene detentus (and which assumes the existence of, at 
least, an abduction executed by the forum State) was not met here.  
As Germany was not involved in the male captus, it could not be asserted either 
that Germany violated the human rights of Al-Moayad. (It should be remembered 
that this is an additional point, alongside the question of whether or not jurisdiction 
had to be refused, which can be examined.)  
Furthermore, “[t]he cooperation between German and US authorities on German 
territory pursuant to the rules governing mutual legal assistance in arresting and 
detaining the applicant do not in itself give rise to any problem under Article 5”.608 
As a result, this part of Al-Moayad’s application was rejected.609  
It must be stressed that because the European Court, like the German one, 
focuses on the situation where there is an obstacle to extradition in any event, it is 
not clear whether it would also accept a refusal of extradition/jurisdiction in a less 
                                                                                                                                              
implicit in the Convention. (…) [A] conscious decision by the authorities to facilitate or improve the 
effectiveness of a planned operation for the expulsion of aliens by misleading them about the purpose of 
a notice so as to make it easier to deprive them of their liberty is not compatible with Article 5 
[emphasis added, ChP].” 
603 See ECtHR (Fifth Section), ‘Decision as to the Admissibility of Application No. 35865/03 by 
Mohammed Ali Hassan Al-Moayad against Germany’, 20 February 2007, para. 87: “It observes in the 
first place that it was not the respondent State itself – or persons for whose actions it must be deemed 
responsible – which had taken extraterritorial measures on Yemen’s territory aimed at inciting the 
applicant to leave that country.” 
604 See ibid., para. 88: “Moreover, the present case does not concern the use of force. The applicant was 
tricked by the US authorities into travelling to Germany. (…) [T]he use of force on the territory of a 
third-party State in violation of its territorial sovereignty in order to remove a suspect from his or her 
State of origin to the respondent State was not alleged in the present case.” 
605 See ns. 388 and 595 of Chapter III. 
606 ECtHR (Fifth Section), ‘Decision as to the Admissibility of Application No. 35865/03 by 
Mohammed Ali Hassan Al-Moayad against Germany’, 20 February 2007, para. 88. 
607 Ibid.  
608 Ibid. 








serious case than an abduction 1) accompanied by serious human rights 
violations/serious mistreatment or 2) followed by a protest from the injured State. 
Finally, with respect to Al-Moayad’s complaints under Article 6, paragraph 1 of 
the ECHR, the ECtHR stated that this provision does not apply to the extradition 
procedures in Germany.610 As a result, that part of Al-Moayad’s application was 
also rejected.611  
 
3 INTERESTING CASES NOT (CLEARLY) FALLING UNDER EITHER SYSTEM 
 
3.1 Older cases 
 
There are several cases which do not clearly fall under either the common or civil 
law system but which still merit to be mentioned in any male captus bene/male 
detentus discussion. The first case which should be examined in this subsection is 
the already briefly mentioned612 Scottish613 Sinclair case. In this case, Matthew 
Sinclair, who was charged with the crime of breach of trust and embezzlement in 
Scotland, argued  
 
that he had been arrested and imprisoned in Portugal by the Portuguese authorities 
without a warrant; that he had been put by them on board an English ship in the 
Tagus, and there had been taken into custody by a Glasgow detective-officer without 
production of a warrant; that during the voyage to London the vessel had been in the 
port of Vigo, in Spain, for several hours; that the complainer had demanded to be 
allowed to land there but had been prevented by the officer; that on arriving in 
London he was not taken before a magistrate, nor was the warrant endorsed, but he 
was brought direct to Scotland, and there committed to prison, and that no warrant 
whatever was produced or exhibited to him.614 
 
                                                          
610 See ibid., paras. 93-94: “The Court reiterates that extradition proceedings do not concern a dispute 
(“contestation”) over an applicant’s civil rights and obligations (...) It further recalls that the words 
“determination ... of a criminal charge” in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention relate to the full process of 
examining an individual’s guilt or innocence in respect of a criminal offence, and not merely, as is the 
case in extradition proceedings, to the process of determining whether or not a person may be extradited 
to a foreign country (...). Therefore, Article 6 is not applicable to the present case in so far as the 
applicant complained about the fairness of the extradition proceedings before the German courts.” 
(Note, however, that the concept of fair trial in exceptional cases can play a role in extradition 
proceedings, namely in the case of a ‘Soering circumstance’ (see also n. 174 of Chapter VIII), “where 
the fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country”. 
(Ibid., para. 100.) However, that was not the case here, see ibid., para. 107.)  
611 See ibid., para. 108. 
612 See ns. 38 and 45. 
613 The Scottish legal system is a mixture of civil and common law, see the extremely helpful 
‘Alphabetical Index of the Political Entities and Corresponding Legal Systems’ of JuriGlobe, a research 
group from the Law Faculty of the University of Ottawa, available at: http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-
juri/index-alpha.php.  
614 High Court of Justiciary, Sinclair v. Her Majesty’s Advocate and Another, 20 March 1890, 17 R. 








The first Justice to give his opinion was the Lord Justice Clerk (Lord MacDonald). 
He stated that judges cannot look at what other governments may have done 
wrongly in the process of bringing a person to Scotland615 but if a Scottish official 
committed pre-trial irregularities, he can be held liable. Notwithstanding this, such 
irregularities will not lead to a male detentus, no matter what happened in this pre-
trial period.616 Lord Adam simply agreed with this.617 The third Justice, Lord 
M’Laren, first combined the two reasons of the non-inquiry rule (see footnote 38) 
with respect to the proceedings of foreign governments.618 He then explained that  
 
I am of opinion with your Lordships that, when a fugitive is brought before a 
magistrate in Scotland on a proper warrant, the magistrate has jurisdiction, and is 
bound to exercise it without any consideration of the means which have been used to 
bring him from the foreign country into the jurisdiction. In a case of substantial 
                                                          
615 See ibid., 17 R. (Just. Cas.) 41, British International Law Cases, Vol. 3: jurisdiction (1965), p. 7: “As 
regards the proceedings abroad and where the complainer was arrested, they may or may not have been 
regular, formal, and in accordance with the laws of Portugal and Spain, but we know nothing about 
them. What we do know is that two friendly powers agreed to give assistance to this country with a 
crime. If the Government of Portugal or of Spain has done anything illegal or irregular in arresting and 
delivering over the complainer his remedy is to proceed against these Governments. That is not a matter 
for our consideration at all, and we cannot be the judges of the regularity of such proceedings.” See also 
ibid., 17 R. (Just. Cas.) 41, British International Law Cases, Vol. 3: jurisdiction (1965), p. 8: “It is said 
that the Government of Portugal did something wrong, and that the authorities in this country are not to 
be entitled to obtain any advantage from this alleged wrongdoing. As I have said, we cannot be the 
judges of the wrongdoing of the Government of Portugal. What we have here is that a person has been 
delivered to a properly authorised officer of this country, and is now to be tried on charge of 
embezzlement in this country. He is therefore properly before the court of a competent jurisdiction on a 
proper warrant. I do not think we can go beyond this. There has been no improper dealing with the 
complainer by the authorities in this country, or by their officer”. 
616 See ibid., 17 R. (Just. Cas.) 41, British International Law Cases, Vol. 3: jurisdiction (1965), p. 7: “If 
there was any irregularity in the granting or execution of these warrants the person committing such 
irregularity would be liable in an action of damages if any damage was caused. But that cannot affect 
the proceedings of a public authority here.” See also ibid., 17 R. (Just. Cas.) 42, British International 
Law Cases, Vol. 3: jurisdiction (1965), p. 8: “No irregularity, then, involving suspension can be said to 
have taken place on his arrival in London and on his journey here. But even if the proceedings here were 
irregular I am of opinion that where a court of competent jurisdiction has a prisoner before it upon a 
competent complaint they must proceed to try him, no matter what happened before, even although he 
may have been harshly treated by a foreign government, and irregularly dealt with by a subordinate 
officer.”  
617 See ibid., 17 R. (Just. Cas.) 42-43, British International Law Cases, Vol. 3: jurisdiction (1965), p. 9: 
“I am of opinion with your Lordship that we cannot go behind the perfectly regular warrant under which 
the suspender was apprehended and brought before a competent court. If there was anything irregular 
and illegal in the mode in which the suspender was brought here, he will have his remedy against the 
wrongdoer”.  
618 See ibid., 17 R. (Just. Cas.) 43, British International Law Cases, Vol. 3: jurisdiction (1965), p. 9: 
“With regard to the competency of the proceedings in Portugal, I think this is a matter with which we 
really have nothing to do. The extradition of a fugitive is an act of sovereignty on the part of the state 
who surrenders him. Each country has its own ideas and its own rules in such matters. Generally it is 
done under treaty arrangements, but if a state refuses to bind itself by treaty, and prefers to deal with 
each case on its merits, we must be content to receive the fugitive on these conditions, and we have 
neither title nor interest to inquire as to the regularity of proceedings under which he is apprehended and 








infringement of right this Court will always give redress, but the public interest in the 
punishment of crime is not to be prejudiced by irregularities on the part of inferior 
officers of the law in relation to the prisoner’s apprehension and detention.619 
 
The exact scope of this quotation is not very clear. Because Lord M’Laren states not 
only that a magistrate is obliged to exercise jurisdiction “without any consideration 
of the means which have been used to bring him from the foreign country into the 
jurisdiction” but also that the Court will always give redress “[i]n a case of 
substantial infringement of right” one may think that these infringements are hence 
not connected to the way in which a suspect was brought from one jurisdiction to 
another. (After all, how can these infringements be connected to the means by which 
a suspect was brought from one jurisdiction to another if a magistrate cannot 
consider these means in the first place?) Thus, what is probably meant here is an 
infringement of right during the proceedings in the courtroom. If that infringement 
is substantial, then the court must give redress, although it is not clear what this 
entails exactly (for example, whether it also encompasses a refusal of jurisdiction). 
Although this is still quite understandable, the last part of the second sentence states 
that “the public interest in the punishment of crime is not to be prejudiced by 
irregularities on the part of inferior officers of the law in relation to the prisoner’s 
apprehension and detention”. This makes one wonder whether irregularities related 
to the arrest and detention committed by superior officers can prejudice the 
proceedings. However, if that were the true meaning of this part of the quotation, 
then it contradicts the first sentence of the quotation (namely that a magistrate must 
exercise jurisdiction “without any consideration of the means which have been used 
[emphasis added, ChP]” to bring a suspect from one jurisdiction to another).  
It thus seems that the only certainty about the scope of this quotation is that it is 
uncertain.620  
Therefore, it is quite hard to agree with Michell who rather straightforwardly 
states that Lord M’Laren “argued that the court would intervene to prevent the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction where there had been “substantial infringement of 
right” [emphasis added, ChP].”621 As one can see in the quotation mentioned above, 
Lord M’Laren only generally observes that the Court, in serious cases, will give 
redress, not that it will allow the more specific (and rather far-reaching) remedy of 
refusal of jurisdiction. A few sentences later, Michell writes that “Lord McLaren’s 
suggestion that courts would refuse to allow criminal proceedings in certain 
circumstances suggests that the male captus bene detentus doctrine was not 
absolute.”622 Michell hereby connects the “substantial infringement of right” (in his 
eyes: a refusal of jurisdiction) to the male captus context, to the pre-trial context of 
arrest and detention. However, it is still doubtful whether this can in fact be done, 
given the fact that the first sentence of the quotation states that a magistrate must 
                                                          
619 Ibid., 17 R. (Just. Cas.) 44, British International Law Cases, Vol. 3: jurisdiction (1965), p. 10. 
620 Cf. also Jones and Doobay 2004, p. 82. 









exercise jurisdiction without any consideration of the means by which a person was 
brought into the now prosecuting jurisdiction. 
The most well-known inter-State male captus case is, of course, the 1961/1962 
Israeli623 Eichmann case. Many aspects of this case have already been addressed 
earlier in this book, but one important point, which has also already been briefly 
mentioned, see Subsection 1.2 of Chapter I and Subsection 2.2 of this chapter (in the 
context of the Al-Moayad case), still needs to be addressed in further detail. It is 
often said (see also the next chapter and the discussion of the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber’s decision in Nikolić), that the Israeli courts applied the male captus bene 
detentus principle because of the seriousness of Eichmann’s alleged crimes.624  
As Sloan has correctly previously observed,625 it is true that the District Court of 
Jerusalem/the Israeli Supreme Court proceeded with Eichmann’s case (bene 
detentus) notwithstanding the fact that Eichmann was abducted from Argentina 
(male captus).  
However, the judges did not apply this male captus bene detentus rule because 
Eichmann was accused of very serious crimes; the Israeli judges were of the opinion 
that “[i]t is an established rule of law that a person being tried for an offence against 
the laws of a State may not oppose his trial by reason of the illegality of his arrest or 
of the means whereby he was brought within the jurisdiction of that State [emphasis 
added, ChP].”626 Hence, according to them, the rule was applicable to any person 
standing trial, not necessarily a person charged with very serious crimes. 
Admittedly, the seriousness of Eichmann’s crimes did play a role for the Israeli 
judges, but not to defend the “established rule of law” summarised by male captus 
bene detentus; it played a role to defend the judges’ usage of the universality 
                                                          
623 The Israeli legal system is a mixture of civil, common, Jewish and Muslim law, see again (see n. 613) 
JuriGlobe’s ‘Alphabetical Index of the Political Entities and Corresponding Legal Systems’, available 
at: http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/index-alpha.php. Another mixed legal system involving Muslim 
law, to also pay some attention to States with that legal background, is Egypt (mixture of Muslim and 
civil law), see again JuriGloves’ Index. It may be interesting to note that El Zeidy has written about a 
decision of the Supreme Court of Egypt which upheld a decision of the public prosecutor (which has 
powers comparable with an investigating judge in the civil law system) to dismiss a case of unlawful 
arrest, see El Zeidy 2006, p. 455, n. 28, referring to “Egyptian Court of Cassation, Criminal Appeal No. 
1762, Judicial Year 31, 10 April 1962”. 
624 See also Michell 1996, p. 499: “It is also argued that the more serious the alleged offense, the less 
appropriate it is that a stay should be ordered. Conduct on the part of the domestic authorities amounting 
to an abuse of process in the case of a lesser offense might not amount to such an abuse where the 
alleged offense was more serious. There was no explicit mention of this factor in Bennett II itself, 
although it might be implied from Lord Lowry’s suggestion that not every “venial irregularity” should 
result in a stay. [See, however, n. 301, ChP.] Roch, L.J., in Schmidt I did consider it a factor, however. 
[See n. 335 and accompanying text, ChP.] It emerges more clearly from cases such as Eichmann 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Van der Wilt 2004, p. 279 and Mohit 2006, p. 144. 
625 See Sloan 2006, pp. 329-330 or Sloan 2005, p. 494, n. 14. 
626 District Court of Jerusalem, The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 
‘Judgment’, 12 December 1961, Criminal Case No. 40/61, para. 41 (36 International Law Reports 1968, 
p. 59). This observation was confirmed by their colleagues in the Israeli Supreme Court, see n. 15 of 








principle,627 whose rationale is that some crimes are so serious that even a State with 
no direct jurisdictional link can try a suspect charged with these serious crimes so 
that the latter can never escape justice. By using the universality principle, the 
Israeli judges claimed that they had the laws enabling them to exercise jurisdiction 
over Eichmann. However, as already explained in Subsection 1.2 of Chapter III, to 
start a trial, one must have not only the legal means, but also the person himself 
(jurisdiction ratione personae).628 These are two separate issues and it is only in 
relation to the second where the problem of male captus bene/male detentus comes 
in.629  
With respect to the application of the male captus bene detentus rule, it may in 
conclusion be interesting to mention that the District Court, whose judgment was far 
more extensive than that of the Supreme Court, not only referred to the well-known 
British and American male captus bene detentus cases such as Scott and Ker but 
also to, for example, the following two cases decided by the Supreme Court of 
Palestine,630 cases which are also reviewed every now and then in the male captus 
discussion.  
                                                          
627 See Supreme Court of Israel, Adolf Eichmann v. The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel, 
‘Judgment’, 29 May 1962, Criminal Appeal No. 336/61, para. 12 (36 International Law Reports 1968, 
p. 304): “Not only do all the crimes attributed to the appellant bear an international character, but their 
harmful and murderous effects were so embracing and widespread as to shake the international 
community to its very foundations. The State of Israel therefore was entitled, pursuant to the principle 
of universal jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian of international law and an agent for its 
enforcement, to try the appellant [emphasis added, ChP].” 
628 Except, of course, in the case of a trial in absentia. 
629 See Supreme Court of Israel, Adolf Eichmann v. The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel, 
‘Judgment’, 29 May 1962, Criminal Appeal No. 336/61, para. 13 (36 International Law Reports 1968, 
pp. 306-307): “The appellant is a “fugitive from justice” from the point of view of the law of nations, 
since the crimes attributed to him are of an international character and have been condemned publicly 
by the civilized world (…) and therefore, by virtue of the principle of universal jurisdiction, every 
country has the right to try him. This jurisdiction was automatically vested in the State of Israel on its 
establishment in 1948 as a sovereign State. Accordingly, in bringing the appellant to trial, it has 
functioned as an organ of international law and has acted to enforce the provisions of that law through 
its own laws. (…) Indeed, counsel for the appellant has here confused the question of the substantive 
penal jurisdiction of the State of Israel with the question whether his client enjoys immunity from the 
exercise of that jurisdiction against him by reason of the fact of his abduction. These two questions are 
entirely separate from one another. As has been indicated, the moment it is conceded that the State of 
Israel possesses criminal jurisdiction both according to local law and according to the law of nations, the 
Court is no longer bound to investigate the manner and legality of the appellant’s detention, as indeed 
may be gathered from the judgments upon which the District Court has rightly relied [emphasis in 
original, ChP].” 
630 Although this Court was, of course, heavy influenced by British law (Britain officially controlled 
Palestine from 1923 to 1948 (when the State of Israel was created), ‘the Mandate period’), it also 
applied local, Palestine law; British law and Palestine law were thus not similar. See also Baade 1961, 
who first notes on pp. 403-404 that “[i]t has been held in England that English courts “have no power to 
go into the question, once a prisoner is in lawful custody in this country, of the circumstances in which 
he may have been brought here [original footnote omitted, ChP]”” and then explains that this English 
rule from the Elliott case (see also Scott) “was received into the law of Palestine during the Mandate 
period [emphasis added, ChP].” (Ibid., p. 404, n. 12.) Baade consequently referred to the two cases 








The first is the 1941 case Yousef Said Abu Dourrah v. The Attorney-General.631 
In this case, the Court noted that the Defence of the appellant, who was extradited 
from Trans-Jordan to Palestine, brought before the Assize Court in Jerusalem and 
charged with murder, had argued “that the extradition proceedings were improper 
and that therefore the Assize Court had no jurisdiction to try the man”.632 The Court 
stated, however, that, if the Government was satisfied that the correct procedures of 
the extradition arrangement had been complied with, “that, we think, must be the 
end of the matter, except that possibly the courts of this country are not entitled to 
try the man for an offence different from that on which his extradition was 
obtained”.633 Furthermore, the Court also remarked with respect to the appellant’s 
claim that his case concerned a political offence that “even supposing it were a 
political murder, nothing prevents the man, if he is within the jurisdiction of this 
country, from being tried for it”.634  
The second case is Afouneh v. Attorney-General from 1942.635 In this case, the 
suspect, accused of (and later convicted for) murder had fled to Syria, where he was 
arrested by a British sergeant,636 who subsequently brought him – against his will – 
to the frontier where he was arrested on the Palestinian side of the border.637 There 
was an extradition treaty between Palestine and Syria and extradition papers had in 
fact been sent to Syria, but they only arrived there after Afouneh was brought to 
Palestine.  
The Court was, however, of the opinion that he could be tried, even if no 
extradition had taken place: 
 
If there is an extradition agreement between two countries and a request for 
extradition is made, the government to whom the request is made must satisfy 
themselves that the formalities of the agreement have been complied with. It is a 
matter for them and not for the government which is making the application. When 
once the accused person has been handed over to the requesting government, the 
position would seem to be that, subject to the limitation that he cannot be tried for an 
offence other than that for which he was extradited, he cannot avail himself of the 
plea that the government to whom the request was made should not have extradited 
him at all because certain irregularities of procedure had occurred.638  
 
                                                          
631 Supreme Court of Palestine (sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal), Yousef Said Abu Dourrah v. The 
Attorney-General, 20 January 1941, Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, Vol. 
10 (1941-1942), Case No. 101, pp. 331-332. 
632 Ibid., p. 331. 
633 Ibid. 
634 Ibid., p. 332. 
635 Supreme Court of Palestine (sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal), Afouneh v. Attorney-General, 11 
February 1942, Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, Vol. 10 (1941-1942), 
Case No. 97, pp. 327-328. 
636 At that time, Syria was occupied by the Allied Forces, see ibid., p. 327. 
637 See ibid. 








In making this male captus bene detentus statement, the Court referred to the Scott 
case and also to a quotation which is not from, but which can be traced back to, the 
decision of the US Supreme Court in Ker.639  
    
3.2 More recent cases 
 
Before turning to the first real case of this subsection, it must first be noted that the 
Eichmann reasoning was also upheld in Israel in more recent times. An example of 
this can be found in the case Vanunu, which, however, will not be addressed here in 
detail as the complete decisions of the Israeli courts in this case could not be 
consulted.640  
However, what can be said about this case is that in late September 1986, 
Mordechai Vanunu, a former employee of the Israeli Negev Nuclear Research 
Center, was lured from London to Rome and from there abducted to Israel by the 
Mossad, after he had spoken with a journalist from the London newspaper The 
Sunday Times about Israel’s nuclear capabilities.641 In Israel, Vanunu objected to his 
abduction – note that the UK did not file a protest642 but that Italy did object to the 
abduction643 – but the Israeli courts were not impressed and rejected his claims.644 
On 27 February 1988, the Israeli District Court sentenced him to 18 years’ 
imprisonment for treason and espionage and on 27 May 1990, Vanunu’s appeal 
before the Israeli Supreme Court was dismissed.645 This judgment was heavily 
                                                          
639 See ibid., p. 328: “Where a fugitive is brought back by kidnapping, or by other irregular means, and 
not under an extradition treaty, he cannot, although an extradition treaty exists between the two 
countries, set up in answer to the indictment the unlawful manner in which he was brought within the 
jurisdiction of the court. It belongs exclusively to the government from whose territory he was 
wrongfully taken to complain of the violation of its rights.” As explained in the main text, these words 
will not be found in the Ker decision itself; they can be found in J.B. Moore’s A digest of international 
law as embodied in diplomatic discussions, treaties, and other international agreements, international 
awards, the decisions of municipal courts, and the writings of jurists, and especially in documents, 
published and unpublished, issued by Presidents and Secretaries of State of the United States, the 
opinions of the Attorneys-General, and the decisions of courts, Federal and State, Vol. 4, Government 
printing office: Washington D.C. 1906, p. 311, where reference is made to the Ker case. 
640 See also Wilske and Schiller 1998, p. 226: “He was convicted of treason and espionage in a closed 
criminal proceeding; only the guilty verdict and sentence were made public [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].”  
641 The Sunday Times published its story on 5 October 1986, a couple of days after Vanunu had 
disappeared, see Cherif Bassiouni 1987, p. 199. About the operation itself, The Sunday Times “later 
reported that Vanunu was lured by a female Mossad agent to Rome, “where he was attacked by two men 
and held down while she injected him with a powerful anesthetic. He was chained and smuggled out of 
Italy in a cargo ship.”” (J. Cohen and N. Solomon, ‘U.S. Media Still Ignoring Journalist Held in Israeli 
Cell’, The Seattle Times, 30 December 1994, available at: 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19941230&slug=1949829.) 
642 See Cherif Bassiouni 1987, p. 199. 
643 See Wilske 2000, p. 321. 
644 See Cherif Bassiouni 1987, p. 199: “At a hearing before the Jerusalem district court, on Dec. 21, 
1986, Vanunu raised the issue of his kidnapping, but the court dismissed it.” See also Quigley 1993, pp. 
726-727 (n. 23). 








criticised by the European Parliament646 which recalled that Vanunu “was 
kidnapped in Rome by the Israeli authorities, in order to stand trial”647 and which 
reminded “the Government of Israel that the kidnapping (...) was a gross violation of 
the sovereignty of a Member State of the European Community”.648  
The first real case to be discussed here is the clearest example of a strict male 
captus male detentus decision ever pronounced by a judge (and as a result will be 
addressed here quite extensively): the already briefly mentioned649 1991 South 
African650 Opinion in State v. Ebrahim case.651  
Although South Africa had followed the traditional male captus bene detentus 
line in the past,652 the Ebrahim case is a clear rupture with that tradition. In this case, 
the Appellate Division of the South African Supreme Court unanimously set aside 
the conviction by a South African trial court of South African citizen Ebrahim 
Ismail Ebrahim, who was charged with treason in 1987 and sentenced to 20 years’ 
imprisonment. What had happened?  
In 1964, Ebrahim, a member of Umkhonto We Sizwe (the military wing of the 
African National Congress (ANC)),653 was convicted of several acts of sabotage and 
was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.654 After his release in 1979, his 
movements were restricted to the magistrate’s district of Pinetown in Natal.655 
Notwithstanding his restriction order, he fled to Swaziland on 19 December 1980 
where, according to the South African Government, he became, among other things, 
active in anti-South African activities.656 On 15 December 1986, Ebrahim was 
forcibly abducted from Swaziland to South Africa by two men who informed him 
                                                          
646 See ibid. 
647 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the kidnapping and imprisonment of Mr Mordechai Vanunu’, 
14 June 1990, OJ C 175, 16 July 1990, p. 168, under C. 
648 Ibid., under 2. 
649 See Chapter II. 
650 The South African legal system is a mixture of civil law and common law, see again (see n. 613) 
JuriGlobe’s ‘Alphabetical Index of the Political Entities and Corresponding Legal Systems’, available 
at: http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/index-alpha.php. See also Supreme Court (Appellate Division), 
Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 International Legal Materials (1992), p. 892 where 
editor John Dugard explains: “The South African common law is Roman-Dutch law, comprising 
principles of Roman law and Germanic custom, as developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries by the writings of jurists and the decision of the courts in Holland and its associated provinces 
in the United Netherlands. It has been strongly influenced during the past two hundred years by the 
English common law.” 
651 In this chapter, both the edited and abbreviated English translation in International Legal Materials, 
prepared by John Dugard (Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 
February 1991, 31 International Legal Materials (1992), pp. 888-899) and the English translation of the 
case in 95 International Law Reports (1994), pp. 417-445 were used. 
652 See, for example, the cases Abrahams v. Minister of Justice and R v. Robertson, see Supreme Court 
(Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 International Legal Materials 
(1992), p. 895. See n. 685 for more information. See for more cases Dugard 1991, p. 200. 
653 See 95 International Law Reports (1994), p. 419. 
654 See Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), p. 890. 
655 See ibid. 








that they were South African police officers.657 Near the border, Ebrahim was 
picked up by armed men who brought him to Pretoria. During this trip, Ebrahim was 
questioned, among other things, about the ANC. From this, he inferred that they 
were members of the security police.658 In Pretoria, Jan Cronjé, head of the security 
branch of the South African Police in the Northern Transvaal, was informed that 
Ebrahim was in Pretoria.659 He arranged for Ebrahim to be brought to the police 
headquarters where Cronjé officially arrested him.660 Ebrahim, who was 
subsequently charged with treason, then applied for release, submitting that his 
“abduction in Swaziland took place with the authority and knowledge of the South 
African Police or other agents of the South African state”.661 The South African 
police, however, denied that it had anything to do with the kidnapping.662 Ebrahim’s 
alternative allegation, namely that the kidnappers were South African agents, was 
left unanswered by the police.663 Be that as it may, the above-mentioned Trial Court 
rejected the application664 and Ebrahim was tried, convicted and sentenced to 20 
years’ imprisonment.        
Because of the denials of the South African police, the Supreme Court – in the 
words of Judge Steyn who wrote the opinion of the Court – stated that it had to be 
                                                          
657 See ibid. The opinion of the Supreme Court did not say anything about the level of violence used 
against Ebrahim (except that he was “forcibly abducted”). In addition, the opinion informs that “[h]e 
was bound, blindfolded and gagged”. (Ibid., p. 890.) In 95 International Law Reports (1994), where one 
can find more details on the abduction itself, one can read that Ebrahim’s kidnappers “pointed guns at 
him and warned him that they would kill him if he screamed or made a noise.” (95 International Law 
Reports (1994), p. 420.)  
658 See ibid., p. 421. 
659 See Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), p. 891. 
660 See ibid. It may be rather amusing within the context of this academic study to note that Cronjé was 
accompanied by two other senior police officers and that, when Ebrahim complained to one of them, 
namely Brigadier Willem Schoon, that he had been abducted from Swaziland, that Schoon replied that 
he was now in South Africa and “that his alleged abduction was therefore of academic interest only”. 
(95 International Law Reports (1994), p. 422.) As will be shown infra, the Supreme Court clearly 
disagreed with Schoon. 
661 Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), p. 891. 
662 See ibid. 
663 See ibid. 
664 Ebrahim sought the following orders: “1. Directing and holding that the applicant is not amenable to 
the criminal jurisdiction of the Court in respect of the indictment referred to in paragraph 3. 2. Declaring 
that the applicant’s apprehension and abduction in the Kingdom of Swaziland on 15 December 1986 and 
his subsequent transportation to the Republic of South Africa and purported arrest and detention 
pursuant thereto is in breach of international law and wrongful and unlawful. 3. Declaring that the 
applicant has not properly and lawfully been arrested and properly and lawfully been arraigned before a 
court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of trying him on the indictment proffered by the 
prosecution against the applicant and two other persons. 4. Declaring that the applicant is entitled to be 
discharged from his imprisonment and detention at present pending his trial on the said indictment. 5. 









accepted that they were indeed not involved in the abduction.665 Nevertheless, it also 
had to be accepted that it was very likely that the kidnappers were South African 
State agents.666 Taking this into account, the Supreme Court looked at the basic 
arguments of Ebrahim “that the abduction was a violation of the applicable rules of 
international law, that these rules are part of our law, and that the violation of these 
rules deprived the trial court of competence to hear the matter”.667 Ebrahim hereby 
focused on traditional international (namely inter-State) law and not, for example, 
on human rights law: 
  
It will be submitted that, having regard to all the facts, the appellant was not amenable 
to the criminal jurisdiction of the Court a quo, alternatively that if such jurisdiction in 
fact existed in theory, the Court a quo had a discretion as to whether the appellant 
should be tried and should, in the exercise of that discretion, have refused to exercise 
its jurisdiction in circumstances where there had been a fundamental breach of those 
rules of acceptable behaviour which govern the comity of nations.668  
 
The Supreme Court subsequently made clear that it would not look at international 
law but at “our common law”669 to resolve the issue.670  
As already explained in footnote 650, this common law is a mixture of Roman-
Dutch law and English common law. Hence, what the Supreme Court had to do was 
to examine the perspective of Roman law, Roman-Dutch law and South African law 
(which has been strongly influenced by English common law) on the present 
problem. 
In its review of Roman law, the Supreme Court mentioned exactly the same 
three rules from the Digest as already presented in Chapter II of this study, namely 
D.1.18.3,671 D.2.1.20672 and D.48.3.7.673 The Court then explained that  
                                                          
665 See Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), p. 891.  
666 See ibid., p. 891: “All the circumstances surrounding the abduction point very strongly to an 
involvement of the state in the abduction. This is confirmed by the failure of the police to disclose the 
identity of the abductors to the court despite the fact that their identity must have been known to the 
police. The appeal must therefore be decided on the basis that the appellant was abducted by agents of 
the South African state.” 
667 Ibid., p. 892. 
668 Ibid. 
669 Ibid. 
670 See ibid. 
671 “The governor of a province has authority only over the people of his own province, and that only 
while he is in the province. For the moment he leaves it, he is a private citizen. Sometimes he has power 
even in relation to non-residents, if they have taken direct part in criminal activity. For it is to be found 
in the imperial warrants of appointment that he who has charge of the province shall attend to cleansing 
the province of evil men; and no distinction is drawn as to where they may come from.” (D.1.18.3 (from 
Paul, Sabinus, book 13).) See Mommsen, Krueger and Watson 1985 A, pp. 34-35 and Supreme Court 
(Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 International Legal Materials 
(1992), pp. 892-893.    
672 “One who administers justice beyond the limits of his territory may be disobeyed with impunity”. 








[t]his limitation on the legal powers of Roman provincial governors and lawgivers is 
understandable and was unavoidable in the light of the great number of provinces 
comprising the Roman Empire in classical times, with their ethnic and cultural 
diversity, and their different legal systems which the politically pragmatic Romans 
allowed to remain largely in force in their conquered territories. Until late in the 
history of the Roman Empire certain provinces were controlled by the Senate and 
others by the Emperor. Intervention by one province in the domestic affairs of another 
was a source of potential conflict. In order to maintain sound mutual relations, a 
practice developed among provincial governors relating to the arrest and extradition 
of offenders.674    
 
After having clarified that this practice became law in Justinian’s Novellae 
Constitutiones,675 the Supreme Court argued: 
 
It is inconceivable that the Roman authorities would recognize a conviction and 
sentence, and allow them to stand, when they were the result of an abduction of a 
criminal from one province on the order or with the co-operation of the authority of 
another province. This would not only have been an approval of illegal conduct, and 
therefore a subversion of authority, but would also have threatened the internal inter-
provincial peace of the Empire.676   
 
One can wonder, as was already explained in Chapter II, whether this is correct. 
After all, the fact that an inter-State abduction was forbidden in antiquity does not 
                                                                                                                                              
Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 International Legal 
Materials (1992), p. 892. 
673 “It is customary for the governors of provinces in which an offense has been committed to write to 
their colleagues [in whose provinces] the perpetrators are alleged to live, requesting that they be 
returned along with those who are to prosecute them; this also is laid down in a number of rescripts.” 
(D.48.3.7 (from Macer, Duties of the Governor, book 2).) See Mommsen, Krueger and Watson 1985 B, 
p. 801a and Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), p. 893. (Note that the Ebrahim case speaks of “Macer, Duties of 
the Governor, book 1” here, but this is incorrect.) 
674 Ibid. 
675 See ibid. See Novella 134, Chapter 5: “When any one of the criminals whom we have just mentioned 
conceals himself, or leaves the province in which he has committed the offence, We order the judge to 
call him into court by the publication of lawful edicts, and if he does not obey, the judge shall proceed in 
the manner prescribed by the laws. If it should be ascertained that the guilty party is living in some other 
province, We order the judge of the district in which the offence was committed to notify the judge of 
the province in which the delinquent resides, by means of a letter, to arrest him on his own responsibility 
and that of his court, and to send the accused to him. When the judge who has received a public letter of 
this kind fails to do what We have stated, and his court does not surrender the criminal, or if it does not 
execute the orders given it, We decree that the said magistrate shall pay a fine of three pounds in gold, 
and his court an equal amount. If, induced by a desire for gain, a judge, or any officer of his court, does 
not arrest a person of this description, or if, after having arrested him, he does not deliver him up, he 
shall, after conviction, be deprived of his office, and sent into exile.” 








necessarily mean that the judges in those days could not opt for a male captus bene 
detentus outcome.677 (This point will be further examined shortly.) 
In its examination of Roman-Dutch law, the South African Supreme Court 
referred to several Roman-Dutch jurists from the 16th to the 19th century to conclude 
that “it is clear that the unlawful removal of a person from one jurisdiction to 
another was regarded as an abduction and as a serious breach of the law in Roman-
Dutch law”.678  
However, this still does not say anything about the consequences of such an 
illegality on the jurisdiction of the court.679  
This was the next point to be examined by the Supreme Court. It explained:  
 
A further question is whether a conviction and sentence following such an abduction, 
in the jurisdiction to which the person was abducted, had any legal validity in Roman-
Dutch law. In other words, did the court before which the abducted person was 
brought to trial have the competence to try him? One would expect that it was not 
competent for the same reasons advanced in respect of the Roman Empire. 
Furthermore, it would have been pointless to have a strict prohibition on the violation 
of territorial sovereignty if it could be simply ignored without any adverse 
consequences in the ensuing legal proceedings.680    
 
After referring to a 17th-century case in Brabant (the Netherlands), where two Dutch 
lawyers indeed deemed a court order following an abduction to be invalid, the 
Supreme Court concluded: “It is therefore clear that in Roman-Dutch law a court of 
one state had no jurisdiction to try a person abducted from another state by agents of 
the former state.”681 Although one can doubt whether it was really that certain that a 
                                                          
677 It may be good to refer here again to the Eichmann analogy: even though the UNSC did indeed 
condemn the inter-State abduction of Eichmann, it did not lead to the refusal of exercising jurisdiction in 
the Israeli courts, where the judges applied male captus bene detentus. 
678 Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), p. 894. 
679 Note, however, that the Supreme Court also explains that one of these Roman-Dutch jurists, 
Johannes Voet (a law professor at Leiden University) in turn referred to the 16th-century Spanish jurist 
Gomezius (Antonio Gomez) and that this Gomez did speak about the consequences of an abduction. 
According to the Supreme Court, he “stated that a judge might not order or effect the arrest of a criminal 
in another’s territory and that if this was done the arrested person was to be immediately released.” 
(Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 International 
Legal Materials (1992), p. 894.) 
680 Ibid., p. 895. The last point is especially strong in case a weaker State does not complain against a 
violation of its sovereignty by a more powerful State. In that case, only the judge can enforce the 
prohibition on inter-State abductions. See also Dugard 1991, p. 201: “The international law rule 
prohibiting cross-border abductions can be enforced in two ways. First, the state whose sovereignty has 
been violated may seek to secure the return of the abductee by means of diplomatic protest and pressure. 
Secondly, the courts of the state in whose territory the abductee is brought to trial may decline to 
exercise jurisdiction. The first method has proved to be ineffective in the South African context as states 
have generally failed to protest against the actions of their more powerful neighbour. Thus Swaziland 
failed to protest against the arrest of Ebrahim (…). The second method is potentially much more 
effective as it removes the object of the abduction and serves to discourage future abductions.”   
681 Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 








court did not have jurisdiction following an abduction by State agents, it cannot be 
denied that logic and the case mentioned by the Supreme Court682 are more in 
favour of a male captus male detentus than a male captus bene detentus outcome. 
The last category the Supreme Court had to examine was the common law of 
South Africa, which “is still substantially Roman-Dutch law as adjusted to local 
circumstances”.683 After explaining that neither statutory nor case law exclude the 
possibility of applying the Roman-Dutch rule, the Supreme Court clarified that 
previous “judgments dealing with the effect of abduction from another state on the 
jurisdiction of our courts to try an abducted person are based either on facts that 
differed materially from the present or failed to consider the question in the light of 
the common law”.684 Although it may be true that these cases did not look at 
Roman-Dutch law, one can wonder whether the cases were factually really that 
different from the present one.685 In addition to this, the English common law was 
disposed of quite easily, even though Dugard had argued that the South African 
common law “has been strongly influenced during the past two hundred years by the 
English common law”.686 Reading the opinion of the Supreme Court, one gets the 
impression that the Supreme Court wants to reach a certain outcome, even if the 
legal avenue in reaching that outcome is arguably not without its flaws. Be that as it 
may, the Supreme Court concluded that the Roman-Dutch rules were still part of the 
South African law.687 
                                                          
682 Note also the consequence of release put forward by Gomez, see n. 679. 
683 Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), p. 895. 
684 Ibid. 
685  See, for example, the cases R v. Robertson 1912 TPD 10 and Abrahams v. Minister of Justice 1963 
(4) SA 452 (C), see Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 
1991, 31 International Legal Materials (1992), pp. 895-896: “In Abrahams v. Minister of Justice 1963 
(4) SA 542 (C) the applicant applied for habeas corpus on the ground that he was abducted from 
Bechuanaland (as Botswana was then known) by members of the South African Police and taken to 
Gobabis in South West Africa (now Namibia) where he was duly arrested. Relying on the authority of R 
v. Robertson 1912 TPD 10 and R v. Officer Commanding Depot Battalion, Colchester: Ex parte Elliot[t] 
[1947] 1 ALL ER 373, the court decided that where a lawful arrest took place within a state’s own 
borders the circumstances under which the accused was brought into the state were irrelevant. In 
Robertson’s case it was argued that a person who had been unlawfully arrested in Natal and brought to 
the Transvaal could not be subjected to extradition proceedings in the Transvaal in answer to an 
extradition request from Britain to stand trial in Scotland. The argument was dismissed by the court as 
follows: “The applicant was brought into the Transvaal. Whether he was brought here legally or 
illegally, this Court has nothing to do with: as a fact he was brought here, and thereafter he was arrested, 
on the 10th October, on a valid warrant which had been issued in Scotland, and which in my opinion was 
duly endorsed. That being so, it is not necessary to go into the other points which have been raised” (at 
12-13) [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
686 See n. 650. See Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 
31 International Legal Materials (1992), p. 896: “Elliot[t]’s case was also an application for habeas 
corpus. (…) The case was decided according to the principles of the English common law. It is 
consequently not relevant (…) [emphasis in original, ChP].” See also Semmelman 1993, p. 134. 
687 See Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 








After these reviews of the different legal systems, the Supreme Court made an 
assessment of the above information in which it again confirmed the above-
mentioned impression that the Supreme Court wanted to break with the (legal) past 
and install new legal principles for the reborn State of South Africa.688 Although 
many of them are indeed exemplary of a healthy system of law and hence cannot but 
be applauded, one can wonder whether they also have the solid basis in the (Roman-
Dutch law influenced) law of South Africa as claimed by the Supreme Court.  
An example is the introduction of the concept of the protection and promotion of 
human rights which was not mentioned at all in the Supreme Court’s overview of 
Roman-Dutch rules.689  
 
Several fundamental legal principles are contained in these [Roman-Dutch] rules, 
namely the protection and promotion of human rights, good inter-state relations and a 
healthy administration of justice. The individual must be protected against illegal 
detention and abduction, the bounds of jurisdiction must not be exceeded, sovereignty 
must be respected, the legal process must be fair to those affected and abuse of law 
must be avoided in order to protect and promote the integrity of the administration of 
justice. This applies equally to the state. When the state is a party to a dispute, as for 
example in criminal cases, it must come to court with “clean hands”. When the state 
                                                          
688 At that moment in time, South Africa was transforming from a State of apartheid into a democratic 
country. See in that respect also Dugard 1991, commenting on the case, on pp. 200, 202 and 203: “In the 
‘bad old days’ when ‘instruments’ of the South African state frequently crossed into neighbouring 
territories to arrest (or kill) anti-apartheid ‘operatives’, South African courts readily assumed jurisdiction 
over kidnapped persons, relying on English decisions (…) and the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court 
in Attorney-General, Israel v Eichmann (…) which studiously followed Anglo-American precedent.” 
“Ebrahim is a welcome decision. It is a great judgment which emphasises the importance of respect for 
fair standards of criminal justice, due process of law, human rights and international law and warns 
against the abuse of law by the state. It is unfortunate that such a decision was not handed down when it 
was most needed and that instead state lawlessness was often condoned by the courts in the interests of 
apartheid. Had judgments of this kind been given in the days of apartheid our courts would not have 
faced the crises of legitimacy that confronts them today.” “What is to become of Roman-Dutch law in a 
post-apartheid society? Is it to be replaced by a code? Is it to fall into disuse until it is replaced by a 
South African version of the English common law? Or is it to keep its place as a proud, enlightened 
system, forming the most significant component of the South African common law? To do so, it needs 
to be rescued by the courts from the reputation it acquired under the system of apartheid. Judgments 
such as Ebrahim are an essential part of this rescue operation.” Semmelman (1993, p. 133) is even more 
outspoken: “The Ebrahim case provides an interesting contrast with Alvarez. While the two opinions are 
readily distinguishable doctrinally, the unusual holding in Ebrahim and the Court’s apparent eagerness 
to reach its conclusion suggest that the political situation in South Africa may have played a crucial role 
in the decision.” See also ibid., pp. 136-137. 
689 See, however, Dugard 1991, p. 203: “During the past 40 years the entire South African legal system 
has been permeated by apartheid. Unfortunately Roman-Dutch law did not escape his contagion as the 
failure of the Appellate Division, under the leadership of LC Steyn, N Ogilvie Thompson, F L H 
Rumpff and P J Rabie [these were the chief justices of the Appellate Division between 1959 and 1989, 
ChP] to apply the principles of Roman-Dutch law in disputes between individual and state inevitably 
created the impression that Roman-Dutch law either had nothing to say on human rights issues or was a 








itself is involved in an abduction across international borders, as in the present case, 
its hands are not clean.690 
 
The Supreme Court, also mentioning that “[s]igns of this development appear 
increasingly in the municipal law of other countries”,691 concluded that “according 
to our common law, the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear the case against the 
appellant. Consequently his conviction and sentence cannot stand.”692  
Although the legal methodology of this decision is arguably not without its 
flaws, the case is still important for many reasons.  
First, it must be noted that the State from which Ebrahim was abducted 
(Swaziland) did not protest against the abduction.693 This means that the Supreme 
Court argues that even if there is no actual friction between two States, a ‘normal’ 
abduction (without serious mistreatment) performed by State agents must not lead to 
a trial. This, in turn, means that the focus should not be only on traditional 
international (inter-State) law694 but also on other aspects such as human rights 
protection and a healthy administration of justice.  
Secondly, the Supreme Court argues that in the case of an international 
abduction performed by State agents,695 a court has no jurisdiction to hear the 
case.696  
This means that there is no discretion for judges in deciding whether or not they 
should exercise jurisdiction: they automatically have no jurisdiction in these kinds 
                                                          
690 Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), p. 896.  
691 Ibid. Note, however, that the Supreme Court hereby only referred to the already discussed Toscanino 
case (and cases mentioned therein). It did not address the aftermath of Toscanino, such as the Lujan 
case. For criticism on this point, see Semmelman 1993, p. 136. 
692 Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), p. 899. Note that next to this male captus male detentus outcome, 
Ebrahim received compensation in a civil case, see Baker 2004, p. 1388.  
693 See Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), p. 891: “There was no suggestion made in the application that the 
government of Swaziland protested to the South African government over appellant’s abduction.” 
694 Although it is true that the Supreme Court decided this case on the basis of national law only, the 
judges clearly underscored the importance of respect for international law. See also Dugard 1991, p. 200 
and Cowling 1992, pp. 248-250. 
695 See for criticism on this point Nsereko 2008, p. 61: “While the court’s decision is salutary, its value 
is somewhat diminished by the distinction that the court drew between action by private and official 
agents. The distinction is unfortunate as it allows the court to ignore the illegal actions of private agents, 
however outrageous, and enables the state of prosecuting authorities to benefit from them.” Cf. also 
Costi 2003, p. 90. 
696 Cowling (1992, p. 255) also refers to another important aspect of this case: “Akehurst remarks that 
the number of extradition treaties has declined recently, and the reason for this could well be that states 
prefer to enjoy a free hand in this respect and hence not be tied to any obligations or procedures. This is 
why it is necessary for the courts to step in to provide assistance to individuals by ensuring that basic 
standards of due process across international boundaries are maintained and that extradition is not to be 
regarded exclusively as facilitating inter-state co-operation in action against crime. Ebrahim’s case 
represents a landmark in this respect, since the Appellate Division was prepared to come to the 









of pre-trial irregularities. Because of this automatism, this case is the most perfect 
example of the male captus male detentus reasoning, which, after all, also 
encompasses an automatism (in the case of a male captus, a male detentus will 
follow.) However, it is clear that the rigidity of this ruling will be difficult to accept 
in the world of judges, who arguably wish to have at least some room and flexibility 
in weighing all the different interests at stake. Practice after Ebrahim has also 
confirmed this. In the words of Michell:  
 
The South African courts have (...) gone a considerable distance in elaborating the 
framework first set out in Ebrahim. The subsequent decisions, however, have been 
surprisingly inconsistent, given Ebrahim’s strict rule against transnational forcible 
abduction. Part of the explanation for the murky state of the South African law after 
Ebrahim may simply be the reluctance of some judges to let go of the male captus 
bene detentus rule. This reluctance may also be inspired by the strictness of the 
Ebrahim doctrine itself, which requires that courts divest themselves of jurisdiction. 
Where the facts are not as stark as in Ebrahim, judges may seek to avoid having to 
apply such a strict rule.697   
 
Another interesting case often mentioned in the male captus discussion is the 
Zimbabwean698 Beahan case.699 Beahan, a resident of the Republic of South Africa 
and a UK citizen,700 “had planned with others to assist convicted prisoners serving 
sentences in Zimbabwe to escape”.701 However, when Beahan wanted to enter 
Zimbabwe to carry out his plan, it became clear that his vehicle was going to be 
searched by the customs officials.702 As a result of that, he fled into Botswana where 
he was arrested a day later.703 A couple of days passed during which Beahan “was 
not taken before a court or given access to legal representation”704 and then, “the 
Botswana Police handed the appellant over to the Zimbabwe Police at the border. 
There was no extradition treaty between Botswana and Zimbabwe.”705 In Botswana, 
Beahan “was charged with having attempted to commit an act of terrorism or 
sabotage by conspiring with others to release convicted prisoners from Zimbabwean 
prisons”.706 Beahan claimed “that the Court lacked jurisdiction, because he had been 
unlawfully removed from Botswana, that his removal had not complied with 
                                                          
697 Michell 1996, p. 458. 
698 The Zimbabwean legal system is a mixture of civil, common and customary law, see JuriGlobe’s 
‘Alphabetical Index of the Political Entities and Corresponding Legal Systems’ available at: 
http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/index-alpha.php. 
699 Supreme Court, Beahan v. State, 4 September 1991, International Law Reports, Vol. 103 (1996), pp. 
203-224. 
700 See ibid., p. 206. 
701 Supreme Court, Beahan v. State, 4 September 1991, International Law Reports, Vol. 103 (1996), p. 
203 (summary). 
702 See ibid. 
703 See ibid.  
704 Ibid. 
705 Ibid. This was because “[m]embers of the Botswana Police Force became aware that the accused was 
wanted by the Zimbabwe Republic Police”. (Ibid., p. 207.) 








Botswana laws regulating deportation and that it was, in effect, an extradition in 
which the proper procedures had not been followed”.707 
The Supreme Court, in the words of Chief Justice Gubbay who delivered the 
judgment, first reiterated what the High Court (whose decision was now under 
appeal before the Supreme Court) had decided on this point: 
 
[W]hile the Court has jurisdiction to try a person properly brought before it regardless 
of the means used to secure his presence before the Court nevertheless the Court can 
decline to exercise that jurisdiction in respect of a person irregularly or illegally 
brought before it and can decline to exercise jurisdiction as a mark of disapproval of 
the abuse of process (…).708 
 
Then, Justice Gubbay tried to find out whether this “middle path” solution709 was 
correct. In doing so, it made an overview of many cases, several of which have also 
been reviewed in this book, such as the cases of Ebrahim,710 Scott, Elliott, Driver, 
Ker, Frisbie, Toscanino711 and Lujan. Then, he concluded:  
 
In my opinion it is essential that in order to promote confidence in and respect for the 
administration of justice and preserve the judicial process from contamination, a court 
should decline to compel an accused person to undergo a trial in circumstances where 
his appearance before it has been facilitated by an act of abduction undertaken by the 
prosecuting state. There is an inherent objection to such a course both on grounds of 
public policy pertaining to international ethical norms and because it imperils and 
corrodes the peaceful co-existence and mutual respect of sovereign nations. For 
abduction is illegal under international law, provided the abductor was not acting on 
his own initiative and without the authority or connivance of his government. A 
contrary view would amount to a declaration that the end justifies the means, thereby 
encouraging states to become law-breakers in order to secure the conviction of a 
private individual.712  
 
It is clear from this statement that Gubbay, who also focuses on the international law 
dimension and who does not seem to demand a protest from the injured State either 
                                                          
707 Ibid.  
708 Ibid., pp. 208-209. 
709 See ibid., p. 209. 
710 Of which Justice Gubbay stated: “This decision commends itself and I respectfully agree with it. Not 
only is it founded on the inherited principles of common law which this country shares with South 
Africa, it has the added quality of being in accord with justice, fairness and good sense.” (Ibid., p. 211.) 
711 Of which Justice Gubbay stated: “It is refreshing to note (…) that a departure from the restricted 
concept embodied in the Ker-Frisbie rule is expressed in the bold judgment of Mansfield Circuit Judge 
in United States v Toscanino”. (Ibid., p. 213.) Although he also noted (ibid.) that “[t]his dictum does not, 
of course, accurately reflect the law of the United States”, he found that “[n]onetheless, it signifies to me 
a realistic and responsive approach for the need to recognise and enforce fair standards of criminal 
justice towards which every legal system should strive.” (Ibid., p. 214.) Given this remark and the 
remark he made in the context of the Ebrahim case (see the previous footnote), it is clear that Gubbay is 
more in favour of the male captus male detentus reasonings. This is also evidenced by his conclusion 









(cf. Ebrahim), is in favour of the male captus male detentus reasoning, although he 
does not go that far as the Ebrahim case in holding that a court is automatically 
deprived of jurisdiction in such cases; courts should refuse jurisdiction.713 However, 
this reasoning was not really of any help to Beahan as “the circumstances under 
which the appellant was brought to this country from Botswana cannot be likened to 
an abduction by agents of the government of Zimbabwe”.714 
Only two further cases need to be discussed in this overview, first the 2002 
Scottish case Vervuren and second the 2004 Namibian715 case Mushwena.  
In the Vervuren case,716 a Dutch national was “charged (...) with the importation 
and supplying of a controlled drug, namely amphetamine”.717  
On 30 May 2001, Vervuren was arrested and detained in Portugal.718 After being 
extradited to Scotland, he appeared before a Scottish court on 27 July 2001, where 
he claimed that his arrest and the extradition proceedings in Portugal had violated 
Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR because he had not received effective legal assistance 
at the extradition hearings in Portugal, because he had not been informed promptly, 
in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge 
against him and because he had signed the relevant documentation under undue 
pressure.719 Vervuren, who – because of these circumstances – had signed the 
relevant documentation for his accelerated extradition procedure “Under protest”,720 
submitted that the (already discussed, see Subsection 3.1) Scottish male captus bene 
detentus Sinclair case was no longer good law and that Bennett had to be 
followed:721 
                                                          
713 Note that Justice Gubbay was “prepared to assume that a discretion vested in the learned judge a quo 
to refuse to exercise jurisdiction [under the abuse of process doctrine, ChP]”. (Ibid., p. 216.) 
714 Ibid., p. 214. This was because the male captus of Beahan “did not constitute a violation of 
international law for it involved no affront to the sovereignty of a foreign state. (…) The immutable fact 
is that the appellant was recovered from Botswana without any form of force or deception being 
practised by the agents of this country. The decision to convey him to Zimbabwe was made, and could 
only have been made, by the Botswana police in whose custody he was. Where agents of the state of 
refuge without resort to extradition or deportation proceedings surrender the fugitive for prosecution to 
another state, that receiving state, since it has not exercised any force upon the territory of the refuge 
state and has in no way violated its territorial sovereignty, is not in breach of international law”. (Ibid., 
with reference to, among other things, Morgenstern 1953, pp. 270-271.) 
715 The Namibian legal system is a mixture of common and civil law, see JuriGlobe’s ‘Alphabetical 
Index of the Political Entities and Corresponding Legal Systems’ available at: 
http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/index-alpha.php. 
716 High Court of Justiciary, HM Advocate v. Vervuren, 12 April 2002, 2002 S.L.T. 555. 
717 Ibid., p. 556. 
718 See ibid. Note that that other male captus case from Scotland (Sinclair) also involved, among other 
things, alleged irregularities in Portugal.  
719 See ibid. 
720 Ibid., p. 557. 
721 See ibid., p. 559: “Senior counsel submitted that the case of Sinclair v HM Advocate was no longer 
good law. The court should prefer the views expressed in the House of Lords in R v Horseferry Road 
Magistrates’ Court, ex p Bennett. The court should also take into account the preamble to the ECHR, 
and the need to preserve the integrity of the rule of law: cf dicta of Lord Griffiths in Horseferry. Counsel 
submitted that what had occurred in (...) [the court in Portugal, ChP] fell within the definition “serious 








[F]irst, that the British authorities had a duty, when making an extradition request to a 
country such as Portugal, to be satisfied that no illegality occurred in the subsequent 
Portuguese extradition proceedings. Secondly, even if that proposition was wrong, 
and there was no positive duty upon Britain to vet the Portuguese extradition 
proceedings, the British government and authorities could not turn a blind eye to 
irregularities in the Portuguese extradition proceedings once these irregularities had 
been brought to their attention (...). The Lord Advocate, on becoming aware of the 
illegality (...), should not raise proceedings by way of indictment against the minuter 
[this is Vervuren, ChP].[722] Thirdly, the British authorities could not collude with a 
foreign state in order to benefit from a person’s presence in the United Kingdom: in 
other words, the end could not justify the means.723 
 
With respect to his first proposition, Lady Paton, writing the opinion, noted that 
“[s]enior counsel could point to no authority supporting such a proposition”724 and 
then made the following (and already-mentioned, see footnote 7) explanation that  
 
the approach adopted by the United Kingdom courts in the past was that it was 
irrelevant how a person arrived on the airport tarmac: all that mattered was, once the 
person was in the United Kingdom, was he subject to due process, to fair proceedings. 
All the courts had been concerned about was the propriety of the domestic 
procedure.725 
 
Although senior counsel for Vervuren submitted “that some authority for his 
submission that a positive duty of checking rested upon the United Kingdom 
                                                                                                                                              
have been involved in such serious abuse of power: the United Kingdom had merely to be aware of the 
abuse of power.” Although counsel accepted that the facts in Bennett (where “the accused had in effect 
been kidnapped: there had been no court proceedings, no extradition proceedings” (ibid.)) were graver 
than in the present case, he “argued that, in the present case, the extradition procedure had been 
disregarded by the Portuguese authorities, and that the authorities in the United Kingdom ought to know 
of this either through exercising due diligence and actively checking the procedures (the first argument) 
or by becoming aware of the illegality as a result of the minute in the current proceedings (the second 
argument).” (Ibid.) See also ibid.: “[C]ounsel argued that the sentiments and principles in Horseferry, 
together with the advent of the Human Rights Act, placed constraints upon the Lord Advocate, and 
required the court to look at the procedure by which the minuter came to be in a Scottish court. The 
court could not support or turn a blind eye to an illegality. Signatory states could not allow other 
signatories to the ECHR to abuse their rights.” 
722 See also ibid., p. 558: “Senior counsel submitted that if there appeared to be a substantial 
infringement of the minuter’s human rights, this court should give redress by prohibiting the Lord 
Advocate from acting further. Reference was made to s 57 of the Scotland Act 1998. By continuing with 
these criminal proceedings against the minuter, the Lord Advocate was acting incompatibly with the 
Convention, and was attempting to benefit from the illegality perpetrated by the Portuguese authorities. 
The current proceedings against the minuter should be discharged in the exercise of the court’s 
supervisory power. Alternatively, if the case was not one falling within s 57 (2), the court itself was a 
public authority, with a duty to preserve the integrity of the High Court: the proceedings should be 
discharged on that basis also. Alternatively the court could order that an inquiry be made into whether 
the proceedings should be discharged, founded as they were on the illegality of another state.” 
723 Ibid., pp. 556-557. 









Government could be found in the preamble to the European Convention on Human 
Rights”,726 he “accepted that his first proposition seemed to run contrary to a line of 
established authority”.727 
Lady Paton did not comment on the second proposition, but she did attack the 
third because “there was no evidence to suggest that there had been a positive act by 
United Kingdom Government agents colluding with an illegality in the Portuguese 
courts”.728  
As a result of this, counsel dropped his third proposition.729 
Lady Paton divided her opinion in two categories, namely 1) if the Sinclair case, 
where it was decided “that Scottish courts should not inquire into the circumstances 
whereby an accused person comes to be in Scotland, facing trial there”,730 is still 
authoritative731 and 2) if the Sinclair case is no longer authoritative.732  
Paton noted with respect to the first situation that Vervuren’s arguments had to 
be dismissed because Sinclair “has not been reviewed by a larger court, nor formally 
disapproved, nor overturned. Technically therefore it is still a binding authority.”733 
Although it may, of course, be the case that Sinclair is still good law in Scotland, it 
seems strange to then also hypothesise this situation: if Paton is indeed of the 
opinion that Sinclair is still binding authority, then why does she use a heading 
stating “[i]f the case of Sinclair is still authoritative”?734  
With respect to the second situation, Paton noted that because of the Bennett case 
(both the one decided by the House of Lords and the one decided by the Scottish 
court which noted the weakness of the Sinclair/male captus bene detentus rule after 
Bennett, see footnote 308) and the ECHR now in force, “it may be necessary that I 
give a view on the assumption that Sinclair might now be regarded as a doubtful 
authority”.735 
Paton then returned to the three arguments of Vervuren already mentioned above 
and rejected the first argument  
 
to the effect that any ECHR signatory state has a duty to adopt a proactive role in 
relation to another ECHR state’s extradition proceedings, including checking the 
                                                          
726 Ibid. 
727 Ibid. 
728 Ibid. See also ibid.: “There was no suggestion that the British authorities had procured the minuter’s 
signature on the form, or that the British authorities had placed the minuter under any pressure, or that 
the British authorities had provided the interpreter. Accordingly there was no suggestion that the United 
Kingdom came to court with unclean hands, or that the state had acted in bad faith. The United 
Kingdom had merely made a request under the Extradition Act in the normal manner.” 
729 See ibid. 
730 Ibid., p. 560. 
731 See ibid., pp. 560-561. 
732 See ibid., pp. 561-562. 
733 Ibid., p. 561. It must be noted that the House of Lords is the final court of appeal on points of law for 
the UK (including Scotland) for civil cases only (and that Bennett was a criminal case). The highest 
criminal court for Scotland is the Scottish High Court of Justiciary. 
734 Ibid., p. 560. 








regularity and legality of any foreign extradition proceedings initiated as a result of a 
United Kingdom request for extradition.736   
 
As already clarified above, the third argument was dropped because counsel for 
Vervuren had conceded that there was “no question of inappropriate actings or 
collusion on the part of the British authorities in the present case”.737 However, 
Paton noted that both the Prosecution and the Defence agreed that if that had 
nevertheless been the case, then the following solution could have been relied upon: 
“if the United Kingdom authorities were guilty of some form of collusion, and did 
not come to court with clean hands, the courts were entitled to respond by, for 
example, sustaining a plea in bar of trial.”738 This in a way resembles the statement 
of Lord Bridge of Harwich in Bennett that  
 
[w]hen it is shown that the law enforcement agency responsible for bringing a 
prosecution has only been enabled to do so by participating in violations of 
international law and of the laws of another state in order to secure the presence of the 
accused within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, I think that respect for the rule 
of law demands that the court take cognisance of that circumstance. To hold that the 
court may turn a blind eye to executive lawlessness beyond the frontiers of its own 
jurisdiction is, to my mind, an insular and unacceptable view.739 
 
Then, Paton turned to the second and final argument of Vervuren which suggested a 
broader responsibility740 for the authorities in the UK, namely that  
 
once an illegality or irregularity in foreign extradition proceedings had been brought 
to the attention of the United Kingdom authorities (including the courts), those 
authorities could not turn a blind eye to them. Once the United Kingdom authorities 
were aware of either non-existent proceedings, or proceedings which had themselves 
thrown up an illegality (for example, because the truncated proceedings could not 
truly be regarded as due process), the United Kingdom authorities were disabled from 
benefiting from the illegality.741 
                                                          
736 Ibid. See also ibid., pp. 561-562: “It seems to me that any ECHR signatory state is entitled, in the 
absence of any sign or evidence to the contrary, to the presumption omnia rite acta esse. [All things are 
presumed to be done in due form, ChP.] Moreover, as each state has its own laws and procedures, about 
which British lawyers, uninstructed in the foreign law, have little or no knowledge or expertise, it would 
in my view prove a time consuming task were every foreign extradition (made in response to a United 
Kingdom request) to undergo a full scrutiny by the United Kingdom. There would probably be a need to 
obtain expert opinion from lawyers about the law of the extraditing state. The resultant procedure would 
be lengthy, expensive, and cumbersome.” 
737 Ibid., p. 562. 
738 Ibid. 
739 House of Lords, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and 
another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 155. 
740 See also n. 287 and accompanying text where it was written that Lord Bridge of Harwich agreed with 
Lord Griffiths but his test is arguably a little more strict as in his view, the domestic authorities really 
have to do something irregular (and not only be a knowing party to the irregular conduct from, for 
example, foreign authorities). 








This rather broad ‘knowing but doing nothing’ standard742 resembles the statement 
of Lord Griffiths in Bennett that   
 
[i]n my view your Lordships should now declare that where process of law is 
available to return an accused to this country through extradition procedures our 
courts will refuse to try him if he has been forcibly brought within our jurisdiction in 
disregard of those procedures by a process to which our own police, prosecuting or 
other executive authorities have been a knowing party.743 
 
Paton accepted “that there may be circumstances where information is placed before 
a Scottish court which that court could not but regard as prima facie evidence of an 
irregularity or illegality meriting some further investigation before any trial should 
be proceeded with”.744 However, “[w]hether or not that investigation might lead to 
the sustaining of a plea in bar of trial would depend on the circumstances of the 
case.”745  
Paton then made a comparison with the Bennett case, which could be used “as an 
illustration of the sort of facts which a Scottish court might regard as worthy of 
investigation”,746 but did not accept that the fact that Vervuren had written “Under 
protest” on the documents enabling his accelerated extradition from Portugal was 
sufficient in itself “to demonstrate to a Scottish court some irregularity or illegality 
or lack of genuine or voluntary consent to the accelerated extradition 
proceedings”.747  
Hence, the words “Under protest” did not merit further investigation by the 
Scottish court into the regularity of the Portuguese proceedings.748 In addition, 
matters were not altered by the fuller information provided by the Defence.749 As a 
result, Paton concluded:  
 
Taking the minuter’s assertions at their highest, as I am invited to do by counsel for 
the minuter, I do not accept that there may have been in this case the sort of 
irregularity or illegality contemplated by their Lordships in R v Horseferry Road 
Magistrates’ Court, ex p Bennett, and therefore meriting further investigation. Nor 
prima facie does there appear to have been a breach of art 5 or 6 of the Convention.750 
 
In short, even if Bennett and not Sinclair was the case to follow here, the arguments 
of Vervuren had to be rejected.751 
                                                          
742 Arnell (2004, p. 255) uses the interesting expression of “clean hands” but no “clear conscience”.  
743 House of Lords, Lord Griffiths, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 
1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 151. 
744 High Court of Justiciary, HM Advocate v. Vervuren, 12 April 2002, 2002 S.L.T. 562. 
745 Ibid.  
746 Ibid.  
747 Ibid. 
748 See ibid. 
749 See ibid. 
750 Ibid. 








Although Paton, because of the two decisions in Bennett and the growth of 
human rights law, also looked at the hypothetical situation that the male captus bene 
detentus case of Sinclair was no longer good law,752 it appears that she is of the 
opinion that this latter case still represents the law in Scotland, something which has 
been sharply criticised in literature.753  
The final case in this chapter is Mushwena, also known as the ‘Caprivi treason 
trial’,754 decided by the Supreme Court of Namibia in 2004.755 In this case, the 13 
respondents (including Moses Limbo Mushwena) and 117756 other persons  
 
were facing 278 charges of which the most serious are high treason, murder, 
attempted murder[,] seduction [this should probably be “sedition”, ChP],[757] robbery 
with aggravating circumstances, public violence[,] unauthorized possession of 
firearms and ammunition, theft and malicious damage to property.758  
 
All these charges were connected to just one incident, namely an attack by groups 
of armed men on several Namibian governmental institutions on 2 August 1999 in 
Katima Mulilo (Namibia), as a result of which several people died and property was 
damaged.759 It was explained that “[t]he respondents and their co-accused were part 
of an exodus of people from the Caprivi Region [of which Katima Mulilo is the 
administrative centre, ChP] into neighbouring countries that took place as a result of 
and prior to the incident.”760  
In Botswana, to where the respondents had fled, they were granted asylum and 
put in refugee camps.761 However, at various times during 1999, all the respondents 
(except for one) left these camps again and seemingly went to Zambia – another 
neighbouring country of Namibia – because it was there that they were subsequently 
apprehended and detained by Zambian authorities and later handed over to the 
Namibian authorities.762 “All the [respondents] claimed in their affidavits that they 
                                                          
752 See n. 735 and accompanying text. 
753 See Arnell 2004, p. 251 (abstract): “Scots law adheres to the rule male captus bene detentus. It was 
recently applied in H.M. Advocate v Vervuren, where it was held that no account could be taken by the 
court of alleged irregularities in an accused’s extradition to Scotland. The rule is bad. Human rights 
and the rule of law stand in opposition to it. It is time for Scots law to limit the scope of male captus 
bene detentus [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
754 See Supreme Court of Namibia, The State v. Mushwena and Others, ‘Appeal judgment’, 21 July 
2004, Case No. SA6/2004 (available at: 
http://www.superiorcourts.org.na/supreme/docs/judgments/Criminal/Mushwena.pdf), p. 249. 
755 Supreme Court of Namibia, The State v. Mushwena and Others, ‘Appeal judgment’, 21 July 2004, 
Case No. SA6/2004 (available at: 
http://www.superiorcourts.org.na/supreme/docs/judgments/Criminal/Mushwena.pdf). 
756 Acting Justice of Appeal O’Linn mentions the number of 107, however, see ibid., p. 48. 
757 See ibid., p. 48. 
758 Ibid., p. 2. 
759 See ibid.  
760 Ibid.  
761 See ibid.  
762 See ibid., pp. 2-3. The one who had not left the refugee camps was handed over to Namibia by the 








were abducted by the Namibian authorities and unlawfully surrendered to 
Namibia.”763 Namibia argued, however, that the suspects were deported to Namibia 
with no involvement of the Namibian authorities.764 
When the case was brought before the High Court in Grootfontein, Judge Hoff 
decided to release the suspects. Although he did not believe that this case involved 
abduction comparable with, for example, the Ebrahim case,765 he was of the 
opinion that another male captus technique, namely disguised extradition, had been 
used to bring 12 of the 13 suspects into the jurisdiction of the Court and that 
because of this male captus, in which the Namibian authorities had been 
involved,766 the Court did not have jurisdiction to try the suspects (male 
detentus).767  
                                                          
763 Ibid. One of the clearest accounts of what had happened was provided by Charles Mafenyaho 
Mushekwa, see ibid., pp. 3-4: “We were separated and placed in different camps in Botswana. Others 
and myself were taken to Dukwe Refugee Camp. Although we had been granted political asylum we 
still reported to the Police Station three times a day (…). I was not happy with the treatment I received 
in the camp including the continuous routine of reporting to the Police Station. We were not given 
enough food so we were starving. Because of these difficulties I decided to leave the country to Zambia. 
I left with my friend (…). (…) When we were in Zambia we went to the Police Station and reported 
ourselves there. This was on the 18 of June 1999. We informed the police that we were claiming 
political asylum. (…) We were later transferred to Mongu Prison. At Mongu prison we were 
interviewed by members of Zambian Intelligence Office. (…) While we were being interviewed by the 
State Security Officers, the Namibian Police came and wanted to take us back to Namibia. The 
Commander of the Zambian Police refused. (…) On the 7th of August we were called by the prison 
officers to the prison reception where we were handed to an officer from the Office of the President of 
Zambia. We were initially asked to collect all our belonging as we were made to believe we were being 
taken to Europe. We then proceeded to the Zambian Airport. We boarded the plane. But before we 
boarded the plane we enquired whether the plane was suitable to take us all the way to Europe. The 
plane was a military plane and we were sure that it could not manage to fly all the way to Europe. The 
pilot assured us that we were right in thinking that the plane would not reach Europe on a single flight, 
but told us that we would be making a stop over in a number of countries to refuel and that our first stop 
was Uganda. When we were airborne we saw that we were going in the wrong direction. We landed at 
Sesheke Air Strip. [This is still Zambian territory, ChP.] We found the Zambian Police had surrounded 
the Air Strip. A few minutes later Namibia Police also arrived. At that time we were six of us. After 
disembarking from the plane we were surrounded by both Zambian and Namibian Police. One of my 
colleagues asked the Zambian Police why they had lied. The Zambian Police said that it was not their 
problem. The Namibian Police then forcibly took us into their custody. The Namibian Police then 
forcibly marched us to the Namibian side [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
764 See ibid., p. 7. 
765 See ibid., p. 8. See also ibid., p. 63. 
766 In reaching that conclusion, Hoff took into account the role played by the Namibian Major General 
Shali who had asked the Zambian authorities to hand over the suspects, see ibid., pp. 23-24: “In my 
view on the facts of this case, the deportation of twelve of the accused persons (…) was indeed a 
disguised extradition. Major General Shali requested his counterparts in Zambia to immediately hand 
over specific fugitives they were looking for and according to his testimony the Zambians did exactly 
what they were asked to do. (…) In my view the protest by the Namibian authorities that they had no 
part in irregularities which occurred during the deportation procedures in Zambia and Botswana, in 
itself, cannot come to their rescue since their own initial conduct, by informally requesting the handing 
over of fugitives and thus bypassing formal extradition proceedings tainted those very deportation 
proceedings they now want to put at a distance. Even if one accepts, in favour of the State, that the 








The State appealed this decision, ensuring that the Supreme Court had to address 
the issue. The first judge, Acting Justice of Appeal Mtambanengwe, upheld the 
State’s appeal because he was not convinced that a disguised extradition had 
occurred in this case (or in any case not a male captus in which the Namibian 
authorities were involved): 
 
I go along with appellant’s counsel’s submission that the court a quo erred both in 
fact and in law in reaching its conclusion that the acts of the Namibian authorities in 
securing the return of the respondents were tainted, more particularly given the fact 
that the court concluded that no conspiracy or connivance was established between 
Namibian authorities and Zambian or Botswana authorities. This is so because the 
evidence does not establish that either Botswana or Zambia rendered the fugitive 
respondents because of the request by Mayor General Shali;[768] no causal link is 
shown to have existed between the request and the handing over of the respondents 
by Zambia or Botswana. The inference sought to be drawn by respondents’ counsel 
from the evidence, and drawn by the court a quo, from the fact that some of the 
respondents had been arrested by respective neighbouring countries authorities and a 
decision had not been taken and they had not been deported until after the Namibian 
authorities had requested their return, is not warranted on a proper review of the 
evidence.769 
 
In his judgment, Mtambanengwe stressed that practice shows that courts around the 
world both defend and reject the male captus bene detentus principle. However, the 
courts which opt for male captus male detentus only do so when the prosecuting 
State’s own authorities are involved in the male captus.770 A conclusion which 
                                                                                                                                              
taken and they had not been deported until some time after the Namibian authorities had requested their 
return [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
767 See ibid., p. 8. See also ibid., pp. 21 and 62. According to Hoff, one of the suspects (Charles 
Samboma) had not been the victim of a disguised extradition, but was nevertheless irregularly brought 
into the jurisdiction of the Court because there was no proper consent in his removal from Zambia to 
Namibia. 
768 See n. 766. 
769 Supreme Court of Namibia, The State v. Mushwena and Others, ‘Appeal judgment’, 21 July 2004, 
Case No. SA6/2004 (available at: 
http://www.superiorcourts.org.na/supreme/docs/judgments/Criminal/Mushwena.pdf), p. 24. 
770 See ibid., p. 33: “The important point that clearly emerges from cases such as (…) Mackeson (…)[,] 
Bennett (…), (…) Ebrahim (…), (…) Hartley (…) and Beahan (…) is that the court will exercise its 
power to decline jurisdiction where the prosecuting authorities, the police or executive authorities have 
been shown to have been directly or indirectly involved in a breach of international law or the law of 
another state or their own municipal law. In Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolic (…) the Trial Chamber of the 
[ICTY] discussed the principle 'male captus bene detentus' as applied or formally applied in various 
jurisdiction[s]. The cases cited or referred to in that discussion also illustrate the point above in 
jurisdictions that have moved away from that principle. (…) In that case the Trial Chamber held that 
misconduct, by somebody other than the prosecution did not form a basis of a successful challenge to 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.” As will be shown in Subsection 3.1.4 of the next chapter, this is an 
incorrect interpretation of the judges’ reasoning as the Trial Chamber also held “that, in a situation 
where an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe even subjected to inhuman, cruel or degrading 
treatment, or torture, before being handed over to the Tribunal, this may constitute a legal impediment to 








indeed seems to be correct.771 Then, he made two very interesting references to 
observations stemming from the still-to-discuss ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision 
in the Nikolić case, see Subsection 3.1.4 of the following chapter, and from the 
already discussed ECtHR’s decision in the Öcalan case, see Subsection 2.2.4 of 
Chapter III, namely “that even if the activities of the abductors could be attributed to 
the UN Officers (…) this by itself would not remove the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to 
hear the matter”772 because the rights of the suspect must be balanced against the 
fact that he is charged with very serious crimes and that his prosecution is needed 
(Nikolić, cf. the German case Al-Moayad) and that one must fairly balance “between 
the demand[s] of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights [emphasis in original, ChP]”773 
(Öcalan).  
Hence, Mtambanengwe was of the opinion that the Namibian authorities were 
not involved in the alleged male captus and arguably also that even if they were, the 
seriousness of the suspects’ charges could nevertheless lead to a bene detentus 
outcome. This can be derived not only from the fact that Mtambanengwe refers to 
the quotations from the Nikolić774 and Öcalan cases but also from the fact that he 
made the following statement in the context of human rights:  
                                                                                                                                              
for SFOR or the Prosecution were involved in such very serious mistreatment. But even without such 
involvement this Chamber finds it extremely difficult to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a person 
if that person was brought into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal after having been seriously mistreated. 
This, the Chamber observes, is in keeping with the approach of the Appeals Chamber in the 
Barayagwiza case, according to which in cases of egregious violations of the rights of the Accused, it is 
“irrelevant which entity or entities were responsible for the alleged violations of the Appellant’s rights” 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on 
Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 
October 2002, para. 114.) Mtambanengwe’s observation on the same p. 33 of the Mushwena judgment 
that “the Appeal[s] Chamber in the Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolic case (…) upheld the above decision” is 
also incorrect in that respect as the Appeals Chamber (as will also be shown in Subsection 3.1.4 of the 
following chapter) held more generally that “certain human rights violations are of such a serious nature 
that they require that the exercise of jurisdiction be declined.” (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. 
Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-
AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 30. See also n. 619 and accompanying text of Chapter VI.) Such a general 
statement could, of course, be interpreted as meaning that the Appeals Chamber does not necessarily 
require the involvement of the Tribunal in the violations to refuse jurisdiction in certain cases. Note, 
however, that in the addendum to his judgment, Mtambanengwe refers to the opinion of Acting Justice 
of Appeal O’Linn who cites – not very accurately by the way – the last words of the above-mentioned 
quotation from the ICTY Trial Chamber’s decision in Nikolić, see Supreme Court of Namibia, The State 
v. Mushwena and Others, ‘Appeal judgment’, 21 July 2004, Case No. SA6/2004 (available at: 
http://www.superiorcourts.org.na/supreme/docs/judgments/Criminal/Mushwena.pdf), p. 38.  
771 Note, however, that in the 1982 Swiss case of X, the Swiss Federal Court issued a male deditus 
decision (but no male detentus decision) as a consequence of a male captus in which no Swiss 
authorities had been involved, see n. 445 and accompanying text.  
772 Supreme Court of Namibia, The State v. Mushwena and Others, ‘Appeal judgment’, 21 July 2004, 
Case No. SA6/2004 (available at: 
http://www.superiorcourts.org.na/supreme/docs/judgments/Criminal/Mushwena.pdf), p. 33. 
773 Ibid., p. 34. See also n. 341 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
774 As also explained in the context of the Al-Moayad case, it must be noted that one could argue, now 








[W]hen one considers the question of human rights care must be taken to balance the 
rights of accused against these of the victims of their [alleged!, ChP] actions. We 
have in this case antecedent circumstances where some people lost their lives and 
property was destroyed as a result of the incident at Katima Mulilo on 2 August 1999. 
The public interest that those responsible must be brought to justice i[s] a very 
weighty counter in the balance.775 
 
Acting Justice of Appeal O’Linn also reviewed, among other things, the Nikolić and 
Öcalan cases.  
With respect to the Öcalan case, he agreed with the general statement at footnote 
341 and accompanying text of Chapter III,776 but only as support for his observation 
that  
 
[t]he answer it seems to me is for states to enact fair but effective procedures, 
simplified if necessary, for extradition and/or deportation in the exercise of their 
sovereignty. Then to give effect to due process and the rule of law as laid down by 
their own laws and that of democratic countries the world over and to intensify and 
expedite international cooperation to this end.777 
 
However, he arguably did not see the Öcalan statement as evidence for the idea that, 
for example, one can weigh the rights of suspects against (the rights of the victims 
of) their alleged crimes, as was suggested by Mtambanengwe.  
Proof of that assertion can be found in the following remark by O’Linn with 
respect to the Nikolić case:778 
     
I have been referred to the following quotation from the Appeal[s] Chamber, which[,] 
so it is argued, requires the balancing of “rights of the accused[”], against “the crimes 
                                                                                                                                              
seriousness of the alleged crimes must be taken into account in the male captus discussion), is incorrect, 
that Mtambanengwe’s reference to Nikolić is also incorrect. However, as already explained earlier (see 
n. 565), the ICTY Appeals Chamber also made some observations of its own concerning this issue (after 
it had discussed the inter-State context). And to those observations, Mtambanengwe can, of course, 
refer. (Indeed, it can be argued that Mtambanengwe is especially interested in the observations of the 
ICTY judges themselves.) 
775 Supreme Court of Namibia, The State v. Mushwena and Others, ‘Appeal judgment’, 21 July 2004, 
Case No. SA6/2004 (available at: 
http://www.superiorcourts.org.na/supreme/docs/judgments/Criminal/Mushwena.pdf), p. 37. 
776 See also n. 773 and accompanying text. 
777 Supreme Court of Namibia, The State v. Mushwena and Others, ‘Appeal judgment’, 21 July 2004, 
Case No. SA6/2004 (available at: 
http://www.superiorcourts.org.na/supreme/docs/judgments/Criminal/Mushwena.pdf), p. 114. 
778 Of which case he also noted that the ICTY held that it agreed with the finding of the ICTR in 
Barayagwiza “according to which in cases of egregious violations of the rights of the Accused, it is 
“irrelevant which entity or entities were responsible for the alleged violations of the Appellant’s rights” 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on 
Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 
October 2002, para. 114.) See Supreme Court of Namibia, The State v. Mushwena and Others, ‘Appeal 
judgment’, 21 July 2004, Case No. SA6/2004 (available at: 
http://www.superiorcourts.org.na/supreme/docs/judgments/Criminal/Mushwena.pdf), p. 123 and the last 








committed”. The passage however does not do so. What it purports to balance is 
“international justice” against “infringing to a limited extent in the sovereignty of 
states.”779  
 
It appears that O’Linn is thus of the opinion that although the balancing exercise of 
“international justice” on the one hand and “infringing to a limited extent in the 
sovereignty of states” on the other may be justified at the level of the international 
criminal tribunals, this may not be the case at the inter-State level where the concept 
of State sovereignty plays quite a different role.  
O’Linn namely explains that the ICTY in the Nikolić case did not deal with a 
situation, as in this Mushwena case,  
 
where each and every provision of the laws of the affected countries were 
contravened and thereby not only the fundamental rights of the accused, and their 
protection provided by those laws, but also an abuse of those laws amounting to a 
breach of the sovereignty of the states whose sovereign parliaments enacted those 
laws in the exercise of their sovereignty. (...) In the case of the International Court, 
the purpose is to try persons who are accused of international crimes against humanity 
such as genocide where states are enjoined and required to cooperate and assist the 
Tribunal in its functions: There are special procedures. One of the most important 
differences is that sovereign national states, can if they so wish, enact laws with 
mandatory provisions in regard to extradition and deportation. This was done by 
Namibia, Botswana and Zambia.780 
 
                                                          
779 Supreme Court of Namibia, The State v. Mushwena and Others, ‘Appeal judgment’, 21 July 2004, 
Case No. SA6/2004 (available at: 
http://www.superiorcourts.org.na/supreme/docs/judgments/Criminal/Mushwena.pdf), p. 124. Although 
the passage to which O’Linn refers (“[T]he damage caused to international justice by not apprehending 
fugitives accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law is comparatively higher than 
the injury, if any, caused to the sovereignty of a State by a limited intrusion in its territory, particularly 
when the intrusion occurs in default of the State’s cooperation. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber does 
not consider that in cases of universally condemned offences, jurisdiction should be set aside on the 
ground that there was a violation of the sovereignty of a State, when the violation is brought about by 
the apprehension of fugitives from international justice, whatever the consequences for the international 
responsibility of the State or organisation involved.” (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan 
Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 
June 2003, para. 26.)) does not mention human rights indeed, the passage is preceded by the following 
words: “Universally Condemned Offences are a matter of concern to the international community as a 
whole. There is a legitimate expectation that those accused of these crimes will be brought to justice 
swiftly. Accountability for these crimes is a necessary condition for the achievement of international 
justice, which plays a critical role in the reconciliation and rebuilding based on the rule of law of 
countries and societies torn apart by international and internecine conflicts. This legitimate expectation 
needs to be weighed against the principle of State sovereignty and the fundamental human rights of the 
accused [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid., paras. 25-26.) 
780 Supreme Court of Namibia, The State v. Mushwena and Others, ‘Appeal judgment’, 21 July 2004, 
Case No. SA6/2004 (available at: 








Hence, at the inter-State level, it is, of course, also important to pay attention to the 
public interest that suspects are prosecuted; but it is never in the public interest to, in 
doing so, violate, among other things, the sovereignty of other States: 
 
To see that justice is done not only to accused persons, but also to the victims of 
crime is part of the aim of the Rule of Law and the public interest. Nevertheless, there 
is no good reason why the State’s officials should flout the constitution and laws of 
their own country and those of neighbouring states. Such abuse of process in 
countries which subscribe to the Rule of Law, can never be in the public interest.781  
 
In contrast to Mtambanengwe, O’Linn was of the opinion that that was what had 
happened here; the Namibian authorities were involved in the irregular transfer782 of 
the 12 suspects to Namibia:783 
 
On the evidence before Court, Namibia was, if not the main instigator, at least a 
“knowing party”, in the words of Lord Griffiths in the Bennet[t] decision. Lord 
Griffiths also made it clear that a situation where “a practice developed where the 
police or prosecuting authorities in this country ignored extradition procedures by a 
mere request to police colleagues in another country, they would be flouting the 
extradition procedures and depriving the accused of the safeguards built into the 
extradition process for his benefit. It is to my mind unthinkable that the Court should 
declare itself to be powerless and stand idly by,…” The case now under consideration 
is precisely such a case.784 
                                                          
781 Ibid., p. 165. See also ibid., p. 203: “I must also point out that the “public interest” is not an interest 
apart from or in opposition to the Rule of Law, due process and the fundamental rights of the accused. It 
is in the public interest to uphold the fundamental rights of the accused persons, just as it is in the public 
interest to protect victims and the law-abiding citizens at large. (...) I need to emphasize: Nothing in this 
judgment is intended to discourage cooperation between police, military and immigration officials of the 
Namibian State with their counterparts in neighbouring states. What cannot be allowed however, is 
cooperation in taking short cuts in conflict with the express provisions of the domestic law of these 
countries and even of International Law, because such actions will gravely undermine the Rule of Law, 
entrenched in the Namibian Constitution, which is the Supreme Law of Namibia. Such actions cannot be 
justified as in the public interest.” 
782 Although O’Linn speaks of an ‘official abduction’ (an abduction in which the authorities of Zambia 
cooperated with their Namibian colleagues, see also ns. 21 and 63 of Chapter III and n. 94 of the present 
chapter), he does not find the exact label to be very important, see ibid., p. 187. Cf. the final words of 
Section 1 of Chapter III. 
783 However, in contrast to Judge Hoff, he was of the opinion that the 13th suspect (Charles Samboma) 
validly consented to his transfer from Zambia to Namibia. As a result, his presence before the Namibian 
courts was lawful. See ibid., pp. 188-189. 
784 Ibid., p. 180. See also ibid., p. 186: “So what we have is that Namibian officials illegally took of[f] 
the accused prisoner inside Zambia and Botswana, illegally detained them and illegally removed them 
across the Namibian border. To do this, the Zambians and the Namibians were dependant on each other 
and the illegal deed was done by cooperation between them.” See finally ibid., pp. 193-194. Again (see 
also n. 766), the role of Mayor General Shali appeared to be crucial, see ibid., p. 185: “The purpose of 
the handing over of the “terrorists” by army personnel in Zambia to army personnel in Namibia was so 
that they “could be brought to book in Namibia” and because General Shali asked for their immediate 
handover for that very purpose. The handover, when it happened was clearly at the initiative of General 
Shali and other Namibian military and police officials. In this context the purpose and motive was 








As a result, the Court had to divest jurisdiction. It is interesting to note that O’Linn 
argues that it is unnecessary to solve the question as to whether a court has a 
discretion in refusing to exercise jurisdiction or whether it is automatically divested 
of jurisdiction (see Ebrahim) because the result would still remain the same in this 
case (no jurisdiction).785 In his judgment, one can find both words which might be 
seen as evidence for the fact that he supports the first position,786 but also that he 
supports the second position.787 
The third Acting Justice of Appeal, Gibson, agreed with Mtambanengwe. After 
after referring to the now often-mentioned dictum of the ECtHR in Öcalan,788 she 
stated: 
 
[T]he fugitives were collected from Zambia and Botswana without any form of 
collusion or deception by the agents of Namibia but explicitly at the request of the 
two foreign countries.[789] Even if it were found that Zambia and Botswana in doing 
so acted in breach of their own municipal laws that was not a matter for the concern 
of Namibia.[790] Therefore there is no justification for holding that Namibia’s hands 
were not clean on account of the above circumstances.791 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
Force and police officials influenced the handing over, or knowingly cooperated [emphasis in original. 
ChP].” 
785 See ibid., p. 197. 
786 See ibid.: “[I]n my respectful view, it was not necessary for the presiding judge to expressly state that 
he was exercising a discretion, although it would have been prudent to do so.” 
787 See ibid., p. 174: “[M]y view is that a total disregard of the laws of the relevant states in regard to 
extradition and/or deportation and even of international law, is in fact “a wrongdoing of the most serious 
kind”. Such wrongdoing is also “exceptional” and falls within its own distinct class or category of gross 
illegality and abuse, which without more, will require a criminal court to decline jurisdiction [emphasis 
added, ChP].” See also ibid., p. 197: “It follows if the Court a quo followed Ebrahim, and thus the 
Namibian common law, he would not have been required to exercise the “discretion” referred to.” See 
finally ibid., p. 209: “The “balancing” would certainly be relevant if the Court was not as in Ebrahim, 
Wellem and Buys, bound to apply the Roman Dutch Common Law, which requires the Court to refuse 
jurisdiction, when it is proved that the applicable legal procedures were not followed [emphasis in 
original, ChP].” This quotation also mentions two other cases in which the strict male captus male 
detentus reasoning of Ebrahim was followed but other cases after Wellem and Buys overruled these two 
cases, both implicitly and explicitly, see ibid., p. 160. See also Michell 1996, p. 458, who notes that after 
Ebrahim, “[t]he subsequent decisions (...) have been surprisingly inconsistent”. (See also n. 697 and 
accompanying text.) 
788 See Supreme Court of Namibia, The State v. Mushwena and Others, ‘Appeal judgment’, 21 July 
2004, Case No. SA6/2004 (available at: 
http://www.superiorcourts.org.na/supreme/docs/judgments/Criminal/Mushwena.pdf), p. 245. 
789 The request by Mayor General Shali was deemed not to be relevant here, see ibid., p. 246: “In the 
instant case, the actions of the Namibia officials which were censured by the trial Court as having 
“tainted” the process of procuring the fugitives from Botswana and Zambia only consist of a request by 
the officer commanding the Namibian forces to his counterpart in Zambia and nothing further is 
suggested by this request.” 
790 This would, however, be different in the case of “a breach of international law or gross invasion of 
human rights.” See ibid., p. 223. Apparently, Gibson was of the opinion that this had not occurred here. 








The penultimate Justice to give his opinion was Acting Chief Justice Strydom. 
Although he was of the opinion that, because of the cooperation between the 
authorities of the States involved, no international law had been violated (thereby 
arguably adopting a rather old-fashioned (inter-State) version of the concept of 
international law),792 he did agree with Justice O’Linn that the way 12 of the 13 
suspects were brought from Zambia and Botswana into Namibia was nevertheless 
irregular, that Namibian authorities were actively involved in this irregular 
transfer793 and hence that the Court had no jurisdiction to try them.794 
The final Justice was Acting Justice of Appeal Chomba who concurred with the 
views of Mtambanengwe and Gibson, as a result of which the final outcome of this 
case was – three Justices for and two Justices against – that the appeal of the State 
was granted and that jurisdiction could be exercised. In his judgment, Chomba, 
referring to the Öcalan case, categorically and arguably also rather bluntly, opted for 
the importance that suspects of serious crimes are prosecuted, even if 
irregularities795 had occurred in the way they were brought into the jurisdiction of 
the now prosecuting court:  
 
I readily concede that there are many celebrated decided cases in many countries 
including South Africa and the United Kingdom in which the plea of lack of 
jurisdiction by courts of trial has succeeded grounded on the principle that the 
accused’s rendition to the country of trial was unlawful in as much as the laws of 
deportation or extradition had not been complied with by the surrendering countries. 
However, in the situation which presents itself in the appeal before us, to use that 
rationale would not, in my considered opinion, meet the tenets of justice. In this day 
and age when the world has been and continues to be ravaged by terrorist activity it is 
otiose to apply that rationale. In my view the rationale on which those celebrated 
cases are predicated sends wrong signals to potential terrorists. All you have to do is 
terrorize a state and when you are about to be apprehended by the authorities you 
cross territorial borders if you have the means to do so and you will be safe unless and 
until the country of refuge catches up with you and either deports or extradites you 
under the law. Meanwhile any of your collaborators who were unable to make a cross 
border escape can face the consequences of the law alone. Furthermore, I think that 
the human rights of fugitives from the law should not be considered by courts to be of 
                                                          
792 See ibid., p. 255: “In the instant case there was clear co-operation between the officials and forces of 
Namibia and Zambia and Botswana (...). I have therefore come to the conclusion that in the present 
instance there was no breach of international law as far as the handing over of the respondents was 
concerned.” 
793 See ibid., p. 266: “Because of the involvement of the Namibian police and/or members of the defence 
force, the respondents were denied any rights they may have had in terms of the deportation laws and 
extradition laws of Zambia and Botswana and also Namibia. (...) The unlawful action of the Namibian 
police and defence force members therefore consists in [their] active participation in the handing over of 
the 12 respondents despite and contrary to reciprocal legislation providing for a procedure and 
safeguards in such handing over and thereby causing the circumventing of those procedures and rights 
which the respondents had in terms of that legislation.” 
794 With respect to the 13th suspect, Charles Samboma, Strydom agreed with O’Linn that he had validly 
consented to his transfer from Zambia to Namibia and thus that he could be tried, see ibid., p. 265. 
795 Note, however, that Chomba was not of the opinion that international law had been violated in this 








prior concern over those of victims of terrorism whose security remains endangered 
as long as the fugitives remain at large.796 
 
                                                          







CASES BETWEEN STATES AND 






In this chapter, alleged male captus cases between States and international(ised) 
criminal tribunals will be discussed.1  
After having briefly examined (in Section 2) the main characteristics of the 
cooperation and transfer regime between States and the two most important 
international criminal tribunals (other than the ICC), namely the UN ad hoc 
Tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR, attention will be paid (in Section 3) to the male 
captus cases which occurred in the context of these two Tribunals. After that, the 
system of legal assistance in the context of internationalised (or hybrid) criminal 
tribunals (Section 4) and the male captus case law stemming from these tribunals 
(Section 5) will be touched upon. Lastly, Section 6 will address a few final 
interesting observations stemming from this last context of the internationalised 
criminal tribunals. It should be noted that in Section 4, only a few general remarks 
will be devoted to the system of legal assistance in the context of the 
internationalised criminal tribunals as it is unnecessary for the purpose of this study 
to explain all the different cooperation regimes of these tribunals in detail. A final 
point which should be explained is that this chapter will start with the ICTY and 
ICTR and not with the first international criminal tribunals established after WW II, 
the IMTs of Tokyo and Nuremberg.2 This is because it appears that those Tribunals 
                                                          
1 It is assumed that general information on the international(ised) criminal tribunals and the conflicts 
which engendered their existence is known to the reader. Such information, which can be found in 
books such as Romano, Nollkaemper and Kleffner 2004 and Schabas 2006, will thus not be presented 
here again.  
2 Although there were no international tribunals established after WW I, one (rather unknown) story 
stemming from this context is that fascinating that it still needs to be mentioned in this book, even if it 
did not lead to a male captus situation in the end. In Art. 227 of the Treaty of Versailles (of 28 June 
1919, available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/versailles_menu.asp), one can read that the 
Allied and Associated Powers sought to try the German Emperor William II “for a supreme offence 
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties” before “[a] special tribunal”, “composed of 
five judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, 
Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.” However, William II fled to the Netherlands and found refuge in 
the country estate of Count Bentinck at Amerongen. (See also Meron 2006, p. 557.) Then, in early 1919, 








never considered a true male captus claim – in any case, literature on the male 
captus issue is silent in this context.3 One explanation for this may be the fact that 
many suspects were already in allied custody after the war. Hence, there was no 
need to come up with dubious male captus methods of capturing them and bringing 
them into the power of the Tribunals: they were already in the de facto power of 
these Tribunals.4    
                                                                                                                                              
Colonel Luke Lea, former United States senator and publisher of the Nashville Tennessean, suspected 
that the British did not really intend to “hang the Kaiser” and thought that if the kaiser were brought to 
Paris public opinion would force action. “The capture, trial, and punishment of the Kaiser,” he said, 
“was to the American doughboy the object which inspired him” to fight. Lea undoubtedly wanted to be 
remembered as the man who achieved the soldier’s fantasy, the man who bagged “Kaiser Bill.” Lea led 
six soldiers to Amerongen just after New Year’s Day. They planned to seize the kaiser by surprise and 
roar off to Paris, daring the Dutch to shoot while the kaiser was held prisoner in their car. (...) What had 
begun as a serious undertaking consequently turned into a semicomic confrontation. The Americans 
determined to persuade the kaiser to go with them voluntarily to face his accusers manfully. They 
continued on to the Bentinck estate on the night of January 5, bluffed their way inside the house, and 
demanded to see Wilhelm II. After a two-hour standoff, during which the kaiser refused to meet with the 
Americans, Dutch troops surrounded the estate with spotlights and machine guns, forcing Colonel Lea 
and his men to depart. Subsequently, Allied governments had no more success in getting the kaiser out 
of the Netherlands than did the venturesome American soldiers [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
(Willis 1982, pp. 100-101.) (Two requests for the surrender of William II, in January and February 
1920, were refused by the Dutch authorities. “In doing so the Dutch government invoked principles of 
national constitutional law as well as a secular tradition of granting asylum.” (Swart 2002 C, pp. 1642-
1643.)) 
3 Although it had nothing to do with an international male captus situation, it may, however, be 
interesting to note that Julius Streicher claimed that he was mistreated after being arrested and before 
being brought to the IMT of Nuremberg. This claim was, however, not accepted by the Tribunal, see the 
following quote of Streicher, responding to the American psychiatrist Goldensohn in Nuremberg when 
the latter asked him about his defence: “The main thing I tried to stress was how badly I was treated in 
the American camp at Freising, but the American prosecutor and the judges ruled that my comments on 
my poor treatment there had to be expunged from the record because it was irrelevant. I don’t think it is 
irrelevant when we National Socialists are accused of war crimes and of murdering 5 million Jews and 
millions of other innocent people such as partisans, hostages, war prisoners. Therefore, I should have 
been allowed to insert into the record of this trial how badly I was treated personally as a prisoner of 
war, after the war was over, mind you, in Freising.” (Gellately 2004, p. 260.) 
4 See Gallant 1994, p. 557 (“Unlike the victors’ war crimes tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 will probably not 
find most of its defendants already captured and ready to be tried.”), Wald 2001, p. 96 (“the vast 
majority of the defendants were already in allied hands before trials began”) and Zappalà 2002 A, p. 
1186 (or – for an almost identical text – Zappalà 2003, p. 67): “It is well known that the Allies, both in 
Nuremberg and in Tokyo, held defendants in custody before the issue of the indictments. Most of them 
had been arrested even before the decision to establish an international tribunal was taken and were 
detained by national contingents. Detention was the general rule and there were no exceptions. 
Moreover, it seems that there was no chance to argue for provisional release, nor was there any right to 
challenge the legality of arrest. The reasons for the adoption of this solution are clearly linked to the 
unique character of those jurisdictions. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were international military 
organs created by victor powers to judge persons responsible for the most heinous crimes. Naturally, the 
combination of the gravity of the crimes, the international character of the proceedings, and the post-
conflict situation created a solid background of reasons to try to prevent any attempt to escape [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].”). As will be shown in this chapter and in Chapter VIII, the element ‘gravity of 








2 MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COOPERATION AND TRANSFER REGIME IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE ICTY AND ICTR 
 
In Chapter III of this book, in which the different male captus situations were 
examined, it was explained that inter-State cooperation is usually achieved by means 
of extradition, “the official surrender of a fugitive from justice, regardless of his 
consent, by the authorities of the State of residence to the authorities of another 
State for the purpose of criminal prosecution or the execution of a sentence”.5 
Although the fugitive lacks consent by this method, this is not the case with respect 
to the States involved: they work together because they consent to work together, 
because they want to work together. Adjectives which may typify the relationship of 
States in this context are ‘equal’, ‘reciprocal’ and ‘horizontal’.6 Such a relationship 
“emphasizes state sovereignty and, correspondingly, attributes decisive weight to 
the interests of the requested state if they are at variance with the execution of the 
request [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.7 
This is completely different in the context of cooperation between States and the 
ICTY and ICTR.  
This cooperation regime can be seen as vertical in nature:8 it is based on 
superiority and non-equality: States9 must cooperate with the hierarchically higher 
Tribunal,10 whether they want to or not.11  
                                                                                                                                              
detentions, hence leading to a context in which provisional release is indeed the exception to the rule (of 
provisional detention). 
5 Stein 1995, p. 327. 
6 It is submitted that horizontal, even though it is often (and correctly) connected with the inter-State 
context, is not necessarily a feature which is only applicable to the inter-State context. Horizontal is here 
understood to mean equal. And, of course, a working relationship based on equality can also very well 
be applicable to non-statal entities. One could hereby think of a cooperation agreement between two 
international organisations which consent to cooperate on a reciprocal basis. This also goes the other 
way around. It is very well possible that a relationship which is often seen as vertical in nature (for 
example, between a State and an international tribunal) may contain horizontal elements. This will be 
discussed in more detail when addressing the arrest and surrender regime of the ICC in Chapter VIII.  
7 Kaul and Kreß 2000, p. 158. 
8 The first time the horizontal-vertical distinction was used in a decision was in the ICTY Blaškić case, 
see ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, ‘Judgement on the Request of the Republic 
of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997’, Case No. IT-95-14, 29 
October 1997, para. 47: “The International Tribunal is an international criminal court constituting a 
novelty in the world community. Normally, individuals subject to the sovereign authority of States may 
only be tried by national courts. If a national court intends to bring to trial an individual subject to the 
jurisdiction of another State, as a rule it relies on treaties of judicial cooperation or, if such treaties are 
not available, on voluntary interstate cooperation. Thus, the relation between national courts of different 
States is “horizontal” in nature. In 1993 the Security Council for the first time established an 
international criminal court endowed with jurisdiction over individuals living within sovereign States, 
be they States of the former Yugoslavia or third States, and, in addition, conferred on the International 
Tribunal primacy over national courts. By the same token, the Statute granted the International Tribunal 
the power to address to States binding orders concerning a broad variety of judicial matters (including 
the identification and location of persons, the taking of testimony and the production of evidence, the 
service of documents, the arrest or detention of persons, and the surrender or transfer of indictees to the 
International Tribunal). Clearly, a “vertical” relationship was thus established, at least as far as the 








Where does this obligation to cooperate originate?  
In his report on the ICTY Statute, the UNSG explained, after having suggested 
that the ICTY needed to be established by a decision of the UNSC acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter: 
 
23. This approach would have the advantage of being expeditious and of being 
immediately effective as all States would be under a binding obligation to take 
whatever action is required to carry out a decision taken as an enforcement measure 
under Chapter VII. (...) 
 
28. In this particular case, the Security Council would be establishing, as an 
enforcement measure under Chapter VII, a subsidiary organ within the terms of 
Article 29 of the Charter, but one of a judicial nature. (...)  
 
125. As pointed out in paragraph 23 above, the establishment of the International 
Tribunal on the basis of a Chapter VII decision creates a binding obligation on all 
States to take whatever steps are required to implement the decision. In practical 
terms, this means that all States would be under an obligation to cooperate with the 
International Tribunal and to assist it in all stages of the proceedings to ensure 
compliance with requests for assistance in the gathering of evidence, hearing of 
witnesses, suspects and experts, identification and location of persons and the service 
of documents. Effect shall also be given to orders issued by the Trial Chambers, such 
as warrants of arrest, search warrants, warrants for surrender or transfer of persons, 
and any other orders necessary for the conduct of the trial. 
 
126. In this connection, an order by a Trial Chamber for the surrender or transfer of 
persons to the custody of the International tribunal shall be considered to be the 
                                                                                                                                              
enforcement the International Tribunal is still dependent upon States and the Security Council).” See 
also ibid., para. 54, Cassese 1998, p. 13 and Swart and Sluiter 1999, pp. 97-101. 
9 Note that ‘State’ in the context of the ICTY must be read extensively, see Rule 2 (A) of its RPE: “In 
the Rules, unless the context otherwise requires, the following terms shall mean: (…) State: (i) A State 
Member or non-Member of the United Nations; (ii) an entity recognised by the constitution of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, namely, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic Srpska; or (iii) a 
self-proclaimed entity de facto exercising governmental functions, whether recognised as a State or 
not”. See also Furuya 1999, pp. 659-660. (The RPE of the ICTR do not contain a definition of the term 
State.) 
10 See also Art. 9, para. 2 of the ICTY Statute (“The International Tribunal shall have primacy over 
national courts”) and Art. 8, para. 2 of the ICTR Statute (“The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall 
have the primacy over the national courts of all States”). 
11 Such an obligation can, of course, be justified by several considerations, see Swart 2002 B, p. 1594: 
“First, while in the vast majority of criminal cases, national courts do not need international cooperation 
in order to be able to function properly, the international tribunals entirely depend on cooperation in 
every single criminal case. The mandatory and unconditional duty for States to cooperate with the 
Tribunals is, moreover, explained by the fact that the international crimes within their jurisdiction 
violate peremptory norms of international law, in the repression of which all States have an equal 
interest. Thirdly, it is the function of the Tribunals, as creatures of the Security Council, to contribute to 
the preservation or restoration of the peace that is endangered by these crimes.” See also Kaul and Kreß 
2000, p. 158: “The vertical approach departs from traditional interstate concepts of cooperation in that it 
attaches greater weight to the community interest in an international criminal prosecution than in 








application of an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations.12    
 
One can read two justifications here as to why States must cooperate with orders of 
the ICTY (and the same would go for those of the ICTR).  
The first (to be found in paragraphs 28 and 126) is that the ICTY is a subsidiary 
organ of the UNSC and that all its decisions (including, for example, an order of 
surrender) can thus be seen as indirect decisions taken by the UNSC on the basis of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Article 25 of the UN Charter stipulates that “[t]he 
Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”13 Hence, all UN Member 
States must cooperate with a request or order of the Tribunal. This justification does 
not pose any problems.  
The second justification (to be found in paragraphs 23 and 125) does not speak 
of the status of the ICTY as a subsidiary organ of the UNSC but states more 
generally that the fact that the UNSC decides (on the basis of Chapter VII) to 
establish an international tribunal means that States thus have an obligation to 
cooperate with that tribunal. The duty of cooperation in that case is hence based on 
the idea that States, according to Article 25 of the UN Charter, must “accept and 
carry out” the decision of the UNSC to establish the ICTY. Now, it is true that 
States are under an obligation to carry out and implement the decision of the UNSC 
to establish a tribunal, but strictly speaking, that would arguably only involve ‘start 
up’ support such as finding an appropriate location to accommodate the tribunal. 
The duty to cooperate with the tribunal in matters of arrest and the like does not 
seem to have anything to do with the establishment of the tribunal; it has to do with 
the daily functioning of the tribunal.  
Hence, it can be argued that States must indeed cooperate with the Tribunal in 
matters of arrest and surrender but this arguably cannot be derived from the decision 
of the UNSC to establish a tribunal as such. It can, however, be derived from the 
actual content of the decision by which the Tribunal was established, in which one 
can clearly find the more specific decision of the UNSC that States must cooperate 
with the Tribunal.14 It is therefore submitted that the fact that the UNSC decides to 
                                                          
12 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, paras. 23, 28 and 125-126. 
13 Reading this text, one could argue that in fact any decision of the UNSC (whether it is based on 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter or not) is binding on all UN Member States. There is much controversy 
about this issue (see Shaw 2003, p. 1102) but this interesting discussion is not relevant for the present 
one (there is no doubt whatsoever that a Chapter VII decision is binding on all UN Member States) and 
as a result will not be examined here. 
14 For the ICTY, see UNSC Res. 827 of 25 May 1993: “The Security Council, (...) Acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, (...) 2. Decides hereby to establish an international tribunal for 
the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be 
determined by the Security Council upon the restoration of peace (...); (...) 4. Decides that all States 
shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the present 








establish an international tribunal does not automatically mean that States have to 
cooperate with it in matters of arrest and surrender, but that this depends on the 
actual content of the decision.  
UNSC Resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005 appears to support the above-
mentioned argument. In this resolution, the UNSC referred the situation in Darfur, 
Sudan, to the ICC. Were one to adhere to the interpretation of the UNSG mentioned 
above, one could argue that the fact that Article 25 of the UN Charter stipulates that 
States must accept and carry out/implement the decision of the UNSC (to refer the 
situation in Darfur to the ICC) in practice means that all States must cooperate with 
the ICC. After all, that would be the only way the ICC could effectively deal with 
the situation in Darfur. In the words of Condorelli and Ciampi: 
 
It is perfectly conceivable that the Security Council could adopt a resolution having as 
its sole object the decision that all Member States shall cooperate with the Court. It 
would even seem natural that a decision to this effect be included in a resolution 
where the Security Council decides to refer a situation to the ICC. One could even 
argue that one of the implications of a SC referral is that all states are automatically 
                                                                                                                                              
measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and 
the Statute, including the obligation of States to comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by 
a Trial Chamber under Article 29 of the Statute; (...) [underlined emphasis in original and italicised 
emphasis added, ChP].” This duty can also be found in Art. 29 of the ICTY Statute: “1. States shall 
cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of 
committing serious violations of international humanitarian law. 2. States shall comply without undue 
delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited 
to: (a) the identification and location of persons; (b) the taking of testimony and the production of 
evidence; (c) the service of documents; (d) the arrest or detention of persons; (e) the surrender or the 
transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal.” For the ICTR, see UNSC Res. 955 of 8 November 
1994: “The Security Council, (...) Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. 
Decides hereby (...) to establish an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons 
responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed 
in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (...) ; 2. Decides 
that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the 
present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal and that consequently all States shall take 
any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution 
and the Statute, including the obligation of States to comply with requests for assistance or orders issued 
by a Trial Chamber under Article 28 of the Statute, and requests States to keep the Secretary-General 
informed of such measures; (...) [underlined emphasis in original and italicised emphasis added, ChP].” 
This duty can also be found in Art. 28 of the ICTR Statute: “1. States shall cooperate with the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of 
committing serious violations of international humanitarian law. 2. States shall comply without undue 
delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including but not limited to: 
(a) The identification and location of persons; (b) The taking of testimony and the production of 
evidence; (c) The service of documents; (d) The arrest or detention of persons; (e) The surrender or the 
transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal for Rwanda.” Note finally that the duty to cooperate 
has also been worked out in other documents, such as the RPE and (for the ICTY) the Dayton Peace 
Agreement of 14 December 1995. See for more information on this topic in the context of the ICTY 
Mundis 2002, pp. 121ff. Note finally that the word “request” in Artt. 29, para. 2 of the ICTY Statute and 
28, para. 2 of the ICTR Statute “is misleading since it implies an element of discretion on the part of the 








put under an international obligation to comply with requests for cooperation by the 
Court [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].15 
 
However, as has been argued above, whether States have a duty of cooperation or 
not arguably does not stem from the decision of the UNSC to establish a tribunal or 
to refer a situation to a tribunal, but from the actual content of this decision.16 Even 
though it would be logical for the UNSC to decide in such a decision that all States 
must cooperate with the ICC – after all, one can imagine that the UNSC, if it truly 
finds that a certain situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, 
will appeal to every member of the international community to support the 
institution in trying to cope with this international problem – the UNSC may 
nevertheless decide differently.17 UNSC Resolution 1593, for example, reads:  
                                                          
15 Condorelli and Ciampi 2005, p. 593. See also Swart 2002 C, p. 1677: “Some remarks should also be 
made here with regard to the referral of a situation to the Court by the Security Council pursuant to 
Article 13 of the Statute. The fact that the Security Council, in doing so, is acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations has a number of important consequences for the system of surrender. 
The obligations arising out of Parts 5 and 9 [of the ICC Statute, ChP] for States in the matter of arrest 
and surrender thereby become obligations for all Member States of the United Nations regardless of 
whether or not they are Parties to the Statute.” 
16 See also Gallant 2003 B, p. 587 (writing on the ICC): “Where (…) a matter is referred by the Security 
Council, Chapter VII of the UN Charter may place a UN member state under a legal obligation to co-
operate with the Court even where the state is not a party to the ICC Statute [emphasis added, ChP]”. 
17 See also Sluiter who, writing at a time when it was still uncertain how the UNSC would deal with this 
issue, does also recognise the possibility that not every State will be obliged to cooperate with the ICC 
after a UNSC referral under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (even though he is of the opinion that this 
possibility, for the very same reasons mentioned above, would be an unlikely option): “In case the 
Council will in the future decide to trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction, it is possible to distinguish grosso 
modo three alternative modes of submitting a matter. First of all, the Security Council may refer a 
situation, which it may describe in more detail, in a resolution to the Court, without any further 
comments or details. In this scenario the matter will be dealt with in accordance with the Statute and the 
duty to co-operate will be exclusively based on the Statute, meaning, for example, that States non-
parties are under no obligation to assist the Court. Such a ‘blank submission’ without referring to 
assistance to the Court by all UN members appears an unlikely option having regard to the nature of 
referral. The Council can only refer a matter when acting under Chapter VII. In other words, it must 
consider investigation and prosecution by the Court necessary to restore or maintain international peace 
and security, which, one may argue, implies co-operation by all UN members, including States that are 
no parties to the Statute. A second, more likely, scenario therefore is that a Chapter VII resolution 
submitting a matter to the Court decides that all States – or all UN members – shall co-operate with the 
Court in accordance with its Statute. The resolution, and ultimately the UN Charter, would then 
constitute the legal basis for the duty to co-operate for all UN members. The duty to co-operate would, 
for States that are members of the United Nations but not parties to the Statute, be confined to the 
investigation submitted to the Court by the Council. The scope of the duty to co-operate would not differ 
from that incumbent on State parties in case of an investigation triggered by a State or initiated by the 
Prosecutor. As a result, the grounds of refusal set out in the Statute are applicable to and can be invoked 
by the States non-parties. The third and final option is that the Security Council, with a view to restoring 
international peace and security, decides that UN members should have the obligation to co-operate 
fully with the Court. To be more specific, the Council could decide that (certain of) the grounds for 
refusal in the ICC Statute are not applicable to UN members. This is, again, an unlikely situation 
because it requires that the Council shapes a new co-operation regime, which may be difficult to 








The Security Council, Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute 
a threat to international peace and security, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations, 1. Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; 2. Decides that the Government of 
Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and 
provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this 
resolution and, while recognizing that States no party to the Rome Statute have no 
obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other 
international organizations to cooperate fully [emphasis in original, ChP].18 
 
Be that as it may, it is in any case clear that States must cooperate with the UN ad 
hoc Tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR, and that this obligation, pursuant to Article 103 
of the UN Charter, prevails over other international obligations of States if the latter 
come into conflict with the former.19 In addition, States cannot invoke national law 
to justify a failure to comply with orders from the ICTY and ICTR.20 This can, for 
example, be discerned from Rule 58 of the ICTY/ICTR RPE (to focus already a 
little more on a specific part of the cooperation regime, namely the transfer21 
provisions):  
 
The obligations laid down in Article [29 for the ICTY and 28 for the ICTR, ChP] of 
the Statute shall prevail over any legal impediment to the surrender or transfer of the 
                                                                                                                                              
an unauthorised interference with the application in practice of the Statute.” (Sluiter 2002 C, pp. 71-72.) 
See also Sluiter 2002 A, p. 129.   
18 UNSC Res. 1593 of 31 March 2005, UN Doc. S/Res/1593 (2005). Note, however, the criticism of 
Condorelli and Ciampi (who, as was shown above, have stated that “[o]ne could even argue that one of 
the implications of a SC referral is that all states are automatically put under an international obligation 
to comply with requests for cooperation by the Court [emphasis in original, ChP]”) towards this 
resolution: “Of course, this argument – that the SC referral per se blurs the distinction between states 
party and states not party to the Statute as far as cooperation with the Court is concerned – could be 
made if the resolution was silent on this point. It cannot, however, be advanced with respect to Res. 
1593 (2005), where § 2 expressly rules out such a consequence of the SC referral. The contradiction 
inherent in the decision to refer the Darfur situation to the ICC, on one hand, and, on the other, to 
expressly confine the obligation to cooperate with the Court to the states party to the Statute [and to the 
Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, ChP], is, however, nothing but one 
sign of the overall scant coherency of Res. 1593 (2005).” (Condorelli and Ciampi 2005, p. 593.) See 
also Heyder 2006, pp. 654-655: “[O]n the one hand, the international community has mandated (…) the 
ICC to exercise jurisdiction; but (…), on the other hand, states that are not party to the Statute of Rome, 
except for Sudan [and those other parties to the conflict which are not party to the ICC Statute, ChP], 
have no obligation to cooperate or support the ICC in fulfilling this task. This contradiction, inherent in 
the Security Council’s logic, is hardly understandable.” 
19 See Art. 103 of the UN Charter: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of 
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” 
20 See also Swart 2002 A, p. 1249: “In the matter of arrest and detention, little autonomy or discretion is 
left to the requested State to refuse to comply with the Tribunals’ orders.” 
21 Like Swart, this study will use the concept of “transfer” in the context of the ICTY and ICTR. (The 
reasons therefore are that 1) there does not seem to be a legal difference in the ICTY/ICTR RPE 
between the concepts of “surrender” and “transfer” (which both are mentioned in the instruments of the 









accused or of a witness to the Tribunal which may exist under the national law or 
extradition treaties of the State concerned.22 
 
Swart explains after having referred to the same rule: 
 
All this seems to imply that constitutional impediments to the handing over of persons 
to a tribunal are as irrelevant as other impediments in domestic law. It also implies 
that a Member State may not invoke the provisions of human rights treaties to which 
it is a party in order to justify a refusal of transfer.[23] The only, rather theoretical, 
situation in which transfer might be refused is that in which jus cogens would forbid a 
State to transfer a person. In all these respects transfer of persons to a tribunal is 
fundamentally different from extradition between States [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].24  
 
Although it would go beyond the scope of this study to make an extensive overview 
of the entire arrest and transfer framework in the context of the ICTY/ICTR,25 some 
                                                          
22 Notwithstanding this, Young (2001, p. 340, n. 77) notes that “[d]espite these seemingly coercive 
powers, the practice of the ICTY and ICTR has shown many incidences where States have imposed 
their national laws to impede the transfer of accused.” Of course, one can imagine that it is sometimes 
possible to refuse the transfer of a person in such obvious cases as mistaken identity, see, for example, 
Art. 4, para. 3 of the Dutch Law of 21 April 1994 implementing the ICTY Statute (available at: 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Member_States_Cooperation/implementation_legislation_t
he_netherlands_1994_en.pdf): “If the District Court [in The Hague, ChP], which is to rule on whether 
the Tribunal’s request may be granted, holds either that it cannot be established that the person brought 
before it is the person whose surrender has been requested or that surrender has been requested on 
account of offences in respect of which the Tribunal is clearly not competent under its Statute, its 
judgement shall declare the surrender inadmissible.” However, O’Shea (1995-1996, pp. 433-434) 
explains that some States go further than that: “A significant number of states have complied with the 
Security Council resolutions establishing the ad hoc tribunals by adopting implementing legislation 
modelled, in most cases, on current extradition law. The newly enacted laws run the gamut from no or 
optional judicial review (as in the case of Australia and Finland), to limited judicial review (as in the 
case of France and Italy [and O’Shea also includes the Netherlands among these States, see ibid., p. 379, 
ChP]), to judicial review of prima facie evidence (as in the case of the United States). Most striking 
among the new legislation are those of Australia and New Zealand which, despite the tribunals’ legal 
origins in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, allows “requests” for cooperation to be denied under 
exceptional circumstances.” Cf. finally Knoops 2002, pp. 70-76 and Zhu 2006, pp. 103-105. 
23 That the State may not invoke provisions from human rights treaties to refuse the transfer does not 
mean, of course, that the State can forget all its obligations under international human rights law in this 
context. On the contrary. See, for example, the still-to-discuss Kajelijeli case before the ICTR: “[T]he 
Appeals Chamber is mindful of the fact that a cooperating State, when effecting an urgent arrest and 
detention pursuant to the Prosecution’s request under Rule 40 of the Rules, must strike a balance 
between two different obligations under international law. First, the State is required under Security 
Council Resolution 955 and Article 28 of the Tribunal’s Statute to comply fully without undue delay 
with any requests for assistance from the Tribunal in fulfilling the weighty task of investigating and 
prosecuting persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law. On the 
other hand, the cooperating State still remains under its obligation to respect the human rights of the 
suspect as protected in customary international law, in the international treaties to which it has acceded, 
as well as in its own national legislation [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 220.) 
24 Swart 2002 C, pp. 1664-1665. See also Zappalà 2003, p. 9. 








interesting provisions from their Statutes and, in particular, their RPE definitely 
deserve to be mentioned here.  
However, before doing so, the importance of the arrest and transfer provisions 
must again be emphasised, see also Chapter I of this book. The Tribunals do not 
recognise trials in absentia, that is, without the person in question being present. As 
a result, arrests and transfers normally have to be made before the trials can 
commence.26 Furthermore, the ICTY/ICTR have no police force of their own. 
Hence, they are dependent on others – one could hereby think of States and 
international forces – in the enforcement of arrests. They are, to again refer to the 
famous metaphor by Cassese, “giant[s] without arms and legs”27 who need 
“artificial limbs to walk and work”.28 
Turning now to the arrest and transfer proceedings in the context of the 
ICTY/ICTR, Article 18, paragraph 4, Article 19 and Article 20, paragraph 2 of the 
ICTY Statute29 explain very basically the procedure to follow here: if the Prosecutor 
determines the existence of a prima facie case, he shall prepare an indictment 
“containing a concise statement of the facts and the crime or crimes with which the 
accused is charged under the Statute”.30 This indictment shall then be transmitted to 
the Trial Chamber where a judge shall review it. “If satisfied that a prima facie case 
has been established by the Prosecutor, he shall confirm the indictment. If not so 
satisfied, the indictment shall be dismissed.”31 If the indictment is confirmed, “the 
judge may, at the request of the Prosecutor, issue such orders and warrants for the 
arrest, surrender or transfer of persons, and any other orders as may be required for 
the conduct of the trial”.32 Finally, “[a] person against whom an indictment has been 
confirmed shall, pursuant to an order or an arrest warrant of the International 
                                                          
26 See Art. 21, para. 4 (d) of the ICTY (“In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant 
to the present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full 
equality: (…) to be tried in his presence”) and ICTR (“In the determination of any charge against the 
accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum 
guarantees, in full equality: (…) To be tried in his or her presence”) Statutes. In addition, a ban of trials 
in absentia may also be derived from Art. 20 of the ICTY Statute (see for the ICTR Art. 19 of its 
Statute): “Article 20 provides that the Trial Chamber can set the date for trial only after reading the 
indictment to an accused and after confirming that he understands its meaning. This indicates that the 
physical presence of an accused before the Chamber is an indispensable requirement for commencing a 
trial.” (Furuya 1999, p. 638.) Note finally that suspects, however, may also come voluntarily to The 
Hague, in which case the arrest is, of course, no conditio sine qua non to the commencement of the trial. 
However, in most cases, an arrest will be necessary. Cf. also n. 33 of Chapter I and n. 2 of Chapter VIII. 
27 Cassese 1998, p. 13.  
28 Ibid. Arbour (2004, p. 397) notes: “I arrived at the ICTY in October 1996. There were many 
interesting issues at play in the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), but there was only one overwhelming, 
all-encompassing and, I would say, life-threatening issue for the ICTY as it had been conceived: arrests. 
In fact, the issue of arrests was so acute that although it ‘belonged’ essentially to the Prosecutor, it had 
become, inevitably, everybody’s issue: the whole of the ICTY, the NGOs and the Press.” 
29 See for the ICTR Statute Artt. 17, para. 4, 18 and 19, para. 2. 
30 Art. 18, para. 4 of the ICTY Statute. 
31 Art. 19, para. 1 of the ICTY Statute. 








Tribunal, be taken into custody, immediately informed of the charges against him 
and transferred to the International Tribunal”.33  
An elaboration of this very basic procedure can be found in the RPE of the 
Tribunals, in particular Section 1 (‘Investigations’: Rules 39-43) of Part 4 
(‘Investigations and Rights of the Suspect’) and Sections 1 (‘Indictments’: Rules 47-
53 bis), 2 (‘Orders and Warrants’: Rules 54-61) and 3 (‘Preliminary Proceedings’: 
Rules 62-65 ter) of Part 5 (‘Pre-Trial Proceedings’).34 Before focusing on some of 
these provisions, it may be worth emphasising that these rules speak of both 
suspects and accused. (Note that in the above-mentioned statutory provisions, only 
the term ‘accused’ was mentioned.) The difference between the two is explained in 
Rule 2 (A) of the ICTY/ICTR RPE: a suspect is “[a] person concerning whom the 
Prosecutor possesses reliable information which tends to show that [t]he [person] 
may have committed a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction” whereas an 
accused is “[a] person against whom one or more counts in an indictment have been 
confirmed in accordance with Rule 47”.  
The first rule which is worth mentioning here is Rule 40 (i) of the ICTY RPE.35 
This rule explains that “[i]n case of urgency, the Prosecutor may request any State 
(...) to arrest a suspect or an accused provisionally”. Rule 40 bis of the ICTY/ICTR 
RPE then further clarifies the law concerning the transfer and provisional detention 
of suspects. A number of paragraphs from this provision should be addressed here. 
First, paragraph (B) states which three conditions must be met before the judge shall 
order the transfer and provisional detention of the suspect.36 In paragraph (C), one 
can read that the order for the transfer and provisional detention of the suspect “shall 
(…) specify the initial time-limit for the provisional detention of the suspect, and be 
accompanied by a statement of the rights of the suspect, as specified in this Rule and 
in Rules 42 and 43”.37 Paragraph (D) further clarifies that “[t]he provisional 
                                                          
33 Art. 20, para. 2 of the ICTY Statute. 
34 Note that in the ICTR RPE context, one will not find a section called ‘Preliminary Proceedings’. The 
provisions from this section have namely been incorporated in Section 2 (‘Orders and Warrants’: Rules 
54-65 bis) of Part 5 (‘Pre-Trial Proceedings’) of the ICTR RPE.  
35 See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 40 (A) (i) of the ICTR RPE. 
36 Rule 40 bis (B) of the ICTY RPE reads: “The Judge shall order the transfer and provisional detention 
of the suspect if the following conditions are met: (i) the Prosecutor has requested a State to arrest the 
suspect provisionally, in accordance with Rule 40, or the suspect is otherwise detained by State 
authorities; (ii) after hearing the Prosecutor, the Judge considers that there is a reliable and consistent 
body of material which tends to show that the suspect may have committed a crime over which the 
Tribunal has jurisdiction; and (iii) the Judge considers provisional detention to be a necessary measure 
to prevent the escape of the suspect, injury to or intimidation of a victim or witness or the destruction of 
evidence, or to be otherwise necessary for the conduct of the investigation.” See for a comparable 
provision in the ICTR context Rule 40 bis (B) of the ICTR RPE. 
37 Rule 40 bis (C) of the ICTY RPE and Rule 40 bis (D) of the ICTR RPE. Rule 42 of the ICTY RPE 
reads: “(A) A suspect who is to be questioned by the Prosecutor shall have the following rights, of 
which the Prosecutor shall inform the suspect prior to questioning, in a language the suspect 
understands: (i) the right to be assisted by counsel of the suspect’s choice or to be assigned legal 
assistance without payment if the suspect does not have sufficient means to pay for it; (ii) the right to 
have the free assistance of an interpreter if the suspect cannot understand or speak the language to be 








detention of a suspect shall be ordered for a period not exceeding thirty days from 
the date of the transfer of the suspect to the seat of the Tribunal.”38 Although this 
detention can be extended,  
 
[t]he total period of detention shall in no case exceed ninety days, at the end of which, 
in the event the indictment has not been confirmed and an arrest warrant signed, the 
suspect shall be released or, if appropriate, be delivered to the authorities of the 
requested State.39  
    
Although the total period of provisional detention may thus not exceed ninety days, 
this period only starts to run as from the date of40 or the day after41 the transfer. 
However, it is not clear how long a person may be deprived of his liberty before the 
(day after the) transfer.42 Swart notes that at the stage of the transfer proceedings in 
the requested State (as well as in the earlier stage of provisional arrest),   
 
the arrested person’s sole recourse is to a tribunal for habeas corpus or for obtaining 
interim release, since Rule 57 of the RPE of both ad hoc Tribunals leaves no 
discretion to States to decide on these matters.[43] It is, therefore, to be deplored that 
neither the Statutes nor the RPE of the ad hoc Tribunals accord an explicit remedy to 
the person at this stage. The duration will be determined by the diligence of the 
                                                                                                                                              
suspect makes shall be recorded and may be used in evidence. (B) Questioning of a suspect shall not 
proceed without the presence of counsel unless the suspect has voluntarily waived the right to counsel. 
In case of waiver, if the suspect subsequently expresses a desire to have counsel, questioning shall 
thereupon cease, and shall only resume when the suspect has obtained or has been assigned counsel.” 
See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 42 of the ICTR RPE. Finally, Rule 43 of the 
ICTY/ICTR RPE has to do with the recording of the questioning of suspects. 
38 See for a comparable (but as regards content also slightly different) provision in the ICTR context 
Rule 40 bis (C) of the ICTR RPE: “The provisional detention of the suspect may be ordered for a period 
not exceeding 30 days from the day after the transfer of the suspect to the detention unit of the Tribunal 
[emphasis added, ChP].” 
39 Rule 40 bis (D) of the ICTY RPE. See for a comparable (but as regards content also slightly different) 
provision in the ICTR context Rule 40 bis (H) of the ICTR RPE: “The total period of provisional 
detention shall in no case exceed 90 days after the day of transfer of the suspect to the Tribunal, at the 
end of which, in the event the indictment has not been confirmed and an arrest warrant signed, the 
suspect shall be released or, if appropriate, be delivered to the authorities of the State to which the 
request was initially made [emphasis added, ChP].” 
40 See Rule 40 bis (D) of the ICTY RPE. 
41 See Rule 40 bis (H) of the ICTR RPE. 
42 See also Swart 2002 A, p. 1250: “[T]he RPE attach no time limit to the period a person may be 
deprived of his liberty at the request of the Prosecutor pending the issuance of an order by a judge or 
Chamber.” 
43 Rule 57 of the ICTY RPE reads: “Upon arrest, the accused shall be detained by the State concerned 
which shall promptly notify the Registrar. The transfer of the accused to the seat of the Tribunal shall be 
arranged between the State authorities concerned, the authorities of the host country and the Registrar.” 
See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 57 of the ICTR RPE. Cf. also the still to be 
mentioned Rule 65 (A) of the ICTY RPE: “Once detained, an accused may not be released except upon 
an order of a Chamber.” Gallant (1994, p. 585) writes on this rule that it “suggests that the arresting state 








Tribunal and the requested State in conducting the proceedings as well as by the 
choice of the person requested to challenge transfer or to consent to it. 44 
 
Nevertheless, in the discussion of the ICTR Barayagwiza case in Subsection 3.2.1, it 
will be shown that the judges have, to a certain extent, filled this legal gap in the 
arrest and transfer proceedings.45  
If the suspect has been transferred to the Tribunal, he “shall be brought, without 
delay, before the Judge who made the order, or another permanent Judge of the 
same Trial Chamber, who shall ensure that the rights of the suspect are respected”.46 
Alongside the already-mentioned release possibilities pursuant to Rule 40 bis (D) of 
the ICTY RPE/Rule 40 bis (H) of the ICTR RPE, paragraph (G)47 adds the 
following habeas corpus-like provision to these proceedings: “During detention, the 
Prosecutor and the suspect or the suspect’s counsel may submit to the Trial 
Chamber of which the Judge who made the order is a member, all applications 
relative to the propriety of provisional detention or to the suspect’s release.”  
Turning now to the provisions focusing on the accused: if the Prosecutor is 
“satisfied in the course of an investigation that there is sufficient evidence to provide 
reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has committed a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal”,48 he “shall prepare and forward to the Registrar an 
indictment for confirmation by a Judge, together with supporting material”.49 If any 
or all of the counts in the indictment are confirmed, “(i) the Judge may issue an 
arrest warrant, in accordance with Rule 55 (A),[50] and any orders as provided in 
Article 19 of the Statute, and (ii) the suspect shall have the status of an accused.”51 
A final provision which should be mentioned here, before looking at the provisions 
on the execution of arrest warrants, is Rule 53 of the ICTY/ICTR RPE.52 This rule 
                                                          
44 Swart 2002 A, p. 1250. See also ibid., p. 1251: “Time limits included in the RPE (...) are not 
concerned with arrest and detention in the requested State but with provisional detention after the 
person’s transfer by that State.” 
45 See also n. 863 and, generally, n. 880.  
46 Rule 40 bis (F) of the ICTY RPE. See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 40 bis (J) 
of the ICTR RPE. 
47 See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 40 bis (K) of the ICTR RPE. 
48 Rule 47 (B) of the ICTY/ICTR RPE. 
49 Rule 47 (B) of the ICTY/ICTR RPE. 
50 Rule 55 (A) of the ICTY RPE reads: “A warrant of arrest shall be signed by a permanent Judge. It 
shall include an order for the prompt transfer of the accused to the Tribunal upon the arrest of the 
accused.” See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 55 (A) of the ICTR RPE. 
51 Rule 47 (H) of the ICTY RPE. See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 47 (H) of the 
ICTR RPE. 
52 Rule 53 of the ICTY RPE (‘Non-disclosure’) reads: “(A) In exceptional circumstances, a Judge or a 
Trial Chamber may, in the interests of justice, order the non-disclosure to the public of any documents 
or information until further order. (B) When confirming an indictment the Judge may, in consultation 
with the Prosecutor, order that there be no public disclosure of the indictment until it is served on the 
accused, or, in the case of joint accused, on all the accused. (C) A Judge or Trial Chamber may, in 
consultation with the Prosecutor, also order that there be no disclosure of an indictment, or part thereof, 
or of all or any part of any particular document or information, if satisfied that the making of such an 
order is required to give effect to a provision of the Rules, to protect confidential information obtained 








authorises the use of sealed indictments, which is one of the three “innovative 
ways”53 to obtain the arrest and transfer of persons to The Hague mentioned by 
Chief of Investigations at the ICTY’s OTP Office Lopez-Terres (the other two will 
be mentioned below).  
 
Sealed indictments proved effective in a number of cases. It was indeed so effective 
that many perpetrators of war crimes, including many who were not wanted by the 
ICTY, started leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina and went to safer areas in Croatia and 
Serbia and Montenegro where they knew nothing could happen to them.[54] The 
practice was, however, discontinued after the number of accused was significantly 
reduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina.55    
 
The instrument of sealed indictments will be returned to in the discussion of the 
Dokmanović case, to be examined in Subsection 3.1.1 of this chapter. 
Rule 55 of the ICTY/ICTR RPE deals with the execution of arrest warrants. Two 
paragraphs from this provision merit some more attention here.  
First, Rule 55 (C) of the ICTY RPE56 mentions the rights to which the accused is 
entitled. Here, reference is made to (the already-mentioned) Rules 42 and 43 of the 
                                                                                                                                              
and (C), the Prosecutor may disclose an indictment or part thereof to the authorities of a State or an 
appropriate authority or international body where the Prosecutor deems it necessary to prevent an 
opportunity for securing the possible arrest of an accused from being lost.” See for a comparable 
provision in the ICTR context Rule 53 of the ICTR RPE. 
53 P. Lopez-Terres, Chief of Investigations, ICTY, ‘Arrest and transfer of indictees. The experience of 
the ICTY’, 15 December 2006 (available at: 
http://www.icln.net/htm/Annual%20conference%202006/Presentation_Lopez-Terres.pdf), p. 5. 
54 Cf. Scharf 1998, pp. 376-377: “The Dayton Peace Accords, Security Council Resolution 1031, and the 
subsequent agreement of the Bosnian government make clear that NATO forces may lawfully exercise 
police powers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Similarly, Security Council Resolution 1037, which with the 
consent of Croatia and the FRY temporarily placed the administration of Eastern Slavonia under 
UNTAES, gave the United Nations peacekeeping force the right to exercise police powers in that region 
of Croatia. Consequently, there is no violation of territorial integrity of the rights of the accused where 
NATO or United Nations personnel apprehend indicted war criminals in Bosnia and Herzegovina or the 
region of Eastern Slavonia, Croatia. Such activities conducted in the FRY and other regions of Croatia, 
however, are another matter [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See also ns. 265 and 516.  
55 P. Lopez-Terres, Chief of Investigations, ICTY, ‘Arrest and transfer of indictees. The experience of 
the ICTY’, 15 December 2006 (available at: 
http://www.icln.net/htm/Annual%20conference%202006/Presentation_Lopez-Terres.pdf), pp. 6-7. See 
also Arbour 2004, p. 397: “Despite the inexplicable (for the time being, one hopes) lack of arrest of 
Karadžić and Mladić, the 1997 arrest strategy was successful. This was not due exclusively to a reversal 
from widely publicized indictments to indictments under seal: many other factors came into play to 
provide, if nothing else, a window of opportunity. But the sealed indictments were critical. They 
provided us with unanswerable arguments to the alleged operational difficulties of arresting publicly 
accused and gave us back some of the leadership of our own operations.” (Note, of course, that Karadžić 
is now in ICTY custody.) 
56 “Each certified copy [of the official arrest warrant, ChP] shall be accompanied by a copy of the 
indictment certified in accordance with Rule 47 (G) and a statement of the rights of the accused set forth 
in Article 21 of the Statute, and in Rules 42 and 43 mutatis mutandis. If the accused does not understand 
either of the official languages of the Tribunal and if the language understood by the accused is known 








ICTY/ICTR RPE and Article 21 of the ICTY Statute/Article 20 of the ICTR Statute 
(entitled ‘Rights of the Accused’).57  
The other paragraph from Rule 55 deserving special attention is Rule 55 (G) of 
the ICTY RPE, which reveals that the execution of arrest warrants is not restricted 
to States: “When an arrest warrant issued by the Tribunal is executed by the 
authorities of a State, or an appropriate authority or international body, a member 
of the Office of the Prosecutor may be present as from the time of the arrest 
[emphasis added, ChP].”  
Rule 59 bis (A) of the ICTY RPE58 should also be mentioned in this context. 
This provision reads: 
 
Notwithstanding Rules 55 to 59, on the order of a permanent Judge, the Registrar 
shall transmit to an appropriate authority or international body or the Prosecutor a 
copy of a warrant for the arrest of an accused, on such terms as the Judge may 
determine, together with an order for the prompt transfer of the accused to the 
                                                                                                                                              
the statement of the rights of the accused in that language.” See for a comparable provision in the ICTR 
context Rule 55 (A) and (B) of the ICTR RPE. 
57 Art. 21 of the ICTY Statute reads: “1. All persons shall be equal before the International Tribunal. 2. 
In the determination of charges against him, the accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, 
subject to article 22 of the Statute [which deals with the protection of victims and witnesses, ChP]. 3. 
The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the provisions of the present 
Statute. 4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the 
accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (a) to be informed 
promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against 
him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with 
counsel of his own choosing; (c) to be tried without undue delay; (d) to be tried in his presence, and to 
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not 
have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the 
interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have 
sufficient means to pay for it; (e) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain 
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him; (f) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in the International Tribunal; (g) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to 
confess guilt.” See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Art. 20 of the ICTR Statute. 
58 Interestingly, the contents of these two provisions (Rule 55 (G) of the ICTY RPE and Rule 59 bis (A) 
of the ICTY RPE) will not be found in the ICTR RPE, which only mention the concepts of ‘appropriate 
authority’ and ‘international body’ in Rule 53 (D) of the ICTR RPE (where it is stated that “the 
Prosecutor may disclose an indictment or part thereof to (...) an appropriate authority or international 
body where the Prosecutor deems it necessary to secure the possible arrest of an accused”) and Rule 39 
(iii) of the ICTR RPE (where it is stated that “[i]n the conduct of an investigation, the Prosecutor may 
(...) [s]eek (...) the assistance (...) of any relevant international body including the International Criminal 
Police Organization (INTERPOL)”). (Note that the ICTR RPE also mention the concept of ‘appropriate 
authority’ in the specific context of the State in Rule 61 (A) (i) of the ICTR RPE where it is explained 
that one of the requirements before the judge shall order that the indictment be submitted by the 
Prosecutor to his Trial Chamber (in case a warrant of arrest has not been executed) is that “[t]he 
Registrar and the Prosecutor have taken all reasonable steps to secure the arrest of the accused, 
including recourse to the appropriate authorities of the State in whose territory or under whose 








Tribunal in the event that the accused be taken into custody by that authority or 
international body or the Prosecutor [emphasis added, ChP].59   
 
Since the nature of international crimes is often characterised by a high level of 
State involvement60 and States may hence be reluctant to make arrests,61 cooperation 
with entities other than States may be very necessary. In fact, Rule 59 bis of the 
ICTY RPE62 is also one of the “innovative ways” to obtain the arrest and transfer of 
persons to The Hague mentioned by Lopez-Terres: “[A] significant number of 
arrests did not occur until the enactment of Rule 59bis, which explicitly permitted 
the transmission of arrest warrants to peacekeeping forces deployed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.”63   
                                                          
59 Note that this provision stipulates that the Prosecutor may also be involved in the arrest itself, even 
though OTP officials do not seem to be allowed to make the arrest themselves. See for the latter point 
the already-mentioned (see n. 8) Blaškić case of 29 October 1997 where the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
stated: “The International Tribunal can prosecute and try those persons. This is its primary jurisdiction. 
However, it is self-evident that the International Tribunal, in order to bring to trial persons living under 
the jurisdiction of sovereign States, not being endowed with enforcement agents of its own, must rely 
upon the cooperation of States. The International Tribunal must turn to States if it is effectively to 
investigate crimes, collect evidence, summon witnesses and have indictees arrested and surrendered to 
the International Tribunal.” (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, ‘Judgement on 
the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997’, 
Case No. IT-95-14, 29 October 1997, para. 26.) A good illustration of this issue can be found in the still 
–to-discuss Dokmanović case where an ICTY OTP official set up a luring operation after which the 
suspect was taken into custody by UNTAES. During the arrest, the OTP official was present and even 
read the accused’s rights. Scharf (1998, p. 379) notes that “[t]he Blaskić opinion [see the above-
mentioned quotation, ChP] makes clear that the officers of the OTP are not authorized to act on their 
own as an international constabulary. This would suggest that they may not unilaterally arrest indicted 
persons, but it does not prevent them from participating in operations as an adjunct of the United 
Nations or NATO.” See finally Zhou (2006, p. 209) who is of the opinion that “the relevant rules of the 
ICTY RPE suggest that the OTP should retain a strong participatory role in the apprehension of 
individuals indicted by the ICTY.” 
60 See Van der Wilt 2004, pp. 274-275. 
61 This is especially so with respect to the ICTY. Ruxton (2001, p. 20) writes, for example, that in the 
context of the ICTR, “we had considerable success working with national authorities of African 
countries. As a result we had many high-ranking accused in custody from an early stage.” 
62 The entire article reads: “(A) Notwithstanding Rules 55 to 59, on the order of a permanent Judge, the 
Registrar shall transmit to an appropriate authority or international body or the Prosecutor a copy of a 
warrant for the arrest of an accused, on such terms as the Judge may determine, together with an order 
for the prompt transfer of the accused to the Tribunal in the event that the accused be taken into custody 
by that authority or international body or the Prosecutor. (B) At the time of being taken into custody an 
accused shall be informed immediately, in a language the accused understands, of the charges against 
him or her and of the fact that he or she is being transferred to the Tribunal. Upon such transfer, the 
indictment and a statement of the rights of the accused shall be read to the accused and the accused shall 
be cautioned in such a language. (C) Notwithstanding paragraph (B), the indictment and statement of 
rights of the accused need not be read to the accused if the accused is served with these, or with a 
translation of these, in a language the accused understands and is able to read.” 
63 P. Lopez-Terres, Chief of Investigations, ICTY, ‘Arrest and transfer of indictees. The experience of 
the ICTY’, 15 December 2006 (available at: 
http://www.icln.net/htm/Annual%20conference%202006/Presentation_Lopez-Terres.pdf), p. 5. See also 
Sluiter 2001, p. 151 and the ICC OTP’s ‘Informal expert paper: Fact-finding and investigative functions 








There has been great discussion64 as to whether IFOR/SFOR not only had the 
possibility (as can be derived from Rules 55 (G) of the ICTY RPE and 59 bis of the 
ICTY RPE) but also an obligation to arrest (as do States have, see Rule 56 of the 
ICTY/ICTR RPE).65 Gaeta, who asserts that IFOR (and SFOR) do have the 
authority but not a duty to arrest persons indicted by the ICTY,66 explains that the 
North Atlantic Council (NATO’s political body under which authority the force(s) 
operate) adopted a resolution on 16 December 1995 which provided that  
 
having regard to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 827, the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1031, and Annex 1-A of the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, IFOR should detain any persons 
indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal[67] who come into contact with IFOR 
in its execution of assigned tasks, in order to assure the transfer of these persons to the 
International Criminal Tribunal [emphasis added, ChP].68 
 
Of interest is the word “should”. Gaeta notices that “[t]he choice of the word 
‘should’ seems to indicate both the absence of an obligation proper and a strong 
                                                                                                                                              
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/490C317B-5D8E-4131-8170-
7568911F6EB2/248459/372616.PDF, para. 91. The NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, IFOR, was replaced by NATO’s SFOR and later by the EU’s EUFOR. Other examples of 
peacekeeping forces in the context of the conflict in former Yugoslavia are the UN-led UNTAES (in 
Croatia) and the NATO-led KFOR (in Kosovo). 
64 See, for example, Lamb 2000, p. 192, Scharf 2000, pp. 951-964, Sluiter 2001, pp. 151-152, Henquet 
2003, pp. 132ff and Frulli 2006, p. 355.  
65 Rule 56 of the ICTY RPE reads: “The State to which a warrant of arrest or a transfer order for a 
witness is transmitted shall act promptly and with all due diligence to ensure proper and effective 
execution thereof, in accordance with Article 29 of the Statute [emphasis added, ChP].” See for a 
comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 56 of the ICTR RPE. Jones (1996, p. 239) argues that 
“[t]wo arguments might be made that IFOR has not only the right but also the duty to execute the 
Tribunal’s arrest warrants [emphasis in original, ChP].” Both of them are indirect: they deal with the 
obligation of States and argue that these obligations are also applicable to national contingents within 
IFOR. “The first argument derives from the Tribunal’s Rules and the overriding obligation of all States 
to comply with the tribunal’s orders pursuant to Resolution 827 (1993). (…) For example, the United 
States contingent of the IFOR currently has responsibility for the operational area which includes 
Srebrenica. If the Registrar believed an accused to be in Srebrenica, she could send an arrest warrant to 
the appropriate authorities of the United States, which would then have the duty to execute the arrest 
warrant [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) The second argument has to do with the aut dedere (to 
perhaps also the ICTY) aut iudicare obligation of (troop-contributing) States with respect to suspects 
charged with grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. (See ibid., pp. 239-240.) 
66 See Gaeta 1998, p. 181. The situation is different with respect to UNTAES though: an obligation to 
cooperate with the ICTY (including the obligation to execute arrest warrants) has been imposed upon 
UNTAES by UNSC Res. 1037 of 15 January 1996 where (in para. 21) the words “UNTAES shall co-
operate with the International Tribunal in the performance of its mandate [emphasis added, ChP]” are 
used (see Gaeta 1998, p. 180, n. 16.). The same is valid for KFOR: para. 14 of UNSC Res. 1244 of 10 
June 1999, establishing KFOR, “Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international 
security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [underlined emphasis in 
original and italicised emphasis added, ChP]”. See also Ciampi 2002, p. 1620. 
67 International forces, fond of abbreviations, usually call these persons ‘PIFWCs’: Persons Indicted For 
War Crimes.  








invitation to IFOR to execute arrest warrants [emphasis added, ChP]”.69 
Furthermore, the passage “persons (…) who come into contact” hints that IFOR 
does not need to actively seek the indicted persons. However, this resolution is not 
very clear and this may also explain the different interpretations on this issue by 
subsequent Trial Chambers.70  
For example, in the 2000 Simić et al. decision (this is the Todorović case which 
will be discussed in more detail in Subsection 3.1.2), the ICTY Trial Chamber, even 
though it agreed with the fact that forces do not need to initiate a search themselves, 
took another stance with respect to the authorisation/obligation discussion. It argued 
that there is in principle   
 
no reason why Article 29 [which, as was clarified earlier, see footnote 14, obliges 
States to cooperate, ChP] should not apply to collective enterprises undertaken by 
States, in the framework of international organisations and, in particular, their 
competent organs such as SFOR in the present case. A purposive construction of 
Article 29 suggests that it is as applicable to such collective enterprises as it is to 
States. The purpose of Article 29 of the Statute of the International Tribunal is to 
secure cooperation with the International Tribunal in the investigation and 
prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international 
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. The need for such cooperation is 
strikingly apparent, since the International Tribunal has no enforcement arm of its 
own – it lacks a police force. Although this cooperation would, more naturally, be 
expected from States, it is also achievable through the assistance of international 
organizations through their competent organs which, by virtue of their activities, 
might have information relating to, or come into contact with, persons indicted by the 
International Tribunal for serious violations of international humanitarian law.71 
                                                          
69 Gaeta 1998, p. 178, n. 10. See also Lamb 2000, p. 191, n. 80. 
70 See also Ph. Vallières-Roland, ‘Prosecuting War Criminals: A Critique of the Relationship between 
NATO and the International Criminal Courts’, Centre for European Security and Disarmament (CESD) 
– Briefing Paper, February 2002, available at http://www.isis-
europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_87_2002_archives_59_paper.natoandiccs.pdf, p. 7: “In circumspect, the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC) acted cautiously in its 16 December 1995 regulation, both by using 
optional language and by limiting to the arrest of ICTY indictees the enforcement authority of the 
multinational force. The NAC probably hoped that the relationship between NATO and the ICTY would 
slowly evolve through the years and be strengthened informally if needed. However, the lack of 
precision on such an important precedent of regulation between an international criminal court and a 
multi-state entity opened the door for an array of speculation and difficult issues for the international 
criminal courts to settle. A good opportunity was therefore lost to set out clear guidelines for a future 
relationship between an international criminal court and a multi-state entity [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” 
71 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan 
Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and 
Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 2000, para. 46. (See also ibid., paras. 47-49.) Cf. also Sluiter 
(2003 A, pp. 288-289) who endorses the purposive construction of Art. 29 but who is not sure whether it 
can be applied to SFOR: “One has difficulty accepting that the ICTY is able to issue orders to a 
“multinational implementation force”, which also enjoys a mandate from the Security Council [which 
does not oblige it to provide legal assistance to the ICTY, ChP]. In other words, I believe that no 
hierarchical relationship can be established between the ICTY and IFOR/SFOR. (…) The Trial Chamber 








This decision was rejected in the 2001 Brñanin & Talić decision72 but confirmed in 
the 2002 Nikolić decision, which will be discussed at length in Subsection 3.1.4 of 
this chapter.73 The only point all these decisions agree upon is the fact that forces do 
not have to look for suspects themselves. There is only an obligation to arrest – if 
such an obligation is indeed present, which is still doubtful – if those forces come 
into contact with suspects. A perhaps – from another perspective – more relevant 
matter is how the commanders on the ground have viewed their mandate with 
respect to the arrest of suspects. Although it was previously mentioned by Lopez-
Terres that “a significant number of arrests did not occur until the enactment of Rule 
59bis”,74 the above-mentioned mandate stemming from the 1995 North Atlantic 
Council resolution, unfortunately, was nevertheless  
 
interpreted restrictively by most commanders on the field, especially when it came to 
senior accused, such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. There are several 
documented instances where, from 1995 till 1998, both men could have been arrested 
by NATO forces, but the local commanders apparently refused to give the appropriate 
orders.75 
 
                                                                                                                                              
mandate, which makes it in my view impossible to treat SFOR as just a group of States to which Article 
29 is fully applicable.” See also Henquet (2003, pp. 138ff), who is very critical of the reasoning in this 
Todorović decision as well. 
72 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brñanin & Momir Talić, ‘Decision on Motion 
by Momir Talić for Provisional Release’, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, 28 March 2001, para. 29: “The use of 
the word “should” [the judges, like Gaeta, looked at the same resolution of the North Atlantic Council, 
ChP] demonstrates the reality that SFOR does not accept any legal obligation on its part to arrest 
anyone. The resolution does not even contemplate any obligation upon SFOR to seek out indicted 
persons in order to arrest them. The inaction by SFOR during the period following the publication of the 
SFOR Decision [this is the above-mentioned 2000 Simić decision, ChP] only underlines the unfortunate 
fact that reliance cannot be placed upon SFOR to arrest indicted persons who fail to appear for trial, in 
the way a police force may be expected to act in domestic legal systems.” 
73 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, paras. 
49 (“The question that may arise is whether the duty to co-operate, as laid down in Article 29, applies to 
States only, or also to other entities or collective enterprises, such as SFOR. Read literally, Article 29 
seems to relate to States only. This question had been discussed previously, inter alia, by the Trial 
Chamber in the Simić Decision. This Trial Chamber sees no reason to take a different view”) and 67 
(“Once a person comes “in contact with” SFOR, (…) SFOR is obliged under Article 29 of the Statute 
and Rule 59 bis to arrest/detain the person and have him transferred to the Tribunal [emphasis added, 
ChP].”). 
74 See also P. Lopez-Terres, Chief of Investigations, ICTY, ‘Arrest and transfer of indictees. The 
experience of the ICTY’, 15 December 2006 (available at: 
http://www.icln.net/htm/Annual%20conference%202006/Presentation_Lopez-Terres.pdf), p. 6: “This 
practice has known some success, especially with the “smaller fish” in the first years of the life of the 
Tribunal.” 
75 According to Lopez-Terres, there appears to be “a significant lack of political will to arrest these men. 
Preserving the security of troops and fear for the “bodybag syndrome” are certainly some of the reasons 
why States participating in international forces have not taken such action.” (Ibid.) Although Karadžić 
has by now been arrested (albeit not by international forces), see Subsection 3.1.6, the above-mentioned 









The penultimate rule which should be mentioned here is Rule 61 of the ICTY/ICTR 
RPE, created to anticipate potential problems the Tribunals would face concerning 
uncooperative States in the context of arrest and surrender and therefore deserving 
special attention in this book.76  
Interestingly, the first case in which the procedure of this rule was used was the 
ICTY77 Nikolić case,78 arguably the most important male captus case in the context 
of this chapter, see Subsection 3.1.4.  
What is to be done if the warrant is not executed within a reasonable time? In 
that case, “the Judge who confirmed the indictment shall invite the Prosecutor to 
report on the measures taken”.79  
The provision then continues, explaining:  
 
When the Judge is satisfied that: (i) the Registrar and the Prosecutor have taken all 
reasonable steps to secure the arrest of the accused, including recourse to the 
appropriate authorities of the State in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction and 
control the person to be served resides or was last known to them to be; and (ii) if the 
whereabouts of the accused are unknown, the Prosecutor and the Registrar have taken 
all reasonable steps to ascertain those whereabouts, including by seeking publication 
of advertisements pursuant to Rule 60,[80] the Judge shall order that the indictment be 
submitted by the Prosecutor to the Trial Chamber of which the Judge is a member.81  
 
Sections under (B) and (C) subsequently introduce a procedure which has often been 
linked with a trial in absentia – forbidden in the context of the ICTY/ICTR82 – 
because the proceeding is held without the accused being present.  
According to the first section, Section (B), the Prosecutor, upon obtaining the 
order as mentioned under the above-quoted Section (A),   
 
shall submit the indictment to the Trial Chamber in open court, together with all the 
evidence that was before the Judge who initially confirmed the indictment. The 
Prosecutor may also call before the Trial Chamber and examine any witness whose 
statement has been submitted to the confirming Judge. In addition, the Trial Chamber 
                                                          
76 In addition, a link with the ICC can also be quickly made here. See Art. 61, para. 2 of the ICC Statute 
(see ns. 1 and 291 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII) for more information. See also Furuya 1999, 
p. 637. 
77 The ICTR never showed any interest in Rule 61 proceedings, see Schabas 2006, p. 383. See also 
Swart 2002 C, p. 1675. 
78 See Quintal 1998, p. 756. 
79 Rule 61 (A) of the ICTY/ICTR RPE. 
80 Rule 60 of the ICTY RPE reads: “At the request of the Prosecutor, a form of advertisement shall be 
transmitted by the Registrar to the national authorities of any State or States, for publication in 
newspapers or for broadcast via radio and television, notifying publicly the existence of an indictment 
and calling upon the accused to surrender to the Tribunal and inviting any person with information as to 
the whereabouts of the accused to communicate that information to the Tribunal.” See for a comparable 
provision in the ICTR context Rule 60 of the ICTR RPE. 
81 Rule 61 (A) of the ICTY RPE. See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 61 (A) of the 
ICTR RPE. 








may request the Prosecutor to call any other witness whose statement has been 
submitted to the confirming Judge.83 
 
Section (C) further clarifies:   
 
If the Trial Chamber is satisfied on that evidence, together with such additional 
evidence as the Prosecutor may tender, that there are reasonable grounds for believing 
that the accused has committed all or any of the crimes charged in the indictment, it 
shall so determine. The Trial Chamber shall have the relevant parts of the indictment 
read out by the Prosecutor together with an account of the efforts to effect service 
referred to in paragraph (A) above.84  
 
There is more, however. According to Section (D),  
 
[t]he Trial Chamber shall also issue an international arrest warrant in respect of the 
accused which shall be transmitted to all States.[85] Upon request by the Prosecutor, 
the Trial Chamber may order a State or States to adopt provisional measures to freeze 
the assets of the accused, without prejudice to the rights of third parties.86 
 
The Rule 61 procedure, sometimes referred to as the ‘voice of the victims’,87 indeed 
very much resembles an in absentia trial. However, it is not the same. After all, the 
rule does not allow for a determination of the accused’s guilt.  
As a result, no sentence can be pronounced.88 Notwithstanding this, it is indeed 
true that “judgement, in a sense, is levelled through the creation of a public record. 
                                                          
83 See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 61 (B) of the ICTR RPE. 
84 See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 61 (C) of the ICTR RPE. 
85 According to the ICTY, such an international arrest warrant entails a number of clear-cut 
consequences: “-the accused will find himself publicly branded an “international fugitive”, and the 
country he has taken cover in will be converted into an “open-air prison”; - the accused will become a 
hostage to the political changes which might take place in his country of refuge: any protection he 
enjoys today may turn out to be only temporary; - and lastly, should the accused hold a public, civil or 
military position of responsibility, his exercise thereof will be seriously affected, both internationally 
and domestically, by his status as a “wanted person”.” (‘Rule 61: The voice of the victims. Rule 61 
proceedings: Tribunal not defeated by non-appearance of the accused’, ICTY Bulletin, No. 3, 22-II-
1996.) For criticism, see Quintal 1998, p. 758. 
86 See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 61 (D) of the ICTR RPE. Note that national 
laws may even allow the freezing of assets of people allegedly supporting the accused persons in 
evading justice: “Under existing legislation in BiH [Bosne i Hercegovine: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
ChP], the property of ICTY indictees who go on the run can be frozen and their business dealings can be 
halted. The same applies in any case where officials have a “grounded suspicion” that a person is 
helping an indictee to evade justice. In this regard, the legislation in question explicitly lists “spouses or 
consensual partners, first line blood relatives, brothers or sisters, adopting parents or adopted children 
and their spouses or consensual partners, attorney, medical doctor or priest”.” (E. Mackic and M. 
Husejnovic, ‘Justice Report: Targeting Fugitives’ Family Finances’, BIRN (Balkan Investigative 
Reporting Network), 19 October 2007, available at: http://www.birn.eu.com/en/108/10/5331.) 
87 See ‘Rule 61: The voice of the victims. Rule 61 proceedings: Tribunal not defeated by non-
appearance of the accused’, ICTY Bulletin, No. 3, 22-II-1996. 
88 See ibid. Note, however, that under Rule 61 (D), the assets of the accused can be frozen provisionally 








The perpetrators’ actions, thus, are publicized for eternity in a process very much 
akin to a Truth Commission.”89 Thieroff and Amley, Jr. also argue that the 
differences between trials in absentia and Rule 61 proceedings may be less 
significant in practice than on paper.90  
Be that as it may, the practice of the rule, which, by the way, was also criticised 
from a prima facie perhaps unexpected corner, namely from former Chief 
Prosecutor Arbour,91 “was discontinued once the Tribunal had defendants in custody 
and the suggestion that it could only function if it could conduct in absentia hearings 
no longer made any sense [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.92     
                                                                                                                                              
refuse to appear before the tribunal, the measures to freeze his assets would substantially assume the 
role of a penalty.” 
89 Quintal 1998, p. 750. See also ‘Rule 61: The voice of the victims. Rule 61 proceedings: Tribunal not 
defeated by non-appearance of the accused’, ICTY Bulletin, No. 3, 22-II-1996: “Rule 61 affords a formal 
means of redress for the victims of the absent accused’s alleged crimes by giving them an opportunity to 
have their testimony recorded for posterity either directly if they are invited to testify or indirectly when 
the Prosecutor speaks on their behalf. Thus the accused cannot escape from international justice simply 
by staying away from the Tribunal, and the Tribunal will create an historic record against him.” This, 
Quintal remarks (Quintal 1998, p. 723), “creates a disincentive on the part of the international 
community to arrest suspected war criminals and bring them to [T]he Hague for trial.” In addition, she 
argues, besides the point that the rule is unnecessary (see ibid., p. 754), “that the proceedings conducted 
under the auspices of Rule 61 may not comport entirely with the norms of due process required by 
international law.” (Ibid., p. 726.) An example mentioned by her (see ibid., p. 752) is the fact that a 
record “is created without the defense having any ability to cross-examine the witnesses. This is a 
violation of a defendant’s ability to confront a witness guaranteed in Article 14(3)(e) of the I.C.C.P.R.” 
See ibid., pp. 752-753 for more examples. 
90 See Thieroff and Amley, Jr. 1998, p. 259: “Although formal distinctions between trials in absentia and 
Rule 61 proceedings may exist, it is possible that reconfirmation hearings function as trials in absentia in 
all but name.” See also Furuya 1999, p. 635: “Officially, this ‘Rule 61 procedure’ is only a proceeding 
for reconfirming an indictment, which does not determine an accused’s guilt or innocence. In substance, 
however, it has functioned as a trial-like procedure to some extent.” In contrast to Quintal, Thieroff and 
Amley, Jr. argue (see Thieroff and Amley, Jr. 1998, p. 234) that the instrument, “even if it is 
characterized as the functional equivalent of a trial in absentia, is consistent with international law.” 
Furuya sides more with Quintal in that respect. See for her criticism towards the rule, Furuya 1999, pp. 
662ff. 
91 See Arbour 2004, p. 399: “The benefit of this process was obviously to satisfy the appetite of the 
press for access to the investigative phase of the work of the Tribunal – a phase not typically conducted 
in public. In turn, the process led to the increased visibility of the Tribunal, and provided a forum to 
mobilize public opinion in favour of aggressive arrest initiatives and budgetary support. I do not know if 
recourse to Rule 61 was either necessary or effective for this purpose. On the other hand, I believed that 
recourse to Rule 61 was detrimental to the work of the Prosecutor, and I was never persuaded that its 
benefits outweighed its deleterious effects. First and foremost, the Rule 61 hearings exposed publicly 
large parts of the evidence against the accused before he was apprehended. This exposure increased the 
danger of witness intimidation, tampering with evidence and fabrication of convenient evidentiary 
responses. It also monopolized important and scarce resources within OTP, with investigators and 
prosecutors re-examining the case for hearing preparation rather than moving on to developing new 
cases. Because the hearings were, by definition, ex parte, it also gave the trial attorneys, in my view, a 
false sense of security and confidence in the quality of their case. Evidence always looks better when it 
is unopposed and unchallenged.” 








The last provision which should be mentioned here is the habeas corpus-like 
provision related to accused persons:93 Rule 65 of the ICTY/ICTR RPE. This 
provision clarifies, among other things, that “[o]nce detained, an accused may not be 
released except upon an order of a Trial Chamber”94 and that provisional release 
may – there is hence no obligation – only be ordered by the Trial Chamber if, 
among other things, “it is satisfied that the accused will appear for trial and, if 
released, will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person”.95 
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber can impose conditions, such as “the execution of a 
bail bond and the observance of such conditions as are necessary to ensure the 
presence of the accused for trial and the protection of others”.96  
It must be noted that the formulation of this provision – especially an earlier 
version of it which demanded that the suspect showed “exceptional circumstances” 
to justify release97 – has been criticised in that it creates a context in which pre-trial 
detention is the rule and provisional release the exception, this being in 
contravention of an article such as Article 9, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR98 and the 
presumption of innocence.99 It is indeed strange that a person had to demonstrate 
“exceptional circumstances” to justify release. The burden of proof should be with 
the Prosecution here. One can agree with Sluiter that the criticism and damage done 
to the authority of the Tribunals caused by this provision could easily have been 
avoided; a different provision would arguably not have led to a situation in which 
persons would be released too quickly.100 After all, it would not be too difficult for 
the Prosecution to prove – given the seriousness of the crimes with which the person 
                                                          
93 For this provision related to suspects, see the already-mentioned Rule 40 bis (G) of the ICTY RPE 
and Rule 40 bis (K) of the ICTR RPE.  
94 Rule 65 (A) of the ICTY RPE. See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 65 (A) of the 
ICTR RPE. 
95 Rule 65 (B) of the ICTY/ICTR RPE. 
96 Rule 65 (C) of the ICTY RPE. See for a comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 65 (C) of the 
ICTR RPE. 
97 Within the context of the ICTY, the amendment of the rule, removing the requirement “exceptional 
circumstances”, entered into force on 6 December 1999, see ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. 
Momčilo Krajišnik & Biljana Plavšić, ‘Decision on Momčilo Krajišnik’s Notice of Motion for 
Provisional Release’, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, 8 October 2001, n. 21. Within the context of the 
ICTR, this only took place more than three years later, on 27 May 2003, see O’Dowd 2004, p. 96. 
98 Which reads: “Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a 
judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a 
reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be 
detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the 
judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement [emphasis added, 
ChP].” 
99 See Zappalà 2003, p. 70, Gordon 2007, pp. 691-692 and Sluiter 2007, p. 14 (and n. 28). Note that 
even judges of the ICTY had to admit that the removal of the “exceptional circumstances” requirement 
did not change “the position that provisional release continues to be the exception and not the rule”. 
(ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik & Biljana Plavšić, ‘Decision on Momčilo 
Krajišnik’s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release’, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, 8 October 2001, 
para. 12.) See also O’Dowd 2004, p. 97. See also ibid., p. 98 (and n. 49), explaining that ICTR judges 
have also followed this stance. 








is charged101 and the fact that there is thus a chance that that person may be 
sentenced to a considerable time in prison – that there is also a chance that that 
person may flee if released.102 Alongside this risk of absconding, which will lead to 
the same problems the police force-lacking Tribunals may have encountered in 
apprehending the person in the first place,103 Sluiter also points to social disturbance 
as a legitimate ground for provisional detention. This approach would indeed be 
more correct, even if the factual outcome may very well be the same as in the first 
approach, namely that detention is the rule and release the exception.  
These kinds of grounds, which were also identified in the context of the 
(problems related to the) remedy of release from provisions such as Article 9, 
paragraph 4 of the ICCPR and Article 5, paragraph 4 of the ECHR (see Subsection 
4.4 of Chapter III), can explain why a Tribunal, once it has a person (finally) in 
custody, will not be keen then to provisionally release him. However, much will 
depend on the exact circumstances of the specific case. One must also understand 
that a person charged with very serious crimes may very well be provisionally 
released, for example, if it is clear that that person will appear for trial and will not 
pose a danger to other persons and if other grounds for denying release, such as 
social disturbance, are lacking. Note finally that supporting such conditional releases 
arguably does not in any way undermine the construction proposed in the context of 
the problematic remedy of release from Article 9, paragraph 4 of the ICCPR and 
Article 5, paragraph 4 of the ECHR, a remedy which has nothing to do with 
provisional release; the release stemming from the two above-mentioned human 
rights provisions is the remedy for an unlawful detention and not for the fact that a 
judge decides that a person, under certain conditions, can await his trial in freedom 
rather than in custody.  
Having briefly discussed the arrest and transfer provisions of the ICTY/ICTR 
(RPE), about which Swart concludes that they are “mainly concerned on the duties 
of States vis-à-vis the Tribunals”104 and “[t]o a certain extent (...) neglect the rights 
                                                          
101 See also Khan 2008, p. 1164, n. 34: “Various commentators have justified or explained the more 
restrictive pre-trial release conditions in the ICTY/R Rules of Procedure and Evidence. For example, D. 
D. Ntanda Nsereko, observes that, “Considering that the rules subscribe to the presumption of 
innocence, the provisional release restrictions are quite stringent. The only justification for this 
stringency that comes to mind is the gravity of the offences over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction and 
the desire to avoid a public outcry over allowing accused persons to be at large” (...). Similarly, K. S. 
Gallant, has stated that “While such a rule [that pre-trial release is exceptional] would be harsh in a court 
with jurisdiction over ordinary crimes, it is reasonable given that the only crimes over which the 
Tribunal has jurisdiction are serious violations of international humanitarian law. The harshness of this 
rule, however, emphasises the need to ensure that persons are not arrested and detained except on 
reasonable (or probable) cause”. (...).” See also O’Dowd 2004, p. 93. 
102 See also O’Dowd 2004, p. 93. 
103 See the remainder of the quotation from the case of Krajišnik and Plavšić (see n. 99), where the 
judges write on the “position that provisional release continues to be the exception and not the rule, a 
position justified by the absence of any power in the International Tribunal to execute its own arrest 
warrants [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik 
& Biljana Plavšić, ‘Decision on Momčilo Krajišnik’s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release’, Case 
No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, 8 October 2001, para. 12.) See also O’Dowd 2004, p. 93. 








of the individual persons concerned”,105 three points still need to be addressed 
before turning to the actual male captus cases.  
First, the third and last “innovative way” to obtain the arrest of persons and their 
transfer to The Hague mentioned by Lopez-Terres is still to be discussed.  
This is the creation, in 2001, of a specialised tracking and intelligence unit in the 
OTP.106 This team has no powers of arrest;107 it assembles information on the 
                                                          
105 Ibid. See also Sluiter 2009, p. 467. 
106 See P. Lopez-Terres, Chief of Investigations, ICTY, ‘Arrest and transfer of indictees. The experience 
of the ICTY’, 15 December 2006 (available at: 
http://www.icln.net/htm/Annual%20conference%202006/Presentation_Lopez-Terres.pdf), p. 7. Note 
that the ICTR also had (in fact, was the first to have, see Simmons 2004) such a tracking team, see, for 
example, ‘Security Council reviews progress made by international tribunals for Rwanda, former 
Yugoslavia. Speakers Stress Need to Bring High-Profile Offenders To Justice, Gain Cooperation of 
Governments in Arresting Those Accused’, UNSC, 5199th Meeting (AM) (13 June 2005), Press Release 
SC/8409, available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8409.doc.htm: “Noting that the 
tracking and apprehension of the 14 fugitives continued to be a high priority, he [ICTR Prosecutor 
Jallow, ChP] said the organization and strategies of the Tracking Unit had been the subject of review as 
a result of which three measures had been taken. The Unit’s capacity had been increased with additional 
staff.  It also had now adopted a strategy for ensuring a greater physical presence of its members in the 
field than at headquarters in Arusha and Kigali. Contact with the political and law enforcement 
authorities had been initiated with the countries in which the fugitives were suspected to be taking 
refuge. Each of those countries had agreed to establish joint mechanism with the Prosecutor’s 
Investigation Division tracking team through which they could collaborate in tracking the 
fugitives. There had also been useful discussions with the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the African Union on modalities of collaboration in 
that respect.” See on this topic also C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, 
Working Paper No. 24 – April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), pp. 34-36. 
107 In that respect, it must be clearly discerned from an international arrest team whose establishment 
was proposed by the Royal Marechaussee of the Netherlands in 2001, see Leurdijk 2001, p. 69. During 
the discussions on this proposal, it was stated that “arresting war criminals is not a soldier’s job but a 
police responsibility. The actual arrests (…) should be left to specialised police trained teams of the 
gendarmerie-type, such as the Marechaussee itself”. (Ibid.) Since these kinds of teams are already 
available, “the real question (…) would be whether it would be politically feasible.” (Ibid., p. 70.) 
Leurdijk, after mentioning potential obstacles with respect to the proposal such as the role of the non-
intervention principle, answers this question in the negative: “[W]hile a permanent arresting team might 
be considered highly desirable, at the same time, it is highly unlikely that here is sufficient political 
support among the UN member states to establish such an ‘A-team’”. (Ibid., p. 71.) See also Supernor 
2001, p. 231: “The UN Charter envisioned that the UN would possess its own standing military force 
but this has never occurred. If, after approximately fifty years, the UN has been unable to implement its 
original intent of possessing a standing military force; it is difficult to envision the creation of a standing 
international police force [original footnote omitted, ChP].” On 14 March 2007, during the lecture ‘The 
Tribunal’s Completion Strategy and the Importance of Cooperation of States for its Work’, presented by 
Olga Kavran, spokesperson for the ICTY’s Prosecutor and hosted by the International Criminal Law 
Network in The Hague, the author of this study asked Olga Kavran whether she knew the current 
opinion of the international community on this issue. Again, the answer was that an international arrest 
team will probably not be feasible because of a lack of political will. See for an older account Gallant 
1994, p. 583: “The reliance upon national authorities to effect arrest is necessary because it is not yet 
politically feasible to establish an international police force with arrest powers.” See finally Lavrijssen 
1998, pp. 27-28, describing the views of Goldstone and Van Boven on this matter: “Dr. Richard 
Goldstone: ‘I do not believe that we are going to have an international police force in the foreseeable 








ground, for example through surveillance,108 in order to track down the suspects. 
This intelligence is then provided to governments, organisations or other entities 
with arrest powers, which must make the actual arrests.109  
The above-mentioned link with the government implies that the State on which 
territory the team is assembling information is aware of this team and has consented 
with its mandate and powers.110  
However, that does not mean that the authorities will always cooperate with the 
team, even if they have an obligation to do so.111  
                                                                                                                                              
arresting their citizens. As much I would like it to happen, it is just not practical politics. (…)’ Professor 
Theo van Boven: ‘It is not realistic to expect that the International Criminal Court will have a police 
force at its disposal. (…)’[emphasis in original but bold emphasis changed into italicised emphasis, 
ChP]” 
108 See M. Simons, ‘Tribunal Detectives Pursue War Criminals in the Balkans’, New York Times, 25 
July 2004, available at: 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E01EFD6173DF936A15754C0A9629C8B63&sec=&s
pon=&pagewanted=all: “The war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has no assault troops or 
police commandos at its service. But it does have detectives armed with cameras. For almost two years, 
the undercover agents and their network of informants have snooped around streets in Serbia and 
travelled through the mountains in Bosnia. Their business is to find and shadow people suspected of 
committing war crimes during the Balkan conflict of the early 1990’s. (…) “It’s classic shadowing 
work, with the use of sources and informants,” said a former investigator familiar with the work of both 
tribunals.” 
109 See P. Lopez-Terres, Chief of Investigations, ICTY, ‘Arrest and transfer of indictees. The experience 
of the ICTY’, 15 December 2006 (available at: 
http://www.icln.net/htm/Annual%20conference%202006/Presentation_Lopez-Terres.pdf), p. 7. See also 
the presentation of David Tolbert of the ICTY during the ‘Second public hearing of the Office of the 
Prosecutor, Session 2: NGOs and Other Experts’, The Hague, 26 September 2006 (available at: 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Network+with+Partners/Public+
Hearings/Second+Public+Hearing/Session+2), commenting on the ICC OTP’s Report on Prosecutorial 
Strategy, The Hague, 14 September 2006 (available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D673DD8C-D427-4547-BC69-
2D363E07274B/143708/ProsecutorialStrategy20060914_English.pdf), providing two examples where 
the ICTY tracking team was used, namely the Hadžić case (see n. 112) and the Gotovina case: “[T]he 
key information which resulted in Gotovina’s arrest in the Canary Islands could only be properly 
assessed because the OTP’s “tracking team” could evaluate it. (…) [T]he Office needs “eyes and ears” 
of its own. (…) Because we had gathered our own intelligence/expertise from the field, we were able to 
test Croatia in the Gotovina case when the authorities c[a]me forward with information. Thus, the 
Prosecutor had the tools to test the information submitted by the Croatian government. When the crucial 
information came that Gotovina was possibly in the Canary Islands, we were able to check this 
information.” 
110 See also n. 106 (where Chief Prosecutor Jallow explains the policy at the ICTR). If that is not the 
case, then one can wonder whether the police work executed by this team is not a violation of a State’s 
sovereignty. (Although the ICTY’s OTP has not qualified the work of the unit as police work (See the 
following summary from the ICTY Weekly Press Briefing, 2 May 2001, available at: 
http://www.icty.org/sid/3334: “He [Jean Jacques Joris, Advisor to the Prosecutor, ChP] added that the 
term ‘police task force’ was given to the general idea previously, now the Prosecutor favoured the 
expression ‘tracking team’ because that was what the team would be about. Not police, because they 
would not be carrying out the arrests, solely locating people. Like a scouting group, he concluded.”), it 
is hard to see why it is not. The fact that the team does not have the (indeed very crucial) power to 
arrest, does not make all its other powers, which appear to go to the core of police work, meaningless. 








The famous Hadžić tip-off story makes this abundantly clear.112 Notwithstanding 
this, Lopez-Terres explains that the unit “has played a crucial role in obtaining 
intelligence and information on the whereabouts of several fugitives, which 
eventually led to their arrest, both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia”.113 
The second point to be made is that it is probably not the above-mentioned 
techniques, but political pressure from third States and organisations that has led to 
most arrests and transfers. In the words of the (then) Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, 
Carla Del Ponte: “Experience had shown that the political pressure from the 
European Union and the United States was the most significant factor encouraging 
the States of the former Yugoslavia to transfer indictees to The Hague.”114 One 
could hereby think of the carrot-and-stick method with respect to finances115 and 
                                                                                                                                              
111 See P. Lopez-Terres, Chief of Investigations, ICTY, ‘Arrest and transfer of indictees. The experience 
of the ICTY’, 15 December 2006 (available at: 
http://www.icln.net/htm/Annual%20conference%202006/Presentation_Lopez-Terres.pdf), p. 7. 
112 See Simons 2004: “Recounting her [Carla Del Ponte’s, ChP] story in an interview, she said that 
earlier this month, when her office was about to deliver a new indictment and arrest warrant to Serbia, 
she and her agents decided to set a trap. The arrest order was for Goran Hadzic, a leader of rebel Serbs 
in Krajina, Croatia, who was charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. A warehouse 
worker before the war, Mr. Hadzic profited from wartime smuggling, Ms. Del Ponte said, and now lives 
in a comfortable villa in Novi Sad, a Serbian city on the Danube. “The day before delivering the papers, 
we put Hadzic’s house under surveillance,” she said. She offered a detailed account of what came next. 
On July 13, at 9:30 a.m., her representatives delivered the indictment and arrest warrant for Mr. Hadzic 
to the Serbian Foreign Ministry in Belgrade. They also provided Mr. Hadzic’s address. In keeping with 
the standard practice, on the same day, at 11:30 a.m., copies were transmitted to the Serbian Embassy at 
The Hague. At 3:30 p.m., Ms. Del Ponte said, the Serbian Foreign Ministry sent the documents to the 
Belgrade District Court. They arrived there after working hours. That day, Mr. Hadzic was seen in his 
garden. He left his home at 12:38 p.m., and returned 45 minutes later. “Around 4 o’clock he gets a call 
on his cellphone,” Ms. Del Ponte said. “It’s the call tipping him off. I’d quite like to know who that 
was.” At 4:27 p.m., he was seen leaving his house carrying a bag. He got into a car with a driver and 
drove off. Two days later, Ms. Del Ponte said, the local police reported to the Belgrade Court that Mr. 
Hadzic was not at home and that his whereabouts were unknown. On Thursday, after she released the 
surveillance photographs, the Serbian police said they would open an internal investigation into Mr. 
Hadzic’s escape. It was not the first time, she said, that a suspect had vanished after the Belgrade 
authorities were asked to make an arrest.” For the official press conference on these events, see ‘Press 
Conference by Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte 19 July 2004’, The Hague, 19 July 2004, JP/P.I.S./872-e, 
available at: http://www.icty.org/sid/8389. 
113 P. Lopez-Terres, Chief of Investigations, ICTY, ‘Arrest and transfer of indictees. The experience of 
the ICTY’, 15 December 2006 (available at: 
http://www.icln.net/htm/Annual%20conference%202006/Presentation_Lopez-Terres.pdf), p. 7. See also 
the ICTY itself on its website available at: http://www.icty.org/sid/97: “The tracking team, which 
consists of information agents from various countries, has contributed to the arrest of several indictees. 
Providing national authorities with exact data on the fugitives’ location can circumvent the passiveness 
of many states in searching for them.” 
114 ‘Presidents, Prosecutors of Rwanda, former Yugoslavia Tribunals Brief Security Council on Progress 
in Implementing Completion Strategies. Say Aim to Conclude by 2010, but Schedule Will Be Affected 
By Apprehension of At-Large Indictees, Transfer of Cases to National Courts’, UNSC, 5328th Meeting 
(AM) (15 December 2005), Press Release SC/8586, available at: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8586.doc.htm. 
115 As will be further clarified in Subsection 3.1.3, “[f]ormer President Milosevic was surrendered to the 
ICTY on 28 June 2001 due to a US threat to boycott a key donor’s conference.” (P. Lopez-Terres, Chief 








membership of organisations.116 One can argue that such actions are not only based 
on politics but may also have a legal dimension. In the words of the ICTY:  
 
Article 29 imposes an obligation on Member States towards all other Members or, in 
other words, an “obligation erga omnes partes”. By the same token, Article 29 posits 
a community interest in its observance. In other words, every Member State of the 
United Nations has a legal interest in the fulfilment of the obligation laid down in 
Article 29 (…). Faced with the situation where a judicial finding by the International 
Tribunal of a breach of Article 29 has been reported to the Security Council, each 
                                                                                                                                              
2006 (available at: http://www.icln.net/htm/Annual%20conference%202006/Presentation_Lopez-
Terres.pdf), p. 10.) See also Gillett 2008, p. 19 (writing on the Milošević transfer as well): “[I]t took the 
conditioning of US $1.28 billion of desperately needed aid on his surrender to persuade the Serbian 
National Assembly to hand him over [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Scharf (2000, p. 938), 
who does not, however, limit himself to the statal context: “[F]inancial inducement can be used as a 
stick (as with the threat or imposition of trade embargoes and the freezing of assets), or as a carrot (as 
with the conditional promise of reconstruction aid or the offer of “rewards).” One can agree with 
Scharf’s preference for the more personal method of freezing of assets here (see ibid., p. 946): 
“Compared to other forms of financial inducement such as imposition of economic sanctions and 
conditionality of reconstruction aid – which hurt the population at large, as well as the target country’s 
trading partners – freezing the assets of indicted war criminals is a precision tool for promoting justice. 
It is a tool of great potential value to the ICC, which would be available where its jurisdiction is 
triggered by the Security Council.” See also n. 300 of Chapter VIII, where the ICC’s own possibilities 
with respect to this tool are further explained. As concerns the rewards, one could think here of financial 
rewards for citizens for information or assistance which will lead, in the end, to the arrest of suspects of 
international crimes, see the ‘US Rewards for Justice Program’, available at: 
http://www.rewardsforjustice.net. See also ibid., p. 950, where Scharf explains that “[o]n June 24, 1999, 
the United States announced that it was offering a reward of $5 million for such information and 
assistance related to indicted Yugoslav war criminals [original footnote omitted, ChP].” This last tool 
could indeed be very practical, at least when it is clear that awards will only be granted for information 
and assistance in the arrest efforts of the competent authorities and not for actually turning in the suspect 
in question, which may lead to chaotic wild-west scenarios executed by private bounty hunters, see also 
n. 281 of this chapter. 
116 See P. Lopez-Terres, Chief of Investigations, ICTY, ‘Arrest and transfer of indictees. The experience 
of the ICTY’, 15 December 2006 (available at: 
http://www.icln.net/htm/Annual%20conference%202006/Presentation_Lopez-Terres.pdf), pp. 10-11: 
“In 2002, in Copenhagen, the European Union agreed to a strategy defining the conditions for the States 
of the former Yugoslavia to join the EU. The full co-operation with the ICTY was one of them. In 
parallel, NATO told Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro that could not join the 
Partnership for Peace program as long as the most wanted indictees would remain at large.” An example 
mentioned by Lopez-Terres (at p. 11) is the Gotovina case: “It was only after the Prosecutor confirmed 
that Croatia was fully co-operating with the ICTY, on 3 October 2005, that the accession talks [with the 
EU, ChP] finally began. A few days earlier, Croatia had communicated Gotovina’s whereabouts.” See 
also Ciampi 2006, p. 734 and Roper and Barria 2008, p. 461. The latter authors, by the way, 
differentiate between political (less efficient) and economic (more efficient) pressure, see ibid., pp. 466-
467 (where they write about the ICC, in whose context political/economic pressure may, of course, also 
be of crucial importance): “We regard political pressure by third parties, whether by states or non-state 
actors, as generally having a limited ability to enhance the bargaining effectiveness of the ICC with 
regard to the capture of indictees. Instead, military or peacekeeping pressure and especially economic 
pressure are more successful tools available to third parties to enhance the leverage of the ICC.” See 
finally Rastan 2008, pp. 438-439 and C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, 
Working Paper No. 24 – April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 








Member State of the United Nations may act upon the legal interest referred to; 
consequently it may request the State to terminate its breach of Article 29. In addition 
to this possible unilateral action, a collective response through other 
intergovernmental organizations may be envisaged. The fundamental principles of the 
United Nations Charter and the spirit of the Statute of the International Tribunal aim 
to limit, as far as possible, the risks of arbitrariness and conflict. They therefore give 
pride of place to collective or joint action to be taken through an intergovernmental 
organization. It is appropriate to emphasise that this collective action: (i) may only be 
taken after a judicial finding has been made by the International Tribunal; and (ii) 
may take various forms, such as a political or moral condemnation, or a collective 
request to cease the breach, or economic or diplomatic sanctions. In addition, 
collective action would be warranted in the case of repeated and blatant breaches of 
Article 29 by the same State; and provided the Security Council had not decided that 
it enjoyed exclusive powers on the matter, the situation being part of a general 
condition of threat to the peace [original footnotes omitted, ChP].117 
 
Recourse to these methods can also be explained by the fact that the normal 
mechanism in the case of non-compliance118 is not very effective.119  
In that respect, the fact that the Tribunals are, on paper, backed by the UN 
Charter and the UNSC, to which, for example, the ICTY’s OTP has often turned for 
assistance, 120 may not necessarily be of any help to these institutions.121   
                                                          
117 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, ‘Judgement on the Request of the Republic 
of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997’, IT-95-14, 29 October 1997, 
paras. 26 and 36. 
118 According to Rule 7 bis of the ICTY (and ICTR) RPE, “[a] judge, a Trial [C]hamber or the 
Prosecutor may request the President to make a finding of non-compliance with the obligation to 
cooperate, and if the President makes such a finding, the Security Council must be notified. Upon 
receipt of the President’s report, the Security Council has the discretion with respect to what action, if 
any, is necessary, to bring the recalcitrant State into compliance with its duties.” (P. Lopez-Terres, Chief 
of Investigations, ICTY, ‘Arrest and transfer of indictees. The experience of the ICTY’, 15 December 
2006 (available at: http://www.icln.net/htm/Annual%20conference%202006/Presentation_Lopez-
Terres.pdf), p. 9.) 
119 See ibid.: “Such a mechanism of denunciation before the Security Council, is potentially a useful 
tool, since if used diligently, is tantamount to a public blame before the representatives of the whole 
international community in New York, which most of States will want to avoid. However, the Security 
Council has not always responded effectively to the Tribunal’s reports of non-compliance, typically 
issuing a Resolution or a Presidential Statement in response to the ICTY President’s reports of non-
compliance. (…) Given the relative inefficiency of such a mechanism the Office of the Prosecutor had 
to find innovative ways to obtain the cooperation from the recalcitrant states by using a substitute 
strategy and also by creating incentives for full cooperation with the ICTY, such as conditioning aid 
programs and admission to international organizations.” The fact that the Tribunals (and this, of course, 
also goes for the ICC) do not have the power to force States to comply with their orders has been 
qualified as the Achilles heel of these institutions. (See, for example, Van Sliedregt 2001 B, p. 74.) 
Although this term is indeed most often used in the context of lack of enforcement powers (see, for 
example, also Sadat 1999, p. 116, Knoops 2002, pp. 1 and 324 and Sloan 2005, p. 492), the term has 
also been used to describe other features in the systems of international criminal tribunals, see for 
example Tolbert 2003, p. 975 (“the defense counsel and legal aid systems”) and Crane 2006, p. 513 
(“the experience of the judges who are appointed to try the cases and hear the various appeals”). 
120 See, for example, the following words from Carla Del Ponte. After having talked about the “accused 








The third and final point which must be made here before turning to the actual 
male captus cases has to do with the interaction between the law of the Tribunals (of 
which part has been described in the previous pages) and human rights law. 
Although the Statute and the RPE mention certain rights,122 one can wonder whether 
the Tribunals are also bound to human rights law stemming from, for example, the 
ICCPR and the ECHR. 
Although the provisions of international and regional human rights treaties in 
principle only create obligations for States and thus not for non-State entities such as 
an international criminal tribunal,123 it can be argued (cf. also the discussion in 
Chapter III on the right to liberty and security) that several of these treaty provisions 
are evidence of customary international law and as such binding on all subjects of 
                                                                                                                                              
S/PV.4063, p. 3), she stated (ibid., p. 4): “I cannot emphasize enough the importance of the support the 
Security Council can give the Tribunal. We do not seek it lightly, and I therefore urge the Council to put 
its full weight behind our efforts when we ask for its assistance and to be creative in finding ways to 
bring to bear the sort of pressures that will produce results.” It must be noted that the word “creative” is 
linked here to the words “in finding ways to bring to bear the sort of pressures that will produce results.” 
Hence, it is linked with the political pressure which the UNSC can resort to. However, these words can 
arguably not be seen as a green light for ‘creative’/dubious ways to arrest suspects, for example, through 
abduction. However, Supernor (2001, p. 217) does connect these words of Carla Del Ponte with the 
abduction of Nikolić (whose case will be discussed in Section 3.1.4). 
121 See in that respect the Report to the Secretary-General of the Commission of Experts to Review the 
Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999, 26 May 
2005. In this report, which can be found in Annex II of UN Doc. S/2005/458 of 15 July 2005 (‘Letter 
dated 24 June 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’), one 
can read (in para. 417): “[T]he experience of the ICTY has shown that a legal foundation in Chapter VII 
may not necessarily guarantee effective enforcement in practice [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
Nevertheless, it is also true that “[o]ne cannot say (...) that all actions by the Security Council against 
Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have had no effect on these States’ efforts to 
cooperate with the ICTY’s requests of arrest and surrender of suspects located in their territory.” 
(Ciampi 2006, p. 732.) Ciampi also provides (see ibid., p. 733) an example related to an 
internationalised criminal tribunal in that respect: “[E]ven the mere possibility that the Security Council 
requires the surrender of suspects under the threat of sanctions has proved effective: for example, when 
the Prosecutor for the Sierra Leone Special Court advanced the proposal of a Chapter VII Security 
Council resolution to compel Nigeria to arrest and transfer wanted fugitive Charles Taylor to the Special 
Court, Charles Taylor was eventually turned over by the Nigerian government before any Security 
Council’s action was taken against the latter [original footnote omitted, ChP].” A very famous example, 
not related to the present international(ised) criminal tribunals, where a Chapter VII recourse 
(eventually) seems to have worked is the Lockerbie case. In UNSC Res. 748 of 31 March 1992, the 
Council, acting under Chapter VII, decided that Libya had to comply, among other things, with requests 
for extradition of the two Libyan officials who were suspected of murdering 270 people in the 1988 
explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over the Scottish town of Lockerbie, “failing which a set of 
enforcement measures would be imposed. Enforcement measures were eventually imposed, remained 
into force for a decade and were finally lifted following not only the surrender of the two suspects to the 
Netherlands for trial before a Scottish tribunal, but also acceptance of responsibility by [the] government 
of Libya for the actions of its officials, payment of appropriate compensation to the victims and an 
express renunciation of terrorism [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ciampi 2006, p. 732.)  
122 See, for example, the already discussed Art. 21 of the ICTY Statute/Art. 20 of the ICTR Statute 
(‘Rights of the accused’) and Rule 42 of the ICTY/ICTR RPE (‘Rights of Suspects during 
Investigation’). 








international law, including an international criminal tribunal.124 Moreover, if a 
tribunal were not bound by such provisions, obligations imposed on States could 
then easily be circumvented by creating tribunals which could then take over State 
functions.125 Finally, it could also be asserted that it is not very logical to maintain 
that these sub-organs of the UNSC, which are often seen as model institutions with 
respect to fair proceedings,126 could operate without respecting such (procedural) 
rights. If that were to happen, then it could have “negative consequences that 
transcend the limited framework of the Tribunals”.127 
Notwithstanding this, the first impression one may have obtained from the 
overview of the arrest and transfer provisions discussed above is that the Tribunals 
are particularly focused on efficiency and not so much on the rights of the 
suspect.128 However, in 1993, the UNSG, commenting on the rights of the accused 
in the context of the ICTY, stated that  
 
[i]t is axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect internationally 
recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its 
proceedings.[129] In the view of the Secretary-General, such internationally 
recognized standards are, in particular, contained in article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.130  
 
Nevertheless, in the Tribunal’s very first case, the Tadić case, the judges, while 
taking into account this paragraph of the UNSG’s report,131 clarified: 
 
The fact that the International Tribunal must interpret its provisions within its own 
legal context and not rely in its application on interpretations made by other judicial 
bodies is evident in the different circumstances in which the provisions apply. The 
interpretations of Article 6 of the ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights are 
meant to apply to ordinary criminal and, for Article 6 (1), civil adjudications. By 
contrast, the International Tribunal is adjudicating crimes which are considered so 
                                                          
124 See also ibid., pp. 1327-1328. See also Sluiter 2003 B, p. 937: “[H]uman rights law binds the 
Tribunals in their activities to the extent that it is part of customary international law or constitutes 
general principles of law.” 
125 See Zappalà 2002 B, p. 1328. See also Sluiter 2002 B, p. 702. 
126 Cf. also Art. 1 (‘purposes’) of the UN Charter: “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all” and Zappalà 2002 B, p. 1328. 
127 Swart 2001, p. 201. This is because “both ad hoc Tribunals inevitably provide role models for 
national systems of criminal justice.” (Ibid.) See also Schomburg 2005, p. 95: “[A]ll international 
criminal tribunals fulfill an important model role for national courts”. 
128 See the already-mentioned remarks of Swart at ns. 24 and 104-105 and accompanying text. 
129 The words “at all stages of its proceedings” show that the Tribunal should ensure that the suspect 
receives not only a fair trial in court (a fair hearing) but also a fair trial more generally, which includes 
the pre-trial process. (Cf. in that respect also the already-mentioned Rule 42 of the ICTY/ICTR RPE: 
“rights of suspects during investigation”.) 
130 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 106. 
131 ICTY, Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a “Dule”, ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses’, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 10 August 








horrific as to warrant universal jurisdiction. The International Tribunal is, in certain 
respects, comparable to a military tribunal, which often has limited rights of due 
process and more lenient rules of evidence. (…) [T]he Trial Chamber agrees with the 
Prosecutor that the International Tribunal must interpret its provisions within its own 
context and determine where the balance lies between the accused’s right to a fair 
trial and the protection of victims and witnesses within its unique legal framework. 
While the jurisprudence of other international judicial bodies is relevant when 
examining the meaning of concepts such as “fair trial”, whether or not the proper 
balance is met depends on the context of the legal system in which the concepts are 
being applied.132  
 
These words can clearly be criticised. Recalling the reasoning made in the 
discussion of the Levinge case (see footnote 159 and accompanying text of Chapter 
V): as concerns the fairness of the trial in the strict sense of the word (which was the 
case here – the issue involved the use of anonymous witnesses), there can arguably 
be no balance between the suspect’s fair trial right and anything else. It is submitted 
that a fair trial in the strict sense of the word is the minimum requirement for any 
trial. If anything less is offered, under the guise of the court’s ‘uniqueness’, the trial 
should be stayed to immediately repair the problem. However, if it becomes clear 
that the suspect can no longer receive a fair trial, the judges should refuse 
jurisdiction to try the case.  
Luckily, however, “[s]ubsequent decisions (...) have displayed a greater ease 
with sources of law outside the Statute and RPE and have increasingly applied treaty 
based human rights law [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.133  
                                                          
132 Ibid., paras. 28 and 30. For criticism, see, for example, Stapleton 1999, pp. 555ff. 
133 Sluiter 2003 B, p. 938. See also Zappalà 2002 B, p. 1328 and the two still-to-discuss Barayagwiza 
(see Subsection 3.2.1) and Nikolić (see para. 110 of the Trial Chamber’s decision of 9 October 2002, see 
Subsection 3.1.4) cases. In the first case, for example, the judges held: “The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights is part of general international law and is applied on that basis. Regional 
human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the American Convention 
on Human Rights, and the jurisprudence developed thereunder, are persuasive authority which may be 
of assistance in applying and interpreting the Tribunal’s applicable law. Thus, they are not binding of 
their own accord on the Tribunal. They are, however, authoritative as evidence of international custom.” 
(ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-
19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 40.) Swart (2001, p. 201) welcomes this development: “Persons 
suspected or accused of international crimes should be no less entitled to respect for their basic 
individual rights than any other suspects or accused.” Of course, one cannot but agree with this 
statement. Prosecutors and judges must respect basic human rights, such as the right to liberty and 
security, in every case, whether that case involves a suspect of fraud or a suspect of genocide. In 
addition, it is also crucial that every pre-trial wrong is repaired by a remedy. However, as will be 
explained in the context of the Dokmanović and Nikolić cases, these commendable thoughts do not 
delete the problems caused by the remedy of release, see Subsection 4.4 of Chapter III. To solve these 
problems, it was, and again will be, suggested that, in the case of the establishment of an unlawful 
arrest/detention, one should take into account all the relevant aspects of the case in determining the most 
appropriate remedy, which may include the fact that the suspect in question is charged with very serious 
crimes and that prosecuting that person is of paramount importance to the international community as a 








An example of this can be provided with respect to the right to liberty and 
security/the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention, which is so 
important for this study.  
This right is not mentioned in Article 21 of the ICTY Statute/Article 20 of the 
ICTR Statute (‘Rights of the accused’) and Rule 42 of the ICTY/ICTR RPE (‘Rights 
of Suspects during Investigation’),134 which have already been alluded to but, with 
inspiration from (or by applying directly) treaties like the ICCPR and the ECHR,135 
judges have tried to fill that gap through case law.136 For example, in the still-to-
discuss (see Subsection 3.2.1) Barayagwiza case, the ICTR judges saw “no reason 
to conclude that the protections afforded to suspects under Article 9 of the ICCPR 
do not also apply to suspects brought before the Tribunal”.137 Zappalà also notes that 
 
[a]n element that may seem surprising in the texts governing the activities of the ad 
hoc Tribunals is the absence of any express provision granting the right to challenge 
the legality of the arrest. This is, however, an element that should absolutely not be 
overestimated. As stated several times by the Chambers of the Tribunals, such a right 
                                                          
134 See also Sluiter 2001, p. 152. Note, however, that Rule 40 bis (G) of the ICTY RPE seems to point to 
a certain habeas corpus possibility: “During detention, the Prosecutor and the suspect or the suspect’s 
counsel may submit to the Trial Chamber of which the Judge who made the order is a member, all 
applications relative to the propriety of provisional detention or to the suspect’s release.” See for a 
comparable provision in the ICTR context Rule 40 bis (K) of the ICTR RPE. See also the review and 
release possibility from the moment of the suspect’s transfer in Rule 40 (C) and (D) of the ICTR RPE. 
135 See ibid., p. 155: “One may explain the prominent place of the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the 
European Court as recognition of the importance and authority of this instrument and this international 
judicial body. Furthermore, a great number of rights are identical under both the ECHR and the ICCPR, 
and the ECHR, was used as a source in the development of the ICCPR.” 
136 Sluiter (ibid., p. 152) notes that, because of the fact that the ICTY Statute and RPE “do not 
incorporate the right of persons not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention”, it is “of vital 
importance that the Tribunal applies these provisions [namely Artt. 9 of the ICCPR and 5 of the ECHR, 
ChP] to their full extent, including relevant case law pertaining to these provisions.” Hence, that should 
also include the remedies mentioned therein. Cf. in that respect also ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić also known as “Pavo”, Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo, 
‘Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal (Provisional Release) by Hazim Delić’, Case No. IT-96-
21-AR72.4, 22 November 1996, para. 16: “The right to liberty is without question a fundamental human 
right. The Applicant has cited a number of international human rights instruments in this connection, but 
the proposition is axiomatic. The right also entails the right to an effective remedy for deprivation or 
violation of that right.” See also ibid., para. 17, where it is clarified that this means that the Chamber 
must review the lawfulness of a person’s deprivation of liberty. Although it is not clearly stated as such, 
this must arguably also include a release if the deprivation of liberty is deemed unlawful. However, that 
was not the case here: “The mistake which the Applicant makes, however, is to consider that the Trial 
Chamber, by denying the motion for provisional release, has violated the Applicant’s right to liberty and 
that the Applicant is therefore entitled to an effective judicial remedy for that violation. The correct 
analysis is that the Trial Chamber is the effective judicial remedy for any alleged violation of the right to 
liberty. By applying to the Trial Chamber, the Applicant exercises his right to challenge the lawfulness 
of his detention and deprivation of liberty. The word “effective” does not mean that the Application has 
to succeed; this would be a nonsense. It is enough that the competent judicial authority reviews the 
position in accordance with the appropriate norms and human rights standards, which the Trial Chamber 
has done quite properly [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
137 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-








is implicit in the system of the Tribunals for its fundamental importance and it 
directly derives from international norms protecting the rights of the individuals in 
criminal proceedings, which are binding on the Tribunals [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].138 
                                                          
138 Zappalà 2002 A, p. 1195. (See also Zappalà 2003, p. 75: “In the ad hoc Tribunals systems there are 
no specific provisions for habeas corpus motions or for compensation for unlawful arrest or detention. 
However, the practice of Chambers has shown that the judges are willing to admit such motions, 
irrespective of the lack of express provisions, in accordance with international human rights law. 
Furthermore, as regards the right of compensation the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal held that where 
the rights of the accused were violated he or she had to receive compensation [original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].” See also Knoops 2003, p. 221.) Zappalà hereby refers, besides the Dokmanović, 
Barayagwiza and Todorović cases which will be addressed in more detail in the next section of this 
chapter, to the Djukić and Krsmanović case (IT-96-19-Misc1). This last case will not be further 
examined in this book (see also n. 3 of Chapter IV) for the Chamber quickly disposed of the matter: it 
“declined to pronounce upon the legality of the arrest by national authorities on the view that it could 
not review the acts of national authorities in this respect”. (Ibid.) (For the decision itself, see ICTY, Trial 
Chamber I, Motion on Behalf of General Djorde Djukić, ‘Decision’, Case No. IT-96-19-Misc. 1, 28 
February 1996.) Cf. also Radosavljevic 2008, p. 276: “[T]he ICTR has consistently held that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review the legal circumstances attending the arrest of a suspect in so far as the arrest had 
been made pursuant to the laws of the arresting state [original footnote omitted, ChP]. Radosavljevic 
refers here to the cases of Karemera, Ngirumpatse and Kajelijeli (ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The 
Prosecutor versus Edouard Karemera, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion for the Release of the 
Accused’, Case No. ICTR-98-44-I, 10 December 1999; ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. 
Matthieu Ngirumpatse, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion Challenging the Lawfulness of the Arrest and 
Detention and Seeking Return or Inspection of Seized Items’, Case No. ICTR-97-44-I, 10 December 
1999; ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor versus J[u]v[é]nal Kajelijeli, ‘Decision on the Defence 
Motion Concerning the Arbitrary Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused and on the Defence Notice 
of Urgent Motion to Expand and Supplement the Record of 8 December 1999 Hearing’, Case No. 
ICTR-98-44-I, 8 May 2000), three cases which were also referred to in the case ICTR, Trial Chamber I, 
The Prosecutor v. Siméon Nshamihigo, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion Seeking Release of the 
Accused Person and/or Any Other Remedy on the Basis of Abuse of Process by the Prosecutor’, Case 
No. ICTR-2001-63-DP, 8 May 2002, n. 2. See finally also ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. 
Joseph Nzirorera, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion Challenging the Legality of the Arrest and 
Detention of the Accused and Requesting the Return of Personal Items Seized’, Case No. ICTR-98-44-
T, 7 September 2000, para. 27 (where the Chamber recalled its decisions in Karemera, para. 4.3.1, 
Ngirumpatse, para. 56 and Kajelijeli, paras. 34 and 35, “where it held that the Chamber lacks 
jurisdiction to review the legal circumstances attending the arrest of a suspect, under Rule 40 of the 
Rules, in so far as the arrest has been made pursuant to the laws of the arresting state”) and ICTR, Trial 
Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion for Exclusion 
of Evidence and Restitution of Property Seized’, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, 12 October 2000, para. 28: 
“[W]e recall the Ngirumpatse Decision, (...) holding that the Tribunal is not competent to determine the 
legality of operations executed by sovereign national authorities within the context of existing national 
legislation.” As will be argued in the remainder of this chapter, this is arguably a too restrictive stance (a 
stance which does arguably not find support in cases such as Dokmanović, Barayagwiza, Semanza 
(Appeals Chamber), Kajelijeli (Appeals Chamber) and Rwamakuba, cases which will all be examined in 
this chapter). If arrests and detentions are made by national authorities (or international forces) at the 
request of the Tribunal, these arrests and detentions are part of the Tribunal’s legal proceedings, even if 
they are executed by others. It is submitted that if wrongs/violations have occurred in these 
(inter)national arrest and detention proceedings, the Tribunal should be able to repair them by granting 
remedies. Thus, it should also be able to review the legal circumstances attending the arrest and 
detention of suspects made at the national level if it wants to find out whether or not wrongs have in fact 








Now that the reader has been introduced to some of the characteristics of the arrest 
and transfer regime of the ICTY and ICTR, it is time to look at the male captus 
cases decided in this context. As will become clear in the next section, not every 
case will receive the same degree of attention as some cases are legally speaking 
simply more interesting than others.  
 
3 CASES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ICTY AND ICTR 
 




The 1997 Dokmanović case139 was “the first case before either of the ad hoc 
Tribunals in which the legality of arrest was the object of litigation”.140  
It is an excellent example of luring and resembles, to a certain extent, the already 
analysed Stocké case, see Subsection 2.2.4 of Chapter III (and Subsection 2.2 of 
Chapter V). 
On 3 April 1996, Judge Fouad Riad of the ICTY ordered that Dokmanović’s 
name be secretly141 added to an indictment against three other accused, namely Mile 
Mrkšić, Miroslav Radić and Veselin Šlijvančanin, “for their alleged involvement in 
the November 1991 beatings and killings of non-Serb men at the Ovčara farm in 
Vukovar”.142 Dokmanović was the President of the Municipal Assembly in 
Vukovar, the capital of Eastern Slavonia – a region in eastern Croatia – where 
UNTAES had its headquarters.143  
The same day, Judge Riad also signed a ‘Warrant of Arrest Order for Surrender’, 
directing UNTAES to search for, arrest, and surrender Dokmanović to the ICTY.144  
Three months later,145 the necessary documents were forwarded to UNTAES,146 
but in the meantime, Dokmanović had already moved east, to Sombor in the FRY, a 
territory beyond the jurisdiction of UNTAES.147  
                                                          
139 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko 
Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-
95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997. 
140 Sluiter 2001, p. 151. 
141 Dokmanović’s indictment was sealed (see also Section 2 of this chapter) because Judge Riad was 
convinced that non-disclosure was necessary for the investigation, see ICTY, Trial Chamber II, 
Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on 
the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, 
para. 2. 
142 Ibid. 
143 See ibid., para. 7. 
144 See ibid., para. 3. As already explained (see n. 66), in contrast to IFOR/SFOR, UNTAES (and the 
same goes for KFOR) has an explicit obligation to cooperate with/arrest suspects for the ICTY. 
145 The reason for this delay is explained in ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, 
Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by 
the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, n. 1. See also ibid., para. 
55. 








When in December 1996, the ICTY OTP’s Belgrade office was contacted by 
Dokmanović, who expressed “his desire to give evidence of alleged atrocities 
committed by Croats against Serbs in the area of Vukovar”,148 the OTP saw its 
chance; a month later, OTP investigator Kevin Curtis contacted Dokmanović, 
“suggesting a possible meeting between himself and Mr. Dokmanović in 
Vukovar”.149  
However, Dokmanović refused, stating he could not come to Vukovar for 
personal reasons.150 When Curtis consequently proposed a number of other 
locations, Dokmanović made clear “that he was not prepared to meet with the OTP 
anywhere in UNTAES territory [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.151 Although 
Dokmanović was (most likely) not aware of the sealed indictment against him, he 
“was among those included on a list of persons not granted amnesty and/or indicted 
as war criminals by Croatia”.152 That could, obviously, explain his wariness in 
coming to UNTAES territory. Dokmanović suggested in turn that Curtis could come 
to Sombor but the latter “stated that he could not make such a trip because of the 
civil unrest at that time in Belgrade”.153  
Nevertheless, and apparently in an effort to win Dokmanović’s trust, OTP 
investigators contacted him at his home in Sombor in June 1997 and requested a 
new meeting with him later that month to discuss the above-mentioned statement he 
wished to give about the atrocities committed against Serbs in Vukovar.154 At this 
meeting, on 24 June 1997, a new opportunity presented itself to lure Dokmanović 
from the FRY to UNTAES territory when Dokmanović “inquired of the OTP 
investigator, Mr. Curtis, about the possibility of compensation for his property in 
Croatia”.155 Curtis informed him that for these kinds of matters, he had to contact 
the Transitional Administrator General Jacques Klein (the head of UNTAES).156 
When Dokmanović stated that he was indeed interested in contacting Klein, Curtis 
seized the opportunity and informed Dokmanović that he would contact the office of 
the Transitional Administrator to see if he could arrange such a meeting.157 
Obviously, UNTAES agreed to cooperate. Curtis, and the interpreter who was also 
present at the meeting of 24 June, came back the next day and told Dokmanović that 
a meeting was indeed possible and that he had to contact Klein’s executive assistant, 
Mr Hryshchyshyn, at 10:15.158 Dokmanović consequently made the call and a 
                                                                                                                                              
147 See ibid., para. 7. 
148 Ibid., para. 8. 
149 Ibid. Of course, the whole idea was not to have this meeting, but to have Dokmanović arrested by 
UNTAES so that he could be transferred to the ICTY.  
150 See ibid. 
151 Ibid.  
152 Ibid., n. 6. 
153 Ibid., para. 8. 
154 See ibid., para. 9. 
155 Ibid., para. 9. 
156 See ibid.  
157 See ibid. 








meeting was scheduled in Vukovar at 15:30 the next day (27 June).159 
Hryshchyshyn informed Dokmanović “that he would send an UNTAES vehicle to 
collect Mr. Dokmanović from the bridge over the Danube River, which divides 
Croatia and Serbia and where the UNTAES checkpoint is located”.160   
The account of the next day’s events is so precise that it is better to provide the 
exact words from the decision rather than to try to paraphrase them. 
 
On the afternoon of 27 June 1997, Mr. Dokmanović and his companion, Milan 
Knežević, arrived at the border post on the FRY side of the Danube River bridge. 
After making their way on to the bridge, and having passed the FRY border post, Mr. 
Dokmanović and Mr. Knežević entered an UNTAES vehicle[161] shortly before 15:00 
hours, believing that they were being taken to their meeting with General Klein. The 
vehicle carrying the accused and his companion, along with two escort vehicles, 
proceeded to cross the bridge towards the Erdut base in the UNTAES administered 
area of Croatia. Upon arrival in Erdut, UNTAES soldiers removed Mr. Dokmanović 
and Mr. Knežević from their vehicle at gunpoint and searched them. Mr. Dokmanović 
was handcuffed, advised by the OTP (through an interpreter) of his rights, and 
informed of the nature of the charges against him. His jacket and handbag[162] were 
seized, and he had a hood placed over his head before being driven to the Čepin 
airfield. Upon arrival at the airfield, he was examined by a medical officer and then 
taken on board an UNTAES aeroplane. Around 16:00 hours, the plane departed the 
Čepin airfield in Croatia bound for The Hague, The Netherlands, in order to transport 
Mr. Dokmanović to detention and trial by the International Tribunal. Minutes after 
lift-off, Mr. Dokmanović was provided with a copy of the Indictment, the arrest 
warrant, and a statement of his rights, these documents all being in Serbo-Croatian 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].163         
 
In The Hague, Dokmanović complained that his arrest was illegal, arguing that it 
violated the ICTY Statute and RPE, the sovereignty of the FRY and international 
law.164 
Six arguments seemed to have been brought forward by the Defence in that 
respect:165 first, the correct procedure for arrest (see Rule 55 of the ICTY RPE) was 
                                                          
159 See ibid. 
160 Ibid., para. 10. 
161 A footnote in the decision (see ibid., n. 7) explains here that “[i]t is disputed as to exactly where Mr. 
Dokmanović and Mr. Knežević entered the UNTAES vehicle. It is clear that it was somewhere in 
between the FRY checkpoint in Serbia and the UNTAES checkpoint in Croatia. However, it is unclear 
as to whether it was (…) in FRY or Croatian territory. Nevertheless, as discussed below in the Findings, 
this factual point is irrelevant because Mr. Dokmanović was not detained against his will until he arrived 
at the UNTAES Erdut base in Croatia [emphasis in original, ChP].” This point will be returned to infra 
in the discussion of the legal merits of this case.  
162 In which, among other things, a loaded .357 Magnum Zastafa hand pistol was found later, see ibid., 
para. 12.  
163 Ibid., para. 11. Note that in Erdut, Mr Knežević “was led away to a building where he was 
temporarily detained and later released.” See ibid., n. 8. 
164 See ibid., para. 13. 








not followed.166 Besides the fact that, according to the Defence, the contents of his 
indictment were refused to be told to him, Dokmanović argued  
 
that Sub-rule 55(B) of the Rules was violated “because FRY could extradite any 
persons who are not citizen[s] of the [FRY] since there is no Constitutional and other 
legal restrictions for that and Mr. Slavko Dokmanović is not a citizen of [the] Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia” [original footnote omitted, ChP].167 
 
This last point also played a role in Dokmanović’s second argument, namely that the 
ICTY had not requested the FRY to extradite Dokmanović pursuant to Article 29 of 
the ICTY Statute.168 “Thus, the Defence contends that both Rule 55 of the Rules 
[which at that time did not yet contain the sub-element (G), which states that an 
arrest warrant can also be executed by “an appropriate authority or international 
body”, see Section 2 of this chapter, ChP] and Article 29 of the Statute [which only 
mentions the obligations of States, ChP] gave the FRY the sole authority for 
bringing the accused before the Tribunal.”169 Thirdly, the Defence argued “that Mr. 
Dokmanović was arrested in a “tricky way,” which can only be interpreted as a 
“kidnapping” [original footnote omitted, ChP].”170 Fourthly, he had been guaranteed 
a safe conduct to Croatia and back again to his home in the FRY.171 Dokmanović’s 
fifth argument was that his arrest “violated the sovereignty of the FRY and 
international law because he was arrested in the territory of the FRY without the 
knowledge or approval of the competent State authorities [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]”.172 Finally, he referred to the male captus male detentus decision of the US 
Court of Appeals in the Alvarez-Machain case (see footnote 191 and accompanying 
text of Chapter V), asserting that the ICTY did not have jurisdiction to try his 
case.173 
The Prosecution, of course, did not agree with any of these arguments; the 
execution of the arrest was procedurally correct,174 it could in no way be viewed as a 
                                                          
166 See ibid., para. 14.  
167 Ibid. 
168 See ibid., para. 15. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid., para. 16. 
171 See ibid., para. 17. 
172 Ibid., para. 18. 
173 See ibid., para. 19. 
174 See ibid., para. 21. Among other things, it hereby contended that UNTAES was authorised, pursuant 
to Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE (whose sub-element (A) (see also Section 2 of this chapter) by that time 
stated that “[n]otwithstanding Rules 55 to 59, on the order of a Judge, the Registrar shall transmit to an 
appropriate authority or international body or the Prosecutor a copy of a warrant for the arrest of an 
accused, on such terms as the Judge may determine, together with an order for his prompt transfer to the 
Tribunal in the event that he be taken into custody by that authority or international body or the 
Prosecutor.”) to make the arrest. In fact, “UNTAES would have been in contravention of a court order 








“kidnapping”,175 Dokmanović was never given explicit guarantees that he would not 
be arrested176 and there was no violation of the sovereignty of the FRY.177 Finally, 
the Prosecution relied on the male captus bene detentus reasoning: it noted that the 
decision of the US Court of Appeals in the Alvarez-Machain case, to which the 
Defence referred, had been reversed by the Supreme Court (see footnote 204 and 
accompanying text of Chapter V) and that on the basis of that decision and other 
decisions (such as the Eichmann case) “the way an accused is brought to the 
International Tribunal does not affect its jurisdiction”.178  
The Trial Chamber, overwhelmed by all the different arguments, decided to 
streamline the proceedings a little by dividing the issues into five headings, namely 
A (‘The Arrest of the Accused’), B (‘Authority for the arrest of the accused’), C 
(‘Non-disclosure of the indictment and issuance of the warrant of arrest’), D (‘The 
method of arrest’) and E (‘Safe conduct’).179 These headings will also be followed 
here in the discussion of the case.  
With respect to the arrest of Dokmanović (issue A), the Trial Chamber 
concluded that Dokmanović had been arrested and detained only after he had arrived 
at the UNTAES base in Erdut, Croatia.180 The Trial Chamber, relying on 
(inter)national definitions of arrest,181 explained:  
 
Mr. Dokmanović did not have his freedom of movement restricted or liberty deprived 
until he arrived at Erdut. The record clearly shows that Mr. Dokmanović entered the 
UNTAES vehicle that carried him to the Erdut base in Croatia of his own free 
will.[182] The accused, in fact, was quite eager to get into the vehicle, due to his belief 
                                                          
175 Ibid., para. 22. This was because, according to the OTP, “there was an Indictment against Mr. 
Dokmanović, a valid warrant for his arrest, and (...) he went to Erdut, where he was arrested, of his own 
free will [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) 
176 See ibid., para. 23. The OTP noted “that Mr. Dokmanović only sought safe conduct in relation to the 
Croatian authorities [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) 
177 See ibid., para. 24. This was because “(1) there was no prohibition in force which disallowed vehicles 
on the Serbian side of the border; (2) Mr. Dokmanović entered the vehicle of his volition; (3) Mr. 
Dokmanović’s arrest cannot be said to have been effected until after the UNTAES vehicle in which he 
was riding crossed into Croatian territory; and (4) Mr. Dokmanović does not have standing to raise the 
issue [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) 
178 Ibid., para. 25. 
179 See ibid., para. 26. 
180 See ibid., para. 27. Lamb (2000, p. 174) notes: “This was despite the fact that Dokmanović had 
probably lost his liberty the moment he entered the UNTAES vehicle, for if he had attempted to leave 
the UNTAES vehicle before it had reached the military compound, he would have almost certainly been 
restrained.” 
181 One example comes from Australia where “to effect an arrest, a law enforcement officer must simply 
make clear to a person by what is said or done that that person is no longer a free individual [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin 
Šlijvančanin and Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko 
Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 29.) 
182 Although it was argued earlier (see Subsection 2.2.4 of Chapter III) that most luring cases can indeed 
probably not be seen as operations against the will of the person, not everybody agrees with that point of 
view, see, for example, Scharf 1998, p. 374: “[A] decision based on misrepresentation cannot truly be 
characterized as a choice made by free will [original footnote omitted, ChP].” If the luring operation had 








that he was heading to a meeting with the Transitional Administrator, General Klein, 
to discuss his property rights in Croatian territory.183 
 
With respect to the authority for the arrest of Dokmanović (issue B), the Trial 
Chamber concurred with the Prosecution that “the mechanism prescribed in Rule 59 
bis provides an alternative procedure to that contemplated by Article 29 and Rule 
55, and that the circumstances of the present case merited the utilisation of this 
alternative”.184 It hereby remarked, among other things, that UNTAES is authorised, 
in fact obliged to cooperate with the ICTY – which includes the making of arrests185 
– and that  
 
the FRY has failed or refused to execute the warrants which remain outstanding for 
the arrest of the three co-accused in the indictment against Mr. Dokmanović. 
Considering this failure, the utilisation of the procedure for arrest contemplated by 
Rule 55 would very well have been an exercise in futility. In addition, when the 
warrant for the arrest of Mr. Dokmanović was issued, it was reasonably believed that 
he was residing in the area of Eastern Slavonia [original footnote omitted, ChP].186 
 
Finally, the Trial Chamber concluded that during this operation, the rights of 
Dokmanović were fully respected and hence that Rule 5 of the ICTY RPE, which by 
                                                                                                                                              
(see again Subsection 2.2.4 of Chapter III, where the ECmHR explained that (colluding for the purpose 
of) returning against his will a person living abroad, without consent of his State of residence, to the 
territory of a High Contracting Party where the latter State can prosecute that person, can lead to an 
unlawful arrest/detention within the meaning of Art. 5 of the ECHR). However, that does not do away 
with the fact that a luring operation where the suspect joins the luring agent on his free will can, under 
certain circumstances, still be seen as a violation of State sovereignty and the suspect’s human rights, 
see the remainder of this decision. 
183 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko 
Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-
95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 30. The Trial Chamber, providing a few notes from the cross-
examination, also noted that Dokmanović was shocked when he was arrested at the base, providing 
evidence “that UNTAES officials had not created the type of environment in which “a person knows he 
is not free,” until the accused got out of the vehicle at the Erdut base.” (Ibid., para. 31.) The fact that Mr 
Dokmanović testified that the door was locked while he was in the vehicle did not change the Trial 
Chamber’s stance: “[H]e did not attempt to open it. He did not express any desire whatsoever for the 
vehicle to stop or to be let out. Furthermore, he was not handcuffed or forcibly restrained in any way 
until he arrived at Erdut. Given the uncertainty as to what would have transpired had the accused 
attempted to leave the vehicle, and the facts stated above, this Trial Chamber finds that the accused was 
arrested and detained only once he arrived at the UNTAES Erdut base in Croatia.” (Ibid., para. 32.) 
184 Ibid., para. 34. 
185 See ibid., para. 46. The Trial Chamber stressed that the accused was arrested by the military forces of 
UNTAES but that it was an OTP investigator, Vladimir Dzuro, who, through an interpreter, advised him 
of his rights and informed him of the nature of the charges against him, see ibid., para. 51 and n. 62. 
(The exact stance of the Prosecution on this point was not very clear, see ibid., para. 50: “The 
Prosecution argued orally at the 8 September hearing that the arrest was carried out by military 
personnel from UNTAES and by representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor, citing Rule 59 bis in 
support. Mr. Hryshchyshyn, however, stated during his testimony that, in his view, the accused was 
arrested by the Prosecution investigators, with the assistance of UNTAES in his detention [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].”)  








then stated that an act can be declared null if it is “inconsistent with the fundamental 
principles of fairness and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice”,187 could not be 
relied upon.188  
In the context of the third issue, the non-disclosure of the indictment and 
issuance of the warrant of arrest, the Trial Chamber clarified that “the Defence 
seemingly claims that, because the Indictment was under seal, the FRY was denied 
the opportunity to serve it upon the accused and thus, somehow, its sovereign rights 
were violated”.189 In its rejection of this point, the Chamber explained that the idea 
that the FRY was somehow exempted because of the non-disclosure was without 
any basis as the rule is clear and absolute in its terms.190 Another reason advanced 
by the Chamber as to why the indictment did not have to be transmitted to the FRY 
was the fact that on 3 April 1996 (when Judge Riad ordered that Dokmanović’s 
name be secretly added to the indictment), Dokmanović was not a resident of the 
FRY.191 In addition, and repeating a point the Chamber already made in the context 
of the second issue,  
 
given the history of non-cooperation with the Tribunal of the FRY it is reasonable to 
conclude that if the arrest of the accused was to be achieved, it was necessary that the 
                                                          
187 The entire Rule 5 read by then: “Any objection by a party to an act of another party on the ground of 
non-compliance with the Rules or Regulations shall be raised at the earliest opportunity; it shall be 
upheld, and the act declared null, only if the act was inconsistent with the fundamental principles of 
fairness and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.” 
188 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and 
Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case 
No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 52. 
189 Ibid., para. 53. It added that the Defence is seemingly “not contending that the fact that Mr. 
Dokmanović was unaware of the existence of the Indictment against him or the warrant for his arrest 
constitutes a violation of his rights [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) The Chamber refers here to 
the fact that the Prosecution has “argued that the use of confidential indictments is standard practice in 
many national jurisdictions and such practice cannot be regarded as constituting a violation of the 
fundamental rights of the accused person. The latter point is based on Articles 9(2) and 14(3)(a) of the 
International Covenant o[n] Civil and Political Rights, as reflected in Rules 55 to 59 of the Rules of the 
Tribunal, which state that an accused person must be informed of the charges against him upon his 
arrest.” (Ibid., n. 68.) However, for (human rights law) criticism related to sealed indictments, see 
Sluiter 2001, pp. 154-155: “At the moment of the confirmation of an indictment, either publicly or 
secretly, a person is formally accused. As an accused, he is, according to Article 21, paragraph 4, (a) of 
the Statute, entitled to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature and cause of the charge against 
him. The language of this provision and provisions in human rights instruments do not suggest that the 
accused is only entitled to be informed of the charges at the moment of his arrest, as has been suggested 
by the Prosecutor. There were two other reasons why the practice of sealed indictments could further be 
looked upon in a critical way. First of all, the accused is denied the opportunity to surrender voluntarily 
to the Tribunal. (…) Secondly, since the accused is denied the opportunity to surrender to the Tribunal, 
he is also denied the opportunity to prepare his defence. (…) However, this [latter] situation may be 
remedied by granting him sufficient time before the commencement of the trial to prepare his case 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
190 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and 
Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case 
No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 54. 








order for non-disclosure remain in effect, even after October 1996, when his 
employment in Eastern Slavonia ceased and he resided in Sombor in the FRY 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].192    
 
The most interesting issue for the purpose of this book is clearly issue D (‘The 
method of arrest’). The Chamber promptly distinguished193 between a luring 
operation and a kidnapping and explained that    
 
[w]hile the Prosecution freely concedes that it “used trickery, it was a ruse” and that 
“[i]t was the intention of the Prosecutor from day one to arrest Mr. Dokmanović,” the 
Trial Chamber does not believe that this amounts to a forcible abduction or 
kidnapping [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].194  
 
It based its belief on the already-mentioned factors that Dokmanović had entered the 
UNTAES vehicle of his own free will and that he was in fact eager to get into the 
car because it would bring him to General Klein with whom he could talk about his 
property rights in Croatia.195  
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber did believe that a luring operation had in fact 
occurred here.196 Could such a technique be considered legal? The Chamber was of 
                                                          
192 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko 
Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-
95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 54. 
193 As already explained in Subsection 1.5 of Chapter III, such a distinction is not recognised by 
everyone. It may, for example, be good to recall the often-used definition of Shearer (1971, p. 72), 
defining abduction as “the removal of a person from the jurisdiction of one state to another by the use of 
force, the threat of force or by fraud” or Scharf’s explanation that “most countries do not distinguish 
between abduction by fraud and abduction by force.” (Scharf 1998, p. 374.) The Trial Chamber, 
admitted this (see ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin 
Šlijvančanin and Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko 
Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, n. 73) but argued that “on the continuum 
between force and fraud, the Trial Chamber does not believe that the accused was coerced in a way that 
would justify our comparing the case at bar to a forcible abduction or kidnapping case [emphasis in 
original, ChP].” (Ibid.) Cf. also Knoops 2002, p. 245: “[T]he Trial Chamber’s position, differentiating 
between abduction by force and abduction by fraud, is not a persuasive one and bears no legal authority. 
In effect, this distinction permits de facto forms of abuse of process.” 
194 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko 
Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-
95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 57. 
195 See ibid. See also n. 183 and accompanying text. Cf. also n. 339 of Chapter V (with respect to the 
case Somchai Liangsiriprasert v. Government of the United States of America): “In the present case the 
applicant and S.C. [Sutham Chokvanitphong, the cousin of Somchai Liangsiriprasert, ChP] came to 
Hong Kong of their own free will to collect, as they thought, the illicit profits of their heroin trade. They 
were present in Hong Kong not because of any unlawful conduct of the authorities but because of their 
own criminality and greed. The proper extradition procedures have been observed and their Lordships 
reject without hesitation that it is in the circumstances of this case oppressive or an abuse of the judicial 
process for the United States to seek their extradition.” 
196 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and 
Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case 
No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 57: “[T]he accused was deceived, tricked and lured into 








the opinion that it could; “such “luring” is consistent with principles of international 
law and the sovereignty of the FRY”.197  
How did the Chamber reach this conclusion? First, it looked at the – by now 
well-known – Articles 9, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR and 5, paragraph 1 of the ECHR 
and found that all the necessary procedures had been followed in this case.198 In 
addition, it also looked at how these provisions had been interpreted in the case law 
of the ECtHR and the HRC.  
Before continuing to look at this case law, it must be emphasised that it is 
commendable that the judges looked at these important human rights provisions in 
such a broad way.  
In the words of Sluiter:  
 
A positive aspect of the examination of in particular human rights instruments 
appears to be its full application to that part of the criminal procedure that takes place 
outside the courtroom. In this respect, the Chamber, in my view, acknowledged the 
overall responsibility of the ICTY for these procedures. This responsibility is based 
on the duty incumbent upon the Trial Chamber pursuant to Article 20 to ensure that 
the accused receives a fair trial and on the vertical co-operation relationship between 
States, which enables the Tribunals to impose modalities of execution. It is imperative 
that the defendant receives the full protection of human rights instruments and should 
not be the victim of the fragmentation of the criminal procedure over two or even 
more jurisdictions [original footnote omitted, ChP].199       
 
This study is very much in favour of this stance, which arguably also means that if 
the Chamber wants to take the ultimate responsibility for everything which happens 
in the context of its case (which it arguably should), and if it really wants to check 
whether a suspect’s right to liberty and security was respected and to remedy 
violations of that right, it must make a full review of that right.  
That entails the judge not only verifying whether the arrest was made on the 
correct grounds (this requirement will normally be met if a valid indictment has 
been issued) or whether the ICTY has observed its own procedures (for example, by 
issuing an arrest warrant),200 it arguably also means (taking into account that Article 
9 of the ICCPR/Article 5 of the ECHR not only refers to international but also to 
national law) that the judge must examine what actually happened on the ground: 
whether the arrest was made in accordance with the proper procedures of the 
(inter)national forces making the arrest, whether the manner of arrest and detention 
was arrested and detained was correct and whether the arrest/detention/transfer can 
                                                          
197 Ibid. See for criticism Van Sliedregt 2001 B, p. 79. 
198 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and 
Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case 
No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 61: “[A]s has been described in detail above, a valid 
Indictment was issued for Mr. Dokmanović, as was a “Warrant of Arrest Order of Surrender.” The 
accused was informed of the charges against him in a timely manner upon his arrest, in a language he 
understands, and was promptly transferred to the International Tribunal for detention and trial.” 
199 Sluiter 2001, pp. 155-156. (See also n. 232 and accompanying text of Chapter III.) 








be seen as non-arbitrary.201 It can be argued that another interpretation, one that does 
not take these arguably crucial elements of the right to liberty and security into 
account, can lead to absurd results. For example, what if the Tribunal had validly 
indicted the person and had respected all its own procedures, but the person in 
question was kidnapped by State officials from another State in contravention of all 
the national laws implementing that State’s duties to cooperate with the Tribunal? In 
such a situation, it is difficult to maintain that there was nothing wrong with the 
person’s right to liberty and security, even if it was based on a valid indictment and 
arrest warrant. Hence, the judges at the Tribunal level must also be able to review 
how the arrest was executed by the (inter)national forces on the ground.202 This does 
not mean, however, that the national judge can invoke certain national irregularities 
to refuse the transfer of the suspect to the Tribunal – he cannot.203 In addition, a 
suspect cannot invoke an irregularity which originated from a State’s failure to 
cooperate with the Tribunal. For example, he cannot invoke a violation of a 
provision which stipulates that that State cannot transfer nationals to the Tribunal.204 
It must concern genuine violations of real national provisions.  
In those cases, it can be argued that the violations (which, in turn, will lead to a 
violation of one’s human right to liberty and security) must be considered and 
remedied by the judges at the Tribunal,205 for the simple reason that these violations, 
whoever was responsible for them, occurred in the context of their case. (In doing 
so, they can, of course, take into account that the Tribunal itself was not involved in 
                                                          
201 See, for example, also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin 
Šlijvančanin and Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko 
Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 59 (explaining how the ECtHR has 
interpreted Art. 5, para. 1 of the ECHR): “The term “procedure” in Article 5(1) of the ECHR has been 
interpreted as including the procedures followed by a court when ordering a detention as well as the 
rules governing the making of an arrest. The European Court of Human Rights has indicated that this 
requirement means that the procedure to be followed must be in conformity with the ECHR and 
applicable municipal law and must not be arbitrary. The “lawfulness” requirement of this Article has 
been interpreted as relating to both procedure and substance [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
202 Cf. also Henquet 2003, p. 155: “If the Tribunal must remedy a violation of the rights of an accused 
during his or her arrest, it must have access to information pertaining to the arrest.” 
203 See the words of Swart at n. 24 and accompanying text. It must be noted that Swart admits that “[t]he 
only, rather theoretical, situation in which transfer might be refused is that in which jus cogens would 
forbid a State to transfer a person.” (See again n. 24 and accompanying text.) However, that would be 
the case if, for example, there is a considerable chance that the suspect be tortured by the Tribunal. In 
such a theoretical case (because one can assume that such a situation will indeed not occur), the national 
judge might validly refuse to transfer. However, that would arguably not be the case if the suspect is, for 
example, abducted from another State. Although the abduction may violate the ius cogens norm of non-
intervention, the subsequent transfer of a suspect to the Tribunal, after such an abduction, does arguably 
not constitute, in itself, a violation of a ius cogens norm. (Nevertheless, this does not mean that a judge 
with more power at the national level (see the still-to-discuss context of the ICC) may not refuse to 
surrender the suspect in such a situation.) 
204 See also the still-to-discuss Milošević case, see Subsection 3.1.3. 
205 However, note that not every error in the proceedings amounts to a violation, which, in turn, should 
lead to a remedy. One could hereby think, for example, of a simple and small technical error in the arrest 
warrant. Cf. n. 603 of Chapter III (with reference to the Brima case and the question when an 








the hypothetical abduction mentioned above.) This important point will be returned 
to in the remainder of this study.  
Although it initially focused on the Tribunal’s own procedures (see footnote 198 
and accompanying text),206 it will be shown in the remainder of the case that the 
Trial Chamber in Dokmanović also looked, seemingly more generally, to the manner 
in which the actual arrest was made by UNTAES.207 This is to be welcomed, 
because the correctness of the way the arrest was made on the ground is, of course, 
also part of the suspect’s right to liberty and security and also falls within the 
context of the Tribunal’s case. However, this likewise means that the Tribunal must 
be able to review the arrest and detention at the national level not only if the 
arresting entity is an international force but also if it is a national police force. In 
that case, the Tribunal must check whether the manner in which the arrest was made 
was in accordance with, for example, the prohibition of arbitrariness and the 
national arrest procedures. As will be shown infra, this stance, which can arguably 
also be found in the still-to-discuss Barayagwiza case, does not seem to comport 
with (Trial Chamber) decisions such as Djukić and Krsmanović, Karemera, 
Ngirumpatse, Kajelijeli (Trial Chamber), Nshamihigo, Nzirorera and 
Nyiramasuhuko (see also footnote 138), which support the idea that the Tribunal is 
“not competent to determine the legality of operations executed by sovereign 
national authorities within the context of existing national legislation”.208 However, 
that would also mean that the Tribunal would not be able to state that an arrest was 
clearly irregular if national police forces had abducted a person from another State 
before handing him over to the Tribunal, simply because the arrest was made in the 
context of national legislation, which the Tribunal could not review. It is submitted 
that this would, of course, make no sense, for the Tribunal in that case would 
arguably turn away from a crucial part of a person’s right to liberty and security, 
namely the question as to how he was actually deprived of his liberty. Nevertheless, 
it appears that these cases have later been (correctly) abandoned in (Appeals 
Chamber) cases such as Semanza, Kajelijeli and Rwamakuba (Trial Chamber and 
Appeals Chamber), cases which will all be addressed in the remainder of this 
chapter.209 
Returning to the Trial Chamber’s examination of the case law stemming from 
the HRC and ECtHR, the Chamber discussed the – already examined, see Chapter 
                                                          
206 See also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin 
and Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, 
Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 60: “In determining whether Mr. Dokmanović was 
arrested in accordance with the standards enunciated in Article 5(1) of the ECHR and Article 9(1) of the 
ICCPR (…), the Tribunal’s own Statute and Rules must first be revisited to see if the accused was 
arrested in a non-arbitrary way in “accordance with procedures prescribed by law” – namely, in 
accordance with the law of the Tribunal.” 
207 See ns. 255-256 and accompanying text. 
208 ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, ‘Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Exclusion of Evidence and Restitution of Property Seized’, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, 12 
October 2000, para. 28. 








III of this book – Stocké,210 Bozano,211 Celiberti de Casariego,212 Lopez Burgos,213 
Almeida de Quinteros214 and Cañón García215 cases and noted that they  
 
discuss illegality of arrest in relation to violations of specific, established procedures 
for obtaining custody of a suspect (often relating to an extradition treaty) or in 
relation to forcible kidnapping, which has been considered manifestly arbitrary. There 
is, however, no such extradition treaty or cooperation agreement between the 
International Tribunal or UNTAES and the FRY. (…) In addition, there was no 
forcible kidnapping at the case at bar, which could be seen as manifestly arbitrary 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].216 
 
Although one may agree with the last point, the first argument that the ICTY seems 
to make, namely that the cases from the ECtHR and the HRC are not really relevant 
here as they had to examine cases where specific, established procedures for 
obtaining custody of a suspect (such as extradition treaties or cooperation 
agreements) were violated, is not very convincing. It ignores the fact that between 
the FRY/UNTAES and the ICTY, there are also specific, established procedures in 
place which can be violated and that the arguably real message of the ECtHR and 
HRC is, if one has to transpose it to the context of the international criminal 
tribunals, that one should not circumvent the existing, formal procedures (whether 
they stem from extradition treaties217 are not).218 One can wonder whether this is not 
what the ICTY has also done here.  
A short explanation may be necessary here: the normal procedures of arrest and 
transfer can be found in, for example, Rules 55 and 59 bis of the ICTY RPE. The 
ICTY, assuming that the FRY would not cooperate pursuant to Rule 55 of the ICTY 
RPE, decided to instruct UNTAES pursuant to Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE to 
arrest Dokmanović. This is, of course, the ICTY’s right: it can use Rule 59 bis 
                                                          
210 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and 
Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case 
No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, paras. 62-64. 
211 See ibid., para. 65. 
212 See ibid., para. 66. 
213 See ibid.  
214 See ibid.  
215 See ibid.  
216 Ibid., para. 67. 
217 It is to be noted that, of course, extradition treaties cannot be concluded in this vertical context 
between the ICTY and UNTAES/States (see also the first words of Section 2). Therefore, it is rather 
strange that the ICTY states that the arrest was not illegal because, among other things, it did not 
circumvent an extradition treaty. See also Sluiter 2001, p. 156: “[O]bviously, neither the International 
Tribunal nor UNTAES are States and thus do not have the power to conclude extradition treaties with 
other States[.]  This contention is, even within its context, totally incomprehensible [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” 
218 Cf. also Lamb 2000, pp. 240-241 (who is, nevertheless, of the opinion that cases which dealt with the 
circumvention of extradition treaties cannot be looked at, see n. 334): “While the transfer of an accused 
to the Tribunal cannot constitute a breach of rights under any extradition arrangement, the question of 
the effects upon the ICTY’s jurisdiction of any arrest by Tribunal staff or multinational forces which 








instead of Rule 55 of the ICTY RPE. However, UNTAES could not in fact arrest 
Dokmanović pursuant to Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE because the latter was not on 
UNTAES territory. Therefore, the luring operation was set in motion to make sure 
that Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE could be enforced and that UNTAES could arrest 
Dokmanović.  
However, can this still be seen as normal use of Rule 59 bis of the RPE ICTY? 
One can very well argue that Dokmanović was not taken into custody on the basis of 
Rule 59 bis alone, but on the basis of a luring operation resulting in an arrest based 
on Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE. The question now is whether such a technique, 
which includes the element of luring, is not a contravention of the existing and 
normal procedures. It can be argued that it is. After all, even though the ICTY’s 
choice of UNTAES (on the basis of Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE) instead of FRY 
(on the basis of Rule 55 of the ICTY RPE) to cooperate in the arrest of Dokmanović 
may initially have been justified, it is arguably not justified to resort to quite another 
arrest technique (namely the dubious method of luring followed by a normal arrest 
method, namely Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE) if there remains another option in the 
catalogue of normal arrest procedures which does not include the dubious element 
of the luring operation, namely to simply ask the FRY to transfer Dokmanović to 
The Hague on the basis of Rule 55 of the ICTY RPE. This point was also observed 
by Scharf (and followed by Sluiter)219 who writes: “The luring of Dokmanović in 
                                                          
219 See Sluiter 2001, p. 153. For another opinion, see Van der Wilt 2004, p. 293, who emphasises that 
the obligation to cooperate with the ICTY can in no way be put on a par with a voluntary cooperation 
agreement such as an extradition treaty which is based on the freedom of contract. That is indeed 
undisputed. However, that arguably does not mean that once a certain procedure has been established, 
whether that procedure has a voluntary origin or not, the procedure in place should not be followed or 
that a deviation from the existing cooperation procedures between the ICTY and States cannot injure 
sovereign rights of the State (see ibid.). It arguably can. Van der Wilt shares the position of Lamb, Van 
Sliedregt and this study that an implicit authority to violate a State’s sovereignty cannot be derived from 
the fact that the ICTY was established pursuant to a resolution from the UNSC (see n. 265) and (thus) 
that the Tribunal cannot be involved itself in violations of State sovereignty, see ibid., p. 295. However, 
it is unclear how that (arguably correct) position must then be seen in light of his earlier (and rather 
generally formulated) remark that a deviation from the existing cooperation procedures between the 
ICTY and States cannot injure sovereign rights of the State. It may be the case that Van der Wilt only 
wants to connect these latter words with actions from third parties. This may be deduced not only from 
the above-mentioned remark that the Tribunal cannot be involved itself in violations of State 
sovereignty, but also from ibid., p. 294, where he argues that, precisely because the Tribunal lacks a 
police force and because the commitment of States is of vital importance in this context, the Tribunal, 
when confronted by States which neglect their duty, must take a more tolerant stance with respect to 
suspects who are put at its disposal through different means. However, in that case, it is perhaps a little 
unclear that Van der Wilt makes his general remark in the context of the Dokmanović case, where, after 
all, the Prosecution was involved in the luring operation. (Note finally that in the case of Dokmanović, it 
cannot be said that the FRY neglected its duty (to transfer Dokmanović). Even though such an outcome 
may have been very probable, no request of transfer was sent to the FRY in the first place.) Be that as it 
may, it can more generally be argued that in the case of non-cooperation, the Tribunals must not debase 
themselves by resorting to illegal methods in obtaining custody over a suspect. They must follow the 
normal route when they are confronted by non-compliance, such as reporting such non-compliance to 
the UNSC. That the UNSC in such cases does not do what it should do, namely putting real pressure on 
the non-cooperating State, is very unfortunate, but strictly speaking, not the problem of the Tribunals. In 








lieu of pursuing his surrender from the FRY through the formally established 
procedure (…) raises the same concerns as if the ICTY had acted in circumvention 
of an operational extradition treaty.”220  
After having examined the international cases, the Trial Chamber looked at the 
national level. Referring to cases which were already discussed or at least mentioned 
in the previous chapter – namely the cases of Yunis,221 Toscanino,222 Wilson,223 
Reed,224 Re Hartnett,225 In re Schmidt226 and Liangsiriprasert227 – it found “that 
there is strong support in such national systems for the notion that luring a suspect 
into another jurisdiction in order to effect his arrest is not an abuse of the suspect’s 
rights or an abuse of process [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.228 
Nevertheless, it admitted that there are also “cases in national jurisdictions where 
courts have frowned upon the notion of luring an individual into a jurisdiction to 
effectuate his arrest [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.229 It thereby referred to the 
already examined Swiss case of 15 July 1982230 and the (not yet addressed) 
Canadian case Walker v. Bank of New York.231 However, notwithstanding these two 
cases, the Chamber argued, 
                                                                                                                                              
Tribunals’ fault, but the fault of politicians who either default on their legal obligations (the politicians 
of the non-cooperating States) or who undermine the fight against impunity and the credibility of their 
own institution by not taking any further action in the case of non-compliance (the politicians in the 
UNSC). However, a perhaps more constructive route which the Tribunals can take is to make more use 
of the already-mentioned “innovative ways” to obtain custody over a person, to freeze the assets of the 
accused under Rule 61 of the ICTY/ICTR RPE, to mobilise powerful States themselves to put pressure 
on non-cooperating States or to use any other creative (but legal, see also Ruxton 2001, p. 21) method 
which can help in the enforcement of arrest warrants.  
220 Scharf 1998, p. 376. Note that Scharf, when writing of the formally established procedure refers, 
among other things, to Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE (see ibid., n. 39). Although some may now wonder 
whether Scharf is still correct (as the luring was not used instead of Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE: it was 
in fact used to enable the use of Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE), Scharf arguable wants to point out, as 
was done in the main text, that what was used in this case was a luring operation followed by an arrest 
on the basis of Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE and that that is a circumvention of the existing and formal 
procedures (because Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE does not mention the dubious element of luring). 
221 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and 
Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case 
No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, paras. 69-70. 
222 See ibid., para. 70. 
223 See ibid., para. 71. (See n. 582 of Chapter V for the Wilson case.) 
224 See ibid. (See n. 103 of Chapter V for the Reed case.) 
225 See ibid., para. 72. (See n. 582 of Chapter V for the Hartnett case.) 
226 See ibid., para. 73. 
227 See ibid., n. 104. (See n. 339 of Chapter V for the Liangsiriprasert case.) 
228 Ibid., para. 68. The Trial Chamber noted that Paust (et al. 1996) had another opinion on this (namely 
that the international community generally disapproves of luring, see also ns. 79 and 234 and 
accompanying text of Chapter III) but found “the very limited case authority cited for this proposition 
unhelpful in resolving the present issue.” (Ibid., n. 92.) 
229 Ibid., para. 74. 
230 See ibid., n. 105. 
231 See ibid. The Trial Chamber explained the case “Walker v. Bank of New York (15 O.R. 3d 596 (Ont. 
(Can.) Gen. Div. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 16 O.R. 3d 504 (Ont. (Can.) C.A. 1994)” (ibid.) as 
follows (ibid.): “Plaintiff was arrested in New York as part of a sting operation by the United States 








in all the national and international cases with which we are familiar, which found 
luring to be a violation of some international law principle[232] or a suspect’s rights, 
there existed an established extradition treaty that was, in each case, circumvented or 
there was unjustified violence used against the suspect [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].233    
 
It then repeated its point already explained above that  
 
there was no extradition treaty which was circumvented in securing the arrest of the 
accused. While Mr. Dokmanović could have been arrested and transferred to The 
Hague pursuant to Rule 55, as discussed, it is not the only method allowed to 
apprehend suspects [original footnote omitted, ChP].234 
 
Again, it can be maintained that this argument is not very convincing.  
Although Rule 55 of the ICTY RPE is indeed not the only way in which a person 
can be arrested (the ICTY can also use Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE), using another 
technique which is not recognised by the RPE (namely a normal arrest on the basis 
of Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE made possible by luring) while there is a regular, 
formal, existing procedure available which does not contain this dubious element of 
luring – namely a transfer by the FRY on the basis of Rule 55 of the ICTY RPE – is 
arguably a contravention of the existing procedures, comparable with the 
circumvention of extradition treaties at the inter-State level.  
As such, one could very well argue that the arrest and detention of Dokmanović 
were not made pursuant to the specific, established procedures for obtaining custody 
and hence that his right to liberty and security was violated.235 Sluiter also notes this 
                                                                                                                                              
but was unaware until he was on board that there was a stopover in New York, where he was 
subsequently arrested. After he was released on bond he fled to Canada. In outlining the background of 
this case, Paust [et al. 1996, ChP] states that although the U.S. requested extradition, Canada refused to 
convene an extradition hearing, citing violations of Canada’s law and sovereignty, Paust, at p. 433”. It 
can be argued that the overview of national case law examined by the Trial Chamber was rather limited. 
See Sluiter 2001, p. 155: “In terms of international law, the ad hoc Tribunals are bound by those 
domestic rules and practices which may be considered general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations[.] If the Chamber wishes to establish the existence of such principles with respect to the arrest of 
indicted persons, it has not succeeded through this comparative legal exercise. The Trial Chamber 
believed that [s]trong support for a certain view could be derived from national systems. What followed, 
however, was a very rudimentary and selective analysis of domestic jurisprudence, in which the focus 
lay with jurisprudence from one particular jurisdiction, that of the United States.” (See also n. 1 of 
Chapter IV.) 
232 The Chamber explained here in a footnote that “[t]here are at least two commentators who argue that 
fraudulent luring by a state or its agent is an international law violation.” (And then, reference is made to 
F.A. Mann’s 1990 Further Studies in International Law (p. 340) and Paust et al. 1996, p. 435. Cf. n. 79 
of Chapter III.) 
233 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko 
Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-
95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 74.  
234 Ibid., para. 75. 








point and then concludes that Dokmanović’s arrest was unlawful.236 He then 
continues with the point that “[t]his does not necessarily mean, however, that the 
accused should be released from custody”.237  
As argued earlier, although paragraph 4 of both Articles 9 of the ICCPR and 5 of 
the ECHR – a provision which arguably has attained customary international law 
status and which would thus, in principle, also be applicable in the context of the 
international criminal tribunals – indeed only mentions that a person should be 
released in the case of an unlawful detention, it is the belief of this study that this 
should also include a release in the case of an unlawful arrest: what is arguably 
important here is that a person unlawfully deprived of his freedom (through an arrest 
and detention) is released.238  
However, it is very well possible that Sluiter has the same opinion on this. If that 
were indeed the case, then when he writes that an unlawful arrest (read: an unlawful 
deprivation of liberty) does not necessarily have to lead to a release, he probably 
means that such a remedy is too far-reaching for the violations committed here. 
However, in Chapter III of this study, it was explained that if a judge (which would 
include a judge at an international criminal tribunal) is of the opinion that a person’s 
detention239 (read: arrest/detention/deprivation of liberty)240 is unlawful, he must, 
strictly speaking, release that person.  
Nevertheless, it was also explained in the same chapter, in its Subsection 4.4, 
that this remedy is problematic; if a person has been the victim of an unlawful 
arrest/detention (but not one which is so serious as to lead to the ending of the 
case),241 he must, strictly speaking, be released.242 However, as explained, that does 
                                                          
236 See Sluiter 2001, p. 153. See also Smeulers 2007, p. 109: “From the Dokmanović case, however, it 
can be concluded that the Trial Chamber does not easily qualify an arrest as illegal. Dokmanović had 
been lured into entering UNTAES territory in order to be arrested. Although the prosecutor was closely 
involved in the arrest, the Trial Chamber concluded that the arrest was not unlawful. This is a decision 
that can be heavily criticized, because it can be seen as a violation of Article 5 European Convention of 
Human Rights [original footnote omitted, ChP].”  
237 Sluiter 2001, p. 153. 
238 See n. 583 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
239 See n. 581 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
240 See ns. 583, 586 and 588 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
241 As explained in Chapter III, even though the release of Art. 9, para. 4 of the ICCPR or Art. 5, para. 4 
of the ECHR does not preclude a re-arrest, a serious violation of these human rights provisions may 
nevertheless lead to a male detentus result, not because these provisions state so but because the judge 
may decide so in his discretion in finding the most appropriate remedy. 
242 Note that there is, however, also a certain threshold before one can qualify a deprivation as unlawful: 
small technical errors will not lead to the qualification ‘unlawful arrest/detention/deprivation of liberty’. 
Cf. in that respect also the already briefly mentioned (see n. 603 and accompanying text of Chapter III) 
Brima case before the SCSL, where Judge Itoe clarified that “having been taken into custody, a mere 
technical flaw in the warrant of arrest neither renders the said arrest nor the detention based on that 
arrest, illegal.” (SCSL, Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor against Tamba Alex Brima, ‘Ruling on the 
Application for the Issue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus Filed by the Applicant’, Case No. SCSL-03-06-
PT, 22 July 2003, p. 14.) The reviewing judge must check the essential points concerning the lawfulness 
of the deprivation of liberty, namely 1) are there substantive grounds for the deprivation; 2) is the 
deprivation in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law and 3) is the deprivation non-arbitrary? 








not mean he cannot be re-arrested and brought to trial. (This will particularly be the 
case if the suspect is charged with serious crimes and prosecution is considered to be 
of utmost importance.) Although a person released by the ICTY/ICTR (in the 
Netherlands/Tanzania) cannot be re-arrested for 15 days,243 one can imagine that the 
ICTY/ICTR will then demand that all UN Member States (which must cooperate 
with these Tribunals) immediately transfer the suspect back to the ICTY/ICTR the 
moment he sets foot on their soil. Thus, one can assume that there is a considerable 
chance that after those two weeks,244 the person will be immediately re-arrested and 
brought to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in question. In such a case, the 
prosecuting authorities could assert that this ‘remedy’ (the ‘release’) has repaired the 
                                                          
243 See Art. XX (‘The suspect or accused’) of the ‘Agreement Between the United Nations and the 
United Republic of Tanzania Concerning the Headquarters of the International Tribunal for Rwanda’ 
(signed at New York on 31 August 1995): “1. The host country shall not exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over any person present in its territory, who is to be or has been transferred as a suspect or 
an accused to the premises of the Tribunal pursuant to a request or an order of the Tribunal, in respect of 
acts, omissions or convictions prior to their entry into the territory of the host country. 2. The immunity 
provided for in this Article shall cease when the person, having been acquitted or otherwise released by 
the Tribunal and having had for a period of fifteen consecutive days from the date of his or her release 
an opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless remained in the territory of the host country, or having left it, 
has returned.” (See for an almost identical provision in the context of the ICTY Art. XX (‘The suspect 
or accused’) of the ‘Agreement Between the United Nations and the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
Concerning the Headquarters of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia Since 1991’ (signed at New York on 27 May 1994). 
244 And sometimes even earlier, see the Ntuyahaga case. In this case, the suspect, who was accused of 
the murder of former Rwandan Prime Minister Unwilingiyimana and ten Belgium peacekeepers, 
illegally entered Tanzania and voluntarily handed himself over to the ICTR. The OTP subsequently 
requested the judges to withdraw the indictment of this case (because it did not fit the prosecution policy 
of the Tribunal) and to defer the case to Belgium, which had already started to investigate the case. 
However, the judges, dismissing the ICTR indictment of Ntuyahaga, stated that they could not defer 
cases to national courts. (This has changed in the meantime, see Rule 11 bis of the ICTR RPE (‘Referral 
of the Indictment to another Court’).) As a result, he was released on Thursday 18 March 1999, although 
he stayed in the detention facility of the ICTR for personal security reasons. Belgium subsequently 
called on Tanzania to arrest Ntuyahaga and to extradite him to Belgium. Peter Gijsels, advisor to the 
Belgium Ministry of Justice, explained “that in deciding whether to arrest Ntuyahaga, Tanzania would 
have to consider both the bilateral treaty with Belgium and its agreement with the ICTR. Under the latter 
accord, persons freed by the tribunal enjoy fifteen days of immunity. But he said there were several 
reasons why this agreement did not apply in Ntuyahaga’s case, and the Tanzanian parliament had not 
yet ratified it.” (‘Belgium Calls on Tanzania to Arrest Ntuyahaga Immediately’, 19 March 1999, 
Fondation Hirondelle, available at: 
http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/0/eefb51a4e2e6f69ac12566bd007e77a2?OpenDocument.) On 
Monday 29 March 1999, Ntuyahaga was released in Dar Es Salaam (Tanzania), but the very same day, 
he was arrested by Tanzanian authorities. “The Justice Minister said Ntuyahaga had been detained for 
his own security, and pending a decision on extradition requests from both Belgium and Rwanda. 
Mwapachu said it was also to “sort out the immigration issue”. Ntuyahaga entered Tanzania illegally 
when he turned himself over to the ICTR last June.” (‘Tanzanian Authorities Arrest Ntuyahaga in Dar 
Es Salaam’, 30 March 1999, Fondation Hirondelle, available at: 
http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/0/eefb51a4e2e6f69ac12566bd007e77a2?OpenDocument.)  In 
the end, Ntuyahaga was extradited to Belgium in 2004 where he was tried, found guilty of murdering 
several peacekeepers and Rwandan civilians and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, a verdict which 








initial iniuria of the irregularity and that the trial can continue as normal. However, 
in that case, the suspect would only be granted a pro forma remedy, comparable 
with that at the national level (but extended over a longer period), which does 
arguably not comport with the idea that a remedy must be real and effective, see also 
Article 2, paragraph 3 (a) of the ICCPR and Article 13 of the ECHR.245 In addition, 
the pro forma release does not take account of the exact seriousness of the 
irregularity. In other words: it is not only a pro forma remedy but also an over-
simplified remedy.  
It would thus be better if a judge would avoid this problematic remedy of release 
and would, if he determines that the suspect was arrested/detained unlawfully, 
simply grant the most appropriate remedy, taking all the different aspects of the case 
into account (including, for example, the seriousness of the unlawful 
arrest/detention/deprivation of liberty and the importance of having this person 
prosecuted). If one follows that route, then one can still satisfy the common sense 
idea behind the immediate re-arrest mentioned above, namely that cases involving 
suspects of serious crimes must be continued if possible – although a male detentus 
must, of course, also not be excluded for these suspects – but one will also replace 
the strange pro forma release and immediate re-arrest with real remedies, such as a 
reduction of the sentence and/or compensation.246 The judge can then take the exact 
                                                          
245 See also the still-to-discuss (see Subsection 3.2.1) Barayagwiza case where the ICTR judges held: 
“[T]o order the release of the Appellant without prejudice – particularly in light of what we are certain 
would be his immediate re-arrest – could be seen as having cured the prior illegal detention. That would 
open the door for the Prosecutor to argue (assuming arguendo the eventual conviction of the Appellant) 
that the Appellant would not then be entitled to credit for that period of detention (...) on the grounds 
that the release was the remedy for the violation of his rights. The net result of this could be to place the 
Appellant in a worse position than he would have been in had he not raised this appeal. This would 
effectively result in the Appellant being punished for exercising his right to bring this appeal.” (ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-
AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 110.) 
246 It may be interesting to note that on 19 September 2000, the then President of the ICTY, Claude 
Jorda, wrote a letter to the UNSG in which he requested that the issue of compensation for persons 
unlawfully arrested/detained, unjustly prosecuted and wrongfully convicted be addressed because a 
provision regarding compensation, cf. Art. 9, para. 5 of the ICCPR for persons unlawfully 
arrested/detained, was lacking in the ICTY Statute/RPE. With respect to persons unlawfully 
arrested/detained, he noted, among other things, that the UN would be legally bound to award 
compensation to the victim of a violation of Art. 9 of the ICCPR but only “if the conduct giving rise to 
this violation is legally imputed to the Tribunal and thus to the United Nations”. (UNSC, ‘Letter dated 
26 September 2000 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’, 
S/2000/904, 26 September 2000, p. 4.) See also Beresford 2002, p. 640, Acquavivia 2007, pp. 621-623 
and Staker 2008, pp. 1499-1500. However, as will be shown in the Barayagwiza case, another 
international criminal tribunal, the ICTR, appeared to indicate that it would award compensation for a 
suspect who was, among other things, irregularly detained and thereafter found not guilty, irrespective 
of who was responsible for the violation, see ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-
AR72, 31 March 2000, paras. 74-75: “The Appeals Chamber (...) confirms that the Appellant’s rights 
were violated, and that all violations demand a remedy. (...) DECIDES that for the violation of his rights 
the Appellant is entitled to a remedy, to be fixed at the time of judgement at first instance, as follows: a) 
If the Appellant is found not guilty, he shall receive financial compensation; b) If the Appellant is found 








seriousness of the irregularity into account in determining how much the sentence 
should be reduced or or how much compensation one should accord the suspect. 
Such a solution would arguably be fairer to the suspect and better capable of putting 
flexibility into the system. 
Furthermore, this solution also avoids the criticism one may expect from various 
actors if a suspect of serious crimes is released for an irregularity which is not so 
serious as to lead to the ending of the case (in such serious cases, the public must 
understand that the court has no option but to refuse jurisdiction and to release (but 
now in a ‘real’ way) the suspect), but which nevertheless ensures that the detention 
must be qualified as unlawful247 and that, strictly speaking, the suspect must be 
released.  
In fact, whereas at the national level, one can expect that a suspect of serious 
crimes will be immediately re-arrested, at the Tribunal level, there may be more 
problems because of the two-week immunity period. As already stated, all UN 
Member States (which must cooperate with the Tribunals) will probably do 
everything in their power to ensure that a suspect of serious international crimes is 
immediately re-arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of the Tribunals, but one 
cannot exclude the prospect of the suspect fleeing to a non-UN Member State 
(which, in principle, has no obligation to cooperate with the Tribunals) or to a State 
which, even though it has an obligation to cooperate, will not do so. That could 
mean that a suspect of international crimes, fleeing to such a State, could effectively 
evade prosecution.  
That is to be avoided. Although the law should obviously be obeyed, one must 
also be careful not to apply the law in such a strict way that it leads to great 
injustice: summum ius, summa iniuria.248 This constitutes another reason to continue 
                                                                                                                                              
construction may be very appropriate (and probably for that reason has also been followed in later 
cases), but that one must not forget either that provisions like para. 5 of Art. 9 of the ICCPR and Art. 5 
of the ECHR state that compensation should not only be awarded in the case of an acquittal. 
Compensation is, in principle, available to any person whose detention was considered unlawful, 
whether that person was later acquitted or not. See also Sluiter 2001, pp. 153-154: “[I]t is suggested that 
creative use be made of (a combination of) other available remedies, such as the reduction of the 
sentence in case of conviction – and financial compensation, rather than termination of the proceedings 
and the release of the accused [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” A final point that 
must be made is that Claude Jorda’s above-mentioned letter, in the end, did not lead to a modification of 
the ICTY Statute, see Acquaviva 2007, p. 623: “[T]he Security Council has not yet decided to intervene 
in this delicate matter by modifying the Statutes of the Tribunals. Unless these Statutes are modified, it 
is hard to envisage the adoption by these two institutions of a rule providing for suitable reparation – 
which, among other things, would inevitably bring about remarkable financial costs for the institution. 
In the absence of a pronunciation by the ‘legislator’, these bodies have difficulties in shaping general 
rules to face such situations [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Nevertheless, this did not constitute a 
reason for the still-to-discuss Rwamakuba case not to order financial compensation, see Subsection 
3.2.4. 
247 Swart, for example, explains that “a failure to promptly inform the person of the reasons for his arrest 
and of any charges against him makes his detention illegal.” (Swart 2001, p. 204.) 
248 See Garner 2004, p. 1759: “The highest right is the utmost injury. That is, law too rigidly interpreted 
produces the greatest injustice.” It may be interesting to note that Green (1963, p. 642) also referred to 
this maxim as a counterargument with respect to the ex iniuria ius non oritur claim of Eichmann (see n. 








to exercise jurisdiction in these kinds of (less serious) male captus cases and to grant 
other remedies which do not jeopardise the trial itself.249  
Thus, it is worth repeating that the judge must take all the different aspects of the 
case into account (including, for example, the seriousness of the unlawful 
arrest/detention/deprivation of liberty and the importance of having this person 
prosecuted) and simply grant the most appropriate remedy in the case of an unlawful 
arrest/detention, comparable with the abuse of process doctrine. If a judge decides to 
continue the case (which may very often be the case considering the seriousness of 
the suspect’s charges), then the suspect should be granted real and concrete other 
remedies such as a reduction of the sentence and/or compensation. In determining 
which exact remedies are to be provided, the judge could then take into account the 
precise male captus which took place. For example, one could hereby look at the 
involvement of the Tribunal in the male captus situation (it should be noted that the 
formulation of paragraph 4 is very general and does not take into account which 
actors were responsible for the unlawful arrest/detention) or the mistreatment 
suffered by the suspect during the operation.250 However, neither should it be 
forgotten that a truly serious male captus situation can lead to one remedy only, 
namely the ending of the case before that particular court, that is, a ‘real’ release 
(without the possibility of re-arrest),251 whether one is dealing with a suspect of 
international crimes or not.  
It seems that Sluiter, when he writes that an unlawful arrest does not necessarily 
have to lead to a release, alludes to this ‘real’ release252 and, of course, it is not hard 
to agree with him on this point: the seriousness of Dokmanović’s male captus was 
not such as to grant him this (‘real’) release, the male detentus remedy. However, as 
                                                          
249 Note that this does not mean, however, that such a suspect cannot be released in certain cases 
(besides the situation that he is released because the judge is of the opinion that the case must be 
stopped). If a judge reviewing a suspect’s detention feels that the suspect will appear at trial, there is no 
longer a need to hold him in detention while awaiting trial. In such a case, the suspect can, of course, be 
provisionally released pending trial, with or without conditions. 
250 Cf. also Sluiter 2003 B, pp. 946-947, where he writes about factors in determining whether or not 
another remedy, namely the male detentus remedy (the termination of the proceedings), should be 
granted: “Crucial factors in determining whether or not this remedy should be provided for are the 
following: 1. The degree of attribution of the violation to the Tribunal, in particular the Prosecutor 
(significant involvement in the violation by the Prosecutor could damage the integrity of the proceedings 
to such an extent that the trial cannot be continued); 2. The nature of the violation of individual rights 
(violation of individual rights of an egregious nature, such as subjecting the individual to inhuman or 
degrading treatment, may constitute a legal impediment to exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal, 
regardless of whether or not the Tribunal, in particular the Prosecutor, had anything to do with the 
violation).” 
251 See also Swart 2001, p. 206: “[B]oth Article 9 of the ICCPR and Article 5 of the ECHR make it 
imperative that a person be released if his detention was unlawful. I take it for granted that, in the case 
of more serious violations of these Articles, the nature of this particular remedy rules out any possibility 
of re-arresting the suspect or the accused.” 
252 See Sluiter 2001, p. 153: “In case of gross violations in which the Prosecutor has been implicated, the 
dismissal of the indictment, resulting in the release of the accused, should not be ruled out as an 
appropriate and effective remedy.” See also ibid.: “I agree with those who believe that the termination of 
the proceedings and the release of a person indicted should only be the ultimate remedy for violations of 








already stated, in principle, he would be entitled to a ‘normal’ (pro forma) release 
given the fact that his deprivation of liberty was unlawful, but as this remedy, as 
explained, is not without its problems, he should be granted other remedies such as a 
reduction of the sentence and/or financial compensation.253   
Returning to the reasoning of the judges in the Dokmanović case, after they had 
explained that Dokmanović’s arrest did not circumvent an established extradition 
treaty, they turned to the other situation mentioned in case law “which found luring 
to be a violation of some international law principle or a suspect’s rights [original 
footnote omitted, ChP]”,254 namely unjustified violence used against the suspect. 
However, that was not the case here either: 
 
[T]here was no “cruel, inhumane and outrageous conduct that would warrant 
dismissal under Toscanino” in the arrest of Mr. Dokmanović. The accused was not 
mistreated in any way on his journey to the Erdut base. There was nothing about the 
arrest to shock the conscience. In fact, it was an ordinary arrest by most standards, 
with no resistance by the accused and no force needed by UNTAES to handcuff him. 
The videotape and audiotape of the arrest confirm that valid procedures were used in 
detaining Mr. Dokmanović and transferring him to The Hague [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].255    
 
These words show the point made supra256 that the Trial Chamber in Dokmanović 
looked, seemingly more generally, to the manner in which the actual arrest was 
made by UNTAES, a point which is to be welcomed because the correctness of the 
way the arrest was made on the ground is, of course, also part of this suspect’s right 
to liberty and security and also falls within the context of this Tribunal’s case. 
The words also show the idea established in the Yunis case, namely that if the 
luring operation is accompanied by “cruel, inhumane and outrageous conduct”, the 
case should be dismissed.  
It must be stressed that, even though the Toscanino decision itself was about an 
abduction, the Trial Chamber only uses the Toscanino threshold here in the context 
of the method of luring. In other words: there is no evidence that the Trial Chamber 
would also demand the Toscanino threshold in cases of abduction. Hence, it can be 
argued that the Trial Chamber’s decision cannot be used as evidence for the idea 
that the Tribunal would only refuse jurisdiction if the Tribunal were responsible for 
an abduction involving “cruel, inhumane and outrageous” conduct (and would hence 
not refuse jurisdiction if the Tribunal were responsible for a ‘normal’ abduction, an 
abduction without “cruel, inhumane and outrageous” conduct).  
                                                          
253 See also ibid., p. 154: “In the case of Dokmanović, if the Chamber had decided his luring was 
unlawful, as it should have, release would clearly have been an inappropriate and disproportionate 
remedy. Financial compensation or a (minor) reduction of the sentence in case of conviction would have 
been more in line with the nature of the violation.”  
254 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko 
Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-
95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 74. 
255 Ibid. para. 75. 








Most probably, the Tribunal would also dismiss a case if the Tribunal was 
responsible for a ‘normal’ abduction. In the words of Scharf: “[T]he Trial Chamber 
focused on the distinction between “luring” (the means used to arrest Dokmanović) 
and “forcible abduction”, reckoning that the former was acceptable while the latter 
might constitute grounds for dismissal in future cases [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].”257  
However, whatever the position of the Trial Chamber is on this issue, it can, in 
any case, be argued that the Tribunal should resolutely refuse jurisdiction if its own 
people were responsible for a ‘normal’ abduction, let alone for an abduction 
accompanied by “cruel, inhumane and outrageous” conduct. It is submitted that the 
Tribunal would clearly undermine its integrity as a court of law if it condoned such 
reprehensible methods of its people, methods which it has been established are 
clearly arbitrary and illegal.258  
The Chamber then turned to the argument that the operation violated the 
sovereignty of the FRY.  
Although Dokmanović – and this is in contrast to the view of the Prosecutor259 – 
did have standing to raise this issue, the argument itself was, according to the 
Chamber, without merit.  
It explained that there had been “no actual physical violation of FRY territory in 
gaining custody of Mr. Dokmanović. The arrest occurred in Croatian territory”.260 
Although in inter-State luring cases, there may be a question of whether a State’s 
sovereignty has been violated, the judges continued, this point was irrelevant for this 
case because “the arresting force, UNTAES, was established under Chapter VII 
authority – binding upon the international community – and thus does not have the 
type of horizontal relationship with the FRY that would exist between sovereign 
States”.261 It hereby referred to the Blaškić case – in which it was held that “[a]n 
order within the International Tribunal’s mandate, addressed to a State, as with any 
compulsory action taken by the Security Council itself, in no way offends the 
sovereignty of that State”262 – and then stated that “[w]hen UNTAES arrested the 
accused, it was fulfilling its obligation pursuant to Resolution 1037 to cooperate 
                                                          
257 Scharf 1998, p. 371. 
258 See ns. 225, 411, 414 and accompanying text of Chapter III and n. 523 and accompanying text of 
Chapter V. 
259 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and 
Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case 
No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 76. The Chamber referred here to the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber decision in Tadić, see also n. 178 of Chapter III. 
260 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko 
Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-
95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 77. 
261 Ibid. 
262 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, ‘Decision on the Objection of the Republic 








with the Tribunal and to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and 
security”.263  
There are a few points which may undermine these two arguments of the Trial 
Chamber related to the alleged violation of the sovereignty of the FRY. First of all, 
can one really assert that there was no actual physical violation of FRY territory in 
gaining custody of Dokmanović? It is, of course, true that the actual arrest occurred 
in Croatia, but during the luring operation culminating in this arrest, OTP 
investigators did enter the territory of the FRY. Should all these preparations simply 
be cut off from what can be seen as the ‘mere’ end result of the luring operation 
itself, namely the arrest by UNTAES? This point was also discussed in Subsection 
2.1 of Chapter III (where, it should be remembered, the inter-State context was 
examined): there, it was explained that, arguably more in line with the principle of 
respect for another State’s sovereignty is not the (limited) idea that agents of other 
States are not allowed to arrest persons in a State, but rather the (broader) idea that 
agents of other States are not allowed to carry out police operations in that State, 
whether these operations amount to an actual arrest or not. If one follows this line of 
reasoning, one may very well consider that the sovereignty of the FRY was in fact 
violated by the luring operation.264 However, does the fact that there is a vertical 
relationship present in the context of this case make a difference here? This point is 
related to the second argument of the Trial Chamber, namely that the fact that there 
is such a relationship present ensures that Dokmanović’s claim that the sovereignty 
of the FRY was violated must fail. This argument is also not without its 
deficiencies: although it is, of course, true that the Chapter VII backbone of 
Resolution 1037 means that UNTAES may arrest persons on a territory where it has 
the mandate to do so, such a backbone does not give UNTAES a full carte blanche. 
For example, it does not allow it to go into the territory of another State where 
UNTAES does not have such a mandate, like the FRY, to make arrests there.265 In 
                                                          
263 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko 
Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-
95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 77. 
264 See also Scharf (1998, p. 374), who notes that “[t]he Trial Chamber’s conclusion [that there was no 
physical violation of FRY territory, ChP] would only have been correct if the communications between 
law enforcement officials and the target of the luring were conducted exclusively over the phone, radio, 
e-mail, or fax. In contrast, an agent of the OTP (Kevin Curtis) did physically enter FRY territory with 
the purpose of engaging in a law enforcement activity (the luring) without the FRY’s permission.” See 
also Currie 2007, p. 363: “The distinction made by the Trial Chamber between luring and abduction 
seems strained, founded as it was on the controversial view that luring is not a sovereignty violation.” 
265 Cf. in that respect Lamb 2000, p. 223, n. 201: “Potentially at least, a State may plead lawful excuse, 
on the grounds that the ICTY (and hence by implication its orders) was instituted by the UN Security 
Council pursuant to a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (…) However, such a 
plea appears unlikely to succeed, on the grounds that while arrest warrants may constitute enforcement 
measures, these oblige custodial States to effect arrests or direct international forces to carry them out. 
They stop short of authorizing such States or forces to launch incursions into third States in order to do 
so”. See also Van Sliedregt 2001 B, p. 75 and Van der Wilt 2004, p. 295. Note, however, that 
international forces might have such powers when the UNSC has specifically authorised them to have 
them, when the State where the operation takes place has consented to the activities or where the 








the same vein, one can wonder whether a joint operation between the OTP and 
UNTAES as the present one can be seen as falling within the scope of their 
mandates.266  
However, it must also be emphasised that even if there were a violation of the 
FRY’s sovereignty, the FRY seemingly did not protest and request Dokmanović’s 
return. However, even if that had been the case, the ICTY would not have been 
obliged to return Dokmanović.  
This must be explained in more detail. Even if this situation had occurred at the 
inter-State level, it should be recalled that Chapter V has shown that the practice of 
States has established that male captus bene detentus must be rejected at any rate if 
the injured State of the person who has been the victim of an abduction (which was 
not the case here) has protested and requested the return of the suspect. In the 
context of a luring operation, a violation of international law will normally lead to 
less far-reaching forms of reparation.  
In addition to this, one should take into account the specific context of the 
Tribunals here (see also above with respect to the remedy of release): if the ICTY 
decides that the luring operation is not so serious as to dismiss the case completely 
(that would in any case be so if the luring were accompanied by serious, Toscanino-
like mistreatment) but that the violation of State sovereignty nevertheless requires 
that the person be returned to the State which protested the violation and has 
requested the return of the suspect, the ICTY would return the suspect, over whom it 
still has jurisdiction, to a State which then comes under an immediate new 
obligation to re-transfer the suspect back to the Tribunal (which, after all, still has 
jurisdiction to try the suspect). However, it can be argued that such a pro forma 
construction does not make much sense. In fact, one can wonder why the ICTY 
would return the suspect to a State which may not cooperate in bringing the suspect 
to justice. (Note, however, that this does not mean that the suspect should not be 
returned in the case of a serious violation of international law such as an abduction. 
However, in that case, the Tribunal can still make the return conditional on the 
injured State prosecuting the suspect itself. This point will come up again in the 
remainder of this study.) In such cases, it would be better for the judge to decide to 
continue the case, to hold the suspect in custody and to grant other forms of 
                                                                                                                                              
(Nevertheless, the construction used by Scharf (1998) on p. 378 of his article, where he argues that 
several more general UNSC resolutions, provisions from the ICTY Statute and RPE and non-
cooperation on the part of the FRY taken together may also lead to a justified law enforcement operation 
in the territory of the FRY, is arguably too broad.) Scharf (1998, p. 376) further argues that “contrary to 
the implication of the Trial Chamber’s opinion, abductions from the FRY may be legally justifiable” but 
it is not clear whether the Trial Chamber indeed disapproves of  operations which can fall under the 
three above-mentioned scenarios. That it does not mention them does not necessarily have to mean that 
it does not recognise them. 
266 Cf. also Sloan 2003 A, pp. 107-108 (with respect to the still-to-discuss Todorović case) and p. 108 in 
particular: “[I]t would appear that the question that needs to be decided in this case is not whether the 
powers of the ICTY in exercising its legitimate functions prevail over traditional concerns of state 









reparation for the violation of State sovereignty which occurred in the context of the 
case.   
The last point of issue D (‘The method of arrest’) has to do with the male captus 
case of Alvarez-Machain to which both the Defence (Court of Appeals) and the 
Prosecution (Supreme Court) referred. Here, the Trial Chamber simply stated that it 
did not have to look at this issue because both the arrest and detention of 
Dokmanović were justified and legal. Hence, the real male captus bene/male 
detentus discussion did not have to take place because, according to the Trial 
Chamber, there was no male captus in the first place.267    
With respect to the final issue (E: ‘Safe conduct’), the Trial Chamber found that 
“the testimony of Mr. Curtis, Mr. Hryshchyshyn, and Witness A, to the effect that 
no guarantees of safe conduct, either specific or general, were provided to the 
accused, is more credible than the testimony of Mr. Dokmanović”.268 In addition, 
“[e]ven if Mr. Dokmanović had been given the assurance which he claims he was 
given, these would not satisfy the criteria required for a legally binding guarantee of 
safe conduct”.269  
Although the ICTY in this case decided – arguably incorrectly – not to delve into 
the true male captus discussion, Scharf notes that if the question of the male captus 
were to be answered by the ICTY, it could choose – “[w]hile recognizing the 
appropriateness of the approach of the Human Rights Committee and the European 
Court of Human Rights270 for ordinary crimes [emphasis added, ChP]”271 – “to 
adopt an ‘Eichmann exception’, in the case of “universally condemned offenses”, 
under which the issue of the fugitive’s abduction should be “decoupled” from his 
subsequent trial [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.272  
                                                          
267 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and 
Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case 
No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 78: “Given that the Trial Chamber has found that the 
particular method used to arrest and detain Mr. Dokmanović was justified and legal, we need not decide 
at this time whether the International Tribunal has the authority to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant 
illegally obtained from abroad [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
268 Ibid., para. 82. 
269 Ibid., para. 83. See also ibid., para. 84: “Only a Judge or Trial Chamber has the authority to provide a 
guarantee of safe conduct – this cannot be issued by the OTP or UNTAES. These orders are issued to 
witnesses in order to secure their testimony. In this case, Mr. Dokmanović was clearly not sought as a 
witness, but as an accused. The alleged assurances did not specify any temporal or territorial restrictions, 
nor did they specify the purpose for which they were allegedly issued.”  
270 See Scharf 1998, p. 381: “The precedent of the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of 
Human Rights would (...) suggest that the ICTY should dismiss a case where the defendant has been 
abducted or lured from a state in contravention of the normal procedures.” As has become clear from the 
previous chapter, although these supervisory bodies normally do not go into the question of jurisdiction 
and in principle only determine whether a certain act leads to a violation of the human rights instrument 
in question, certain decisions can indeed be seen as evidence for the idea that jurisdiction should be 
refused in cases of luring and abduction. However, certain decisions from the European institutions can 
also be seen as support for the reasoning behind the male captus bene detentus rule, see ns. 388 and 595 
of Chapter III. 
271 Scharf 1998, p. 381. 
272 Ibid. Scharf hereby refers to the fact that UNSC Res. 138 of 23 June 1960 did not explicitly require 








This study believes that the ICTY should not follow this reasoning273 as this may 
lead to a carte blanche for law enforcement officials to do whatever they can to 
obtain custody over a person charged with international crimes. Although it can be 
justified that one should, if possible, opt for those remedies which do not jeopardise 
the trial of the suspect of international crimes, the pre-trial and trial phase should not 
be decoupled altogether as in that case, even the most extreme male captus situation 
– for example, a serious abduction orchestrated by the ICTY and involving serious 
mistreatment – would not jeopardise the consequent trial. That, of course, should not 
be tolerated. In very serious cases, divestiture of jurisdiction may very well be the 
only correct remedy, even if the court in question deals with a suspect charged with 
very serious crimes.274 If the refusal to exercise jurisdiction is deemed to constitute 
too harsh a remedy, but it is nevertheless decided that a male captus has occurred 
which should be remedied, then one may apply other less far-reaching remedies, 
such as a reduction of the sentence.   
Before turning to the next case, it must be pointed out that the Appeals Chamber 
did not look at this case because “Dokmanović’s appeal from this decision was 
summarily rejected (…) on the ground that the defense argument was “ill-founded in 
                                                                                                                                              
crimes with which Eichmann was charged in approving that the trial in Israel would go ahead, see n. 521 
and accompanying text of Chapter III. Note, however, that this Eichmann exception can arguably not be 
connected with the outcome of the legal process in Israel, see Subsection 3.1 of Chapter V. 
273 See also Van der Wilt 2004, p. 280, explaining that the Eichmann exception has a rather unsound 
legal basis as it is founded on the misconception arising from the fact that one confuses the authority (or 
obligation) to create universal jurisdiction with the physical enforcement of criminal law (enforcement 
power). See also n. 163 of Chapter III. 
274 See also Sluiter 2001, p. 153: “I agree with those who believe that the termination of the proceedings 
and the release of a person indicted should only be the ultimate remedy for violations of the rights of the 
accused. Such a remedy should not, however, be ruled out altogether on the basis of the male captus 
bene detentus argument, or on what has been called the “Eichmann” exception. The character and 
stature of the ICTY as an international tribunal may make the discontinuation of the proceedings an 
imperative remedy under certain circumstances, in spite of the magnitude of the crimes before it 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].” In addition, one can wonder whether there will ever be such a 
serious case of Eichmann again, a case where many judges, due to the seriousness of Eichmann’s 
charges, would probably continue to exercise jurisdiction, notwithstanding the male captus. (Note that 
the Israeli judges did not have to found their argument on this basis as male captus bene detentus, to 
their opinion, was an established rule of law, applicable to anyone.) After all, although suspects of 
international criminal tribunals may be charged with very serious crimes, it seems doubtful that a person 
will ever be held co-responsible for the deaths of millions of people again. See in that respect also Mann 
1989, p. 414 where he writes about the “decisive” question, which “is not whether jurisdiction exists, 
but whether jurisdiction should be exercised.” He continues: “In order to answer this question one 
should not think of a case such as Eichmann. This was so extreme, so unique, so horrendous a case that 
a court which had jurisdiction because the man stood before it could not possibly be expected not to 
exercise it or even ask whether it should be exercised. The singular character of the crime was such as to 
render the exercise of jurisdiction a duty, but at the same time should not in any sense be allowed to 
supply the standard applicable in other cases.” Although Mann wrote this article before the ICTY and 
ICTR were established, one can imagine that Mann would still see the Eichmann case as an exception. 
Cf. also Michell 1996, p. 423 (“The case concerned crimes of such a unique and grave nature that it 
would be imprudent to abstract general principles from it [original footnote omitted, ChP].”) and 
Lowenfeld 1990, p. 490: “I have tried throughout the article to stay away from cases that are bigger than 








fact and law” [original footnote omitted, ChP].”275 Sadly, a verdict could not be 
rendered in this case as Dokmanović hanged himself in his cell almost six months 




The second case to be addressed here is the rather mysterious case of Todorović. 
The initial indictment against the Bosnian Serb Stevan Todorović (and his (initially 
five)277 co-accused) was confirmed by the ICTY on 21 July 1995, the day on which 
a warrant for his arrest was also issued.278 Todorović was indicted for grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war and 
crimes against humanity, “all relating to events said to have taken place in the area 
of Bosanski Šamac, in the north-eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, during the 
summer of 1992”.279 On 27 September 1998, Todorović was transferred by SFOR to 
the ICTY. Three days later, at his initial appearance before the ICTY, he “stated that 
he did not feel well because he had received a heavy blow from a baseball bat over 
his head ‘during the kidnapping’”.280 What had happened here? Most probably, the 
exact details of Todorović’s deprivation of liberty will stay a mystery for ever. In 
the words of Sloan: 
 
According to Todorović’s version of events, as well as various media reports, on the 
night of 27 September 1998, four armed, masked men burst into Todorović’s home in 
Zlatibor in western Serbia, gagged, blindfolded, and beat him with a baseball bat, then 
proceeded to smuggle him out of the country and into Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Within a few minutes of Todorović’s arrival in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a helicopter 




                                                          
275 Scharf 1998, p. 371. 
276 See ibid., p. 371. 
277 Todorović’s five co-accused were Blagoje Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Simo Zarić, Milan Simić and 
Slobodan Miljković. The indictment against the latter suspect was withdrawn as a result of his death on 
7 August 1998. 
278 See ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorović, ‘Sentencing Judgement’, Case No. IT-
95-9/1-S, 31 July 2001, para. 1. 
279 Ibid.  
280 Ph. Vallières-Roland, ‘Prosecuting War Criminals: A Critique of the Relationship between NATO 
and the International Criminal Courts’, Centre for European Security and Disarmament (CESD) – 
Briefing Paper, February 2002, available at http://www.isis-
europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_87_2002_archives_59_paper.natoandiccs.pdf, p. 3 (referring to “Prosecutor 
v. Stevan Todorovi[ć], ‘Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention and Removal of 
Defendant Stevan Todorovi[ć] and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss Indictment’, 10 February 








Depending on which newspaper accounts (if any) are believed, those involved in his 
capture were either ‘bounty hunters’[281] paid from a ‘CIA slush fund’,[282] or 
                                                          
281 That bounty hunters should be used in the context of the international criminal tribunals is proposed 
by, for example, Supernor 2001, who argues (at p. 250) that “[t]he UNSC should pass a resolution that 
provides international bounty hunters with immunity from domestic laws for the forceful acts necessary 
to arrest an indicted war criminal.” See also Kovac 2002 and n. 1174 and accompanying text (with 
respect to the case of Charles Taylor before the SCSL). However, even though the UNSC may condone 
a specific international arrest operation to maintain international peace and security (see n. 157 of 
Chapter III), it is very doubtful that it would also approve a more general immunity for bounty hunters 
with respect to acts which it has always condemned. One could think here not only of the condemnation 
in the Eichmann case, but also of UNSC Res. 579 of 18 December 1985 (see also n. 184 of Chapter III): 
“Considering that the taking of hostages and abductions are offences of grave concern to the 
international community, having severe adverse consequences for the rights of the victims and for the 
promotion of friendly relations and co-operation among States, (…) 1. Condemns unequivocally all acts 
of hostage-taking and abduction; 2. Calls for the immediate safe release of all hostages and abducted 
persons wherever and by whomever they are being held; 3. Affirms the obligation of all States in whose 
territory hostages or abducted persons are held urgently to take all appropriate measures to secure their 
safe release and to prevent the commission of acts of hostage-taking and abduction in the future; (…) 5. 
Urges the further development of international co-operation among States in devising and adopting 
effective measures which are in accordance with the rules of international law to facilitate the 
prevention, prosecution and punishment of all acts of hostage-taking and abduction as manifestations of 
international terrorism [emphasis in original, ChP].” In addition, even if the UNSC were to grant such 
immunity, many practical questions remain. For example, how does one regulate the ‘quality’ of these 
bounty hunters? How does one prevent the situation that, even if one has publicly stated that such 
operations can only be executed by professional, private military firms, amateurish fanatics – longing 
for the financial award – enter a foreign territory and create an international mess by, for example, 
killing the suspect in their effort of apprehending him? (See for the problems related to assassinations 
Scharf 2000, pp. 974-975: “While assassination may achieve a sense of “accountability,” it is 
inconsistent with several of the other goals of international criminal justice, namely achieving truth 
telling, deterrence, and reconciliation. Without a living defendant, there can be no presentation of 
evidence at trial, and therefore no production of a historical record. Far from deterring acts of violence, 
assassination is likely to lead to escalated violence in revenge.” Of course, a suspect may also be killed 
during the course of an arrest operation by international forces (see, for example, the cases of Simo 
Drljača, Dragan Gagović and Janko Janjić, see Harmon and Gaynor 2004, p. 410, n. 21), but one can 
assume that this risk will become far greater if amateurish individuals join the ‘arrest’ efforts because 
the UNSC, in a way, provides them this possibility.) Moreover, what would the consequences of such an 
event be for the (nationals of the) State of residence of these individuals? See for criticism also 
Kalinauskas 2002, p. 404: “One potential problem with this practice is that it could result in legal 
liability on the part of Western governments for the consequences of bounty hunters’ actions. 
Furthermore, as a policy matter, it is unclear whether encouraging abductions for profit is an acceptable 
method of achieving the goals of international justice, peace, and stability in Bosnia [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” See finally also Van der Wilt 2004, p. 295, arguing that the use of private bounty 
hunters is not to be recommended at all for the State’s monopoly on violence must be spared as much as 
possible. 
282 On the DPI (Division of Public Information) site of UNMIK, one can find a news item from Reuters, 
dated 22 August 2000, where one can read that “[a] Serbian regional court charged seven men on 
Tuesday with terrorism, accusing them of abducting a war crimes suspect indicted by the United Nations 
from Serbia in 1998 and handing him over to NATO troops. (…) The court in Serbia’s central town of 
Uzice named the accused as Ignjatije Popovic, Djordje Maksimovic, Djura Dragovic, Zivko Abasevic, 
Rodoje Erakovic, Branko Zivkovic and Milan Popovic. (…) On Tuesday, the Uzice court charged two 
more people, also belonging to the group accused of kidnapping Todorovic, Dragan Zivkovic and 
Nebojsa Suvajdzic, with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and theft, [independent 








members of the British SAS and/or elite Delta units from the United States. 
According to one account, his captors had offered to let him go in return for the 
equivalent of £13,000. While some of these reports seem far-fetched and elements 
may be unfounded, because of the wall of secrecy erected by SFOR and strenuously 
defended by the OTP, untested allegations and unconfirmed press reports are all we 
have to inform us of what actually happened on the night of 27 September 1998 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].283 
   
In any event, Todorović started to file numerous motions challenging the legality of 
his arrest and seeking his release and return to the FRY.284 
The first motion285 was filed on 10 February 1999 through which Todorović’s 
Defence requested five things, one of them being an evidentiary hearing as to the 
circumstances of his arrest, detention and delivery to the Tribunal.286 The Trial 
Chamber noted that Todorović alleged that he was illegally kidnapped by four 
unknown individuals in the FRY and that this point also raised the issue of the 
Prosecution’s involvement in the kidnapping.287 However, even if the Prosecution 
                                                                                                                                              
few months later, The New York Times reported, again referring to Beta, that “[a] Serbian regional court 
found nine men guilty today of kidnapping a war crimes suspect in Serbia who was later handed over to 
NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia”. See ‘9 Convicted in Kidnap of War-Crimes Suspect’, The New York 
Times, 12 December 2000, available at:  http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/12/world/9-convicted-in-
kidnap-of-war-crimes-suspect.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/K/Kidnapping. This 
information was confirmed by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia’s report Annual 
Report 2000, Human Rights in Serbia 2000 (available at: http://www.helsinki.org.rs/reports_t10.html), 
in which one can read (under ‘IV: International Humanitarian Law’): “Trial of 9 persons involved in 
abduction of Stevan Todorovic began in the Uzice District Court on 5 December 2000. According to the 
indictment in the early morning hours of 27 September 1998 they abducted Stevan Todorovic in 
Zlatibor village Rudine for a 50,000 dollar award and handed him over to the SFOR soldiers. (…) Trial 
Chamber of the Uzice District Court on 11 December 2000 sentenced the accused to a total of 45 years 
in prison. (…) For the said abduction Ignjatije Popovic (at large) was sentenced to 7 years in prison, 
Milan Popovic to 7 years, D[j]ordje Maksimovic to 6 years, Zivko Odabasic [the Reuters news item, see 
this footnote, speaks of Zivko Abasevic, ChP] to 8 years and 6 months in prison, Radoje Herakovic [the 
Reuters news item, see this footnote, speaks of Rodoje Erakovic, ChP] to 4 years and 11 months, 
Branko Zivkovic to 6 years, D[j]ura Dragovic to 4 years and 7 months (assistance in abduction), Dragan 
Zivkovic to 18 months (for hiding a stolen Todorovic’s car) and Nebojsa Suvajdzic to 6 months in 
prison (illegal possession of Todorovic’s pistol).” 
283 Sloan 2003 A, p. 86. 
284 See ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorović, ‘Sentencing Judgement’, Case No. IT-
95-9/1-S, 31 July 2001, para. 2.  
285 This motion was entitled ‘Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention and 
Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorovi[ć] and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss Indictment’ 
and was supplemented by a ‘Memorandum of Law in Further Support for an Evidentiary Hearing as to 
Abduction and Detention of Accused Todorovi[ć]’. See ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje 
Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Decision Stating Reasons for 
Trial Chamber’s Order of 4 March 1999 on Defence Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on the Arrest of 
the Accused Todorović’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 25 March 1999, p. 2. 
286 See ibid. Next to this, it was also requested (see ibid.): “(2) that the accused be allowed to give 
evidence on this issue, (3) a discovery order directed to the Prosecution to make available to the Defence 
all documents in its possession as to the manner of, and individuals responsible for, the detention, arrest 
and delivery of the accused to the Tribunal, (4) that the accused be returned to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (“FRY”) and (5) that the indictment against him be dismissed”. 








had not been involved in his abduction, Todorović argued, he had still been illegally 
brought into the power of the ICTY.288 Conversely, the Prosecution contended, 
among other things, that Todorović’s right to liberty and security was not violated 
and that 
  
it was not involved in any activity relating to the accused’s removal from the FRY, 
that it did not have prior information of any proposed operation to secure the arrest of 
the accused, and that it first learned of the accused’s arrest on 27 September 1998 
when it was contacted by SFOR (…).289   
   
The Trial Chamber was not impressed by Todorović’s arguments either and orally 
rejected his motion on 4 March 1999, issuing the reasons for this rejection in its 
decision of 25 March 1999.290 In that decision, the Chamber considered that 
Todorović’s motion “is only supported by a report posted by a private individual on 
an e-mail bulletin board based on an alleged newspaper report”291 and hence, that it 
“does not contain sufficient factual and legal material, and in particular does not 
provide a statement as to the factual circumstances of his arrest, to warrant an 
evidentiary hearing”.292  
Todorović subsequently filed a motion for leave to appeal this decision,293 which 
was granted by a bench of three judges of the Appeals Chamber.294 The Appeals 
Chamber stressed that  
 
the issue before the Trial Chamber was not whether there was a kidnapping and, if so, 
what were its legal effects, but whether or not, as stated by the Trial Chamber in its 
decision of 25 March 1999, to grant the Accused’s request for an evidentiary hearing 
as to the alleged kidnapping of the Accused[.] 295 
 
According to the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber, in denying Todorović’s 
motion, had not abused its discretion.296 As a result, the Appeals Chamber noted that 
                                                          
288 See ibid., p. 3. 
289 Ibid. 
290 See ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan 
Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Decision Stating Reasons for Trial Chamber’s Order of 4 March 1999 on 
Defence Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on the Arrest of the Accused Todorović’, Case No. IT-95-9-
PT, 25 March 1999. 
291 Ibid., p. 3. 
292 Ibid.  
293 This motion (of 25 May 1999) was entitled ‘Accused Stevan Todorovi[ć]’s Motion for Leave to 
Appeal From a Certain Oral Order Dated March 4, 1999 and a Decision Dated March 25, 1999 which 
Denied Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing on Abduction and Kidnapping and Thereafter for Leave to 
File a Motion to Repatriate the Accused to the Country of Refuge’, see ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Decision 
on Appeal by Stevan Todorović Against the Oral Decision of 4 March 1999 and the Written Decision of 
25 March 1999 of Trial Chamber III’, Case No. IT-95-9-AR73.2, 13 October 1999, p. 2. 
294 This decision (of 1 July 1999) was entitled ‘Decision on Application by Stevan Todorović for Leave 
to Appeal Against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber III of 4 March 1999’, see ibid. 
295 Ibid. 








“no ground appears on which the Appeals Chamber may intervene in respect of the 
Trial Chamber’s finding”297 and dismissed the appeal.298  
Todorović, however, did not give up. Eight days after the dismissal of his appeal, 
he filed a ‘Notice of motion for an order directing the Prosecutor to forthwith return 
the accused Stevan Todorovi[ć] to the country of refuge’, to which he attached a 
statement clarifying what he believed had happened to him – now more than a year 
ago. Sloan explains: “Here again he based his request for relief on an assertion that 
his arrest was illegal, arguing that it was in violation of state sovereignty and 
contrary to customary international law [original footnote omitted, ChP].”299 
Furthermore, another (habeas corpus) motion was filed three weeks later, on 15 
November 1999.   
This time, Todorović had more success; on 23 November 1999, the Trial 
Chamber issued an oral decision “in which it found that Todorović’s statement ‘was 
a new circumstance such that it justified ordering an evidentiary hearing on the 
legality of the arrest and detention of the Accused’ [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]”.300  
The day after, Todorović filed a new motion,  
 
seeking an Order from the Trial Chamber requesting the assistance of the 
Stabilisation Force (“SFOR”), or other military and security forces operating on the 
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to provide documents and witnesses to the 
Defence in connection with the transfer of the accused from his residence in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the Tuzla Air Force base 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the arrest of the accused, all alleged to have occurred 
between 26 and 28 September 1998, for use in the evidentiary hearings as to the 
legality of that arrest now before the Trial Chamber.301 
 
The Prosecution filed its response, arguing that the motion and the related 
proceedings were “nothing more than a legalistic ‘fishing expedition’”.302 
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber, after a request from the Defence for the 
Prosecution to provide similar material, ordered the Prosecution to provide material 
                                                          
297 Ibid., p. 3. 
298 See ibid. After this decision, the Trial Chamber also dismissed other motions filed by Todorović on 
21 and 22 September 1999, which sought “orders from the Trial Chamber for the production of 
documents and witnesses by the Ministry of the FRY and by SFOR [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
(Sloan 2003 A, p. 89.) (Todorović had filed these motions because “[h]e claimed that these materials 
would be necessary for the evidentiary hearing that would result if he was successful in his then pending 
appeal [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) Since his appeal was dismissed on 13 October 1999, 
these motions had become insignificant.) 
299 Sloan 2003 A, p. 90. 
300 Ibid.  
301 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan 
Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and 
Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 2000, para. 1. 








on what had happened to Todorović.303 After an unsuccessful appeal against this 
order, the Prosecution disclosed some information, but very little.304 At the same 
time, Todorović, who was ordered by the Trial Chamber to try to obtain information 
from SFOR,305 was told by the latter that “[i]t is the position of SFOR that the ICTY 
has no authority to order SFOR to disclose any information.”306 At this instance, the 
Trial Chamber itself came in action: it “ordered that the Motion be served on 
SFOR”.307 After SFOR was granted time to prepare its case,308 it filed a written 
response on 10 July 2000, followed by new filings from the Defence and the 
Prosecution.309 In one of these filings, the Defence specified for the first time that 
the relief it sought (related to these proceedings) also included a request for judicial 
assistance directed to the US.310 Finally, a hearing on the motion was held on 25 
July 2000 (at which SFOR failed to show up, incidentally).311 
The Defence’s main argument before this hearing was “that it is entitled to seek 
assistance in the production of evidence relating to the facts and circumstances of 
the detention and alleged arrest of the accused”.312 The relief sought was far-
reaching, namely:  
 
(i) an order and subpoena duces tecum directed to the Commanding General of SFOR 
(…)[313]; (ii) a subpoena ad testificandum directed to the Commanding General Tuzla 
Air Force base, General Shinseki, and to the SFOR personnel involved in the seizure, 
                                                          
303 See ibid., para. 3. In more detail, the Prosecution was ordered “to provide copies of relevant reports 
and other material, including disclosure of the identity of various individuals involved in the 
transportation to and arrest of the accused at the Tuzla Air Force base.” (Ibid.) 
304 See ibid., para. 4. In fact, it “provided only a one-page report about the arrest of the accused, 
prepared by the investigator who effected the arrest on 27 September 1998, Mr. Ole Brøndum. The 
Prosecution asserted that, apart from this report, it had none of the designated material within its custody 
and control.” (Ibid.) 
305 See ibid. 
306 Ibid., para. 5. 
307 Ibid., para. 6. 
308 See ibid., paras. 6-7. 
309 See ibid., para. 7. 
310 See ibid., para. 7. 
311 See ibid., para. 8. 
312 Ibid., para. 9. In particular, it sought: “(a) attendance of the individual or individuals who transported 
the accused by helicopter to the Tuzla Air Force base; (b) attendance of the individual who placed the 
accused under arrest and served the arrest warrant; (c) production of the audio and video tapes made on 
27 September 1998 of the initial detention and arrest of the accused at the Tuzla Air Force base; (d) 
SFOR pre- and post-arrest operations reports relating to the arrest and detention of the accused.” (Ibid.) 
313 Namely to produce: “(a) all pre- and post-arrest operational reports relating to the seizure, abduction 
and arrest of the accused, including orders as to the movement of personnel; (b) orders, approvals and 
logs for the movement of vehicles including helicopters used in such operations; (c) pre- and post-
operation field, operational, movement and headquarters reports, notes, action reports and memoranda 
relating to the seizure, abduction and arrest of the accused; (d) audio and video tapes of the seizure, 
abduction and arrest of the accused; (e) orders authorising payment and proof of payment to SFOR 
personnel and to third parties; (f) names, rank and serial numbers of SFOR personnel involved in the 
seizure, abduction and arrest of the accused; and (g) names and last known addresses of non-SFOR 








abduction and arrest of the accused; and (iii) a request for judicial assistance directed 
to the United States of America for the same materials.314  
 
To support its claims, the Defence argued “that individuals serving with SFOR are 
amenable to compulsory attendance”315 and that the involvement of SFOR in the 
abduction was shown by the fact that the helicopter which brought him to the SFOR 
base in Tuzla arrived minutes after he and his kidnappers arrived in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.316 Finally, the Defence maintained – and this also relates to the point 
already discussed at footnote 65 and accompanying text, namely if, and if so to what 
extent, SFOR must cooperate with the ICTY – that  
 
even if SFOR itself is not subject to the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, the 
individual member States remain liable and obligated to fulfil all of the obligations 
undertaken as members of the United Nations and thus to cooperate with the 
International Tribunal.317 
 
The Prosecution and SFOR, however, did not agree with all this.  
They first argued, in essence: “(a) the Motion does not establish any prima facie 
basis for judicial enquiry; (b) even if any irregularity in the circumstances of the 
arrest did exist, it would not justify the relief sought.”318 It is clear that the latter 
argument “comes close to adopting the male captus bene detentus principle”.319 
Because this point goes to the core of this book’s subject, it will now be examined in 
more detail.320  
                                                          
314 Ibid. 
315 Ibid., para. 11. 
316 See ibid. One could argue, by the way, assuming for now that this story is accurate, that the sole fact 
that a helicopter picked him up from a group of kidnappers and brought him to the SFOR base (whether 
this happened within a few minutes after Todorović’s arrival in Bosnia and Herzegovina or not) strongly 
points to at least some SFOR involvement in the operation. 
317 Ibid., para. 13. 
318 Ibid., para. 14. 
319 Sluiter 2003 A, p. 287. 
320 As the summary of the Prosecution’s arguments in the Trial Chamber’s decision of 18 October 2000 
(see the end of this footnote) does not really go into this matter in detail, use has been made of a specific 
document from the Prosecution itself (ICTY, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan 
Simić, Miroslav Tadić a/k/a Miro Brko, Stevan Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo a/k/a Monstrum and 
Simo Zarić a/k/a Šolaja, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to the “Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on 
Arrest, Detention and Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorović and for Extension of Time to Move to 
Dismiss Indictment” Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 February 1999’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 
February 1999), including Sloan’s article on the Todorović case (Sloan 2003 A). For the summary of the 
Prosecutor’s arguments in the Trial Chamber’s decision of 18 October 2000, see ICTY, Trial Chamber 
III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan Todorović and Simo Zarić, 
‘Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 
18 October 2000, paras. 15-17. In these paragraphs, the Chamber noted that the Prosecution argued, 
among other things, “that “some international laws are not binding on certain international institutions”” 
(ibid., para. 15), “that the territorial jurisdiction of the International Tribunal extends throughout the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, and so there is no basis to assert any breach of sovereignty” (ibid., 
para. 15) and that “no credible evidence has been put forward to indicate that members of the Office of 








The Prosecution noted that “[t]he accused’s Motion appears to proceed from the 
assumption that if there is any breach of the fundamental rights of an accused in the 
criminal process, the accused will be entitled to have the indictment dismissed and 
to be released”.321 However, this was not the case according to the Prosecution:  
 
Withdrawal of the indictment altogether would be required only in extreme cases, 
where any continuation of the trial proceedings would in all the circumstances be 
fundamentally incompatible with the right to a fair trial and the integrity of the justice 
system.322    
 
However, in less serious cases, “other remedies may be available to cure any 
resulting injustice”.323 It is not hard to agree with this stance as it very much 
resembles the position taken in this study as well. Thus, it is important, the 
Prosecution continued, “to identify exactly which rights of the accused are said to 
                                                                                                                                              
(Ibid., para. 16.) The Prosecution also explained “that arrest operations conducted by SFOR “clearly 
involve serious security and other risks to the States concerned, including risks to the lives of personnel 
involved. The desire of the States and forces concerned to maintain the strictest confidentiality in respect 
of the operational details of these activities is readily understandable” [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
(Ibid., para. 17.)  
321 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić a/k/a Miro 
Brko, Stevan Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo a/k/a Monstrum and Simo Zarić a/k/a Šolaja, 
‘Prosecutor’s Response to the “Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention and 
Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorović and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss Indictment” 
Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 February 1999’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 February 1999, para. 27. 
322 Ibid., para. 28. See also Lamb 2000, pp. 241 and 243: “[W]ithdrawal of the indictment altogether and 
the release of the accused would be required only in extreme cases, where any continuation of the trial 
proceedings would in all the circumstances be fundamentally incompatible with the right to a fair trial 
and the integrity of the judicial process. (…) [I]n most cases, the extreme remedy of release of a person 
indicted for the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law will not be seen to 
comport with justice. Nevertheless, the release of the accused must, in extremis, remain as the ultimate 
remedy on the grounds that it constitutes the strongest deterrent and sanction against the abuse of power 
by law enforcement personnel and serves as a remedy of last resort in those truly exceptional 
circumstances where the divestiture of its jurisdiction is thought by the Tribunal to be necessary to 
safeguard the integrity of the conduct of international criminal justice [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
323 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić a/k/a Miro 
Brko, Stevan Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo a/k/a Monstrum and Simo Zarić a/k/a Šolaja, 
‘Prosecutor’s Response to the “Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention and 
Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorović and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss Indictment” 
Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 February 1999’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 February 1999, para. 27. 
The Prosecution hereby referred, as a hypothetical example, to “the case of an accused in a national 
legal system charged with a serious crime such as murder [it is interesting to note that the Prosecution, 
not very surprisingly, deems the seriousness of the crimes with which the suspect is charged to 
constitute an important element to take into account here, ChP], who is illegally beaten by police during 
arrest or during pre-trial detention. International human rights norms would not necessarily require that 
the prosecution of the accused for murder be terminated in such a case. International norms may require 
that the accused have an appropriate legal remedy in respect of the unlawful beating (for instance, a civil 
action for damages). By virtue of the right to a fair trial, the accused may also be entitled to claim other 
remedies in the trial process (for instance, exclusion from the trial of evidence of anything said by the 








have been violated”.324 However, the problem in this case, the Prosecution 
complained, is that  
 
[t]he accused’s Motion does not specify precisely which rights of the accused are 
alleged to have been violated in this instance, other than “the right not to be illegally 
kidnapped or illegally abducted”. Nor does the accused’s Motion specify the 
particular law which rendered the “abduction” illegal.325 
 
The Prosecution therefore assumed that the claimed illegality in this case was “the 
alleged violation of the sovereignty of the FRY under international law, and/or an 
alleged violation of the municipal law of the FRY”.326  
The main question to be answered in this case would thus be “whether such 
illegalities in the accused’s forcible removal from the FRY would require that the 
indictment against the accused be dismissed, and that the accused be released from 
custody”.327       
The Prosecution first noted that there were a number of cases and doctrinal 
support for the male captus bene detentus view328 but that it “does not need to rely 
on these authorities, and does not seek to do so”.329 This was because, as will also 
                                                          
324 Ibid. It can be argued that this is indeed the route one should follow. As the Prosecution arguably did 
not follow this avenue itself, is is rather strange that the Prosecution now defends this position. See also 
Sloan’s comment (Sloan 2003 A, p. 99, n. 101) that “[a]n argument that in order to determine the 
suitability of the accused’s proposed remedy the potential fairness of the trial must be considered ‘in all 
the circumstances’ with a careful examination of ‘exactly which rights of the accused are said to have 
been violated’, is not easily reconciled with the OTP’s earlier argument that disclosure from SFOR on 
the facts surrounding Todorović’s arrest was unnecessary, as the matter could be decided on the limited 
facts available.” 
325 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić a/k/a Miro 
Brko, Stevan Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo a/k/a Monstrum and Simo Zarić a/k/a Šolaja, 
‘Prosecutor’s Response to the “Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention and 
Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorović and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss Indictment” 
Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 February 1999’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 February 1999, para. 29. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Ibid., para. 30. The Prosecution hereby noted that this point had not been examined yet by a Trial 
Chamber as in Dokmanović, the Trial Chamber decided that there was no male captus in the first place, 
see ibid. See also n. 267. 
328 See ibid., para. 31, ns. 9-10. The Prosecution hereby referred, among other things, to the Eichmann 
and Alvarez-Machain cases and to handbooks such as Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 
(1998, p. 320) and Shaw’s International Law (1997, p. 478). Sloan (2003 A, p. 101) notes that “[i]n its 
pleadings, the OTP led by arguing in favour of the male captus bene detentus principle” but that it, 
“despite this ostensible confidence in the male captus bene detentus principle in international law, (…) 
carefully avoided going down a path that would have required it to champion the principle [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) 
329 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić a/k/a Miro 
Brko, Stevan Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo a/k/a Monstrum and Simo Zarić a/k/a Šolaja, 
‘Prosecutor’s Response to the “Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention and 
Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorović and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss Indictment” 
Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 February 1999’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 February 1999, para. 31. It 
may be interesting to note that the Prosecution, looking at the more specific context of the ICTY, had 
already earlier (see ibid., para. 26) noted “that there is some doctrinal support [the Prosecution here 








become clear in the following pages, the Prosecution was of the opinion that there 
was no male captus in the first place, or at least no male captus so serious (for 
example, because it could be attributed to the Tribunal) as to lead to a male detentus 
outcome: the refusal of jurisdiction. Hence, even if the ICTY were in favour of the 
male captus male detentus reasoning, this would, according to the Prosecution, not 
lead to a refusal of jurisdiction in this case because there was no male captus at all, 
or no male captus so serious that a refusal of jurisdiction would be justified.  
It then turned to case law which can (more or less) be connected to the male 
captus male detentus reasoning, to cases where it was affirmed “that a court should 
decline to exercise criminal jurisdiction over an accused who has been brought 
within the jurisdiction of the court by means of an irregular rendition [original 
footnote omitted, ChP]”.330  
However, the Prosecution argued that this last category of cases could not be 
relied upon because “the basis of the reasoning in these cases affords no valid 
analogy to the situation under consideration by this Trial Chamber in the present 
case”.331 The reasons for this assertion in Todorović’s case, the Prosecution argued, 
were threefold: 1) there was no circumvention of an extradition treaty, 2) his alleged 
male captus was not executed by the authorities of the now prosecuting forum and 
3) his right to liberty and security was not violated.332  
To start with the first reason, the Prosecution explained that “the decisions in 
some of these cases were premised on the fact that the removal of the accused from 
the other State involved a circumvention of applicable extradition procedures 
[original footnote omitted, ChP]”333 but that in the context of the ICTY, “there are 
no extradition arrangements, or analogous arrangements, between the Tribunal and 
the FRY [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.334  
                                                                                                                                              
Tribunal may be forcibly arrested by agents of one State in the territory of another State, without the 
latter State’s consent [original footnote omitted, ChP].” However, also here, the Prosecution stated that 
“this is not a matter that needs to be determined in the present proceedings.” (Ibid.) 
330 Ibid., para. 33. Here, the Prosecution (ibid., para. 33, n. 13) referred to Hartley, Ebrahim, Bennett, 
Toscanino, Stocké, Cañón García and Celiberti de Casariego. 
331 Ibid., para. 33. 
332 See Sloan 2003 A, p. 102. 
333 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić a/k/a Miro 
Brko, Stevan Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo a/k/a Monstrum and Simo Zarić a/k/a Šolaja, 
‘Prosecutor’s Response to the “Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention and 
Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorović and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss Indictment” 
Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 February 1999’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 February 1999, para. 34. 
334 Ibid. Cf. also Lamb 2000, p. 210, n. 150: “While certain cases decided by national courts have 
affirmed that a court should decline to exercise criminal jurisdiction over an accused who has been 
brought within the jurisdiction of a court by means of an irregular rendition, these cases generally do not 
afford a valid analogy to Tribunal arrests, on the grounds that such decisions were premised on the fact 
that the removal of the accused from the other State involved a circumvention of applicable extradition 
procedures. However, the regime of extradition is patently inapplicable to the case of the Tribunal”. See 








This point was already discussed (and criticised) in the previous Dokmanović 
case and will therefore not be addressed here, except that it is worth mentioning that 
Sloan was not impressed by this reason either.335  
With respect to the second reason, the Prosecution argued that it had “no 
involvement in any activity relating to the accused’s removal from the FRY”,336 
whereas some of the national cases were based on the fact that authorities from the 
prosecuting State were involved in the alleged male captus.337 The Prosecution also 
noted that “[t]he conduct of States, and multi-State entities such as NATO and 
SFOR, cannot be imputed to the Prosecutor, when the Prosecutor was not involved 
in that conduct. They are not agencies of the Tribunal, and should not be treated as if 
they were.”338  
It has become clear from the examination of the inter-State cases in Chapter V of 
this book that it is indeed true that the participation of authorities of the now 
prosecuting forum is an important factor for the judges to take into consideration 
and that the involvement of other parties may indeed lead to another legal 
outcome.339 However, one can have one’s doubts whether States and entities such as 
SFOR cannot be seen as a sort of agencies of the Tribunal when they make arrests 
for the latter. Of course, they are not proper agencies or organs of the ICTY, but the 
moment they make arrests for the ICTY, they function as its enforcement arm. After 
all, it has been said earlier that the Tribunals do not have a police force of their own 
and hence are dependent on others to make arrests and such like. That also means 
that the moment States and multi-State entities such as SFOR make arrests for the 
ICTY, they form the latter’s temporary police force.340 This point was also 
                                                          
335 See Sloan 2003 A, pp. 102-103: “[W]hile the reasoning in several of the cases cited was indeed based 
on the national court’s concern at the state’s ignoring an established extradition regime (thereby 
depriving the accused of guarantees afforded by that system), none of the courts held – or implied – that 
the existence of an extradition treaty was a sine qua non of the determination to refuse jurisdiction. The 
argument that national courts’ reasoning – reflecting as it does a desire to protect the accused from 
illegal behaviour on the part of state agents, to prevent the abuse of the process of the court, to safeguard 
the rule of law, and to protect an accused’s freedom in society – was contingent on the existence of an 
extradition regime was not convincingly made by the OTP [original footnotes omitted, ChP].”  
336 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić a/k/a Miro 
Brko, Stevan Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo a/k/a Monstrum and Simo Zarić a/k/a Šolaja, 
‘Prosecutor’s Response to the “Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention and 
Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorović and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss Indictment” 
Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 February 1999’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 February 1999, para. 36. 
337 See ibid.  
338 Ibid., para. 39. 
339 See also Sloan 2003 A, p. 103. 
340 See also ibid., p. 104: “[T]he divide between SFOR and the Tribunal does not appear to be as great as 
the OTP and SFOR have represented it to be. The OTP and SFOR placed great emphasis on their 
assertion that the OTP alone – and not SFOR – was by analogy to represent the enforcement agents of 
the prosecuting state in the national cases, with SFOR being treated as analogous to a third party. 
However, the nature of the relationship between SFOR and the OTP and, more generally, between 
SFOR and the Tribunal as a whole, calls such an assertion into question. If one is to analogize the 
circumstances of Todorović’s capture with the law of interstate capture, it would surely be more apt to 
liken SFOR to the role of the enforcement agents of the prosecuting state. They have, after all, been 








addressed by Judge Robinson in his separate opinion to the 18 October 2000 
decision, which will be briefly examined after discussion of this case.  
Thus, even if it cannot be said that ‘the Tribunal’ abducted a person from another 
State if that abduction was perpetrated by entities such as SFOR (and not by staff 
from the ICTY itself), the Tribunal should take into account that an abduction has 
occurred in the context of its case and that this abduction was perpetrated by entities 
which can, to a certain extent, be connected to the Tribunal. In those cases, it is 
submitted, remedies for the suspect should still be granted. It may indeed go too far 
to refuse jurisdiction in such cases (although much will depend on the exact male 
captus) but then other, lighter remedies may be appropriate.  
The third reason that the Prosecution gave for the cases which can more or less 
be connected to the male captus male detentus reasoning not being applicable here 
was that some of them “suggest that a forcible abduction by agents of one State in 
the territory of another, contrary to the domestic claw of the State where the 
abduction occurs, would be a denial of the accused’s right to liberty and security”,341 
whereas in the context of the ICTY, “[t]here is no rule that a person indicted by the 
Tribunal can be arrested only pursuant to the national law of the place where the 
person is located”.342  
Now, it is, of course, true that a person’s arrest and surrender does not 
necessarily have to be based on the procedures of the State where that person 
resides. After all, it may very well be that other entities such as SFOR may also have 
the power to arrest that person. If SFOR, for example, makes the arrest, then, of 
course, it does not need to follow the procedures which are applicable to national 
police officials. However, what is arguably important is that, whatever entity makes 
the arrest, the proper procedures which are applicable to that entity are followed. 
That means that if the person in question is arrested by national police forces, these 
forces must follow their own arrest procedures. If, on the other hand, the person is 
arrested by SFOR, then SFOR does not need to follow those national arrest 
procedures but must follow its own arrest procedures. As already explained in the 
context of the Dokmanović case, it is difficult to see those arrest procedures being 
irrelevant to the person’s deprivation of liberty. Hence, if the proper procedures of 
the national police force or SFOR’s own rules are not followed in the arrest, for 
example, if SFOR abducts a person from a territory where it does not have 
jurisdiction to make arrests (or has such an abduction executed by third parties), 
then it is difficult to argue that that person’s right to liberty and security has not been 
                                                                                                                                              
fitting to consider SFOR to be a co-enforcement official, alongside the OTP, given that each has a role 
in the execution of arrest warrants [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
341 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić a/k/a Miro 
Brko, Stevan Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo a/k/a Monstrum and Simo Zarić a/k/a Šolaja, 
‘Prosecutor’s Response to the “Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention and 
Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorović and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss Indictment” 
Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 February 1999’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 February 1999, para. 40. 
The words “more or less” have been chosen here as a violation of this right in principle only leads to a 









violated, simply because all the rules of the ICTY have been adhered to. The fact 
that the ICTY has issued a valid indictment (so that there are grounds for arrest) and 
an arrest warrant (one of the elements leading to an arrest which can be seen as 
being in accordance with a procedure), important as they are, say nothing about the 
question of how the arrest was factually executed on the ground, which is arguably 
an important, if not, crucial, part of one’s right to liberty and security.343 As earlier 
explained, although a national judge cannot ‘use’ a violation of a person’s right to 
liberty and security to refuse the transfer of the suspect to the ICTY and although 
such a violation does not necessarily have to lead to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction 
by the ICTY itself,344 it may very well be appropriate for the ICTY to accord other 
remedies in such cases. At a certain moment, the Prosecution made the statement 
that “[g]iven this lawful authority [this is the authority of other States to detain 
Todorović for transfer to the ICTY, even if they have not received a warrant of 
                                                          
343 See, however, Lamb (2000, p. 228, n. 220), who is of the opinion that “[t]he fact that an arrest may 
violate the law of the State where the arrest took place is of no consequence, owing to the explicit 
subordination of national law to the provisions of the ICTY Statute.” (See also ibid., p. 240.) See also 
Sloan 2003 A, p. 105: “[I]f the OTP is to look to jurisprudence setting out the right to liberty and 
security at the national level and distil the requirement that the deprivation of liberty must comport with 
the procedural guarantees where this deprivation takes place, surely the apposite question for the Trial 
Chamber is whether Todorović had been afforded his procedural rights under the international law 
governing the functioning of the ICTY, not whether he had been afforded his procedural rights under the 
law of the FRY.” Nevertheless, a little later, Sloan also stresses the importance of the regularity of the 
arrest on the ground (which arguably implies that one should also be able to review whether the 
arresting entity has complied with its own procedures), see Sloan 2003 A, pp. 105-106: “[The OTP] 
described issues relating to the procedure surrounding the arrest warrant – including the fact that it had 
not been issued to the states involved in the detention and had not specifically authorized an arrest in the 
country to which the accused had fled – as ‘immaterial’, and appeared content to overlook whether 
excessive force had been used. In short, the OTP appeared to be asserting that neither the particulars of 
the arrest warrant nor the nature of the apprehension were relevant to the issue of the right to liberty and 
security – so long as the indictment was valid. Consideration of the right to liberty and security of 
person by international bodies both at the European level and the wider international level suggests that 
the OTP’s approach may be overly deferential to the Tribunal [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
344 Again, the remedy in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention is release and not necessarily the 
refusal of jurisdiction. It can be maintained that judges should indeed only refuse jurisdiction in the most 
extreme cases and not in cases where it is clear that uncooperative States, executing arrests for the 
Tribunal, have violated procedures on purpose, even if these violations are rather serious, in an effort to 
ensure that a person’s trial would not continue because of these violations. In that respect, one must 
agree with the Prosecution that “it could defeat the purposes of justice if every illegality by a State 
authority, over which the Tribunal has no control, could vitiate a prosecution altogether. Indeed, any 
such doctrine might potentially encourage certain States, which have hitherto failed to fulfil their 
obligations of co-operation with the Tribunal, to hand accused persons over to the Tribunal but to ensure 
that there are serious irregularities in the process. The States concerned could thus claim that they are 
fulfilling their obligation to co-operate, while at the same time ensuring that the prosecution against the 
accused cannot proceed.” (ICTY, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, 
Miroslav Tadić a/k/a Miro Brko, Stevan Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo a/k/a Monstrum and Simo 
Zarić a/k/a Šolaja, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to the “Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, 
Detention and Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorović and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss 
Indictment” Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 February 1999’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 February 1999, 
para. 51.) See also Lamb 2000, p. 211, n. 154. This concern was also expressed by the Prosecutor in the 








arrest, ChP], the arrest of the accused by States who were not the addressees of an 
arrest warrant cannot be considered arbitrary, or a violation of the accused’s right to 
liberty and security of person”.345 However, this is a rather narrow interpretation of 
what constitutes a violation of the right to liberty and security.346 As explained 
before, the fact that certain actors are allowed to make an arrest does not mean that 
the arrest itself can be considered legal/non-arbitrary. One should also take into 
account other elements, such as whether the execution of this specific arrest was 
non-arbitrary.  
Going back to the Trial Chamber’s decision of 18 October 2000 itself and the 
position of SFOR, the judges noted that the NATO force maintained that first, 
“further disclosure is unnecessary because the accused would not be entitled to the 
relief sought even if the allegations are proven”347 and secondly, that “compelling 
                                                          
345 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić a/k/a Miro 
Brko, Stevan Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo a/k/a Monstrum and Simo Zarić a/k/a Šolaja, 
‘Prosecutor’s Response to the “Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention and 
Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorović and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss Indictment” 
Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 February 1999’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 February 1999, para. 47. See 
also ibid., para. 48: “Here, the Tribunal has indicted the accused, and had issued warrants for his arrest. 
There was lawful authority for his detention by the authorities of any State. (…) Thus, even if the 
forcible removal of the accused from the FRY as part of his transfer to the Tribunal violated rights of the 
FRY under international law, it cannot be said to have violated any right of the accused to liberty or 
security of person [emphasis in original, ChP].” This is arguably also a rather strange claim. If SFOR, or 
a State would indeed have kidnapped Todorović by entering the sovereignty of the FRY without the 
latter’s consent, one can assume that the normal arrest procedures of SFOR or that State were not 
followed. After all, they do not have enforcement authority in the FRY. And that in turn leads to a 
violation of a person’s right to liberty and security because the arrest was not executed according to the 
proper procedures. 
346 See also Sloan 2003 A, pp. 105-106.  
347 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan 
Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and 
Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 2000, para. 18. This was because, according to SFOR, “(a) 
relevant case law does not mandate release of the accused, (b) the accused is not entitled to the remedy 
of release from custody, and (c) the accused should not be returned to a State which defies its legal 
obligations to the International Tribunal”. (Ibid.) It hereby referred, for example, to the still-to-discuss 
second Barayagwiza decision, in that that decision supports the idea “that release is not justified where 
the misconduct is not attributable to the Prosecution” (ibid., para. 19). However, as will be discussed in 
the examination of that case, one can have one’s doubts with respect to that conclusion. In addition, 
SFOR relied on the already discussed Dokmanović case and stated that this case, “in which an arrest 
involving deceptive “luring” was held to be lawful, does not support the accused’s claim for relief 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) That assertion is arguably also rather odd as Todorović’s case 
involved an alleged abduction and not a luring operation. See also Sluiter 2003 A, p. 287: “It is (…) a 
“classical” abduction case”. Nevertheless, SFOR also turned more specifically to abduction cases and 
argued that “[i]n cases addressing the lawfulness of cross-border abductions, some cases uphold a 
principle that abduction in violation of the law of one State does not divest another of jurisdiction, while 
others suggest that the courts have a discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction where the State’s own 
agents have been complicit in the abduction.” (ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, 
Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Decision on Motion for Judicial 
Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 2000, para. 18.) 
However, “SFOR points out that, in the current case, it is the Office of the Prosecutor, not SFOR, that 
stands analogous to the agents of a prosecuting State [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid., para. 19.) 








requirements of operational security preclude further disclosure by SFOR 
concerning the detention of the accused [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.348  
After presenting the final reaction from the Defence to these arguments,349 the 
Chamber looked at the submissions of the parties during the previously mentioned 
hearing of 25 July 2000350 and the post-hearing submissions.351 There is no need to 
examine all of these here, but one remark by the Defence may nevertheless be 
interesting to note, namely that the Defence acknowledged that,  
 
if it were successful in challenging the validity of the arrest, and the accused were 
returned to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), there were 
two possibilities: either the accused would be returned to the custody of the 
International Tribunal immediately; or that country would not honour its 
commitments. However, that issue was “beyond the interests of the International 
Tribunal and has to be dealt with in a political forum” [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].352 
 
As will also be explained in the 2002 Nikolić case, this reasoning is arguably 
fallacious: if, for example, employees of the OTP are responsible for a serious male 
captus, for instance, an abduction which violated the sovereignty of a State, the 
regular transfer procedures and the human rights of the suspect, the judges will have 
no option but to refuse jurisdiction and to release the person. That might very well 
lead to a return of that suspect to his State of residence/the injured State. If that 
happens, one can wonder why that State would have a renewed obligation to return 
                                                                                                                                              
of the ICTY, this does not mean that irregularities committed by third parties might not lead to remedies 
or even a dismissal of the case (see also the still to Barayagwiza case). SFOR also argued that an alleged 
violation of the domestic law of the FRY “does not vest in the accused a right to be released from the 
custody of the International Tribunal, especially as the accused “deliberately created a situation in which 
what he would consider a procedurally regular arrest and transfer was impossible” [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” (Ibid., para. 20.) (As explained earlier: even though irregularities in the national arrest 
procedures may not lead to a refusal from the national judge to surrender the suspect to The Hague, such 
irregularities do arguably have an effect on the lawfulness of one’s deprivation of liberty.) Finally, it 
stated “that a ruling that the International Tribunal will not exercise jurisdiction over a person 
apprehended in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) unless the 
apprehension is conducted in accordance with its domestic law could have far-reaching consequences 
for the ability of the International Tribunal to try indictees and would, in effect, afford legal recognition 
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as a sanctuary for war crimes 
indictees.” (Ibid., para. 21.) (As stated, although these national irregularities may be taken into account 
by the judge reviewing one’s deprivation of liberty, the refusal of jurisdiction should only be reserved 
for the most serious male captus cases. National procedural irregularities will normally not lead to that 
result.) 
348 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan 
Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and 
Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 2000, para. 18. See also ibid., para. 22.  
349 See ibid., paras. 23-26. 
350 See ibid., paras. 27-33. 
351 See ibid., paras. 34-36. 
352 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan 
Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and 








the suspect to the ICTY. That would make no sense. After all, the Tribunal has 
stated that it has no jurisdiction to try the case. How can a State have an obligation 
to return a suspect to a forum which has stated that it can no longer try the suspect? 
It would be better if the Tribunal made the return conditional, for example, on the 
State of residence prosecuting the suspect for his alleged crimes itself.353 The 
Tribunal must not forget that it also has a responsibility to fight impunity, even if it 
is of the opinion that the suspect can no longer be tried before its own judges. (This 
was a correct point of criticism vented against the first Barayagwiza case, which 
will be discussed in Subsection 3.2.1 of this chapter.) Hence, if it is uncertain 
whether the suspect will be genuinely prosecuted in the injured State, the judges 
should transfer the suspect to another jurisdiction which is willing and able to try the 
suspect and repair the violation of the injured State’s sovereignty in another way. 354 
In less serious male captus cases, where the judge has not refused jurisdiction 
but where he may nevertheless be of the opinion that a violation of, for example, the 
sovereignty of the FRY strictly speaking demands that the suspect is released and 
returned to that injured State (see also the discussion of this point in the context of 
the Dokmanović case), it would be better for the Tribunal not to return the suspect at 
all. After all, in such a situation, the suspect would be returned to a State which has 
an immediate obligation to re-transfer the suspect to the ICTY (which is, after all, 
still capable of trying the suspect). In such a case, the Tribunal could argue that the 
return has repaired the initial iniuria and that one can restart the trial as if nothing 
had happened. However, that would constitute an absurd pro forma remedy. 
Furthermore, one could also argue that it would be rather ridiculous to return a 
suspect to a State which may not cooperate with the ICTY.355  
                                                          
353 It must be noted that such a new national trial would probably not violate the principle ne bis in idem 
for suspects making male captus claims have normally not been tried on the merits of the case yet in the 
context of the Tribunal. Cf. also Sluiter 2001, p. 154, n. 29 and accompanying text (writing on the 
context of the ICTY). 
354 This point was already made at the inter-State context, see Fawcett 1964, pp. 199-200 (see also n. 
570 of Chapter III): “[I]t might perhaps be said, in the case of irregular capture and removal for trial of a 
criminal jure gentium, that the State, from which he is taken, may only demand his reconduction if two 
conditions are satisfied: that that State is the forum conveniens for his trial, and that it declares an 
intention to put him on trial. If these conditions are not satisfied, then the State must accept reparation in 
another form, since otherwise the interest of justice would be defeated.” See also n. 381 of the present 
chapter. 
355 Cf. also the UK submission in the Todorović case where it was argued: “It follows that even if 
Todorovic were to be released and returned to the FRY, the FRY would be under an absolute obligation 
immediately to hand him back to the Tribunal. The United Kingdom submits that it would be absurd for 
the Tribunal to hold that international law required it to release Todorovic and return him to the FRY 
while also requiring the FRY to hand him straight back to the Tribunal. It would be even more absurd to 
hold that there was a duty to return him to the FRY if there were any chance that the FRY would not 
comply with its obligations to the Tribunal.” (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje 
Simi[ć], Milan Simi[ć], Miroslav Tadi[ć], Stevan Todorovi[ć] and Simo Zari[ć], ‘Submissions of the 
United Kingdom Regarding Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber III, 18 October 2000’, Case No. 








Hence, it would arguably be better in such a situation to hold the suspect in the 
custody of the Tribunal, to continue the case and to accord other remedies for the 
wrongs which occurred in the context of the case.   
The Trial Chamber, after having referred to the relevant legal provisions,356 first 
presented the question as to whether the ICTY can issue an order to SFOR pursuant 
to Article 29 of the ICTY Statute, now that that article in principle speaks only of 
States.357  
There is no need to discuss this issue in more detail because it has already been 
explained supra, see footnote 71 and accompanying text, that the ICTY in this case 
was of the opinion that a purposive reading of Article 29 of the ICTY Statute indeed 
allows it to issue such an order.  
It then turned to the motion of the Defence, explained what its purpose was358 
and rejected the argument of the Prosecution and SFOR that the motion had to be 
dismissed because Todorović would not be entitled to the relief sought anyway, 
even if Todorović’s allegations were true.359  
 
This argument proceeds on the assumption that the evidence is complete. That 
assumption is erroneous, as what Todorović is seeking is further evidence from SFOR 
which will assist him to obtain the relief which he seeks. Only when Todorović has 
had the opportunity to present all the available evidence will it be possible for the 
Trial Chamber to determine whether he is entitled to the relief he seeks.360  
 
In the US brief on review of this decision, it was argued, while referring to this – 
according to the US – “glaringly circular” and “plainly erroneous” reasoning, that  
 
[i]n view of the compelling operational security concerns raised by SFOR, the Trial 
Chamber erred or abused its discretion in ordering the production of the requested 
information, when the OTP and SFOR concurred that, in the absence of that 
information, the accused’s assertions of fact could be taken as established for the 
purposes of his requests for release, and that those requests could then be decided as a 
matter of law [original footnote omitted, ChP].361   
                                                          
356 See ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan 
Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and 
Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 2000, para. 37. 
357 See ibid., para. 38. 
358 See ibid., para. 59: “The purpose of the Defence Motion is to secure certain information and 
documents, which the accused believes to be in the custody and control of SFOR, and which will assist 
him in his motions challenging the legality of his arrest [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
359 See ibid. 
360 Ibid. 
361 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan 
Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Brief of the United States of America on Review of Decision on Motion for 
Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-AR108bis, 15 November 
2000, p. 7. See also ibid., p. 8: “If all the accused’s allegations can be taken as established, and these 
allegations still will not support the relief he seeks as a matter of law, then there is no conceivable 








Although the US seems to have a point here, one can wonder whether full disclosure 
of the male captus of Todorović would not lead to an even more serious account 
than the one alleged by Todorović himself.  
This is the point observed by Sloan. He explains that the Chamber “correctly 
observed that it would only be appropriate to turn to the issue of the suitability of the 
remedy where the evidence was complete [original footnote omitted, ChP]”362 
because  
 
[e]ven if Todorović’s allegations were accepted ‘at their highest’ by the OTP and 
SFOR for the purposes of the motions – something which was by no means clear[363] 
– he was, nevertheless, not in a position to make fuller or further allegations without 
having the requested disclosure. Without the full story of what happened surrounding 
his arrest (information presumably possessed by SFOR and its contributing states, 
and, perhaps, the OTP), Todorović was disadvantaged; he was only in a position to 
make allegations relating to conduct of which he had first-hand knowledge. There 
was nothing to say that disclosure of the full story of his arrest would not show 
treatment that was significantly worse than he had alleged [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].364 
    
The Trial Chamber also looked at the argument by SFOR that requirements of 
operational security do not allow further disclosure of what happened to Todorović 
but this “blanket objection”365 was not accepted by the Chamber either.366 As a 
result, the Chamber found 
 
that it has been adequately demonstrated that there is material in the custody or 
control of SFOR which is likely to assist Todorović in obtaining the relief he seeks, 
and that there is a legitimate forensic purpose in having it produced. The Trial 
Chamber is also satisfied that, as the Prosecution has not been able to produce copies 
                                                                                                                                              
the production of such “further evidence,” in the face of SFOR’s well-founded security concerns, is 
futile, erroneous, and an abuse of discretion.” See for this brief also Murphy 2001. 
362 Sloan 2003 A, p. 98. 
363 Sloan (ibid., pp. 97-98, n. 95) notes here that “[t]he OTP’s assertion that it was willing to assume 
Todorović’s allegations to be true, and to take them ‘at their highest’ was quite misleading. Instead of 
taking his allegations at their highest, the OTP referred to a carefully drawn list of facts that it was 
willing to admit for the purposes of the motions and made no concessions additional to these (…). 
Important omissions from the OTP’s list included the accused’s allegations of collusion between the 
OTP and SFOR, as well as allegations that the accused was beaten by the forces that captured him.” 
364 Ibid., pp. 97-98. At the end of this quotation, Sloan (ibid., p. 98, n. 96) explains that “[i]t might, for 
example, have come to light upon full disclosure of the facts that there was an extreme disregard of 
national or international law by SFOR of an even more egregious nature than that alleged by the 
accused, or that there had been collusion between the OTP and SFOR.” 
365 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan 
Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and 
Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 2000, para. 60. 
366 SFOR could have chosen “to make specific objections to the disclosure of particular documents or 








of the material, it is appropriate that SFOR now be required to disclose that 
material.367 
 
In conclusion, the Trial Chamber granted the motion of the Defence and ordered 
“what to some was the unthinkable”,368 namely that SFOR, its responsible authority 
(the North Atlantic Council) and all the participating States in SFOR (including the 
US) disclose all the relevant material concerning the arrest and detention of 
Todorović to the Defence.369 In addition to this, it also noted that “[a] subpoena shall 
be issued in due course to General Shinseki requiring him to provide evidence in the 
ongoing evidentiary hearing in this matter at a date and time to be specified”.370    
In his separate opinion to this case, Judge Robinson, also referring to the still-to-
discuss Barayagwiza case,371 underscored the importance of a person’s right to 
challenge the legality of his arrest, including its remedy of release.372 Even though 
this right is not explicitly mentioned in the ICTY Statute, it can be found in all the 
major human rights instruments, has customary international law status373 and can 
without a doubt be seen as “one of the “internationally recognised standards 
regarding the rights of the accused” which the Secretary-General indicates that the 
Tribunal must “fully respect””.374 He argued that  
 
a judicial body, whether domestic or international, (…) must be in a position to 
require the arresting authority[375] to provide material relevant to an arrest; failing 
                                                          
367 Ibid., para. 61. 
368 Sloan 2003 A, p. 91. 
369 See ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan 
Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and 
Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 2000, disposition. 
370 Ibid. 
371 See ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan 
Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 
2000, para. 3. 
372 See ibid.  
373 See ibid., para. 2. 
374 Ibid., para. 3. See also n. 130 and accompanying text. See further Zappalà 2002 A, p. 1195, n. 27. 
375 As clarified earlier (see the text following n. 340 and accompanying text), Robinson also looked at 
the relationship between the ICTY and SFOR and concluded that the “extension of SFOR’s function 
gives SFOR a role comparable to that of a police force in some domestic legal systems, and creates, as 
between itself and the Tribunal, through the Office of the Prosecutor, a relationship of which the 
analogue in such systems is the relationship between the police force, the prosecuting authority and the 
courts. This quasi police function of SFOR, whereby it virtually operates as an enforcement arm of the 
Tribunal, clearly impacts on the work of the Tribunal in the discharge of its fundamental purpose to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law. (…) There is 
clearly a strong functional, although not organic, relationship between SFOR and the Tribunal, through 
one of its organs, the Office of the Prosecutor.” (ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, 
Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson’, 
Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 2000, para. 6.) Although it can indeed be argued, as was done supra, 
that the moment SFOR makes arrests for the ICTY, it functions as the latter’s enforcement arm, one 
must also agree with Sluiter who notes that the ICTY is in principle not in a hierarchically higher 
position than SFOR. See Sluiter 2003 A, p. 289: “Although one may sympathise with this position [of 








such a competence, the right to challenge the legality of one’s arrest, which is a right 
under customary international law, may well be rendered nugatory and without 
substance.376 
 
The decision of the Trial Chamber “caused considerable consternation in NATO”,377 
which “hinted that the co-operation with the Tribunal might be brought to a halt if 
the Appeals Chamber did not review the Trial Chamber’s orders”.378 It may also be 
interesting to refer in that respect to the brief of the US, which qualified the decision 
as “both erroneous and an abuse of discretion [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.379 
Furthermore, in the German request for review, the male captus bene detentus 
                                                                                                                                              
be best if the Tribunal could dispose of all relevant evidence, including that of a privileged nature, like 
information in the hands of the ICRC. However, Judge Robinson’s approach in particular fails to 
provide legal analysis of the relationship with SFOR, which is, contrary to the relationship between 
States and the ICTY, not of a hierarchical nature, but rather one between equals, with both having their 
own Security Council mandate.” See also Sluiter’s already-mentioned criticism in n. 71. See for a 
detailed analysis of this issue also Henquet 2003, who concludes (at p. 155) that SFOR is not an agent of 
the Tribunal “since it appears that the Tribunal does not exercise control over SFOR.” However, note 
that Henquet (at ibid.) is also of the opinion that “the “agency test” seems to have been incorrectly 
derived from the case law.” (See also n. 71.) The US was also of the opinion that SFOR could not be 
seen as the agent of the Prosecution and hence that, “in the absence of a connection between the OTP 
and the alleged abduction, the accused’s requests for release fail as a matter of law.” (ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan Todorović and Simo Zarić, 
‘Brief of the United States of America on Review of Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be 
Provided by SFOR and Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-AR108bis, 15 November 2000.) The US hereby 
referred to the second Barayagwiza decision but as will be shown infra, this decision does not overrule 
the first Barayagwiza decision with respect to the point that the Tribunal seems to be willing to take its 
responsibility for violations in the context of its case, irrespective of the entity responsible. 
Nevertheless, one can assume that the Tribunal will not quickly refuse jurisdiction in case its own 
people were not responsible for the male captus, even though that point cannot be excluded either. 
376 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan 
Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 
2000, para. 4. For even stronger words, see ibid., para. 7: “No legal system, whether international or 
domestic, that is based on the rule of law, can countenance the prospect of a person being deprived of 
his liberty, while its tribunals or courts remain powerless to require the detaining or arresting authority 
to produce, in proceedings challenging the legality of the arrest, material relevant to the detention or 
arrest; in such a situation, legitimate questions may be raised about the independence of those judicial 
bodies.” 
377 Ph. Vallières-Roland, ‘Prosecuting War Criminals: A Critique of the Relationship between NATO 
and the International Criminal Courts’, Centre for European Security and Disarmament (CESD) – 
Briefing Paper, February 2002, available at http://www.isis-
europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_87_2002_archives_59_paper.natoandiccs.pdf, p. 4. 
378 Ibid. 
379 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan 
Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Brief of the United States of America on Review of Decision on Motion for 
Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-AR108bis, 15 November 
2000, A 99. See also ibid., A 100 – A 99: “Refusing to consider whether the accused’s allegations could 
possibly entitle him to the relief he seeks, the Trial Chamber ordered the production of information that 
is neither relevant nor necessary to that relief, but whose disclosure – or indeed, even further litigation 








principle was explicitly defended.380 Finally, the UK authorities submitted that the 
seriousness of Todorović’s alleged crimes had to play a role.381  
                                                          
380 See ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simi[ć], Milan Simi[ć], Miroslav Tadi[ć], Stevan 
Todorovi[ć] and Simo Zari[ć], ‘Request of the Federal Republic of Germany for Review of Decision on 
Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-AR108bis, 2 
November 2000: “Even a decision departing from the facts as they are put forward by the accused must 
come to the conclusion that the relief sought by the accused, namely his release, cannot be reached 
under any legal aspect whatsoever. a) Even if the information which the Tribunals orders to provide 
proved an illegal nature of his arrest, this would in no way affect the legality of his detention. In other 
words, even if the accused was “male captus”, he is in any case “bene detentus”. b) In the sense of the 
“male captus, bene detentus”-principle, the accused may not invoke a breach of any [sovereignty] in his 
favor, since all States are obliged to cooperate with the Tribunal and to surrender alleged war criminals 
by a resolution of the UN-Security-Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. Furthermore, such 
a breach of a State sovereignty would not affect the rights of the accused as such. No rule of customary 
international law provides that in the sense of “male captus, bene detentus” a forced abduction of a 
hereafter legally detained person would hinder his/her trial before a criminal court or would entail 
his/her release out of a legally maintained detention.” See also ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor 
v. Blagoje Simi[ć], Milan Simi[ć], Miroslav Tadi[ć], Stevan Todorovi[ć] and Simo Zari[ć], ‘Request of 
the Federal Republic of Germany for Review of Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be 
Provided by SFOR and Others’, Case No. IT-95-9-AR108bis, 15 November 2000. As has become clear 
from the previous chapter, one could argue that this is a rather blunt statement, which does not take into 
account the fact that the exact nature of the male captus may affect the question whether or not male 
detentus must/should follow. This point was also confirmed in 2003 by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court in Al-Moayad. 
381 See ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simi[ć], Milan Simi[ć], Miroslav Tadi[ć], 
Stevan Todorovi[ć] and Simo Zari[ć], ‘Submissions of the United Kingdom Regarding Review of the 
Decision of Trial Chamber III, 18 October 2000’, Case No. IT-95-9-AR108 bis, 15 November 2000, 
paras. 26-28: “It is not necessary for the Tribunal to resolve the question (on which different views have 
been expressed) whether a State which has abducted a person from the territory of another State to stand 
trial in respect of crimes under its own domestic law is required by international law to return that 
person to the State from which he or she was abducted. The present case is different, because Todorovic 
is charged with crimes under international law and before an international tribunal. It is not clear that 
international law requires that in every case where the accused has been abducted or brought before the 
courts outside normal processes of extradition a State is deprived of jurisdiction in respect of 
international crimes (see, in particular, the decisions of the French Court of Cassation in Barbie 78 ILR 
125, the District Court of Jerusalem and the Supreme Court of Israel in Attorney-General of Israel v. 
Eichmann 36 ILR 5 (especially pp. 305 et seq.)). In addition, a number of decisions of a more general 
character have suggested that the nature of the crime charged is a factor to be taken into account (see, in 
particular, the decision of the House of Lords in R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex parte 
Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42 and the Court of Appeal in R. v. Mullen [1999] 3 WLR 777). [Note that the 
examination of these cases in the previous chapter of this book does not always agree with these 
observations presented by the UK authorities, ChP.] Juristic commentary is also far from unanimous in 
supporting the existence of a blanket rule requiring restitution of the defendant and denying jurisdiction 
to the courts of the State to which a person has been abducted (see, e.g. Jennings and Watts, 
Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed., 1992) vol. I, pp. 388-90 and Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law (5th ed., 1998), p. 320). Moreover, a number of commentators who consider that there 
is normally a duty of restitution in such a case consider that there are exceptions where the accused is 
charged with crimes under international law and the State from which he was abducted is not prepared 
to prosecute him.” This point was already earlier discussed (see n. 570 and accompanying text of 
Chapter III and n. 354 and accompanying text of the present chapter) and it is arguably indeed so that 
the State of residence should have no right to demand the return of the suspect if it cannot guarantee that 
it will prosecute the suspect itself (a return is not the same as impunity), but that does not mean that the 








After the Trial Chamber had issued its decision, the Prosecution took a drastic 
step: even before382 the decisions of the Appeals Chamber were issued (which 
rejected the appeals of the Prosecution), it filed a motion containing a plea 
agreement with Todorović by which 1) the latter would plead guilty to one count 
and would withdraw all the motions pertaining to his alleged unlawful arrest and 2) 
the Prosecution would drop the other 26 counts against him.383 As a result of this, 
Todorović pleaded guilty to one count and, on 31 July 2001, Trial Chamber III 
sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment (minus the almost three years Todorović 
had spent in pre-trial detention).384 Consequently, the ICTY did not – again – have 
to look at the real male captus discussion (namely at the question as to the effect of 
a male captus on the jurisdiction of the court) for the allegation of the male captus 
was dropped.385 Nevertheless, as probably has become clear in the previous pages, 
the male captus issue was discussed in the proceedings leading up to this 
decision,386 and furthermore, the case has produced much interesting material which 
can be connected to the male captus discussion and which will hopefully elucidate 
the examination of the cases still to be addressed.387  
When journalists asked Graham Blewitt, Deputy Prosecutor of the ICTY, “what 
had been sacrificed in the interest of justice to remove the issue of the involvement 
of SFOR in the arrest of Todorovic, Blewitt replied that absolutely nothing as far as 
the OTP was concerned had been sacrificed”.388 Blewitt hereby pointed to the fact 
that “the negotiations leading up to the plea agreement had been ongoing for some 
months. They stemmed from the desire of the accused to enter this plea of guilty.”389 
Nevertheless, he also “recognised that a consequence of this plea removed a 
particular problem that had been confronting the Tribunal for some months, 
particularly if the problem had anything to do with the recent lack of apprehensions 
by SFOR in the last six months”.390  
                                                                                                                                              
involved in an abduction, it should refuse jurisdiction. The problem of impunity (if the State of 
residence is not able or willing to prosecute the suspect itself) could then be solved by transferring the 
suspect to a jurisdiction which is able and willing to prosecute the suspect. 
382 This may be explained by the fact that the Prosecution did not have much faith in the outcome of its 
appeals, see, for example, Sloan 2003 A, p. 92. 
383 See ibid., pp. 92-93. 
384 See ibid., p. 93. 
385 See also Sluiter 2003 A, p. 288. 
386 See, for example, ICTY, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav 
Tadić a/k/a Miro Brko, Stevan Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo a/k/a Monstrum and Simo Zarić a/k/a 
Šolaja, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to the “Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention 
and Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorović and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss 
Indictment” Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 February 1999’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 February 1999. 
387 Cf. also Sloan 2003 A, p. 85 (abstract). 
388 Summary of the ICTY Weekly Press Briefing, 13 December 2000, available at: 
http://www.icty.org/sid/3672. 
389 Ibid. 
390 Ibid. See also ibid: “For that reason alone, the OTP saw that today’s plea was a significant one and 
hoped that if there was a log jam being created by the Todorovic proceedings involving SFOR this plea 








Although it may indeed be the case that Todorović was interested in making this 
plea earlier on – that would in any case explain the motion containing the plea 
agreement being filed even before the decisions of the Appeals Chamber concerning 
the legality of arrest were issued – it is hard to believe that the Prosecution was 
really of the opinion that “absolutely nothing” had been sacrificed in this case.391 
Sloan also notes in this respect that, “in view of the gravity and extent of his crimes, 
it is fair to say that Todorović got off relatively lightly”.392 That may indeed be the 
case, but Todorović could nevertheless not enjoy the life of a free man for long: on 3 





The third alleged male captus case under examination here is the case of Milošević. 
Almost a year after four Dutch nationals, two Canadian nationals and two British 
nationals were detained by the Yugoslav authorities on suspicion “of operating on 
behalf of Western intelligence agencies with instructions to enter its territory and 
kidnap, among others, Milosevic”,393 the former President of Serbia and the FRY 
was apprehended on 1 April 2001 for corruption and abuse of power in a more 
successful operation by Serbian authorities at his home in Belgrade.394  
Almost two years earlier, on 24 May 1999, an ICTY indictment against 
Milošević (and four co-accused) had been confirmed for alleged crimes committed 
                                                          
391 See also Cogan (2002, p. 127), who finds the statement of Blewitt “rather unconvincingly”. See 
further Sridhar 2006, p. 362: “The non-cooperation of states could have a potentially crippling effect on 
the day-to-day operations of the Tribunal, undermining the institution by depriving it of its defendants. 
As a result, the Prosecutor was likely anxious to strike a deal with Todorovic. The Tribunal, for its part, 
was likely happy to accept such a plea and be relieved of any duty to examine the matter further.” 
392 Sloan 2003 A, p. 87. See also ibid., p. 93: “The ultimate result in the case (26 out of 27 of the charges 
against Todorović being dismissed in return for his renouncing his right to access SFOR information) 
appears to be a vindication of Todorović’s strategy and may be an indication that the OTP’s desire to 
ensure that SFOR did not have to disclose any information relating to the capture of Todorović was its 
primary concern, surpassing all else, including its desire to ensure the accused did not escape justice 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” This could also be discerned from the following document, in which 
the Prosecution hinted that it might withdraw the whole indictment if necessary, see ICTY, Trial 
Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić a/k/a Miro Brko, Stevan 
Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo a/k/a Monstrum and Simo Zarić a/k/a Šolaja, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to 
the “Notice of Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention and Removal of Defendant Stevan 
Todorović and for Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss Indictment” Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 
February 1999’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 February 1999, para. 53: “Should the Trial Chamber decide in 
any case that knowledge of such operational facts were necessary to ensure the integrity of a trial (and 
for the reasons given, that is not the case here), it is submitted that the Prosecution should be given prior 
notice. This would enable the Prosecution to consider whether in the circumstances it would be in the 
public interest to apply to withdraw the indictment, rather than to embark upon such an enquiry.” (See 
also Sloan 2003 A, p. 93, n. 70.) 
393 Magliveras 2002, p. 671. This example again shows the importance of addressing the role of 
(actual?) private individuals in male captus cases, see also the Nikolić case which will be discussed in 
Subsection 3.1.4. 








in Kosovo.395 Three days later, on 27 May 1999, copies of the warrants of arrest 
were issued.396  
Now that Milošević was in custody (albeit for other crimes), the pressure from 
Western States to transfer him to the ICTY began to grow. On 23 June 2001, after 
efforts to have a law on cooperation with the ICTY passed by the Yugoslav 
Parliament had failed, Yugoslav President Koštunica adopted a governmental decree 
with a similar purpose.397 This decree was subsequently challenged by Milošević’s 
attorneys on legal grounds (in that the decree was unconstitutional) and on 
procedural grounds.398 Wedgwood explains what happened then as follows: 
 
This decree was suspended by the Yugoslav constitutional court on June 28, pending 
further hearing, and President Kostunica of Yugoslavia stated that he would await the 
outcome of the court’s proceeding. Thereafter, Zoran Djindjic, the prime minister of 
Serbia, asserted that Serbia had power to nullify the Yugoslav decision, and ordered 
the transport of Milosevic by helicopter to the Bosnia airbase at Tuzla, where the 
former president was flown to The Hague.399   
                                                          
395 At that time, he was the first head of State in function that was charged by an international criminal 
tribunal. 
396 It may be interesting to note that these copies were transmitted not only to the FRY, but also to all 
UN Member States and the Confederation of Switzerland. However, it is important to stress that here, 
the procedure envisaged by the already discussed (see ns. 85-86 and accompanying text) Rule 61 (D) of 
the ICTY RPE (the international arrest warrant) was not used; what was used was a broad interpretation 
of Rule 55 (D) of the ICTY RPE which states that “[s]ubject to any order of a Judge or Chamber, the 
Registrar may transmit a certified copy of a warrant of arrest to the person or authorities to which it is 
addressed, including the national authorities of a State in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction the 
accused resides, or was last known to be, or is believed by the Registrar to be likely to be found.” See 
also ICTY, Judge David Hunt, Prosecutor v Slobodan Milošević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, 
Dragoljub Ojdanić & Vlajko Stojiljković, ‘Decision on Review of Indictment and Application for 
Consequential Orders’, Case No. IT-99-37-I, 24 May 1999, paras. 21-22: “21. In the light of the 
possibility that some or all of the accused may seek refuge outside the territory of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, the Prosecutor also seeks an order, pursuant to Rule 55(D), that certified copies of each 
of the warrants are to be transmitted by the Registrar to all States Members of the United Nations and to 
the Confederation of Switzerland. 22. Rule 61(D) permits the issue of international arrest warrants to be 
transmitted to all such States, but only where the arrest warrant issued pursuant to Rule 55 has not been 
executed within a reasonable time, and such international warrants may be issued only by a Trial 
Chamber. It is nevertheless argued that the power to transmit certified copies of the arrest warrant 
pursuant to Rule 55(D) is a wide one, and that it is expressly not limited to transmission only to those 
national authorities of the States or territories where the accused resides or is believed to reside. In any 
event, it is argued, the procedure permitted by Rule 55(D) of transmitting certified copies of the original 
arrest warrant is not the same as the issue of international arrest warrants pursuant to Rule 61(D). 
Rule 54 permits a judge of the Tribunal to issue such orders as may be necessary for the purposes of the 
preparation or conduct of the trial. There can be no trial until the accused is arrested. The orders sought 
would assist in ensuring the arrest of the accused [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
397 See Magliveras 2002, p. 663. 
398 See ibid. 
399 R. Wedgwood, ‘Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic To Be Tried in The Hague for 
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Allegedly Committed in Kosovo’, ASIL Insights, July 2001 
(available at: http://www.asil.org/insigh76.cfm). It may be interesting to note that ICTY OTP 
investigator Kevin Curtis – a by now hopefully familiar name (see the (alleged) male captus case of 








ðjinñić admitted afterwards that the sudden transfer of Milošević was the 
consequence of great pressure from in particular the US and the EU, which 
threatened Yugoslavia with a financial boycott if it did not comply with the requests 
for transfer in this case.400 That Yugoslav President Koštunica labelled the transfer 
as illegal may not come as a surprise, but also Magliveras, in his article in the 
European Journal of International Law, concludes straightforwardly “that the 
Serbian Government’s decision to surrender Milosevic to the ICTY lacked any legal 
basis”401 and that “[h]is arrest and detention were clearly illegal”.402  
                                                                                                                                              
Milošević himself at p. 672 of the transcripts of the 20 February 2002 session of his case (available at: 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/020220IT.htm): “THE ACCUSED: 
[Interpretation] Well, then I have another thing to say. I heard a name mentioned, Kevin Curtis. If I 
understood the name correctly, it was Kevin Curtis. Kevin Curtis is an individual who committed a 
crime, the crime of my unlawful arrest in Belgrade. He was the perpetrator of that.” That Curtis was 
indeed involved in the operation can be found in Carla Del Ponte’s memoirs, see Del Ponte 2009, pp. 
118-119, where one can read an interesting ‘inside’ account of Milošević’s transfer into the custody of 
the ICTY: “On the Thursday that was Vidovan in 2001 [28 June 2001, ChP], the Serbian government 
turned over Slobodan Milošević to face trial. A little after seven in the evening, the Belgrade 
government made a public announcement that Milošević had been placed in the tribunal’s custody. 
Kevin Curtis, a British police officer and former Olympic-caliber swimmer, was shown to an area 
behind a government building where three helicopters awaited. After a few minutes, Milošević arrived 
in a prison van. The sight of the helicopters appears to have alarmed him, as if he did not know that any 
deals he might have struck with Koštunica no longer held. He raised his arm. He asked the prison 
warden what was going on. And the warden explained that he would soon be departing for The Hague. 
Milošević protested. He complained that he did not recognize the tribunal’s authority. He said he would 
not leave. The warden led him toward Curtis, who read Milošević his rights and formally placed him 
under arrest. Milošević refused to acknowledge or accept any of the paperwork offered to him. A 
security officer searched Milošević’s person. Then the security officer, Curtis, their translator, and 
Milošević boarded a helicopter that set off toward Bosnia and Herzegovina and the NATO military base 
outside the city of Tuzla. Against the engine scream and beating chopper blades, Milošević attempted to 
converse with Curtis in English. Stepping off the aircraft at Tuzla, he asked Curtis to put a handkerchief 
on the ground so he would not have to set foot on Bosnian soil; and he tried without success to exchange 
small talk with the soldiers who were guarding him. Sometime after ten o’clock, handcuffed and ordered 
to remain silent, he boarded a C-130 transport aircraft and flew to Eindhoven, a small airport east of 
Rotterdam. There he boarded a Dutch helicopter that flew him to a landing pad inside the penitentiary in 
Scheveningen, where he would reside until his dying day.”        
400 See Strijards 2003, pp. 750-751, n. 5 and Magliveras 2002, p. 676. See also Van Sliedregt 2001 A, p. 
635, who states that it was the power of money and not the power of justice that made Milošević end up 
in a prison in Scheveningen, and R. Wedgwood, ‘Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic To Be 
Tried in The Hague for Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Allegedly Committed in Kosovo’, 
ASIL Insights, July 2001 (available at: http://www.asil.org/insigh76.cfm): “Critics of the decision argued 
that Serbia was under pressure to act because an international donors’ conference was scheduled for 
June 28 [this must be 29, ChP] to consider $1.2 billion in aid for the reconstruction of Serbia.” See 
finally also ‘Milosevic extradition steps closer’, CNN, 23 June 2001 (available at: 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/06/23/milosevic.decree/index.html): “An international 
donors’ conference is due to be held next week at which Serbia hopes to raise over one billion dollars in 
much needed aid. The United States has made clear it will only attend the donors’ conference in 
Brussels on June 29 if it has seen signs of progress in Belgrade’s cooperation with the tribunal. A White 
House spokesman said: “This is a good step in the right direction. We’ll be watching to see when he’s 
[extradited]. But this is a potentially positive step.[”] “The international community regard his 
extradition as a moral imperative. It is an oft-stated and important goal.”” 









In The Hague, Milošević raised his concerns, including those pertaining to his 
transfer, in two motions (of 9 and 30 August 2001) which were considered by the 
Trial Chamber in its decision of 8 November 2001.403  
Paragraphs 35-51 of this decision deal with the argument ‘Lack of competence 
by reason of his unlawful surrender’.  
Milošević presented the following grounds as to why his transfer had to be seen 
as unlawful: 
 
(a) The International Tribunal sent the arrest warrants to the authorities of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, not to the government of the Republic of Serbia. However, it 
was the latter that transferred the accused to the International Tribunal. That 
government had no power to act in such a manner.  
(b) The Serbian government had no international obligation to cooperate with the 
International Tribunal.  
(c) Article 18 of the Federal Constitution does not provide for the extradition or 
transfer of Yugoslav citizens to an international body.  
(d) In the circumstances set out in (a), (b) and (c) above, his transfer is an abuse of 
process in that the procedures of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were bypassed 
and he was unlawfully transferred to the International Tribunal.404  
 
The Prosecution countered this by saying that it is a “well-established principle of 
law that States may not rely on their national legislation to defeat their international 
obligations”405 and that the FRY was under an international obligation to cooperate 
with, and transfer Milošević to, the ICTY.406  
As already asserted in the Dokmanović case, a suspect could invoke ‘real’ 
irregularities related to his national deprivation of liberty and transfer but he cannot 
invoke an irregularity which originated from a State’s failure to cooperate with the 
Tribunal. Thus, Milošević cannot claim that his transfer was illegal because his 
national Constitution does not provide for the transfer of nationals to the ICTY.  
The Trial Chamber first underscored the importance of a provision to which 
considerable attention has already been paid in this book: the habeas corpus right of 
Article 9, paragraph 4 of the ICCPR. The Chamber noted that this right was not 
included in the Statute but that, “as one of the fundamental human rights of an 
accused person under customary international law, it is, nonetheless, applicable, and 
indeed, has been acted upon by this International Tribunal”.407  
After having made this statement, it turned to the above-mentioned arguments of 
the Defence and the Prosecution and clarified that  
 
                                                          
403 See ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, ‘Decision on Preliminary Motions’, 
Case No. IT-99-37-PT, 8 November 2001. 
404 Ibid., para. 35. 
405 Ibid., para. 36. See also Section 2 of this chapter. 
406 See ibid.  
407 Ibid., para. 38. The Trial Chamber referred here to the still-to-discuss Barayagwiza case before the 








notwithstanding the fact that the surrender was made by the government of the 
Republic of Serbia, rather than the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to whom the 
request was made, the provisions of Rule 58[408] apply and, consequently, the transfer 
was effected in accordance with the provisions of the Statute.409 
 
There is something strange about this reasoning. It is indeed so that Rule 58 of the 
ICTY RPE stipulates that States may not use (problems in) their national law to 
refuse cooperation with the ICTY but that is, it is submitted, something quite 
different from the question as to whether the transfer was executed procedurally 
correctly and whether the suspect can invoke the fact of his unlawful transfer (if that 
is the case). However, the Chamber clarified this point when it subsequently noted 
the relevance of Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
provides that “a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty”. It explained:  
 
The Statute of the International Tribunal is interpreted as a treaty. The Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia has an obligation under the Statute to comply with the request 
to arrest and transfer the accused and, therefore, cannot rely on its internal law, 
namely the division of power as between the federal government and its States as a 
justification for failure to comply. Although it is the accused, and not the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia that is seeking to rely on the internal constitutional system of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it follows that if the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia itself cannot rely on internal laws, then, a fortiori, neither can the 
accused. Accordingly, this ground is dismissed.410 
 
This can be accepted: it may indeed be the case that the transfer was made by the 
Government of the Republic of Serbia, rather than the FRY to whom the request 
was sent, but this irregularity originates from the fact that the FRY had apparently 
not clearly regulated how this State (including its constituent parts) was to cooperate 
with the Tribunal. Such an irregularity, it has been argued earlier, cannot be invoked 
by the suspect before the ICTY.  
The Chamber then turned to the abuse of process doctrine. It clarified that an 
abuse of process does not necessarily have to lead to a lack of jurisdiction, but that 
the judges have a discretion to refuse jurisdiction.411 Nevertheless, the Trial 
                                                          
408 This rule, which has already been discussed earlier, see n. 22 and accompanying text, provides that 
“[t]he obligations laid down in Article 29 of the Statute shall prevail over any legal impediment to the 
surrender or transfer of the accused or of a witness to the Tribunal which may exist under the national 
law or extradition treaties of the State concerned.” The Chamber held that this “Rule should be given an 
interpretation that takes full account of its purpose” (ibid., para. 46), which is “is to ensure that domestic 
procedures relating to the surrender and transfer of a person, from a State in respect of whom a request 
for arrest and transfer has been made, are not used as a basis for not complying with the request.” (Ibid., 
para. 45.) 
409 Ibid., para. 46. 
410 Ibid., para. 47. 
411 Ibid., para. 48. It hereby referred to the Bennett case (see Subsection 1.2 of Chapter V) and the 
observation in that case that “[a] court has a discretion to stay any criminal proceedings on the ground 








Chamber also clarified that the ICTY “will exercise its discretion to refuse to try the 
accused if there has been an egregious breach of the rights of the accused [emphasis 
added, ChP].”412 This means that the ICTY may refuse jurisdiction under certain 
circumstances but that, in any case, jurisdiction will be refused in the case of an 
egregious breach of the suspect’s rights.  
Applying these observations to the case at bar, the Chamber held: 
 
In light of that jurisprudence, the Chamber holds that the circumstances in which the 
accused was arrested and transferred – by the government of the Republic of Serbia, 
to whom no request was made, but which is a constituent part of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, to whom the request for arrest and transfer was made – are not such as 
to constitute an egregious violation of the accused’s rights. (…) Consequently, the 
doctrine of the abuse of process is inapplicable, and this ground is dismissed.413  
 
This quotation also shows that the ICTY may connect the most extreme 
consequence (namely the refusal of jurisdiction) to violations committed by third 
parties, violations for which the ICTY is not responsible. This can certainly be 
applauded. However, it is submitted that the ICTY should also grant less far-
reaching remedies for less serious violations, irrespective of the question of whether 
the ICTY was responsible for them. After all, if the ICTY takes the ultimate 
responsibility for violations committed in the pre-trial phase of its case, whoever 
committed them, it should also take ‘normal’ responsibility for less serious 
violations. It would be very strange if the ICTY took responsibility for a suspect 
                                                                                                                                              
impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) because it offends the 
court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of a particular 
case [emphasis added by the ICTY and original footnote omitted, ChP].” See ibid., para. 49.  
412 Ibid., para. 48. The Chamber here referred again to the Barayagwiza case, where, according to the 
ICTY Trial Chamber, the ICTR Appeals Chamber “stressed that the discretionary power to dismiss a 
charge is exercised “in light of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove 
detrimental to the court’s integrity”.” (Ibid., para. 50.) Besides the fact that this sentence does not flow 
properly, the Trial Chamber also presents the ICTR observation as if it means that judges must exercise 
their power to dismiss the charge under these circumstances (“is exercised”), whereas the ICTR decision 
speaks of a discretion. The exact sentence of the ICTR decision namely reads: “It is a process by which 
Judges may decline to exercise the court’s jurisdiction in cases where to exercise that jurisdiction in light 
of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove detrimental to the court’s 
integrity [emphasis added, ChP].” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74.) However, perhaps 
this difference only exists on paper; one can imagine that if judges determine that to exercise jurisdiction 
under certain circumstances would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity, that there is only one 
option left, namely to refuse jurisdiction. (In any case, it would be very difficult for judges to explain 
why they would nevertheless continue to exercise jurisdiction if they have previously determined that to 
continue to exercise jurisdiction would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity.) Cf. also Jones and 
Doobay 2004, p. 95 (discussed in the context of the Bennett case in Chapter V): “Although the majority 
use the framework of the abuse of process doctrine, in which the word “discretion”, rightly or wrongly, 
is frequently employed, the trenchant words of Lord Griffiths and Lord Bridge, and to a lesser extent 
Lord Lowry, appear to leave little or no room for the operation of a discretion or balancing exercise, 
where an abduction abroad in breach of extradition procedures has been found.” 
413 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, ‘Decision on Preliminary Motions’, 








who suffered egregious violations, but refused to do so when the suspect suffered 
less serious violations for the reason that these violations could not be attributed to 
the ICTY. That does not matter with respect to serious violations in the context of 
the abuse of process doctrine and arguably should not matter with respect to 
‘normal’ violations which do not lead to the ending of the case.  
The Chamber explains here that the fact that Serbia made the arrest and transfer 
– whereas the request was sent to the FRY – are not such as to constitute an 
egregious violation. That seemingly implies that the Chamber is nevertheless of the 
opinion that there was a violation in this case, even if it was not so serious as to lead 
to a refusal of jurisdiction.414 Although one can readily agree with the fact that the 
circumstances of this case should not lead to a refusal of jurisdiction, this statement 
also appears to confirm the views of Koštunica and Magliveras that the transfer was 
illegal. However, the fact that the Chamber does not accord other, less far-reaching, 
remedies here may be explained by the point mentioned above, namely that 
Milošević cannot invoke the illegality of his transfer as it originates from a failure 
from the FRY to regulate the cooperation with the ICTY in such a way that such 
problems would not occur. Nevertheless, Magliveras has argued that there were also 
other violations discernible in the arrest, detention and transfer of Milošević to The 
Hague, violations which may have a weaker connection with the internal 
organisational problems of the FRY.415 If that were indeed the case here, if actual 
violations did occur, then remedies should arguably have been granted, depending 
on the seriousness of the violations. (Which, in this case, given the fact that the 
ICTY was involved in the case, but not in the violations, may, of course, be very 
light.)  
As will also be explained in Chapter VIII, Milošević also “brought summary 
civil proceedings (kort geding) against the Netherlands State before the President of 
the Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague”.416 He asked the 
Court primarily to order the defendant, namely the Dutch State, to release him 
unconditionally because, among other things, “[t]he so-called Tribunal, elements in 
the Serbian government and the defendant blatantly kidnapped and abducted him in 
a coordinated action, which must be regarded as a flagrant breach of his human 
                                                          
414 See also Magliveras 2002, p. 669. 
415 See ibid., p. 668. For example, he writes that “the Yugoslav Constitution confers upon an arrested 
person a number of procedural rights that must be strictly observed, for instance, the right to appeal 
against the arrest order, which must be decided by the competent court within 48 hours. From what one 
can ascertain, these procedural rights were not applied in the case of Milosevic. The same conclusion is 
reached if we examine the position under the relevant stipulations of the Serb Constitution [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” 
416 ECtHR (Second Section), ‘Decision as to the admissibility of Application No. 77631/01 by Slobodan 
Milošević against the Netherlands’, 19 March 2002, p. 3. For the Dutch kort geding, see 
Arrondissementsrechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, Sector Civiel Recht – President, Vonnis in kort geding van 
31 augustus 2001, gewezen in de zaak met rolnummer KG 01/975 van: Slobodan Milošević tegen de 
Staat der Nederlanden, LJN: AD3266. The English translation can be found at: http://icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/012854276cd2950dc1256da20051ac68!OpenDocument. 








rights”.417 However, the President of the District Court in The Hague determined 
that the Netherlands had transferred its jurisdiction to hear an application for release 
from detention to the Tribunal and hence that this, or any other, Dutch court did not 
have jurisdiction to decide on Milošević’s application for release.418 After this 
decision, Milošević “lodged an appeal against this judgment, but withdrew it again 
as of 17 January 2002”,419 apparently because he believed that it would be to no 
avail since the District Court had stated that the Dutch courts (plural!) have no 
jurisdiction to decide on the application. Finally, on 20 December 2001, Milošević’s 
counsel lodged a series of complaints with the ECtHR,420 but the European Court 
quickly declared his entire application inadmissible, explaining that domestic 
remedies had not been exhausted. Although Milošević claimed that the judgment of 
the District Court (which stated that Dutch courts have no jurisdiction to decide on 
the application) showed that no adequate and effective domestic remedies were 
available, the ECtHR stated that  
 
the applicant did not make use of the opportunities offered by Netherlands law to 
challenge this finding; he withdrew his appeal to the Court of Appeal and in so doing 
also deprived himself of the possibility of lodging a subsequent appeal on points of 
law to the Supreme Court. The Court reiterates that the existence of mere doubts as to 
the prospects of success of a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not a 




The most important male captus case in the context of the international criminal 
tribunals is arguably the 2002 (Trial Chamber) and 2003 (Appeals Chamber) Nikolić 
case.  
Dragan Nikolić was indicted on 1 November 1994 for 24 counts of crimes 
against humanity, violations of the laws or customs of war and grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions.422 Most of these crimes, it was alleged, were committed in the 
detention camp Susica (eastern Bosnia), where Nikolić was allegedly the camp 
commander.423  
                                                          
417 The English translation of the Dutch kort geding at: http://icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/012854276cd2950dc1256da20051ac68!OpenDocument. 
418 See ibid. 
419 ECtHR (Second Section), ‘Decision as to the admissibility of Application No. 77631/01 by Slobodan 
Milošević against the Netherlands’, 19 March 2002, p. 4. 
420 Milošević claimed that the following rights of the ECHR had been violated: Art. 5, paras. 1 (among 
other things, because of his unlawful transfer from the FRY to The Hague), 2 and 4, Art. 6, paras. 1, 2 
and 3 (c), Artt. 10, 13 and 14. See ibid, pp. 4-6. 
421 Ibid., p. 6. 
422 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
2. It may be interesting to note that Nikolić was the very first person to be indicted by the ICTY.    








As explained earlier,424 Nikolić was the first defendant in whose case the Rule 61 
proceedings were used; after it became clear that the two arrest warrants for Nikolić 
(issued to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the Bosnian Serb 
administration in Pale)425 would not be executed,426 in May 1995 Judge Odio Benito 
ordered that the case be submitted to the Trial Chamber to review the indictment 
pursuant to Rule 61 (A) of the ICTY RPE.427 As this Trial Chamber was of the 
opinion that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Nikolić had committed 
the crimes with which he was charged, an international arrest warrant was issued.428 
After these Rule 61 proceedings, the Prosecution amended the indictment (which 
now contained no less than 80 (!) counts of crimes against humanity, violations of 
the laws and customs of war and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions), which 
was confirmed by Judge Claude Jorda on 12 February 1999.429 After that, a new 
arrest warrant was issued to the FRY.430   
Then, a little more than a year later, on or about 20 April 2000, Nikolić was 
arrested and detained by SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and transferred to The 
Hague.431 Although he made no complaint about the way he was brought into the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY during his first appearance on 28 April 2000,432 his counsel 
advised the Tribunal during a Status Conference almost six months later that the 
legality of Nikolić’s arrest and detention pursuant to that arrest would be 
challenged.433 Subsequently, on 17 May 2001, Nikolić filed his first motion 
challenging his male captus.434 Interestingly but perhaps not very surprisingly, 
                                                          
424 See n. 78 and accompanying text. 
425 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
10.    
426 See ibid., para. 11. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina notified the ICTY that it could not 
execute the warrant whereas the Bosnian Serb administration in Pale did not respond at all. 
427 See ibid., para. 12.    
428 See ibid. The Trial Chamber also noted “that the failure of the Prosecution to effect service of the 
Indictment was due wholly to the failure or refusal of the Bosnian Serb administration in Pale to co-
operate. In accordance with the procedure of Rule 61(E), the Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber 
requested the President of the Tribunal to notify the Security Council of this failure. The President of the 
Tribunal complied with this request and sent a letter dated 31 October 1995 to notify the Security 
Council [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Ibid., para. 13.) This was the first time the ICTY notified 
the UNSC of such a lack of cooperation. 
429 See ibid., para. 14.    
430 See ibid.  
431 See ibid., para. 15    
432 See ibid., para. 3.    
433 See ibid., para. 4.    
434 See ibid., para. 6. See for this motion: ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli[ć], 
‘Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the Prior Unlawful 
Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-Related Abuse of Process Within the 









Nikolić had heard from the rather successful tactics used in the male captus case of 
Todorović and argued that he would also use that method if necessary:435  
 
In this Motion Nikolić reserves his right to rely upon the decision of a Trial Chamber 
of this Tribunal in the case of Todorović (“Simić Decision”) so that, if this present 
Motion failed, he would seek an evidentiary hearing to establish the facts surrounding 
his arrest as an alternative challenge to the Tribunal’s exercise of jurisdiction [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].436  
 
Although the Prosecution acknowledged this reservation on the part of Nikolić, it 
also made clear that this case was different as all the material in its possession 
pertaining to Nikolić’s arrest had already been disclosed to Nikolić.437  
After a number of appeals from the judges to reach an agreement to narrow the 
issues in dispute, an agreement was indeed reached between the Defence and the 
Prosecution after another Status Conference held on 29 August 2001.438 In addition 
to this, a second motion with the exact issues to be resolved was filed by the 
Defence on 29 October 2001.439  
Finally, in February 2002, the indictment was again amended, meaning that at 
the time the Trial and Appeals Chamber’s decisions with respect to Nikolić’s male 
                                                          
435 That Nikolić did not use the successful Todorović method right away (but only as a safety net) was, 
of course, much to the OTP’s relief, see Sloan 2003 A, pp. 109-110 (who finalised his article at a time 
when the Trial Chamber had not yet issued its decision of 9 October 2002): “Given that the Trial 
Chamber’s decision that Todorović was entitled to disclosure from SFOR and its participating states was 
the ace in the hole that resulted in his negotiating a favourable plea agreement with the OTP, it might 
have been expected that Nikolić would follow a similar path and seek potentially embarrassing 
disclosure from SFOR and its participating states. Surprisingly, he did not. Instead, his counsel 
requested that the Trial Chamber determine the jurisdictional consequences that would flow from a 
successful challenge to the legality of the arrest as a preliminary matter. Of course the OTP, which 
along with SFOR had been agitating for this approach in the Todorović case, was only too pleased to 
follow this course. Under this approach, SFOR and its contributing states are safely out of reach of any 
embarrassing requests for disclosure from the Tribunal – at least until the complicated issues related to 
remedy are considered. Presumably, if the Trial Chamber finds that the requested remedy is 
inappropriate, Nikolić will request the Tribunal – which by then may very well be losing patience with 
the matter – for an order requiring disclosure from SFOR; if the remedy is found to be appropriate, the 
OTP still has the option of making a deal with Nikolić [emphasis in original and original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].” See also Sloan 2003 B, p. 544. 
436 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 6.    
437 See ibid.  
438 See ibid., para. 8.    
439 See ibid., para. 9. See for this second motion: ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v Dragan 
Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion to Determine Issues As Agreed Between the Parties And the Trial Chamber As Being 
Fundamental to the Resolution of the Accused’s Status Before the Tribunal in Respect of the 
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Under Rule 72 and Generally, the Nature of the Relationship Between the 
OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of Any Illegal Conduct Material to the Accused, his Arrest and 








captus challenges were issued, he was ‘only’ charged with eight counts of crimes 
against humanity.440  
In the above-mentioned agreement between the Defence and the Prosecution, it 
was stipulated that “[t]he relief sought by the Accused is his release and the 
dismissal of the Indictment against him or such other relief that the Court deems 
appropriate”.441 In addition, the two parties agreed that,  
 
[i]n order to determine whether the relief should be granted (…) the following issues 
would require resolution by way of hearing; 1. If it can be established by the accused 
that the accused’s arrest was achieved by any illegal conduct committed by, or with 
the material complicity of; (a) any individual or organisation (other than SFOR, OTP 
or the Tribunal), (b) SFOR, (c) OTP or (d) the Tribunal would the accused be entitled 
to the relief sought[?] 2. Does SFOR act as an agent of the OTP and/or the Tribunal in 
the detention and arrest of suspected persons?442  
 
These issues had to be resolved on the basis of the following facts, although it was 
also agreed that if, on the basis of these assumed facts, the judges were indeed of the 
opinion that the relief requested by Nikolić could be granted, that “a further hearing 
would be held to determine the factual circumstances of the Accused’s arrest 
[emphasis added, ChP]”.443 Hence, the parties were operating in a legal framework, 
to which – perhaps – the ‘real’ facts of the case would be applied later. The assumed 
facts of the case were:   
 
- that the Accused at the time of his apprehension was living in the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia; - that the Accused was taken forcibly and against his will and 
transported into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina; - that the apprehension and 
transportation into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was undertaken by 
unknown[444] individuals having no connection with SFOR and/or the Tribunal; - that 
                                                          
440 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
16. See also ibid., para. 2. After the Appeals Chamber’s decision in June 2003, the indictment was 
amended again. In the end, the indictment was brought back to four counts to which Nikolić pleaded 
guilty. On 4 February 2005, he was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment.      
441 Ibid., para. 18. Note that in the decision of 9 October 2002, the Trial Chamber itself does not mention 
the arguably important element “or such other relief that the Court deems appropriate”: “By way of 
relief, Nikolić seeks a stay, dismissal or negation of the Indictment, his release from the custody of the 
Tribunal and a return to his place of residence prior to his arrest [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
(Ibid., para. 2.) This was the relief sought in the first Defence motion of Nikolić, see ICTY, Trial 
Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of 
Arrest Following Upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-
Related Abuse of Process Within the Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 
72’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 17 May 2001, para. 1. 
442 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 18. 
443 Ibid.  
444 One can wonder whether the identities of these individuals were really such a mystery when the Trial 
and Appeals Chamber made their decisions in October 2002 and June 2003, respectively. (The Appeals 








the Accused in his interview with the Prosecution asserted that he was handcuffed and 
in the trunk of a car, when the unknown individuals handed him over to SFOR; - that 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Accused was arrested and detained by SFOR; - that 
subsequently the Accused was delivered into the custody of the Tribunal and 
transferred to The Hague; - that certain individuals have been tried and sentenced in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia[445] for the acts relating to the apprehension of the 
Accused [original footnote omitted, ChP].446  
 
The submissions of the parties were as follows. The Defence claimed that because a 
kidnapping, like the one in this case, is such a serious male captus,447 “a judicial 
body set up with, inter alios, the objectives of preserving human rights can have no 
proper option but to make it plain that jurisdiction will not be entertained in such 
circumstances [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.448 That also means that it is not 
necessary to check whether a kidnapping will, for example, jeopardise the fairness 
of the subsequent trial because that is a different matter.449 This male detentus 
                                                                                                                                              
“unknown individuals”, see ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 3.) 
After all, already in the spring of 2001, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia released the 
(already-mentioned, see the Todorović case) Annual Report 2000, Human Rights in Serbia 2000 
(available at: http://www.helsinki.org.rs/reports_t10.html), in which one can read (under ‘IV: 
International Humanitarian Law’, after the account of the trial of the kidnappers of Todorović): “In mid-
May police arrested 9 men on suspicion that “in the early morning hours of 21 April 2000 they abducted 
[Dragan] Nikolic in the territory of Serbia and handed him over to SFOR in Bosnia, for his further 
extradition to the Hague.” (…) After the main hearing, held between 24 October-24 November, the trial 
chamber of the Smederevo District Court pronounced the following sentences for commission of the 
criminal offense of abduction under article 64 of the Penal Code of Serbia: Amir Morenkovic (sentenced 
in absentia) - 6 years in prison, Branko Stupar, Zeljko Mitrovic, Goran Dimitrijevic - three years in 
prison each, Zivorad Trajkovic - three years and four months, Jadranka Kovacevic - 2 years and 6 
months, Slavoljub Antunovic - 6 months, while Miroljub Vasic and Boris Nestorovic were cleared of 
charges.” It may also be good to point out that the Defence, in the first Defence motion, also spoke of 
“known individuals”, see ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion for Relief 
Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and 
Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-Related Abuse of Process Within the Contemplation of 
Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 72’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 17 May 2001, para. 3. With 
respect to the nationalities of the kidnappers, different news reports show that these persons were from 
Serbia (like Nikolić was). See also Sloan 2003 B, p. 541 (‘abstract’). Note finally, to return to the 
possible dangers of rewards (see also n. 115), that Nikolić’s counsel had implied that Nikolić “had been 
arrested as part of the US State Department’s Rewards Program for Former Yugoslavia War Criminals.” 
(Magliveras 2002, p. 673.) 
445 See also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
6.    
446 Ibid., para. 21.    
447 See ibid., para. 24: “[I]n this case, and any case involving, in effect, kidnapping, the taint of that 
degree of illegality and breach of fundamental human rights is so pernicious, and the dangers of the 
appearance of condoning it to any degree so much a hostage to unpredictable consequence and fortune 
that [… see the main text for the remainder of this quote, ChP]”. 
448 Ibid.  
449 Cf. ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia 
Upon Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the 








outcome, Nikolić’s Defence continued, which, among other things, is necessary to 
protect and maintain the integrity of the ICTY, would have to be entertained a 
fortiori where the breach of international law “was committed by or with the 
material complicity of an agent and/or alternatively, by a recipient of an order of the 
Tribunal itself”.450  
With a greater focus on this specific case, the Defence had, according to the Trial 
Chamber, basically two lines of reasoning to challenge the exercise of jurisdiction 
by the ICTY.451 The first submission brought in the previously discussed (see 
Subsection 3.3 of Chapter III) matter of attribution:  
 
[B]y taking over the accused from the unknown individuals, SFOR and/or the 
Prosecution have acknowledged and adopted the alleged illegal conduct of those 
individuals. The illegality of the acts of the individuals thereby becomes attributable 
to SFOR and to the Prosecution. In turn, such attribution leads to the conclusion that 
the Tribunal is barred from exercising jurisdiction over the accused.452 
 
This argument must be clarified in more detail. First, how can certain conduct from 
private individuals be attributed to SFOR and/or the Prosecution? This was because, 
according to the Defence, SFOR “had knowledge, actual or constructive, that the 
accused had been unlawfully apprehended and brought from Serbia against his free 
will”.453 Secondly, the argument states that the illegality becomes attributable to 
                                                                                                                                              
Relief Under Rule 72’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 17 May 2001, para. 11: “It is not the thrust of this motion 
to assert that the accused could not have a fair trial simply because of the nature of his initial arrest or 
that in every case (…) the rights of an accused should take unlimited precedence over all other 
considerations; to do so would be intellectually and jurisprudentially barren. The fairness of proceedings 
once started depends upon different criteria.” See also the already discussed Bennett case where these 
two points were also clearly separated: “[A] court has a discretion to stay any criminal proceedings on 
the ground that to try those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process either (1) because it 
will be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) because it offends 
the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of a 
particular case.” (House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and 
another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 161.) This quotation was also referred to in 
ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia Upon 
Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused 
and Co-Related Abuse of Process Within the Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief 
Under Rule 72’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 17 May 2001, para. 15. 
450 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 24. 
451 See ibid., para. 29. 
452 Ibid. 
453 Ibid., para. 25. In more detail, the Defence argued that “[i]n spite of being aware that the rendition 
was tainted with illegality and knowing that, but for the breach of international law and fundamental 
human rights principles, Nikolic would not have been in their presence SFOR personnel opted to “take 
advantage” of the situation by taking custody of the accused, alerting the International Tribunal of his 
presence and proceeding with the arrest procedures as agreed with the Tribunal. It is submitted that, by 
not only ignoring the illegality but, by actively taking advantage of the situation and taking into custody 
the accused, SFOR’s exercise of jurisdiction over Nikolic was an adoption of the illegality – of which 
they were aware – and thus, an extension of the unlawful detention.” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The 








SFOR and to the Prosecution. This idea, that certain conduct can be attributed to 
SFOR and hence also to the OTP/the ICTY, implies that the Defence is of the 
opinion that there is a strong relationship between SFOR on the one hand and the 
OTP/the ICTY on the other in matters of arrest. This was indeed asserted by the 
Defence, which argued “that SFOR must be considered both the de facto and de jure 
agent of the Prosecution and of the Tribunal in apprehending indictees and that, 
consequently, the illegal conduct can be attributed to the Tribunal [original footnote 
omitted, ChP]”.454 If this agency argument were not accepted, the Defence 
continued, then one could argue “that the subsequent conduct of the Prosecution and 
the Tribunal “was such that the conduct of SFOR was in effect ratified and made as 
if it had been previously authorised” [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.455 
The second submission cleared the technical attribution hurdle: “[T]he illegal 
character of the arrest in and of itself should bar the Tribunal from exercising 
jurisdiction over the accused [emphasis added, ChP].”456 It thus argued that even if 
the abduction could not be attributed to SFOR or the Prosecution, the simple fact 
that there was a kidnapping involved, by definition a serious457 male captus 
                                                                                                                                              
Trial Chamber As Being Fundamental to the Resolution of the Accused’s Status Before the Tribunal in 
Respect of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Under Rule 72 and Generally, the Nature of the Relationship 
Between the OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of Any Illegal Conduct Material to the Accused, his 
Arrest and Subsequent Detention’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 29 October 2001, para. 12.)     
454 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 25. 
455 Ibid. 
456 Ibid., para. 29. 
457 The alleged seriousness of the male captus can be found in the following words of the Defence: “It is 
not the thrust of this motion to assert (…) that in every case (…) the rights of an accused should take 
unlimited precedence over all other considerations (…). The central argument is that in this case, and 
any case involving, in effect, kidnapping, the taint of that degree of illegality and breach of fundamental 
human rights is so pernicious, and the dangers of the appearance of condoning it to any degree so much 
a hostage to unpredictable consequence and fortune that a judicial body set up with, inter alios, the 
objectives of preserving human rights can have no proper option but to make it plain that jurisdiction 
will not be entertained in such circumstances.” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan 
Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the Prior 
Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-Related Abuse of Process Within the 
Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 72’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 17 May 
2001, para. 11.) See also the following summary by the Trial Chamber of the Defence’s arguments: 
“that the forcible removal of the Accused from the FRY entailed a breach of both the sovereignty of the 
FRY and the Accused’s individual due process guarantees; and that although such breaches occurred 
prior to the delivery of the Accused into the custody of SFOR and the Tribunal, these breaches were of 
such magnitude that even absent the involvement of SFOR or Prosecution, the release of the Accused 
from the custody of this Tribunal and the dismissal of the indictment against him is the only appropriate 
remedy [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. 
Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the 
Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 25.) Nevertheless (and as already explained in n. 
442 of Chapter III), note that the footnote after these words of the Trial Chamber (n. 34, referring to 








situation, violating State sovereignty, human rights and the rule of law,458 can mean 
but one thing, namely that the Tribunal is not to exercise its jurisdiction.  
                                                          
458 To be very precise, these three elements indeed played an important role in the arguments of the 
Defence (and hence should also be mentioned here), but, strictly speaking, the words of the Trial 
Chamber in para. 71 of its decision (“The central submission of the Defence is that unlawful rendition of 
a defendant to the Tribunal should lead to the conclusion “[t]hat international law has to some degree 
been breached and that the violation of some fundamental principle – whether it be state sovereignty 
and/or international human rights and/or the rule law of law – needs to be protected above all other 
considerations [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.”) are incorrect because the  words “[t]hat international 
law has to some degree been breached and that the violation of some fundamental principle – whether it 
be state sovereignty and/or international human rights and/or the rule law of law – needs to be protected 
above all other considerations [original footnote omitted, ChP]” were not presented as a submission of 
the Defence, but ‘merely’ as an explanation of the reasoning of earlier male captus male detentus cases, 
see ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion to Determine Issues As 
Agreed Between the Parties And the Trial Chamber As Being Fundamental to the Resolution of the 
Accused’s Status Before the Tribunal in Respect of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Under Rule 72 and 
Generally, the Nature of the Relationship Between the OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of Any 
Illegal Conduct Material to the Accused, his Arrest and Subsequent Detention’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 
29 October 2001, para. 14: “The decision by both national courts and international tribunals to deny 
jurisdiction where the defendant can show that there has been an unlawful rendition, has been justified 
on the grounds that international law has to some degree been breached and that the violation of some 
fundamental principle – whether it be state sovereignty and/or international human rights and/or the rule 
law of law – needs to be protected above all other considerations [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that the Defence used these reasonings of other male captus male detentus 
cases in this case as well. Note finally that the Defence and the Prosecution are officially still operating 
in a theoretical framework, working with assumed facts; strictly speaking, the Defence is not arguing 
that these elements have been violated in the case of Nikolić; it only argues that if that were to be 
established, that this must lead to a male detentus outcome, see, for example, ICTY, Trial Chamber II, 
The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion to Determine Issues As Agreed Between the Parties And 
the Trial Chamber As Being Fundamental to the Resolution of the Accused’s Status Before the Tribunal 
in Respect of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Under Rule 72 and Generally, the Nature of the 
Relationship Between the OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of Any Illegal Conduct Material to the 
Accused, his Arrest and Subsequent Detention’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 29 October 2001, para. 18: “It is 
submitted that if the accused does establish that his arrest was achieved by illegal conduct committed by 
or with the material complicity of any individual or organization and/or SFOR and/or the OTP and/or 
the Tribunal, such conduct or complicity, entailing a breach of international law, would entitle the 
accused to relief that is meaningful, effective and substantial. As such, the only appropriate remedy must 
be that the indictment is stayed, dismissed or otherwise negated followed by the return [of] the injured 
party, Dragan Nikolic, to the status quo ante [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
Hence, it is arguably not correct of the Trial Chamber to write that the Defence alleges that these 
violations have occurred in this case, see ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, 
‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-
94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 96: “The Chamber must now address the allegations of the Defence that, 
in the present case, violations of international law occurred. Such violations relate to: (i) a violation of 
the State sovereignty of the injured State, (ii) a violation of international human rights, in particular the 
rights of the accused, and (iii) a violation of the rule of law.” However, it must also be admitted that the 
line between the assumed facts and the allegations of the Defence is sometimes blurry, see, for example, 
ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion to Determine Issues As Agreed 
Between the Parties And the Trial Chamber As Being Fundamental to the Resolution of the Accused’s 
Status Before the Tribunal in Respect of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Under Rule 72 and Generally, 
the Nature of the Relationship Between the OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of Any Illegal 
Conduct Material to the Accused, his Arrest and Subsequent Detention’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 29 








Because the Defence suggested that the male captus male detentus outcome had 
to be preferred in this case implies that the Defence looked at the male captus topic 
more generally and, especially in its second Defence motion, the Defence did indeed 
examine it. It is appropriate to now pay some more attention to that discussion of the 
Defence, which not only looked at the inter-State context but, of course, also at the 
context of the Tribunals.  
First, the Defence noted that the male captus bene detentus principle had lost 
much of its relevance today, a statement which is true if one follows the old-
fashioned rationale of the maxim, but which is also, see the outcome of Chapter V, 
perhaps rather shallow given the fact that courts around the world still issue 
decisions which can be qualified as male captus bene detentus decisions:  
 
It is acknowledged that traditionally, the principle male captus, bene detentus has 
applied and that in some civil law jurisdictions, the maxim may still remain good law. 
However, it is submitted that the principle can no longer be considered good law, or 
at least the most consistent with the flow of human rights legislation, in most common 
law jurisdictions and that moreover, under international law, the maxim male captus, 
male detentus is preferred [original footnotes omitted, ChP].459   
 
It subsequently explained that the different male captus male detentus courts had 
used the following general justification for reaching their male detentus outcomes, 
namely  
 
that international law has to some degree been breached and that the violation of 
some fundamental principle – whether it be state sovereignty and/or international 
human rights and/or the rule law of law – needs to be protected above all other 
considerations [original footnote omitted, ChP].460 
   
These three elements, which were also presented and discussed in Chapter III of this 
book, were then examined in more detail.  
With respect to State sovereignty, the Defence noted: 
 
While evidence of direct or material complicity by a state in the abduction of an 
individual can, it is submitted, raise a legitimate action for the violation of state 
sovereignty, where the abduction has been perpetrated by private individuals, the law 
                                                                                                                                              
accused has been brought into the Tribunal’s jurisdiction seriously taints and undermines the integrity of 
the judicial process, not simply in the instant case but in the eyes of the international community at 
large.” 
459 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion to Determine Issues As Agreed 
Between the Parties And the Trial Chamber As Being Fundamental to the Resolution of the Accused’s 
Status Before the Tribunal in Respect of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Under Rule 72 and Generally, 
the Nature of the Relationship Between the OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of Any Illegal 
Conduct Material to the Accused, his Arrest and Subsequent Detention’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 29 
October 2001, para. 14. 








remains unsettled and thus, the remedy for (…) such a breach also remains 
unresolved.461 
 
Although this quotation is not entirely clear (see also footnote 442 of Chapter III), it 
appears that the Defence is claiming that private individuals can violate the 
sovereignty of another State, but that it is unclear whether an abduction, executed by 
private individuals, can also be used to raise a legitimate action with respect to this 
violation.462 As a result, it is also unclear what kind of remedy for the violation of 
State sovereignty (the words “for (…) such a breach” also imply that private 
individuals can violate a State’s sovereignty) should be granted.  
However, in any case, it was asserted that “subsequent ratification of the illegal 
act does establish state responsibility [original footnote omitted, ChP]”463 and that 
the appropriate remedy in such cases would be the return of the abducted 
individual.464 Although the Defence does not clearly explain how this point is to be 
transposed into the context of the Tribunals, it can be argued that it is of the opinion 
that if the Tribunal were to ratify the conduct (and given the sources to which the 
Defence refers, such ratification could already be established if the Tribunal would 
simply continue with the case)465 the Tribunal would become responsible for the act, 
as a result of which the remedy of the return would have to be granted.  
Turning to international human rights law, the Defence, referring to “some of the 
most recent and pertinent rulings by regional and international human rights 
                                                          
461 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion to Determine Issues As Agreed 
Between the Parties And the Trial Chamber As Being Fundamental to the Resolution of the Accused’s 
Status Before the Tribunal in Respect of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Under Rule 72 and Generally, 
the Nature of the Relationship Between the OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of Any Illegal 
Conduct Material to the Accused, his Arrest and Subsequent Detention’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 29 
October 2001, para. 15. 
462 Such an interpretation would be in conformity with the first Defence motion, where it was stated that 
“the assumptive facts must amount to a violation of sovereignty”. (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor 
v. Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the 
Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-Related Abuse of Process Within 
the Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 72’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 17 May 
2001, para. 11.) 
463 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion to Determine Issues As Agreed 
Between the Parties And the Trial Chamber As Being Fundamental to the Resolution of the Accused’s 
Status Before the Tribunal in Respect of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Under Rule 72 and Generally, 
the Nature of the Relationship Between the OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of Any Illegal 
Conduct Material to the Accused, his Arrest and Subsequent Detention’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 29 
October 2001, para. 15. 
464 See ibid., n. 24.  
465 See ibid., where the Defence refers to, among other things, the words of Mann (1989, p. 408) which 
were already mentioned earlier in this book, see n. 527 of Chapter III. The Defence also referred to the 
following words from Shen 1994, p. 23 (this must, by the way, be p. 63): “Whether the captors are 
government officials or private citizens, and whether the abduction is originally authorized or sponsored 
by the government, the State whose unauthorized agents or private citizens engage in extraterritorial 
captures assumes its responsibility as soon as it adopts, sanctions, or takes advantage of the private or 
unauthorized kidnapping activities. A State that fails to return the abducted individual and then arrests 








tribunals on forcible abductions [original footnotes omitted, ChP]”,466 submitted 
“that where a defendant has been the victim of an abduction, his rights under 
customary international human rights law have been violated”467 and that “[w]here a 
forcible abduction has been established in fact, international tribunals have 
consistently called for the return of the defendant to the status quo ante as the 
appropriate remedy [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.468 The Defence explained 
here as well that the fact that the initial wrong may have been caused by private 
individuals does not change this point:  
 
It is further submitted that because an unlawful rendition not only seriously curtails 
the basic inalienable rights of the individual, but must also necessarily involve the 
irregular exercise of jurisdiction over an individual by the adjudicating court, the 
issue of whether or not the perpetrators of the abduction were state-sponsored or 
acting in a private capacity, is irrelevant. Therefore, any attempt to distinguish 
                                                          
466 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion to Determine Issues As Agreed 
Between the Parties And the Trial Chamber As Being Fundamental to the Resolution of the Accused’s 
Status Before the Tribunal in Respect of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Under Rule 72 and Generally, 
the Nature of the Relationship Between the OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of Any Illegal 
Conduct Material to the Accused, his Arrest and Subsequent Detention’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 29 
October 2001, para. 16. Reference was made here (in ns. 25-26) to the now well-known cases of Stocké, 
Bozano, Velásquez Rodríguez, Celiberti de Casariego, Lopez Burgos, Almeida de Quinteros and Cañón 
García. 
467 Ibid. 
468 Ibid. The Defence refers here (in n. 30) to Celiberti de Casariego, Lopez Burgos, Almeida de 
Quinteros, Cañón García and Barayagwiza. Some critical comments should be made here. To start with 
Barayagwiza (which will be discussed in Subsection 3.2.1), that case did not involve a forcible 
abduction. Furthermore, it must be noted that in Cañón García, the HRC could not ask for the release or 
the return to the status quo ante as the State holding the suspect (the US) “had not ratified, or acceded 
to, the Covenant or the Optional Protocol.” (HRC, Cañón García v. Ecuador, Communication No. 
319/1988 (5 November 1991), UN Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/319/1988 at 90 (1991), available at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/dec319.htm, para. 5.1.) In this case, the Committee was of 
the opinion that the State co-responsible for the abduction (Ecuador) had nevertheless violated, among 
other things, Art. 9 of the ICCPR and concluded that: “the State party is under an obligation to take 
measures to remedy the violations suffered by Mr. Cañón García. In this connection, the Committee has 
taken note of the State party’s assurance that it is investigating the author’s claims and the circumstances 
leading to his expulsion from Ecuador, with a view to prosecuting those held responsible for the 
violations of his rights. The Committee would appreciate receiving from the State party, within ninety 
days of the transmittal to it of this decision, all pertinent information on the results of all its 
investigations, as well as on measures taken to remedy the situation, and in order to prevent the 
repetition of such events in the future.” (Ibid., paras. 6.2 and 7.) However, in the other three cases 
(which, it must be noted, also involved other human rights violations), the HRC indeed ordered the 
release of the suspect. Although, as explained, a release as such would not exclude a new trial, the HRC 
explicitly stated in the cases of Celiberti de Casariego and Lopez Burgos that the suspect also had to be 
permitted to leave the forum State, which arguably means the de facto ending of the case. In Almeida de 
Quinteros, it was not necessary to mention this permission to leave the forum State as the latter State 
(Uruguay) was also the suspect’s home State. Given the serious male captus involved here (see n. 251 
and accompanying text of Chapter III), one can assume that the HRC would not accept a release 
followed by an immediate new arrest on the spot. Hence, in that case, the release would arguably also 








between the categories of violator of the human rights of the accused is, it is 
submitted, a superfluous exercise [original footnote omitted, ChP].469 
 
This study agrees with the point that the Tribunal should look at all violations, 
whether they have been committed by OTP staff or private individuals. However, 
the entity responsible for the violation may and should certainly play a role in 
determining the most appropriate remedy for the violation, including whether or not 
the ultimate remedy, the refusal of jurisdiction, should follow. 
With respect to the final element, the rule of law, the Defence submitted that the 
still-to-discuss Barayagwiza case before the ICTR and a series of national cases 
require “that a court consider divesting itself of jurisdiction over the defendant 
where there has been a serious violation of the rule of law or an abuse or process 
[original footnote omitted, ChP]”,470 for example, because it wants “to provide a 
remedy for the violation of the accused’s rights; to deter future misconduct; and to 
enhance the integrity of the judicial process [original footnote omitted, ChP]”,471 
and that, while an abduction per se is both an abuse of process and a breach of the 
rule of law, a transfer, as a direct consequence of such an abduction, of a suspect to 
a jurisdiction so that that suspect can be tried is (also) an abuse of process.472  
The Defence emphasised that an irregular rendition does not necessarily deprive 
a suspect of a fair trial.  
However, that is not important. What is important is that 
 
by proceeding with the trial, the manifestly unlawful means by which the accused has 
been brought into the Tribunal’s jurisdiction seriously taints and undermines the 
integrity of the judicial process, not simply in the instant case but in the eyes of the 
international community at large.473   
 
Like the other elements, State sovereignty and human rights, the Defence submitted 
that here also, the fact that the abduction may have been executed by private 
individuals would not make a difference.474 Finally, the Defence made a sort of 
general appeal that  
                                                          
469 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion to Determine Issues As Agreed 
Between the Parties And the Trial Chamber As Being Fundamental to the Resolution of the Accused’s 
Status Before the Tribunal in Respect of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Under Rule 72 and Generally, 
the Nature of the Relationship Between the OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of Any Illegal 
Conduct Material to the Accused, his Arrest and Subsequent Detention’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 29 
October 2001, para. 16. 
470 Ibid., para. 17. 
471 Ibid.  
472 See ibid.  
473 Ibid. 
474 This was because such conduct could be ratified by the Tribunal, see ibid.: “[E]ven where private 
parties are the initial perpetrators of the abuse of process and/or breach of the rule of law, the illegality 
can be imputed to SFOR and/or the OTP and/or the Tribunal, on subsequent ratification [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” As the Defence refers back to n. 24 of its Motion (see n. 465 and 
accompanying text), one can assume that the Defence is here also of the opinion that such ratification 








it cannot be that in war crime cases a resort to the male captus bene detentus maxim is 
an automatically acceptable surrogate procedure for circumventing procedures of 
apprehension that comply with human rights principles and the central tenets of the 
rule of law. As an organ of the United Nations, the cradle for international human 
rights norms, the ICTY should promote and develop those rights within the 
framework of international law and turn its face from what could be seen to be 
encouraging or accepting lawlessness.475 
   
Before turning to the Trial Chamber’s observations, it should be noted that the 
Prosecution basically focused on the availability of the remedies and argued that the 
far-reaching remedies sought by Nikolić may only be warranted in extreme cases 
(which was not the case here), namely in situations which involve at a minimum:  
 
a) [u]nambiguous, advertent[476] violations of international law which can be 
attributed[477] to the Office of the Prosecutor; and/or b) a residual category of cases 
                                                                                                                                              
with a violation of the accused’s human rights, any attempt to distinguish between the illegal conduct – 
abuse of process or breach of the rule of law – committed by or with the material complicity of an 
individual or organization and such conduct by SFOR personnel, the OTP or the Tribunal is, once again, 
a superfluous exercise.” See finally ibid. for a more general statement, which could be applied to all 
three situations: “It is submitted that if the accused does establish that his arrest was achieved by the 
illegal conduct committed by or with the material complicity of any individual or organization and/or 
SFOR and/or OTP and/or the Tribunal, such conduct or complicity, entailing a breach of international 
law, would entitle the accused to relief that is meaningful, effective and substantial. As such, the only 
appropriate remedy must be that the indictment is stayed, dismissed or otherwise negated followed by 
the return [of] the injured party, Dragan Nikolic, to the status quo ante [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” 
475 Ibid., para. 20. 
476 A synonym of this word is ‘mindful’, a word which clarifies that there must have been a real intent 
from the Prosecution to violate international law. Cf. in that respect also Chapter V where intent played 
a considerable role in the different male captus cases. See also Swart 2001, p. 206, where he writes: 
“Dismissal of criminal cases as a result of official misconduct is a remedy accepted by the courts of 
many States. There is, of course, considerable variation in the way national legal systems make use of 
that remedy. Among other things, the choice will depend on the availability of other effective remedies 
for correcting the wrongs done to the accused. Usually, a relevant consideration is also whether 
unlawful conduct on the part of law officers shows an intent to prejudice the rights of the accused or 
instead constituted negligence [emphasis added, ChP].” The above-mentioned words of the Prosecution 
stem from para. 17 of ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Prosecutor’s 
Response to Defence “Motion to Determine Issues as Agreed Between the Parties And the Trial 
Chamber…and the Consequences of Any Illegal Conduct Material to the Accused, His Arrest and 
Subsequent Detention”, filed 29 October 2001’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 12 November 2001 (this is the 
response of the Prosecutor to the second Defence motion of Nikolić). In an earlier response (the 
response to the first Defence motion of Nikolić), the Prosecution had used comparable words, words 
which also show that the violations must have been committed consciously/intentionally, see ICTY, 
Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to “Defence Motion for 
Relief Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and 
Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-Related Abuse of Process Within the Contemplation of 
Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 72” filed 17 May 2001’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 31 May 
2001, para. 31: “At a minimum, cases in which such extreme remedies may be warranted will involve 
either: a) unambiguous, conscious violations of international legality which can be attributed to the 
Office of the Prosecutor (i.e. the Prosecution’s own conduct would have to be in some way egregious); 








where the violations in question are of such egregiousness or outrageousness that, 
irrespective of any lack of involvement on the part of the Prosecution, the Trial 
Chamber could not, in good conscience, continue to exercise its jurisdiction over the 
Accused [original footnote omitted, ChP].478  
 
The Trial Chamber focused on the two central submissions of the Defence 
mentioned above: one related to attribution and one making a more direct relation 
between the male captus and the male detentus outcome, namely that jurisdiction 
should be refused even if the male captus could not be attributed to SFOR/the OTP. 
The Chamber first examined whether the (assumed) acts of the individuals could 
be attributed to SFOR/the OTP.  
After having explained the legal framework in which SFOR, the OTP and the 
Tribunal operate,479 it first confirmed the Todorović case with respect to the 
question of whether SFOR has a legal obligation to arrest suspects for the ICTY – 
this point was already discussed earlier, see footnote 71 and accompanying text480 – 
                                                                                                                                              
outrageousness that, irrespective of any lack of involvement on the part of the Prosecution, the Trial 
Chamber could not, in good conscience, continue to exercise its jurisdiction over the accused. In such 
circumstances, his or her release may therefore be ordered so as to safeguard the integrity of the entire 
judicial process [first emphasis added, ChP].” The Prosecution formulated this test relying on Lamb 
2000. See also Sloan 2003 A., p. 110, n. 183. In this context, the Prosecution also submitted “that any 
irregularities committed by the authorities of another State or individuals prior to the delivery of the 
accused to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal should not suffice to divest this Tribunal of its jurisdiction 
over the accused [original footnote omitted, ChP]” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Dragan 
Nikolić, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to “Defence Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of 
Arrest Following Upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-
Related Abuse of Process Within the Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 
72” filed 17 May 2001’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 31 May 2001, para. 34), among other things, because it 
would entail an inducement for certain States “to ensure that serious irregularities were committed in the 
arrest process before handing the accused to the Tribunal, being confident that after review, the 
indictment would be dismissed and the defendant released because the defendant’s rights had been 
violated by the authorities in the FRY. Under this scenario, the States concerned could claim that they 
were fulfilling their obligations of co-operation while, at the same time, knowingly sabotaging the 
Prosecution by violating the accused’s fundamental rights in the process of transferring him to the 
Tribunal.” (Ibid., para. 34, n. 31.) See also ibid., para. 35 and ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. 
Dragan Nikolić, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to Defence “Motion to Determine Issues as Agreed Between 
the Parties And the Trial Chamber…and the Consequences of Any Illegal Conduct Material to the 
Accused, His Arrest and Subsequent Detention”, filed 29 October 2001’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 12 
November 2001, para. 6. This – justified – concern was also identified in the Todorović case, see n. 344. 
477 The Prosecution was of the opinion that “[t]he mere subsequent acceptance by the Prosecution of 
custody of the Accused is not sufficient in and of itself to satisfy the required level of “collusion” and/or 
“official involvement.” According to the Prosecution, at least some form of adoption and approval by 
the Prosecution of such violations is required [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial Chamber 
II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 27.) 
478 Ibid., para. 28. 
479 See ibid., paras. 35-47. 
480 See ibid., paras. 49 (“The question that may arise is whether the duty to co-operate, as laid down in 
Article 29, applies to States only, or also to other entities or collective enterprises, such as SFOR. Read 
literally, Article 29 seems to relate to States only. This question had been discussed previously, inter 








and explained that “in the particular circumstances of this case the relevant SFOR 
forces had no other option than to detain the Accused and to set the standard 
procedures in motion in order to have the Accused transferred to The Hague”.481 In 
other words, it was not up to SFOR to release Nikolić. The Trial Chamber then 
turned to the question as to whether the male captus of Nikolić, allegedly committed 
by these private individuals, could be attributed to SFOR. It hereby looked at the 
(already discussed in Chapter III) ILC’s DARS, although it immediately warned that 
“any use of this source should be made with caution”.482 This was because these 
Draft Articles 
 
are still subject to debate amongst States. They do not have the status of treaty law 
and are not binding on States. Furthermore, as can be deduced from its title, the Draft 
Articles are primarily directed at the responsibilities of States and not at those of 
international organisations or entities.483  
 
Notwithstanding this caveat, the Chamber examined whether Article 11 of the 
DARS (‘Conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own’)484 could be 
relevant here.485  
The Trial Chamber referred to the ILC’s commentary to this article,486 which 
explains that  
 
                                                                                                                                              
view”) and 67 (“Once a person comes “in contact with” SFOR, (…) SFOR is obliged under Article 29 
of the Statute and Rule 59 bis to arrest/detain the person and have him transferred to the Tribunal 
[emphasis added, ChP].”). It may be interesting to note that the Trial Chamber also concurred with 
another (and also already discussed) male captus case before the ICTY, the Dokmanović case, namely 
with respect to that decision’s reasoning that Rule 59 bis of the ICTY RPE should be read as providing a 
mechanism additional to that of Rule 55 of the ICTY RPE, see ibid., para. 50. 
481 Ibid., para. 55. 
482 Ibid., para. 60. 
483 Ibid. It may be interesting to note that the ILC is now in the process of preparing draft articles on the 
responsibility of international organisations, see, for example, Chapter IV (‘Responsibility of 
International Organizations’) of the Report of the International law Commission, Sixty-first session (4 
May-5 June and 6 July-7 August 2009), UNGA OR, Sixty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10, UN Doc. 
A/64/10, pp. 13-183. On pp. 77-78 of this report, one can even find a reference to the ICTY Trial 
Chamber’s decision in the Nikolić case, after which the ILC commented (at p. 78): “No policy reasons 
appear to militate against applying to international organizations the criterion for attribution based on 
acknowledgement and adoption.” (See for the acknowledgement and adoption topic the remainder of the 
main text.) Cf. also Acquaviva 2007, p. 634. 
484 “Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall nevertheless be 
considered an act of that State under international law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges 
and adopts the conduct in question as its own.” See also n. 482 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
485 Another DARS article which is often relied upon in comparable cases (Art. 8: ‘Conduct directed or 
controlled by a State’, see n. 481 and accompanying text of Chapter III) was not examined here for it 
was not argued or suggested in any way that SFOR instructed, directed or controlled the acts of the 
private individuals, see ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence 
Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 
2002, para. 64. 








as a general matter, conduct will not be attributable to a State under article 11 where a 
State merely acknowledges the factual existence of conduct or expresses its verbal 
approval of it. In international controversies, States often take positions which amount 
to “approval” or “endorsement” of conduct in some general sense but do not involve 
any assumption of responsibility. The language of “adoption”, on the other hand, 
carries with it the idea that the conduct is acknowledged by the State as, in effect, its 
own conduct. (…) [T]he term “acknowledges and adopts” in article 11 makes it clear 
that what is required is something more than a general acknowledgment of a factual 
situation, but rather that the State identifies the conduct in question and makes it its 
own.487  
 
The Trial Chamber was of the opinion that SFOR had not acknowledged and 
adopted the male captus of the private individuals as its own.488 In fact, “SFOR did 
nothing but implement its obligations under the Statute and the Rules of this 
Tribunal”.489  
As the conduct of the private individuals could not be attributed to SFOR, the 
Trial Chamber found it unnecessary to examine whether certain conduct by SFOR 
could be attributed to the OTP/the Tribunal.490  
Now that the attribution submission of the Defence was rejected, the Trial 
Chamber looked at the submission as to whether the male captus should lead to a 
male detentus anyway, even if the male captus could not be attributed to SFOR/the 
OTP/the Tribunal. And in doing so, the judges of the ICTY, for the first time 
ever,491 explicitly examined the male captus bene/male detentus discussion.492 
However, before going into this discussion, it warned that “[c]are needs to be 
applied”493 with respect to the male captus case law of the various national 
jurisdictions. This was because this case law 1) “is far from uniform”494 and 2) was 
                                                          
487 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, Report of the Commission to 
the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 
2007, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 53. 
488 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
67. 
489 Ibid. 
490 See ibid., para. 69. 
491 The judges noted that “[t]he Trial Chamber is aware that in answering the central legal question (…) 
it finds itself in uncharted waters.” (Ibid., para. 75.) 
492 The Trial Chamber used the following male captus bene detentus definition: “The maxim male 
captus, bene detentus expresses the principle that a court may exercise jurisdiction over an accused 
person regardless of how that person has come into the jurisdiction of that court.” (Ibid., para. 70.) It 
also noted, apparently with approval, the following male captus male detentus definition used by the 
Defence: “In the view of the Defence, this Tribunal should instead apply the principle of male captus, 
male detentus, meaning that an irregularity has occurred in the arrest of the Accused and therefore 
should bar any further exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) 
493 Ibid., para. 75. 
494 Ibid. See also ibid.: “In some national jurisdictions, the maxim male captus, bene detentus is more 
closely followed than in others. Furthermore, the case law on this particular issue is still developing and 
such developments are more advanced in some jurisdictions. In addition, the concept of forced cross-
border abductions is not always interpreted the same way. Case law often differs also in that the facts on 








decided in the context between sovereign States, on a horizontal level, whereas the 
relation between States and the ICTY is of a vertical nature.495 Hence, “the national 
case law must be “translated” in order to apply to the particular context in which this 
Tribunal operates”.496 However, notwithstanding these two caveats, the Chamber 
noted that it “still regards it useful to provide an overview of his case law although 
the overview will not and cannot be exhaustive”.497 
The overview of the Trial Chamber consisted of 15 paragraphs,498 addressing 19 
national cases,499 all of which have been discussed or at least briefly mentioned 
earlier in this book (where it was also argued that the Trial Chamber was sometimes 
not entirely accurate in its analysis).500 
After its examination, the Trial Chamber first correctly observed “that the case 
law described above is rather diverse”501 and that it involved many different male 
captus situations.502 However, after repeating the warning made earlier that these 
cases stem from a context other than that in which the ICTY operates,503 the Trial 
Chamber nevertheless distilled the following core elements (one might better say: 
core questions) from the overview: 
                                                                                                                                              
the case law from the previous chapter was very diverse and involved many different male captus cases, 
leading to many different outcomes, this does not mean that there are not some common features 
discernible. See in that respect, for example, the point mentioned in the Al-Moayad case that in two 
specific male captus situations, State practice appears to indicate that jurisdiction must be refused. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that much depends here on the exact circumstances and therefore, that one 
should also be wary of making general statements on the (customary international law) status of male 
captus bene detentus. See, for example, Strijards 2001, pp. 96-97, Goldstone and Simpson 2003, p. 19, 
Hamid 2004, pp. 70, 78 and 86 and Loan 2005, p. 284. (Note that Goldstone and Simpson (2003, p. 19, 
n. 33) even qualify the male captus bene detentus rule as “a principle of extradition law”. This peculiar 
statement has also been noted by Currie 2007, p. 359, n. 43. See for the same oddity Knoops 2002, p. 
253, writing about “the principle of international extradition law male captus bene detentus”.) 
495 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
76. See also ibid., paras. 95, 100 and 103. In addition, the Chamber warned that caution is required with 
respect to its own decision when referring to the debates on the male captus bene detenus principle at 
the national level, just like “caution is needed to interpret the outcome of this case in its vertical context 
to the debates in that horizontal context.” (Ibid., para. 78.) 
496 Ibid., para. 76. 
497 Ibid., para. 77. 
498 See ibid., paras. 79-93. 
499 Namely: Ker v. Illinois, Frisbie v. Collins, United States v. Toscanino, United States, ex rel. Lujan v. 
Gengler, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, United States v. 
Noriega, Eichmann, ex p. Scott, ex p. Elliott, ex parte Mackeson, re Bennett, Regina v Hartley, Levinge, 
State v. Ebrahim, re Jolis, re Argoud, an untitled case by the German Constitutional Court from 17 July 
1985 [this is the Stocké case, see ns. 503 et seq. of Chapter V, ChP] and State v. Beahan (Trial 
Chamber’s own notation). Short references to cases in footnotes are not included here. 
500 See, for example, the ICTY Trial Chamber’s statement that “[t]he rule of law is clearly interpreted 
here as demanding only a fair trial for an accused” (in the Bennett case) and its remark that “[t]he Court 
used its discretionary power to stay the case as it considered the conduct of the police to be an abuse of 
power” (in the Hartley case). 
501 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 94. 
502 See ibid.  








- Was a member of the executive of the forum State involved in the illegal transfer of 
the accused from the State where he was found (the injured State) to the forum 
State?[504] (...) - Was the accused a national of the injured State (...) or of the forum 
State (...)?[505] - Did the injured State protest in some way against the fact that the 
accused was taken out of its territory? (...)[506] - Did an extradition treaty exist 
between the forum State and the injured State and, if so, was there first an attempt to 
apply that treaty? (...)[507] - How was the accused treated during the period between 
the moment of his deprivation of liberty in the injured State and the moment of his 
                                                          
504 Chapter V has shown that this is indeed an important element: if a prosecuting forum’s own 
authorities are involved in the male captus, it is more likely that a male detentus will follow. An 
exception is the Swiss case of X (but it is to be noted that that was ‘only’ a male deditus decision). Cf. 
also Sluiter 2003 B, p. 946. One of the factors he presents which can be used in the determination 
whether a male detentus must follow is the “degree of attribution of the violation to the Tribunal”. 
505 One can imagine that States may protest the violation of their sovereignty, irrespective of the 
nationality of the abducted person, see Fawcett 1964, p. 199: “[W]here there is an international issue in 
the form of a breach of the territorial jurisdiction of another State by the capture and abduction of an 
offender, neither his nationality nor the reason for his presence in that State are material to the right of 
that State to demand his return. In other words, such a demand is in effect an assertion by the State, not 
of a right of protection of the offender, but of its exclusive jurisdiction over persons and property in its 
territory. The offender therefore need not be a national of that State, or domiciled, or even legally 
resident within its territory.” Nevertheless, one can assume that a protest will be more likely if the 
suspect is a national of the injured State. See, for example, Alvarez-Machain (Mexican national, male 
captus in Mexico, protest from Mexico), Jolis (Belgian national, male captus in Belgium, protest from 
Belgium) and Al-Moayad (Yemeni national, male captus in Yemen, protest from Yemen). Conversely, 
if the suspect is a national from the forum State and not from the State where the male captus took 
place, there may not be a protest, see, for example, Scott (English national, male captus in the 
Netherlands) and Ebrahim (South African national, male captus in Swaziland). 
506 Chapter V has shown that State practice indicates that an abduction followed by a protest and request 
for the return of the suspect must lead to the male detentus outcome. However, in other male captus 
situations, of which it is less clear whether they lead to a violation of international law in the first place, 
such as luring, a protest may not help, see Al-Moayad. 
507 This point may be invoked by the forum State, in that a male captus technique would be more 
justified in case it is resorted to as an ultimum remedium. However, it is unclear whether the judges 
trying the case will be more willing to refuse jurisdiction if the Executive has not tried other legal 
possibilities first before turning to the male captus technique. Although cases like Bennett and Hartley 
(where the judges refused jurisdiction, among other things, because the Executive had not turned first to 
the possibility of having the suspect extradited in a normal way) and Matta-Ballesteros (where the 
judges did not refuse jurisdiction in a case where the prosecuting authorities had first tried to have the 
suspect extradited from Honduras to the US before they abducted him) may point to such an element, 
there are also cases where judges continued to exercise jurisdiction, even if the Executive had not 
resorted to the available extradition possibilities first, see, for example, Alvarez-Machain. Conversely, 
even if the circumvention of extradition treaties may constitute a factor in refusing jurisdiction, it is not 
so that such circumvention is necessary before a judge can stop the case. See in that respect also Sloan 
2003 B, p. 549, n. 63: “The most that may be said is that the violation of an extradition treaty (…) may 
be a factor in the decisions of national courts [emphasis in original, ChP]”. See also n. 335 where Sloan 
(2003 A, pp. 102-103) argues: “[W]hile the reasoning in several of the cases cited was indeed based on 
the national court’s concern at the state’s ignoring an established extradition regime (thereby depriving 
the accused of guarantees afforded by that system), none of the courts held – or implied – that the 








official arrest in the forum State?[508] (...) - Finally, for which crimes was the accused 
sought?509  
 
Now that the core elements/questions from the national male captus case law had 
been identified, the Trial Chamber turned to the allegations of the Defence that in 
this case, violations of 1) the sovereignty of the injured State and 2) human rights 
and the rule of law/due process of law510 had occurred.511  
With respect to the alleged violation of State sovereignty, the Trial Chamber, 
mentioning the elements which should be taken into account here,512 was of the 
opinion that no such violation had occurred in this case. The reasons for this were 
threefold.  
First, the Trial Chamber recalled the previously mentioned fact that in the 
vertical context of the ICTY/ICTR (international criminal tribunals established on 
the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter), “sovereignty by definition cannot play 
the same role”513 as in the horizontal context of equal, sovereign States, where “it is 
of utmost importance that any exercise of (...) national jurisdiction be exercised in 
full respect of other national jurisdictions”514 because “[o]bservance of this 
                                                          
508 Chapter V has shown that State practice indicates that courts will refuse jurisdiction in case an 
abduction is accompanied by serious mistreatment. In fact, one can assume that courts will do so in any 
male captus situation, see, for example, the following reasoning from the luring case of Yunis: “In this 
action, there is no dispute that United States law enforcement officers were fully involved in the 
planning and execution of defendant’s arrest. However, defendant has failed either to allege or to show 
any actions committed by these officers that meet the standard of outrageousness established by 
Toscanino and its progeny requiring this Court to divest itself of jurisdiction. The record in this 
proceeding has been reviewed with care and the Court fails to find the type of cruel, inhumane and 
outrageous conduct that would warrant dismissal under Toscanino.” (US District Court, District of 
Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, Crim. No. 87-0377 (681 F.Supp. 909), p. 920.) Cf. 
also Sluiter 2003 B, p. 946. One of the factors he presents which can be used in the determination 
whether a male detentus must follow is the “nature of the violation of individual rights”. He continues 
(ibid., pp. 946-947): “violation of individual rights of an egregious nature, such as subjecting the 
individual to inhuman or degrading treatment, may constitute a legal impediment to exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Tribunal, regardless of whether or not the Tribunal, in particular the Prosecutor, had 
anything to do with that violation”. 
509 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 95. Chapter V 
has indeed shown that judges may more easily continue the case because of the seriousness of the 
crimes with which the suspect is charged, see, for example, Latif. 
510 The Trial Chamber decided to address the concepts of ‘human rights’ and ‘the rule of law’/‘due 
process of law’ together, see ibid., para. 106: “In relation to the question of whether a violation of 
human rights has occurred, the following factors in particular may play a role: how was the accused 
arrested, how was he treated, who was involved in the arrest and treatment? As regards the question of 
whether a violation of the principle of due process of law occurred, the same factors may play a role. In 
addition, the question may arise as to whether the Accused can still be considered to receive a fair trial. 
As both arguments are closely connected to each other, they will be discussed here together.” 
511 See ibid., para. 96. 
512 See ibid., para. 97: “[T]he role the executive authorities of the forum State played in the transfer of 
the accused, the nationality of the accused, the role of the injured State itself and any treaty obligations 
that may exist between the injured State and the forum State, especially as to extradition.” 









fundamental principle forms an important asset of peaceful co-operation between 
States”.515 This argument appears to be valid, although it should, of course, not 
constitute a carte blanche for the Tribunals to violate the sovereignty of States at 
will.516  
Secondly, the Trial Chamber noted that Nikolić was deprived of his liberty by 
unknown individuals and that neither SFOR nor the Prosecution had been involved 
in his transfer from the FRY to Bosnia and Herzegovina or had offered incentives to 
these individuals.517 This point was deemed to be very important as the national case 
law had shown “that in every case in which a court decided not to exercise 
jurisdiction the facts of the case demonstrated that executive authorities of the forum 
State had been involved in the disputed operation to transfer an accused from one 
State to another”.518 It is indeed true that Chapter V has shown that courts will 
generally continue with the case if the prosecuting State’s own authorities were not 
involved in the male captus.519  
Although the first two arguments are very reasonable, the third reason much 
resembles the argument already made and criticised in the context of the 
Dokmanović and Todorović cases, namely that  
 
no issue arises as to possible circumvention of other available means for bringing the 
Accused into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. As follows inter alia from the vertical 
relationship between the Tribunal and national States, no extradition treaties are 
applicable. Instead, States are obliged to surrender indicted persons in compliance 
with any arrest warrants. Such warrants are de jure orders of this Tribunal directed to 
all Member States of the United Nations.520 
                                                          
515 Ibid. 
516 Cf. also Sloan 2003 B, pp. 549-550: “While it is, of course, true that different considerations must 
apply as regards relations between the Tribunal and member states of the UN (clearly the Tribunal could 
not function if its relations with states were constrained in the same manner as between states), it is 
submitted that there must nevertheless be some limits on the ICTY’s power to intervene in a state. 
Indeed the Decision would have benefited from consideration of whether there are such limits on the 
ICTY, and, if so, what they are and whether Nikolić’s capture in violation of the law of the FRY 
violated them [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also (again, see n. 265) 
Lamb 2000, p. 223, n. 201: “Potentially at least, a State may plead lawful excuse, on the grounds that 
the ICTY (and hence by implication its orders) was instituted by the UN Security Council pursuant to a 
resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (…) However, such a plea appears unlikely to 
succeed, on the grounds that while arrest warrants may constitute enforcement measures, these oblige 
custodial States to effect arrests or direct international forces to carry them out. They stop short of 
authorizing such States or forces to launch incursions into third States in order to do so”. 
517 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
101. 
518 Ibid. 
519 An exception in that respect, see also n. 504, is the 1982 Swiss case of X (where no Swiss authorities 
were involved in the luring operation and the judge nevertheless halted the case), although it must also 
be admitted that this Court did not refuse jurisdiction to try the case (male detentus) but refused to 
extradite the person to the State involved in the luring operation (male deditus). 
520 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 








Although it is true that extradition treaties do not apply in the context of the 
Tribunals, this does not mean that one cannot circumvent the procedures applicable 
in the context of a State and the Tribunal and that such a circumvention of the 
normal rules can be compared with a circumvention of the extradition procedures in 
the horizontal context of States.521 
The Chamber also made an obiter dictum, namely that “[e]ven if this Chamber 
would have concluded that a violation of State sovereignty had taken place in this 
case, the maxim “dolo facit qui petit quod [statim] redditurus est” would still have 
applied [original footnote omitted, ChP].”522  
This maxim means that “a person acts with deceit who seeks what he will have 
to return [immediately]”.523 Thus, a person/State cannot ask what he/it is not entitled 
to, what he/it must return straightaway.  
In this case, it would mean that “if a violation of State sovereignty had taken 
place, the Accused should first have been returned to the FRY, whereupon the FRY 
would have been immediately under the obligation of Article 29 of the Statute to 
surrender the Accused to the Tribunal”.524  
A few critical remarks can be made about this reasoning.  
As already explained earlier, if, for example, employees from the OTP are 
responsible for orchestrating an abduction, violating the sovereignty of a State, the 
regular transfer procedures and the human rights of the suspect, the judges will have 
no option but to refuse jurisdiction and to release the person. That might very well 
lead to a return to that suspect’s State of residence/the injured State.  
Now, of course, the male captus discussion must not be used in such a way that 
the fight against impunity is brought to a standstill. The fact that this court will 
refuse the case does not mean that the suspect cannot be tried elsewhere. As a result, 
the return can be made conditional, for example, on the State of residence being 
willing and able to prosecute the suspect for his alleged crimes. If the injured State 
cannot guarantee this, the suspect should be transferred to another jurisdiction which 
is willing and able to prosecute him.  
However, all this does not mean that the suspect or the injured State cannot claim 
that the suspect should be returned to the injured State. They can. The argument of 
the Tribunal – in that they cannot do so because the injured State would have a 
renewed obligation to transfer him to the Tribunal – overlooks the fact that such a 
new transfer would make no sense if the Tribunal has earlier refused jurisdiction in 
this case. The fact that, for example, the OTP has forfeited its right to prosecute the 
suspect will not simply disappear because of the return and the immediate new 
transfer. In short, there is no point in transferring a person to a Tribunal which has 
earlier determined that it cannot try the person. If there is no point in transferring the 
person, the injured State arguably has no obligation to do so. Thus, a maxim which 
                                                          
521 See for criticism on this point of the Trial Chamber also Sloan 2003 B, p. 549. 
522 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 104. 
523 Ibid., n. 114.    








assumes that the complaining actor cannot complain because it has a duty to re-
transfer cannot be applied. 
However, in less serious male captus cases, where the judge has not refused 
jurisdiction but where he may nevertheless be of the opinion that a violation of State 
sovereignty, strictly speaking, demands that the suspect is released and returned to 
the injured State (note that this would only be so if the injured State protested the 
violation of its sovereignty and requested the return of the suspect), then the maxim 
would make sense, see also the discussion of this issue in the Dokmanović and 
Todorović cases. After all, in such a case, the Tribunal can still try the person. If that 
is so, and taking into account the injured State’s obligation to cooperate with the 
Tribunal, it would indeed be strange if the suspect/the injured State sought the 
suspect’s return. After all, that would mean that the suspect would be returned, after 
which the injured State would have to immediately transfer the suspect back to the 
Tribunal (which would (still) be competent to try him). Such a pro forma and 
ridiculous ‘return-immediate re-transfer construction’ would make no sense, 
especially in the context of a State which is not very willing to cooperate with the 
Tribunal. Hence, in such a case, it would be better if the Tribunal does not return the 
suspect but continues the case and repairs the violation of State sovereignty in 
another way, for instance, through an apology. 
With respect to the alleged violation of human rights and the rule of law/due 
process of law, the Trial Chamber, mentioning the elements which should be taken 
into account here,525 first of all noted that it attached great importance to these two 
concepts.526  
For example, it considered that it had “a responsibility to fully respect 
“internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages 
of its proceedings””,527 standards which can be found in Articles 5 and 6 of the 
ECHR.  
Although Article 5 of the ECHR could be interpreted strictly, meaning that the 
Tribunal would only look at how the suspect was formally arrested and detained by 
ICTY officials when the suspect came into the power of these officials, the Tribunal 
has rightly rejected this approach and has opted for a much broader interpretation:  
 
There exists a close relationship between the obligation of the Tribunal to respect the 
human rights of the Accused and the obligation to ensure due process of law. 
Ensuring that the Accused’s rights are respected and that he receives a fair trial forms, 
in actual fact, an important aspect of the general concept of due process of law. In that 
context, this Chamber concurs with the view expressed in several national judicial 
decisions, according to which the issue of respect for due process of law encompasses 
                                                          
525 See ibid., para. 106: “In relation to the question of whether a violation of human rights has occurred, 
the following factors in particular may play a role: how was the accused arrested, how was he treated, 
who was involved in the arrest and treatment? As regards the question of whether a violation of the 
principle of due process of law occurred, the same factors may play a role. In addition, the question may 
arise as to whether the Accused can still be considered to receive a fair trial.” 









more than merely the duty to ensure a fair trial for the Accused. Due process of law 
also includes questions such as how the Parties have been conducting themselves in 
the context of a particular case and how an Accused has been brought into the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal [emphasis added, ChP].528 
 
Thus, the Trial Chamber continued, the Prosecution must come to court with clean 
hands (cf. the reasoning in Ebrahim).529  
In addition, it concurred with the still-to-discuss Barayagwiza case of the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber in that “the abuse of process doctrine may be relied on if “in the 
circumstances of a particular case, proceeding with the trial of the accused would 
contravene the court’s sense of justice””.530  
However, according to the Trial Chamber, this doctrine can only be used if it is 
“clear that the rights of the Accused have been egregiously violated [original 
footnote omitted, ChP]”.531  
Importantly, the Trial Chamber noted, after having – carefully – referred to a 
number of cases from the UN Human Rights Committee,532 that in such cases, the 
entity responsible for such an egregious violation is irrelevant (cf. also the 
previously discussed Milošević case):  
 
[I]n a situation where an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe even subjected 
to inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to the 
Tribunal, this may constitute a legal impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction over 
such an accused. This would certainly be the case where persons acting for SFOR or 
the Prosecution were involved in such very serious mistreatment. But even without 
such involvement this Chamber finds it extremely difficult to justify the exercise of 
jurisdiction over a person if that person was brought into the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal after having been seriously mistreated.533  
 
This version of the abuse of process test clearly goes much further than the national 
abuse of process doctrine, where the involvement of the authorities of the 
prosecuting forum appears to be required. Nevertheless, even if it does not follow 
                                                          
528 Ibid., para. 111. 
529 See ibid.  
530 Ibid. 
531 Ibid.  
532 See ibid., para. 113: “The Defence makes reference to several decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee relating to forced abductions in the 1980’s in some Latin-American countries [namely the 
cases of Almeida de Quinteros, Lopez Burgos, Celiberti de Casariego and Cañón García, see ibid., n. 
122 and Subsection 2.2.2 of Chapter III, ChP]. In these decisions, the persons concerned were 
considered victims of violations of the right to liberty and security of the person. The Chamber hesitates 
to apply this case law automatically mutatis mutandis to the issue at hand. Those cases were decided in 
the specific context of whether a State should be held responsible for the violation of the human rights it 
was duty-bound to respect. Furthermore, in all those cases, the States against which the applications 
were lodged were themselves involved in the forced abductions of the victims. As already discussed 
above, this aspect is an important factor in the assessment of the legal and factual issues in the case at 
hand [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 








the national abuse of process doctrine, it can be argued that this Tribunal’s version 
of the doctrine is to be welcomed and in fact may also be very appropriate for the 
inter-State context. The abuse of process doctrine, in the words of Lord Lowry, 
means that 
 
a court has a discretion to stay any criminal proceedings on the ground that to try 
those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process either (1) because it will 
be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) 
because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the 
accused in the circumstances of a particular case.534 
 
Thus, and focusing now on the second element, which for this study is the most 
interesting (see also Subsection 4.3 of Chapter III), there may be pre-trial 
circumstances which are so serious that it would undermine the court’s sense of 
justice/integrity/propriety to proceed with the case. Although the national abuse of 
process doctrine focuses on the pre-trial irregularities committed by authorities 
which can be linked to the prosecuting forum, the above-mentioned words of Lord 
Lowry are so generally formulated that they could also encompass irregularities 
committed by others. For example, national courts may also be confronted by an 
abduction by private individuals during the course of which the suspect is seriously 
mistreated. This may seem far-fetched, but when the stakes are considered to be 
high enough, such a situation may not be excluded at the national level either. The 
fact that national courts are prosecuting more and more international crimes 
themselves may contribute to such situations. If it can be established that such an 
abduction took place in the context of the national court’s case, one can imagine that 
a judge may also refuse jurisdiction because the irregularity which occurred in the 
context of his case may be deemed to be so serious that he cannot continue with the 
case, even if entities which cannot be connected with the prosecuting forum were 
responsible for the irregularity. 
Nevertheless, this broad version of the abuse of process doctrine is arguably 
especially interesting for the Tribunals because they do not have their own police 
force. That means that, besides the fact that they may be confronted by irregularities 
committed by private individuals (a situation which may occur in the context of any 
court, even a court which has a police force at its disposal), the Tribunal may be 
confronted by irregularities committed by, for example, national police forces and 
international troops working for them. Normally, there is nothing wrong with 
arrests/detentions/transfers executed by those entities at the request of the Tribunal. 
In those cases, the Tribunal may profit from the actions of third parties. However, 
there may also be instances where the consequences of the Tribunal’s dependence 
on others are negative, namely when something goes wrong in the pre-trial arrest 
and detention phase. It would be very easy but not a sign of real legal ‘maturity’ for 
the Tribunal to only accept the positive side of the fact that it has no police force of 
                                                          









its own. In addition, if the Tribunal – and this also goes for a national court – did not 
remedy violations committed in its pre-trial phase, whichever entity committed 
those violations, the suspect would fall into a legal vacuum, a situation which must, 
of course, be prevented by the court which is ultimately prosecuting the case.  
Having said that, it must also be noted that the above-mentioned words of the 
ICTY Trial Chamber focus on the mistreatment dimension of the abuse of process 
doctrine. That is, of course, very well possible: if a person is seriously mistreated in 
the context of his case, a judge may feel that he cannot continue the case. However, 
it must also be understood that the abuse of process doctrine is not a ‘torture test’.535 
It is not only about (physical)536 mistreatment. It may very well be that a suspect’s 
rights are seriously violated, even if he is not mistreated. In such cases, the abuse of 
process doctrine can, of course, also be invoked. In that respect, it may be good to 
know that the Nikolić Trial Chamber, when it wrote that “in order to prompt a 
Chamber to use this doctrine, it needs to be clear that the rights of the Accused have 
been egregiously violated [original footnote omitted, ChP]”,537 referred to the (still-
to-discuss) Barayagwiza case,538 a case in which the suspect was not seriously 
mistreated. In that case, the suspect ‘only’ suffered such serious violations of his 
rights that the Appeals Chamber was of the opinion that a male detentus verdict was 
in order.539 To use the example of the abduction: it can be argued (as has been done 
earlier and as will be done later in this book) that if the Tribunal were responsible 
for an abduction, the judges should resolutely refuse jurisdiction under the abuse of 
process doctrine. In such a situation, it should not matter whether or not the suspect 
was seriously mistreated during his abduction. The mere fact that an international 
criminal tribunal would resort to an abduction should be seen as such a serious 
irregularity that the judges, in good conscience, can no longer proceed with the case. 
It should be noted that the Trial Chamber may indeed be in favour of this stance. It 
is true that the judges have focused on serious mistreatment in their explanation that 
the abuse of process doctrine can also be applied to third parties, but they only did 
so in the context of private individuals’ conduct.540 Hence, this does not exclude the 
                                                          
535 Cf. also Michell 1996, p. 403 (commenting on the interpretation of the Toscanino case by later 
courts): “[T]hese later interpretations suggest incorrectly that Toscanino was primarily a “torture” case 
rather than a “forcible abduction” case [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
536 In the context of male captus cases, mistreatment normally means physical mistreatment/bodily 
harm. See, for example, the torture suffered by Toscanino (see ns. 53 and 79 of Chapter V). However, 
even though the term (serious) mistreatment/torture in this book is thus mainly used in a physical sense, 
the term as such may, of course, also encompass mental mistreatment. 
537 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 111. 
538 See ibid., n. 121. See also ibid., para. 114 where the Trial Chamber notes that its view “is in keeping 
with the approach of the Appeals Chamber in the Barayagwiza case, according to which in cases of 
egregious violations of the rights of the Accused, it is “irrelevant which entity or entities were 
responsible for the alleged violations of the Appellant’s rights.” [original footnote omitted, ChP]” 
539 See also the Bennett case as discussed in Chapter V, where the judges refused jurisdiction under the 
abuse of process doctrine in a case where the prosecuting authorities were involved in a deliberate 
circumvention of the extradition possibilities and during which Bennett was not mistreated in any way. 
540 See also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 








Trial Chamber from also applying the abuse of process doctrine in, for example, the 
above-mentioned case of an abduction organised by Tribunal staff and without any 
serious mistreatment. In fact, the following (and partly already presented) words 
constitute clear support for that stance:  
 
[T]his Chamber concurs with the view expressed in several national judicial 
decisions, according to which the issue of respect for due process of law encompasses 
more than merely the duty to ensure a fair trial for the Accused. Due process of law 
also includes questions such as how the Parties have been conducting themselves in 
the context of a particular case and how an Accused has been brought into the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The finding in the Ebrahim case [where, it should be 
remembered, the suspect was the victim of a ‘normal’ abduction, without any serious 
mistreatment, ChP][541] that the State must come to court with clean hands applies 
equally to the Prosecution coming to a Trial Chamber of this Tribunal.542     
 
Moreover, one can also imagine that in cases in which the Tribunal was not 
involved, a certain male captus may be deemed to be so serious, even if the suspect 
was not seriously mistreated, that judges may refuse jurisdiction.  
Applying the Trial Chamber’s reasoning to the facts of the case, the judges 
assessed the level of violence against Nikolić and found “that the assumed facts, 
although they do raise some concerns, do not at all show that the treatment of the 
Accused by the unknown individuals (…) was of such an egregious nature.”543 As a 
result, the final conclusion was that  
 
on the basis of the assumed facts, the Tribunal must exercise jurisdiction over the 
Accused. The allegations that his human rights have been violated or that proceeding 
with the case would violate the fundamental principle of due process of law are 
rejected.544  
 
There is something strange about this conclusion.  
Although the Trial Chamber may be perfectly right in concluding that, on the 
basis of the assumed facts, the male captus of Nikolić was not so egregious as to 
divest jurisdiction – it can be argued that this should indeed be reserved for the truly 
serious cases – and hence that proceeding with the case would not violate the 
                                                                                                                                              
113: “The Chamber has already concluded that, as such, the acts of the unknown individuals, i.e. 
bringing the Accused against his will from the territory of the FRY into the territory of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, cannot be attributed to SFOR or the Prosecutor.” 
541 Of course, an abduction will always contain some force/threat of force. For the Ebrahim case, see n. 
657 of the previous chapter, where reference is made to Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in 
State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 International Legal Materials (1992), p. 890: “He was bound, 
blindfolded and gagged”. In 95 International Law Reports (1994), where one can find more details on 
the abduction itself, one can read that Ebrahim’s kidnappers “pointed guns at him and warned him that 
they would kill him if he screamed or made a noise.” (95 International Law Reports (1994), p. 420.) 
542 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 111. 
543 Ibid., para. 114. 








fundamental principle of due process of law/the rule of law, it was nevertheless also 
concluded, again within the context of the assumed facts, that Nikolić was 
kidnapped and mistreated during his abduction. However, how does that conclusion 
comport with the Trial Chamber’s findings that no human rights have been violated?  
This can probably only be explained by the fact that the Trial Chamber must be 
of the opinion that private individuals cannot violate human rights, see also the 
discussion of this topic in Chapter III of this book.545 After all, how else can one 
conclude – on the basis of the assumed facts – that, on the one hand, there was a 
kidnapping during which course Nikolić was mistreated (but not so seriously as to 
divest jurisdiction) and, on the other hand, there was no violation of human rights?  
A reason for this potential inconsistency could be that the ICTY was afraid of the 
possible consequences of a finding that there was a violation of Nikolić’s rights, 
namely that in that case, it would be logical to grant remedies.546 (As explained in 
the context of the Milošević case, if the Tribunal is prepared, in the context of the 
abuse of process doctrine, to take the ultimate responsibility (namely the refusal of 
jurisdiction) for violations committed by other entities, one can argue that it should 
also take responsibility more generally and repair less serious violations committed 
in the context of its case, whether or not these violations can be attributed to the 
Tribunal.)  
It is also interesting to point to the fact that the ICTY ‘safely’ speaks about 
Nikolić’s rights, which arguably refers to his rights under the ICTY Statute, and not 
more broadly about Nikolić’s human rights, which term the Defence seemed to 
embrace (see footnotes 442-443 of Chapter III and 448, 457-458 and accompanying 
text of the present chapter). There may be a reason for this. It could be that the 
Tribunal is afraid that if it were to speak more broadly about human rights such as 
the right to liberty and security, that a finding that a violation of that right had 
occurred would lead to the remedies of this human right, such as release and 
compensation. However, as the ICTY Statute does not refer to these remedies (or to 
the right to liberty and security), the Tribunal may have thought that if it did not to 
                                                          
545 Cf. again (see also n. 532) ibid., para. 113: “The Defence makes reference to several decisions of the 
Human Rights Committee relating to forced abductions in the 1980’s in some Latin-American countries 
[namely the cases of Almeida de Quinteros, Lopez Burgos, Celiberti de Casariego and Cañón García, 
see ibid., n. 122 and Subsection 2.2.2 of Chapter III, ChP]. In these decisions, the persons concerned 
were considered victims of violations of the right to liberty and security of the person. The Chamber 
hesitates to apply this case law automatically mutatis mutandis to the issue at hand. Those cases were 
decided in the specific context of whether a State should be held responsible for the violation of the 
human rights it was duty-bound to respect. Furthermore, in all those cases, the States against which the 
applications were lodged were themselves involved in the forced abductions of the victims. As already 
discussed above, this aspect is an important factor in the assessment of the legal and factual issues in the 
case at hand [original footnote omitted, ChP].”  
546 See also Sloan 2006, p. 341: “[A]lthough the facts – limited though they were – clearly implied that 
illegality had occurred, the Trial Chamber concocted several arguments to the effect that there had been 
no breach of sovereignty or human rights and therefore no illegal capture. By making such improbable 
findings (…) the Trial Chamber was able to sidestep the difficult issue of what remedy would be 
required.” See further Sloan 2005, p. 492, arguing that the illegal capture “violated state sovereignty and 








refer to general human rights, it would have more discretion in finding the most 
appropriate remedy in the case of a violation and as such would have been able to 
evade the rather ‘automatic’ sanctions in the case of a violation of the right to liberty 
and security, namely release and compensation. However, even if that was the 
reasoning of the ICTY, this would not have helped the Tribunal as it has already 
been shown that the Tribunal must not only adhere to (the rights from) its own 
Statute but also to the more general human rights (such as the right to liberty and 
security, which arguably also includes the remedies of this right).  
Hence, although the fundamental principle of due process/the rule of law might 
still have been violated if Nikolić’s mistreatment by the private individuals were 
more serious (because for that violation to materialise, it is irrelevant which entity is 
responsible for the violation), the Chamber’s conclusion that no violation of State 
sovereignty or Nikolić’s human rights had occurred appears to have been triggered 
by the assumed fact that Nikolić was kidnapped and mistreated by private 
individuals. And because the Trial Chamber seems to be of the opinion that private 
individuals cannot violate the sovereignty of a State or human rights, Nikolić’s 
arguments were rejected. In that respect, one can only agree with Sloan who notes in 
his commentary to this decision that  
 
Nikolić’s lack of success in the motions appears to have been linked in no small way 
to the decision on the part of the defence counsel to agree to assumed facts and, in 
particular, to agree that Nikolić’s captors in the FRY were ‘unknown individuals 
having no connection with SFOR and/or the Tribunal’ [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].547 
 
One cannot deny that there seems to be some friction in the outcome of this 
decision, a friction which is caused by the fact that the Trial Chamber, on the one 
hand, concludes that the assumed facts show that Nikolić was abducted and 
mistreated during his abduction and, on the other hand, does nothing with that 
conclusion. As explained above, one could argue that the Tribunal, now that it has 
admitted that it will take the ultimate form of responsibility (namely by divesting 
jurisdiction) in very serious cases, is also perfectly able to take responsibility for less 
serious violations committed in the pre-trial phase (by unknown individuals). Thus, 
perhaps the judges could also have stated that the assumed facts mean that Nikolić is 
entitled to lighter, less far-reaching remedies (than the male detentus remedy) for the 
abduction and his (not so serious) mistreatment, and that it now only needs to be 
determined, via an evidentiary hearing, whether the assumed facts have in fact 
occurred in reality. If the Chamber had taken such a stance, it would have met 
Nikolić’s very reasonable request that the Chamber, if it did not grant him the 
(ultimate) relief sought (namely his release and the dismissal of the indictment 
                                                          








against him), would grant him “such other relief that the Court deems 
appropriate”.548  
A final point which must be made before turning to the Appeals Chamber’s 
decision is that the Trial Chamber is clearly not in favour of the male captus bene 
detentus rule as interpreted by the Trial Chamber itself, namely “that a court may 
exercise jurisdiction over an accused person regardless of how that person has come 
into the jurisdiction of that court”.549 After all, the words “regardless of” entail that 
the judges can always exercise their jurisdiction, no matter what happened during 
the proceedings of bringing a person into the power of the court. It is clear that this 
idea is not supported by the Trial Chamber for it has stated that “[d]ue process of 
law also includes questions such as (…) how an Accused has been brought into the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal”.550 This means that the circumstances of how an 
accused came into the power of the court may influence the decision as to whether 
or not jurisdiction should be exercised in this specific case. Therefore, a maxim 
which automatically upholds the exercise of jurisdiction, no matter what had 
happened during the pre-trial phase, is arguably not endorsed here. In fact, the Trial 
Chamber, while neither following the strict male captus male detentus reasoning of 
the Defence,551 seems nevertheless more interested in the ideas behind this latter 
maxim when it writes, referring to the male captus male detentus case (Ebrahim), 
that the Prosecution must come to court with clean hands, implying that if the 
Prosecution did not do so, the Trial Chamber would follow the male detentus 
route.552  
                                                          
548 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 18. See also 
Sluiter 2003 B, p. 947: “I agree with the Chamber that in such circumstances, release of the accused 
would be a disproportionate remedy. However, one wonders why the Trial Chamber, as the Appeals 
Chamber did in Barayagwiza, did not consider alternative remedies. In this respect, one can envisage the 
reduction of the sentence, in case of conviction, or financial compensation, in case of acquittal.” 
549 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 70 and n. 492. 
550 See ns. 528 and 542 and accompanying text. 
551 After all, a male captus situation (“an irregularity has occurred in the arrest of the Accused”) does not 
automatically lead (“and therefore”) to a male detentus situation (“should bar any further exercise of 
jurisdiction”). See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
70. Only a serious male captus might lead to the dismissal of jurisdiction. Hence, there are two ‘buts’ 
here. First of all, there must be not just any irregularity but a serious male captus. Although the Defence 
alleged that this was the case here, the Trial Chamber did not concur. Furthermore, even if there was 
such a serious male captus, then this does not automatically lead to the verdict male detentus. (Although 
the Trial Chamber should, of course, come up with extremely good reasons to entertain jurisdiction in 
such a case.) 
552 See also Sloan 2003 B, pp. 547-548: “While not explicitly endorsing the male captus, male detentus 
approach over that of male captus, bene detentus, the trial chamber did appear to disapprove of the latter 
approach given its clear willingness to look into the nature of the accused’s capture. Moreover, it 
specifically applied aspects of some of the national decisions which followed the male captus, male 
detentus approach [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also ibid., p. 552: “[T]he trial chamber’s 
emphasis on its obligation to ensure due process of law and its endorsement of some of the principles 








However, many will also argue that despite all these theoretical deliberations and 
commendable ideas, the factual outcome of the case is still that the court continues 
to exercise its jurisdiction (bene detentus), notwithstanding the (assumed) fact that 
Nikolić was kidnapped – and mistreated during his kidnapping – before being 
brought to the ICTY (male captus). The Trial Chamber could perhaps have 
distanced itself even more from the rather old-fashioned male captus bene detentus 
reasoning if it had remedied the assumed violations suffered by Nikolić, even if 
those remedies had not led to a male detentus outcome. Such an approach would 
have brought more flexibility into a system which sometimes seems too much 
focused on the two ultimate and extreme remedies: bene detentus or male detentus.  
Nikolić appealed the decision of the Trial Chamber, thus ensuring that the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY had for the first time to give its opinion on the male 
captus discussion.553  
Reading the Appeals Chamber’s central question554 and its strategy on how to 
tackle the problem at hand,555 it is apparent that the judges – in contrast to their 
colleagues in the Trial Chamber – wished to address the issue of the remedies first, 
before turning to the specifics of the case.556 They started with a theoretical 
framework – in which cases of violations of State sovereignty and human rights in 
general is the remedy of setting aside jurisdiction appropriate? – to which they later 
wanted to apply the facts of this specific case. If these facts indeed warranted the 
requested remedy, then it also had to be determined whether these violations could 
                                                                                                                                              
comment that the prosecution is obliged to come before a trial chamber of the ICTY with ‘clean hands’ 
– might be taken as an indication of how it would rule if the OTP and/or SFOR were implicated in the 
capture [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
553 The following examination of the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision in Nikolić has, to a large extent, 
been taken from Paulussen 2008. 
554 See ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 3: “The question presented 
in this appeal is whether the International Tribunal can exercise jurisdiction over the Appellant 
notwithstanding the alleged violations of Serbia and Monten[e]gro’s sovereignty and of the Accused’s 
human rights committed by SFOR, and by extension OTP, acting in collusion with the unknown 
individuals who abducted the Accused from Serbia and Montenegro.” 
555 See ibid., para. 18: “The Appeals Chamber observes that the basic assumption underlying the 
Defence submissions is that setting aside jurisdiction by the International Tribunal is the appropriate 
remedy for the violations of State sovereignty and/or human rights that allegedly occurred in this case. 
That assumption requires further scrutiny. For, if the setting aside of jurisdiction is not the appropriate 
remedy for such violations, then, even assuming that they occurred and that the Defence is correct that 
the responsibility for the actions of the Accused’s captors should be attributed to SFOR, jurisdiction 
would not need to be set aside. Thus, the first issue to be addressed is in what circumstances, if any, the 
International Tribunal should decline to exercise its jurisdiction because an accused has been brought 
before it through conduct violating State sovereignty or human rights. Once the standard warranting the 
declining of the exercise of jurisdiction has been identified, the Appeals Chamber will have to determine 
whether the facts of this case are ones that, if proven, would warrant such a remedy. If yes, then the 
Appeals Chamber must determine whether the underlying violations are attributable to SFOR and by 
extension to the OTP.” 
556 The judges of the Trial Chamber did not (really) have to go into the matter of the remedies since, in 
their opinion, the facts of the case did not indicate violations of the sovereignty of Serbia and 








in fact be attributed to SFOR and by extension to the OTP. At least two comments 
can be made here.557 
First, as with the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber seemed too focused on 
the ultimate remedy of setting aside jurisdiction. Admittedly, that is the remedy the 
Defence is aiming for, but Nikolić’s basic objective is arguably that the injustice of 
his abduction is addressed and repaired – for example, by other, less drastic 
remedies if the desired remedy is not granted.558 By formulating its strategy as such, 
the Appeals Chamber limited the issue of the remedies to an ‘all-or-nothing’ 
formula, which leaves no room for differentiation and which will ensure that the 
suspect will rarely come off best. After all, bearing in mind that an international 
criminal tribunal has the task not only of protecting the human rights of the suspect 
but also of prosecuting very serious crimes, it will – and within the limits of the law, 
it should – do everything in its power to prevent the termination of the proceedings.  
Secondly, a crucial element in the argumentation of the Defence was that a 
kidnapping as such (irrespective of who was responsible for it and how much 
violence was used) constitutes an egregious violation of the accused’s rights 
                                                          
557 A further comment is that the central question does not contain the allegation that the abduction 
violated due process of law – even though that allegation is correctly mentioned in the paragraph 
preceding the one containing the central question, where the Appeals Chamber provides a summary of 
the Trial Chamber’s conclusions. A short remark like the one made by the Trial Chamber in para. 106 of 
that Chamber’s decision, see also n. 510 (“As both arguments [relating to the issues of human rights 
violations and violations of due process of law, ChP] are closely connected to each other, they will be 
discussed here together.”) would probably have been enough to at least diminish the somewhat hasty 
and incomplete impression one gets when reading the Appeals Chamber’s decision. Several small 
(spelling) errors contribute to that feeling. An example can be found in para. 19, where the Appeals 
Chamber states that Nikolić is charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, even 
though Nikolić was indeed initially indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity (see also ICTY, 
Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning 
Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 2), he was ‘only’ charged with crimes 
against humanity at the time of the proceedings, see also n. 440 and accompanying text. 
558 See again ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
18: “The relief sought by the Accused is his release and the dismissal of the Indictment against him or 
such other relief that the Court deems appropriate [emphasis added, ChP].” In fact, Sluiter (2004 C, pp. 
245-246) explains that the judges are not even bound by the submissions of the parties. When writing on 
the UK and US briefs in the Todorović case, he notes: “The briefs also harbour a misconception as to the 
role of the judiciary when it comes to the question of relief. The shared argument is that even if the facts 
asserted by the defence are true, they do not warrant the relief the defendant seeks, namely release and 
return to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. One notices here the apparent position, that the Trial 
Chamber has no option other than to either grant or refuse the requested relief. However, in the ICTY 
procedure, the Chamber is not limited to the application of the parties. The Chamber may, on the basis 
of presented evidence, rule that release is not an appropriate remedy and instead order alternative 
remedies. (...) Taking account of Rule 5 (C), the Trial Chamber decides independently on an appropriate 
legal remedy [emphasis in original and original footnotes omitted, ChP].” Rule 5 (C) of the ICTY RPE 
reads: “The relief granted by a Trial Chamber under this Rule shall be such remedy as the Trial 
Chamber considers appropriate to ensure consistency with the fundamental principles of fairness.” 
Sluiter (ibid., p. 246, n. 19) clarifies: “Although Rule 5 applies to violations of the Rules or Regulations, 
it offers a good starting point when dealing with violations of other applicable law.” Cf. also Lamb 








justifying a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction.559 The Appeals Chamber was aware 
of this argument.560 Indeed, as will be shown infra, under certain circumstances, the 
Appeals Chamber seemed to concur with the more specific view that an abduction, 
irrespective of who was responsible for it, can lead to a refusal of jurisdiction.561 
However, if that is indeed the Appeals Chamber’s position on this, then both its 
central question and strategy are confusing, since they give rise to the impression 
that the Tribunal will only set aside its jurisdiction if the violations requiring that 
remedy can be connected to the Tribunal.562  
Leaving aside that matter for now, it is time to look at the two questions 
founding the Appeals Chamber’s theoretical framework: 1) under what 
circumstances does a violation of State sovereignty require jurisdiction to be set 
aside; and 2) under what circumstances does a human rights violation require 
jurisdiction to be set aside?  
With respect to the first question, the Appeals Chamber started by saying that 
this is “a novel issue for this Tribunal”563 and that “[i]n the absence of clarity in the 
Statute, Rules and jurisprudence of the International Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber 
will seek guidance from national case law, where the issue at hand has often arisen, 
in order to determine State practice on the matter”.564 This approach, which was 
                                                          
559 See ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 15: “The Defence contends 
that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that the circumstances of the Accused’s arrest were insufficiently 
egregious to justify a discretionary stay of the proceedings. The Defence argues that, following the 
reasoning of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal [for Rwanda, ChP] (“ICTR”) 
in Barayagwiza, a court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction in cases where violations of an accused’s 
rights are so egregious that to exercise jurisdiction would be detrimental to the court’s integrity. The 
Defence contends that kidnapping constitutes such an egregious violation. In order to deter future 
kidnappings, the Defence stresses that the International Tribunal should only exercise jurisdiction over 
indictees who were transferred to the International Tribunal through lawful means. Exercising 
jurisdiction in this case amounts to condoning kidnappings that are executed with minimal violence.” 
560 See ibid. With respect to the position that it should be irrelevant as to who is responsible for the 
abduction, see also the following and more general sentence in ibid., para. 18, where the connection 
with the Tribunal is also not mentioned: “[T]he basic assumption underlying the Defence submissions is 
that setting aside jurisdiction by the International Tribunal is the appropriate remedy for the violation of 
State sovereignty and/or human rights that allegedly occurred in this case.” 
561 It is, however, doubtful whether the Appeals Chamber also agrees with the idea that an abduction, 
irrespective of how much violence was used during the seizure (this may include an abduction with 
minimal violence), can lead to the ending of the case, see infra. 
562 After all, the central question reads: “The question in this appeal is whether the International 
Tribunal can exercise jurisdiction over the Appellant notwithstanding the alleged violations (…) 
committed by SFOR, and by extension OTP, acting in collusion with the unknown individuals [emphasis 
added, ChP]”. (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 3.) Furthermore, the 
last part of the strategy states: “Once the standard warranting the declining of the exercise of jurisdiction 
has been identified, the Appeals Chamber will have to determine whether the facts of this case are ones 
that, if proven, would warrant such a remedy. If yes, then the Appeals Chamber must determine whether 
the underlying violations are attributable to SFOR and by extension to the OTP [emphasis added, 
ChP].” (Ibid., para. 18.) 









reapplied when addressing question two, reflects the Trial Chamber’s approach to 
seeing which of the elements of the inter-State discussion on male captus bene/male 
detentus might play a role in the case at hand. However, whereas the Trial Chamber 
examined the inter-State context rather comprehensively,565 the theoretical 
framework of the Appeals Chamber prima facie seemed less impressive: it 
warranted just four paragraphs,566 addressing nine national cases.567  
Besides this quantitative aspect, which admittedly is not necessarily a reliable 
criterion for the quality of the overview, one can focus on the sort of cases the 
judges reviewed in order to find the principles from the inter-State context. The 
Appeals Chamber appeared to use a specific criterion here: almost all the cases the 
judges referred to were decided by the highest judicial authorities of a State.568 Such 
a criterion might very well be justifiable, since these institutions and their cases have 
de iure and de facto great legal authority.569  
Continuing this line of reasoning, it is understandable that the Appeals Chamber 
also paid some – albeit perhaps too little – attention in its overview to inter-State 
male captus case law decided by institutions with perhaps even greater legal 
authority: the ECmHR and the ECtHR (obviously taking into account that these 
institutions, in contrast to national courts, do not have to decide whether they can try 
the suspect notwithstanding the male captus).570  
However, it is a pity that the Appeals Chamber, in contrast to the Trial Chamber, 
did not refer to decisions from, for example, the HRC.571  
Admittedly, being a quasi-legal institution, its decisions might not have the same 
authority as those from genuine international human rights courts, but its 
international perspective on inter-State male captus cases would nevertheless be of 
value to the ICTY judges.  
Returning to question one, the Appeals Chamber referred on the one hand to the 
French Argoud, German Stocké and US Alvarez-Machain cases to show that several 
(supreme) courts “have held that jurisdiction should not be set aside, even though 
                                                          
565 See ns. 498-499 and accompanying text. 
566 See ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, paras. 21-23 (concerning the 
issue of State sovereignty) and para. 29 (concerning the issue of human rights). 
567 Argoud, Stocke, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, Jacob-Salomon, State v. Ebrahim, Bennet, 
Eichmann, Barbie and Toscanino. (Appeals Chamber’s own (and not always correct) notation.) Short 
references to cases in footnotes are not included here.  
568 Exceptions are the Jacob-Salomon and Toscanino cases. As already explained in n. 407 of Chapter 
V, Jacob-Salomon was not decided by a judicial body. This kidnapping case was settled directly 
between the Governments of Switzerland and Germany after the latter proposed the termination of the 
initiated arbitral procedure. Furthermore, Toscanino was ‘merely’ decided by a US Court of Appeals.   
569 See also Chapter IV. 
570 Although only the reference to the Stocké case (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan 
Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 
June 2003, para. 21) could be found in the Appeals Chamber’s overview (ibid., paras. 21-23 and 29), the 
Öcalan (ibid., para. 26, n. 30) and Soering (ibid., para. 30, n. 36) cases were also mentioned in the 
decision. (Note, however, that the Soering case cannot be seen as a male captus case.) 








there might have been irregularities in the manner in which the accused was brought 
before them”.572  
On the other hand, the Appeals Chamber noted that “there have been cases in 
which the exercise of jurisdiction has been declined”,573 referring to the Swiss-
German Jacob-Salomon, (which, it should be remembered, did not involve a court 
declining jurisdiction),574 South African Ebrahim and the British Bennett cases.  
It then turned to two cases which concerned “the same kinds of crimes as those 
falling within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal”:575 the Israeli Eichmann 
and French Barbie cases.  
From these eight cases, the Appeals Chamber, while rightly warning that “it is 
difficult to identify a clear pattern in this case law, and caution is needed when 
generalising”,576 distilled two principles, which “seem to have support in State 
practice as evidenced by the practice of their courts”:577  
 
First, in cases of crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
which are universally recognised and condemned as such (“Universally Condemned 
Offences”), courts seem to find in the special character of these offences and, 
arguably, in their seriousness, a good reason for not setting aside jurisdiction. Second, 
absent a complaint by the State whose sovereignty has been breached or in the event 
of a diplomatic resolution of the breach, it is easier for courts to assert their 
jurisdiction. The initial iniuria has in a way been cured and the risk of having to 
return the accused to the country of origin is no longer present.578  
 
To begin with the latter (and not very carefully formulated)579 principle: Chapter V 
has shown that there is indeed evidence in the practice of courts that if two States 
have resolved the problem of an alleged violation of State sovereignty amongst 
themselves (not resulting in a request for the return of the suspect), or if the injured 
State does not complain at all about the violation, there is no duty for the 
prosecuting State to return the suspect to the injured State.580  
That would also mean that there is in principle no reason for a judge, as an 
element of that prosecuting State, not to proceed with the case. As explained earlier, 
a suspect should, of course, have ius standi to plead an alleged violation of State 
                                                          
572 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 21. 
573 Ibid., para. 22. 
574 See n. 568 of this chapter and n. 407 of Chapter V. 
575 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 23. 
576 Ibid., para. 24. 
577 Ibid. 
578 Ibid. 
579 To take the example of the State sovereignty violating abduction: in many cases where the injured 
State complained about an abduction by the forum State, the problem was solved diplomatically by the 
return of the abducted person from the forum State to the injured State (see, for example, the Jacob-
Salomon case). If such a diplomatic resolution took place, it was not “easier” for a court to assert 
jurisdiction: it was in fact impossible (because there was not going to be a trial at all). 








sovereignty,581 but arguably, if there is no request by the injured State for the return 
of the suspect, the suspect’s argument for returning him to the injured State is 
doomed to failure.582  
That does not mean that the judge in such cases should proceed with the case – 
there might be other reasons to refuse jurisdiction, for example, in relation to human 
rights/due process considerations – but the hurdle of an alleged violation of State 
sovereignty, which could prevent him from exercising jurisdiction, will have been 
overcome.  
Turning now to the Appeals Chamber’s first principle, one can wonder how the 
deduction of a principle, which “seem[s] to have support in State practice as 
evidenced by the practice of their courts”, is achievable in the first place from only 
two cases.583 However, even if that were possible, a few remarks are in order with 
respect to the way the Appeals Chamber uses these cases.  
As was explained in the previous chapter584 and as Sloan has correctly 
previously observed,585 it is true that the Israeli Supreme Court proceeded with 
Eichmann’s case (bene detentus) notwithstanding the fact that Eichmann was 
abducted from Argentina (male captus).  
                                                          
581 It seems that the Appeals Chamber is not defending the idea that a person has no ius standi to raise a 
violation of State sovereignty, but only that it might be easier for courts to assert their jurisdiction if the 
injured State does not protest and demand the return of the suspect. However, Sloan does not agree with 
that. He is of the opinion that the Appeals Chamber does support the idea that a person has no standing 
to raise such a violation (thus contradicting its own views in the Tadić case), see Sloan 2006, p. 331. 
582 See also n. 178 of Chapter III. 
583 This point is also criticised by Sloan (2006, pp. 328-329): “It is, of course, perfectly appropriate for 
the ICTY to turn to national law where there are gaps in international criminal law – a relatively young 
part of international law – and it has done so many times in the past. But it must be acknowledged that 
this gap-filling process vests in the ICTY judges a tremendous discretion in deciding what national 
jurisdictions to consult (it would be impractical to consult the national jurisdictions of each and every 
state in the world), what the characteristics of national law in the jurisdictions consulted are and which 
particular aspects of this national law are applicable to the ICTY in view of its many differences from a 
national system. While this discretion is necessary and desirable, with it must come a duty on the part of 
the judges to be balanced and comprehensive (or at least relatively so) in their analysis of the national 
law and clear in their reasoning as to why the law of one national jurisdiction is apposite – and why that 
of another is not. Unfortunately, in the Nikolić decision the Appeals Chamber’s treatment of national 
case law was flawed; it was neither comprehensive – giving the impression of selectivity – nor clearly 
reasoned, at times relying on cases that are either inappropriate or controversial, and at times failing to 
cite a source at all. Despite its acknowledgement that ‘it is difficult to identify a clear pattern in [the 
national criminal] case law’ on the question of the exercise of jurisdiction in the face of an illegal or 
irregular interstate capture, and that ‘caution is needed when generalising’, the Appeals Chamber 
appeared to disregard its own good advice and proceeded to generalise based on a small number of 
cases, several of which were of only limited value to the ICTY. Based on a perfunctory review of 
Eichmann, Barbie and a handful of other cases, the Appeals Chamber reduced the detailed and complex 
jurisprudence on the subject of irregular capture from the world’s national courts to two principles and a 
balancing test [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (See also n. 1 of Chapter IV.) For another (and 
arguably rather strange) opinion on this, see Acquaviva 2007, p. 630, who writes about the Appeals 
Chamber’s “meticulous analysis of the domestic case law on the seizure of suspects without 
authorization by local authorities”. 
584 See n. 626 and accompanying text of that chapter. 








However, the judges did not apply this male captus bene detentus rule because 
Eichmann was accused of very serious crimes; it should be remembered586 that the 
judges in the District Court of Jerusalem were of the opinion that “[i]t is an 
established rule of law that a person being tried for an offence against the laws of a 
State may not oppose his trial by reason of the illegality of his arrest or of the means 
whereby he was brought within the jurisdiction of that State [emphasis added, 
ChP]”.587 Hence, according to them, the rule was applicable to any person standing 
trial, not necessarily a person charged with very serious crimes.  
Admittedly, the seriousness of Eichmann’s crimes did play a role for the Israeli 
judges, but not to defend the “established rule of law” summarised by male captus 
bene detentus; it played a role to defend the judges’ usage of the universality 
principle,588 whose rationale is that some crimes are so serious that even a State with 
no direct jurisdictional link can try a suspect charged with these serious crimes so 
that the latter can never escape justice. By using the universality principle, the 
Israeli Supreme Court claimed that it had the laws enabling it to exercise jurisdiction 
over Eichmann. However, as explained in Subsection 1.2 of Chapter III, to start a 
trial, one must have not only the legal means, but also the person himself 
(jurisdiction ratione personae).589 These are two separate issues and it is only in 
relation to the second where the problem of male captus bene/male detentus comes 
in.590  
                                                          
586 See n. 15 of Chapter I. 
587 District Court of Jerusalem, The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 
‘Judgment’, 12 December 1961, Criminal Case No. 40/61, para. 41 (36 International Law Reports 1968, 
p. 59). This observation was confirmed by their colleagues in the Israeli Supreme Court, see again n. 15 
of Chapter I of this book. See also the last sentence of the quotation in n. 590 of the present chapter. 
588 See Supreme Court of Israel, Adolf Eichmann v. The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel, 
‘Judgment’, 29 May 1962, Criminal Appeal No. 336/61, para. 12 (36 International Law Reports 1968, 
p. 304): “Not only do all the crimes attributed to the appellant bear an international character, but their 
harmful and murderous effects were so embracing and widespread as to shake the international 
community to its very foundations. The State of Israel therefore was entitled, pursuant to the principle 
of universal jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian of international law and an agent for its 
enforcement, to try the appellant [emphasis added, ChP].” 
589 Except, of course, in the case of a trial in absentia. 
590 See Supreme Court of Israel, Adolf Eichmann v. The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel, 
‘Judgment’, 29 May 1962, Criminal Appeal No. 336/61, para. 13 (36 International Law Reports 1968, 
pp. 306-307): “The appellant is a “fugitive from justice” from the point of view of the law of nations, 
since the crimes attributed to him are of an international character and have been condemned publicly 
by the civilized world (…) and therefore, by virtue of the principle of universal jurisdiction, every 
country has the right to try him. This jurisdiction was automatically vested in the State of Israel on its 
establishment in 1948 as a sovereign State. Accordingly, in bringing the appellant to trial, it has 
functioned as an organ of international law and has acted to enforce the provisions of that law through 
its own laws. (…) Indeed, counsel for the appellant has here confused the question of the substantive 
penal jurisdiction of the State of Israel with the question whether his client enjoys immunity from the 
exercise of that jurisdiction against him by reason of the fact of his abduction. These two questions are 
entirely separate from one another. As has been indicated, the moment it is conceded that the State of 
Israel possesses criminal jurisdiction both according to local law and according to the law of nations, the 
Court is no longer bound to investigate the manner and legality of the appellant’s detention, as indeed 
may be gathered from the judgments upon which the District Court has rightly relied [emphasis in 








It is almost ironic that the ICTY judges explicitly (and correctly) state that the 
discussion in their decision centres on the issue of jurisdiction ratione personae,591 
but then negate their own warning by using quotations from the Eichmann case 
which have nothing to do with that matter – particularly since these quotes can be 
found in the very same paragraph in which the Israeli Supreme Court corrects 
Eichmann’s counsel for making exactly the same mistake.592  
Looking at the facts of the second case, that of Klaus Barbie, one wonders why 
the Appeals Chamber includes this case in the part of its decision entitled “Under 
what circumstances does a violation of State sovereignty require jurisdiction to be 
set aside [emphasis added, ChP]?” After all, Barbie involved an alleged disguised 
extradition, which cannot lead to a violation of a State’s sovereignty.593 However, 
perhaps one should look beyond this fault in classification and see what the Appeals 
Chamber is trying to clarify, namely that the French Supreme Court upheld 
jurisdiction notwithstanding (alleged) irregularities in the arrest – a disguised 
extradition – because the suspect was accused of very serious crimes. As already 
explained in the previous chapter, that might indeed be the case.594 Nevertheless, 
even if that were the outcome of the Barbie case, one can seriously doubt whether 
one can conclude, on the basis of that case only, that there is a principle, 
“seem[ingly] (…) [having] support in State practice as evidenced by the practice of 
their courts”595 advocating the idea that, notwithstanding irregularities in the arrest 
proceedings, courts have not refused jurisdiction because of the seriousness of the 
crimes involved. With respect to the more specific irregularity of an abduction 
violating another State’s sovereignty (which did not occur in the Barbie case), one 
can wonder, on the basis of the Appeals Chamber’s analysis, if there is any 
supporting State practice as evidenced by the practice of courts at all. 
However, as was shown in the previous chapter, there are more cases – not 
mentioned by the Appeals Chamber – in which one may find (implicit) evidence for 
the idea that judges seem to take the seriousness of the alleged crimes into account 
in deciding that jurisdiction/extradition to a third State should not be refused in the 
case of a pre-trial irregularity.596 (The previous chapter has also shown that after the 
                                                          
591 See ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 19. 
592 See n. 590. 
593 See n. 77 and accompanying text of Chapter III. See also n. 499 of Chapter V where the same 
mistake is made by Conforti. (Note that the Appeals Chamber also referred to Conforti, see ICTY, 
Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning 
Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 23, n. 28.) 
594 See n. 499 and accompanying text of Chapter V. 
595 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 24. 
596 This can most clearly be discerned from cases such as Schmidt (luring) and Latif (luring). In Mullen, 
such a balancing exercise was also used, but in that case, the English judges felt that it was more 
important to legally disapprove of the male captus (a disguised extradition in which the British 
authorities were involved) by refusing jurisdiction, even if Mullen was charged with (and in fact already 
convicted for) serious crimes, namely IRA terrorism. The idea that the seriousness of the alleged crimes 








ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision in Nikolić, other inter-State decisions were 
issued which support this idea, but obviously, the Appeals Chamber could not have 
taken those cases into account.)597  
Notwithstanding this, the Appeals Chamber added its own observations 
regarding this matter.598  
It stated that there is a legitimate expectation that persons accused of 
‘Universally Condemned Offences’ are quickly brought to justice599 and that this 
expectation “needs to be weighed against the principle of State sovereignty and the 
fundamental rights of the accused”.600 With respect to State sovereignty, it observed:  
 
[T]he damage caused to international justice by not apprehending fugitives accused of 
serious violations of international humanitarian law is comparatively higher than the 
injury, if any, caused to the sovereignty of a State by a limited intrusion in its 
territory, particularly when the intrusion occurs in default of the State’s cooperation. 
Therefore, the Appeals Chamber does not consider that in cases of universally 
condemned offences, jurisdiction should be set aside on the ground that there was a 
violation of the sovereignty of a State, when the violation is brought about by the 
apprehension of fugitives from international justice, whatever the consequences for 
the international responsibility of the State or organisation involved. This is all the 
more so in cases such as this one, in which the State whose sovereignty has allegedly 
                                                                                                                                              
found in the Australian Levinge case, where the judges stated more generally that “it is necessary to 
balance the public interest in preventing the unlawful conduct against the public interest in having the 
charge or complaint determined. This is not to say that the end can justify the means and that the more 
serious the charge the greater is the scope for the prosecution to engage in unlawful conduct. But 
conduct which might be regarded as constituting an abuse of process in respect of a comparatively 
minor charge may not have the same character in respect of a serious matter”, see n. 158 and 
accompanying text of Chapter V. See further the German case from 1986 (BVerfG (3. Kammer des 
Zweiten Senats), Beschl. v. 3.6 1986 – 2 BvR 837/85. NJW 1986, Heft 48), where even an abduction by 
German agents did not lead to a refusal of jurisdiction. For older cases, one may refer to the Ker case 
(see n. 26 and accompanying text of Chapter V) and, perhaps, the Argoud case. Although the judges in 
this latter case adhered to a rather strict male captus bene detentus reasoning, comparable with the one 
of the Eichmann case, the words of rapporteur Comte may reflect what the judges may have thought 
when they issued their decision, see n. 410 and accompanying text of Chapter V. 
597 One could mention here the German case Al-Moayad (luring) and the Namibian case Mushwena 
(alleged disguised extradition/irregular transfer). These cases also referred to the Nikolić case. As 
already explained in the context of these two cases, one could argue, now that the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber’s reference to the Eichmann case (as support for the idea that the seriousness of the alleged 
crimes must be taken into account in the male captus discussion), is incorrect, that the references in Al-
Moayad and Mushwena to Nikolić (to support this idea) are also incorrect. However, as will now be 
shown in the main text, the ICTY Appeals Chamber also made some observations of its own concerning 
this issue (after it had discussed the inter-State context). And to those observations, these two cases can, 
of course, safely refer (as long as they do not qualify them as evidence of State practice, see Al-
Moayad). 
598 See ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 24: “Drawing on these 
indications from national practice, the Appeals Chamber adds the following observations.”  
599 See ibid., para. 25. 








been breached has not lodged any complaint and thus has acquiesced in the 
International Tribunal’s exercise of jurisdiction [original footnote omitted, ChP].601 
 
After having stated that this observation, which, incidentally, is somewhat 
reminiscent of the ECtHR’s statement that “[i]nherent in the whole of the 
Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the community 
and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights”,602 
would count a fortiori with respect to abductions carried out by ‘real’ private 
individuals,603 because those actions “do not necessarily in themselves violate State 
sovereignty”,604 the Appeals Chamber concluded that “even assuming that the 
conduct of the Accused’s captors could be attributed to SFOR and that the latter is 
responsible for a violation of Serbia and Montenegro’s sovereignty, the Appeals 
Chamber finds no basis, in the present case, upon which jurisdiction should not be 
exercised”.605 
To better understand the possible implications that follow from these 
observations, it is appropriate to first look at question two of the Appeals Chamber’s 
theoretical framework: under what circumstances does a human rights violation 
require jurisdiction to be set aside?  
With respect to this second question, the Appeals Chamber, after a short review 
of the Trial Chamber’s decision in Nikolić, the US Toscanino case and two other 
cases from the UN ad hoc Tribunals (the previously discussed ICTY Dokmanović 
case and the still-to-discuss ICTR Barayagwiza case), concluded that it “agrees with 
these views”.606 That does not, however, clarify what the Appeals Chamber’s 
position is, as these views are arguably not identical. The differences can be found 
between the Toscanino and the Dokmanović cases on the one hand and the Nikolić 
and Barayagwiza cases on the other.  
In Toscanino, and only focusing now on the first reason of the judges of that case 
to dismiss jurisdiction, namely the reason related to constitutional law/due 
process/the rights of the suspect,607 the US Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated 
that  
 
                                                          
601 Ibid. 
602 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, ‘Judgment’, 12 May 
2005, para. 88. See also ECtHR (Plenary), Case of Soering v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 
14038/88, 7 July 1989, para. 89. 
603 Namely private individuals whose actions are not instigated, acknowledged or condoned by a State, 
international organisation or other entity, see ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, 
‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 
2003, para. 26. 
604 Ibid. See also the discussion of this point in the context of the Trial Chamber’s decision and 
Subsection 3.2.2 of Chapter III. 
605 Ibid., para. 27. 
606 Ibid., para. 30. 
607 It should be remembered that one could identify three reasons why the Court in Toscanino dismissed 
jurisdiction in this case. The other two are: supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice 








we view due process as now requiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the 
person of a defendant where it has been acquired as the result of the Government’s 
deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused’s constitutional 
rights [emphasis added, ChP].608 
 
Hence, Toscanino shows that there is an obligation for a court to refuse jurisdiction, 
but only if the prosecuting forum (in casu the US Government) is responsible for the 
violations of the suspect’s rights. Furthermore, those violations must be very 
serious. Although the words of the Toscanino case itself (“deliberate, unnecessary 
and unreasonable”) are still rather general, and although one may also find support 
in the case for the idea that a forcible abduction as such (without serious 
mistreatment) must lead to the ending of the case, it was shown earlier that cases 
after Toscanino, such as Lujan (see Subsection 1.2 of Chapter V), have interpreted 
the case as a very narrow exception to the male captus bene detentus rule because of 
the extreme facts involved.609 Another such case is the luring case of Yunis, see 
again Subsection 1.2 of Chapter V. In this case, the judges stated that their case did 
not involve “the type of cruel, inhumane and outrageous conduct that would warrant 
dismissal under Toscanino”.610 The ICTY judges in the Dokmanović case, where the 
prosecuting forum (the Tribunal, in casu the OTP) was involved in a luring 
operation, followed Yunis and stated that, in the context of the male captus situation 
of luring, “there was no “cruel, inhumane and outrageous conduct that would 
warrant dismissal under Toscanino” in the arrest of Mr. Dokmanović. The accused 
was not mistreated in any way (…). There was nothing about the arrest to shock the 
conscience [original footnote omitted, ChP].”611 
Conversely, the Nikolić and Barayagwiza cases, explicitly discussing the (from 
the common law system stemming) abuse of process doctrine,612 held that even 
without involvement of the prosecuting forum (the Tribunal), serious613 and 
                                                          
608 US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 73-
2732 (500 F 2d 267), p. 275. 
609 It should be remembered that Toscanino, in the context of his abduction, was tortured for nearly three 
weeks. Note that Circuit Judge Anderson in the Lujan case also asserted that the Toscanino judges 
themselves would only divest jurisdiction in the case of an abduction accompanied by serious 
mistreatment (and not in the case of a ‘normal’ forcible abduction). See n. 97 of Chapter V. 
610 US District Court, District of Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, Crim. No. 87-
0377 (681 F.Supp. 909), p. 920. See also n. 177 and accompanying text of the previous chapter. 
611 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko 
Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-
95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 75. See also n. 255.  
612 Note, however, that the Toscanino and Dokmanović cases also made some brief references to this 
doctrine, see US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, 
Docket 73-2732 (500 F 2d 267), p. 276 (in its discussion of the second reason to dismiss jurisdiction 
(supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice)) and ICTY, Trial Chamber II, 
Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on 
the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, 
paras. 68, 73 and n. 104. 
613 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 








egregious614 violations of the suspect’s rights/(very) serious or egregious615 
mistreatment could lead to the refusal of jurisdiction.616 Furthermore, these tests 
seem – at least in theory – not to be as high as the Toscanino standard (“cruel, 
inhumane and outrageous”). The Trial Chamber’s judges in the Nikolić case, for 
example, referred to an accused being “very seriously mistreated, maybe even 
subjected to inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, or torture [emphasis added, 
ChP]”.617 The Nikolić and Barayagwiza cases also differ in another aspect: they held 
                                                          
614 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
111. See also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case 
No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74. 
615 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
114. 
616 See ibid., paras. 111 and 114: “[T]his Chamber concurs with the Appeals Chamber in the 
Barayagwiza case that the abuse of process doctrine may be relied on if “in the circumstances of the 
particular case, proceeding with the trial of the accused would contravene the court’s sense of justice”. 
However, in order to prompt a Chamber to use this doctrine, it needs to be clear that the rights of the 
Accused have been egregiously violated [original footnote omitted, ChP].” “[T]he Chamber holds that, 
in a situation where an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe even subjected to inhuman, cruel or 
degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to the Tribunal, this may constitute a legal 
impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction over such an accused. This would certainly be the case where 
persons acting for SFOR or the prosecution were involved in such very serious mistreatment. But even 
without such involvement this Chamber finds it extremely difficult to justify the exercise of jurisdiction 
over a person if that person was brought into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal after having been seriously 
mistreated [emphasis added, ChP].” (Note that in the Appeals Chamber’s decision (ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of 
Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 28), the first words of this quotation are not 
correctly printed.) See further ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, 
‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, paras. 73-74: “[U]nder the abuse of process 
doctrine, it is irrelevant which entity or entities were responsible for the alleged violations of the 
Appellant’s rights. (…) It is important to stress that the abuse of process doctrine may be invoked as a 
matter of discretion. It is a process by which Judges may decline to exercise the court’s jurisdiction in 
cases where to exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s 
rights would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity.” It must be noted, however, that the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber does not mention the arguably most important words of the Nikolić and Barayagwiza 
cases, namely where they explicitly state that it is irrelevant which entity was responsible for the 
mistreatment/the violations. This may be seen as proof of the idea that the Appeals Chamber is of the 
opinion that the Tribunal will only refuse jurisdiction if the Tribunal itself is responsible for the 
mistreatment/the violations. However, one can also argue – and this is probably the better view – that 
the fact that the Appeals Chamber refers to these two cases is enough proof that it follows (the core of) 
these cases, especially now that it does mention the Trial Chamber’s words earlier quoted in this 
footnote that “[t]his would certainly be the case where…” (see ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. 
Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-
AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 28); this shows that the Appeals Chamber is aware of the Trial Chamber’s 
view that the latter will also consider refusing jurisdiction in case SFOR/OTP was/were not involved in 
the male captus. In addition, the Appeals Chamber does not explicitly disapprove of the judges’ view in 
Nikolić and Barayagwiza that it is irrelevant which entity was responsible for the mistreatment/the 
violations either.  
617 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 114. Two 








that there is no obligation, but rather a discretion for judges to decide whether or not 
jurisdiction should be refused.618  
It appears that the Nikolić Appeals Chamber picked the most far-reaching 
elements from those four cases when it observed that “certain human rights 
violations are of such a serious nature that they require that the exercise of 
jurisdiction be declined”.619 After all, that could be interpreted as meaning that the 
Appeals Chamber does not necessarily require the involvement of the Tribunal in 
the violations to refuse jurisdiction in certain cases.620 Furthermore, by choosing the 
verb “require”, the Appeals Chamber states that some human rights violations are so 
serious that jurisdiction must (and not may) be refused. Finally, the Appeals 
Chamber followed the (at least in theory) lower ‘serious and egregious’ violation 
standard.621 
However, the Appeals Chamber promptly warned that these would be 
“exceptional cases”622 and that “the remedy of setting aside jurisdiction will (…) 
usually be disproportionate”623 because “[t]he correct balance must (…) be 
maintained between the fundamental rights of the accused and the essential interests 
of the international community in the prosecution of persons charged with serious 
violations of international humanitarian law”.624  
                                                                                                                                              
jurisdiction of the Tribunal after having been seriously mistreated.” After stating that it concurred with 
the judges in the Barayagwiza case (who used the adjectives “serious” and “egregious”), the Trial 
Chamber also referred to the word “egregious” (see ibid.). See also ibid., para. 111. 
618 Nevertheless, it must also be stated that the discretion mentioned in Nikolić and Barayagwiza is 
relative in nature. For instance, in Nikolić (see n. 616), one can read: “[T]his Chamber concurs with the 
Appeals Chamber in the Barayagwiza case that the abuse of process doctrine may be relied on if “in the 
circumstances of the particular case, proceeding with the trial of the accused would contravene the 
court’s sense of justice”.” One can imagine that if the Tribunal is of the opinion that to proceed with the 
case, in view of certain serious circumstances, contravenes its sense of justice, it will not exercise 
jurisdiction, even if it officially has a discretion. The same can be said about the Barayagwiza case, 
where it was stated (see ibid.): “It is important to stress that the abuse of process doctrine may be 
invoked as a matter of discretion. It is a process by which Judges may decline to exercise the court’s 
jurisdiction in cases where to exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious and egregious violations of the 
accused’s rights would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity.” Again, if the court is of the opinion 
that to proceed with the case, in view of the serious male captus, proves detrimental to the court’s 
integrity, it will, of course, not continue with the case (unless it wants to undermine its own integrity). 
Cf. in that respect also Jones and Doobay 2004, p. 95 (commenting on the Bennett case), see n. 412. 
619 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 30. 
620 See Sluiter 2004 C, pp. 246-247: “The court’s integrity is, of course, more obviously damaged in 
case of involvement of the Prosecutor, who is expected to come with “clean hands” to the Trial 
Chamber. However, in Nikolić it has also been established that serious human rights violations prior to 
trial may in and of themselves require that the exercise of jurisdiction is declined [original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].” (Sluiter refers here to ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, 
‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 
2003, para. 30.)  
621 For the “egregious” term, see ibid., paras. 31-32. 










As explained earlier, one can argue that it seems indeed reasonable that under 
certain circumstances, for example under the abuse of process doctrine, judges 
should be able to balance all the different interests at stake and to use their 
discretion to decide what the most appropriate remedy in a specific case is (and that, 
in that balancing exercise, he can very well take into account that a suspect is 
charged with very serious crimes and that the trial, if possible, should continue). 
However, there is also a risk in this discretion, a risk that clearly reprehensible male 
captus situations are in a way approved because one is dealing with a suspect of 
very serious crimes. This can never be the case. A court can never continue to 
exercise jurisdiction if it is clear that members of the OTP have, for example, 
orchestrated an abduction in clear violation of international law and human rights. 
Those cases are arguably so serious and so devastating to the court’s integrity that, 
in the words of the Appeals Chamber, “they require that the exercise of jurisdiction 
be declined”. In that respect, one can argue that the idea of the Appeals Chamber 
that such male detentus cases would be exceptional cases should only be read to 
mean that one can hope that employees of the Tribunal will never resort to such 
male captus techniques. However, one cannot argue that these cases would be 
exceptional because, even if they occur, a court can still decide to continue the trial 
because of the seriousness of the crimes with which the suspect is charged; it is 
submitted that if they occur, they should lead to the ending of the case.  
After determining that Nikolić’s rights were not egregiously violated,625 the 
Appeals Chamber concluded the examination of question two by stating that “even 
assuming that the conduct of Accused’s captors should have been attributed to 
SFOR and that the latter was responsible for a breach of the rights of the Accused, 
the Appeals Chamber finds no basis upon which jurisdiction should not be 
exercised”.626  
The final conclusion was therefore that Nikolić’s appeal had to be dismissed.627 
Putting the outcome of questions one and two together, the Appeals Chamber’s 
decision can be summarised as meaning that jurisdiction would not be refused if, in 
the process of bringing a suspect of very serious crimes to justice, the sovereignty of 
a State is violated (even if that State were to complain about the violation and 
                                                          
625 See ibid., para. 32. The Appeals Chamber explained (see ibid., para. 31) that it had reviewed proprio 
motu all the facts of the case but the decision, unfortunately, does not elaborate on this issue any further. 
Sloan (2006, p. 340) notes that “[t]he Appeals Chamber did not indicate whether this proprio motu 
review involved the issuance of subpoenas or orders for the attendance of additional witnesses, as is 
arguably permitted under the Rules. Nor does the decision of the Appeals Chamber shed even a glimmer 
of light on what its proprio motu review might have turned up [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
However, importantly, this review was one of the reasons why Nikolić, after this decision, could not ask 
for an evidentiary hearing in the style of Todorović to find out what had actually happened to him, see 
Sloan 2006, pp. 340-341. 
626 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 33. 








request the return of the suspect),628 on the condition that the suspect’s rights are not 
violated during that process to such an extent that jurisdiction must be refused.  
Now, it is not hard to agree with the Appeals Chamber that “certain human rights 
violations are of such a serious nature that they require that the exercise of 
jurisdiction be declined”. However, because it was assumed that Nikolić was the 
victim of an abduction, because the Appeals Chamber was apparently not very 
impressed by the value of State sovereignty and because the Appeals Chamber 
refers to passages from cases which are particularly interested in the serious 
mistreatment dimension,629 it could be argued that the Appeals Chamber’s male 
detentus test appears to be mainly interested in the seriousness of the mistreatment 
inflicted on the suspect.630 This could mean that the Appeals Chamber would not be 
                                                          
628 Although the Appeals Chamber distils the principle that it is easier for a court to assert its jurisdiction 
when the international imbalance or iniuria has been resolved (for example, by not complaining about 
the (alleged) violation), it does not state that if the injured State complains (and requests the return of the 
suspect), jurisdiction would be set aside. In fact, the observations in ibid., para. 26, where the principle 
is discussed in the context of the Tribunal, seem to hint that even if an injured State complains and 
requests the return of the suspect, jurisdiction would not be set aside: “[T]he Appeals Chamber does not 
consider that in cases of universally condemned offences, jurisdiction should be set aside on the ground 
that there was a violation of the sovereignty of a State (…). This is all the more so in cases such as this 
one, in which the State whose sovereignty has allegedly been breached has not lodged any complaint 
and thus has acquiesced in the International Tribunal’s exercise of jurisdiction [emphasis added and 
original footnote omitted, ChP].” The emphasis shows that as the injured State has not complained about 
the (alleged) violation, there is no reason at all why jurisdiction should be refused. However, that does 
not mean that jurisdiction would be refused if the injured State has complained. 
629 See also Sloan 2006, pp. 340-341. 
630 This important point needs to be clarified in further detail. Although the reference to the 
Barayagwiza case (where there was no mistreatment of the suspect) and the test mentioned in that case 
(“It is a process by which Judges may decline to exercise the court’s jurisdiction in cases where to 
exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove 
detrimental to the court’s integrity.” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74)) would not exclude a 
‘normal’ abduction (without serious mistreatment), the Appeals Chamber’s other references are 
particularly focused on the mistreatment aspect. First of all, the Appeals Chamber refers to the Nikolić 
Trial Chamber’s words which specifically focus on the question whether Nikolić was seriously 
mistreated: “[W]here an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe even subjected to inhuman, cruel 
or degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to the Tribunal, this may constitute a legal 
impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction over such an accused. This would certainly be the case where 
persons acting for SFOR or the Prosecution were involved in such very serious mistreatment.” (ICTY, 
Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning 
Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 28.) See also ibid., para. 31: “In the 
present case, the Trial Chamber examined the facts agreed to by the parties. It established that the 
treatment of the Appellant was not of such an egregious nature as to impede the exercise of jurisdiction. 
(…) [T]he Appeals Chamber concurs with the Trial Chamber that the circumstances of this case do not 
warrant, under the standard defined above, the setting aside of jurisdiction.” The Appeals Chamber also 
referred to a passage from the Toscanino case dealing with the national concept of due process. These 
words could, in itself, encompass a ‘normal’ abduction but the Toscanino test has later been interpreted 
as a very restricted male detentus possibility. An abduction as such is not enough. What is required is in 
fact serious mistreatment. For example, the judges in the Yunis case stated that their case did not involve 
“the type of cruel, inhumane and outrageous conduct that would warrant dismissal under Toscanino.” 
(US District Court, District of Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, Crim. No. 87-0377 








concerned about an abduction, as long as that abduction was not accompanied by 
serious mistreatment.631 
Although the Appeals Chamber may very well be right in arguing that the 
abduction in this case (which after all, was ‘merely’ executed by private individuals) 
was not so serious as to divest jurisdiction, the male detentus test of the Appeals 
Chamber can be interpreted as meaning that the judges would be obliged neither to 
refuse jurisdiction if the Tribunal itself were involved in an abduction (as long as 
that abduction was not accompanied by serious mistreatment).  
It can be argued that the Appeals Chamber should have stated (at least more 
clearly)632 that the judges would also refuse jurisdiction if employees of the Tribunal 
itself intentionally633 committed serious (procedural) irregularities in the process of 
bringing a suspect to trial, such as an abduction. In such a case, it should not matter 
whether or not the accused was seriously mistreated.634 The mere fact that the OTP 
                                                                                                                                              
can also be derived from its reference to the paragraphs in the Dokmanović case where one can read: 
“[T]here was no “cruel, inhumane and outrageous conduct that would warrant dismissal under 
Toscanino” in the arrest of Mr. Dokmanović. The accused was not mistreated in any way on his journey 
to the Erdut base. There was nothing about the arrest to shock the conscience [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and 
Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case 
No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 75.) 
631 See also Currie 2007, p. 372, writing about the “fairly stark” “logical implications” of the “test put 
forward by the court”: “For example, if State A sends its police or agents into the territory of State B 
where they violently abduct a fugitive, then so long as State A can present the individual to the Tribunal 
there will be no jurisdictional problems (absent serious physical abuse). That A has violated the 
territorial integrity of B is of no moment, even supposing relations between these states are already 
fractious and the abduction might provoke an international incident.” 
632 It may be interesting to note that the Defence was apparently also not very sure about the exact 
content of the Appeals Chamber’s male detentus test and therefore asked the Chamber for clarification, 
see ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion Requesting Clarification of 
the Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 20 June 
2003, para. 5: “[T]he defence respectfully requests clarification of exactly what test is contemplated by 
‘the standard defined above’ [see para. 31 of the Appeals Chamber’s decision, ChP], and where that 
above (…) is to be found in the instant judgement. The facts agreed by the parties encompassed 
kidnapping and the forcible removal by a person against his will from a sovereign jurisdiction to another 
jurisdiction without the leave of either, such having involved the prosecution and conviction of some of 
the perpetrators in Serbia. If it be the case that the defence is correct in interpreting the ‘standard’ simply 
thus, that the agreed subjective facts were not sufficient to establish an egregious violation, then the 
defence respectfully requests what ‘standard’ is applicable so as to form the watershed between 
illegality that, on the one hand is egregious and, on the other, is not. That, with respect cannot be an 
abstraction, as the use of the phrase ‘the standard defined’ implies just that, a defined test [emphasis in 
original, ChP].” However, the Appeals Chamber, declaring the request “frivolous”, considered that no 
clarification was required, see ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on 
Motion Requesting Clarification’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 6 August 2003, A 69. See also Sloan 2006, 
pp. 333-334. 
633 Cf. n. 476 and accompanying text. 
634 In that respect, it can be argued that the Tribunal should follow the lower male detentus standards 
which can, for example, be found in cases like Bennett. See also Sloan 2006, p. 337: “The Appeals 
Chamber made no effort to reconcile the approach in the Toscanino case [perhaps it is better to speak 
here of the interpretation of this case by subsequent courts, ChP] with the jurisprudence of other states 








is, for example, orchestrating an abduction should make the judges refuse 
jurisdiction.635 It is not so much the harm inflicted on the suspect (which might be 
minimal) or the harm inflicted on the sovereignty of a State636 which should lead to 
the refusal of jurisdiction here, it is above all the integrity and credibility of the 
                                                                                                                                              
the court to reject jurisdiction [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].” Cf. also Sluiter 
2003 B, pp. 946-947: “Crucial factors, in determining whether or not this remedy [this is the termination 
of the proceedings, ChP] should be provided for are the following: 1. The degree of attribution of the 
violation to the Tribunal, in particular the Prosecutor (…); 2. The nature of the violation of individual 
rights (violation of individual rights of an egregious nature (…) may constitute a legal impediment to 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal, regardless of whether or not the Tribunal, in particular the 
Prosecutor, had anything to do with that violation).” 
635 It can be argued that the cases to which the Appeals Chamber refers would not exclude this. 
However, as explained, the Appeals Chamber seems particularly interested in the serious mistreatment 
passages of some of these cases, see also n. 630. The Barayagwiza case (where there was no 
mistreatment of the suspect) and the test mentioned in that case (“It is a process by which Judges may 
decline to exercise the court’s jurisdiction in cases where to exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious 
and egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity.” 
(ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-
19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74)) would not exclude a ‘normal’ abduction (without serious 
mistreatment). See also ibid.: “Under the doctrine of “abuse of process”, proceedings that have been 
lawfully initiated may be terminated after an indictment has been issued if improper or illegal 
procedures are employed in pursuing an otherwise lawful process [emphasis added, ChP].” 
Furthermore, one can also find evidence in the Toscanino case itself that a normal abduction would fall 
under its male detentus test, although the case has not been interpreted as such in subsequent cases. (See 
also Michell 1996, p. 403: “[T]hese later interpretations suggest incorrectly that Toscanino was 
primarily a “torture” case rather than a “forcible abduction” case.”) In addition, the Nikolić and 
Dokmanović cases arguably also include passages which can be seen as supporting a male detentus test, 
which could include a normal abduction, without serious mistreatment. In the Trial Chamber’s decision 
in Nikolić, the judges stated more generally: “Due process of law also includes questions such as how 
the Parties have been conducting themselves in the context of a particular case and how an Accused has 
been brought into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The finding in the Ebrahim case that the State must 
come to court with clean hands applies equally to the Prosecution coming to a Trial Chamber of this 
Tribunal. In addition, this Chamber concurs with the Appeals Chamber in the Barayagwiza case that the 
abuse of process doctrine may be relied on if “in the circumstances of a particular case, proceeding with 
the trial of the accused would contravene the court’s sense of justice”. However, in order to prompt a 
Chamber to use this doctrine, it needs to be clear that the rights of the Accused have been egregiously 
violated [original footnote omitted, ChP].” In addition, neither should it be forgotten that the passage 
from the Dokmanović case, to which the Appeals Chamber refers, was (only) made in the context of 
luring. However, before the Trial Chamber in Dokmanović turned to this male captus situation, it had 
distinguished this situation from the male captus situation forcible abduction. This may mean that the 
Trial Chamber might have dismissed the case of Dokmanović if the OTP was not involved in a mere 
luring operation, but in an abduction operation. See also Scharf 1998, p. 371: “[T]he Trial Chamber 
focused on the distinction between “luring” (the means used to arrest Dokmanović) and “forcible 
abduction”, reckoning that the former was acceptable while the latter might constitute grounds for 
dismissal in future cases [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
636 That might indeed be of less importance to an international criminal tribunal whose relationship with 
national States is of a superior, vertical and not of an equal, horizontal nature. However, as already 
explained, the fact that the sovereignty aspect “by definition cannot play the same role” (ICTY, Trial 
Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of 
Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 100) in the context of the 









Tribunal as an institution based on (international) law which would be harmed if the 
trial continued.637 In that sense, neither should it matter whether a State has, for 
example, protested and requested the return of the suspect. An abduction as such 
(without any further qualification) should lead to the ending of the case if the 
Tribunal wants to be taken seriously as a court of law. One could also mention 
practical considerations here; such an approach would arguably also be damaging to 
the entire mission of the Tribunal.638 In addition, neither should one forget that the 
negative consequences of proceeding with the case in such a situation might not be 
limited to the context of the Tribunals. For national States/courts, these international 
institutions may be seen as examples to follow. If employees of a Tribunal are 
involved in an abduction and, in a way, get away with it (because the judges do not 
decline jurisdiction), then national States/courts can refer to the Tribunal’s approach 
to defend their own (potentially) dubious methods of bringing suspects to trial or to 
defend the ‘approval’ of such methods by proceeding with the case.639 That, in turn, 
                                                          
637 Cf. also Sloan 2006, pp. 342-343: “If all the facts were brought to light and it became clear that 
SFOR had been involved in illegal behaviour, the nature of the violation of human rights and 
sovereignty would appear in a different light. Indeed, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a 
thorough examination of the facts might even have shown foreknowledge on the part of the OTP of 
SFOR’s intention to carry out illegal capture operations (...). Were such findings to have been made, the 
arrest process would have been found to be contaminated. The obligation of the Appeals Chamber, 
therefore, would have been to provide a remedy that reflected the ICTY’s intolerance of such conduct 
by making it clear that such behaviour in the future would be unlikely to lead to the prosecution of the 
accused. This might very well have taken the form of ordering the release of Nikolić”. 
638 See also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
65: “Both SFOR and the Tribunal are involved in a peace mission and are expected to contribute in a 
positive way to the restoration of peace and security in the area. Any use of methods and practices that 
would, in themselves, violate fundamental principles of international law and justice would be contrary 
to the mission of this Tribunal.” Cf. also Henquet 2003, p. 146: “The purpose of the Tribunal, indeed the 
legal basis for its establishment, is to contribute to the restoration of peace and security in the former 
Yugoslavia. Thus, it might be argued, if the Tribunal is to succeed in this task it must be perceived as 
credible and just. This requires it to uphold the highest standards of justice.” See also Van Sliedregt 
2001 B, pp. 82-83. 
639 Cf. the already-mentioned words of Swart and Schomburg at n. 127 and accompanying text (writing 
on the context of respect for international human rights). See further Carcano 2005, p. 91 (“[N]ational 
courts, when called to decide cases involving crimes of international concern or raising certain aspects 
of international criminal law, may be influenced by the content of international decisions”) and Sluiter 
2006 C, pp. 629-630, writing about Dutch war crimes courts which “proved not to be insensitive 
towards ICTY jurisprudence, also in the field of international criminal procedure. The rationale lies in 
the lack of relevant case law of human rights supervisory organs in relation to those complex cases.” See 
also ibid., p. 635: “International criminal procedure may in spite of all its flaws fulfil an important gap-
filling function and serve as important point of reference for participants in domestic war crimes trials 
with an open eye and mind for procedural solutions and approaches coined in other systems. In this 
light, the ‘legislator’ in the field of international criminal procedure should become aware of its 
relevance and impact beyond the scope of international criminal trials.” See finally Smeulers 2007, p. 
108 (writing about the concepts of human rights and due process of law: “The tribunal fulfills an 
important and exemplary function”) and Starr 2008, pp. 713-714: “At least some of the ICTs’ judges see 
the Tribunals as models for other courts’ treatment of defendants and point out that respecting due 
process is crucial to that mission. Indeed, the ICTs’ procedural rules and jurisprudence have repeatedly 








would harm the integrity of these States/courts, the human rights of their suspects 
and – what is far more important for the horizontal context than for the context of 
the Tribunals – the very foundation of the inter-State level itself, namely respect for 
another State’s sovereignty.640 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber’s ‘carte blanche’ 
approach towards State sovereignty641 could also have consequences for the ICC, 
the context of which will be discussed in the next part of this book.642 
One could counter the suggestion that the Appeals Chamber should have 
mentioned this second situation (at least more clearly), by arguing that the judges 
did not need to address that situation at all, as Nikolić was not abducted by 
employees of the Tribunal but by private individuals. However, as almost all the 
generally formulated observations in this decision are not so much related to the 
case itself but more to the theory behind it, this important aspect should not have 
been left out. In addition, there are even indications that the Tribunal is of the 
opinion that jurisdiction should not be refused, even if the Tribunal itself were 
involved in the irregularity – as long as the accused is not seriously mistreated. After 
all, the Appeals Chamber also bases its ‘serious violation’ criterion on cases such as 
Toscanino and Dokmanović, cases in which the prosecuting forum itself was 
involved in the (alleged) irregularity.643 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber, in its 
central question and last sentence from its strategy, makes use of the combination 
“violations (…) committed by SFOR, and by extension OTP [emphasis added, 
                                                                                                                                              
international courts and commissions and advocates before those bodies, and by domestic courts 
interpreting their own international legal obligations [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” One could here 
think, for example, of the Al-Moayad and Mushwena cases discussed in Chapter V. 
640 See again (see also n. 519 of Chapter III) UNSC Res. 138 of 23 June 1960 (S/4349), in which the 
Council, dealing with the Israeli abduction of Eichmann in Argentina, stated “that the repetition of acts 
such as that giving rise to this situation would involve a breach of the principles upon which 
international order is founded, creating an atmosphere of insecurity and distrust incompatible with the 
preservation of peace”. Cf. also Van der Wilt 2004, p. 295, who explains that if the Tribunal would 
knowingly make use of States carrying out violations of State sovereignty for the Tribunal, it would also 
jeopardise the peaceful coexistence. See finally Currie 2007, p. 373: “Under the Nikolić test, the threat 
to international peace and security that these offenders pose is more significant than the inter-state 
conflict their arrest might engender, even though that inter-state conflict might itself threaten peace and 
security.” 
641 See also ibid., p. 384: “The Appeals Chamber’s approach in Nikolić has a certain carte blanche, 
“hang the consequences” flavour, adopting as it does the view that international crime in the form of 
universally-condemned offences represents a greater threat to international peace and security than the 
prospect of states invading each others’ territory to abduct wanted individuals.” 
642 See also Sloan 2006, p. 333: “[T]o simply observe that the violation [of State sovereignty, ChP] may 
lead to ‘consequences for the international responsibility of the State or organization involved’, without 
establishing meaningful parameters regarding when such violations will be tolerated by the ICTY, gives 
a blank cheque to those who would violate state sovereignty in what they perceive to be the best 
interests of international criminal justice. If this were to be considered a precedent for capture of those 
indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) residing in non-cooperating member states, the 
ramifications could be very damaging to international peace and security [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].” 
643 In addition, one could argue that the Appeals Chamber does not explicitly mention the important 
words of the ICTY Trial Chamber in Nikolić and the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Barayagwiza that it is 
irrelevant which entity is responsible for the mistreatment/the violations. However, it seems that this 








ChP]”/“violations (…) attributable to SFOR and by extension to the OTP [emphasis 
added, ChP]”.644 That could mean that the conclusion of the Appeals Chamber, 
namely that the remedy of setting aside jurisdiction will almost never be 
appropriate, is also applicable to situations where the violations can be attributed to 
the OTP.645  
However, even if the Tribunal only refers to situations where it is not itself 
involved in the irregularity,646 the outcome, or at least the way it is formulated, is 
unfortunate. The Appeals Chamber’s ‘all-or-nothing’ formula with respect to the 
issue of remedies leads to a ‘not-unless’ answer (‘jurisdiction will not be set aside, 
unless...’). As a result, the judges focus on what irregularities may not cause, thus in 
a way reassuring the parties involved in the pre-trial arrest and detention phase that 
they should not worry too much if irregularities are committed in the process of 
bringing a suspect of very serious crimes to justice. However, if the Tribunal wants 
to deter such irregularities, it should emphasise what they may in fact lead to. The 
Appeals Chamber could also have stated that violations will not be tolerated and 
that, if they occur, they will be remedied.647 This might neither lead to the ultimate 
remedy – the refusal of jurisdiction/dismissal of the indictment – (that should indeed 
be reserved for the more serious male captus cases), but then less drastic remedies 
would have to be granted.648 By formulating it in this way, the Appeals Chamber 
                                                          
644 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, paras. 3 and 18. 
645 The Appeals Chamber did not need to consider the question of whether the violations in this case 
could be attributed to SFOR or the OTP, as it concluded that the requested remedy was not going to be 
granted in any event.   
646 The fact that in paras. 27 and 33 of its decision, the Appeals Chamber – in contrast to its central 
question and strategy – suddenly leaves out the part “and by extension (to) the OTP”, might be proof of 
this possibility.   
647 Cf. also Sluiter 2003 B, pp. 941-942: “From a practical point of view, the most vital question is, to 
what extent the ICTY should bear responsibility (in the sense of providing remedies) for human rights 
violations that have occurred in the framework of its proceedings. (…) [T]he trial forum must take 
account of every human rights violation that occurs in the framework of the criminal proceedings. This 
view finds its ultimate basis in simple fairness and in the nature of the relationship between the accused 
and the trial forum.” 
648 Cf. also M. Federova, S. Verhoeven and J. Wouters, ‘Safeguarding the Rights of Suspects and 
Accused Persons in International Criminal Proceedings’, Working Paper No. 27 – June 2009, Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 
http://www.ggs.kuleuven.be/nieuw/publications/working%20papers/new_series/wp27.pdf), p. 23. One 
could think here of a reduction of the sentence and financial compensation, see ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 
November 1999, paras. 74-75. The time or amount of these remedies can then depend on factors like the 
seriousness of the irregularity and the (perceived – see n. 154 of Chapter V) ‘closeness’ of those 
responsible for the irregularity in relation to the Tribunal. One may argue that the remedy for an 
abduction committed by SFOR should be more significant than the remedy for an abduction committed 
by private individuals having no connection with the Tribunal or an entity cooperating with the Tribunal 
whatsoever. Cf. also Carcano 2005, p. 88 (who is, however, of the opinion that the Appeals Chamber did 
not have to address this issue in this case): “[W]hile the Appeals Chamber has clearly stated that it will 
not tolerate egregious human rights violations in the process of arresting individuals, it did not discuss 
whether there should also be a remedy for lesser violations. This is understandable because the issue had 








would have shown more clearly that it is not only focusing on the prosecution of 
very serious crimes but also on respect for law in general.649   
The main justification for the Appeals Chamber not to give up jurisdiction too 
readily is, arguably, the seriousness of the crimes with which its suspects are 
charged.650 Although the Appeals Chamber’s overview of national case law does not 
provide solid support for that justification, the previous chapter has shown that there 
are more cases – cases not mentioned by the Appeals Chamber – in which one may 
find (implicit) evidence for the idea that judges seem to take the seriousness of the 
alleged crimes into account in deciding that jurisdiction/extradition to a third State 
should not be refused. However, even if clear support in national case law were 
lacking, one can argue that such a justification, to a certain extent (see infra), is 
quite reasonable651 for courts (both at the national and at the international level) 
which have to prosecute suspects of serious crimes.  
Several aspects of this reasoning were already mentioned in Subsection 4.4 of 
Chapter III and the Dokmanović case, but it is worth now clarifying this important 
issue in further detail. It must first be stressed that, apart from the possible rule of 
customary international law that jurisdiction must be refused in the case of an 
abduction perpetrated by the prosecuting forum and followed by a protest and 
request for the return of the suspect,652 there is no clear international rule for courts 
                                                                                                                                              
the latter’s actions remained acts of private individuals with no relevance at the international level. 
Nevertheless, the International Tribunal, in order to avoid the impression that it condones them, should 
also have ways to remedy non-egregious human rights violations. Such a system may provide, for 
instance, for the granting of monetary compensation or a reduction of the sentence when a Chamber 
finds that the accused has been the victim of human rights violations.” 
649 In that respect, it is difficult to agree with Carcano (2005, p. 88) when he states that the decision “is 
arguably well balanced and sufficiently protective of the accused’s human rights”. 
650 As already explained in the context of the Dokmanović case, there is an even stronger proposition 
that the illegal method of apprehending a suspect charged with international crimes should be 
‘decoupled’ from the exercise of jurisdiction. That means that in such cases, jurisdiction must never be 
refused, see Higgins 1994, pp. 72-73. Michell, referring to Higgins, calls this the “Eichmann exception”. 
(Michell 1996, pp. 423-424.) However, one can wonder why this is called the Eichmann exception, as 
the Israeli courts – it was already shown earlier – did not use the seriousness of Eichmann’s alleged 
crimes as a reason for applying the male captus bene detentus rule. However, the reference to Eichmann 
might be explained by the fact that the UNSC arguably did take Eichmann’s alleged crimes into account 
to, in a way, condone the trial in Israel, a trial which was made possible by the abduction, see n. 521 and 
accompanying text of Chapter III. One may notice that the Eichmann exception from Higgins is not 
followed by the Nikolić Appeals Chamber, as at least one male captus situation must lead to the 
dismissal of jurisdiction (namely when the accused’s rights are seriously violated). Note, however, that 
Van der Wilt (2004, p. 279) writes that the Eichmann exception appears in the case law of the ICTY. 
Nevertheless, as can be deduced from his article (in which he correctly states that the Nikolić decisions 
recognise that jurisdiction would be refused in very serious cases), he apparently uses another concept of 
the Eichmann exception, namely that the Tribunals take into account the seriousness of the suspect’s 
alleged crimes when determining the consequences of a male captus, which is indeed correct).   
651 See also Carcano 2005, p. 87. 
652 This will be further explained in Chapter VII. However, assuming for now that such a rule indeed 
exists at the inter-State level – founded on the idea that courts refuse jurisdiction in such cases to protect 
the fragile international legal order based on the equality of States (and to repair what the Executive has 
not done) – one can wonder whether it can also be applied mutatis mutandis to the context of the 








to refuse jurisdiction in a certain case. For example, there is no human rights 
provision which states that jurisdiction must be refused in the case of a violation. 
Admittedly, courts may refuse jurisdiction if they are of the opinion that the male 
captus is so serious (for example, because the prosecuting authorities resorted to 
clearly illegal means, entailing serious violations of human rights) that the court 
cannot proceed with the case. However, courts have a discretion here, cf. the abuse 
of process doctrine; they can (and should) take every aspect of the case into account 
in deciding whether or not jurisdiction should be refused. One of those aspects may 
be that the suspect is charged with international crimes, crimes of which the 
international community demands that they be prosecuted. There is nothing strange 
about taking this important element into account. It is certainly rational that, because 
of the seriousness of the alleged crimes involved, a court should do everything 
within the limits of the law to prevent the termination of the proceedings.653 
                                                                                                                                              
of States, the latter concept does arguably play a less important role. In that respect, it could be argued 
that a protest from a State will have less influence in the vertical context of the Tribunals than it will 
have in the horizontal context of the States. Perhaps it could be argued that in such circumstances, there 
would be no obligation for a Tribunal to transfer the suspect back. Notwithstanding this however, it has 
already been submitted that in the case of an abduction orchestrated by the Tribunal, the latter should 
return (conditionally, see n. 354 and accompanying text) the suspect back, whether or not there has been 
a protest from the injured State. 
653 Cf. also the following words from the Prosecution in the still-to-discuss (see Subsection 3.2.2) 
Semanza case before the ICTR when it made a comparison with US Code, Title 18 (‘Crimes and 
Criminal Procedure’), Section 3162 (‘Sanctions’), under (a)(1): “18 USC 3162(a)(1) sets out factors that 
are to be considered, among others, in deciding whether a dismissal shall be with or without prejudice. 
The factors are: 1. the seriousness of the offense; 2. the facts and circumstances of the case which led to 
the dismissal; and 3. the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act and on 
the administration of justice. (...) [I]n U.S. v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988), the U.S. Supreme Court 
characterized as “serious” the charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession of 400 grams 
of cocaine with intent to distribute. In that case the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal with prejudice, 
finding that the trial court had abused its discretion. While drug-related crimes are certainly serious, 
there is simply no comparison between the illegal possession of sale of drugs and the 14 counts of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes with which the Accused is charged in this case. 
These are among the most serious crimes with which a person may be charged in any jurisdiction, 
national or international, in the world. The seriousness of these crimes, by itself, should preclude a 
dismissal with prejudice. (...) A dismissal with prejudice would be devastating to the administration of 
justice under international law. Dismissal with prejudice would not only prevent a trial on the merits for 
an accused mass murderer but would also foster the belief that political and military leaders can act with 
impunity in committing crimes against their own population in their territory. This practice of impunity 
is exactly what United Nations Resolution 955 sought to end when it adopted the Statute of the 
Tribunal.” (TPIR, Chambre d’Appel, Le Procureur contre Laurent Semanza, ‘Réponse du Procureur au 
Mémoire Préalable [à] l’Appui de l’Acte d’Appel du 12 Octobre 1999 contre l’Ordonnance du 6 
Octobre 1999 de la Chambre de Premi[è]re Instance III Relative [à] la Requête de la Défense en 
Annulation de la Procédure d’Arrestation et de Détention de Laurent Semanza pour Cause d’Illégalité’, 
Affaire No. ICTR-97-20-I, 21 janvier 2000, pp. 28-29, 208bis – 207bis.) A final remark is that these 
observations may very well be correct with respect to this specific case, but it must be clearly 
understood that the words “[t]he seriousness of these crimes, by itself, should preclude a dismissal with 
prejudice” may not necessarily apply to any case of suspects of international crimes. As will now also be 
explained in the main text, the seriousness of the crimes should definitely play a role in deciding 
whether jurisdiction must be refused or not, which may imply that a male detentus 








However, what is not justified – and what the Appeals Chamber should have 
disapproved of more clearly – is that the seriousness of the alleged crimes may be 
used as an excuse to commit irregularities in the process of bringing suspects of 
such crimes to justice;654 it must be stressed that the view that one may take the 
seriousness of the crimes into account in deciding whether or not jurisdiction must 
be refused in a certain situation cannot in any way be seen as a green light for using 
male captus techniques in the context of international crimes.655 On the contrary: as 
has already been argued, if the Tribunal discovers that its employees have 
orchestrated an abduction, it should resolutely refuse jurisdiction. That would be the 
only avenue to avoid further damage to the integrity of the proceedings. However, if 
less serious wrongs have been committed in the pre-trial phase of their case, judges 
should opt for less far-reaching remedies which do not jeopardise the trial.  
Of particular interest in this discussion is the remedy of release in the case of an 
unlawful arrest/detention. As previously explained, there is no human right stating 
that in the case of a violation, jurisdiction must be refused. Because of that, a judge 
should take every single aspect of the case into account (including the seriousness of 
the crimes with which the suspect is charged) in deciding whether or not jurisdiction 
must be refused. However, that discretion is lacking in the context of the remedy of 
release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention. This remedy is applicable to 
anyone. Any arrested/detained person, whether that any person is charged with fraud 
or with genocide, must, strictly speaking, be released if the judge finds his (arrest 
and) detention unlawful. However, even though that is true, it was also argued in 
Chapter III and in the context of the Dokmanović case that this remedy is not 
without its problems. Release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention does not 
preclude re-arrest and being brought to trial. Although a person released by the 
ICTY/ICTR (in the Netherlands/Tanzania) cannot be re-arrested for 15 days, one 
can imagine that the ICTY/ICTR will then demand from all UN Member States 
(which must cooperate with these Tribunals) to immediately transfer the suspect 
back to the ICTY/ICTR the moment he sets foot on their soil. Thus, one can assume 
that it is highly likely that after those two weeks, the person is immediately re-
arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in question. In such a case, 
                                                                                                                                              
possible, but that does not mean that this remedy is entirely excluded from this context. On the contrary, 
if ICTY/ICTR authorities are involved in a kidnapping, the ICTY/ICTR should refuse 
jurisdiction/dismiss the case with prejudice if it still wants to be taken seriously as a court of law. 
654 See also Sloan 2006, p. 334: “The Appeal Chamber’s focus on the serious nature of the crimes and 
the indignation of the international community, and its willingness to balance it against violations of 
human rights or sovereignty (and, in the case of sovereignty, to find a good basis for not setting aside 
jurisdiction in the ‘universally condemned’ nature of the alleged offences) leaves the impression that the 
graver the alleged crime, the less troubled an international judicial body should be by the violation.” 
655 In that respect, this study cannot disagree more with views such as the one expressed by Mohit 
(2006, p. 144), who writes on the inter-State context: “It would be absurd to hold that terrorists and 
serious human rights violators should not be brought to trial by irregular means, for example, by 
abduction. The interests of society require that such offenders be brought to trial.” (Mohit (ibid.) stresses 
that “[t]hese methods should (…) be utilized by states only once they have exhausted all possible routes 
to secure the fugitive’s return by normal processes”, but even then, prosecuting authorities should not 








the prosecuting authorities could assert that this ‘remedy’ (the ‘release’) has repaired 
the initial iniuria of the irregularity and that the trial can continue as normal. 
However, in that case, the suspect would only be granted a pro forma remedy, 
comparable with the one at the national level (only extended over a longer period), 
which does not comport with the idea that a remedy must be real and effective. In 
addition, the pro forma release does not take account of the exact seriousness of the 
irregularity. In other words: it is not only a pro forma remedy but also an over-
simplified remedy.  
Thus, it was and is argued that it would be better for a judge, when he determines 
that a person’s arrest/detention was unlawful, to avoid this problematic remedy of 
release and instead simply grant the most appropriate remedy which takes into 
account all the specifics of the case, including the seriousness of the suspect’s 
alleged crimes and the importance of having the case continued. If one follows that 
route, which much resembles the abuse of process doctrine (where the seriousness 
of the alleged crimes can be taken into account without any problems since the 
remedy ‘refusal of jurisdiction’ is discretionary), then one can still satisfy the 
common sense idea behind the immediate re-arrest mentioned above, namely that 
cases involving suspects of serious crimes must be continued if possible – although 
it should neither be forgotten that a truly serious male captus situation can lead to 
one remedy only, namely the ending of the case before that particular court, that is, a 
‘real’ release (without the possibility of re-arrest) – but one will also avoid the 
strange pro forma release and immediate re-arrest and replace it with real remedies, 
such as a reduction of the sentence and/or compensation.  
The judge can then take the exact seriousness of the irregularity into account in 
determining how much time to reduce from the sentence or how much compensation 
to accord the suspect.  
For example, one could hereby look at the involvement of the Tribunal in the 
male captus situation or the mistreatment suffered by the suspect during the 
operation. Such a solution would arguably be fairer to the suspect and better capable 
of putting flexibility into the system. 
Furthermore, this solution also avoids the (justified) criticism one may expect 
from various actors if a suspect of serious crimes is released for an irregularity 
which is not so serious as to lead to the ending of the case (in such serious cases, the 
public must understand that the court has no option but to refuse jurisdiction and to 
release (but now in a ‘real’ way) the suspect), but which nevertheless entails that the 
detention must be qualified as unlawful and that, strictly speaking, the suspect must 
be released.  
In fact, whereas at the national level, one can expect that a suspect of serious 
crimes will be immediately re-arrested, the Tribunal level may engender more 
problems because of the two-week immunity period.  
As already stated, all UN Member States (which must cooperate with the 
Tribunals) will probably do everything in their power to ensure that a suspect of 
serious international crimes will be immediately re-arrested and brought to the 








may flee to a non-UN Member State (which, in principle, does not have an 
obligation to cooperate with the Tribunals) or to a State which, even though it has an 
obligation to cooperate with them, will not do so.  
This could mean that a suspect of international crimes, fleeing to such a State, 
could effectively evade prosecution because of an irregularity which will, strictly 
speaking, demand the release of the suspect, but which is not considered to be so 
serious that jurisdiction must be refused.  
This is to be avoided. This constitutes another reason to continue to exercise 
jurisdiction in these kinds of (less serious) male captus cases and to grant other 
remedies which do not jeopardise the trial itself.  
Critics of this reasoning may assert that taking into account the seriousness of the 
alleged crimes of the suspect (and hence the importance of prosecution) within the 
examination of what the consequences must be of certain irregularities is not in 
conformity with the presumption of innocence, as the quality of the suspect (who is, 
of course, innocent until proven guilty) plays a role in the judge’s balancing 
exercise.656 
And indeed, it cannot be denied that there is some tension here. For example, 
under the abuse of process doctrine, a suspect of less serious crimes may be better 
off than a suspect of serious crimes. Imagine the situation in which a suspect of 
minor domestic crimes becomes the victim of a kidnapping by private individuals in 
which the authorities of the now prosecuting forum were not involved and during 
which he was not mistreated before being brought to the national judge. In such a 
situation, it would not be surprising if the national judge would refuse to exercise 
jurisdiction and to release the suspect because of, on the one hand, the rather serious 
male captus and, on the other, the low importance of having this person prosecuted. 
However, if the person is charged with genocide, one can imagine that the judge 
(whether it be a judge at the national or at the Tribunal level) would continue the 
case and grant the person other remedies instead. Although the seriousness of the 
male captus is the same in both cases, the importance of having this person 
prosecuted will probably tip the balance, ensuring that the trial will continue and 
that the suspect will receive other less far-reaching remedies for the wrongs he 
suffered.   
                                                          
656 See, for example, Oehmichen 2007, pp. 230-231 (criticising the German case from 1986 in which the 
German judges did not refuse jurisdiction in the aftermath of an abduction executed by the German 
police). See also n. 523 of Chapter V. It must, however, also be emphasised that this study agrees with 
Oehmichen with respect to that particular case as discretion to balance all the different elements and 
taking into account the seriousness of the suspect’s alleged crimes must have some boundaries: some 
male captus situations, such as the one of the German case, are arguably so serious that jurisdiction 
should be refused. The same would go for the Tribunals: if the OTP is involved in an abduction, the 
judges should refuse jurisdiction, even if that suspect was charged with very serious crimes. Note finally 
that even though it was explained in the inter-State context that Oehmichen has serious reservations as 
concerns the element ‘seriousness of the alleged crimes’ in general (see n. 523 of Chapter V), she 
nevertheless admits that the abuse of process doctrine, in the context of the international criminal 
tribunals, has been limited to exceptional human rights violations, “was in Anbetracht der Delikte, die 
bei den Internationalen Strafgerichten in Frage stehen, in gewisser Weise nachvollziehbar erscheint.” 








However, as explained earlier, because of the discretionary nature of the abuse of 
process doctrine, the judge is able to take every single aspect of the case into 
account in determining whether it would contravene the court’s integrity/sense of 
justice to continue the case, notwithstanding the irregularities. And one of these 
aspects is that the person standing before him is charged with very serious crimes of 
which the international community demands that they be prosecuted. There is no 
reason as to why this important element should not be taken into account here. In 
fact, the judge may be of the opinion that it would contravene the court’s sense of 
justice and other goals of its institution, such as, in the case of the ICTY, 
contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace,657 if he were not to take 
the importance of prosecution into account.658  
However, this stance may be more complicated with respect to a violation of the 
human right to liberty and security as the remedy of release in the case of an 
unlawful arrest/detention is not discretionary; it applies to any suspect unlawfully 
                                                          
657 See UNSC Res. 827 of 25 May 1993: “The Security Council, (…) Convinced that in the particular 
circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the establishment as an ad hoc measure by the Council of an 
international tribunal and the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law (…) would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace [emphasis in 
original, ChP]”. This is indeed true, but it should neither be forgotten (see also n. 638 and accompanying 
text) that it would in fact contravene the Tribunal’s mission if it were to resort itself to illegal methods in 
obtaining custody over persons. 
658 Cf. also Ryngaert 2008, p. 731, who notes with respect to the still-to-discuss (see Subsection 5.1) 
Duch case: “[S]erious concerns may be raised over the use of the gravity of the crime as a free-standing 
criterion (...) in terms of the presumption of innocence. While Duch may be accused of grave and 
heinous crimes, he should remain innocent until a trial judge has determined his guilt – even if he is 
ready to confess and reveal the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge. It would therefore appear unfair 
to rely on a presumption of his having committed grave crimes, a presumption that may tip the balance 
in favour of not staying the proceedings. Irrespective of the gravity of his crime(s), should not every 
suspect be entitled to the same due-process protection?” However, in the end, Ryngaert concurs with the 
vision of this study, see ibid., p. 732 (writing on the abuse of process doctrine): “Because the tribunal’s 
decision is a discretionary one, it may rely on any criteria it deems fit in order to assess whether 
application of the abuse of process doctrine to the case would be warranted. There is no reason why 
gravity of the crime could not be one of them.” Note that Ryngaert, after the quotation at the beginning 
of this footnote, writes: “Sluiter, however, has submitted, precisely in the context of the ECCC (but well 
before the Duch order), that it is not unfair, pointing out that ‘[w]hen prosecuting the most serious 
crimes, mandatory release [in case of blatant violations of important protections, including unlawful 
arrest and/or detention] may appear disproportionate to the human rights violations of which the suspect 
is accused.’ [original footnote omitted, ChP]” However, it must be clarified that Sluiter is not writing 
here about the abuse of process doctrine in which one has a discretion to decide the most appropriate 
remedy, but about a provision which dictates a certain remedy (cf. Art. 9, para. 4 of the ICCPR). In 
addition, it can be argued that Sluiter takes a more subtle standpoint here, see Sluiter 2006 B, pp. 317-
318: “When prosecuting the most serious crimes, mandatory release may appear disproportionate to the 
human rights violations of which the suspect is accused. At the same time, expectations of the CEC 
[Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, ChP]’s role as a model of criminal justice should not be 
underestimated, and may require faithful application of these mandatory release provisions [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” See also ibid., p. 317. n. 14: “One could argue that mandatory release in 
respect of an individual indicted for genocide is not always consistent with international standards, 
bearing in mind the duty to bring such persons to justice. However, this argument is difficult to 









detained. For example, in his commentary on the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision 
in Nikolić, Sloan notes: 
 
The Appeal Chamber’s focus on the serious nature of the crimes and the indignation 
of the international community, and its willingness to balance it against violations of 
human rights or sovereignty (and, in the case of sovereignty, to find a good basis for 
not setting aside jurisdiction in the ‘universally condemned’ nature of the alleged 
offences) leaves the impression that the graver the alleged crime, the less troubled an 
international judicial body should be by the violation. On the question of human 
rights, at least, such an approach must surely be misguided: it does not appear to 
comport with the presumption of innocence. Indeed, if our human rights are to be 
meaningful, the opposite approach would appear fitting. That is to say, when an 
accused is charged with a very serious crime – one of the type that is likely to 
engender severe public outrage, or in the words of the Appeals Chamber one that 
triggers the ‘legitimate expectation’ of ‘the international community’ – a judicial 
body must be most scrupulous in ensuring that the accused’s human rights are 
observed. For a court to provide no remedy for a human rights violation where the 
accused is charged with a traffic offence and subject to a fine would be regrettable; to 
provide no remedy where the accused is charged with mass murder or war crimes and 
subject to life imprisonment would be unconscionable [emphasis in original, ChP].659 
 
                                                          
659 Sloan 2006, p. 334. Cf. also the report Extradition. European standards. Explanatory notes on the 
Council of Europe convention and protocols and the minimum standards protecting persons subject to 
transnational criminal proceedings, Council of Europe, December 2006, p. 140: “Issues of unlawful 
arrest and transfer to an international tribunal have been raised in the cases of Todorovic, Nikolic and 
Krajisnik [see for this last case the end of this footnote, ChP] before the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The tribunal found itself with a fundamental dilemma; namely, 
whether to encourage the apprehension of suspects and the bringing to justice of individuals who had 
engaged in serious crimes, on the one hand; or the safeguard of international legality and fundamental 
human rights, on the other. It seems that administration of justice considerations have prevailed in the 
reasoning of the ICTY, which, as mentioned above, poses certain questions concerning the presumption 
of innocence; an obligation found in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” As concerns the Krajišnik case: although this case has been included in this 
chapter for other purposes (see ns. 97, 99 and 103), no actual male captus claims were found in its 
proceedings, hence making it unnecessary to include this case in the overview of male captus cases. 
That the report of the Council of Europe nevertheless mentions this case in the context of cases like 
Todorović and Nikolić may, however, be explained by the fact that the report, in the paragraph where 
this remark is made, refers to Lamb 2001, pp. 39-40. Although one will not find any reference on these 
pages to the Krajišnik case, on p. 34, n. 32 of Lamb’s article, one can read: “The modalities in which the 
accuseds Dragan Nikolić and Momčilo Krajišnik were apprehended raise similar issues to Todorović 
and the lawfulness of these arrests may thus also in future be challenged; see infra.” Although Lamb 
does not re-examine the case “infra”, these words clarify that there was something special about the 
arrest of Krajišnik. And indeed, it was quite robust, see M. Simons, ‘Nato Troops Seize a Top Serb 
Facing War Crime Charge’, The New York Times, 4 April 2000 (available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/04/world/nato-troops-seize-a-top-serb-facing-war-crime-
charge.html?pagewanted=1): “NATO and tribunal officials said Mr. Krajisnik was at his elderly parents’ 
home in Pale when French troops blew open the door with explosives shortly after 3 a.m. today. They 
briefly detained his parents, tied the hands of his two sons and hustled Mr. Krajisnik, still in his pajamas, 
out the door.” Hence, because of this robust arrest, Lamb was justified to write in 2001 that Krajišnik 








Many of these words are to be welcomed; as stated earlier, it can indeed not be the 
case that “the graver the alleged crime, the less troubled an international judicial 
body should be by the violation”. Furthermore, it is also not hard to agree with the 
idea that “a judicial body must be most scrupulous in ensuring that the accused’s 
human rights are observed” and that remedies are provided when violations occur.660  
However, it is submitted that neither should the – indeed very important – 
presumption of innocence be used in such a way as to lead to absurd results. One 
must not forget that the Tribunals are prosecuting not just any suspects, but suspects 
charged with the most serious crimes known to the international community as a 
whole. For example, a judge at the ICTY cannot issue an arrest warrant unless he 
has confirmed the indictment of the Prosecution, an indictment which can only be 
prepared if the Prosecutor is of the opinion that a prima facie case exists. Although 
this fact does not, of course, mean that the person is guilty of the international crime 
– that would constitute a clear violation of the presumption of innocence – there is 
no reason why one should not take into account the fact that one is not dealing with 
a normal suspect here, but with a suspect of whom the independent Prosecutor and 
an impartial judge are of the opinion that a prima facie case exists against him and 
hence that there are reasons to assume that the person may be involved in extremely 
serious crimes of which the international community demands that they be 
prosecuted. This is not nothing. This is an important element which should be taken 
into account, not only in the context of the abuse of process doctrine, but also in the 
context of determining what to do with the consequences of an unlawful 
arrest/detention. It is submitted that negating this important element and strictly 
applying the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention, a remedy 
which was already criticised for the fact that it can be used in a mere pro forma way 
and for the fact that it totally disregards the specifics of the exact male captus, can 
possibly lead to absurd results which no longer have anything to do with the concept 
of justice. For example, if a suspect of the ICTY/ICTR is not promptly informed of 
the reasons for his arrest, this would, strictly speaking, mean that his detention is 
unlawful and that he is to be released. However, if the suspect is released, the 
Netherlands/Tanzania would not be able to re-arrest the suspect for 15 days. In that 
time, he could flee to a non-UN Member State (which, in principle, does not have an 
obligation to cooperate with the Tribunals) or to a State which, even though it has an 
obligation to cooperate with them, will not do so. That could mean that a suspect of 
international crimes, fleeing to such a State, could effectively evade prosecution 
because of an irregularity which is not considered so serious that jurisdiction must 
be refused but which, strictly speaking, would demand the release of the suspect. 
This is to be avoided. As explained, although the law should obviously be obeyed, 
one must also be careful not to apply the law in such a strict way that it leads to 
great injustice: summum ius, summa iniuria. 
                                                          
660 See also Van Sliedregt 2001 B, p. 82, noting that one can argue that “the more serious the allegation, 
and therefore the potential sanction, the more assiduous any court or Tribunal should be with regard to 
taking into account any material illegality, and the more reluctant it should be to adopt any ‘tainted’ 








A final word on the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision in Nikolić is that the 
Appeals Chamber, like the Trial Chamber, does not explicitly support the definitions 
of male captus bene/male detentus as used in the Trial Chamber’s decision.  
That should be welcomed as these versions are the height of simplicity, leaving 
no room for differentiation at all.661 However, neither is that much-needed 
differentiation provided by the Appeals Chamber, because it limits the issue of 
remedies to an ‘all-or-nothing’ formula: should jurisdiction be set aside or not? Even 
if termination of the proceedings is not the appropriate remedy here (which might 
very well be the case), the Appeals Chamber should have granted other, less drastic 
remedies to repair the abduction suffered by Nikolić.662  
As argued before: now that the Chambers have admitted that they will take the 
ultimate responsibility (namely by refusing jurisdiction) in very serious cases, it is 
submitted that they should also have the power to remedy less serious violations 
committed in the pre-trial phase of their case, irrespective of the entity responsible. 
Furthermore, the unsatisfactory ‘all-or-nothing’ formula leads to an equally 
unsatisfactory ‘not-unless’ answer, which may be interpreted as authorising parties 
involved in the pre-trial arrest and detention phase to use (potentially) dubious 
methods in bringing a suspect of serious crimes to justice rather than deterring them 
from using such methods.663 As a result, even though it does not explicitly support 
male captus bene detentus, the Appeals Chamber’s decision may be viewed as 
backing the idea behind that principle, as only a serious mistreatment of the accused 
– which arguably will almost never occur664 – will lead to male detentus.665 The 
Appeals Chamber could have lessened this (unpopular) male captus bene detentus 
image by clearly stating that jurisdiction should also be refused if the prosecuting 
forum, the Tribunal, is involved in serious, intentional (procedural) irregularities in 
the process of bringing a suspect to trial, even if that suspect is not seriously 
mistreated.666  
                                                          
661 After all, a court should not continue to exercise jurisdiction irrespective of what has happened 
during the process of bringing a suspect to court (“a court may exercise jurisdiction over an accused 
person regardless of how that person has come into the jurisdiction of that court [emphasis added, 
ChP]”), nor should it refuse jurisdiction any time an irregularity occurs, because that could include a 
simple procedural, non-intentional fault by a third party as well (“an irregularity has occurred in the 
arrest of the Accused and therefore should bar any further exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal”). 
662 See also Sluiter (2003 B, pp. 945 and 947) when addressing the Trial Chamber’s decision in Nikolić. 
663 See also Sloan 2006, p. 344: “[T]he decision of the Appeals Chamber will allow future international 
criminal decision-making bodies to turn a blind eye to violations of human rights and state sovereignty 
in pursuit of the ‘greater good’. More worryingly, the absence of guidance and a tolerance of illegality 
means that there is nothing to give pause to SFOR, its successor or other such forces before they engage 
in illegal behaviour – or commission criminals or bounty hunters to do so on their behalf – so long as it 
doesn’t exceed what appears to be a very wide margin of appreciation [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
664 See Sloan 2005, p. 492: “The appeals chamber’s rejection of Nikolić’s claims sends a clear message 
to other defendants before the ICTY that jurisdiction will not be set aside in the face of an illegal capture 
in any but the most egregious situations.” See also the words from Sloan in the previous footnote. 
665 See also Sloan 2006, p. 334: “The Appeals Chamber (...) favoured the male captus, bene detentus 
approach over the male captus, male detentus approach.” See also ibid., p. 342. 
666 See again the quotation from the Trial Chamber – which arguably seems more in favour of the idea 








3.1.5 Tolimir  
 
The penultimate case which will be discussed in the ICTY context is that of Zdravko 
Tolimir.  
Tolimir, who was charged with genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, crimes 
against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war, was arrested on 31 
May 2007 and transferred to The Hague on 1 June 2007.  
In The Hague, Tolimir argued that he had been kidnapped by “illegal groups and 
individuals”667 in Belgrade (Serbia) and taken to Bijeljina (Republika Srpska/Bosnia 
and Herzegovina)668 where he met a patrol from the Ministry of the Interior of the 
Republika Srpska.669  
From there, he was allegedly brought to Bratunac, another location in the 
Republika Srpska/Bosnia and Herzegovina which can also be found in Tolimir’s 
indictment.  
Tolimir claimed that he  
 
was kept there for half a day and recorded secretly or not secretly for reasons 
unknown to me and the entire public was deceived into believing that I was arrested 
in Bratunac, which seemed to have the effect of incriminating me in the sense that the 
criminal was arrested at the scene of the crime.670  
 
After these events, he was allegedly taken back to Bijeljina, brought to Banja Luka 
(also located in the Republika Srpska/Bosnia and Herzegovina), handed over to 
                                                                                                                                              
text: “The finding in the Ebrahim case that the State must come to court with clean hands applies 
equally to the Prosecution coming to a Trial Chamber of this Tribunal.”  
667 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Preliminary Motions on the Indictment 
in Accordance with Rule 72 of the Rules’ (Public Filing), Case No. IT-05-88/2-I, 30 October 2007 
(Translation: 7 November 2007), p. 4 (under 1.15). 
668 See ibid., p. 3: “1.5 I was abducted at 0315 hours on 31 May from an apartment at Vajara Živojina 
Lukića Street number 7, Bežanijska Kosa in Belgrade, Serbia, when the armoured door was blown in by 
explosives without previous warning. The abduction was carried out by a well-equipped and organised 
group of 20 men. They introduced themselves both to me and to my neighbours as policemen. Denying 
me a lawyer, and putting a sack over my head, they put me in a van which, under heavy security, 
accompanied by escort vehicles, took me to Belgrade, to a prison facility where cells were secured by 
doors with bars. 1.6 Around 0800 hours on 31 May I was taken from the detention facility to a BMW 
passenger car. Under escort and accompanied by a vehicle of the same colour and make, against my 
will, I was taken to the Pavlovića Ćuprija border crossing, near Bijeljina, on the border between Serbia 
and Republika Srpska. 1.7 We went through border crossings between the Republic of Serbia and 
Republika Srpska without waiting or any checks, and we were given priority passage, which points to 
the organisation, official relations, and links between the persons who abducted me and the state 
customs organs of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is responsible for the borders of 
Republika Srpska.” 
669 See ibid., p. 3 (under 1.8). 
670 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Public Transcript of Hearing 03 July 








NATO officers and OTP representatives, helicoptered to the NATO base in Sarajevo 
and from there flown to The Hague.671 
In his first submission, Tolimir argued that his abduction violated the 
Constitution and national laws of Serbia and a number of rights accorded to him by 
the ICTY Statute and RPE672 and that “[t]he International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia has no jurisdiction to try abducted persons, set precedents, or 
legalise such legal practice in international law and relations”.673  
The Prosecution responded that it had “no knowledge of, and had no 
involvement in, the alleged abduction”674 and that, even if Tolimir had indeed been 
abducted – in the meantime, namely on 17 September 2007, the OTP had 
“submitted a formal request for information from the Serbian government 
concerning the Accused’s allegations [original footnote omitted, ChP]”675 – this did 
not deprive the ICTY of jurisdiction.676 The OTP referred to the decisions of the 
Trial and Appeals Chamber in the Nikolić case and argued, with respect to the 
concept of State sovereignty, that “[e]ven if a violation of Serbia’s sovereignty had 
occurred, this merely would have resulted in the Accused being returned to Serbia, 
whereupon his extradition to The Hague would be required”.677 With respect to the 
concept of human rights, the OTP noted that Tolimir had “not raised any human 
rights violations that are of such a serious nature that the Tribunal should decline to 
exercise jurisdiction”.678 On 3 December 2007, the OTP filed a supplement to its 
response, which contained, among other things, a report from the authorities of the 
Republika Srpska on Tolimir’s arrest (no response was received on the part of the 
Serbian Government).679 According to this report, Tolimir was not deprived of his 
liberty in Belgrade but in the Republika Srpska/Bosnia and Herzegovina following a 
coordinated operation in the border region of the Republika Srpska/Bosnia and 
                                                          
671 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Preliminary Motions on the 
Indictment in Accordance with Rule 72 of the Rules’ (Public Filing), Case No. IT-05-88/2-I, 30 October 
2007 (Translation: 7 November 2007), p. 4 (under 1.12 and 1.13). 
672 Ibid., pp. 4-5 (under 1.16). 
673 Ibid., p. 2 (under 1.1). 
674 ICTY, Pre-Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Prosecution Response to the 
Accused’s Preliminary Motion on the Indictment’ (Public with Confidential Appendices), Case No. IT-
05-88/2-PT, 21 November 2007, para. 6 (p. 2). According to the Prosecution, it “first became involved 
in the arrest of the Accused on 31 May 2007, when the Prosecutor was contacted by the Prime Minister 
of Republika Srpska and informed that the Accused was in the custody of the Republika Srpska police. 
On the evening of 31 May 2007, the Accused was formally arrested in Banja Luka by Mr. Don King, 
head investigator for the Office of the Prosecutor’s Sarajevo office, and subsequently transferred to The 
Hague [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid., para. 5 (p. 2).) 
675 Ibid., para. 9 (p. 3). 
676 See ibid. 
677 Ibid., para. 14 (p. 4). See also ibid.: “To decline jurisdiction on this ground would be senseless.” 
678 Ibid., para. 15 (p. 5). 
679 See ICTY, Pre-Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Supplement to Prosecution 
Response to the Accused’s Preliminary Motion on the Indictment’ (Confidential), Case No. IT-05-88/2-








Herzegovina and Serbia, in which authorities from these two entities were 
involved.680  
On 14 December 2007, Trial Chamber II of the ICTY issued its decision. In this 
decision, it followed the Prosecution in applying the Nikolić jurisprudence to the 
case at hand. Approving the (not uncriticised, see supra) Appeals Chamber’s 
distillation of the two ‘principles’ which “seem to have support in State practice as 
evidenced by the practice of their courts”, the Trial Chamber rejected a possible 
claim related to the concept of State sovereignty:  
 
In the present case, the Accused is charged with genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. Assuming, without deciding, that a violation of state sovereignty 
occurred in the instant case, the Trial Chamber finds that given the serious crimes 
involved such a violation is not sufficient to justify the setting aside of jurisdiction by 
this Tribunal. Moreover, the Trial Chamber notes that Serbia did not lodge a 
complaint. Therefore, any alleged violation of state sovereignty is not a basis to 
decline jurisdiction in this instance.681 
 
                                                          
680 See ibid., Appendix, D729-D727: “In the early hours of 31st May 2007, members of the Security and 
Information agency of the Republic of Serbia phoned authorized employees of the Criminal Police 
Administration from the Team for locating and apprehending [T]he Hague indictees and informed them 
that they had the intelligence information according to which, in the course of that same day, some of 
[T]he Hague indictees, most probably Ratko Mladić or someone close to him, will try to cross over from 
the Republic of Serbia to Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is to the territory of the Republic of Srpska, 
between Zvornik and Ljubovija, most probably on the territory bordering with Ljubovija, to the 
municipality of Bratunac. According to this information, deputy head of the Criminal Police 
Administration of the RS Ministry of Interior, with six members of this Administration of the Team for 
locating and apprehending of [T]he Hague indi[c]tees, headed to the area of the Bijeljina Public Security 
Centre in order to prepare for blocking and controlling of the mentioned terrain, that is coordinating of 
simultaneous action of the blockade, both from the territory of the Serbian Republic and the territory of 
the Republic of Srpska. (...) The action implicated a discrete control of all vehicles and persons on the 
blocked road directions, and it fully started around 14.00 hours on the same day with coordination of 
activities of the Republic of Serbia Ministry of Interior members, who used helicopters in the action of 
blocking in their [border] area. Members of the Team of the Criminal Police Administration, with three 
unmarked official vehicles, took part in mobile observation of road communication along the Drina 
river, especially the road communication which from the [border] crossing towards Ljubovija leads 
along the Drina river towards Sopotnik, and then towards Drinjača and Zvornik. At about 14.15, while 
taking a detour from the road communication in the direction of Sopotnik, on the part of the cobbled 
road the mobile team of the Criminal Police Administration intercepted movement of one person, who 
was moving on foot towards the settlement of Sopotnik, on the left side of the road. This person was 
stopped and an attempt to identify him was made. He said he had no id whatsoever and he introduced 
himself as General Zdravko Tolimir, officer of the Republic of Srpska army, to whom he did resemble 
in some of his features, although had lost a lot of weight. Following this, since the person was in poor 
health and had difficulties moving, he was asked where he was heading, what direction he came from 
and if anyone else was with him, that is, if anyone else drove him, but he did not wish to answer the 
questions posed. (...) The person was immediately put into the official vehicle, and then transported to 
Banja Luka with escort of the entire team of the Crime Police.” 
681 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Decision on Preliminary Motions on the 









With respect to the concept of human rights,682 the Trial Chamber was, “[f]or the 
purpose of the present analysis only, (...) prepared to accept the factual allegations 
of the Accused related to the initial phase of his arrest”,683 even though “the only 
information concerning the very initial phase of the Accused’s arrest is the 
description of the events given by the Accused himself”.684 However, this was not of 
any help to Tolimir: 
 
What is before the Trial Chamber – with reference to each phase of the arrest 
individually and cumulatively – does not amount to a human rights violation of such a 
serious nature so as to require that the exercise of jurisdiction be declined. In fact, the 
only irregular aspect of the arrest is the alleged circumstances surrounding the 
Accused’s removal from his apartment in Belgrade. Assuming those allegations to be 
true, even that scenario however is not so egregious as to merit declining jurisdiction 
over this Accused in relation to the grave crimes charged against him.685  
 
In this context, the Trial Chamber noted a not unimportant point, namely the fact 
that no evidence was provided that NATO/the OTP were involved in the initial 
phase of Tolimir’s arrest.686 In fact, it found that “the Prosecution has provided 
evidence to the contrary”.687  
Although at the time the Trial Chamber issued its decision, the Prosecution had 
not yet received a response from the Serbian Government regarding the 
circumstances of Tolimir’s arrest,688 the Serbian Government finally reacted on 9 
October 2008, more than a year (!) after the Prosecution had submitted a formal 
request for information. This reaction, which was received on 13 October, can be 
found in a submission from the Prosecution dated 15 October and explains that the 
Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs has informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
“that it was not in possession of either records or any documents in relation to the 
arrest of Zdravko TOLIMIR, as well as that the officials of that Ministry did not 
participate in the arrest of Zdravko TOLIMIR”.689 However, the reaction does 
                                                          
682 See ibid., para. 23: “The Accused submits that the manner in which his abduction, transfer to the RS 
and ultimately transfer to the Tribunal were conducted resulted in a violation of his rights. According to 
the Accused, the NATO forces and the representatives from the Prosecution involved in the abduction 
acted in collusion with his captors and therefore the unlawful conduct of his capture, detention and 
transfer to The Hague are imputable also to them [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
683 Ibid., para. 25. 
684 Ibid., para. 24. It must be noted that at the time the Trial Chamber issued its decision, there was still 
no response from Serbia regarding the OTP’s request to provide information on Tolimir’s arrest. See 
ibid. 
685 Ibid., para. 25. 
686 See ibid., para. 26. 
687 Ibid. The Trial Chamber also noted that “[o]nce the Accused came into contact with NATO and the 
Prosecution his arrest was carried out in a lawful manner and without any violations of his rights.” 
(Ibid.) 
688 See also n. 675 and accompanying text.  
689 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Submission Pursuant to the Direction 
of the Trial Chamber Concerning the Accused’s Arrest, With Appendix’ (Public), Case No. IT-05-88/2-








confirm the already-mentioned690 joint operation in the border region on 31 May 
2007.691  
On 22 October 2008, Tolimir challenged the authenticity and truthfulness of the 
document in which one can read the Serbian reaction and argued, among other 
things, that the reaction contradicts the statement of Carla Del Ponte in her memoirs 
that “a Serbian special unit took Tolimir into custody after he had refused to 
surrender voluntarily”.692 Two days later, Tolimir wrote another submission in 
which he noted that on 22 October 2008, “the Minister of Interior [of the Republic 
of Serbia, ChP] accused the former Government of the Republic of Serbia of having 
arrested me in Serbia and of handing me over to Hague Tribunal”.693  
The Prosecution was, however, not impressed by these new assertions as Trial 
Chamber II, in its 14 December 2007 decision, had already concluded “that even if 
the Accused’s allegations concerning the circumstances of his arrest were true, they 
do not justify declining the exercise of jurisdiction [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]”.694 
Tolimir, in his reaction of 4 December 2008, emphasised, however, that he had 
not requested a reconsideration of the 14 December 2007 ruling in his submissions 
because he was simply unable to make such a request.695 The reason for his inability 
to do so was that he was “not familiar with the content of this ruling, because it has 
not been translated to a language the Accused understands or has been entered in the 
Tribunal’s judicial data base”.696 The aim of Tolimir’s present submissions was 
 
that it be established that Zdravko Tolimir was arrested in the Republic of Serbia (and 
not in Republika Srpska) and that he was denied the right to have the competent court 
                                                          
690 See n. 680. 
691 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Submission Pursuant to the 
Direction of the Trial Chamber Concerning the Accused’s Arrest, With Appendix’ (Public), Case No. 
IT-05-88/2-PT, 15 October 2008 (filed: 16 October 2008, D 2079 – D 2070), Appendix A, D 2075 – D 
2073. 
692 ICTY, [Trial] Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Submission by the Accused 
Concerning the Prosecution’s Submission of 15 October 2008’ (Public), Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, 22 
October 2008 (translation filed: 29 October 2008), D 2163, under 9. See also ibid., under 10: “In her 
book, Carla del Ponte also states that “the Bosnian Serb authorities later told me they would never again 
participate in such a charade just so Koštunica could say that none of the Tribunal’s accused had been 
arrested on Serbian soil” [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
693 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Supplementary Submission by the 
Accused Concerning the Prosecution’s Submission of 15 October 2008’ (Public, Urgent), Case No. IT-
05-88/2-PT, 24 October 2008 (translation filed: 29 October 2008), D 2173, under 2. 
694 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Response to Submission, 
Supplementary Submission and Attachment by the Accused Concerning the Prosecution’s Submission 
of 15 October 2008’ (Public), Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, 6 November 2008, para. 1. 
695 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Reply to the Prosecution’s 
Response to Submission, Supplementa[r]y Submission and Attachment by the Accused Concerning the 
Prosecution’s Submission of 15 October 2008’ (Public), Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, 4 December 2008 
(translation filed: 16 December 2008), D 2593, under 2. 
696 Ibid. (It is arguably rather strange that a suspect is not familiar with a decision concerning his case 








decide about handing him over to the Tribunal in accordance with the Law on 
Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal.697 
 
According to Tolimir, writing about himself, “the truth about his arrest has been 
covered up (...) as this can have an impact on the Tribunal’s final judgement and 
Zdravko Tolimir’s position after and before the final judgement”.698  
On 18 December 2008, Trial Chamber II, having examined all these 
submissions, decided:   
 
The Accused requests that the Trial Chamber make inquiries and take other measures 
in order to investigate and establish the circumstances of his arrest. Specifically the 
Accused asks the Trial Chamber to rule that he was arrested in Serbia and denied his 
right to call on “a competent court” with regard to his arrest. He requests this without 
seeking a specific legal remedy as a result and on the basis of the Tribunal’s “inherent 
right” to do so. This Tribunal does not entertain arguments – factual or legal – in the 
abstract. While the Accused may have remedies to pursue in national courts in 
relation to an alleged illegal arrest, it is not for this Trial Chamber to examine the 
circumstances of the Accused’s arrest for the purpose of providing some form of 
declaration. The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the Accused are relevant to 
the Trial Chamber to the extent that they may affect the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
over him. For this reason the Trial Chamber will consider the arguments of the 
Accused related to his arrest only in the context of the impact on the jurisdiction of 
the Trial Chamber to adjudicate on this case.699   
     
Before going to examine the Trial Chamber’s observations regarding the issue of 
jurisdiction, some attention must be paid to the Trial Chamber’s remarks that “it is 
not for this Trial Chamber to examine the circumstances of the Accused’s arrest for 
the purpose of providing some form of declaration” because these circumstances are 
only “relevant (...) to the extent that they may affect the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
over him”.  
This, it can be argued, is again a rather restricted view of the consequences of an 
illegal arrest. The Trial Chamber focuses only on the ultimate remedy, the refusal of 
jurisdiction.700 However, as explained earlier, there is another remedy which can be 
                                                          
697 Ibid., under 3. 
698 Ibid., D 2592, under 9. 
699 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Decision on Submissions of the Accused 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’ (Public), Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, 18 December 2008, para. 12. 
700 As already explained in the context of the Nikolić case, this focus on the ultimate remedy alone, in a 
way, reassures the parties involved in the pre-trial arrest and detention phase that they should not worry 
too much if irregularities are committed in the process of bringing a suspect of very serious crimes to 
justice. Cf. also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Reply to the Prosecution’s 
Response to Submission, Supplementa[r]y Submission and Attachment by the Accused Concerning the 
Prosecution’s Submission of 15 October 2008’ (Public), Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, 4 December 2008 
(translation filed: 16 December 2008), D 2592, under 10: “If the Trial Chamber fails to issue a ruling 
that Tolimir’s arrest was unlawful, the Tribunal will send out an unambiguous signal that the law does 
not apply to those accused before the Tribunal and that every measure, including unlawful arrest, can be 
undertaken against them.” It may not seem strange that the Trial Chamber only looked at the ultimate 








linked to the establishment of an illegal arrest/detention and which is, because of its 
(at least) customary international law status, also applicable to the context of the 
Tribunals, namely the right of every arrested and detained person to have the 
lawfulness of his (arrest and) detention reviewed and to be released if his (arrest 
and) detention is deemed unlawful.  
However, as stated, because this remedy is not without its problems, see 
Subsection 4.4 of Chapter III and the discussions of the cases of Dokmanović and 
Nikolić supra, it would be better if the judge would avoid this remedy and would 
grant, in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention, the most appropriate remedy for 
the wrong suffered, taking every aspect of the case at hand into account, whether 
that remedy consists of a declaration701 that a person’s arrest was unlawful (for 
example, with respect to minor violations (not committed by ICTY/NATO 
personnel)), of a reduction of the sentence or financial compensation,702 or of the 
(final!) release of the suspect and the ending of the case (in truly serious cases). 
However, before one can grant the most appropriate remedies, one must, of course, 
determine, among other things, how serious the violations are. Hence, it is important 
that the judge knows how the suspect in question was arrested/detained and whether 
the process was accompanied by any irregularities, irrespective of the question of 
whether these irregularities should have any effect on the exercise of jurisdiction.  
Returning now to the Trial Chamber’s observations regarding the jurisdiction 
issue, the judges, who were of the opinion that Tolimir, despite his submission to the 
contrary, in fact wanted to have a reconsideration of the 14 December 2007 
ruling,703 felt that the new information revealed after 14 December 2007 had no 
influence on that decision; there was “no basis to doubt the authenticity of the Serbia 
report”704 and even if Carla Del Ponte’s statements and the allegations of the 
Serbian Minister of Interior were correct in that Tolimir was arrested by Serbian 
forces in Serbia, “this would not add anything new to the original allegations 
advanced by the Accused and decided upon by the Trial Chamber in the 14 
December 2007 Decision”.705 
                                                                                                                                              
argued that the ICTY had no jurisdiction to try him. However, the Trial Chamber, in this passage, 
clearly responds to Tolimir’s suggestions that the circumstances of his arrest must be established and 
that this may entail lighter remedies, such as a declaration that his arrest was unlawful. (In addition, it 
can be argued that any judge should consider for himself whether the suspect is not entitled to other less 
far-reaching remedies if the ultimate remedy is not granted.)  
701 In contrast to the Trial Chamber’s position, there is arguably no reason why this cannot be seen as a 
“specific legal remedy” as well. 
702 Cf. the still-to-discuss Barayagwiza case. 
703 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Decision on Submissions of the 
Accused Concerning Legality of Arrest’ (Public), Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, 18 December 2008, para. 
13. 
704 Ibid., para. 16. 
705 Ibid., para. 17. See also ibid.: “The comments of the former Chief Prosecutor alleged by the Accused 
and the remarks of the Minister of the Interior are both submitted in support of the Accused’s original 
allegation that he was arrested in Serbia and illegally transferred to the Republika Srpska and that 
Serbian authorities were involved. Given that the Trial Chamber’s original decision assumed these 
allegations to be true for the purpose of its determination, no new circumstances have been presented so 








Tolimir appealed the 18 December 2008 and not the 14 December 2007 decision 
(about which Tolimir clarified that a “translation (...) into a language which the 
accused understands was not filed until on 31 December 2008”)706 as he found this 
senseless, given the fact that the 2007 decision was, in effect, incorporated into the 
2008 decision.707  
He asserted, as was done supra, that “[t]he Trial Chamber erred in limiting its 
consideration of the circumstances under which the accused was arrested to the 
“context of the impact on the jurisdiction of the Trial Chamber to adjudicate” 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].”708  
It is hard not to agree with Tolimir’s argument that “the very least that is 
expected of the International Tribunal is to establish the circumstances under which 
the accused was arrested and whether or not he was deprived of his freedom in a 
lawful or unlawful manner”.709 Only then can one properly look at what kinds of 
remedies would be appropriate to heal possible violations.710 It was asserted supra 
that a simple declaration that the person was unlawfully arrested could very well 
constitute an appropriate remedy if the nature of the unlawfulness were minor. This 
point was, not surprisingly, also raised by Tolimir.711  
However, Tolimir – possibly inspired by the formula used by the Trial Chamber 
in Nikolić – also hinted that more far-reaching remedies would perhaps be 
appropriate in this case because, in his opinion, the circumstances of his 
apprehension were also rather serious: 
 
It is not merely that the arrest was made in an illegal manner because, inter alia, he 
was subjected to torture and other forms of inhumane conduct (putting a sack over his 
head during the arrest, failure to inform him of the charges against him, unlawful 
transfer to the territory of Republika Srpska without the appropriate or binding 
                                                          
706 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Appeal Against the Decision on 
Submissions of the Accused Concerning Legality of Arrest’ (Public), Case No. IT-05-88/2, 23 January 
200[9] (translation filed: 29 January 2009), A 22, under 1. 
707 See ibid., A 22, under 2. 
708 Ibid., A 21, under 6. 
709 Ibid., A 20, under 10. See also ibid., A 20 – A 19, under 13: “It cannot be claimed that the Tribunal 
has no jurisdiction to establish the circumstances of the arrest of an accused, considering that the 
Tribunal is actively involved in the procedure to arrest the accused and that actual acts, in whose legality 
the Tribunal as a judicial organ must have an interest, are carried out by organs of states which are 
legally obliged to cooperate with the Tribunal. The Tribunal must be the guardian of the principles of 
the rule of law and therefore must also take account of whether the arrest was made legally, either when 
raised by the accused or on its own initiative.” Cf. also Sloan 2006, p. 342 (writing on the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber’s decision in Nikolić): “The first obligation of a decision-making body in these circumstances 
should be to get to the heart of what actually happened”. 
710 Cf. again (see also n. 202) Henquet 2003, p. 155: “If the Tribunal must remedy a violation of the 
rights of an accused during his or her arrest, it must have access to information pertaining to the arrest.” 
711 See ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Appeal Against the Decision on 
Submissions of the Accused Concerning Legality of Arrest’ (Public), Case No. IT-05-88/2, 23 January 
200[9] (translation filed: 29 January 2009), A 19 – A 18, under 15-17. See also ibid., A 15, under 32: 
“Simply making a declaration is not mere abstract deliberation without any consequences; establishing 
certain relevant circumstances and their legal qualification constitute a form of satisfaction and a 








procedure, forcing the accused to “come to an understanding” whereby he renounced 
his citizenship of the Republic of Serbia, etc.), but also that his arrest was presented in 
a way which calls into question the integrity of the Tribunal and makes the accused 
the subject of manipulation and propaganda activities in the context of cooperation 
with the Tribunal and the Republic of Serbia avoiding taking responsibility for 
arresting people accused before the Tribunal [emphasis added and original footnote 
omitted, ChP].712  
  
Tolimir also hinted that one of those more far-reaching remedies could, for example, 
be a reduction of his sentence: “[t]he circumstances under which he was arrested are 
important, for example, for his provisional release, sentencing decision, etc. 
[emphasis added, ChP]”.713  
In fact, in the final words of his appeal, Tolimir confirmed the point he also 
made in his very first submission,714 namely that the ICTY must actually grant him 
the ultimate remedy available: 
 
[T]he accused Zdravko Tolimir hereby requests that the Appeals Chamber amend the 
decision of the Trial Chamber, and establish: A) that, considering the circumstances 
under which Zdravko Tolimir was arrested and those which followed upon his arrest, 
it is not within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to continue proceedings against Zdravko 
Tolimir.715 
 
Only if that remedy were rejected, Tolimir requested that the ICTY establish: 
 
B) That Zdrvako Tolimir was arrested in the territory of the Republic of Serbia. C) 
That he was arrested in an unlawful manner. D) If it considers there is insufficient 
information to render a decision on applications B) and C), that it order the 
Prosecution to use the instruments of cooperation to investigate further with the 
Republic of Serbia the circumstances relating to the manner and location of Zdravko 
Tolimir’s arrest, and to take a statement from the former Chief Prosecutor, Ms Carla 
Del Ponte, to confirm the claims regarding intelligence related to his arrest. E) To 
draw to the attention of the President of the Tribunal and the Chief Prosecutor the 
circumstances under which Zdravko Tolimir was arrested in order that this 
information be included in the reports submitted to the Security Council.716  
 
                                                          
712 Ibid., A 18 – A 17, under 20. 
713 Ibid., A 16, under 30. 
714 See n. 673 and accompanying text. 
715 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Appeal Against the Decision on 
Submissions of the Accused Concerning Legality of Arrest’ (Public), Case No. IT-05-88/2, 23 January 
200[9] (translation filed: 29 January 2009), A 14, under 36. In that respect, the word “establish” in the 
following passage in ibid., A 15, under 34 must be considered a clear mistake: “The accused hereby sets 
out for the Appeals Chamber applications on which the Trial Chamber has ruled. The first is to establish 
its jurisdiction due to the serious violations of Zdravko Tolimir’s rights, and due to the prolonged 
consequences of these violations, which have been made manifest not only in the violation of his rights 
but also because the acts which followed his arrest (...) have done serious damage to the Tribunal’s 
integrity.” 








The Prosecution, in its response, was of the opinion that Tolimir’s appeal had to be 
dismissed for a number of procedural reasons. However, even if that were not 
accepted by the Appeals Chamber, the substantive arguments of Tolimir had to be 
rejected as well. This was because,  
 
[t]he Appeal fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber committed any discernible 
error of law or fact, or that it weighed either relevant or irrelevant considerations in an 
unreasonable manner, irrespective of whether the Accused is requesting the Appeals 
Chamber to decline jurisdiction based on the circumstances of his arrest, or whether 
he is simply seeking a declaration. Furthermore, the Accused similarly has failed to 
show that the Trial Chamber has abused its discretion [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].717   
 
On 12 March 2009, it fell to the Appeals Chamber to shed light on these issues. 
However, unfortunately, it did not go into the merits of the case as it dismissed both 
the appeal of Tolimir and the Prosecution’s response to this appeal on procedural 
grounds alone: according to the judges, Tolimir should have asked the Trial 
Chamber’s permission to file an appeal against the 2008 decision (which was not 
done)718 and the Prosecution filed its response to Tolimir’s appeal too late.719   
Although it is, of course, unfortunate that the Appeals Chamber did not go into 
the merits of this case, the case remains interesting for a number of issues which 
have been reviewed during the examination of this case. One could refer here not 
only to the discussion as to whether the ICTY should not put too much emphasis on 
the ultimate remedy of setting aside jurisdiction, but also to the fact that the Trial 
Chamber’s decision of 14 December 2007 confirmed the findings of the Appeals 
Chamber in Nikolić with respect to the element of ‘seriousness of the alleged 
crimes’. Hence, even if the legal foundation for the Appeals Chamber’s observations 
on that point is not without its flaws, one can assert that the Appeals Chamber’s 




On 31 July 2008, the world could see one of the ‘biggest fish’ of the ICTY, Radovan 
Karadžić, being brought into the courtroom of the Tribunal. During this initial 
appearance, Karadžić wished to inform Judge Orie – who presided over this session 
– of the “procedural irregularities in my arrival here”,720 a point which he further 
                                                          
717 See ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Prosecution’s Motion for 
Extension of Time to File a Response and Response to Tolimir’s “Appeal Against the Decision on 
Submissions of the Accused Concerning Legality of Arrest”’ (Public), Case No. IT-05-88/2-AR72.2, 10 
February 2009, para. 13. 
718 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Decision on Zdravko Tolimir’s Appeal 
Against the Decision on Submissions of the Accused Concerning Legality of Arrest (Public), Case No. 
IT-05-88/2-AR72.2, 12 March 2009, para. 13. 
719 Ibid., paras. 9-10. 
720 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18, Transcripts of 31 July 2008, p. 20. 








developed in his first motion where he recounted the circumstances of his 
apprehension in Serbia as follows: 
 
The next irregularity occurred in Belgrade. Unknown civilians showed me a badge so 
quickly that I could not identify it, took me out of a public transport vehicle and held 
me in an unknown place for 74 hours. During this time I was not informed of the 
rights to which I am entitled if they abducted me in the name of international justice. 
Nor did they tell me who they were or what they intended to do with me. Nor did they 
allow me to speak with one of their chiefs or allow me to make a telephone call. They 
did not even allow me to send a single SMS message to one of my new friends so that 
they would not go round the hospitals and mortuaries looking for me. Nor would they 
send such a message on my behalf. For those 74 hours I did not exist, and after that 
they handed me over to the Special Court and an investigating judge, after which 
everything was regular.721  
 
On 4 August 2008, the Prosecution stated that it did not see this submission of 
Karadžić, who was defending himself, as an official motion and hence that it would 
not respond to it.722 As a result, two days later, Karadžić filed an “[o]fficial 
submission concerning my first appearance and my immunity agreement with the 
USA”.723 Remarkably, this submission, even though it very much resembles the 
earlier one, leaves out the most interesting point from the perspective of this study, 
namely the circumstances pertaining to his actual apprehension in Belgrade. As a 
result, the proceedings continued with respect to Karadžić’s alleged immunity 
agreement with the US, the so-called Holbrooke Agreement, but the point of his 
alleged male captus faded into the background. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
Karadžić had not forgotten it; on 4 August 2009, he filed a motion through which he 
returned to this topic.  
Before going to examine that motion however, it is worth pointing out that in the 
aftermath of the alleged immunity agreement proceedings, Trial Chamber III and the 
Appeals Chamber made some interesting remarks about the abuse of process 
doctrine. In the context of these proceedings, Karadžić had argued that, if the 
Chamber were to decide that the agreement was not binding on the ICTY, it then 
had to  
 
consider whether it should dismiss the Indictment or stay the proceedings as an abuse 
of process “so as not to taint the integrity of the Tribunal by prosecuting someone 
                                                          
721 See ICTY, Pre-Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, ‘Irregularities Linked to My Arrival Before 
the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-95-5/18-I, 31 July 2008 (filed on 1 August 2008), p. 3. 
722 See ICTY, Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Prosecution’s Notice Regarding 
Accused’s Communication with the Pre-Trial Chamber’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-I, 4 August 
2008, para. 1. 
723 See ICTY, Pre-Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Karadžić, ‘Official submission concerning my first 








who, through no fault of his own, relied upon an agreement which was based on 
deception [original footnote omitted, ChP].”724 
 
The judges indeed decided that the agreement was not binding on the ICTY,725 
thereby assuming for the moment – and only for the purpose of first deciding the 
legal issues726 – that Karadžić’s allegations concerning the agreement were true. As 
a result, the judges turned to the abuse of process argument. After having examined 
the observations of the judges in the Barayagwiza (to be discussed in the next 
subsection) and Nikolić cases on this doctrine, they rejected Karadžić’s claim:  
 
First, proceeding with his case, even in light of the Agreement, would not affect any 
of the Accused’s fair trial rights, including as a suspect or an accused. In addition, the 
Chamber recalls its finding that Holbrooke did not act with actual or apparent 
authority of the UNSC. Thus, he was essentially a third party, unconnected to the 
Tribunal, promising immunity years before the Accused’s transfer to the Tribunal. It 
is difficult to see how, in those circumstances, to proceed with the case can be said to 
be such an abuse of process that the Tribunal would be obliged to stay the 
proceedings.727 
 
Two remarks can be made here.  
First, the test used by the Trial Chamber – “proceeding with his case (...) would 
not affect any of the Accused’s fair trial rights” – is not, as will also be shown in the 
next subsection, the test used by the ICTR Barayagwiza case, even though the ICTY 
judges referred earlier728 to this correct test: 
 
[T]he abuse of process doctrine may be relied on in two distinct situations: (1) where 
delay has made a fair trial for the accused impossible; and (2) where in the 
circumstances of a particular case, proceeding with the trial of the accused would 
contravene the court’s sense of justice, due to pre-trial impropriety or misconduct.729 
                                                          
724 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on the Accused’s Holbrooke 
Agreement Motion’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, 8 July 2009, para. 11. 
725 See ibid., para. 80. 
726 See ibid., paras. 46-47: “If the Accused cannot obtain the relief he seeks as a matter of law, then the 
issue of whether the Agreement was ever made is irrelevant to any issue other than sentence, on which 
evidence may be led at trial. (...) The Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber in Nikolić followed the 
same approach: the parties there agreed to proceed without an evidentiary hearing and, instead, 
submitted a list of agreed facts on which the Chamber was to rely while making its determination on the 
law. The fact that in this case there is no such agreement, nor any agreed facts, does not preclude the 
Chamber from taking a similar approach. Instead of relying on agreed facts, the Chamber will make its 
determination on the basis that the evidence submitted by the Accused is accepted pro veritate for this 
purpose. Thus, the Accused’s argument that the facts surrounding the Agreement are all disputed does 
not prevent the Chamber from deciding the legal issues first [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
727 Ibid., para. 84. 
728 See ibid., para. 80. 
729 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, paras. 77. See also ibid., para. 74: “It is a process by which Judges may 
decline to exercise the court’s jurisdiction in cases where to exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious 








Hence, the judges can use the abuse of process doctrine, even if continuing with the 
trial would not affect the person’s right to fair trial (in the strict sense of the word), 
namely “where in the circumstances of a particular case, proceeding with the trial of 
the accused would contravene the court’s sense of justice, due to pre-trial 
impropriety or misconduct”. In that latter case, one could argue that the broader 
concept of a fair trial, the fairness of the entire proceedings of bringing a suspect to 
justice, has been affected, entailing that it would be unfair to try the suspect in the 
first place. (See also Subsection 4.3 of Chapter III.) 
The second remark that can be made here is that the Trial Chamber’s emphasis 
on the fact that Holbrooke cannot be connected to the Tribunal may not necessarily 
make any difference. It is true that the ‘national’ abuse of process doctrine, even 
though it is sometimes formulated in such a general way that it could also 
encompass the actions of third parties,730 focuses on the actions of the prosecuting 
forum’s own authorities, but the cases of Milošević and Nikolić (and the same goes 
for other still-to-discuss cases, such as Barayagwiza) have shown that the Tribunal’s 
version of this doctrine entails that the judges may refuse to exercise jurisdiction in 
very serious male captus cases, irrespective of the entity responsible for the serious 
male captus. Now, the judges of Trial Chamber III did in fact acknowledge that in 
the Nikolić case, the judges of Trial Chamber II had held “that the Tribunal should 
not exercise its jurisdiction over persons who have been “seriously mistreated” by a 
party not acting for the Tribunal and before being handed over to the Tribunal”731 
but they also expressed “some doubts that this statement is applicable to every 
situation involving a third party not connected to the Tribunal”.732 They explained 
their reservation as follows: 
 
The Nikolić Trial Chamber based this part of its decision on two examples, namely (i) 
the events in Barayagwiza, where there was a considerable delay by state authorities 
before the accused’s transfer to the Tribunal, and (ii) a hypothetical situation of 
torture or cruel or degrading treatment of the accused by a third party just before his 
                                                          
730 See the following words of Lord Lowry in Bennett, see n. 610 and accompanying text of Chapter III 
and ns. 300 and 310 and accompanying text of Chapter V: “[A] court has a discretion to stay any 
criminal proceedings on the ground that to try those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own 
process either (1) because it will be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair 
trial or (2) because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in 
the circumstances of a particular case.” (House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road 
Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 161.) See also the 
following words of Lord Steyn in Latif (see n. 346 and accompanying text of Chapter V): 
“[P]roceedings may be stayed in the exercise of the judge’s discretion not only where a fair trial is 
impossible but also where it would be contrary to the public interest in the integrity of the criminal 
justice system that a trial should take place.” (House of Lords, Lord Steyn, Regina v. Latif; Regina v. 
Shazad, 18 January 1996, 1 W.L.R. 112-113 [1996].) Not very surprisingly, these quotations were also 
referred to by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Barayagwiza, see ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, paras. 74-
75. 
731 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on the Accused’s Holbrooke 









transfer to the Tribunal. However, those two situations are hardly applicable to a case 
such as the one before the Chamber. First, in Barayagwiza, the prosecution was 
stayed partly also because of the delays caused by the ICTR’s Prosecutor upon the 
transfer to the Tribunal, which compounded the serious delays caused by the state 
authorities that captured Barayagwiza. In addition, the state authorities in question 
were explicitly held to have been acting on behalf of the ICTR Prosecutor and thus 
were not completely unconnected to the Tribunal. As for the example of “serious 
mistreatment” of the accused by a third party, such as torture or cruel and/or 
degrading treatment, there is no indication that the Accused suffered such serious 
mistreatment or that there was any other egregious violation of his rights, including 
his right to political activity. In any event, in the opinion of this Chamber, it could 
only be in exceptional circumstances that actions of a third party that is completely 
unconnected to the Tribunal or the proceedings could ever lead to those proceedings 
being stayed. Where an accused is seriously mistreated by such a third party, that 
mistreatment is unlikely to be a barrier to a fair trial which can be secured in various 
other ways, for example, by excluding any evidence obtained by torture at the hands 
of the third party [emphasis in original and original footnotes omitted, ChP].733 
 
The last point is connected with the previously mentioned – and criticised – abuse of 
process test of the Trial Chamber that even serious mistreatment, such as torture, 
may not lead to the ending of the case because his fair trial rights may not be in 
danger. However, as mentioned above, the abuse of process doctrine is also about 
stopping a case, not when the fairness of the trial in court is in jeopardy, but where it 
would be unfair to start a trial in the first place in view of certain circumstances. In 
that latter case, one could say that because of certain circumstances, the broad fair 
trial concept (meaning the entire process of bringing a person to justice), the judges’ 
sense of justice in general, has become infected. Recall the abuse of process doctrine 
from the Bennett case: 
 
[A] court has a discretion to stay any criminal proceedings on the ground that to try 
those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process either (1) because it will 
be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) 
because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the 
accused in the circumstances of a particular case.734  
 
Judges may and should also refuse jurisdiction in the case of serious pre-trial 
irregularities, even if these irregularities do not jeopardise a person’s fair trial in the 
restricted sense of the word. It is not only the fair trial for the suspect which is at 
stake, but also the integrity of the court in question. That integrity will, of course, be 
more easily harmed if the authorities of the prosecuting forum itself are involved in 
the serious male captus, but the court may also be of the opinion that its integrity as 
a court of law is undermined if it were to try a person who, in the context of the 
court’s proceedings, has been seriously mistreated. 
                                                          
733 Ibid. 








Having that said, one can, however, generally agree with the Trial Chamber’s 
other observations that the irregularities in this case are definitely not so severe as to 
divest jurisdiction. What is required is such a serious male captus (irrespective of 
the entity responsible) that the judges cannot, in good conscience, decide to continue 
with the case. However, what constitutes such a serious male captus depends on the 
circumstances, for example on who was involved in it. In that respect, one can 
concur with the Chamber that some third parties can be seen as being more 
connected with the Tribunal than others. For example, irregularities caused by a 
State which is acting on the Prosecutor’s behalf may be deemed to be more serious 
than the same irregularities committed by third parties which have a less strong 
connection with the Tribunal, such as private individuals acting on their own.735 
Another aspect which could be taken into account is the question as to how much 
violence was used against the person.  
As will be shown in the Barayagwiza case, the seriousness of the irregularities 
related to that person’s pre-trial detention were caused by the several violations of 
the person’s rights in which the Prosecution, but also a third party, had its share. In 
this context, one could also think of this study’s suggestion presented in the context 
of the Dokmanović and Nikolić case, namely that a court should refuse jurisdiction if 
employees of the Tribunal itself were, for example, involved in serious, intentional 
irregularities related to a person’s apprehension, such as a kidnapping. In that latter 
situation, however, the person may not been mistreated (that was also not the case in 
Barayagwiza). Nevertheless, one can imagine that a court may also be of the 
opinion that it should refuse jurisdiction where it has become clear that a suspect 
was tortured in the context of its proceedings, even if the Prosecution was not in 
some way involved in that irregularity. (It is, of course, clear that if the Prosecution 
were involved in such serious mistreatment – which probably/hopefully will never 
happen – the court has no proper option but to refuse jurisdiction.) 
Karadžić appealed the decision and argued, with respect to the Trial Chamber’s 
use of the abuse of process doctrine, and referring to the Barayagwiza and Nikolić 
cases, that “the Trial Chamber improperly concluded that there were two different 
standards for abuse of process – one for Tribunal actors and one for non-Tribunal 
actors”.736 However, as clarified, although there are two situations possible, there is 
arguably only one test: 
 
                                                          
735 Although it is true that Barayagwiza was being held for a long time at the request of the ICTR in 
Cameroon, the ICTR also stated that even if Barayagwiza was not in the constructive custody of the 
Tribunal, the fact that he had “spent an inordinate amount of time in provisional detention without 
knowledge of the general nature of the charges against him” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 85, 
see also n. 856 and accompanying text) had to be taken into account. This is a point which the Trial 
Chamber does not mention here.  
736 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, ‘Appeal of Decision of Holbrooke 








[T]he abuse of process doctrine may be relied on in two distinct situations: (1) where 
delay[737] has made a fair trial for the accused impossible; and (2) where in the 
circumstances of a particular case, proceeding with the trial of the accused would 
contravene the court’s sense of justice, due to pre-trial impropriety or misconduct.738 
 
Hence, if the judge is of the opinion that the suspect can no longer enjoy a fair trial 
(in the strict sense of the word) or that some pre-trial circumstances mean it would 
be contrary to the integrity of the court/his sense of justice to have a trial in the first 
place (one could call this the concept of a fair trial more broadly perceived),739 he 
can refuse jurisdiction. 
Hence, there is only one test, consisting of two male detentus avenues. However, 
and focusing now on the avenue which is most interesting for this study (the second 
one), in taking all the elements into account in this exercise, the nature of the actor 
responsible for the impropriety/misconduct is, it can be argued, of course, an 
important element which should be taken into account here.740 It can certainly be 
                                                          
737 Or other circumstances, see the test from Bennett (see n. 734 and accompanying text) to which the 
judges in the Barayagwiza case referred, see ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 75. 
738 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 77. See for the second male detentus avenue also ibid., para. 74: 
“It is a process by which Judges may decline to exercise the court’s jurisdiction in cases where to 
exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove 
detrimental to the court’s integrity.” With respect to these particular words, requiring serious violations 
of the suspect’s rights, it is submitted that the judge should take a liberal stance. Hence, even if he is of 
the opinion, for example, that private individuals cannot violate (human) rights (see the Nikolić case), he 
should ask himself whether what happened to the suspect is nonetheless so serious that jurisdiction must 
be refused. In that respect, one can agree with the following words from the Appeals Chamber in 
Karadžić: “[T]he question before the Appeals Chamber is whether, assuming that the Appellant’s 
factual submission are accepted, proceeding with the trial of the Appellant would contravene to the 
Tribunal’s sense of justice or would be detrimental to the Tribunal’s integrity, due to pre-trial 
impropriety or misconduct amounting to serious and egregious violations of the Appellant’s rights 
[emphasis added, ChP].” (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on 
Karadžić’s Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on Alleged Holbrooke Agreement’ (Public), Case No. 
IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, 12 October 2009, para. 51.) In any case, one can always refer here to the more 
general words of the Barayagwiza decision as mentioned in para. 77: “pre-trial impropriety or 
misconduct”. 
739 This was also very clearly explained in the Latif case (see also n. 346 and accompanying text of 
Chapter V): “The speeches in Ex parte Bennett conclusively establish that proceedings may be stayed in 
the exercise of the judge’s discretion not only where a fair trial is impossible but also where it would be 
contrary to the public interest in the integrity of the criminal justice system that a trial should take 
place.” (House of Lords, Lord Steyn, Regina v. Latif; Regina v. Shazad, 18 January 1996, 1 W.L.R. 112-
113 [1996].) See also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, 
Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74. (See also n. 730.)  
740 In this context, it is also to be remembered that at the national level, the abuse of process doctrine, 
even though one will find rather general definitions of his concept, seems to require the involvement of 
the prosecuting forum’s own authorities. Cf. also Sloan 2006 p. 342 (writing on the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber’s decision in Nikolić): “If the full facts were set out and it became clear that there was no link 
to SFOR, then many of the bases on which national courts have favoured the male captus, male detentus 
approach (e.g., a desire to control an overzealous executive, avoiding the perception of impropriety, etc.) 








maintained that the integrity of a Tribunal will more easily be affected by the pre-
trial impropriety/misconduct if it can be attributed to the Tribunal. It can be asserted 
that the Barayagwiza/Nikolić cases ‘only’ support the idea that serious 
impropriety/misconduct can lead to the ending of the case, irrespective of the entity 
responsible,741 but not that actions from a third party may not be given less weight 
than actions from parties which can be connected to the prosecuting forum, when 
the judge has to determine whether the impropriety/misconduct is so serious that it 
must lead to the ending of the case. In other words, although one can agree with 
Karadžić that “[t]he Barayagwiza Appeals Chamber never purported to exclude 
third-party conduct from scrutiny under the abuse of process doctrine or to limit 
such scrutiny only to extreme cases of severe physical mistreatment or torture”,742 
one can imagine that a Tribunal, given its important responsibility to also prosecute 
suspects of international crimes, will not refuse jurisdiction too readily and certainly 
not when the entities which can be connected to the prosecuting forum have done 
nothing wrong. Hence, only in extreme cases, such as (but indeed not limited to) 
serious mistreatment of the suspect, will a Tribunal probably refuse jurisdiction if 
the impropriety/misconduct was committed by third parties having no link with the 
Tribunal (and arguably rightly so). However, it appears that the Trial Chamber did 
not deny this when it stated (see also footnote 733 and accompanying text):  
 
As for the example of “serious mistreatment” of the accused by a third party, such as 
torture or cruel and/or degrading treatment, there is no indication that the Accused 
                                                          
741 Arguably, the Tribunal should apply a broad concept of abuse of process doctrine here, see also the 
discussion on this point in the context of the Nikolić case. Cf. also ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The 
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, ‘Appeal of Decision of Holbrooke Agreement’ (Public), Case No. IT-
95-05/18-AR73.4, 27 July 2009, paras. 109-111: “Within national jurisdictions, it will almost always be 
a single state authority which creates the criminal law, investigates and arrests individuals for breaches 
of it, and establishes the courts in which to hear the criminal case. It is also the same state authority 
which is represented by the prosecution that proceeds with the case. In these circumstances, it will be 
exceedingly rare for an actor unrelated to the state to be involved in the law enforcement and 
adjudication. As such, it is perhaps rational for an abuse or process doctrine operating in this context to 
look primarily or solely to misconduct attributable to the state – reserving only an extraordinary or 
residual category for abusive misconduct attributable to other unrelated actors. The exact opposite is 
true of international tribunals. These are highly decentralized institutions. Only the actors which create 
the criminal law (the UNSC) and which hear and prosecute cases for breaches of its (the Tribunal/OTP) 
are exclusively related to the central authority (the UN). As the Tribunal itself frequently points out, “the 
International Tribunal has no enforcement arm of its own – it lacks a police force.” As such, it is entirely 
dependent on a diverse range of actors to fill this critical role. A whole host of states, inter-state 
organizations and international agencies – as well as diplomats, special envoys, local authorities, and 
military personnel, – routinely fill the key roles of investigating crimes, sharing intelligence, and 
arresting and transferring suspects. This involvement may be formal or informal, and it may occur with 
or even without the Tribunal’s knowledge. Where so many diverse actors may be involved in creating, 
enforcing and adjudicating international criminal law – sometimes even without one another’s 
knowledge or consent – it is essential that the doctrine of abuse of process in this setting not be applied 
in a restrictive or technical manner. (…) A Court operating in these circumstances must have the 
discretionary authority to look at all the events that have led to the proceedings and decide, regardless of 
whom they are attributable, whether on the whole they breach the Accused’s rights or contravene the 
Court’s sense of justice [emphasis in original and original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 








suffered such serious mistreatment or that there was any other egregious violation of 
his rights, including his right to political activity. In any event, in the opinion of this 
Chamber, it could only be in exceptional circumstances that actions of a third party 
that is completely unconnected to the Tribunal or the proceedings could ever lead to 
those proceedings being stayed [emphasis added and emphasis (of the word 
“egregious”) in original, ChP].743  
      
The Appeals Chamber, which repeated its balancing exercise from the Nikolić 
case,744 agreed with this position when it held:  
 
[T]he Trial Chamber adopted the common standard established by the Appeals 
Chamber in the Barayagwiza Decision and in the Nikolić Appeal Decision, and not a 
higher one, by considering whether the Appellant suffered a serious mistreatment or if 
there was any other egregious violation of his rights [emphasis added, ChP].745 
 
Finally, it may also be worth mentioning that the Appeals Chamber, in contrast to 
the Trial Chamber, correctly checked whether one of the two situations triggering 
the abuse of process doctrine was met746 (which was not the case here).747 
Returning to the actual male captus discussion, in his motion filed on 4 August 
2009, Karadžić first repeated (see his first submission filed a year earlier) what had 
in fact happened to him.  
He claimed that he was arrested in Belgrade on Friday 18 July 2008 by unknown 
men and taken to a location where he was held incommunicado for three days.748 
“During that time, he was never advised of the reason for his arrest, the identity of 
                                                          
743 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on the Accused’s Holbrooke 
Agreement Motion’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, 8 July 2009, para. 85. 
744 See ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on Karadžić’s Appeal of 
Trial Chamber’s Decision on Alleged Holbrooke Agreement’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, 12 
October 2009, para. 49: “The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Appellant is charged with genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. The public interest in the prosecution of an individual accused 
of such offences, universally condemned, is unquestionably strong. Against the legitimate interest of the 
international community in the prosecution of the Appellant for Universally Condemned Offences 
stands the alleged violation of the Appellant’s expectation that he would not be prosecuted by the 
Tribunal, pursuant to the alleged Agreement [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
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747 See ibid., para. 53. 
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Violation of Rights in Connection with Arrest’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, 3 August 2009 (filed 








his captors, or brought before a judicial officer. He was refused access to a 
telephone to inform anyone that he had been arrested.”749  
After the weekend, Karadžić continued, the Serbian authorities improperly 
announced that he was arrested on Monday 21 July 2008, three days after his actual 
apprehension on the Friday.750 On Tuesday 22 July 2008, Karadžić was brought 
before a judge.751 Thus, he had allegedly been held without seeing a judicial officer 
for four days.  
According to Karadžić, these four days, which thus also encompassed three days 
of incommunicado detention, had violated his rights,752 namely 1) his right to 
liberty; 2) his right to be informed of the reasons for his arrest and 3) his right to be 
promptly brought before a judge.  
With respect to the first right, Karadžić argued that “[t]he practice of 
incommunicado and unacknowledged arrest and detention is ‘an obvious example’ 
of arbitrary arrest and detention [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.753 This argument, 
supported by Nowak, was mentioned earlier in this book,754 but it was there also 
explained that this statement should be refined: 
  
Brief incommunicado detention, that is, deprivation of liberty for a short period of 
time in complete isolation from the outside world, including family and lawyer, does 
not per se appear to be illegal under international human rights law, but it cannot be 
used in order to bar the detainee from exercising his or her rights as an arrested or 
detained person.755 
 
Next to the element of arbitrariness, Karadžić looked at the procedural dimension of 
the element of legality and correctly asserted that “human rights instruments require 
compliance with the national procedures during arrest and detention in order for the 
deprivation of liberty to be lawful”.756 Hence, the relevant Serbian provisions had to 
be examined.  
In Karadžić’s view, an examination of these provisions (including relevant 
human rights provisions) showed that they had been infringed.757 Given these 
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violations of the elements of procedural legality and non-arbitrariness, it had to be 
concluded that his right to liberty and security had been breached.758 
Karadžić asserted that his second right, the right to be informed of the reasons 
for his arrest (and of the charges against him), was also violated759 but arguably, he 
had already done this in the context of the more general right to liberty, a right 
which includes this more specific right.760  
The third right, the right to be promptly brought before a judge, can also be seen 
as a sub-right of the more general right to liberty and security.761  
According to Karadžić, this (sub)right was also violated762 because he “was 
brought before the national judicial authority on 22 July 2008, that is on the fifth day 
after his arrest of 18 July 2008. Such time period is clearly contrary to the relevant 
international human rights standards.”763 
Because of these human rights violations, Karadžić argued, he was entitled to an 
effective remedy.  
This had been earlier stressed in cases such as Delalić et al.764 and the four still-
to-discuss ICTR cases of Barayagwiza,765 Kajelijeli,766 Semanza767 and 
Rwamakuba.768  
The fact that these violations were not committed by authorities which can be 
linked to the Tribunal did not change this – a statement which, as will also be shown 
in the remainder of this chapter, can certainly find support in the above-mentioned 
cases:    
 
In light of the above jurisprudence it is not necessary to address the question whether 
or not the violations of Dr. Karadzic’s rights can in some way be attributed to the 
ICTY, or one of its organs. It follows from the highly authoritative case law from the 
Appeals Chamber in Barayagwiza, Kajelijeli, Semanza and Rwamakuba, that 
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attribution or any involvement of the ICTY in aforementioned violations cannot be a 
condition for Dr. Karadzic’s entitlement to an effective remedy.769 
 
Karadžić concluded his submission by requesting the Trial Chamber to first, “find 
that Dr. Karadzic’s rights to liberty, to be informed of the reasons for his arrest, and 
to be taken promptly before a judicial officer, were violated during his arrest, and to 
hold an evidentiary hearing if necessary”770 and secondly – invoking the remedies 
formula used in the still-to-discuss cases of Barayagwiza771 and Semanza772 – “order 
that an appropriate remedy, namely financial compensation in the event of an 
acquittal or reduction in sentence, in the event of a conviction, be fixed by the Trial 
Chamber as part of the final judgement in this case”.773 
The Prosecution responded on 18 August 2009. It argued, among other things, 
that “Karadžić’s request should be denied because the Tribunal is under no 
obligation to provide him with a remedy unless the alleged violations can be 
attributed to the Tribunal”.774 The Prosecution was of the opinion that Karadžić 
could not rely on Barayagwiza, Kajelijeli, Semanza and Rwamakuba in that respect 
as in those cases, “the accused were granted a remedy because those violations were 
attributed to the ICTR through one of its organs, i.e. the ICTR Prosecution”.775 
However, as will be explained in the remainder of this chapter, all cases contain 
reasonings which can be interpreted as meaning that the ICTR will take 
responsibility for violations, even if they cannot be clearly attributed to the 
Prosecutor. The Rwamakuba case is the weakest case in that respect and the 
Barayagwiza case, where the judges even looked at irregularities beyond the period 
of constructive custody (see footnotes 828-829 and accompanying text for this 
term), the most far-reaching.  
The Prosecution in Karadžić clarified its point, referring to different statements 
from these four cases. For example, with respect to the first Barayagwiza decision, it 
noted that the Appeals Chamber  
 
found that “the Prosecutor has failed with respect to her obligation to prosecute the 
case with due diligence.” The Appeals Chamber ordered the release of the accused as 
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“the only remedy available for such prosecutorial inaction and the resultant denial of 
his rights [original footnotes omitted, ChP].”776 
 
However, what do these words say?  
They arguably only say that because the Prosecution failed to such an extent in 
this case, the case had to be dismissed with prejudice to the Prosecution. Thus, 
because of serious flaws in the Prosecution’s handling of the case, the remedy had to 
be far-reaching.  
However, that does not mean that the Tribunal would not have granted lighter, 
less far-reaching remedies if the suspect suffered violations which were not caused 
by serious failures on the part of the Prosecution. As will be shown in the next 
subsection, the Barayagwiza case arguably supports the idea that any violation 
occurring in the context of the case must be remedied, even if the violation, strictly 
speaking, cannot be attributed to the Prosecution/Tribunal. This point is clear with 
respect to the abuse of process doctrine (see the first Barayagwiza decision),777 but it 
seems that the Tribunal would also take responsibility and remedy the (less serious) 
violations which do not trigger the male detentus outcome (and rightly so), see the 
second Barayagwiza decision.  
The Prosecution in Karadžić noted with respect to this second decision that  
 
the Appeals Chamber found that even though the accused’s rights had been violated 
by the Cameroonian authorities, those violations “were not attributable to the 
Prosecutor.” The Appeals Chamber consequently altered the remedy because it found 
that “new facts diminish the role played by the failings of the Prosecutor as well as 
the intensity of the violations of the rights of the Appellant.” A remedy was 
nevertheless granted because of the violations of the accused’s rights once he had 
been transferred to the ICTR [original footnotes omitted, ChP].778      
 
However, as will also be shown in the discussion of that decision, the fact that 
certain violations were not attributable to the Prosecutor does not mean that the 
judges would not take these violations into account when determining the 
appropriate remedies for these violations.  
It seems that the Appeals Chamber did take (just as it arguably should take) all 
the violations into account when determining the remedies, including those which 
cannot be attributed to the Prosecution, when it stated more generally “that the 
Appellant’s rights were violated, and that all violations demand a remedy”.779 
This point was also made in the Semanza case, where the judges stated “that any 
violation, even if it entails only a relative degree of prejudice, requires a 
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proportionate remedy”.780 The Prosecution in Karadžić noted that this statement was 
only made “in the circumstances of the case where there were violations attributable 
to the Prosecution and the ICTR”.781  
However, as will be shown in the discussion of that case, one can wonder 
whether this is so. The decision also contains a remark which can be seen as 
evidence for the idea that the statement “that any violation, even if it entails only a 
relative degree of prejudice, requires a proportionate remedy” must be viewed 
broadly, an idea which is reinforced by the declaration of Judge Lal Chand Vohrah 
in this case, see footnotes 834 and 985. 
The fact that there was some delay in transferring Semanza to the ICTR and that 
this delay “was not attributable to the Prosecutor and consequently that the Tribunal 
did not violate Rule 40 bis”782 does not jeopardise this reasoning. It only says that 
the Tribunal itself did not violate Rule 40 bis of the ICTR RPE because the delay 
could not be attributed to it. However, that does not mean that the judges may not 
view such a delay as a human rights violation nonetheless (which, by the way, does 
not seem to be the case here) which must be remedied, even if it could not be 
attributed to the Tribunal.783  
The Prosecution in Karadžić also referred to the statement in the Kajelijeli case 
that “[t]he Prosecution failed to effect its prosecutorial duties with due diligence out 
of respect for the Appellant’s rights following its Rule 40 request to Benin. Thus, 
the Appellant is entitled to a remedy from the Tribunal.”784 As will also be 
explained in the context of the Kajelijeli case, this is a tricky remark as it indeed 
seems to connect the granting of remedies with the attribution of certain violations 
to the Prosecutor, note the word “[t]hus”. Of course, it is obvious that if certain 
violations can be attributed to the Prosecutor, then the suspect is entitled to a 
remedy. However, the more interesting question is whether these words imply that 
the suspect is only entitled to a remedy if certain violations can be attributed to the 
Prosecutor. As will become clear from the discussion of this case, the decision 
seems to provide enough room for the interpretation that the Tribunal is of the 
opinion that all violations in the context of a certain case must be remedied, even if 
those violations cannot be attributed to the Prosecutor.785  
Finally, with respect to the Rwamakuba case, the Prosecution in Karadžić opined 
that “the Appeals Chamber based its conclusion that Rwamakuba was entitled to an 
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effective remedy for violations following his transfer to the ICTR on the fact that 
these violations were “attributable to the Tribunal.” [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]”786 It is indeed correct that in this case, the ICTR only looked at violations 
which occurred after the suspect’s transfer to the Tribunal. (According to the ICTR, 
the violations at the national level did not occur in the constructive custody of the 
ICTR.) However, this does not necessarily negate the general connotation of the 
statement that every violation must be effectively remedied. Here, the same point 
can be made as that made supra in the context of the Kajelijeli case; of course, the 
ICTR must remedy violations which are clearly attributable to it. However, the more 
interesting question is whether this case can also be seen as support for the idea that 
the ICTR will remedy violations occurring in the context of its case (for example, 
violations occurring in the context of the constructive custody) which cannot be 
clearly attributed to it. As will be shown in the discussion of that case, the judges in 
Rwamakuba, referring to Barayagwiza and Semanza, also seemed to accept 
responsibility for parts of the constructive custody, although it is also clear that this 
case does not go as far as those two cases.  
The Prosecution in Karadžić also had another point, namely that “[t]he 
Barayagwiza, Semanza, and Kajelijeli cases are further distinguishable from 
Karadžić’s case because, in the former, no confirmed indictments and no arrest 
warrants had been issued prior to the accused’s detention in the detaining state”.787 
Although the issuance of indictments and arrest warrants may lead to additional 
obligations on the part of the national State,788 this does not change the basic idea 
suggested in this study, a suggestion which arguably finds support in the ICTR 
cases, that the Tribunal will remedy violations committed in the context of a certain 
case, whether or not the suspect has received an indictment or arrest warrant. 
Finally, the Prosecution in Karadžić stated that “[t]he requirement that violations 
be attributed to the Tribunal does not deprive Karadžić of his right to an effective 
remedy since he may seek relief for the alleged violations elsewhere, e.g. in Serbia 
[original footnote omitted, ChP]”.789 This is a rather easy remark for the Prosecution 
to make. However, the Prosecution cannot seriously be of the opinion that Karadžić 
can get an effective remedy for these violations elsewhere (if they are established as 
such). After all, if it is established that Karadžić’s detention was unlawful pursuant 
to national law, the normal remedy in such a case would be the release of the 
suspect, see the habeas corpus provision of, for example, Article 9, paragraph 4 of 
the ICCPR. However, how can Karadžić be released by the Serbian authorities if he 
is in the ICTY’s custody?  
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As argued before, it would be a sign of real legal ‘maturity’ on the part of the 
ICTY if it takes the full responsibility for all violations occurring in the context of 
its cases, simply because it is the ICTY that is now trying this suspect.  
In providing the remedies for certain violations, the judges can then, of course, 
take into account the fact that their own people were not involved in the violations. 
As a result, the remedies can be very light. However, that is better than simply 
ignoring the problems which are inherently linked with the cooperation system of 
the ICTY, namely that the Tribunal is dependent on other actors for arresting and 
detaining suspects and thus that it should not only accept the fortunate, but also the 
less fortunate consequences of this dependence.  
In his reply to these arguments, Karadžić first of all pointed to the decision of 8 
July 2009 concerning the Holbrooke Agreement (see supra),790 which supported the 
abuse of process idea in the Nikolić case that serious violations may lead to a refusal 
of jurisdiction, even if these violations were not committed by organs which can be 
connected to the Tribunal. As argued earlier in this book, the fact that the Tribunal 
would take the ultimate responsibility (by refusing jurisdiction) for serious actions 
of third parties, should indeed be seen as additional evidence for the idea that the 
Tribunal must remedy every violation in the context of its cases, irrespective of the 
entity responsible for these violations.  
Alongside that, Karadžić rejected the views of the Prosecution with respect to the 
ICTR cases mentioned above. Much of his criticism resembles the remarks briefly 
mentioned above and examined in greater detail in the remainder of this chapter. For 
example, with respect to the Barayagwiza case, Karadžić stated, among other things:  
 
The fact that violations of rights not directly attributable to the ICTR still entitle the 
accused to a remedy follows from two basis elements of the Decision: (i) the 
violations by the Cameroonian authorities not directly attributable to the ICTR were 
fully taken into consideration; (ii) the unequivocal concluding statement that all 
violations demand a remedy [original footnote omitted, ChP].791  
 
Likewise, Karadžić pointed to passages in the Semanza792 and Kajelijeli793 cases 
which will be further addressed in the remainder of this chapter and which indeed 
seem to support the idea that the Tribunal will remedy any violations in the context 
of its case, whether or not these violations could be attributed to the Prosecutor.  
The last point to be discussed here is that Karadžić was, of course, also not of the 
opinion that the way a case is brought within the context of a Tribunal should 
influence the basic idea that the Tribunal should take responsibility for violations 
committed in this context.  
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Hence, in that respect, it would not matter whether that case was brought within 
the context of the Tribunal via the issuance of an indictment/arrest warrant or 
otherwise.794  
On 31 August 2009, the Trial Chamber issued its decision on these matters. The 
judges were very brief: they decided that these matters were premature and would 
have to be resolved at the end of the substantive case.795 However, the judges 
nevertheless already noted  
 
that there is substance in the Prosecution’s submission that, before being able to 
obtain the remedy he seeks, the Accused has to be able to attribute the infringement 
of his rights to one of the organs of the Tribunal or show that at least some 
responsibility for that infringement lies with the Tribunal.796  
 
As has – and will – become clear in this study, although it may seem very logical 
that the Tribunal would only have to remedy those violations which can be 
attributed to it or for which it can be held legally responsible (to a certain extent), 
and although it is true that in the cases mentioned by Karadžić, “the major 
discussions and findings ultimately revolved around the Prosecution’s responsibility 
for violations, rather than the responsibility of state authorities [original footnote 
omitted, ChP]”,797 there are still several passages in these cases which also provide 
room for another interpretation, namely that the Tribunal will take a more general 
responsibility, even if violations cannot be clearly attributed to it or of which it 
cannot be said that the Tribunal was, strictly speaking, legally responsible (to some 
extent) for them, and that it will remedy all violations in the context of its cases. 
The fact that judges, under the abuse of process doctrine, will take even the 
ultimate responsibility (namely the refusal of jurisdiction) for actions of other 
entities in very serious situations (which was not the case here)798 arguably 
constitutes additional evidence for this idea.  
One can assume that if the trial of Karadžić reaches its final stage, these points 
will be re-litigated, probably up to the Appeals Chamber. It remains to be seen how 
those judges will respond, although it seems clear that both interpretations can be 
found in the jurisprudence of the Tribunals.  
It is submitted that this study is, in any case, of the opinion that the interpretation 
which does not demand the attribution of certain violations to the Tribunal is the 
better one. 
Simple fairness (among other things – this point will be returned to) demands 
that the now prosecuting forum remedies all the violations which have been 
committed in the context of its case. In the words of Zahar and Sluiter:  
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When other entities bear primary responsibility for violations of human rights, what 
matters is the duty of every tribunal bench to protect the fairness and integrity of the 
trial by determining an appropriate remedy. Obviously, the trial does not start at the 
seat of the tribunal but extends to every act connected with it. While this may be a 
heavy and seemingly unfair burden on the tribunals – they interact with a wide variety 
of actors, not all of whom may apply the highest standards of justice, and the tribunals 
are not in a position to change this – the reverse is even more unfair.799 
 
The judges in Karadžić also agreed with the Prosecution that the authorities used by 
Karadžić  
 
are not directly applicable to cases where an arrest warrant has been issued and 
executed pursuant to Rule 55 as they concerned facts where suspects were detained 
by various states pursuant to requests from the Prosecution under Rule 40, and then 
were left to languish in those states for months, while the Prosecution was preparing 
to issue an indictment against them.800 
 
That is, of course, true, but it can again be argued that this does not necessarily 
jeopardise the idea mentioned above, namely that violations which occur in the 
context of a Tribunal case must be remedied by the final prosecuting forum, whether 
that “in the context of a Tribunal case” concept has been triggered by an indictment, 
arrest warrant, request for provisional arrest or otherwise.  
 




It was stated earlier in this book that this study would particularly focus on those 
male captus cases which have to do with irregular arrests as the word captus, of 
course, refers to the capture/apprehension. The previous cases from the ICTY have 
confirmed this. However, it is now time to look at a case which is also very often 
mentioned in the male captus discussion and which has to do with the question of 
the effect of an irregular pre-trial detention on the exercise of jurisdiction: the – 
already very often alluded to – case of Barayagwiza. In this case,  
 
[t]he Appeals Chamber of the ad hoc Tribunals was confronted with the impossible 
task of striking the right balance between two interests that had equal dignity and 
deserved equal consideration. On the one hand, the right of the accused not to be 
arbitrarily detained; on the other, the effective functioning of international criminal 
justice [original footnotes omitted, ChP].801 
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In 1997, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was charged with genocide, complicity in 
genocide, incitement to commit genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide and 
crimes against humanity (murder and persecution).802 Schabas notes that “[t]aking 
everything into account, and assuming the allegations in the indictment can be even 
partially established, Barayagwiza stands out as one of the most heinously evil of 
those responsible for the Rwandan genocide – and not for want of competitors”.803  
The problems related to the pre-trial detention of this ‘big fish’ are rather 
complicated but may be summarised as follows.  
On 15 April 1996, thus before he was indicted by the ICTR, Barayagwiza (and 
several other suspects) were arrested in Cameroon by the authorities of Cameroon 
“on suspicion of having committed genocide and crimes against humanity in 
Rwanda in 1994 [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.804 Barayagwiza claimed that “he 
was arrested by Cameroon on the basis of a request from the [ICTR] Prosecutor, 
while the Prosecutor contend[ed] that the Appellant was arrested on the basis of 
international arrest warrants emanating from the Rwandan and Belgian 
authorities”.805  
Although Goldstone, the then ICTR Prosecutor, was at first interested in 
investigating Barayagwiza and had therefore requested on 17 April 1996, pursuant 
to Rule 40 of the ICTR RPE,806 that Barayagwiza be detained,807 he “informed 
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for example, because the suspect’s arguments were quickly rejected, see, for example, the above-
mentioned Kambanda decision where the Appeals Chamber held (in para. 48): “As the Appellant has 
failed to establish any reason for which he should exceptionally be allowed to raise the question of the 
legality of his detention for the first time on appeal, this ground of appeal is rejected.” Cf. also ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ‘Judgment’, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, 1 June 
2001, paras. 364-375. See in that respect also ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor Versus Gratien 
Kabiligi, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion to Lodge Complaint and Open Investigations into Alleged 
Acts of Torture under Rules (40)(C) and 73(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-34-I, 5 October 1998. In this case, the Trial Chamber dismissed a motion of the suspect who 
claimed to have been tortured in the context of his arrest and detention. A subsequent appeal was 
dismissed for procedural reasons, see ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Gratien Kabiligi, 
‘Decision Rejecting Notice of Appeal’, Case No. ICTR-97-34-A, 18 December 1998. As a result, these 
kinds of cases will not be examined here in their entirety, although some observations stemming from 
them may, of course, be reviewed. (See also n. 3 of Chapter IV.) 
802 See ICTR, Judge Lennert Aspegren, The Prosecutor versus Jean[-]Bosco Barayagwiza, ‘Decision 
Confirming the Indictment’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-I, 23 October 1997. The charges in the final, 
amended, indictment of 13 April 2000 were genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations 
of Art. 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, see ICTR, Office of the 
Prosecutor, The Prosecutor against Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, ‘Amended Indictment’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19, 13 April 2000. 
803 Schabas 2000, p. 564. 
804 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 5. 
805 Ibid., Appendix A: Chronology of Events, p. 65. 
806 Which at that time read: “(A) In case of urgency, the Prosecutor may request any State: (i) to arrest a 








Cameroon [on 16 May 1996, ChP] that she [this must be “he”, ChP][808] only 
intended to pursue prosecutions against four of the detainees, excluding the 
Appellant [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP]”.809  
That the new Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, was also not interested in a prosecution 
became clear from the fact that “[o]n 15 October 1996, responding to a letter from 
the Appellant complaining about his detention in Cameroon, the Prosecutor 
informed the Appellant that Cameroon was not holding him at her behest [original 
footnote omitted, ChP]”.810  
However, on 21 February 1997, the day that the Court of Appeal of Cameroon 
rejected a request from Rwanda to have the remaining suspects extradited to 
Rwanda and ordered their release, the ICTR Prosecutor nevertheless reacted and 
“made a request pursuant to Rule 40 for the provisional detention of the Appellant 
and the Appellant was immediately re-arrested pursuant to this Order [original 
footnote omitted, ChP]”.811  
                                                                                                                                              
escape of a suspect or an accused, injury to or intimidation of a victim or witness, or the destruction of 
evidence. The State concerned shall comply forthwith, in accordance with Article 28 of the Statute. (B) 
Upon showing that a major impediment does not allow the State to keep the suspect under provisional 
detention or to take all necessary measures to prevent his escape, the Prosecutor may apply to a Judge 
designated by the President for an order to transfer the suspect to the seat of the Tribunal or to such 
other place as the Bureau may decide, and to detain him provisionally. After consultation with the 
Prosecutor and the Registrar, the transfer shall be arranged between the State authorities concerned, the 
authorities of the host Country and the Registrar. (C) In the cases referred to in paragraph B, the suspect 
shall, from the moment of his transfer, enjoy all the rights provided for in Rule 42, and may apply for 
review to a Trial Chamber of the Tribunal. The Chamber, after hearing the Prosecutor, shall rule upon 
the application. (D) The suspect shall be released if (i) the Chamber so rules, or (ii) the Prosecutor fails 
to issue an indictment within twenty days of the transfer.” 
807 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 5. See also ibid.: “On 6 May 1996, the Prosecutor asked 
Cameroon for a three-week extension of the detention of all the suspects, including the Appellant 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
808 At the time, Richard Goldstone was still the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTR. The new Prosecutor, 
Louise Arbour, replaced Goldstone on 1 October 1996, see UNSC Res. 1047 of 29 February 1996, UN 
Doc. S/RES/1047 (1996).  
809 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 5. 
810 Ibid., para. 7. The delay between May and October was, according to Barayagwiza, caused by the 
fact that “on 31 May 1996, the Court of Appeal of Cameroon adjourned sine die consideration of 
Rwanda’s extradition request, pursuant to a request to adjourn by the Deputy Director of Public 
Prosecution of the Court of Appeal of the Centre Province, Cameroon. The Appellant claims that in 
making this request, the Deputy Director of Public Prosecution relied on Article 8(2) of the Statute 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Ibid., para. 6.) Art. 8, para. 2 of the ICTR Statute reads: “The 
International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the primacy over the national courts of all States. At any 
stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal for Rwanda may formally request national courts to 
defer to its competence in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.” 








In addition, she requested an Order for transfer and provisional detention 
pursuant to Rule 40 bis of the ICTR RPE,812 which was signed by Judge Aspegren 
on 3 March 1997 and filed on 4 March 1997.813  
However, it was only on 19 November 1997, more than eight months later, that 
Barayagwiza was transferred to the ICTR pursuant to this Order.814  
                                                          
812 Which at that time read: “(A) In the conduct of an investigation, the Prosecutor may transmit to the 
Registrar, for an order by a Judge assigned pursuant to Rule 28, a request for the transfer to and 
provisional detention of a suspect in the premises of the detention unit of the Tribunal.  This request 
shall indicate the grounds upon which the request is made and, unless the Prosecutor wishes only to 
question the suspect, shall include a provisional charge and a summary of the material upon which the 
Prosecutor relies. (B) The Judge shall order the transfer and provisional detention of the suspect if the 
following conditions are met: (i) the Prosecutor has requested a State to arrest the suspect provisionally, 
in accordance with Rule 40, or the suspect is otherwise detained by a State; (ii) after hearing the 
Prosecutor, the Judge considers that there is a reliable and consistent body of material which tends to 
show that the suspect may have committed a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction; and (iii) the 
Judge considers provisional detention to be a necessary measure to prevent the escape of the suspect, 
injury to or intimidation of a victim or witness or the destruction of evidence, or to be otherwise 
necessary for the conduct of the investigation. (C) The provisional detention of a suspect may be 
ordered for a period not exceeding 30 days from the day after the transfer of the suspect to the detention 
unit of the Tribunal. (D) The order for the transfer and provisional detention of the suspect shall be 
signed by the Judge and bear the seal of the Tribunal. The order shall set forth the basis of the 
application made by the Prosecutor under Sub-rule (A), including the provisional charge, and shall state 
the judge’s grounds for making the order, having regard to Sub-rule (B). The order shall also specify the 
initial time limit for the provisional detention of the suspect, and be accompanied by a statement of the 
rights of a suspect, as specified in this Rule and in Rules 42 and 43. (E) As soon as possible, copies of 
the order and of the request by the Prosecutor are served upon the suspect and his counsel by the 
Registrar. (F) At the end of the period of detention, at the Prosecutor’s request indicating the grounds 
upon which it is made and if warranted by the needs of the investigation, the Judge who made the order, 
or another Judge of the same Trial Chamber, may decide, subsequent to an inter partes hearing, to 
extend the detention for a period not exceeding 30 days. (G) At the end of that extension, at the 
Prosecutor’s request indicating the grounds upon which it is made and if warranted by special 
circumstances, the Judge who made the order, or another Judge of the same Trial Chamber, may decide, 
subsequent to an inter partes hearing, to extend the detention for a further period not exceeding 30 days. 
(H) The total period of detention shall in no case exceed 90 days, at the end of which, in the event the 
indictment has not been confirmed and an arrest warrant signed, the suspect shall be released or, if 
appropriate, be delivered to the authorities of the requested State. (I) The provisions in Rules 55(B) to 
59 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of the order for the transfer and provisional detention 
relative to a suspect. (J) After his transfer to the seat of the Tribunal, the suspect, assisted by his counsel, 
shall be brought, without delay, before the Judge who made the order, or another Judge of the same 
Trial Chamber, who shall ensure that his rights are respected. (K) During detention, the Prosecutor and 
the suspect or his counsel may submit to the Trial Chamber of which the Judge who made the order is a 
member, all applications relative to the propriety of provisional detention or to the suspect’s release. (L) 
Without prejudice to Sub-rules (C) to (H), the Rules relating to the detention on remand of (…) accused 
persons shall apply [mutatis mutandis] to the provisional detention of persons under this Rule.” 
813 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 7. 
814 See ibid. See also ibid., para. 9: “The President of Cameroon issued a Presidential Decree on 21 
October 1997, authorising the transfer of the Appellant to the Tribunal’s detention unit. On 22 October 
1997, the Prosecutor submitted the indictment for confirmation, and on 23 October 1997, Judge 
Aspegren confirmed the indictment, and issued a Warrant of Arrest and Order for Surrender addressed 








Another remarkable point is that Barayagwiza filed a writ of habeas corpus on 
29 September 1997 to challenge the legality of his detention but his application was 
never considered.815  
In addition, it also took quite some time before Barayagwiza appeared in the 
courtroom for the first time: his initial appearance was on 23 February 1998,816 more 
than three months after he was transferred to the ICTR and more than 22 months 
after his arrest in Cameroon.    
The following day, Barayagwiza filed his ‘Extremely Urgent Motion by the 
Defence for Orders to Review and/or Nullify the Arrest and Provisional Detention 
of the Suspect’ in which he submitted, among other things, that a number of his 
rights had been violated817 and that as a result, he requested the Trial Chamber to 
declare: “1. The arrest and provisional detention unlawful, null and void. 2. The 
entire proceedings are a nullity. 3. The accused be set free. 4. In the alternative, that 
the accused be released on bail pending further hearing.”818  
This motion was dismissed by Trial Chamber II on 17 November 1998. In doing 
so, it held, among other things, that “the accused was arrested at the behest of the 
Rwandan and Belgian governments”,819 that “the Defence failed to show that the 
accused was kept in custody because of the Prosecutor (...) before 21 February 
1997”,820 that “detention under rule 40 for a period between 21 February 1997 and 3 
March 1997 (...) does not violate the rights of the accused under rule 40”821 and that 
neither did the long period between 3 March 1997 and 19 November 1997 violate 
Rule 40 bis of the ICTR RPE because   
 
[t]he maximum time periods for provisional detention provided for under rule 40 (bis) 
take effect from the day after the accused is transferred. At the end of the maximum 
time periods provided for under rule 40 (bis), if the indictment has not been 
confirmed and an arrest warrant signed, the suspect shall be released or delivered to 
the authorities of the State to which the request was initially made. In the instant case 
the indictment of the accused was confirmed before the accused was even transferred 
[emphasis in original, ChP].822   
                                                          
815 See ibid., para. 8. 
816 See ibid., para. 9. 
817 See ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor versus Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, ‘Decision on the 
Extremely Urgent Motion by the Defence for Orders to Review and/or Nullify the Arrest and 
Provisional Detention of the Suspect’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-I, 17 November 1999, p. 2: “In the 
Motion, the Defence submit[s]; 1. That the accused rights, liberties and freedoms under article 20 of the 
Statute have been violated because: the provisional detention was a miscarriage of justice under rule 5 
(Non-co[m]pli[a]nce with Rules); the Prosecutor’s request for provisional detention was unprocedural 
and unwarranted; Rule 40(bis) (Transfer and Provisional Detention of Suspects) was not satisfied 
regarding the provisional detention; and there was no justification for the arrest or provisional detention. 
2. Rule 40(bis) breaches the provisions of article 17, 18 and 19 of the Statute. 3. The provisional charges 
were illegal.” 
818 Ibid., p. 2. 
819 Ibid., p. 4. 
820 Ibid. 
821 Ibid.  








The fact that Cameroon had waited so long after 3 March 1997 for the transfer of 
Barayagwiza could not lead to a violation of the RPE by the Prosecution.823 
Barayagwiza appealed this decision and on 3 November 1999, the Appeals 
Chamber issued its controversial decision which will now be considered in greater 
detail. 
The Appeals Chamber examined two main issues, namely 1) whether the rights 
of Barayagwiza were violated and 2) the abuse of process doctrine.  
With respect to the first main issue, it looked at the right to be promptly charged 
under Rule 40 bis of the ICTR RPE and the period of time between the transfer of 
Barayagwiza and his initial appearance.  
Focusing on the first element, the Appeals Chamber found that there were “two 
relevant periods of time under which Cameroon was clearly holding the Appellant at 
the behest of the Tribunal”.824  
The first ran from 17 April 1996 to 16 May 1996825 and the second ran from 4 
March 1997 to 19 November 1997.826 With respect to the second period of time827 
(when Barayagwiza was only held at the behest of the Tribunal – it is to be recalled 
that from 17 April 1996 – 16 May 1996, Barayagwiza was also detained because of 
the inter-State extradition procedures), the judges clarified that “Cameroon was 
holding the Appellant in constructive custody for the Tribunal by virtue of the 
Tribunal’s lawful process or authority”.828 This means that the ICTR was detaining 
Barayagwiza pursuant to lawful authority but in the absence of physical control.829 
The judges also clarified: “This finding does not mean, however, that the Tribunal 
was responsible for each and every aspect of the Appellant’s detention, but only for 
the decision to place and maintain the Appellant in custody.”830  
That may, of course, be the Appeals Chamber’s opinion (see, however, infra), 
but it is submitted that the Tribunal, even if it is not, strictly speaking, responsible 
for certain wrongs, should take responsibility for them. If actors involved in the 
arrest/detention of suspects (such as national States and international forces) arrest 
and detain a suspect for and at the behest of the Tribunal, the Tribunal should bear 
                                                          
823 See ibid. 
824 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 43. 
825 On 17 April 1996, two days after Barayagwiza’s initial arrest on the basis of the Rwandan and 
Belgian extradition requests, the Prosecutor made his first Rule 40 request for provisional detention and 
on 16 May 1996, he indicated that he was no longer interested in pursuing the case, see ibid. 
826 4 March 1997 is the day when the Rule 40 bis Order was filed and 19 November 1997 the day when 
Barayagwiza was transferred to the ICTR, see ibid., para. 44. 
827 See also ibid., para. 100. 
828 Ibid., para. 61. 
829 See ibid., para. 58. One wonders why the ICTR does not conclude then that Barayagwiza was also in 
the constructive custody of the ICTR between 17 April 1996 and 16 May 1996. After all, also in that 
period, it could be argued that the ICTR was detaining Barayagwiza pursuant to lawful authority 
(namely pursuant to the request based on Rule 40 of the ICTR RPE) but in the absence of physical 
control. The fact that Barayagwiza by that time was also held in custody by Cameroon because of the 
inter-State extradition procedures does not seem to change this. It is submitted that to detain a person at 
the behest of the ICTR/to have a suspect in the constructive custody of the ICTR is the same. 








the ultimate responsibility for every aspect of this process. As explained, although 
the Tribunal may not, strictly speaking, be responsible for certain violations (for 
example, if the suspect is mistreated by a State official while the former is in pre-
transfer detention pursuant to a request from the Tribunal), one could argue that this 
entire constructive custody period falls under the more general responsibility of the 
Tribunal.831 Hence, even if certain violations occurring in this context cannot, 
strictly speaking, be attributed to the Tribunal, one can argue that the entire 
constructive custody period/detention at the request/behest of the Tribunal is 
attributable to the Tribunal in a more general sense. In fact, one can even make a 
more general submission, see also the final words from the discussion of the 
Karadžić case, namely that simple fairness – among other things, this point will be 
returned to – towards the suspect demands that every wrong/irregularity/violation832 
committed in the context of the Tribunal’s case more generally (whether this 
occurred in the constructive custody period or not) should be remedied by the 
Tribunal, even if that Tribunal was – strictly speaking – not responsible for it.833  
It is, of course, difficult to define the exact meaning of 
“wrongs/irregularities/violations committed in the context of a Tribunal case” but 
one clear example which should definitely fit this definition – besides the obvious 
example of organs of the Tribunal having committed the violations themselves – are 
irregularities in the arrest and detention executed by States/international forces if the 
Tribunal has requested that the suspect be arrested and detained by these parties, see 
supra. Other situations may very well also fit the “in the context of” criterion, but 
these should be considered on a case-by-case basis.834 For example, in the ICTY 
                                                          
831 Cf. also DeFrancia 2001, p. 1438: “Protections of the international system should, as far as possible, 
apply at the moment of the suspect or accused is in the constructive custody of the international court.” 
832 Again taking into account that certain errors are so small and insignificant that they cannot be seen as 
actual wrongs/irregularities/violations in need of a remedy. Cf. the Brima case and the question when 
one can speak of an unlawful arrest/detention, see n. 603 of Chapter III and ns. 205 and 242 of the 
present chapter. 
833 Cf. also Sluiter 2003 B, p. 942: “[T]he trial forum must take account of every human rights violation 
that occurs in the framework of the criminal proceedings. This view finds its ultimate basis in simple 
fairness and in the nature of the relationship between the accused and the trial forum.” 
834 See also Judge Lal Chand Vohrah’s declaration to the still-to-discuss 2000 decision in Semanza (see 
also n. 985) where he stated: “If an accused is arrested or detained by a state at the request or under the 
authority of the Tribunal, even though the accused is not yet within the actual custody of the Tribunal, 
the Tribunal has a responsibility to provide whatever relief is available to it to attempt to reduce any 
violations as much as possible, and this remedy must be proportional to the violations. (…) I would also 
like to note my apprehension of certain language employed in the present Decision, which states that the 
“Appeals Chamber emphasises that, in any case, the Tribunal is not responsible for the period of time 
which elapsed before the Appellant was transferred to the Detention Facility of the Tribunal.” [It must 
be noted that this is not an entirely accurate reproduction of the Appeals Chamber’s words. The original 
Appeals Chamber’s words go as follows: “[T]he Appeals Chamber emphasizes that in any event, the 
Tribunal is not responsible for the time that elapsed before the Appellant was transferred to the 
Tribunal’s Detention Facility.”, ChP.] (…) I do not take it to imply nor should it be interpreted as 
implying, that the Tribunal has no responsibility to an accused before he is transferred to the Detention 
Facility of the Tribunal when the accused has been arrested or detained at the behest of the Tribunal. 
This accords with the position taken in the Barayagwiza Review Decision, that the cumulative effects of 








Nikolić case, the Trial Chamber held that the ICTY would find it very hard to 
continue the case if a person was seriously mistreated before being handed over to 
the Tribunal (irrespective of who was responsible for this mistreatment).835 It was 
argued in the context of that case that if the Tribunal takes the ultimate 
responsibility (namely by refusing jurisdiction) for serious male captus cases, it 
should also definitely have the authority to take responsibility for less serious 
irregularities committed against a person before that person is handed over to the 
Tribunal, irrespective of which entity committed those irregularities. Although 
“before (…) handed over” may encompass huge time periods, the ICTY does not, of 
course, have to take responsibility for irregularities committed against the person 
which occurred 50 years ago and which cannot be connected in any way to the 
proceedings of the ICTY. Thus, one could assert that the ICTY is referring here to 
irregularities which are in some way related to the way a person was brought into its 
jurisdiction. Hence, alongside the more specific ‘at the request/behest’ situations 
(involving States and international forces), one may also look at this more generally 
formulated and thus broader situation, namely that the Tribunal will take 
responsibility for irregularities in some way related to the way a person was brought 
into its jurisdiction, irrespective of the question as to which entity 
(States/international forces/private individuals) committed these irregularities.836 In 
addition to these two situations, there may be other situations which could fall 
within the notion of “committed in the context of a Tribunal case”, but that would 
have to be determined on the basis of the exact circumstances.  
Returning to the judges’ clarification that “[t]his finding does not mean (…) that 
the Tribunal was responsible for each and every aspect of the Appellant’s detention, 
                                                                                                                                              
fashioning an appropriate remedy [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent 
Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, Declaration by Judge 
Lal Chand Vohrah, paras. 6-7.) Judge Lal Chand Vohrah further notes that “[r]esponsibility and 
authority to redress violations occurring at a time when the accused was not detained under Tribunal 
request or authority would need to be considered on a case by case basis.” (Ibid., para. 7, n. 7.) 
835 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
114: “[I]n a situation where an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe even subjected to inhuman, 
cruel or degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to the Tribunal, this may constitute a 
legal impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction over such an accused. This would certainly be the case 
where persons acting for SFOR or the Prosecution were involved in such very serious mistreatment. But 
even without such involvement this Chamber finds it extremely difficult to justify the exercise of 
jurisdiction over a person if that person was brought into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal after having 
been seriously mistreated.” 
836 See ibid., para. 111: “Ensuring that the Accused’s rights are respected and that he receives a fair trial 
forms, in actual fact, an important aspect of the general concept of due process of law. In that context, 
this Chamber concurs with the view expressed in several national judicial decisions, according to which 
the issue of respect for due process of law encompasses more than merely the duty to ensure a fair trial 
for the Accused. Due process of law also includes questions such as how the Parties have been 
conducting themselves in the context of a particular case and how an Accused has been brought into the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal [emphasis added, ChP].” Mohan 2009, p. 22 notes here: “Although the 
Chamber’s decision was far from perfect, it acknowledged that violations of Nikolic’s rights at the pre-
trial stage could undermine the fairness of the proceedings and must be redressed as a matter of fairness 








but only for the decision to place and maintain the Appellant in custody”, one could 
argue that the ICTR is actually in favour of taking a broader responsibility when it 
later concluded “that the length of time that the Appellant was detained in 
Cameroon at the behest of the Tribunal without being indicted violates Rule 40bis 
and established human rights jurisprudence governing detention of suspects”.837 
Hence, the Tribunal is concerned that the suspect’s pre-transfer detention is not in 
conformity with human rights case law concerning the detention of suspects. That 
may mean that the Tribunal is in fact interested in (and may take responsibility for) 
more elements of the pre-transfer period than just “the decision to place and 
maintain the Appellant in custody”, even if the Tribunal itself is, strictly speaking, 
not responsible for them. As was previously clarified in discussed cases in this book, 
in the remainder of this decision, it appeared that the Appeals Chamber more clearly 
confirmed this stance.  
Turning to the second element, the period of time between the transfer of 
Barayagwiza and his initial appearance: could the 96-day period (between 19 
November 1997 and 23 February 1998) be seen as violating the requirement that the 
initial appearance is to be held “without delay”?838 The Appeals Chamber held that 
it could.839  
With respect to the second main issue, the abuse of process doctrine, the Appeals 
Chamber explained that this doctrine would be used to look at Barayagwiza’s 
allegations regarding the following three issues: 
 
1) the right to be promptly informed of the charges during the first period of 
detention; 2) the alleged failure of the Trial Chamber to resolve the writ of habeas 
corpus filed by the Appellant; and 3) the Appellant’s assertions that the Prosecutor 
did not diligently prosecute her case against him.840    
 
However, before turning to these three issues, the Appeals Chamber first described 
some general features of the abuse of process doctrine.  
                                                          
837 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 67. It may be interesting to note that the Appeals Chamber was of 
the opinion that the suspect’s right to be promptly charged (see Rule 40 bis of the ICTR RPE) becomes 
effective when an order based on this rule has been filed. See ibid. However, it must be noted that Rule 
40 bis (C) states that “[t]he provisional detention of the suspect may be ordered for a period not 
exceeding 30 days from the day after the transfer of the suspect to the detention unit of the Tribunal 
[emphasis added, ChP].” In that respect, one can wonder whether Rule 40 bis was in fact violated. The 
Appeals Chamber, however, remarked on this point: “[T]he purpose of Rule 40 and Rule 40bis is to 
limit the time that a suspect may be provisionally detained without the issuance of an indictment. This 
comports with international human rights standards.” (Ibid., para. 53.) (See also n. 982 and 
accompanying text.) 
838 See ibid., para. 69. 
839 See ibid., para. 71: “Based on the plain meaning of the phrase, ‘without delay’, the Appeals Chamber 
finds that a 96-day delay between the transfer of the Appellant to the Tribunal’s detention unit and his 
initial appearance to be a violation of his fundamental rights as expressed by Articles 19 and 20, 
internationally-recognised human rights standards and Rule 62.” 








Here, it repeated the above-mentioned point identified in other cases that in the 
context of the abuse of process doctrine, the Tribunal should be concerned by and 
take responsibility for pre-transfer wrongs, irrespective of who was responsible for 
them: 
      
[T]his analysis focuses on the alleged violations of the Appellant’s rights and is not 
primarily concerned with the entity responsible for the alleged violation(s). As will be 
discussed, it is clear that there are overlapping areas of responsibility between the 
three organs of the Tribunal and as a result, it is conceivable that more than one organ 
could be responsible for the violations of the Appellant’s rights. However, even if 
fault is shared between the three organs of the Tribunal – or is the result of the actions 
of a third party, such as Cameroon – it would undermine the integrity of the judicial 
process to proceed. Furthermore, it would be unfair for the Appellant to stand trial on 
these charges if his rights were egregiously violated. Thus, under the abuse of process 
doctrine, it is irrelevant which entity or entities were responsible for the alleged 
violations of the Appellant’s rights.841    
 
As was stated earlier, one can wonder whether the national abuse of process doctrine 
in fact deems the perpetrator of the violation irrelevant; although it is true that there 
are some cases in which rather general statements were made, statements which 
could be seen as supporting the ICTR’s explanation,842 it was concluded in the 
previous chapter of this book that it appears that the prosecuting forum’s own 
authorities must be involved in the irregularity before one can turn to the abuse of 
process doctrine.  
Nevertheless, even if the national abuse of process doctrine does not support the 
idea that a court may refuse jurisdiction if a third party were responsible for the 
violations, it is clear that this study supports this ICTR’s version of the abuse of 
process doctrine: as the Tribunals do not have their own police force, it is 
appropriate that they not only take advantage of achievements effectuated by the 
parties on which they depend (national police forces, international troops etc.) but 
also take responsibility if something goes wrong in the arrest and transfer phase.843 
                                                          
841 Ibid. 
842 See the following words of Lord Lowry in Bennett (see n. 610 and accompanying text of Chapter III 
and ns. 300 and 310 and accompanying text of Chapter V): “[A] court has a discretion to stay any 
criminal proceedings on the ground that to try those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own 
process either (1) because it will be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair 
trial or (2) because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in 
the circumstances of a particular case.” See also the following words of Lord Steyn in Latif (see n. 346 
and accompanying text of Chapter V): “[P]roceedings may be stayed in the exercise of the judge’s 
discretion not only where a fair trial is impossible but also where it would be contrary to the public 
interest in the integrity of the criminal justice system that a trial should take place.” Not very 
surprisingly, these quotations were also referred to by the Appeals Chamber, see ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 
November 1999, paras. 74-75. (See also ns. 730 and 739.) 
843 Cf. also the still-to-discuss 2000 decision in Barayagwiza (“[A]ll violations demand a remedy”: 
ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s Request 
for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 31 March 2000, para. 74.), Sluiter 2001, 








In that respect, they should also be able to, for example, review the circumstances 
surrounding the arrests and detentions made by national States and international 
forces on the ground.844     
The Appeals Chamber, after having stated that “[u]nder the doctrine of “abuse of 
process”, proceedings that have been lawfully initiated may be terminated after an 
indictment has been issued if improper or illegal procedures are employed in 
pursuing an otherwise lawful process”,845 subsequently stressed the discretionary 
approach of the abuse of process doctrine: “It is a process by which Judges may 
decline to exercise the court’s jurisdiction in cases where to exercise that jurisdiction 
in light of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove 
detrimental to the court’s integrity.”846   
After having discussed a number of national abuse of process cases, which were, 
by the way, not all correctly summarised,847 and after having mentioned the three 
                                                                                                                                              
should not be the victim of the fragmentation of the criminal procedure over two or even more 
jurisdictions. In other cases, Trial Chambers have acknowledged their responsibility in this respect and 
have not refrained from providing drastic remedies in cases where the rights of the defendant were 
violated in the pre-trial phase, even if the Tribunal itself had no part in it [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].”) and Swart 2002 A, p. 1250: “Where it is a case involving the ad hoc Tribunals, rather than a 
case of extradition between two States, the responsibility for the person’s arrest/or detention lies mainly 
with the Tribunals, and it is therefore principally to the Tribunals that a suspect or accused must turn for 
the protection of his basic individual rights when deprived of his liberty for the purpose of surrender.” 
844 This view, see also ns. 138 and 208 and accompanying text, is not in conformity with the (Trial 
Chamber) cases of Djukić and Krsmanović, Karemera, Ngirumpatse, Kajelijeli, Nshamihigo, Nzirorera 
and Nyiramasuhuko (where the Tribunal argued that it was not competent to review the legality of the 
arrests and detentions made at the national level), but it does appear to be in conformity with the 
(arguably better) view of the Appeals Chamber. This will be further discussed in the next cases. 
845 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74. 
846 Ibid. Note, however, that this test is arguably relative, see n. 618. 
847 For example, the Appeals Chamber stated that “[i]n R. v. Hartley, the Wellington Court of Appeal 
relied on the abuse of process doctrine in quashing a conviction that rested on an unlawful arrest and the 
illegally obtained confession that followed [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
(ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-
19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 75.) As already explained in n. 133 (and accompanying text) of the 
previous chapter (and see the remainder of this footnote), this is incorrect. Schabas, in his commentary 
to the Barayagwiza case, doubts the precedential value of the abuse of process cases invoked by the 
Appeals Chamber, hereby indicating that the seriousness of Barayagwiza’s alleged charges should play 
a role: “For example, as “one of the leading cases,” the judgment cites one [this is the Bennett case, 
ChP] in which a stay for abuse of process was allowed “because it offends the court’s sense of justice 
and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of a particular case.” What the appeals 
chamber does not mention is that the crime in question was fraudulent purchase of a helicopter, and that 
the accused had been handcuffed to an airplane seat by South African policemen in lieu of the normal 
extradition process. A second case, cited by the appeals chamber to support a stay for failure to inform 
an accused of the charges, involved driving while intoxicated. A third case concerned firearms charges 
but no killing. Only the fourth case dealt with homocide [this is the Hartley case, ChP], but contrary to 
what the appeals chamber contends, a conviction was not quashed based on abuse of process. Although 
the Court of Appeal of Wellington was harsh in its criticism of an illegal rendition, the court explicitly 
refrained from ordering a stay for abuse of process, and overturned the conviction because of an 
illegally obtained confession. The court noted that without the confession, there was no evidence – an 








important functions of the use of supervisory powers (a notion “[c]losely related to 
the abuse of process doctrine”),848 namely “to provide a remedy for the violation of 
the accused’s rights; to deter future misconduct; and to enhance the integrity of the 
judicial process [original footnote omitted, ChP]”,849 the Appeals Chamber looked at 
the above-mentioned three elements850 to find out “whether it would offend the 
Tribunal’s sense of justice to proceed to the trial of the accused”.851 This question 
was based on the following, and already briefly mentioned,852 abuse of process test:  
 
[T]he abuse of process doctrine may be relied on in two distinct situations: (1) where 
delay has made a fair trial for the accused impossible; and (2) where in the 
circumstances of a particular case, proceeding with the trial of the accused would 
contravene the court’s sense of justice, due to the pre-trial impropriety or 
misconduct.853 
 
With respect to the first of the three elements, the right to be promptly informed of 
the charges during the first period of detention, the Appeals Chamber noted that this 
right was indeed violated854 and repeated its point made earlier that it would take 
responsibility for the violations suffered by the suspect, even if the Tribunal, to a 
great extent, is, strictly speaking, not responsible for them: 
 
In the present case, the Appellant was detained for a total of 11 months before he was 
informed of the general nature of the charges that the Prosecutor was pursuing against 
him. While we acknowledge that only 35 days out of the 11-month total are clearly 
attributable to the Tribunal (the periods from 17 April – 16 May 1996 and 4 – 10 
March 1997),[855] the fact remains that the Appellant spent an inordinate amount of 
time in provisional detention without knowledge of the general nature of the charges 
                                                                                                                                              
Presumably, if the appeals chamber had found any case whatsoever where the facts were even remotely 
similar to those before it – that is, where multiple murder charges had been stayed because of a delay of 
less than two years – it would have cited the case in its judgment [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
(Schabas 2000, p. 567.) 
848 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 76.  
849 Ibid. Cf. also n. 471 and accompanying text. 
850 See n. 840 and accompanying text. 
851 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 77. 
852 See ns. 729 and 738 and accompanying text. 
853 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 77. 
854 See ibid., para. 78: “In the present case, the Appellant makes several assertions regarding the precise 
date he was informed of the charges. However, using the earliest date, we conclude that the Appellant 
was informed of the charges on 10 March 1997 when the Cameroon Deputy Prosecutor showed him a 
copy of the Rule 40bis Order. This was approximately 11 months after he was initially detained 
pursuant to the first Rule 40 request [emphasis in original and original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
855 See also n. 829 where it was wondered why the ICTR does not conclude that Barayagwiza was also 
in the constructive custody of the ICTR between 17 April 1996 and 16 May 1996. After all, also in that 
period, it could be argued that the ICTR was detaining Barayagwiza pursuant to lawful authority 









against him. At this juncture, it is irrelevant that only a small portion of that total 
period of provisional detention is attributable to the Tribunal, since it is the Tribunal – 
and not any other entity – that is currently adjudicating the Appellant’s claims. 
Regardless of which other parties may be responsible, the inescapable conclusion is 
that the Appellant’s right to be promptly informed of the charges against him was 
violated.856      
 
The ICTR takes responsibility here for irregularities (irrespective of which entity 
committed them) which occurred even beyond the constructive custody/the 
detention at the behest of the Tribunal.857 Schabas has criticised this stance because 
it would be “tantamount to holding the prosecutor responsible for things over which 
she had no control”.858 Schabas may have a point here, for this violation was also 
taken into account when the judges formulated their final remedy, which was, as 
will be shown at the end of this case, with prejudice to the Prosecutor. However, it is 
arguably a good thing that the judges take the ultimate responsibility for violations 
committed in the context of their case, irrespective of whether the Prosecutor or 
another entity was responsible for these violations. Hence, that may also include 
violations committed by entities over which the organs of the Tribunal have no 
control. One could think here, for example, of private individuals involved in the 
kidnapping of a suspect. The only important requirement is arguably that these 
wrongs can in some way be connected to the context of the Tribunal case (at least, if 
one does not want that the Tribunal takes responsibility for wrongs which have 
absolutely nothing to do with the Tribunal case).859 Two examples have already 
                                                          
856 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 85. 
857 See also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 100: “[E]ven if he was not in the constructive custody of 
the Tribunal, the period of provisional detention was impermissibly lengthy.” However, one cannot 
agree with the ICTR’s conclusion a few paragraphs later that “[i]n the present case, the Appellant has 
been in provisional detention since 15 April 1996 – more than three years. During that time, he spent 11 
months in illegal provisional detention at the behest of the Tribunal without the benefits, rights and 
protections afforded by being formally charged [emphasis added, ChP].” (Ibid., para. 104.) After all, 
only a few days of the 11 months between 15 April 1996 and 10 March 1997 were at the behest of the 
ICTR (between 17 April and 16 May 1996 and between 4 March and 10 March 1997). (According to the 
ICTR, Barayagwiza was only in the constructive custody of the ICTR between 4 March and 10 March 
1997, but it was argued before (see ns. 829 and 855) that one could add to this constructive custody 
period the other ‘at the behest of the ICTR’ period (between 17 April and 16 May 1996). As explained 
in n. 829 (and 855), these concepts are arguably the same. Why the ICTR only qualifies the second 
(between 4 March and 19 November 1997) and not the first ‘at the behest of’ period (between 17 April 
and 16 May 1996) as ‘constructive custody’ of the ICTR is unclear.) 
858 Schabas 2000, p. 569. See also ibid., pp. 568-569. 
859 In that respect, one cannot agree more with Zahar and Sluiter (2008, pp. 285-286, see also n. 799 and 
accompanying text) when they state: “When other entities bear primary responsibility for violations of 
human rights, what matters is the duty of every tribunal bench to protect the fairness and integrity of the 
trial by determining an appropriate remedy. Obviously, the trial does not start at the seat of the tribunal 
but extends to every act connected with it. While this may be a heavy and seemingly unfair burden on 
the tribunals – they interact with a wide variety of actors, not all of whom may apply the highest 
standards of justice, and the tribunals are not in a position to change this – the reverse is even more 








been mentioned in that respect: irregularities committed while the suspect was in the 
constructive custody of the Tribunal and irregularities in some way connected to the 
way a person was brought into the jurisdiction of the court. However, there may be 
other situations falling under the notion “committed in the context of a Tribunal 
case” but they would have to be determined on the basis of the exact circumstances 
of the case. In this case, the judges stated that they would take into account the 
entire 11-month period of detention, even if only a small portion of that period was 
at the behest of the Tribunal, “since it is the Tribunal – and not any other entity – 
that is currently adjudicating the Appellant’s claims”. However, the fact that the 
Tribunal is now adjudicating the case does not mean that the Tribunal also has to 
take responsibility for every violation ever suffered by the suspect. As already 
explained, the minimum requirement must obviously be that the violation was 
committed in the context of the Tribunal case. Otherwise, the Tribunal would also 
have to remedy human rights violations suffered by the suspect 50 years ago which 
have nothing to do with the Tribunal, for the only reason that the Tribunal is now 
trying that suspect. That, of course, would be a ridiculous situation. However, the 
Tribunal is probably saying that it needs to take responsibility for violations 
committed in the context of the Tribunal case, irrespective of the question of who 
committed these violations, because it is the Tribunal that is now trying this case. 
That is to be welcomed. Although the judges do not explain very clearly how they 
view these violations as falling within the context of the ICTR case, an explanation 
may be that these violations occurred after the Prosecution started the case against 
Barayagwiza and in a period during which the Prosecution, even if Barayagwiza 
was not detained at the ICTR’s behest, was nevertheless (perceived to be)860 
involved in the case.861  
With respect to the second element, the alleged failure of the Trial Chamber to 
resolve the writ of habeas corpus filed by Barayagwiza, the Appeals Chamber stated 
that Barayagwiza was indeed “never afforded an opportunity to be heard on the writ 
of habeas corpus”.862 This notwithstanding the importance of the possibility for a 
detained person to “have recourse to an independent judicial officer for review of 
                                                                                                                                              
Nyiramasuhuko, Ngirumpatse, Kajelijeli, Karemera and Nzirorera (see also ns. 138, 208-209 and 844 
and accompanying text), ChP] not to review national activities is simply untenable from the perspective 
of the duty to ensure a fair trial [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
860 See, for example, Schabas 2000, p. 564: “On May 31, 1996, the Yaounde Court of Appeal suspended 
the Rwandan extradition hearing, apparently at the request of Cameroon deputy director of public 
prosecutions, and proceedings did not resume for many months. The Cameroon authorities claimed they 
were acting pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Statute, which asserts the primacy of the ICTR and requires 
states to relinquish jurisdiction in its favor. Cameroon’s having made such a claim, would, moreover, 
explain why, while awaiting the Yaounde Court of Appeal decision, Barayagwiza wrote to the ICTR 
complaining about his detention.” 
861 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 86: “The numerous letters attached to one of the 
Appellant’s submissions point to the fact that the Appellant was in continuous communication with all 
three organs of the Tribunal in an attempt to assert his rights.” 








the detaining authority’s acts”.863 The judges concluded that even though their 
decision (of 3 November 1999) rendered the writ of Barayagwiza moot,  
 
the failure to provide the Appellant a hearing on this writ violated his right to 
challenge the legality of his continued detention in Cameroon during the two periods 
                                                          
863 Ibid., para. 88. The Appeals Chamber clarified that the fact that a detained person must have this 
possibility, even if “neither the Statute nor the Rules specifically address writs of habeas corpus as 
such” (ibid.), “is well-established by the Statute and Rules. Moreover, this is a fundamental right and is 
enshrined in international human rights norms, including Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Article 9(4) of the ICCPR, Article 5(4) of the ECHR and Article 7(6) of the ACHR 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) See for other examples from the context of the UN ad hoc 
Tribunals also n. 407 and accompanying text of this chapter (the Milosević case), ICTY, Trial Chamber 
II, Prosecutor v Radoslav Brñanin, ‘Decision on Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus On Behalf of 
Radoslav Brñanin’, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, 8 December 1999, paras. 2-6, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The 
Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, ‘Decision on the Defence Extremely Urgent Motion on Habeas 
Corpus and for Stoppage of Proceedings’, Case No. ICTR-96-15-I, 23 May 2000, paras. 27-28, ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 
2000, paras. 112-113, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Samuel Musabyimana, ‘Decision on 
Musabyimana’s Motion on the Violation of Rule 55 and International Law at the Time of his Arrest and 
Transfer’, Case No. ICTR-2001-62-T, 20 June 2002, para. 24 and ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor 
v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Notice of Appeal’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR72, 9 January 2003, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 11. See also n. 45 and, generally, n. 880. Note that in the 
Kanyabashi case, the judges, after having referred to the rather broad scope of some national habeas 
corpus concepts (they provide, for instance, the example of the US writ of habeas corpus ad 
subiiciendum (see also n. 42 of Chapter II) which “extends to all constitutional challenges” (ICTR, Trial 
Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, ‘Decision on the Defence Extremely Urgent Motion 
on Habeas Corpus and for Stoppage of Proceedings’, Case No. ICTR-96-15-I, 23 May 2000, para. 24)), 
stipulate that “[t]he Chamber restates that the Tribunal is not bound by any national law. It finds the 
notion of habeas corpus at the international level is limited to a review of the legality of detention. The 
Accused’s Motion, apart from the submission of violation of the right to protection from unlawful 
detention, is beyond that scope and, therefore, is not proper.” (Ibid., para. 28.) Although the judges do 
not mention this point very clearly, it can be argued that the concept of the right to protection from 
unlawful detention used by the judges must, of course, also encompasses the consequence of release if 
the detention (and arguably also the arrest) is to be considered unlawful, in conformity with what 
appears to be the scope of the habeas corpus concept at the international level, see, for example, Art. 9, 
para. 4 of the ICCPR, Art. 5, para. 4 of the ECHR and Art. 7, para. 6 of the ACHR. (See also Chapter III 
of this book.) Even though it has been argued earlier that this remedy is not without its problems and 
that it would be better if judges confronted by a male captus of a considerable but not serious nature 
would continue the case instead and accord other, real remedies, such a construction can, of course, only 
be suggested if one assumes in the first place that judges in principle have the obligation to release the 
suspect in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention. If the judges do not even recognise that, then there 
would be no need to devise a construction on how to cope with irregularities which can be linked with 
one’s deprivation of liberty. (However, that cannot be seriously maintained by judges for it could mean 
that a suspect would not even be released in the case of the most extreme unlawful arrest/detention, a 
situation which, of course, has nothing to do with protection from unlawful detention.) Finally, it must 
also be stated that the ICTR was willing to look at the other objections of Kanyabashi, even though they 
were, according to the judges, beyond the scope of the habeas corpus concept (violation of right to 
protection from unlawful detention). One of those objections was the violation of the right to be 
promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest/detention/charges. However, one can argue that this right 
is in fact part of this concept. Cf., for example, Swart when he notes that “a failure to promptly inform 
the person of the reasons for his arrest and of any charges against him makes his detention illegal.” 









when he was held at the behest of the Tribunal and the belated issuance of the 
indictment did not nullify that violation.864     
 
Regarding the third and final element, Barayagwiza’s assertions that the Prosecutor 
did not diligently prosecute her case against him, the judges first stated that “once 
the Prosecutor has set this process [namely the process of bringing a defendant to 
trial, ChP] in motion, she is under a duty to ensure that, within the scope of her 
authority, the case proceeds to trial in a way that respects the rights of the 
accused”.865  
The judges then explained that Barayagwiza had “claimed that the Prosecutor 
simply forgot about his case”.866 Although such a claim is, of course, very difficult 
to prove, the judges noted “that after the Appellant raised this claim, the Prosecutor 
failed to rebut it in any form, relying solely on the argument that it was Cameroon’s 
failure to transfer the Appellant that resulted in this delay”.867  
However, that argument was not credible to the judges, who stated, among other 
things, that “[t]he Prosecutor provided no evidence that she contacted the authorities 
in Cameroon in an attempt to get them to comply with the Rule 40bis Order 
[original footnote omitted, ChP]”.868 Hence, “the only logical conclusion to be 
drawn (…) is that the Prosecutor failed in her duty to diligently prosecute this 
case”.869   
After having repeated the conclusions related to the two main issues of this 
case,870 the Appeals Chamber turned to the final point to be looked at here: the 
appropriate remedy for these pre-trial irregularities.  
The judges, hereby also referring to the seriousness of Barayagwiza’s charges, 
concluded: 
 
The crimes for which the Appellant is charged are very serious. However, in this case 
the fundamental rights of the Appellant were repeatedly violated. What may be 
worse, it appears that the Prosecutor’s failure to prosecute this case was tantamount to 
negligence. We find this conduct to be egregious and, in light of the numerous 
violations, conclude that the only remedy available for such prosecutorial inaction 
                                                          
864 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 90. 
865 Ibid., para. 92. 
866 Ibid., para. 98. 
867 Ibid.  
868 Ibid.  
869 Ibid., para. 99. 
870 See ibid., paras. 100-101. See for a brief summary also ibid., para. 104: “In the present case, the 
Appellant has been in provisional detention since 15 April 1996 – more than three years. During that 
time, he spent 11 months in illegal provisional detention at the behest of the Tribunal without the 
benefits, rights and protections afforded by being formally charged. [See for criticism on this point n.  
857, ChP.] He submitted a writ of habeas corpus seeking to be released from this confinement – and 
was never afforded an opportunity to be heard on this writ. Even after he was formally charged, he spent 
an additional 3 months awaiting his initial appearance, and several more months before he could be 








and the resultant denial of his rights is to release the Appellant and dismiss the 
charges against him.871  
 
Indeed, the judges clarified that Barayagwiza’s release and dismissal had to be with 
prejudice to the Prosecutor, meaning that the Prosecutor was barred from starting a 
new prosecution against Barayagwiza in the future.872 This is a clear male detentus 
verdict: because of the serious male captus involved, the court has no jurisdiction to 
try the person and the Prosecutor cannot start the trial anew when the person is 
released from custody.873  
The judges were aware of the fact that this remedy, which was “consistent with 
the jurisprudence of many national systems [original footnote omitted, ChP]”,874 
was extreme, but they felt that it was also necessary:  
 
As troubling as this disposition may be to some, the Appeals Chamber believes that to 
proceed with the Appellant’s trial when such violations have been committed, would 
cause irreparable damage to the integrity of the judicial process. Moreover, we find 
                                                          
871 Ibid., para. 106. See for the element ‘seriousness of the charges’ also Judge Shahabuddeen’s 
‘Separate Opinion’ to the decision of 3 November 1999, under ‘1. Post-transfer delay’: “Matters to be 
taken into account in evaluating whether that consequence [namely lack of jurisdiction, ChP] follows 
from a breach of the requirement of promptitude include the seriousness of the offences with which the 
accused is charged. Here the offences were serious. But the requirement of promptitude was 
fundamental, and its breach was also grave, the delay extending to a little over three months. On 
balance, I respectfully agree with the Appeals Chamber that the administration of justice by the Tribunal 
would suffer from proceeding with the case notwithstanding the delay.” 
872 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 108. See also n. 611 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
873 This also implies that there is a difference between a dismissal of the indictment/the charges as such 
and a dismissal of the indictment/the charges with prejudice to the Prosecutor in that the first remedy 
would not exclude a new trial. See also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 109: “The failure to hear 
the writ of habeas corpus, the delay in hearing the Extremely Urgent Motion, the prolonged detention of 
the Appellant without an indictment and the cumulative effect of these violations leave us with no 
acceptable option but to order the dismissal of the charges with prejudice and the Appellant’s immediate 
release from custody. We fear that if we were to dismiss the charges without prejudice, the Appellant 
would be subject to immediate re-arrest and his ordeal would begin anew [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” However, one can imagine that if a judge, because of the serious male captus involved, were to 
determine that the person’s indictment must be dismissed, that that should mean the real ending of the 
case. After all, it would be very strange if the Prosecutor could restart the trial after a judge has 
determined that the pre-trial irregularities are so serious that the charges must be dismissed. Note finally 
that the 1999 Barayagwiza decision can also be seen as a rupture with the Kabiligi decision (see n. 801) 
where the appeal of the suspect (who also claimed to have been the victim of serious violations, namely 
torture) was dismissed “on the basis that the Notice of Appeal did not go to the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal”. (Lamb 2000, p. 242, n. 279.) See also ibid.: “This decision (...) sits uncomfortably with the 
recent Appeals Chamber ruling in Barayagwiza (...) where, on the basis of numerous irregularities 
pertaining to the accused’s detention (some of which were attributable to the Office of the Prosecutor), 
the Appeals Chamber did resort to the exceptional remedy of dismissing the indictment against the 
accused and directing his immediate release.” 
874 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 108.  The judges referred here to a subsection of the decision in 








that it is the only effective remedy for the cumulative breaches of the accused’s 
rights.[875] Finally, this disposition may very well deter the commission of such 
serious violations in the future.876 
 
Although one can seriously wonder whether the violations suffered by Barayagwiza 
were indeed so serious that they must lead to the ending of the case (one could 
perhaps also opt for other, less far-reaching remedies such as a reduction of the 
sentence and/or compensation),877 an international criminal tribunal should, of 
course, have the power to release a person and dismiss the charges against him with 
prejudice to the Prosecutor.  
Such a male detentus remedy may constitute the only appropriate answer to 
serious irregularities in the pre-trial phase.  
The basis for this discretionary remedy lies in what is called the abuse of process 
doctrine in common law countries, namely the – arguably – inherent power of any 
judge (whether stemming from a common, civil or other legal background)878 to 
                                                          
875 See also ibid., para. 109: “We reiterate that what makes this case so egregious is the combination of 
delays that seemed to occur at virtually every stage of the Appellant’s case.” 
876 Ibid., para. 108. Cf. also n. 849 and accompanying text.  
877 Cf. also Swart 2001, p. 206: “I have attempted to explain that not all criticisms of the Appeals 
Chamber are justified. In my opinion, there was no violation of “the Appellant’s right to be promptly 
charged pursuant to international standard as reflected in Rule 40 bis”. Neither the ICCPR nor the 
ECHR recognise such a right. They accord the person the right to be promptly informed of the 
“charges”. That, however, is an entirely different matter. (...) On the other hand, it is obvious that the 
Appellant’s right to be promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest and of any ‘charges’ against him 
in accordance with international human rights standards had been violated, and more often than the 
Appeals Chamber assumed. [See, however, Schabas 2003, pp. 264-265, where he writes that 
Barayagwiza “must have known he was being held for his involvement in the Rwandan genocide from 
the moment of his arrest, and, most certainly, from the point he first appeared in court in Cameroon to 
answer the Rwandan and Belgian extradition requests. This was not some Kafkaesque scenario where an 
ignorant accused lingered in prison wanting to know what he might have done to justify arrest and 
detention. Where, then, is the violation of the international norm entitling any person “to be informed, at 
the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest” and to be “promptly informed of any charges against 
him” [original footnote omitted, ChP]?”, ChP.] Finally, I strongly disagree with the Appeals Chamber as 
to how long the Appellant spent in illegal detention in Cameroon at the behest of the Tribunal. In sum, 
the violations of Appellant’s rights, although serious, were considerably less egregious and numerous 
than the Appeals Chamber believed. (...) Another remedy which is accepted in the case law of 
international bodies concerning these two Articles [Artt. 9 of the ICCPR and 5 of the ECHR, ChP] has 
been the reduction of the sentence in the situation of a conviction (...). Finally, the two Articles provide 
that a person wrongfully arrested or detained shall have an enforceable right to compensation, a right 
that is of particular importance when a person has been acquitted. Of course, recourse can also be had to 
a combination of different remedies. My own assessment of the legal situation in the case of the 
Appellant leads me to believe that a combination of these remedies would have been an appropriate 
solution.” Note finally that the entire decision (including its far-reaching remedies) has also been hailed, 
although that opinion does not appear to be shared by many people. See DeFrancia 2001, p. 1405: 
“What should have been recognized as a healthy decision to strengthen the future integrity of the 
Tribunal was rather considered a “setback in efforts to hold accountable those responsible for the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994.” [original footnote omitted, ChP]” 
878 See, for example, the 1985 Stocké case (see ns. 512-513 and 516-517 and accompanying text of 
Chapter V) and the decision the German Federal Constitutional Court issued one year later: BVerfG (3. 








stop the proceedings if he is of the opinion, for example, that to continue the trial 
would seriously damage the integrity of the judicial process.879  
Before turning to its disposition, the Appeals Chamber stated the following last 
words, which generally (not focusing on the question as to whether or not 
Barayagwiza’s violations were indeed that serious as to divest jurisdiction) can only 
be applauded:  
 
The Tribunal – an institution whose primary purpose is to ensure that justice is done – 
must not place its imprimatur on such violations. To allow the Appellant to be tried 
on the charges for which he was belatedly indicted would be a travesty of justice. 
                                                                                                                                              
(see ns. 522-523 and 526 and accompanying text of Chapter V). Note that also in the Ebrahim case, 
words resembling the abuse of process doctrine were used: “The individual must be protected against 
illegal detention and abduction, the bounds of jurisdiction must not be exceeded, sovereignty must be 
respected, the legal process must be fair to those affected and abuse of law must be avoided in order to 
protect and promote the integrity of the administration of justice [emphasis added, ChP].” (Supreme 
Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 International Legal 
Materials (1992), p. 896.) Cf. also Nsereko 2008, p. 61: “Invoking the abuse of process doctrine, the 
South African court nullified the proceedings.” Note, however, that in that case, the Court did not state 
that judges had a discretion to consider whether the violations of these values had to lead to a refusal of 
jurisdiction. It simply stated that these violations entailed that the judges had no jurisdiction to try the 
case. See finally also Beahan (see n. 713 of Chapter V) and the reasoning of Acting Justice of Appeal 
O’Linn in the Mushwena case (see n. 781 and accompanying text of Chapter V). Cf. also Schabas 2000, 
p. 567, writing on the ICTR’s use of the abuse of process doctrine: “[T]he Chamber is (...) on firm legal 
ground in invoking abuse of process. In particular, even though the Statute gives the ICTR no explicit 
authority to stay proceedings in the case of abuse of process, the remedy is well recognized in national 
legal systems and can reasonably be deemed to be an inherent power.” See also Lamb 2000, p. 237, 
writing on “the inherent jurisdiction of any judicial body to prevent an abuse of its own process 
[emphasis added, ChP]”. See also ibid., p. 240: “[C]ases in which an otherwise-competent national court 
has declined to exercise jurisdiction over an accused stress the unacceptable and egregious nature of the 
violations of the accused’s rights which have occurred and the fact that all judicial bodies have an 
inherent jurisdiction to guard against abuses of their own process [emphasis added, ChP].” Cf. finally 
the words of Arbour in ns. 23-24 of the very first chapter of this book. Although she writes about quite 
another issue here (rendition), she connects the abuse of process doctrine with the words “any credible 
jurisdiction [emphasis added, ChP]”: “[The] features of the ‘new normal’ are characterized by the fact 
that it would appear that terrorist suspects are being arrested, detained and interrogated with no apparent 
intention of bringing them to trial. And I say ‘with no apparent intention of bringing them to trial’ 
because the circumstances of their arrest, detention and interrogation – take only the length of their 
detention – would in any credible jurisdiction amount to such an abuse of process that trial jurisdiction, 
if it ever existed, could never be exercised.” 
879 However, it must be noted that the Appeals Chamber, in defending the remedy, also referred to Rule 
40 bis (H) of the ICTR RPE which states that “[t]he total period of provisional detention shall in no case 
exceed 90 days, at the end of which, in the event the indictment has not been confirmed and an arrest 
warrant signed, the suspect shall be released or, if appropriate, be delivered to the authorities of the State 
to which the request was initially made.” The judges noted that the word “shall” “is imperative and is 
certainly not intended to permit the Prosecutor to file a new indictment and re-arrest the suspect.” 
(ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-
19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 110.) However, although judges may, of course, be of the opinion 
that if the Prosecutor has violated this provision to such an extent that the suspect cannot be re-arrested 
anew, the provision itself, like a habeas corpus provision such as Art. 9, para. 4 of the ICCPR, only 
speaks of a release as such and not of a release with prejudice to the OTP. Arguably, the word “shall” 








Nothing less than the integrity of the Tribunal is at stake in this case. Loss of public 
confidence in the Tribunal, as a court valuing human rights of all individuals – 
including those charged with unthinkable crimes – would be among the most serious 
consequences of allowing the Appellant to stand trial in the face of such violations of 
his rights. As difficult as this conclusion may be for some to accept, it is the proper 
role of an independent judiciary to halt this prosecution, so that no further injustice 
results.880  
 
Then, finally, the Appeals Chamber unanimously dismissed the indictment with 
prejudice to the Prosecutor and directed the immediate release of Barayagwiza.881 In 
addition, it directed – with Judge Shahabuddeen dissenting – “the Registrar to make 
the necessary arrangements for the delivery of the Appellant to the Authorities of 
Cameroon”.882 
Perhaps not very surprisingly,883 all hell broke loose after the decision was 
issued.  
The Government of Rwanda, for example, could not believe that such a ‘big fish’ 
as Barayagwiza was apparently going to escape justice and consequently suspended 
its cooperation with the Tribunal.884  
Amnesty International also issued a public statement in which it expressed its 
concerns. Although the organisation regretted “that there have been violations of the 
procedural rights of fair trial of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza”,885 it noted that the 
Appeals Chamber decided to release Barayagwiza “without any assurance that the 
                                                          
880 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 112. That the ICTR stressed the importance of human rights in 
the pre-trial phase, a context which is not comprehensively regulated by the ICTR RPE, is, of course, to 
be applauded. See also Swart 2002 A, p. 1251: “Time limits included in the RPE (...) are not concerned 
with arrest and detention in the requested State but with provisional detention after the person’s transfer 
by that State. It is therefore to be welcomed that, in Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTR seized the opportunity to affirm that arrest and detention for the purpose 
of transfer should conform to established international legal norms, that the person arrested on the 
territory of a State may turn to the Tribunal for habeas corpus and that the surrender proceedings should 
be conducted with due diligence on the part of the Prosecutor [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also 
ns. 45 and 863 and accompanying text with respect to the issue of habeas corpus. 
881 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 113. 
882 Ibid. Judge Shahabuddeen was of the opinion that “the proper order was to set the appellant at liberty 
and to direct the Registrar to provide him with reasonable facilities to leave Tanzania, if he so wishes.” 
(Judge Shahabuddeen’s ‘Separate Opinion’ to the decision of 3 November 1999, under ‘1. Post-transfer 
delay’.) It must also be noted that Judge Shahabuddeen believed that Barayagwiza had to be released 
and his indictment dismissed on the basis of the delay between the transfer and his initial appearance 
(and not on his detention prior to his transfer), see ibid., under ‘Preliminary’. 
883 See also Swart 2001, p. 206. 
884 This is very much reminiscent of the reactions within NATO after the Todorović decision of 18 
October 2000 was issued, see ns. 377-378 and accompanying text. 
885 Amnesty International, News Service: 221/99, AI Index: AFR 47/20/99, 24 November 1999, 
‘International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza must not escape justice’ (Public 









charges then pending against him of having participated in the Rwandan genocide of 
1994 will be considered by a national court”.886  
This is a good point which was also examined in Chapter III of this book where 
it was explained that although a male detentus outcome may constitute a proper 
remedy for serious violations and will lead to the ending of the case before the now 
prosecuting court, it is not the same, or should not be the same, as impunity for the 
suspect. That a court decides to refuse to exercise jurisdiction because, for example, 
the authorities which can be linked to the prosecuting forum have acted irregularly, 
does arguably not mean that another court, which has nothing to do with the male 
captus, cannot try the suspect afterwards.887  
However, Barayagwiza was not released immediately after the decision since 
Barayagwiza himself filed an application for review two days later. This was 
because he did not agree with the fact that the Registry was ordered to return him to 
Cameroon.888  
When the Prosecutor “responded to the application, asking to be heard on the 
same point [original footnote omitted, ChP]”,889 Barayagwiza withdrew his request. 
On 19 November 1999, the Prosecutor informed the judges “of her intention to file 
her own request for review of the Decision pursuant to Article 25 of the Statute of 
the Tribunal,[890] and in the alternative, a “motion for reconsideration””891 and on 1 
December 1999, her request, entitled ‘Prosecutor’s Motion for Review or 
Reconsideration of the Appeals Chamber’s Decision Rendered on 3 November 
1999, in Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. the Prosecutor and Request for Stay of 
Execution’ was filed.892  
In its decision of 31 March 2000, the Appeals Chamber considered this motion, 
in which the Prosecutor argued, among other things, that  
 
review is justified on the basis of the new facts, which establish that the Prosecutor 
made significant efforts to transfer the Appellant, that the Prosecutor acted with due 
                                                          
886 Ibid.  
887 That court could then take into account the fact that the suspect has suffered an irregular pre-trial 
phase and grant him certain remedies. Otherwise, the suspect would still not have received a ‘personal’ 
remedy repairing the wrongs. (The fact that the first court refuses jurisdiction and that the second court 
starts a new trial is not of any ‘advantage’ to the suspect. Although it is not so that every remedy must 
be to the benefit of the suspect, it would arguably contravene the concept of fairness if the suspect is, for 
example, kidnapped, brought to a court which refuses jurisdiction, brought before a new court and then 
tried without the latter court providing him a remedy, which, in the suspect’s eyes, would effectively 
repair the wrongs suffered by him, such as a reduction of his sentence.)  
888 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v the Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 31 March 2000, para. 4. 
889 Ibid. 
890 This article (‘Review Proceedings’) reads: “Where a new fact has been discovered which was not 
known at the time of the proceedings before the Trial Chambers or the Appeals Chamber and which 
could have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision, the convicted person or the Prosecutor may 
submit to the International Tribunal for Rwanda an application for review of the judgement.” 
891 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v the Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 31 March 2000, para. 6. 








diligence and that any delays did not fundamentally compromise the rights of the 
Appellant and would not justify the dismissal of the indictment with prejudice to the 
Prosecutor.893 
 
The Prosecutor also stressed that the decision of 3 November 1999 was “contrary to 
the mandate of the Tribunal to promote national reconciliation in Rwanda by 
conducting public trial on the merits”894 and that not only the rule of law and the 
human rights of the suspect had to be taken into account, but also, indeed 
particularly, “the interests of justice required by the victims and the international 
community as a whole”.895  
The Defence, of course, did not agree with these arguments. Moreover, it 
specifically urged the judges “to forcefully reject the notion that the human rights of 
a person accused of a serious crime, under the rubric of achieving national 
reconciliation, should be less than those available to an accused charged with a less 
serious one”.896 
The Appeals Chamber first reacted to the warning from the Government of 
Rwanda that an unfavourable decision would jeopardise the co-operation on the part 
of Rwanda with the ICTR:897  
                                                          
893 Ibid., para. 25. 
894 Ibid., para. 22. 
895 Ibid.  
896 Ibid., para. 33. 
897 See ibid., para. 34: “[T]he Chamber notes that during the hearing on 22 February 2000 in Arusha, 
Prosecutor Ms Carla Del Ponte, made a statement regarding the reaction of the government of Rwanda 
to the Decision. She stated that: “The government of Rwanda reacted very seriously in a tough manner 
to the decision of 3 November 1999.” Later, the Attorney General of Rwanda appearing as 
representative of the Rwandan Government, in his submissions as “amicus curiae[”] to the Appeals 
Chamber, openly threatened the non co-operation of the peoples of Rwanda with the Tribunal if faced 
with an unfavourable Decision by the Appeals Chamber on the Motion for Review [original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].” It may be interesting to note that during the hearing of 22 February 2000, Carla Del 
Ponte took the guilt of Barayagwiza for granted when she stated rather sweepingly: “I am the only 
person here to represent the victims, and on their behalf I pray you to allow the prosecutor to institute 
proceedings against Barayagwiza, who has committed crimes against humanity, who has committed 
genocide, and his indictment has been confirmed. He is no longer a suspect. He is an accused. This 
accused is responsible for the death of over 800,000 people in Rwanda, and the evidence is there. 
Irrefutable, incontrovertible, he is guilty…In the name of justice, genuine justice, for the sake of the 
victims, for the sake of the survivors. There are victims who are still suffering for what happened in 
Rwanda. I will always continue to say that Barayagwiza is guilty.” (Del Ponte 2009, p. 82.) Luckily, the 
Appeals Chamber emphasised that it is for the judges and for the judges alone (and not the Prosecutor) 
to adjudicate on the guilt of Barayagwiza. (See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v the 
Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-
AR72, 31 March 2000, para. 35.) In his Separate Opinion to the 31 March 2000 decision, Judge 
Shahabuddeen examines this interesting point a little further (para. 68): “The Prosecutor of the ICTR is 
not required to be neutral in a case; she is a party. But she is not of course a partisan. This is why, for 
example, the Rules of the Tribunal require the Prosecutor to disclose to the defence all exculpatory 
material. The implications of that requirement suggest that, while a prosecution must be conducted 
vigorously, there is room for the injunction that prosecuting counsel “ought to bear themselves rather in 
the character of ministers of justice assisting in the administration of justice”. The prosecution takes the 
position that it would not prosecute without itself believing in guilt. The point of importance is that an 








The Appeals Chamber wishes to stress that the Tribunal is an independent body, 
whose decisions are based solely on justice and law. If its decision in any case should 
be followed by non-cooperation, that consequence would be a matter for the Security 
Council.898 
 
These words are, of course, to be welcomed: the ICTR is a legal institution which 
should not be put under pressure by political entities which do not agree with the 
outcome of a certain case.899  
However, even though the Appeals Chamber’s stance is very commendable, 
many believe that the remainder of the decision, which – as will be shown infra – 
led to quite another outcome, in fact revealed that the judges did yield to political 
pressure.900  
                                                                                                                                              
the Tribunal must seek to benefit from all of them. Taking due account of that circumstance, I 
nevertheless consider that the system of the Statute under which the Tribunal is functioning will support 
a distinction between an affirmation of guilt and an affirmation of preparedness to prove guilt. In this 
case, I would interpret what was said as intended to convey the latter meaning, but the strength with 
which the statements were made comes so close to the former that I consider it right to say that the 
framework of the Statute is sufficiently balanced and sufficiently stable not to be upset by the spirit of 
the injunction referred to concerning the role of a prosecutor. I believe that it is that spirit which 
underlies the remarks now made by the Appeals Chamber on the point [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” It is reassuring that Carla Del Ponte, in her memoirs, also admitted that her (above-mentioned) 
words were perhaps too strong, although it is also clear that she (still) assumed the guilt of Barayagwiza, 
see Del Ponte 2009, pp. 82-83: “In hindsight, these words might have gone over the line. I allowed my 
zeal on behalf of the victims to carry my rhetoric beyond the bounds required by the presumption of 
innocence and respect for the tribunal’s own independence. Perhaps I should have stressed that 
Barayagwiza had only been indicted for genocide and crimes against humanity, that he stood accused of 
these crimes. I anticipated that the judges would comment upon my rhetorical flourish. But I decided 
that if I did not stress as starkly as possible the fact that, if the Appeals Chamber did not overturn the 
previous ruling and allowed a guilty man, a man who had participated in genocide at the wholesale 
level, to go free, then it would be on their conscience and not mine. I was almost daring the judges not to 
overturn the ruling of November 3 [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
898 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v the Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 31 March 2000, para. 34. This 
point was further elaborated upon by Judge Nieto-Navia in his declaration to the 31 March 2000 
decision. 
899 See also Sloan 2006, p. 343: “For an Appeals Chamber to order the release of an accused war 
criminal would take courage, but, depending on the circumstances (including who was involved, on 
whose behalf and what level of force was used), it could well be the only appropriate way forward. 
While there would certainly be political fallout in the face of a decision to order the release of an 
accused war criminal – many would view this as a retrograde movement in the battle against impunity – 
the impartial administration of justice must be the primary concern of a judicial body, not political 
factors.” 
900 See, for example, Schabas 2000, pp. 570-571 (“As for the judges of the appeals chamber, their 
second thoughts may well have saved the ICTR, whose future was compromised by Rwanda’s quite 
predictable and understandable fury with the first judgment and with what appeared to be an ICTR-
sanctioned grant of impunity to Barayagwiza. In view of the lamentable legal reasoning in the second 
decision, the judges’ insistence that Rwanda’s pledge not to cooperate with the Tribunal – a threat 
echoed by the prosecutor at the February 2[2] hearing on the review motion – had no bearing in their 
deliberations was, and remains, unconvincing.”), Cogan 2002, p. 135 (“The judges denied that they had 
been coerced into changing their decision to release Barayagwiza, but it is likely that Rwanda’s threats 








After having stated that it could review the 3 November 1999 decision on the 
basis of Article 25 of the ICTR Statute and Rule 120 of the ICTR RPE,901 the 
Appeals Chamber turned to the merits of the case. It divided Barayagwiza’s pre-trial 
detention in three periods, namely 1) 15 April 1996 (arrest by the Cameroon 
authorities) – 21 February 1997 (when the Court of Appeal of the Centre of 
Cameroon rejected Rwanda’s extradition request); 2) 21 February 1997 (Rule 40 
ICTR RPE request) – 19 November 1997 (transfer of Barayagwiza) and 3) 19 
November 1997 (transfer of Barayagwiza) – 23 February 1998 (initial appearance of 
Barayagwiza).902  
With respect to the first period, it found that the new information submitted to 
the judges established that Barayagwiza “knew the general nature of the charges 
against him by 3 May 1996 at the latest”.903 Although these 18 days (at most) still 
entailed a violation of his right to be informed without delay of the charges against 
him, the judges felt that “this violation is patently of a different order than the one 
identified in the Decision whereby the Appellant was without any information for 11 
months”.904  
New facts were also ‘discovered’905 with respect to the second period; the judges 
explained that in the 3 November 1999 decision, the Appeals Chamber had 
determined that “Cameroon was willing to transfer the Appellant”.906 However, the 
new information showed that Cameroon had in fact not been prepared to transfer 
Barayagwiza before 24 October 1997.907  
The judges continued: 
 
                                                                                                                                              
flip-flop was viewed by many as politically motivated.”), Sridhar 2006, p. 362 (“The Barayagwiza case 
in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) provides a parallel example of how 
international tribunals might be undermined by political pressures.”) and Zahar and Sluiter 2008, pp. vii-
viii, where they state that “the ICTR Appeals Chamber distorted the law in order to breathe new life into 
legal proceedings which had been terminated, by its first decision, for no reason other than to appease 
the Rwandese government which was furious about the release of a prominent defendant over what the 
government saw as a trivial human rights violation.” 
901 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v the Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 31 March 2000, para. 50. Rule 
120 of the ICTR RPE complements Art. 25 of the ICTR Statute (see n. 890) and reads: “Where a new 
fact has been discovered which was not known to the moving party at the time of the proceedings before 
a Chamber, and could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, the defence or, 
within one year after the final judgement has been pronounced, the Prosecutor, may make a motion to 
that Chamber, if it can be reconstituted or, failing that, to the appropriate Chamber of the Tribunal for 
review of the judgement.” 
902 See ibid., para. 53. 
903 Ibid., para. 54. 
904 Ibid., para. 55. 
905 See Schabas 2000, p. 568: “None of the “new facts” admitted by the appeals chamber were 
“discovered,” nor were they unknown when the appeals chamber first heard the case in 1999. The 
prosecutor had simply failed to put them in evidence.” 
906 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v the Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 31 March 2000, para. 57. 








The new fact, that Cameroon was not prepared to transfer the Appellant prior to the 
date on which he was actually delivered to the Tribunal’s detention unit,[908] would 
have had a significant impact on the Decision had it been known at the time, given 
that, in the Decision, the Appeals Chamber drew its conclusions with regard to the 
Prosecutor’s negligence in part from the fact that nothing prevented the transfer of the 
Appellant save the Prosecutor’s failure to act (...).909  
 
As a result, it was held that “the new facts show that, during this second period, the 
violations [of Barayagwiza’s human rights, ChP] were not attributable to the 
Prosecutor”.910  
As already explained in the context of the Karadžić case, this may, of course, be 
true and if so, should have an effect on the remedies. However, this quotation 
arguably does not mean that these violations were not taken into account by the 
Appeals Chamber when it came to determine the remedies.911  
With respect to the third and final period, the judges stated that the new 
information had revealed that counsel for Barayagwiza, in an annex to a letter to the 
Registrar, had in fact consented to an initial appearance taking place on 3 February 
1997. Although this still meant a substantial delay of 20 days (the initial appearance 
took place on 23 February 2007), the delay was clearly less extensive than the 96-
day period mentioned in the 3 November 1999 decision.912 
After having discussed these three periods, the Appeals Chamber turned to Rule 
120 of the ICTR RPE which introduces an additional condition related to Article 25 
of the ICTR Statute.913  
According to this rule, a party can only submit a motion for review “[w]here a 
new fact has been discovered which was not known to the moving party at the time 
of the proceedings before a Chamber, and could not have been discovered through 
the exercise of due diligence”.914  
After the Appeals Chamber had concluded that “[t]he new facts identified in the 
first two periods (...) may have been known to the Prosecutor or at least they could 
                                                          
908 These words are arguably incorrect; Cameroon was prepared to transfer the Appellant prior to the 
date on which he was actually delivered to the Tribunal’s detention unit. After all, a few moments 
earlier, the Appeals Chamber had clarified that Cameroon was not prepared to transfer Barayagwiza 
before 24 October 1997. However, that also means that Cameroon was prepared to transfer Barayagwiza 
after 24 October 1997, a date which is still prior to the date Barayagwiza was actually transferred to the 
ICTR (19 November 1997). Unfortunately, the Appeals Chamber does not go into this period of time (of 
almost a month) between the moment Cameroon would be prepared to transfer Barayagwiza and the 
actual date of transfer. 
909 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v the Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 31 March 2000, para. 58. 
910 Ibid. 
911 It seems that the Appeals Chamber did take (like it arguably should take) all the violations into 
account when determining the remedies, including those which cannot be attributed to the Prosecution, 
see n. 919 and accompanying text. 
912 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v the Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 31 March 2000, para. 62. 
913 See n. 890. 








have been discovered”,915 a conclusion which would block the motion for review 
with respect to the ‘new’ facts of the first two periods, it consequently diminished 
the relevance of Rule 120 of the ICTR RPE to, arguably, reach the result it already 
had in mind:916  
 
In the wholly exceptional circumstances of this case, and in the face of a possible 
miscarriage of justice, the Chamber construes the condition laid down in Rule 120, 
that the fact be unknown to the moving party at the time of the proceedings before a 
Chamber, and not discoverable through the exercise of due diligence, as directory in 
nature. In adopting such a position, the Chamber has regard to the circumstance that 
the Statute itself does not speak to this issue.[917] There is precedent for taking such 
an approach. Other reviewing courts, presented with facts which would clearly have 
altered an earlier decision, have felt bound by the interests of justice to take these into 
account, even when the usual requirements of due diligence and unavailability were 
not strictly satisfied. (...) To reject the facts presented by the Prosecutor, in the light of 
their impact on the Decision, would indeed be to close ones eyes to reality.918  
 
                                                          
915 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v the Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 31 March 2000, para. 64. The 
Appeals Chamber was arguably of the opinion that the new fact related to the third period was not 
known to the Prosecutor because the annex to the letter written by the defence counsel of Barayagwiza 
to the Registrar, in which counsel had given his consent to an initial appearance taking place on 3 
February 1997, was not available to her. The word “arguably” has been used here because the Appeals 
Chamber states that “[i]t must be deduced that the fact that the defence counsel had given his consent 
was known to the Prosecutor at the time of the proceedings before the Appeals Chamber”. (Ibid., para. 
70.) However, taking all the words of this paragraph into account (and the fact that the judges first 
clarified that “[t]he new facts identified in the first two periods (...) may have been known to the 
Prosecutor or at least they could have been discovered”, thus contrasting the first two periods with the 
third period), it appears that the judges have forgotten the word “not” between “was” and “known”, see 
ibid.: “With regard to the third period, the Appeals Chamber remarks that, although a set of the elements 
submitted by the Prosecutor on 16 February 2000 were available to her prior to that date, according to 
the Registrar’s memorandum, Annex C [the annex to the letter written by Barayagwiza’s counsel and 
directed to the Registrar which indicated that the former had given his consent to an initial appearance 
taking place on 3 February 1997, ChP] was not one of them. It must be deduced that the fact that the 
defence counsel had given his consent was known to the Prosecutor at the time of the proceedings 
before the Appeals Chamber.” 
916 Cf. also Schabas 2000, p. 567: “In the second decision, the appeals chamber ultimately distorts the 
law in an effort to achieve the desired result – to compensate for its previous decision and, in view of the 
“new facts” adduced, to enable the prosecution of Barayagwiza to proceed. In all fairness, the “new 
facts” did, indeed, change the appeals chamber’s perception of the case and of the prosecutor’s conduct, 
but the chamber’s efforts to justify overturning its previous decision are surprisingly weak. For example, 
the chamber itself seems to acknowledge that none of the “new facts” came anywhere near the test set 
by Rule 120”. See also ibid., p. 571. 
917 For criticism related to this observation, see ibid., pp. 567-568. 
918 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v the Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s 









In the end, the judges concluded “that the Appellant’s rights were violated, and that 
all violations demand a remedy”919 but that “the violations suffered by the Appellant 
and the omissions of the Prosecutor are not the same as those which emerged from 
the facts on which the Decision is founded”.920  
As a result, the remedy had to be changed.921 Barayagwiza was not released and 
his indictment was not dismissed with prejudice to the Prosecutor, but the judges 
decided  
 
that for the violation of his rights the Appellant is entitled to a remedy, to be fixed at 
the time of judgement at first instance, as follows: a) If the Appellant is found not 
guilty, he shall receive financial compensation; b) If the Appellant is found guilty, his 
sentence shall be reduced to take account of the violation of his rights.922  
 
Consequently, when Barayagwiza’s case was completed on the merits, the Trial 
Chamber reduced his life sentence (Barayagwiza was found guilty of conspiracy to 
commit genocide, genocide, complicity in genocide, direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide, crimes against humanity (extermination, murder and persecution) 
and serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II) to 35 years’ imprisonment.923  
As has become clear from examination of this case, decisions of the Appeals 
Chamber are definitely not flawless, one of the most important points of criticism 
being that the Appeals Chamber should take into account the fact that refusing 
jurisdiction may be an appropriate remedy in serious cases, but that refusing 
                                                          
919 Ibid., para. 74. These words confirm the idea of the 3 November 1999 decision that every violation 
committed in the context of an ICTR trial, even one for which the Prosecutor may not be directly 
responsible, should be remedied. That the Appeals Chamber supports the rather general view of the first 
decision in that the judges must take responsibility for violations committed in the context of an ICTR 
trial (and do not only have to look at violations which, for example, occurred while Barayagwiza was 
being detained at the behest/request of the Tribunal) can also be discerned from the following words: 
“The information now before the Chamber demonstrates that (…) the Appellant knew the general nature 
of the charges against him by 3 May 1996 at the latest. He thus spent at most 18 days in detention 
without being informed of the reasons therefor. The Appeals Chamber considers that such a time period 
violates the Appellant’s right to be informed without delay of the charges against him.” (Ibid., paras. 54-
55.) Thus, the judges start to count as from the day Barayagwiza was arrested (3 May 1996 minus 18 
days = 15 April 1996), a day on which Barayagwiza was not yet detained at the behest/request of the 
ICTR. Apparently, the judges were of the opinion that by then, the detention could nevertheless be seen 
as falling within the context of their case. 
920 Ibid., para. 74. 
921 See also ibid., para. 71: “The Chamber notes that the remedy it ordered for the violations the 
Appellant was subject to is based on a cumulation of elements: (…) The new facts diminish the role 
played by the failings of the Prosecutor as well as the intensity of the violation of the rights of the 
Appellant. The cumulative effect of these elements being thus reduced, the reparation ordered by the 
Appeals Chamber now appears disproportionate in relation to the events. The new facts being therefore 
facts which could have been decisive in the Decision, in particular as regards the remedy it orders, that 
remedy must be modified.” 
922 Ibid., para. 75. 
923 See ICTR, Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and 








jurisdiction should not be equated with impunity for the suspect. That prosecuting 
forum A has forfeited its right to prosecute the suspect does not mean that the 
suspect may not be tried by prosecuting forum B.924 However, the decisions can also 
be applauded, for example, for (arguably) confirming the idea that the Tribunal must 
remedy every violation committed in the context of its case, even if the Tribunal is, 
strictly speaking, not responsible for it. This duty to repair wrongs is apparently not 
only valid in the context of the abuse of process doctrine (when the Tribunal decides 
to refuse jurisdiction because of serious violations), but also in the context of less 
serious irregularities which do not lead to the ending of the case, see the general 
words in the 2000 Barayagwiza case: “all violations demand a remedy”. 
Finally, a last word on this case’s judicial legacy; although the 2000 decision 
clearly reversed many factual observations from the 1999 decision, other, more 
general, reasonings of the 1999 decision have remained untouched.925 One could 
hereby think of the Appeals Chamber’s observation that one may rely on the abuse 
of process doctrine if “in the circumstances of a particular case, proceeding with the 
trial of the accused would contravene the court’s sense of justice”,926 cited with 
approval by the Trial Chamber in Nikolić.927 The same Chamber also agreed with 
the idea established in the 1999 decision of Barayagwiza that a court may refuse to 
exercise jurisdiction in the case of serious violations, irrespective of the entity 
responsible for it.928 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber’s remarks on the importance 
                                                          
924 See also Subsection 4.1 of Chapter III and Schabas 2000, p. 569: “In the November decision, the 
appeals chamber ordered Barayagwiza to be returned to Cameroon. Although theoretically, in view of 
the prosecutorial abuse, it may have been appropriate for the appeals chamber to refuse to exercise its 
jurisdiction, the ICTR still had a duty to promote accountability for genocide. Its decision to send 
Barayagwiza back to Cameroon seemed destined to accomplish the opposite. Article VI of the 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) offers 
two bases for jurisdiction: an international tribunal or the state where the crime took place. Rwanda 
would therefore be the alternative forum, and the ICTR should have seen itself as bound to ensure 
Barayagwiza was within effective reach of that forum.” See also Fernández de Gurmendi and Friman 
2002, pp. 330-331, n. 240, referring to (the wrong pages of) Schabas. One can agree with Schabas that, 
“[i]f the interests of international justice are to be served, the ICTR should be empowered to transfer 
individuals to a state with jurisdiction over the crime and a willingness to prosecute in cases where the 
ICTR declines jurisdiction (for whatever reason).” (Schabas 2000, p. 570.) Luckily, in 2002, Rule 11 bis 
of the ICTR RPE was adopted (see also n. 244), which enables and regulates the transfer of cases from 
the ICTR to national courts. Finally, it must be noted that the ICC might face the same problems the 
ICTR has experienced as “the same lacuna exists in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) 
925 See also Sluiter 2003 B, pp. 944- 945 and Currie 2007, p. 364 (quoting Sluiter). 
926 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 77.  
927 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
111. See also, for example, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 
‘Decision on Defence Motion for a Stay of Proceedings and Abuse of Process’, Case No. ICTR-97-21-
T, 20 February 2004, para. 14. 
928 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
114. As already explained earlier, it was not entirely clear whether the ICTY Appeals Chamber also 








of a person’s right to habeas corpus have been confirmed as well.929 In that respect, 
one cannot agree with Schabas who wrote in 2003 that the 1999 decision “seems to 




The next case under examination, Semanza, has many similarities with 
Barayagwiza. On or about 26 March 1996, Laurent Semanza was arrested by the 
authorities of Cameroon pursuant to an international arrest warrant issued by the 
Rwandan Attorney-General’s Office.931 Some three weeks later, on 17 April 1996, 
the ICTR Prosecutor used Rule 40 of the ICTR RPE to issue a request for 
provisional measures to be taken against Semanza and several other suspects 
(including Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza).932 On 6 May 1996, the Prosecutor issued a 
request to the authorities of Cameroon for a three-week extension of the suspects’ 
                                                                                                                                              
concurred with the idea expressed in Barayagwiza that a court may refuse jurisdiction in cases “where to 
exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove 
detrimental to the court’s integrity.” (See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74 and ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of 
Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, paras. 29-30.) These latter words were also confirmed in 
the still-to-discuss Kajelijeli case, see ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, 
‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 206. 
929 Although many cases have generally confirmed the habeas corpus reasoning of the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber (see n. 863), the following two statements are explicit examples in that respect. In the 
Milošević case, the judges held, commenting on a person’s right to habeas corpus and the 1999 
Barayagwiza decision: “This case was overturned by the Appeals Chamber on a review on grounds that 
do not in any way affect the validity of the Chamber’s rulings as to the significance of the right of an 
accused to habeas corpus.” (ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, ‘Decision on 
Preliminary Motions’, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, 8 November 2001, para. 39, n. 44.) Cf. also the Separate 
Opinion of Judge Robinson in the Todorović case where he stated: “The subsequent history of this case, 
in which the decision was reviewed pursuant to Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in no way affects the validity of the Appeals Chamber’s 
dictum in paragraph 88 that the “notion that a detained individual shall have recourse to an independent 
judicial officer for review of the detaining authority’s acts” is a “fundamental right”.” (ICTY, Trial 
Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan Todorović and Simo 
Zarić, ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 2000, para. 3, n. 1.) See 
finally (from the context of the internationalised criminal tribunals): SCSL, Trial Chamber, The 
Prosecutor against Tamba Alex Brima, ‘Ruling on the Application for the Issue of a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus Filed by the Applicant’, Case No. SCSL-03-06-PT, 22 July 2003, pp. 7 and 9. (See also n. 1288 
and accompanying text.) 
930 Schabas 2003, p. 265. (Note that the 2005 case of Kajelijeli (see n. 928) should, of course, not be 
taken into account here as that decision was only issued after Schabas’ article was published.) See also 
C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, Working Paper No. 24 – April 2009, 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), p. 50, n. 187. 
931 See ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, ‘Decision on the “Motion to Set 
Aside the Arrest and Detention of Laurent Semanza as Unlawful”’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-I, 6 October 
1999, para. 2. 








provisional detention933 but on 16 May 1996, he informed the authorities in 
Cameroon of his intention to proceed against only four of the suspects, excluding 
Semanza (and Barayagwiza).934 As previously explained in the context of the 
Barayagwiza case, on 21 February 1997, the day that the Court of Appeal of 
Cameroon rejected a request from Rwanda to have the remaining suspects extradited 
to Rwanda and ordered their release, the ICTR Prosecutor reacted by issuing a new 
request for provisional arrest.935 Furthermore, she requested an Order for transfer 
and provisional detention pursuant to Rule 40 bis of the ICTR RPE,936 which was 
filed by Judge Aspegren on 4 March 1997.937 This Order was “served on the 
authorities in Cameroon on 6 March 1997 and the Appellant received a copy thereof 
on 10 March 1997”.938 Like Barayagwiza, Semanza filed a writ of habeas corpus 
challenging the lawfulness of his detention on 29 September 1997.939 On 17 October 
1997, the indictment against Semanza was filed,940 charging him with “genocide, 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, crimes 
against humanity and serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II”.941 This indictment was confirmed on 23 
October 1997.942 Like Barayagwiza, Semanza was finally transferred to the ICTR on 
19 November 1997,943 where he made his initial appearance on 16 February 1998,944 
more than 22 months – cf. again Barayagwiza – after he was arrested in Cameroon. 
After his indictment was amended and corrected, Semanza filed his ‘Motion to Set 
Aside the Arrest and Detention of Laurent Semanza as Unlawful’ on 16 August 
                                                          
933 See ibid., para. 4. See also n. 807. Note that para. 4 of the 6 October 1999 decision speaks of an 
extension of three months, but this is arguably incorrect, see also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent 
Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, para. 6. 
934 See ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, ‘Decision on the “Motion to Set 
Aside the Arrest and Detention of Laurent Semanza as Unlawful”’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-I, 6 October 
1999, para. 5. See also n. 809 and accompanying text. 
935 See ibid., paras. 6-7. See also n. 811 and accompanying text. 
936 See ibid., para. 8. See also n. 812 and accompanying text. 
937 See ibid., para. 10. See also n. 813 and accompanying text. 
938 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 
31 May 2000, para. 9. 
939 See ibid., para. 10. See also n. 815 and accompanying text. 
940 See ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, ‘Decision on the “Motion to Set 
Aside the Arrest and Detention of Laurent Semanza as Unlawful”’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-I, 6 October 
1999, para. 11. 
941 ICTR, Prosecutor, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal versus Laurent Semanza, ‘Indictment’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-20-I, 16 October 1997, p. 1. 
942 See ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, ‘Decision on the “Motion to Set 
Aside the Arrest and Detention of Laurent Semanza as Unlawful”’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-I, 6 October 
1999, para. 12. 
943 See ibid., para. 13. See also n. 814 and accompanying text. Note that para. 13 of the 6 October 1999 
decision speaks of 11 November 1997 as the date of Semanza’s transfer, but this is arguably incorrect, 
see also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-
20-A, 31 May 2000, para. 12. 
944 See ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, ‘Decision on the “Motion to Set 
Aside the Arrest and Detention of Laurent Semanza as Unlawful”’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-I, 6 October 








1999, which was considered by Trial Chamber III.945 On 6 October 1999, the judges 
issued their decision on this motion. 
The Trial Chamber first examined the submissions of the parties. Like 
Barayagwiza, Semanza argued, among other things, that his detention was 
“unlawful and unjustifiable”.946  
This was countered by the Prosecutor, who was of the opinion that his detention 
was “lawful under the Statute and Rules”.947 It was also stipulated that “the 
Prosecutor does not have judicial control stricto senso over detention within a 
sovereign State”.948  
The Trial Chamber divided the points to be discussed into two categories: 1) the 
detention of Semanza before his transfer to the ICTR and 2) the detention of 
Semanza after his transfer. 
With respect to the first category, the judges held that “it is not for the Tribunal 
to consider alleged violations of Semanza’s rights before his transfer to the custody 
of the Tribunal”949 because “an accused, before his transfer to the custody of the 
Tribunal, has no remedy under the Statute and Rules for the detention and acts by 
sovereign States over which the Tribunal does not exercise control”.950  
This stance was already expressed in the 1996 ICTY case of Djukić and 
Krsmanović (see also footnotes 138, 208 and 844 and accompanying text) and was 
later repeated by ICTR Trial Chambers in cases such as Karemera, Ngirumpatse, 
Kajelijeli (this last case will be further discussed in Subsection 3.2.3 of this chapter), 
Nshamihigo, Nzirorera and Nyiramasuhuko.  
However, one can question whether these six decisions (which were decided on 
10 December 1999 (Karemera and Ngirumpatse), 8 May 2000 (Kajelijeli and 
Nshamihigo), 7 September 2000 (Nzirorera) and 12 October 2000 
(Nyiramasuhuko)) are consistent with the first (and second) Appeals Chamber’s 
decision in Barayagwiza, where it was, after all, seemingly established that the 
ICTR may also remedy pre-trial violations committed by third parties in the context 
of a Tribunal case.951  
                                                          
945 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-
20-A, 31 May 2000, para. 17. 
946 ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, ‘Decision on the “Motion to Set Aside 
the Arrest and Detention of Laurent Semanza as Unlawful”’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-I, 6 October 1999, 
para. 23. See also ibid. why Semanza thought his detention was unlawful and unjustifiable: “(a) the 
accused did not receive a formal indictment stating the charges against him before his transfer, and 
therefore was unable to prepare his defence; (b) the provisional detention of the accused violated the 
rights of the accused under Article 20 of the Statute and Rule 40; (c) the extension of the detention in the 
absence of judicial control was arbitrary and an abuse of the rights of the accused; (d) the accused has 
been discriminated against, as compared to others arrested in Cameroon; (e) the Prosecution failed to 
comply with Rule 40bis and the 40bis Order to file an indictment within thirty days, by 2 April 1997.”  
947 Ibid., para. 27. 
948 Ibid. 
949 Ibid., para. 31. 
950 Ibid., para. 30. 
951 With respect to the question as to whether the Trial Chambers must follow the reasonings of the 
Appeals Chamber, it may be interesting to refer to the following words stemming from the ICTY 








Furthermore, the judges, turning to the second category, found “that the Defence 
has failed to show any violation of the provisions of the Statute and the Rules with 
regard to Semanza’s detention after his transfer to the custody of the Tribunal”.952  
Semanza decided to appeal this decision and the Appeals Chamber issued its 
decision on 31 May 2000, two months after the Appeals Chamber had reversed its 3 
November 1999 decision in Barayagwiza.  
The similarities between the cases of Semanza and Barayagwiza was also why 
the Appeals Chamber stressed that this did   
 
not necessarily imply that the legal findings will be the same. The Appeals Chamber 
would like to recall the specific features of the instant case relative to the 
Barayagwiza case and states that it has considered the issues raised in the instant case 
on the basis of the specific arguments and grounds submitted to it by the Parties.953 
 
Before turning to the merits of the case, the judges first had to consider a 
preliminary point, namely the Prosecutor’s request to supplement the record on 
appeal with additional evidence in view of the outcome of the Barayagwiza case.  
According to the Prosecutor, “the new evidence was rendered unavailable 
inasmuch as it related to points of law which the Chamber had not considered; those 
points of law were raised only after the Barayagwiza Decision had been 
delivered”.954 In addition to this unavailability argument, the Prosecutor submitted 
that the interests of justice must also constitute a reason why the Appeals Chamber 
should consider the new evidence.955  
Semanza did not agree with these arguments and stated, among other things, that 
“the Prosecutor did possess the evidence but simply failed to make use of it [original 
footnote omitted, ChP]”.956 With respect to the interests of justice argument, 
Semanza believed that this concept in fact demands that the Appeals Chamber must 
“refuse to admit the evidence presented by the Prosecutor, who, “just as for any 
other organ of the Tribunal, or any party, […] is bound by the rights and privileges 
stipulated in the Statute and Rules” [original footnote omitted, ChP].”957 
The judges concurred with Semanza with respect to the unavailability argument; 
according to them, the Prosecutor had failed to demonstrate in what respect the 
                                                                                                                                              
construction of the Statute requires that the ratio decidendi of its decisions is binding on Trial 
Chambers”. (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, ‘Judgement’, Case No. IT-95-
14/1-A, 24 March 2000, para. 113.) 
952 ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, ‘Decision on the “Motion to Set Aside 
the Arrest and Detention of Laurent Semanza as Unlawful”’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-I, 6 October 1999, 
para. 36. 
953 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 
31 May 2000, para. 3. 
954 Ibid., para. 30. 
955 See ibid., para. 31. 
956 Ibid., para. 32. According to Semanza, “this application is but a frantic attempt to anticipate issues 
and/or reopen the debate on the jurisprudence of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza” [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” (Ibid.) 








relevant documents had not been available at the trial proceedings.958 The outcome 
of the Barayagwiza case could not constitute a reason for unavailability: 
“developments in case-law can in no case be the cause or grounds for, or even a 
factor in the unavailability of evidence”.959  
Nevertheless, with respect to the interests of justice argument, the judges agreed 
with the Prosecution: 
 
[B]y admitting the new facts presented in the Barayagwiza case, ICT[R] Appeals 
Chamber, in reviewing the Decision, rectified the miscarriage of justice which had 
emerged in the light of those facts. The Appeals Chamber is consequently aware that 
if henceforth it refuses to admit certain items of evidence in the instant case a 
miscarriage of justice will result. This exceptional situation consequently enables it to 
admit said evidence (...).960  
 
As a result, the judges turned to the merits of the case, taking into account (some of) 
the new evidence presented by the Prosecutor.  
The judges first summarised the substantive arguments submitted by the two 
parties and noted that Semanza had requested the Appeals Chamber  
 
to vacate the Trial Chamber III Decision; to find that his fundamental rights were 
violated and that the principle of equality of arms was not complied with; to vacate 
the arrest and detention proceedings as unlawful; to order his release; and to rule the 
Appeal suspensive of proceedings before the Trial Chamber [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].961  
 
However, the Prosecutor did not agree. She argued, among other things, that the 
Trial Chamber had correctly concluded “that no remedy was open to the Accused 
under the Statute or Rules of the Tribunal for matters predating his transfer to the 
Tribunal”962 because “the above-mentioned legal instruments contain no provision 
for reviewing the domestic legislation of States in which arrest and detention take 
place [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.963 As already explained supra, this stance 
was later repeated by ICTR Trial Chambers in cases such as Karemera, 
Ngirumpatse, Kajelijeli, Nshamihigo, Nzirorera and Nyiramasuhuko but appears to 
be inconsistent with the Barayagwiza case where it was seemingly established that 
the ICTR may also remedy pre-trial violations committed by third parties in the 
context of a Tribunal case. Moreover, the Prosecutor was of the opinion – a point 
which was also explained in Chapter III of this book964 – “that dismissal of the 
Prosecution charges is not a remedy which is permitted under international human 
                                                          
958 See ibid., para. 43. 
959 Ibid. 
960 Ibid., para. 45. 
961 Ibid., para. 59. 
962 Ibid., para. 63. 
963 Ibid., para. 63. 








rights law [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.965 The Prosecutor also argued that even 
if this remedy were permitted under international law, that the facts of the case did 
not justify granting it.966 As already explained in the present chapter,967 the 
Prosecutor looked at different factors which should be considered in deciding 
whether or not a dismissal should be with or without prejudice, one of them being 
the seriousness of the suspect’s charges. 
The Appeals Chamber considered five major issues, of which four will be 
examined here:968 1) the right of the suspect to be informed promptly of the nature 
of the charges against him, 2) the suspect’s right to be promptly charged, 3) the right 
of the accused to be brought before a Trial Chamber without delay and to be 
formally charged and 4) the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention (habeas 
corpus). 
With respect to issue number one, the judges first made the general statement 
that “a suspect arrested by the Tribunal has the right to be informed promptly of the 
reasons for his or her arrest [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.969 In addition, they 
stressed that, “[i]n accordance with the norms of international human rights law, (...) 
this right comes into effect from the moment of arrest and detention [original 
footnote omitted, ChP]”.970  
This means that either the Tribunal or national authorities/international forces 
making the arrest for the Tribunal must promptly inform the person of the reasons 
for his arrest if this right is not to be violated. This, in turn, implies that the Tribunal, 
if necessary, should be able to review whether the arrest and detention at the 
national level was properly executed, for example, with due regard to a person’s 
right to be promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest.  
Hence, this can arguably be seen as a rupture with cases such as Karemera, 
Ngirumpatse and Kajelijeli (Trial Chamber) which support the idea that the ICTR 
cannot review the circumstances surrounding the arrest and detention at the national 
level. Concerning this specific case, the judges divided Semanza’s detention at the 
request of the ICTR Prosecutor in two different periods,971 namely 15 April 1996 
(the date of the first request based on Rule 40 of the ICTR RPE)972 – 17 May 1996 
(when the authorities of Cameroon were informed that the Prosecutor was not 
                                                          
965 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 
31 May 2000, para. 65. 
966 See ibid.  
967 See n. 653. 
968 The first, whether or not there was a violation of the principle of ne bis in idem, is not particularly 
interesting here. (However, note that the topic can be relevant for this book’s subject in general, see n. 
353.) 
969 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 
31 May 2000, para. 78. 
970 Ibid.  
971 See ibid., para. 79. 
972 Note that this request (dated 15 April 1996) was submitted on 17 April 1996 to the authorities of 








interested in prosecuting the suspect)973 and 21 February 1997 (the date of the 
second request based on Rule 40 of the ICTR RPE) – 19 November 1997 (when 
Semanza was transferred to the ICTR).  
Regarding the first period, the judges concluded on the basis of the new evidence 
that Semanza “had been informed of the nature of the crimes for which he was being 
pursued by the Prosecutor on 3 May 1996”.974 This is 18 days after the date of the 
first request based on Rule 40 of the ICTR RPE of 15 April 1996, when Semanza 
was detained for the first time at the request of the ICTR Prosecutor.975 According to 
the judges, this constituted a violation of Semanza’s right to be informed promptly 
of the nature of the charges against him.976 Furthermore, the judges found that “[a] 
fitting remedy for this violation is justified”.977  
This is an interesting point, which was also used by Karadžić,978 for the judges 
state that a remedy is necessary because of the violation as such. They do not state, 
for example, that the remedy is necessary because it can be clearly attributed to the 
Prosecutor.  
This is the correct approach. A suspect detained at the behest of the ICTR must 
be promptly informed of the nature of the charges against him, whether this is done 
by somebody from the OTP or by the national authorities detaining the suspect for 
the ICTR. However, this also means that if the OTP requests the national authorities 
to inform the suspect and the latter authorities fail to do so, a violation has occurred 
within the context of the ICTR case which must be remedied, whether or not that 
violation is, strictly speaking, attributable to the OTP.  
Regarding the second period, the judges opined that Semanza’s right to be 
informed promptly of the nature of the charges against him started on 21 February 
1997 and that he “was formally informed of the charges laid against him by the 
Tribunal when the Order issued under Rule 40 bis was served on him in Cameroon 
on 10 March 1997”.979 The Appeals Chamber admitted that this period of 18 days 
could be seen as a violation of Semanza’s right to be informed promptly of the 
nature of the charges against him, but also held that “the violation is less serious 
                                                          
973 Note that, according to the Trial Chamber in Semanza and the Appeals Chamber in Barayagwiza, the 
Cameroon authorities were informed on 16 May 1996, see ns. 934 and 809 and accompanying text, 
respectively.  
974 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 
31 May 2000, para. 81. 
975 See ibid., para. 87. Note that the judges (in contrast to those of the Barayagwiza case) do not look at 
the period of time between Semanza’s first deprivation of liberty (pursuant to an international arrest 
warrant issued by the Rwandan Attorney-General’s Office) and his detention at the request of the ICTR. 
Hence, in this case, the judges were not of the opinion that the first days of detention could be seen as 
falling with the context of the ICTR case. 
976 See ibid. 
977 Ibid. 
978 See also n. 792 and accompanying text. 
979 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 








since the Appellant had been informed in substance of the nature of the Prosecutor’s 
charges against him during his first period in detention”.980 
With respect to issue number two, Semanza’s right to be promptly charged, the 
judges first noted that their colleagues who had written the 3 November 1999 
decision in Barayagwiza were of the opinion that this right “becomes effective as 
soon as a Rule 40 bis Order is filed [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.981 However, 
the judges in Semanza did not agree with this, arguing that “the clock for the Rule 
40 bis time-limit starts running only from the day the suspect is transferred to the 
Tribunal’s Detention Facility”.982 As a result, Rule 40 bis of the ICTR RPE could 
not have been violated, as Semanza’s indictment had already been confirmed (23 
October 1997) before he was transferred to the ICTR (19 November 1997).983 
Moreover, the judges also made a point comparable with the one made by the judges 
in the 31 March 2000 decision in Barayagwiza, namely  
 
that in any event, the Tribunal is not responsible for the time that elapsed before the 
Appellant was transferred to the Tribunal’s Detention Facility. The evidence before 
the Appeals Chamber shows that Cameroon was not inclined to transfer the Appellant 
before 21 October 1997.984   
 
As was also explained in the context of the 31 March 2000 decision in Barayagwiza, 
it may, of course, very well be that the Tribunal was, strictly speaking, not 
responsible for what happened to Semanza prior to his transfer, but this does not 
mean that the Tribunal, if it is of the opinion that violations occurred in the context 
of its case, may not repair them (although the fact that certain violations cannot 
clearly be attributed to the Tribunal can, of course, be of influence in determining 
the remedies for the violations). As asserted before, see the text following footnote 
830 and accompanying text, one can very well argue that violations which occur in 
the context of constructive custody – the context on which the case of Semanza 
focuses – can generally be seen as being the Tribunal’s responsibility, whether or 
not the specific violations occurring in this context can be clearly attributed to it.985 
                                                          
980 Ibid., para. 90. 
981 Ibid., para. 91.  
982 Ibid., para. 96. See also n. 837. 
983 See ibid., para. 100. 
984 Ibid. para. 101. Note, however, that in the Barayagwiza case, Cameroon was three days slower, see n. 
907 and accompanying text. 
985 Cf. also Judge Lal Chand Vohrah’s declaration to this decision, where he remarked (see also n. 834): 
“If an accused is arrested or detained by a state at the request or under the authority of the Tribunal, 
even though the accused is not yet within the actual custody of the Tribunal, the Tribunal has a 
responsibility to provide whatever relief is available to it to attempt to reduce any violations as much as 
possible, and this remedy must be proportional to the violations. (…) I would also like to note my 
apprehension of certain language employed in the present Decision, which states that the “Appeals 
Chamber emphasises that, in any case, the Tribunal is not responsible for the period of time which 
elapsed before the Appellant was transferred to the Detention Facility of the Tribunal.” [It must be noted 
that this is not an entirely accurate reproduction of the Appeals Chamber’s words. The original Appeals 
Chamber’s words go as follows: “[T]he Appeals Chamber emphasizes that in any event, the Tribunal is 








The statement cited above, on the “fitting remedy”, and the declaration of Judge Lal 
Chand Vohrah in this case, see footnotes 834 and 985, can be seen as evidence for 
this reasoning, for the idea that ICTR takes its responsibility for violations which 
occur in the context of its case.  
With respect to issue number three, the right of Semanza to be brought before a 
Trial Chamber without delay and to be formally charged, the judges again made a 
point comparable with the one made by the judges in the 31 March 2000 decision in 
Barayagwiza, namely that counsel for Semanza had requested postponement of 
Semanza’s initial hearing to 16 February 1998.986 According to the judges, this 
request had “the import of waiving the Appellant’s right to claim violation of his 
right to be brought before a Trial Chamber without delay and be formally 
charged”.987 
The fourth and final issue which had to be discussed was Semanza’s right to 
challenge the lawfulness of detention (habeas corpus). After having confirmed the 
reasoning of the 3 November 1999 decision in Barayagwiza on the importance of 
this right,988 the judges noted that a writ of habeas corpus was filed on 29 
September 1997 but was not heard by a Trial Chamber.989 As a result, Semanza’s 
right to challenge the lawfulness of his detention was violated.990 However, “[t]o 
assess the extent of the violation and its consequences in terms of remedy”,991 the 
judges had to take into account all the circumstances of the case. In doing so, they 
found that after this writ was filed in 1997, counsel for Semanza remained inactive 
on it for quite some time; according to the judges, it was “apparent that the 
Appellant became interested in the fate of his writ of habeas corpus only after the 
Appeals Chamber’s 3 November 1999 Decision in the Barayagwiza case [original 
footnote omitted, ChP]”.992 Because of this, the Appeals Chamber concluded that 
Semanza’s counsel “had failed in his duty of diligence by not carrying through to 
                                                                                                                                              
Detention Facility.”, ChP.] (…) I do not take it to imply nor should it be interpreted as implying, that the 
Tribunal has no responsibility to an accused before he is transferred to the Detention Facility of the 
Tribunal when the accused has been arrested or detained at the behest of the Tribunal. This accords with 
the position taken in the Barayagwiza Review Decision, that the cumulative effects of all violations – 
even those occurring prior to transfer into Tribunal custody – are to be considered in fashioning an 
appropriate remedy [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. 
The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, Declaration by Judge Lal Chand 
Vohrah, paras. 6-7.) Judge Lal Chand Vohrah further notes that “[r]esponsibility and authority to redress 
violations occurring at a time when the accused was not detained under Tribunal request or authority 
would need to be considered on a case by case basis.” (Ibid., para. 7, n. 7.) 
986 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-
20-A, 31 May 2000, para. 108. 
987 Ibid., para. 111. See for criticism on this point, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, Declaration by Judge Lal Chand 
Vohrah, paras. 9-10. 
988 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-
20-A, 31 May 2000, paras. 112-113. See also n. 863 and accompanying text. 
989 See ibid., para. 114. 
990 See ibid.  
991 Ibid., para. 115. 








conclusion the matter he had undertaken on the Appellant’s behalf in his writ of 
habeas corpus”.993 This is rather an awkward statement: it appears that the Appeals 
Chamber is trying to turn the ICTR’s own fault (namely its fault not to have 
considered the 1997 writ of habeas corpus) into a fault of the Defence because the 
latter has not sufficiently stressed the importance of this writ for his case. Is this not 
the world turned upside-down?994 The judges also clarified that Semanza  
 
adduced two principal grounds in his 29 September 1997 writ of habeas corpus. 
Firstly, he contends that the Prosecutor was responsible for the continuing increase in 
the lapse of time before he was transferred to the Tribunal’s Detention Facility and, 
secondly, that he was detained with no formal legal justification. The Appeals 
Chamber recalls that an indictment was confirmed against the Appellant on 
23 October 1997 and that he was transferred to the Tribunal’s Detention Facility on 
19 November 1997. The results sought by filing the writ of habeas corpus were 
therefore achieved relatively soon after the writ was filed [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].995 
 
As a result, the judges concluded that “while indeed there was prejudice caused, it 
must be seen in perspective and thus does not take the form of material prejudice 
alleged by the Appellant”.996 Arguably, the judges’ clarification does not seem to be 
without its flaws. Although the fact that Semanza’s indictment was confirmed 
indeed appears to resolve his argument that he was detained with no formal legal 
justification, it is difficult to understand how his transfer can solve his assertion 
“that the Prosecutor was responsible for the continuing increase in the lapse of time 
before he was transferred”. After all, even if Semanza has been transferred, the 
                                                          
993 Ibid., para. 121. However, one can wonder whether this is indeed so. After all, the Appeals Chamber 
notes itself (ibid., para. 116) that “[h]is 29 September 1997 writ of habeas corpus aside, the Appellant 
challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and detention in Cameroon for a second time in his Motion to Set 
Aside [the Arrest and Detention of Laurent Semanza] as Unlawful, which he filed on 16 August 199[9] 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” As the aim of a writ of habeas corpus is to challenge the lawfulness 
of one’s arrest and detention, one can wonder whether this challenge, made on 16 August 1999 – hence 
before the Barayagwiza case – is not a repetition of the 1997 writ of habeas corpus in another form. In 
that respect, the following words are also incomprehensible (ibid., para. 119): “Counsel for the 
Appellant neglected to follow up the 29 September 1997 writ of habeas corpus until the Barayagwiza 
Decision had been delivered. The fact that Counsel for the Appellant elected to challenge the lawfulness 
of the Appellant’s arrest and detention in August 1999 in a second motion confirms this finding.” The 
question is how this possible, given the fact that (16) August 1999 is clearly preceding the moment the 
Barayagwiza Decision was delivered (3 November 1999). 
994 Cf. also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-20-A, 31 May 2000, Declaration by Judge Lal Chand Vohrah, para. 12: “I consider that when any 
organ of the Tribunal contributes to due process or other human rights violations (including by omission 
or oversight), the Chambers should be sufficiently flexible to allow the violations to be raised and 
redressed. Indeed, when an accused is defending himself against charges of genocide, crimes against 
humanity or war crimes before the Tribunal, he should not also be required to diligently ensure that the 
Tribunal is not itself contributing to a violation of his rights, as that onus should rest with the Tribunal.” 
995 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 









Prosecutor can still be held responsible for the considerable lapse of time prior to the 
transfer. 
Be that as it may, the Appeals Chamber nevertheless found “that any violation, 
even if it entails only a relative degree of prejudice, requires a proportionate 
remedy”.997 This statement, which very much resembles the concluding statement of 
the judges in the 31 March 2000 decision in Barayagwiza that “all violations 
demand a remedy”,998 can be welcomed999 as it can be seen as confirmation of what 
appears to be the reasoning in the Barayagwiza decisions, namely that the Tribunal 
will take responsibility for any violations committed in the context of its case, even 
if these violations have been committed by third parties.1000 
The last remark made by the judges before they turned to the final conclusion 
arguably indirectly showed that in determining a proportionate remedy, the 
seriousness of the suspect’s alleged crimes may be taken into account: “In that 
connection, the Appeals Chamber also kept in mind the Tribunal’s mandate, 
particularly in respect of the protection of international public order.”1001   
The judges’ final conclusion was that Semanza’s right to be informed promptly 
of the nature of the charges against him and his right to challenge the lawfulness of 
his detention were violated.1002 However, “the remedy sought by the Appellant, 
namely his release, is disproportionate, in the instant case”.1003 As a result, the 
judges decided  
 
                                                          
997 Ibid., para. 125.  
998 See n. 919 and accompanying text. 
999 However, strictly speaking, one could argue that the Appeals Chamber’s statement is in violation of 
the ICTR RPE for Rule 5 (A) of the ICTR RPE states that “[w]here an objection on the ground of non-
compliance with the Rules or Regulations is raised by a party at the earliest opportunity, the Trial 
Chamber shall grant relief, if it finds that the alleged non-compliance is proved and that it has caused 
material prejudice to that party [emphasis added, ChP]”. Remarkably, this rule was also presented in 
this decision (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, para. 122) but the Appeals Chamber does not say anything about the fact 
that this rule seemingly contradicts the Appeal Chamber’s conclusion that a remedy will be provided in 
this case, even if the prejudice caused “does not take the form of material prejudice alleged by the 
Appellant”. (See n. 996 and accompanying text.) This point will be returned to in the Rwamakuba case, 
see ns. 1139-1145 and accompanying text. 
1000 The only difference is that in the Barayagwiza case, the judges also looked at a period of detention 
which could not be seen as being at the behest/request of the Prosecutor, see ns. 857 and 919 and 
accompanying text. 
1001 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-
A, 31 May 2000, para. 126. 
1002 See ibid., paras. 127-128. 
1003 Ibid., para. 129. As explained earlier (see the Dokmanović case), although the remedy of (final) 
release may indeed not be a proportionate remedy in this case, the judges do not explain how their 
conclusion can be reconciled with the strict application of the law, which stipulates that such violations 
lead to an unlawful detention (see also Swart 2001, p. 204 who explains that “a failure to promptly 
inform the person of the reasons for his arrest and of any charges against him makes his detention 
illegal”), which, in turn, according to para. 4 of Artt. 9 of the ICCPR or 5 of the ECHR, demands the 








that for the violation of his rights, the Appellant is entitled to a remedy which shall be 
given when judgement is rendered by the Trial Chamber, as follows: (a) If he is found 
not guilty, the Appellant shall be entitled to financial compensation; (b) If he is found 
guilty, the Appellant’s sentence shall be reduced to take into account the violation of 
his rights, pursuant to Article 23 of the Statute.1004 
 
Although this disposition is similar to the one of the second Barayagwiza case, 
Semanza’s remedy was considerably smaller than the one of Barayagwiza (whose 
life sentence, it is recalled, was reduced to 35 years’ imprisonment); when 
Semanza’s substantive case was completed, his sentence (25 years’ imprisonment) 
was reduced by six months.1005  
Although it is not clear exactly how the judges arrived at this remedy and 
although this remedy may not seem very impressive to the suspect, it is to be 
welcomed that the judges seemingly did what every chamber should do, namely to 
properly examine the pre-transfer period of its case and to accord the suspect a 
remedy if his rights were violated in the context of the case, irrespective of who was 
responsible for these violations.  
Perhaps, the fact that the judges in this case accorded a small remedy for the 
violations may also reassure people critical of granting remedies to suspects of 
international crimes that providing a remedy may not necessarily jeopardise the 
prosecution of that suspect. Although such remedies may and in fact should be 
granted in certain serious male captus cases, for example when the Tribunal itself is 
involved in a kidnapping, one can assume, or hope, that this will not happen too 
often. Normally, a (small) reduction of the (very often quite severe) sentence will 
suffice, hence ensuring that both the sense of justice of the person in question (in 
that his violations are remedied) and of the victims/the international community as a 
whole (in that a suspect of international crimes, if found guilty, receives an 
appropriate (which very often means stern) penalty for his deeds) are met.  
 
3.2.3 Kajelijeli  
 
The penultimate case in the ICTR context to be discussed here is that of Kajelijeli. 
On 5 June 1998, pursuant to Rule 40 of the ICTR RPE, Juvénal Kajelijeli was 
arrested by the authorities in Benin and put in custody.1006 Almost three months 
                                                          
1004 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-
A, 31 May 2000, under ‘Disposition’, para. 6. 
1005 See ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor vs. Laurent Semanza, ‘Judgement and Sentence’, Case 
No. ICTR-97-20-T, 15 May 2003, para. 590. See also ibid., para. 580: “The Chamber has fully 
considered the nature of these violations. The total period of the violation of the Accused’s right to be 
promptly informed of the charges lasted approximately thirty-six days, while the violation of his right to 
challenge his detention was found not to cause material prejudice. Considering the importance of these 
fundamental rights, the Chamber finds that it is appropriate to reduce the Accused’s sentence by a 
period of six months.” 
1006 See ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor versus J[u]v[é]nal Kajelijeli, ‘Decision on the Defence 








later, on 29 August 1998, Kajelijeli’s indictment was confirmed, charging him, and 
others (including André Rwamakuba whose case will be discussed after this one), 
with “Conspiracy to commit Genocide, Genocide, Complicity in Genocide, Direct 
and Public Incitement to commit Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and 
Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 
II”.1007 A few days later, on 9 September 1998, Kajelijeli was transferred to the 
ICTR.1008 Although his initial appearance was scheduled for 24 November 1998, 
this date was postponed several times and took place as late as 7 and 8 April 
1999.1009 However, already long before this date, namely on 9 November 1998, 
Kajelijeli had filed a motion challenging the lawfulness of his arrest and 
detention.1010  
Kajelijeli complained 1) that he was arrested without a warrant and probable 
cause;1011 2) that he was denied the right to counsel during his interrogation in July 
1998 in Benin;1012 3) that he was not promptly informed about the charges against 
him in a language he understands;1013 and finally 4) that his right to an initial 
appearance without delay was violated.1014 Because of these violations, counsel for 
Kajelijeli submitted that his client was “entitled to a right to remedy pursuant to 
Article 9 (4) of the ICCPR; Article 5 (4) of the ECPHR [here, another abbreviation 
for the ECHR is used, ChP] and Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights”.1015 This latter submission is very interesting for it is, surprisingly, one of 
the few where the Defence specifically refers to those human rights provisions 
which one would think would be used much more often by suspects claiming to 
have been the victims of an illegal arrest/detention, namely the habeas corpus 
provisions of the ICCPR and ECHR which unequivocally state that the judge must 
release a person if that person’s detention is unlawful, see Subsection 4.2 of Chapter 
III. 
The Prosecutor rejected these arguments and claimed, among other things, that 
“if the Accused has any complaint about his arrest, he can seek redress from the 
Benin Authorities, as the Tribunal has no jurisdiction”.1016 This, again, is 
                                                                                                                                              
of Urgent Motion to Expand and Supplement the Record of 8 December 1999 Hearing’, Case No. 
ICTR-98-44-I, 8 May 2000, p. 2. 
1007 Ibid. 
1008 See ibid.  
1009 See ibid.  
1010 See ibid. 
1011 See ibid., para. 3. 
1012 See ibid., para. 9. 
1013 See ibid., para. 10. See also ibid.: “He was presented, for the first time: a confirmation of non-
disclosure of the indictment; a warrant and a copy of a redacted indictment without his name being 
mentioned anywhere and without any identification of him, when he was transferred to Arusha on 9 
September 1998. All the documents were in English, which he does not understand”. 
1014 See ibid., para. 11.  
1015 Ibid. 








reminiscent of a case like Ngirumpatse, the reasoning of which seems to have been 
abandoned in cases such as Barayagwiza and Semanza.1017  
The Ngirumpatse decision, and likewise the Karemera decision, were also 
referred to by the judges in Kajelijeli, namely in the context of Kajelijeli’s first 
point; the judges found, after having stated that the ICTR RPE do not refer to 
“probable cause” but only to a “suspect”,1018 that, when arresting a “suspect”, no 
warrant of arrest is needed.  
This is because  
 
[a]t this stage, the manner and execution of arrest is an area within the States’ 
responsibility. When the Prosecutor makes a request for the arrest of the Accused, the 
matter falls within the domain of the requested State and it is that State which 
organizes, controls and carries out the arrest in accordance with their domestic law. 
All these procedures were fulfilled in this case. The Accused was, therefore, properly 
arrested under Rule 40.1019 
 
After this statement, the judges recalled the reasonings of Karemera1020 and 
Ngirumpatse1021 and stated that “[t]he Trial Chamber maintains its reasoning in the 
above cited cases on the issue of lack of warrant of arrest and is of the view that 
there is no good reason to depart from it”.1022 Furthermore, Kajelijeli “had not 
shown that any denial, whatsoever, has occurred to affect his right to immediately 
challenge the legality of his arrest in Benin”.1023 That may be so, but as national 
proceedings may not be used as an excuse to refuse the transfer of the person in 
question to the ICTR (unless one is of the opinion that transferring the suspect 
would lead to a ius cogens violation),1024 national authorities will not permanently 
                                                          
1017 This point will be further discussed when examining the Appeals Chamber’s decision in Kajelijeli. 
1018 As a result, what is required is reliable information which tends to show that a person may have 
committed a crime over which the ICTR has jurisdiction. See ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor 
versus J[u]v[é]nal Kajelijeli, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion Concerning the Arbitrary Arrest and 
Illegal Detention of the Accused and on the Defence Notice of Urgent Motion to Expand and 
Supplement the Record of 8 December 1999 Hearing’, Case No. ICTR-98-44-I, 8 May 2000, para. 32. 
1019 Ibid., para. 34. 
1020 See ibid., para. 35: “In [the] Karemera case, Trial Chamber II expressed the opinion that a request 
made by the Prosecutor is executed and controlled by the State authorities using their law enforcement 
organs (…). In that case, it was decided that “the Trial Chamber therefore, considers that it cannot 
provide any remedy concerning such arrest and custody as these are still matters within the jurisdiction 
of the requested State.”” 
1021 See ibid.: “In the Ngirumpatse [c]ase a similar declaration was made. At para. 56, the Trial Chamber 
states that “the Tribunal is not competent to supervise the legality of arrest, custody, search and seizure 
executed by the requested State. The laws of the requested State may not require an arrest warrant or 
impose other legal conditions.”” 
1022 Ibid. 
1023 Ibid., para. 36. The Prosecutor noted (ibid., para. 21) that “[t]he Accused made a request to the 
Benin Authorities to be released but they did not respond. The Prosecutor has no power over the Benin 
Authorities and she cannot compel the release of the Accused by those authorities.” 
1024 See n. 24 and accompanying text. It must be clarified that even though some may assert that the 
right of a person to challenge the lawfulness of his detention can be considered a ius cogens norm (see n. 








release a person on the basis of a habeas corpus proceeding.1025 In fact, Swart has 
already1026 explained that “the arrested person’s sole recourse is to a tribunal for 
habeas corpus or for obtaining interim release, since Rule 57 of the RPE of both ad 
hoc Tribunals leaves no discretion to States to decide on these matters”.1027 Rule 65 
(A) of the ICTR RPE could also be mentioned here: “Once detained, an accused 
may not be provisionally released except upon an order of a Trial Chamber.”1028 
Hence, the reference of both the Prosecutor1029 and the judges to Kajelijeli’s right to 
challenge the legality of his arrest and detention in Benin is quite odd.  
With respect to the second point raised by Kajelijeli, namely that he was denied 
the right to counsel during his interrogation in July 1998 in Benin, the judges noted 
that “the Accused voluntarily waived his right to counsel at the time of the 
questioning”.1030  
The judges also looked at an issue which can be connected to this subject, but 
which was not mentioned by the Trial Chamber in its summary of the allegations of 
Kajelijeli, namely the fact that there was a delay in the assignment of his counsel.1031 
They were of the opinion that the process of assigning counsel to Kajelijeli was 
indeed prolonged but this was also caused by Kajelijeli himself, who had “abused 
                                                                                                                                              
course, includes the right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention, ChP] is recognized as a jus 
cogens norm”), it can arguably not be said that a denial of this right by the national authorities can 
constitute a reason for the national judge, in the context of the ICTR, to refuse the transfer. A refusal to 
transfer the suspect is arguably only possible if the judge is of the opinion that the transfer to the ICTR 
itself would lead to a ius cogens violation. (Cf. also n. 203.) 
1025 As explained earlier, the habeas corpus provisions in human rights law only speak of a release as 
such and not of a permanent release/a release with prejudice. Hence, such a release does not have to lead 
to a refusal to transfer. Nevertheless, judges may be of the opinion that such serious procedural 
irregularities occurred in the arrest/detention that the person in question is to be released with prejudice 
to the OTP, hence blocking the possibility of transferring the person to the Tribunal. 
1026 See n. 44 and accompanying text. 
1027 Swart 2002 A, p. 1250. 
1028 See also n. 43, where reference was also made to the following words from Gallant 1994, p. 585, 
writing that the ICTY version of the rule “suggests that the arresting state has no authority to release the 
defendant pursuant to its own law.” 
1029 See n. 1016. 
1030 ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor versus J[u]v[é]nal Kajelijeli, ‘Decision on the Defence 
Motion Concerning the Arbitrary Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused and on the Defence Notice 
of Urgent Motion to Expand and Supplement the Record of 8 December 1999 Hearing’, Case No. 
ICTR-98-44-I, 8 May 2000, para. 39. 
1031 It appears that the Trial Chamber simply forgot to mention this allegation (‘Right to Counsel 
generally’). The fact that the Trial Chamber first states that “[t]he Defence submitted that there were 
five major complaints against the Prosecutor, which are elaborated below.” (Ibid., para. 1.) and then 
addresses only four complaints (namely 1) that he was arrested without a warrant and probable cause; 2) 
that he was denied the right to counsel during his interrogation in July 1998 in Benin; 3) that he was not 
promptly informed about the charges against him in a language he understands; and finally 4) that his 
right to have an initial appearance without delay was violated) may be additional proof for that 
assertion. Note that in the summary of the Prosecutor’s response, the Trial Chamber did mention this 








his right to Counsel by not following the established procedure on the assignment of 
Counsel”.1032  
With respect to the complaint that Kajelijeli was not promptly informed about 
the charges against him in a language he understands, the Trial Chamber found 
“that, at the time of arrest, the Accused should have been informed of the reasons 
for his arrest by the Benin Authorities”.1033 After having stated that it was not 
certain whether this had in fact happened, the Trial Chamber quickly turned to the 
undisputed fact that Kajelijeli had received a warrant of arrest, a copy of the 
redacted indictment and an order for the non-disclosure of the indictment “while in 
Benin, before his transfer to the UNDF [United Nations Detention Facilities, ChP] 
on 9 September 1998”.1034 Although this seems correct,1035 one can wonder whether 
the Trial Chamber can present this as an undisputed fact because Kajelijeli had 
(apparently incorrectly) argued that he had received these documents for the first 
time “when he was transferred to Arusha on 9 September 1998”.1036 Furthermore, 
the judges do not really explain how Kajelijeli’s was promptly informed of the 
charges. Moreover, they forget to address the argument of Kajelijeli that he must not 
only be promptly informed, but also in a language he understands.    
Concerning Kajelijeli’s last complaint, that his right to an initial appearance 
without delay was violated, the judges opined that at the initial appearance, the 
judges must also be satisfied that Kajelijeli’s right to counsel is respected.1037 
However, as already explained by the Trial Chamber, the assignment of counsel was 
also delayed by Kajelijeli himself. Thus, the judges concluded, “he stands to blame 
                                                          
1032 Ibid., para. 41. See also ibid., para. 40: “It is clear that serious efforts were made by the Registry to 
secure an assigned Counsel for the Accused. It is also true that the Accused frustrated these efforts by 
selecting Counsel whose names were not on the Registrar’s drawn up list.” 
1033 Ibid., para. 42. 
1034 Ibid. 
1035 See also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. 
ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 210: “In total, the Appellant was in the custody of the authorities 
of Benin from the date of his initial arrest until his transfer to the custody of the Tribunal for 95 days. 
During this period, the Appellant was in the custody of Benin authorities for 85 days before being 
served with an arrest warrant or a confirmed indictment.” That would mean that Kajelijeli was served 
with these documents 10 days before his transfer on 9 September 1998, on 30 August 1998. See also 
ibid., para. 231 for a less clear conclusion: “The evidence on the record indicates that the Appellant was 
never informed by a Judge of the charges against him, even provisionally, until sometime between 29 
August 1998 and 7 September 1998, when he was formally served with an arrest warrant and a copy of 
the redacted indictment against him from the Tribunal [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
1036 See n. 1013. The following words do not contradict this as 9 September 1998 is, of course, also 
falling in the period after 29 August 1998: “The Appellant notes that it was not until after 29 August 
1998 that he was served in Benin with copies of a warrant for his arrest, an order of surrender, an order 
of confirmation and non-disclosure, and a redacted version of the amended indictment from the 
Tribunal.” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. 
ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 212.) 
1037 See ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor versus J[u]v[é]nal Kajelijeli, ‘Decision on the Defence 
Motion Concerning the Arbitrary Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused and on the Defence Notice 
of Urgent Motion to Expand and Supplement the Record of 8 December 1999 Hearing’, Case No. 








for the delay in his initial appearance, which is inter-twined to the issue of the 
assignment of Counsel”.1038   
As a result, Kajelijeli’s motion was dismissed. Kajelijeli subsequently filed a 
notice of appeal but this was dismissed by the Appeals Chamber on 10 August 2000 
as it “lacked specificity in that it did not mention any ground of appeal or the relief 
sought, and that the Appellant failed to cure this deficiency within the deadline it 
had set for doing so”.1039  
Hence, Kajelijeli filed a second challenge to the jurisdiction of the ICTR, but this 
challenge was also rejected by Trial Chamber II, which noted “that these issues are 
res judicata, as they were decided upon by the Trial Chamber in its Decision of 8 
May 2000”.1040  
When Kajelijeli appealed this decision, the Appeals Chamber, in its decision of 
16 November 2001,  
 
declined to comment on the Appellant’s arguments contesting the Tribunal’s personal 
jurisdiction noting that an appeal on that issue had already been dismissed. The 
Appeals Chamber indicated that at a later stage in the trial, the Appellant could raise 
before the Trial Chamber all issues relating to his fundamental rights and any 
demands for reparation [original footnotes omitted, ChP].1041 
 
When Kajelijeli’s substantive case was about to be brought to an end, the Appeals 
Chamber stated that it now had to find out whether, taking its earlier decisions of 10 
August 2000 and 16 November 2001 into account, it could perhaps “reconsider the 
arguments addressed therein in considering the Appellant’s submission under this 
ground of appeal that the Trial Chamber erred in rejecting them and in finding that it 
had jurisdiction”.1042  
It decided that Kajelijeli could not re-litigate the issue of the ICTR’s personal 
jurisdiction1043 and explained that even if the judges were to reconsider it, this would 
not lead to a refusal of jurisdiction.1044 This was because Kajelijeli’s violations – in 
contrast to their colleagues at the Trial Chamber level, the judges of the Appeals 
                                                          
1038 Ibid. 
1039 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-
44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 199. 
1040 ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor versus Juvénal Kajelijeli, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion 
Objecting to the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal’, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, 13 March 2001, para. 6. 
1041 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-
44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 200. 
1042 Ibid., para. 201. 
1043 See ibid., para. 205. The judges explained in that respect (ibid.): “The Appeals Chamber squarely 
held, in its 16 November 2001 decision, that the Appellant procedurally lost his entitlement to raise his 
personal jurisdiction objection by failing to file a sufficiently specific notice of appeal, even after the 
Appeals Chamber had allowed him extra time to do so after his initial failure. This holding disposed of 
the personal jurisdiction objection. The Appellant has not demonstrated any cause to reconsider this 
determination on a discretionary basis: there is no clear error in the Appeals Chamber’s reasoning, nor is 
reconsideration necessary to prevent an injustice.” 








Chamber had proprio motu1045 established that his “rights were in fact violated 
during his initial arrest and detention prior to his initial appearance”1046 – did not 
meet the male detentus test as established by the Barayagwiza and Nikolić cases: 
 
[E]ven if it were to reconsider the issue of its personal jurisdiction, the Appeals 
Chamber does not find that these newly and more detailed submitted breaches rise to 
the requisite level of egregiousness amounting to the Tribunal’s loss of personal 
jurisdiction. The Appeals Chamber is mindful that it must maintain the correct 
balance between “the fundamental rights of the accused and the essential interests of 
the international community in the prosecution of persons charged with serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.” While a Chamber may use its discretion 
under the circumstances of a case to decline to exercise jurisdiction, it should only do 
so “where to exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious and egregious violations of 
the accused’s rights would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity.” For example, 
“in circumstances where an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe even subject 
to inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to the 
Tribunal, this may constitute a legal impediment.” However, those cases are 
exceptional and, in most circumstances, the “remedy of setting aside jurisdiction, will 
. . . be disproportionate.” The Appeals Chamber gives due weight to the violations 
alleged by the Appellant; however, it does not consider that this case falls within the 
exceptional category of cases highlighted above [original footnotes omitted, ChP].1047 
 
It must be noted that the Appeals Chamber, even though it does not exclude the fact 
that serious violations of a suspect’s human rights (without serious mistreatment) 
can lead to the ending of the case,1048 again (see also the Nikolić case) focuses here 
on the more ‘physical’ dimension (“very serious mistreatment”) of the male detentus 
test.  
That is, of course, unproblematic, but one must be careful that the male detentus 
test, by constantly focusing on this dimension, is not slowly transforming into a 
‘torture test’. As argued before, there may be other male captus situations not 
involving serious mistreatment which should also lead to the ending of the case, 
such as an abduction (not involving serious mistreatment) orchestrated by OTP staff.   
Even though the violations did not lead to a male detentus outcome, what was 
the exact opinion of the Appeals Chamber judges on these violations and their 
consequences for this case? 
The judges divided the violations in two different periods, namely 1) between his 
arrest and transfer to the ICTR and 2) between his transfer and his initial 
appearance.  
                                                          
1045 See ibid., para. 208. 
1046 Ibid., para. 206. 
1047 Ibid. 
1048 See the words “[f]or example” as in: “While a Chamber may use its discretion under the 
circumstances of a case to decline to exercise jurisdiction, it should only do so “where to exercise that 
jurisdiction in light of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove detrimental 
to the court’s integrity.” For example, “in circumstances where an accused is very seriously mistreated, 
maybe even subject to inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to 








With respect to the first period, the judges examined three issues, namely 1) the 
arrest and the right to be promptly informed of the reasons for the arrest; 2) 
Kajelijeli’s detention in Benin and 3) Kajelijeli’s right to counsel during 
questioning. The second period covered two issues, namely 1) the right to counsel 
and 2) the right to an initial appearance. 
However, before it addressed issue number one, it first noted a number of what it 
called undisputed facts.  
These included that Kajelijeli had been detained by the Benin authorities for 95 
days and that it had taken 85 days before he was served with an arrest warrant or a 
confirmed indictment.1049 This also means that Kajelijeli had been served with these 
documents ten days before he was transferred to Arusha. Even though this may, of 
course, be true,1050 it is hard to see how this point can be presented as an undisputed 
fact – see also footnote 1036 and accompanying text – since Kajelijeli had claimed 
that he had only received these documents for the first time “when he was 
transferred to Arusha on 9 September 1998”.1051  
Be that as it may, the judges also made a few general remarks, for example, that 
“under Rule 40 of the Rules, the Prosecution and Benin had overlapping 
responsibilities during the first period of the Appellant’s arrest and detention in 
Benin”.1052 This, the judges continued,  
 
flows from the rationale that the international division of labour in prosecuting crimes 
must not be to the detriment of the apprehended person. Under the prosecutorial duty 
of due diligence, the Prosecution is required to ensure that, once it initiates a case, 
“the case proceeds to trial in a way that respects the rights of the accused [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].”1053  
 
This statement by the Kajelijeli Appeals Chamber, which includes a quotation from 
the first Barayagwiza decision,1054 must be applauded for it clearly stresses the 
importance alluded to earlier that the suspect must not become the victim of the fact 
that the legal proceedings of his case are fragmented over two or more 
jurisdictions.1055  
Returning to the overlapping responsibilities during the first period of arrest and 
detention in the State concerned,1056 the Appeals Chamber explained that this means 
                                                          
1049 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-
98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 210. 
1050 See also n. 1035 and accompanying text.  
1051 See n. 1013.  
1052 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-
44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 220. 
1053 Ibid. 
1054 See n. 865 and accompanying text. 
1055 See n. 199 and accompanying text. (See also ns. 231-232 and accompanying text of Chapter III and 
n. 843 of the present chapter.) 
1056 See also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. 
ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 221: “[A] shared burden exists with regard to safeguarding the 








that the national judge can and must also safeguard several fundamental rights of the 
suspect,1057 but that it is not this judge’s task to go into the merits of the case:  
 
He or she would not know the reasons for the detention in the absence of a 
provisional or final arrest warrant issued by the requesting State or the Tribunal. This 
responsibility is vested with the judiciary of the requesting State, or in this case, a 
Judge of the Tribunal, as they bear principal responsibility for the deprivation of 
liberty of the person they requested to be surrendered.1058 
 
It can be argued that the words quoted above, that the ICTR bears principal 
responsibility for the deprivation of liberty of the person, is valid for the entire 
deprivation of liberty. Hence, not only for the substantive part, but also for the 
procedural part (even though that latter part is factually executed by others).  
The judges recalled the commendable and previously mentioned1059 words of 
Judge Lal Chand Vohrah in the Semanza case that  
 
if an accused is arrested or detained by a state at the request or under the authority of 
the Tribunal even though the accused is not yet within the actual custody of the 
Tribunal, the Tribunal has a responsibility to provide whatever relief is available to it 
to attempt to reduce any violations as much as possible (…).1060 
 
They then turned to the first issue (the arrest and the right to be promptly informed 
of the reasons for the arrest) of the first period (between his arrest and transfer).  
The Appeals Chamber first noted that the Trial Chamber had found that 
Kajelijeli’s arrest was not arbitrary or in violation of due process of law;1061 Rule 40 
of the ICTR RPE had been adhered to1062 and, with respect to the exact “manner and 
execution of the arrest pursuant to the Prosecutor’s request”,1063 this was the domain 
of the State over which the Tribunal had no control: 
                                                          
1057 See ibid. For example, “[a] Judge of the requested State is called upon to communicate to the 
detainee the request for surrender (or extradition) and make him or her familiar with any charge, to 
verify the suspect’s identity, to examine any obvious challenges to the case, to inquire into the medical 
condition of the suspect, and to notify a person enjoying the confidence of the detainee and consular 
officers [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) 
1058 Ibid. 
1059 See ns. 834 and 985. 
1060 However, as commendable as these words are, it is submitted that judges should also take their 
responsibility for irregularities which can be seen to fall within the notion of “within the context of the 
Tribunal case” but which are not triggered by the fact that a request for arrest and detention has been 
issued by the Tribunal. This was not excluded by Judge Lal Chand Vohrah, by the way, see again ns. 
834 and 985, where it was explained that this Judge further noted that “[r]esponsibility and authority to 
redress violations occurring at a time when the accused was not detained under Tribunal request or 
authority would need to be considered on a case by case basis.” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent 
Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, Declaration by Judge 
Lal Chand Vohrah, para. 7, n. 7.) 
1061 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-
98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 225. 









[T]he Trial Chamber held that responsibility lies with the cooperating State to 
organize, control, and carry out the arrest in accordance with its domestic law. The 
Trial Chamber found that there was no violation of the Appellant’s right to be 
promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest and of the charges against him. The 
Trial Chamber noted that responsibility for promptly informing the Appellant of the 
reasons for his arrest lay with the Benin authorities, and it was disputed whether or 
not information was passed to the Appellant at the time of his arrest.1064  
 
It was noted earlier that this reasoning, which was also expressed in cases such as 
Karemera and Ngirumpatse, appears to be in violation of cases such as Barayagwiza 
and Semanza (Appeals Chamber) where the judges examined the pre-transfer phase 
of their case and seemingly took responsibility (by granting remedies) for any 
violation committed in the context of their case.  
The Appeals Chamber in Kajelijeli apparently supports this stance because it did 
not agree with the above-mentioned reasoning of the Trial Chamber. Although Rule 
40 of the ICTR RPE was not violated in this case, “the manner in which the arrest 
was carried out was not according to due process of law because the Appellant was 
not promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest”.1065 Hence, the fact that the 
national authorities had not informed Kajelijeli entailed a breach of his rights.1066 
This means that Tribunal does what it arguably should do, namely taking into 
account pre-transfer violations committed in the context of its case (such as 
violations occurring in the context of the Tribunal’s constructive custody), even if 
the Prosecutor was not, strictly speaking,1067 responsible for these violations.  
With respect to the second issue (Kajelijeli’s detention in Benin) of the first 
period (between his arrest and transfer), the judges concluded that the Trial 
Chamber  
 
erred in failing to find that his detention in Benin for a total of 85 days without charge 
and without being brought promptly before a Judge was clearly unlawful and was in 
violation of his rights under the Tribunal’s Statute and Rules as well as international 
human rights law.1068 
                                                          
1064 Ibid.  
1065 Ibid., para. 226. The Appeals Chamber hereby referred to the already-mentioned (see ns. 969-970 
and accompanying text) observation by the Appeals Chamber in Semanza that “a suspect arrested at the 
behest of the Tribunal has a right to be promptly informed of the reasons for his or her arrest, and this 
right comes into effect from the moment of arrest and detention [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
(Ibid.) 
1066 See ibid., para. 227: “The Appellant claims in this appeal that at the time of the arrest, he asked the 
Benin authorities as to the reasons for his arrest and was informed that he would find them out at a later 
date. The Prosecution failed to rebut this argument. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber finds that in the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Appellant’s right to be informed of the reasons as to why he 
was being deprived of his liberty was not properly guaranteed [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
1067 Nevertheless, it can again be maintained that the Prosecutor can be seen as generally responsible for 
every violation taking place within this constructive custody (or better: within the context of the 
Tribunal case more generally). 
1068 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-








For these violations, the judges continued, the Prosecution was responsible because 
the latter “failed to make a request within a reasonable time under Rules 40 and 
40bis for the Appellant’s provisional arrest and transfer to the Tribunal”.1069 With 
respect to the responsibility of the Prosecution for Kajelijeli’s violated right to be 
brought promptly before a judge, the judges clarified that this violation was not 
solely attributable to the Prosecution. Hence, the violation could also be attributed in 
part to the national authorities. However, the Prosecution was nevertheless to be 
held responsible in general as “it was the Prosecution, thus an organ of the Tribunal, 
which was the requesting institution responsible for triggering the Appellant’s 
apprehension, arrest and detention in Benin”.1070 This statement, which was also 
used by Karadžić,1071 can again be seen as a confirmation of the view that the 
Prosecution is to be held generally responsible for pre-transfer violations committed 
in the context of a Tribunal case (such as in this case: violations occurring in the 
constructive custody of the Tribunal), irrespective of the question as to exactly 
which entity the violation could be attributed.1072  
Concerning the third issue (Kajelijeli’s right to counsel during questioning) of 
the first period (between his arrest and transfer), the judges simply agreed with the 
Trial Chamber that there was no violation of this right as Kajelijeli had not 
challenged “the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that there had been voluntary waiver or 
his concession of the same”.1073  
With respect to the second period (between the transfer and the initial 
appearance), it is recalled that the Appeals Chamber looked at two issues, namely 1) 
the right to counsel and 2) the right to an initial appearance. 
However, as with the first period, before the judges went to address issue number 
one of this second period, they first noted a number of undisputed facts. For 
example, the fact that Kajelijeli “was in the custody of the Tribunal for a total of 211 
days prior to any initial appearance during which he was without assigned counsel 
for 147 days”.1074 
Turning to the first issue in the context of the second period, the judges 
concluded, in contrast to their colleagues from the Trial Chamber, that Kajelijeli’s 
right to counsel had in fact been violated because “[i]t constitutes a violation (...) not 
                                                          
1069 Ibid.  
1070 Ibid., para. 232. 
1071 See n. 793 and accompanying text. 
1072 Hence, what is important is that, if a violation is identified in the context of a Tribunal case (for 
example, after the Prosecutor has requested the national State to provisionally arrest a person), that 
violation is consequently repaired by the now prosecuting forum, the Tribunal, irrespective of who 
committed the violation. However, this does not mean that the Tribunal will express itself on whether 
the party which (seems to have) committed this violation is also legally responsible for it. That is clearly 
a domain which is not for the Tribunal to enter, see also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. 
The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 252, where the judges 
summarised their findings, without going into or “irrespective of any responsibility of Benin for 
violations of the Appellant’s rights during the first period of arrest and detention, on which this Tribunal 
does not have competence to pronounce”. 
1073 Ibid., para. 236. 








to assign duty counsel, in spite of ongoing efforts to assign counsel of choice in light 
of the outstanding initial appearance”.1075 
With respect to the second issue of this period, the right to an initial appearance, 
the judges, again, disagreed with the Trial Chamber. In fact, they held that “the 211-
day delay between the Appellant’s transfer to the Tribunal and the initial appearance 
before a Judge of this Tribunal constitutes extreme undue delay”.1076 The problems 
with respect to assigning counsel to Kajelijeli did not change this.1077 
Now that the five issues, divided over two periods of time, had been examined, 
the judges turned to the conclusion. In this context, the judges stated, among other 
things:  
 
[T]he Appeals Chamber finds that fault is attributable to the Prosecution for 
violations to the Appellant’s rights during this first period of arrest and detention. The 
Prosecution failed to effect its prosecutorial duties with due diligence out of respect 
for the Appellant’s rights following its Rule 40 request to Benin. Thus, the Appellant 
is entitled to a remedy from the Tribunal.1078  
 
As earlier explained in the context of the Karadžić case (see the text following 
footnote 784 and accompanying text), this is a tricky remark as it seems to connect 
the granting of remedies with the attribution of certain violations to the Prosecutor, 
note the word “[t]hus”. Of course, it is obvious that if certain violations can be 
attributed to the Prosecutor, then the suspect is entitled to a remedy. However, the 
more interesting question is whether these words imply that the suspect is only 
entitled to a remedy if certain violations can be attributed to the Prosecutor. As has 
become clear from discussion of this case, this study is of the opinion that the 
decision provides enough room for the interpretation that the Tribunal is of the 
opinion that all violations in the context of a certain case (which in this case 
happened as from the constructive custody) must be remedied, irrespective of the 
question as to exactly which entity the violation could be attributed. Recall in this 
respect, for example, the following statement, made by the Appeals Chamber in the 
context of Kajelijeli’s right to be promptly brought before a judge:  
 
[A]lthough the violation is not solely attributable to the Tribunal, it has to be recalled 
that it was the Prosecution, thus an organ of the Tribunal, which was the requesting 
institution responsible for triggering the Appellant’s apprehension, arrest and 
detention in Benin.1079 
 
Thus, the fact that the Prosecutor initiated the case means that it must take the 
general responsibility for violations which occur in the context of its case, 
                                                          
1075 Ibid., para. 245. 
1076 Ibid., para. 250. 
1077 See ibid., para. 248. 
1078 Ibid., para. 252. 








irrespective of the question as to exactly which entity the violation could be 
attributed. 
This is arguably also confirmed by the final words of this part of the Kajelijeli 
decision, when the judges repeated the reasonings of their colleagues in the 
Barayagwiza and Semanza (Appeals Chamber) cases1080 that “any violation of the 
accused’s rights entails the provision of an effective remedy pursuant to Article 
2(3)(a) of the ICCPR [emphasis added, ChP]”.1081  
In the end, they concluded, in conformity with the Barayagwiza (Appeals 
Chamber) and Semanza (Appeals Chamber) cases, that  
 
where the Appeals Chamber has found on interlocutory appeal that an accused’s 
rights have been violated, but not egregiously so, it will order the Trial Chamber to 
reduce the accused’s sentence if the accused is found guilty at trial. With this in mind, 
the Appeals Chamber will take into consideration its findings here on violations of the 
Appellant’s rights when it turns to the task of determining the Appellant’s sentence in 
this Judgement in order to provide for an appropriate remedy [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].1082  
 
The remedy was considerable, although the remaining sentence was still so severe 
that it is unlikely that Kajelijeli will ever be a free man again:  
 
The Appeals Chamber finds that under the circumstances of this case, in view of the 
serious violations of the Appellant’s fundamental rights during his arrest and 
detention in Benin and the UNDF from 5 June 1998 to 6 April 1999, and considering 
the Appellant’s entitlement to an effective remedy for those violations under the 
Tribunal’s law and jurisprudence and Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR, the Appellant’s 
two life sentences and fifteen years’ sentence as imposed by the Trial Chamber shall 
be set aside and converted into a single sentence consisting of a fixed term of 
imprisonment of 45 years.1083  
 
Before turning to the final case in the ICTR context, it may be interesting to note 
that the Appeals Chamber speaks here of “serious violations of the Appellant’s 
fundamental rights [emphasis added, ChP]”. In the disposition, the judges also stated 
“that the Appellant’s fundamental rights were seriously violated [emphasis added, 
ChP]”.1084  
The fact that the Appeals Chamber did not refuse jurisdiction in this case, 
notwithstanding the fact that Tribunal was of the opinion that the suspect’s rights 
                                                          
1080 See ns. 919 and 997 and accompanying text, respectively. 
1081 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-
44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 255. See also ibid., para. 322: “Where a suspect or an accused’s rights have 
been violated during the period of his unlawful detention pending transfer and trial, Article 2(3)(a) of 
the ICCPR stipulates that “[a]ny person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall 
have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity.”” See for Art. 2, para. 3 (a) of the ICCPR also n. 575 of Chapter III. 
1082 Ibid., para. 255. 
1083 Ibid., para. 324. 








were seriously violated/that serious violations of the suspect’s rights had occurred, 
can be seen as additional proof for the fact that the serious/egregious test as 
presented by the Nikolić case is indeed a very restrictive test which will probably not 
be met in the case of ‘normal’ serious human rights violations (see the outcome of 
Kajelijeli) but probably only in such serious cases as those in which the suspect is, 
for example, seriously mistreated (involving torture-like conditions). As explained 
earlier, one should be careful that this test does not become too restrictive; there 
may still be situations which do not involve serious mistreatment, but which should 
nevertheless lead to a male detentus outcome, for example, if the Tribunal itself is 
involved in a kidnapping or when third parties are responsible for serious 




The final case in the ICTR context to be discussed here is that of Rwamakuba. On 2 
August 1995, André Rwamakuba was arrested and detained by the authorities in 
Namibia.1085 Almost five months later, on 22 December 1995, the ICTR’s OTP 
“contacted the Namibian authorities for the Accused to be kept in custody pending 
further information by their services”.1086 However, on 18 January 1996, the OTP 
informed the Namibians that they had no evidence against Rwamakuba, as a result 
of which the latter was released by the Namibian authorities on 8 February 1996.1087 
Nevertheless, on 29 August 1998, Rwamakuba’s indictment was confirmed – 
charging him with the same crimes with which Kajelijeli was charged1088 – and after 
an order for his arrest and transfer was issued on 8 October 1998, he was arrested on 
21 October in Namibia and transferred to the ICTR the next day.1089 It was not until 
more than five months later, on 7 April 1999, that Rwamakuba’s initial appearance 
took place,1090 showing that the ICTR seems to have great difficulty in bringing 
persons before a judge of the ICTR as soon as possible.   
The Defence claimed, among other things, 1) that Rwamakuba’s arrest was 
carried out on the basis of a formal request from the OTP pursuant to Rule 40 of the 
ICTR RPE, thus ensuring that “[a]ny irregularities pertaining to both the arrest and 
the subsequent detention of the Accused in Namibia from 2 August 1995 to 7 
February 1996 are (...) attributable to the Tribunal”;1091 2) that his arrest was illegal 
“in the absence of any proof against the Accused to consider him a suspect, let alone 
                                                          
1085 See ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba et alia, ‘Decision on the Defence 
Motion Concerning the Illegal Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused’, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, 
12 December 2000, p. 2. 
1086 Ibid. 
1087 See ibid.  
1088 See n. 1007 and accompanying text. 
1089 See ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba et alia, ‘Decision on the Defence 
Motion Concerning the Illegal Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused’, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, 
12 December 2000, p. 2. 









ask for his arrest”;1092 3) that during his detention, “several of his individual rights 
were violated”,1093 namely that he had not received assistance of a counsel, that he 
was not brought before a judge and that no indictment was issued against him;1094 4) 
that his second arrest in 1998 (after his release in 1996 in the absence of evidence 
against him) shows “a lack of diligence in the Prosecutor’s handling of this case, 
resulting, notably, in the violation of his right to a speedy trial”;1095 5) that there was 
a 135-day delay between his second arrest/transfer and his initial appearance and, 
moreover, a delay in providing him with a counsel and that both delays “are 
substantial enough in themselves to warrant the loss of jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
over the Accused and, consequently, his release and the dismissal of all charges 
against him”;1096 and 6) that, in any case, this remedy had to be granted in view of 
“[t]he cumulation of all these violations of the individual rights of the Accused”.1097 
The Prosecution countered these arguments, saying that it “did not direct or 
otherwise cause the August 1995 arrest”.1098 According to the OTP, former 
Prosecutor Goldstone only learnt of Rwamakuba’s arrest four months after it had 
happened, as a result of which he sent the Namibians a letter, dated 22 December 
1995, 
 
asking them to continue detaining the Accused pending further information under the 
regime of their municipal laws rather than on behalf of the Tribunal. Therefore, the 
Accused was not detained at the behest of the Tribunal in 1995/1996, which has no 
jurisdiction over alleged irregularities in this respect.1099  
 
Regarding the delay between Rwamakuba’s transfer and his initial appearance, the 
Prosecution explained that this was not only caused by the judicial recess but also by 
Rwamakuba himself who had delayed appointment of his counsel.1100 The 
Prosecution felt that Rwamakuba could “not claim for responsibility of the Tribunal 
with respect to a delay for which he is partly responsible”.1101 
The judges first examined whether the ICTR had jurisdiction over the conditions 
of Rwamakuba’s detention in Namibia in 1995 and 1996. In this context, they 
recalled the reasoning of cases such as Karemera, Ngirumpatse, Kajelijeli (the 
decision of 8 May 2000), Nzirorera and Nyiramasuhuko that “as a rule, the Tribunal 
has consistently held that it had no jurisdiction over the conditions of any arrest, 
detention or other measures carried out by a sovereign State at the request of the 
Tribunal”.1102 However, the judges continued,  
                                                          
1092 Ibid., para. 3. 
1093 Ibid., para. 4. 
1094 See ibid.  
1095 Ibid., para. 5. 
1096 Ibid., para. 6. 
1097 Ibid., para. 7. 
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1099 Ibid. 
1100 See ibid., para. 9. 
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[a]s far as detention in a State is concerned (...), these holdings have to be read in the 
light of the Bar[a]yagwiza Decision of 3 November 1999 (...) where the Appeals 
Chamber (...) held that “under the facts of this case, Cameroon was holding [him] in 
the “constructive custody” of the Tribunal by virtue of the Tribunal’s lawful process 
or authority”. Although the notion of one’s “constructive custody” was not explicitly 
referred to in its subsequent Semanza Decision of 31 May 2000, which addressed in 
essence the same issues, the Appeals Chamber applied some of the consequences 
drawn from the notion of constructive custody in its Barayagwiza Decision of 
3 November 1999 in the Semanza Decision as well. Among these consequences are 
the responsibility of the Tribunal for some aspects of the detention of such an 
individual detained at its behest, while specific timeframes under the Rules run with 
respect to the “constructive detainee” of the Tribunal, prior to his transfer to the 
UNDF, notably with respect to his right to be promptly informed of the nature of the 
charges against him [emphasis in original, ChP].1103 
 
It can be argued that this is not entirely correct since the judges in the Barayagwiza 
case even took responsibility for violations committed beyond the constructive 
custody period/the period during which Barayagwiza was detained at the behest of 
the ICTR.1104 In addition, the cases of Barayagwiza and Semanza (Appeals 
Chamber) can arguably be viewed as support for the broader idea that the Tribunal 
must take responsibility for all wrongs committed in the context of a Tribunal case.  
Be that as it may, it appears that the judges in Rwamakuba would nevertheless 
take their responsibility for parts of the detention of Rwamakuba, even if violations 
in this context could not, strictly speaking, be attributed to the Tribunal, as long as 
the detention was at the behest of the ICTR. This is at least something. However, in 
this specific case, the judges were of the opinion that Rwamakuba had not been 
arrested and detained on 2 August 1995 at the behest of the ICTR.1105 Furthermore, 
they established that the ICTR Prosecutor was only informed of Rwamakuba’s 
detention as from 21 December 1995.1106 As a result, the judges concluded that the 
Prosecutor was not responsible for Rwamakuba’s detention between 2 August 1995 
and 22 December 1995,1107 that the ICTR had no jurisdiction over the conditions of 
                                                          
1103 Ibid., para. 23. 
1104 See ns. 857 and 919 and accompanying text. 
1105 See ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba et alia, ‘Decision on the Defence 
Motion Concerning the Illegal Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused’, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, 
12 December 2000, para. 27: “The Trial Chamber (…) finds that no such evidence was brought by the 
Defence that the Namibian authorities so acted to abide, more specifically, by a formal request from the 
Prosecutor pursuant to Rule 40 of the Rules, in the form of a list of suspects including the Accused’s 
name, notified to the State of Namibia by the Prosecutor, and requesting States to arrest and detain the 
suspects in question. (…) Being thus satisfied, in view of the arguments and the material submitted by 
both Parties, that the Namibian Authorities did not act on the basis of a list of suspects circulated by the 
Prosecutor prior to the Accused’s arrest of 1995, the Trial Chamber does not find it necessary to request, 
pursuant to Article 28 of the Statute, the said authorities for further clarifications on the circumstances 
of the arrest and detention of the Accused in 1995 and 1996, as asked by the Defence.” 
1106 See ibid., para. 30. 








that period of detention and that “any challenges in this respect [were] to be brought 
before the Namibian jurisdictions”.1108  
The judges concluded the same with respect to the period between 22 December 
1995 and 18 January 1996 (when the OTP informed the Namibians that they had no 
evidence against Rwamakuba), because “the letter [of 22 December 1995, ChP] 
does not amount to a request under Rule 40 to detain the Accused on behalf of the 
Tribunal”.1109  
It may very well be that Rwamakuba was not arrested and detained at the request 
of the ICTR, but perhaps the more interesting question the judges could have asked 
themselves, see also the point mentioned supra, is whether the arrest and detention 
by the Namibians could in any way be seen as falling within the context of the ICTR 
case more generally. If that were not the case, then the ICTR, of course, does not 
need to take responsibility for irregularities committed in the course of that 
arrest/detention, but if were the case, then the Tribunal should arguably take 
responsibility. 
With respect to the delay between Rwamakuba’s transfer (22 October 1998) and 
initial appearance (7 April 1999), the judges first of all noted that one had to look at 
the date between the transfer and (no later than) 10 March 1999 as counsel of 
Rwamakuba (and counsels of the other co-accused) had requested that the initial 
appearance, planned for 10 March 1999, be adjourned to 7 April 1999.1110 However, 
“[e]ven so, it clearly appears that the Accused’s initial appearance was not 
scheduled (…) “without delay” (…) as more than four months and a half had 
elapsed since his transfer”.1111 Nevertheless, the judges noted “that this delay is 
mainly attributable to the difficulties in having a Counsel assigned to the 
Accused”1112 and that “the Registrar took reasonable steps so as to have a Counsel 
assigned to the Accused in due time following his transfer to the Tribunal”.1113 As a 
result, the Registry was not responsible for the delay in assigning counsel to 
Rwamakuba.1114 Nevertheless, a suspect’s right to legal assistance is broader than 
just having the counsel of his choice assigned to him; the Registry has also a duty, 
as from the moment of transfer, of assigning a duty counsel to the suspect pending 
nomination of the ‘real’ counsel.1115 The judges concluded that the Registry had 
failed in that respect and that  
 
                                                          
1108 Ibid. 
1109 Ibid., para. 33. See also ibid.: “[T]he words used by the Prosecutor do not suggest that, upon being 
notified of the Accused’s detention in Namibia, he considered him a suspect before the Tribunal. On the 
contrary, the letter suggests that the Prosecutor did not even know whether the Accused could be 
considered a suspect. Besides, the Trial Chamber notes that the Prosecutor, in this letter, did not ask for 
the continued detention of the Accused on behalf of the Tribunal, but rather envisaged such possibility 
under the regime of the Namibian laws, “if [these] laws permit this” [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
1110 See ibid., para. 35. 
1111 Ibid., para. 36. 
1112 Ibid.  
1113 Ibid., para. 40. 
1114 See ibid.  








[t]his omission resulted in the absence of any legal assistance for the Accused over an 
extended period of time in contradiction with, notably, Article 20(4)(c) of the Statute 
[the right to be tried without undue delay, ChP], and, further, in the delay in the 
Accused’s initial appearance.1116 
 
However, notwithstanding the fact that this delay in assigning a duty counsel 
constituted “a violation of one of the Accused’s fundamental rights”1117 and had 
caused the delay in his initial appearance, the judges were also of the opinion that it 
had not caused Rwamakuba “a serious and irreparable prejudice”.1118 Thus, 
Rwamakuba’s request to be immediately and unconditionally released was 
dismissed.  
Rwamakuba appealed, but in 2001, a bench of the Appeals Chamber, for 
procedural reasons, dismissed his appeal. Nevertheless, the judges clarified “that it 
is open to the Appellant to invoke the issue of the alleged violation of his 
fundamental human rights by the Tribunal in order to seek reparation as the case 
may be, at the appropriate time”.1119  
When more than five years later Trial Chamber III rendered judgment in this 
case, it found that Rwamakuba was not guilty of the (amended) charges, namely 
genocide, complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity (extermination and 
murder) and thus that he had to be acquitted.1120  
With respect to the observation of the Appeals Chamber in 2001 “that it is open 
to the Appellant to invoke the issue of the alleged violation of his fundamental 
human rights by the Tribunal in order to seek reparation as the case may be, at the 
appropriate time”, the judges of Trial Chamber III first of all noted that Trial 
Chamber II had found in 2000 that Rwamakuba’s right to legal assistance had been 
violated – Trial Chamber III appears to forget here that Trial Chamber II was also of 
the opinion that the delay in assigning a duty counsel to Rwamakuba was in 
contradiction with the latter’s right to be tried without undue delay1121 – and that the 
delay in assigning a duty counsel to him had caused a delay in his initial 
appearance.1122 It then repeated the words of the Appeals Chamber in cases such as 
Barayagwiza, Semanza and Kajelijeli1123 that every violation must be effectively 
remedied1124 – note, however, the previously mentioned point that even though these 
                                                          
1116 Ibid., para. 43. 
1117 Ibid., para. 45. 
1118 Ibid., para. 44. 
1119 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, André Rwamakuba v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Appeal Against 
Dismissal of Motion Concerning Illegal Arrest and Detention)’, Case No. ICTR-98-44-A, 11 June 2001, 
p. 4. 
1120 See ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-
98-44C-T, 20 September 2006, under ‘Chapter IV – Verdict’, I. 
1121 See n. 1116 and accompanying text. 
1122 See ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-
98-44C-T, 20 September 2006, para. 217. 
1123 See ns. 919, 997 and 1081 and accompanying text. 
1124 See ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-








words are rather generally formulated, they were also made in the context of a case 
which involved violations for which the ICTR was clearly responsible – and 
remarked that the judges in Barayagwiza and Semanza had decided that if the 
person in question were found to be not guilty, then he had to receive financial 
compensation.1125 Finally, it concluded that “[s]ince a violation of the Accused’s 
right to legal assistance during the first months of his detention was found,1126 André 
Rwamakuba is at liberty to file an application seeking an appropriate remedy”.1127  
Rwamakuba consequently filed an application, in which he requested not only an 
appropriate remedy for the violation of his right to legal assistance “but also for the 
alleged grave and manifest injustice occasioned”.1128 He was of the opinion that he 
“was indicted and prosecuted on false and manipulative evidence”1129 and that “this 
circumstance, combined with the length of his pre-trial and trial detention which 
amounts to a total of nine years, constitutes a miscarriage of justice [original 
footnote omitted, ChP]”.1130 Rwamakuba requested the judges to order that the 
Registry: 
 
(i) provide Rwamakuba with an apology; (ii) seek the good offices of the State where 
Rwamakuba’s family is present to facilitate some temporary status for him in that 
State; (iii) seek the good offices of that State to ensure the uninterrupted schooling of 
Rwamakuba’s children; and (iv) provide financial compensation to Rwamakuba 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].1131 
 
Regarding the violation of his right to legal assistance, Rwamakuba more 
specifically requested “financial compensation covering a minimum of 2,000 US 
dollars (USD) per month for loss of earnings and 10,000 USD for emotional stress 
[original footnote omitted, ChP]”.1132  
The judges first of all noted that Trial Chamber III, in its judgement of 2006, had 
not stated that grave and manifest injustice had occurred which could be used to 
seek a remedy, but they were also of the opinion that it was nevertheless “in the 
interests of justice to discuss it since it could pertain to the fundamental rights of a 
former accused of the Tribunal.”1133  
                                                          
1125 See ibid. 
1126 Note, however, that Trial Chamber II was also of the opinion that the delay in assigning a duty 
counsel to Rwamakuba was in contradiction with the latter’s right to be tried without undue delay, see 
ns. 1116 and 1121 and accompanying text. 
1127 ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-
44C-T, 20 September 2006, para. 220. 
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Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, 31 January 2007, para. 5. 
1129 Ibid., para. 19. 
1130 Ibid. 
1131 Ibid., para. 5. 
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However, in their discussion of this request, in which Rwamakuba also referred 
to Article 85, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute,1134 the judges explained, whilst 
underlining the importance of the concept behind Article 85, paragraph 3 of the ICC 
Statute,1135 that the Statute/RPE/case law of the ICTR unfortunately did not provide 
for “the power to accord compensation to an acquitted person in circumstances 
involving a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice”.1136 In addition, neither did 
another source of law which could be applied by the ICTR, customary international 
law, help Rwamakuba as, 
 
other than the ICC Statute,[1137] no instrument in international criminal law or 
international human rights law includes a provision for compensation for an acquitted 
person in circumstances involving a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice while 
some of them do provide for compensation under other circumstances.1138 
 
Hence, the additional request of Rwamakuba was denied by the judges. 
Turning to Rwamakuba’s request for a remedy based on the violation of his right 
to legal assistance, the judges first explained that Rule 5 of the ICTR RPE, which 
demands that material prejudice is proved,1139 could not constitute a basis for such a 
request as the judges in 2000 had clarified that the violation had not caused 
Rwamakuba “a serious and irreparable prejudice”.1140 Nevertheless, the judges 
admitted that a right to an effective remedy for violations of human rights 
                                                          
1134 This provision states: “In exceptional circumstances, where the Court finds conclusive facts showing 
that there has been a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice, it may in its discretion award 
compensation, according to the criteria provided in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, to a person 
who has been released from detention following a final decision of acquittal or a termination of the 
proceedings for that reason.” See also n. 44 of Chapter IX. 
1135 See ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, ‘Decision on Appropriate 
Remedy’, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, 31 January 2007, paras. 29-30: “[T]he Chamber finds it (…) 
necessary to emphasize the importance and the relevance of the principle set forth in Article 85(3) of the 
ICC Statute in light of the long and complex trials in this Tribunal. (…) [T]he Chamber is of the view 
that the possibility to grant some sort of remedy or compensation would be fair in circumstances where, 
although the arrest or detention of an acquitted person was not unlawful, he or she was subject to a 
lengthy detention during the pre-trial and trial stages. Such an award of compensation would be 
exercised in light of the circumstances of the case, and could not be applied, for instance, where an 
accused had intentionally caused his or her arrest or where it would be unreasonable to award 
compensation. In the Chamber’s view, such a provision would offer an acceptable balance between the 
fundamental right to freedom of any individual and the realities of the investigation and prosecution of 
international crimes.” 
1136 Ibid., para. 21. 
1137 The judges also noted that the inclusion of Art. 85, para. 3 in the ICC Statute had not been without 
controversy either, see ibid., para. 26. 
1138 ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, ‘Decision on Appropriate Remedy’, 
Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, 31 January 2007, para. 25. 
1139 The entire rule reads: “Where an objection on the ground of non-compliance with the Rules or 
Regulations is raised by a party at the earliest opportunity, the Trial Chamber shall grant relief, if it finds 
that the alleged non-compliance is proved and that it has caused material prejudice to that party.” 
1140 See ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, ‘Decision on Appropriate 
Remedy’, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, 31 January 2007, para. 38. See also the discussion in the Semanza 








“undoubtedly forms part of customary international law”1141 and is expressly 
provided for in many international human rights instruments.1142 In addition, the 
judges stated,  
 
[r]elying upon international human rights instruments, and particularly the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Appeals Chamber of this 
Tribunal has recognized on several occasions [the judges refer here to the cases of 
Barayagwiza, Semanza and Kajelijeli, ChP][1143] that an Accused has a right to an 
effective remedy [original footnote omitted, ChP].1144 
 
Thus, the judges concluded that they had the power to grant an effective remedy for 
human rights violations and that this power arose out of “the combined effect of the 
Tribunal’s inherent powers and its obligation to respect generally accepted 
international human rights norms”.1145 
However, did this also include financial compensation? The Registry was of the 
opinion that it did not. It had two arguments in this respect: 1) “orders to financially 
compensate those whose rights have been violated are only under development 
within the general principles of law as understood in Article 38 of the ICJ 
Statute”;1146 and 2) “there is no provision in the Statute that allows the Tribunal or 
Chambers to grant financial compensation to individuals it has allegedly wronged 
[original footnote omitted, ChP]”.1147  
The Trial Chamber, after having examined human rights instruments and human 
rights case law, quickly rejected the first point, stating that “it cannot be said that 
orders to financially compensate those whose rights have been violated are only 
under development in international law”. 
With respect to the second point, the Trial Chamber noted that the Registrar had 
referred in this respect to, among other things, the fact that the Presidents of the 
ICTR (and the Presidents of the ICTY) had sent letters to the UNSC requesting the 
latter to have the Statute(s) of the Tribunal(s) amended so that the Chambers could 
make orders for compensation,1148 something which has already been briefly 
mentioned earlier in this study.1149 However, the judges also rejected this point; the 
                                                          
1141 Ibid., para. 40.  
1142 See ibid. In more detail: “[T]he Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the Convention 
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1148 See ibid.  








Chamber’s above-mentioned inherent power to grant an effective remedy 
encompassed financial compensation “where, in the specific circumstances of a 
case, it constitutes the appropriate remedy to redress a violation of the human right 
in question”.1150 The fact that this power was not explicitly mentioned in the ICTR’s 
Statute/RPE was immaterial in that respect.1151 Moreover, the above-mentioned 
letters of the Presidents did not change this point either as   
 
the Presidents did not discuss the possibility that the Chamber possessed an inherent 
power to grant financial compensation, nor did they comment on the right to an 
effective remedy as they were not acting as a judicial body as this Chamber is in the 
present case.1152 
 
Finally, the judges also referred to the Barayagwiza and Semanza cases1153 where 
the Appeals Chamber had stated that if the suspects were found to be not guilty, they 
were entitled to financial compensation.1154  
Now that the judges had established that they could indeed grant Rwamakuba 
financial compensation, they turned to the merits of this case. After having stated 
that human rights case law had shown that “an effective remedy must be granted on 
a case-by-case basis, taking into account the subject matter as well as the nature of 
the right allegedly violated [original footnote omitted, ChP]”,1155 the judges asked 
themselves two questions: 1) would the outcome, with respect to (pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary) damages, have been different if Rwamakuba’s right to legal 
assistance had not been violated and 2) had Rwamakuba suffered from the violation 
itself?1156  
The judges answered the first question in the negative: “there is no causal link 
between the violation found and his alleged loss in earnings, nor between the 
violation found and any non-pecuniary injury he may have suffered as a result of his 
detention”.1157 While that may, of course, be the case, the judges explained in this 
context that “[w]hile Trial Chamber II established that the violation of 
Rwamakuba’s right to legal assistance caused a delay in his initial appearance, the 
Defence has not established that this delay lengthened the duration of his time in 
detention [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.1158 That, however, seems to be a rather 
strange observation. After all, a delay in one’s initial appearance arguably 
automatically means that one’s (pre-trial) detention is extended (until the moment of 
his initial appearance).  
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With respect to the second question, the judges concluded that “Rwamakuba 
must have suffered some moral damage as a result of the violation of his right to 
legal assistance which cannot be adequately compensated by the sole finding of a 
violation and the provision of an apology by the Registrar”.1159 
Finally, and in contrast to the comprehensive examination on the question of 
whether the Chamber could provide the remedy of financial compensation, the 
judges very quickly established that all the other remedies Rwamakuba had asked 
for were also to be granted by the Registrar.1160 
As a result, the Chamber ordered  
 
that the Registrar provide André Rwamakuba with an apology for the violation of his 
right to legal assistance; (…) that the Registrar provide André Rwamakuba with 
financial compensation in the amount of 2,000 (two thousand) US dollars for the 
moral injury sustained as a result of this violation; (…) that the Registrar use all 
available means to seek the good offices of the State where André Rwamakuba’s 
family is present to facilitate some temporary status for him in that State and to seek 
the good offices of that State to ensure the uninterrupted schooling of his children.1161 
 
Neither Rwamakuba nor the Registrar agreed with this decision; Rwamakuba 
because his claim based on the grave and manifest injustice was not considered and 
the Registrar because it did not agree with the Chamber’s award of financial 
compensation to Rwamakuba.1162 
The judges of the Appeals Chamber, however, agreed with the Trial Chamber 
and rejected both arguments,1163 thereby confirming important observations from 
earlier cases such as the one in Semanza that “any violation, even if it entails a 
relative degree of prejudice, requires a proportionate remedy [original footnote 
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finding that it lacked authority to award him compensation for his acquittal. Furthermore, Mr. 
Rwamakuba fails to substantiate his claim that he suffered a grave and manifest injustice from the 
proceedings brought against him because he was indicted and prosecuted on false and manipulative 
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that even though the Registrar was ordered to pay 2,000 US dollars to Rwamakuba, it “refused to pay 
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omitted, ChP]”.1164 The only other point which may be interesting to note in relation 
to this decision is that the judges held that “[i]t is not disputed that Mr. 
Rwamakuba’s suffered serious violations of his fundamental rights [emphasis 
added, ChP]”.1165 The word “serious” is reminiscent of the discussion at the end of 
the Kajelijeli case1166 and confirms the idea that judges will probably only refuse 
jurisdiction in extremely serious cases, for example, cases involving serious physical 
mistreatment and torture-like circumstances. As explained, judges should, however, 
be careful to not restrict this test too severely: there may also be violations not 
involving serious mistreatment (cf. the Barayagwiza case) that are so serious that 
jurisdiction should be refused.  
 
4 GENERAL REMARKS ON COOPERATION REGIMES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
INTERNATIONALISED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS  
 
As already stated in the introduction to this chapter, this study will only devote a 
few general remarks to the cooperation regimes in the context of the 
internationalised (or hybrid) criminal tribunals – tribunals which are half 
international, half national1167 – as it is unnecessary for the purpose of this study to 
explain all the different regimes in detail. However, a few general remarks can 
certainly be made.  
Like the UN ad hoc Tribunals, internationalised criminal tribunals do not have a 
police force of their own.1168 Hence, for cooperation – such as for arresting suspects 
– they are dependent on other entities. (For most1169 internationalised criminal 
                                                          
1164 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, André Rwamakuba v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision on Appeal against 
Decision on Appropriate Remedy’, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-A, 13 September 2007, para. 24. See also 
ns. 919 (Barayagwiza), 997 (Semanza) and 1081 (Kajelijeli) and accompanying text. See also ns. 1124 
and 1144 and accompanying text (Rwamakuba). 
1165 Ibid., para. 29. 
1166 See ns. 1083-1084 and accompanying text. 
1167 For example, their staff may be half national – half international, their subject-matter jurisdiction 
may encompass both international and national crimes and their way of establishment has also very 
often some semi-international dimensions (think of an agreement between the State in question and the 
UN). For more information on these internationalised criminal tribunals, see Romano, Nollkaemper and 
Kleffner 2004 (see also n. 1). 
1168 See Sluiter 2004 B, p. 379. 
1169 See, however, Art. 22 of the STL Statute (‘Trials in absentia’): “1. The Special Tribunal shall 
conduct trial proceedings in the absence of the accused, if he or she: (a) Has expressly and in writing 
waived his or her right to be present; (b) Has not been handed over to the Tribunal by the State 
authorities concerned; (c) Has absconded or otherwise cannot be found and all reasonable steps have 
been taken to secure his or her appearance before the Tribunal and to inform him or her of the charges 
confirmed by the Pre-Trial Judge. 2. When hearings are conducted in the absence of the accused, the 
Special Tribunal shall ensure that: (a) The accused has been notified, or served with the indictment, or 
notice has otherwise been given of the indictment through publication in the media or communication to 
the State of residence or nationality; (b) The accused has designated a defence counsel of his or her own 
choosing, to be remunerated either by the accused or, if the accused is proved to be indigent, by the 
Tribunal; (c) Whenever the accused refuses or fails to appoint a defence counsel, such counsel has been 
assigned by the Defence Office of the Tribunal with a view to ensuring full representation of the 








tribunals, arresting suspects is normally a necessity because they explicitly/most 
probably do not allow trials in absentia.)1170 These other entities will normally be 
the State where the internationalised criminal tribunal is located, but one could also 
think here of assistance from other (neighbouring) States, for example, if suspects 
have moved to those areas.1171 Furthermore, the help of international forces may be 
needed,1172 for instance, if such forces have taken over the daily tasks of the local 
authorities.1173 With respect to the role played by international forces in the context 
of arresting suspects for internationalised criminal tribunals, it may be interesting to 
refer to UNSC Resolution 1638 of 11 November 2005, in which the UNSC, acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, decided 
 
that the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) shall include the 
following additional element: to apprehend and detain former President Charles 
Taylor in the event of a return to Liberia and to transfer him or facilitate his transfer 
to Sierra Leone for prosecution before the Special Court for Sierra Leone and to keep 
the Liberian Government, the Sierra Leonean Government and the Council fully 
informed (...).1174 
 
In contrast to the sometimes rather vague mandates of a peacekeeping force such as 
IFOR/SFOR (see Section 2 of this chapter), this mandate is extremely explicit and 
clear and should therefore be welcomed.1175  
However, it must also be understood that this Chapter VII decision was made in 
the specific context of the UNSC’s determination that Charles Taylor’s “return to 
                                                                                                                                              
designated a defence counsel of his or her choosing, shall have the right to be retried in his or her 
presence before the Special Tribunal, unless he or she accepts the judgement.” 
1170 See Sluiter 2004 B, p. 380: “It must be mentioned that the legal framework of the UNTAET Serious 
Crimes Panels in East Timor and UNMIK courts in Kosovo explicitly exclude the possibility of trials in 
absentia. The legal framework of the Sierra Leone Special Court and the legal framework of the 
Cambodia Extraordinary Chambers are not as explicit on this point, but one may expect that in light of 
the right attributed to the accused to be tried in his presence and in light of the reduced authority of in 
absentia verdicts, these bodies will avoid conducting trials in absentia, in particular when an individual 
is accused of the most serious international crimes [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
1171 See ibid., pp. 380-381. 
1172 See ibid., p. 379. 
1173 See Frulli 2006, p. 352, n. 2, mentioning “the powers conferred upon military forces acting in the 
framework of a UN Transitional Administration or Authority such as those established, for instance, in 
East Timor (UNTAET) and in Kosovo (UNMIK/KFOR)”: “It is obvious that in these cases the military 
components are endowed with broad enforcement powers, including the power to arrest and detain war 
criminals, since they temporarily replace local authorities.” 
1174 UNSC Res. 1638 of 11 November 2005, UN Doc. S/RES/1638 (2005), para. 1. It may also be 
interesting to note that almost two years earlier, a private UK-based military firm, Northbridge Services 
Groups, stated that it was looking for an investor to fund an operation by which the company would 
kidnap Taylor “to claim a $2m reward allegedly offered by the United States Congress.” (BBC, ‘Firm 
Seeks Charles Taylor Bounty’, 11 December 2003, available at: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199/41037.html.) (Cf. also n. 281.) 
1175 See also Frulli 2006, p. 352: “This new duty assigned to a peacekeeping mission enables a 
significant and most welcome departure from UN practice.” See also C. Ryngaert, ‘The International 
Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, Working Paper No. 24 – April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global 








Liberia would constitute an impediment to stability and a threat to the peace of 
Liberia and to international peace and security in the region”.1176 The decision has 
nothing to do with the nature of the cooperation regime of the SCSL itself.  
In fact, although the term ‘tribunals’ (as in: internationalised criminal tribunals) 
hints at a connection with the UN ad hoc Tribunals, the cooperation regime of the 
internationalised criminal tribunals is very much akin to the inter-State cooperation 
regime.1177 Nevertheless, the lack of a vertical cooperation regime may not always 
be a problem as many of these tribunals (although an exception is the SCSL) “have 
the advantage of being integrated into a domestic legal order, enabling them to 
exercise enforcement power over a certain territory”.1178 With respect to the 
internationalised criminal tribunals in Kosovo and East Timor, Sluiter writes, for 
example, that these institutions, even if they “lack enforcement powers of their 
own”,1179 “have the considerable advantage over the existing international criminal 
tribunals in that they do preside over a ‘police force’ capable of using coercive 
measures, within a geographically limited area”.1180 And, since many suspects in 
whom those Tribunals are interested may still reside in those areas, the lack of a 
vertical cooperation regime may not necessarily be an insurmountable problem. 
However, things are different, of course, with respect to suspects which have moved 
to other areas. In those cases, being unable to issue binding orders to States that 
certain suspects must be arrested may indeed influence the effectiveness of the 
Tribunals’ ability to bring suspects to justice.1181 Having said that, it is time to 
examine the male captus case law stemming from the context of the 
internationalised criminal tribunals. 
 
5 CASES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONALISED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
 
5.1 The Duch case before the ECCC 
 
Guek Eav Kaing, alias Duch, was arrested and detained by the Cambodian Military 
Court on 10 May 1999 for various charges under Cambodian law.1182 It was more 
                                                          
1176 UNSC Res. 1638 of 11 November 2005, UN Doc. S/RES/1638 (2005). 
1177 See Sluiter 2003 C, p. 651, n. 167: “These “internationalized tribunals” do not in any way enjoy the 
benefit of a vertical cooperation relationship and can only count on existing and applicable mechanisms 
of interstate legal assistance. As a result, a considerable amount of evidence – and a considerable 
number of suspects – could be beyond their reach.” 
1178 Ibid. See also C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, Working Paper No. 
24 – April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), p. 6 (writing on the ECCC). 
1179 Sluiter 2004 B, p. 379. 
1180 Ibid., p. 389. See also n. 1073 and accompanying text. 
1181 See also C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, Working Paper No. 24 – 
April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), p. 8, writing on the situation in East 
Timor. 
1182 See ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-








than two years later, on 10 August 2001, that the ‘Law on the Establishment of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ entered into force.1183 
(However, according to the co-investigating judges of the ECCC, it was not until 22 
June 2007, the date the Internal Rules of the ECCC entered into force, that this new 
internationalised criminal tribunal became operational.)1184 On the basis of this ‘Law 
on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ 
(ECCC law) and apparently in anticipation of the birth of this new internationalised 
criminal tribunal,1185 the Investigating Judge of the Cambodian Military Court 
issued detention orders for Duch on 20 February 2002, 2003 and 2004 charging him 
with crimes against humanity.1186 On 28 February 2005, 2006 and 2007, Duch’s 
‘provisional’ detention (now for charges of war crimes and crimes against 
internationally protected persons but again pursuant to the ECCC law) was extended 
by the Investigating Judge, but on 21 July 2008, “the Military Court, considering 
that it was no longer competent to try crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the 
ECCC, issued a Decision terminating the competence of the Military Court with 
respect to the Accused [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.1187 
However, this did not lead to Duch’s release because by that time, he was 
already in the custody of the ECCC; as explained earlier, the ECCC had become 
operational on 22 June 2007. About a month later, on 31 July 2007, two co-
investigating judges of the ECCC1188 ordered that Duch be placed in the provisional 
detention of the ECCC. In reaching this result, the co-investigating judges examined 
the male captus discussion and its effect on the proceedings of this specific 
internationalised criminal tribunal. It is this interesting order and its aftermath which 
will be discussed here in detail.  
In their order, the two co-investigating judges first explained the charges against 
Duch in the context of the ECCC. He was 
 
accused of directing the Security Prison S-21 between 1975 and 1979 where, under 
his authority, countless abuses were allegedly committed against the civilian 
population (arbitrary detention, torture and other inhumane acts, mass executions, 
                                                          
1183 See ibid. 
1184 See ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case 
File 002/14-08-2006, Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 20.  
1185 See Mohan 2009, p. 16. See also K. Ossenova, ‘Khmer Rouge genocide tribunal denies bail for 
former prison chief’, Jurist Paper Chase, 3 December 2007 (available at: 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/12/khmer-rouge-genocide-tribunal-denies.php): “Those 
charges were primarily brought to keep Duch in custody while the ECCC started operations.” 
1186 See ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 2. 
1187 Ibid., para. 3. 
1188 The (on the – civil law – Cambodian legal system focused) system of the ECCC is not comparable 
with the system of Tribunals like, for example, the ICTY and ICTR. “[T]he investigations before the 
trial stage are carried out not by the Parties (Prosecutors and Defense), but by two Co-Investigating 
Judges, a national Judge and an international Judge.” 
(Http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/investigating_judges.aspx.) After this investigative phase, the 








etc.), which occurred within a political context of widespread or systematic abuses 
and constitute crimes against humanity.1189 
 
Although the ECCC’s co-prosecutors requested Duch’s placement in provisional 
detention, Duch’s lawyer argued, unsurprisingly, that Duch had been in detention 
for more than eight years, that this violated both Cambodian law and international 
standards (standards which the ECCC must respect), that the conditions for 
provisional detention were not satisfied, that Duch was no senior leader and finally 
that ““more than two thousand persons” held positions as heads of security 
centres”.1190 
Because of this, Duch’s lawyer requested “that the Court release Duch from 
detention and impose a bail order instead”.1191 This seems a rather mild request. 
After all, a bail order implies that Duch only sought to be released pending trial. 
However, one can imagine that there would also be suspects/lawyers who would 
demand a much more far-reaching remedy for these kinds of violations, namely a 
real male detentus remedy such as a dismissal of the charges/release with prejudice 
to the Prosecutor (with the result that the suspect does not have to appear in court 
again). That Duch did not choose such a remedy may be explained by the fact that it 
seems as if he wanted to be tried. In any case, the Defence argued that Duch “did 
not resist arrest in May 1999”,1192 “has never denied being the chief of centre S-
21”,1193 “has said that he is prepared to reveal details of all the crimes committed by 
the Khmer Rouge”1194 and “has (…) indicated that he is prepared to be tried by the 
ECCC”.1195 
However, even though it appears that Duch did not want a true male detentus 
remedy (and only a provisional release pending trial), the co-investigating judges 
deemed it necessary nevertheless to delve into the male captus discussion: 
 
                                                          
1189 ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 
002/14-08-2006, Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 1. 
1190 Ibid. 
1191 Ibid. 
1192 ECCC, Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘Appeal Brief Challenging the Order of Provisional Detention of 31 July 
2007’ (Confidential), Case No. 002/14-08-2006, 5 September 2007, para. 120. Note that this appeal was 
only submitted after the 31 July 2007 decision (which still needs to be discussed here), but these 




1195 Ibid., para. 121. On 12 August 2009, Duch told the ECCC: “I will accept without challenge (…) all 
the judgments which will be made by this Chamber; the judgment for my role as the Chairman of S-21 
and all the crimes committed there. I will accept it by legal means and by psychological means. And I 
am humble before the Cambodian people to accept all these crimes and I would like the Cambodian 
people to condemn me to the strictest level of punishment.” (ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Transcript of Trial 











It is necessary (...) to examine if DUCH’s prior detention [, which, it must be stressed, 
the co-investigating judges qualified as “problematic in light of international 
standards of justice and, more specifically, articles 9(3) and 14(3)(c) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that any individual 
arrested or detained for a criminal offence shall be entitled to a trial within a 
reasonable time period or to be released”,1196 ChP] affects the proceedings for which 
the concerned person is before us today. The issue may be phrased in these terms: 
Does the more than 8 year detention of the Charged Person in separate proceedings 
before another jurisdiction taint the present proceedings? Or rather, is such detention 
so excessive and prejudicial to the rights of the defence as to affect the very ability to 
bring this case within the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers (which was 
established within the Cambodian Judicial organization but constitutes an 
independent institution having a separate structure from the national jurisdictions), to 
no longer allow the detention of the Charged Person within the jurisdiction of the 
Extraordinary Chambers, or even to require the Co-Investigating Judges to stay the 
proceedings? The alternatives before the Co-Investigating Judges today are as 
follows: must the adage Male captus, bene detentus be applied or, on the contrary, 
should the theory of abuse of process take precedence? Before concluding, both 
theories shall be reviewed.1197 
 
The fact that the co-investigating judges placed the eight years of detention under 
the term male captus is explicit support for the view entertained in this study, 
namely that in the male captus discussion, one may focus on, but should not limit 
oneself to, irregularities related to the capture; the male captus discussion may also 
involve other pre-trial irregularities, such as irregularities related to the pre-trial 
detention (cf., for example, the Barayagwiza case). In the words of the co-
investigating judges:  
 
Many examples exist in domestic as well as international law which apply this 
maxim, whereby the circumstances which bring an Accused before a tribunal have no 
effect on the judgement of the Accused. Although most of these precedents are based 
on the initial arrest of the Charged Person, and more rarely on the conditions of their 
prior detention, in both cases the reasoning is the same as that with which we are now 
confronted [emphasis in original, ChP].1198 
 
First, the co-investigating judges examined cases which can be linked to the male 
captus bene detentus side. Alongside a few national cases (which were all 
mentioned/discussed in this study),1199 they looked at the ICTR case of Rwamakuba 
(noting in a footnote that the same reasoning was also used in the cases Semanza 
and Kajelijeli) and explained in that context that the ICTR “has stated on many 
occasions that it was not responsible for the illegal arrest and detention of a 
                                                          
1196 ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 
002/14-08-2006, Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 2. 
1197 Ibid., paras. 3-4. 
1198 Ibid., para. 5. See also n. 6 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
1199 Namely the cases of Scott, Elliott, Ker v. Illinois, Frisbie v. Collins, Alvarez-Machain, Eichmann, 








defendant if the act was not the result of its order”.1200 The co-investigating judges 
concluded this part of their decision by stating that “[t]here therefore exists a solid 
tradition supporting the strict separation of, on the one hand, a legal procedure 
before one jurisdiction and, on the other hand, the prior illegal arrest and detention 
ordered by a different authority”.1201 Some comments need to be made about this 
conclusion.  
First of all, the ECCC connects the national male captus cases with the idea that 
there exists a strict separation between the legal procedure in one jurisdiction and 
the male captus problems caused by other entities in another jurisdiction. However, 
the national male captus cases may go much further than that; they may state that 
the prosecuting forum will continue to exercise jurisdiction, regardless of how the 
suspect was brought into the jurisdiction of the court. That may thus also involve 
irregularities perpetrated in another jurisdiction by authorities which can be linked 
to the prosecuting forum (and hence not only irregularities caused by authorities 
which cannot be linked to the prosecuting forum).  
Secondly (and with respect to the ICTR cases), it is true that the Semanza, 
Kajelijeli (but then the Appeals Chamber)1202 and Rwamakuba cases focused on the 
lawfulness of arrests and detentions at the national level pursuant to ICTR requests, 
but that does not mean that those judges would not also look into irregularities 
beyond the constructive custody if the judges were of the opinion that those 
irregularities occurred in the context of their case. That “in the context of their case” 
concept is normally triggered by a request for arrest and detention,1203 but there 
might also be other circumstances which the judges may consider to fall within this 
notion. For example, something may also go wrong in the context of a suspect being 
brought into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, without that suspect being detained by 
                                                          
1200 ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 
002/14-08-2006, Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 10. 
1201 Ibid., para. 11. 
1202 It is a little strange that the judges refer here to the Trial Chamber’s decision in Kajelijeli because 
the reasoning of the judges in that decision (namely that it is not up to the ICTR to take responsibility 
for the arrest and detention phase at the national level, even if that arrest/detention is at the behest of the 
ICTR, with reference to the Karemera and Ngirumpatse cases, see ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The 
Prosecutor versus J[u]v[é]nal Kajelijeli, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion Concerning the Arbitrary 
Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused and on the Defence Notice of Urgent Motion to Expand and 
Supplement the Record of 8 December 1999 Hearing’, Case No. ICTR-98-44-I, 8 May 2000, paras. 34-
35) was rejected by the other two cases the judges at the ECCC allude to, see the text following n. 970 
and accompanying text (Semanza) and n. 1103 and accompanying text (Rwamakuba). In fact, the Trial 
Chamber’s decision in Kajelijeli was also rejected by the Appeals Chamber in the same decision, see n. 
1065 and accompanying text. 
1203 In Semanza, the judges were apparently of the opinion that the arrest/detention preceding the 
arrest/detention at the request of the ICTR could not be seen as falling within the context of the ICTR 
case, see ns. 975 and 1000 and accompanying text. In Kajelijeli, there was not even an arrest/detention 
prior to the arrest/detention at the request of the ICTR, see n. 1006 and accompanying text, as a result of 
which the Tribunal could only look at the arrest/detention at the request of the ICTR. Finally, the judges 
in Rwamakuba, like their colleagues in Semanza, were apparently of the opinion that the arrest/detention 
preceding the arrest/detention at the request of the ICTR (including its alleged violations) could not be 








a State at the request of the ICTR, for instance if private individuals kidnap a person 
and bring him into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Such a situation does not fall 
under the ‘arrest/detention at the request/behest of the Tribunal’ category but is 
certainly an irregularity committed in the context of the ICTR case which one can 
assume the judges will look at. Indeed, the fact that the ICTY has already stated that 
it will take the ultimate responsibility (by refusing jurisdiction, invoking the abuse 
of process doctrine) in a serious male captus involving such a situation, even if the 
irregularity cannot be attributed to the Tribunal, may constitute evidence for the idea 
that judges of the ICTR would also remedy violations which can be connected with 
this irregularity but which do not reach the male detentus standard. It can be argued 
that Semanza and Kajelijeli can be interpreted as having followed this reasoning – 
that the Tribunal will take its responsibility for pre-transfer irregularities committed 
in the context of its case, irrespective of the entity responsible for these irregularities 
– when they make the general statements that “any violation (…) requires a 
proportionate remedy [emphasis added, ChP]”,1204 or that “any violation of the 
accused’s rights entails the provision of an effective remedy pursuant to Article 
2(3)(a) of the ICCPR [emphasis added, ChP]”.1205 These two statements were also 
confirmed in the Rwamakuba case1206 where the judges referred not only to the 
cases of Semanza and Kajelijeli, but also to the second decision in Barayagwiza, a 
decision where the judges – like their colleagues in the first decision1207 – took 
responsibility for violations which occurred even beyond the context of constructive 
custody/a detention at the request/behest of the ICTR.1208 Nevertheless, as clarified 
earlier, it must also be admitted that Rwamakuba seems to be less far-reaching than 
Semanza and Kajelijeli as the above-mentioned confirmations were made in the 
context of a case in which the violations were clearly attributable to the ICTR.1209  
Be that as it may, it is in any case difficult to connect these ICTR cases with the 
idea that there is a strict separation between, on the one hand, male captus problems 
caused by other entities and stemming from a pre-transfer jurisdiction and, on the 
other hand, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Even if one is of the opinion that these 
cases only constitute evidence for the idea that judges will remedy violations which 
can be connected to an arrest/detention at the behest of the Tribunal (in which 
context it must be noted that Rwamakuba is again less far-reaching than Semanza 
                                                          
1204 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-
A, 31 May 2000, para. 125. See also n. 997 and accompanying text. 
1205 ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-
44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 255. (Cf. also ibid., para. 322.) See also n. 1081 and accompanying text.  
1206 See ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-
98-44C-T, 20 September 2006, para. 218 (see n. 1124 and accompanying text), ICTR, Trial Chamber 
III, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, ‘Decision on Appropriate Remedy’, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-
T, 31 January 2007, para. 41 (see n. 1144 and accompanying text) and ICTR, Appeals Chamber, André 
Rwamakuba v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision on Appeal against Decision on Appropriate Remedy’, Case 
No. ICTR-98-44C-A, 13 September 2007, para. 24 (see n. 1164 and accompanying text). 
1207 See n. 857 and accompanying text. 
1208 See n. 919. 








and Kajelijeli),1210 the fact that these judges nevertheless take responsibility for 
actions of others, committed in another legal system (albeit under the authority of 
the ICTR), shows that the separation between the national level and the Tribunal 
level is perhaps not as strict as the ECCC wants to present it here.   
After having discussed the male captus bene detentus side, the co-investigating 
judges turned to the other side of the coin, the abuse of process doctrine.1211 
Although it can be maintained that the most accurate opposite of the male captus 
bene detentus doctrine is, of course, the male captus male detentus/ex iniuria ius 
non oritur doctrine (and not the abuse of process doctrine), the co-investigating 
judges, in their examination of the abuse of process doctrine, looked at cases which 
can more generally be seen as opposing the reasonings of the male captus bene 
detentus doctrine: not only abuse of process cases but also ‘real’ male captus male 
detentus cases such as Ebrahim.1212 After a discussion of these cases, which have all 
been examined in this study already,1213 the co-investigating judges turned to the 
ICC Appeals Chamber’s position in the still-to-discuss Lubanga Dyilo case, see 
Section 2 of Chapter X, and explained that the ICC had 
                                                          
1210 See n. 1103 and accompanying text. 
1211 It is interesting to note that the ECCC, which is focused on the (civil law) Cambodian legal system, 
looked at the – from the common law stemming – abuse of process doctrine. This confirms the idea that 
this doctrine may very well be used by courts with a more civil law background, see n. 878. (See also n. 
1255.) 
1212 Note that also in the Ebrahim case, words resembling the abuse of process doctrine were used: “The 
individual must be protected against illegal detention and abduction, the bounds of jurisdiction must not 
be exceeded, sovereignty must be respected, the legal process must be fair to those affected and abuse of 
law must be avoided in order to protect and promote the integrity of the administration of justice 
[emphasis added, ChP].” (Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 
February 1991, 31 International Legal Materials (1992), p. 896. See also n. 690 and accompanying text 
of Chapter V.) Note, however, that in that case, the Court did not state that judges had a discretion to 
consider whether the violations of these values had to lead to a refusal of jurisdiction. It more 
straightforwardly stated that these violations entailed that the judges had no jurisdiction to try the case. 
1213 Other cases (besides Ebrahim) were: Barayagwiza, Toscanino, Hartley and Bennett. It must also be 
noted that the judges in a few of these cases may have made some general interesting remarks on the 
abuse of process doctrine/a comparable doctrine, but may not have used the abuse of process doctrine 
itself to refuse jurisdiction, see, for example, the Hartley case (and n. 847). In addition to these cases, 
the judges also mentioned the Nikolić case, as an example of a case where the abuse of process doctrine 
from Barayagwiza was repeated, but, in the end, not applied. The co-investigating judges referred here 
specifically to the reasoning of the Trial Chamber in Nikolić that under the abuse of process doctrine, 
jurisdiction may be refused, irrespective of the entity responsible for the serious male captus (in Nikolić: 
private individuals): “In this decision, the ICTY held that (…) this theory could only apply where the 
Accused had been subject to serious mistreatment [This is, by the way, not certain. Although the Trial 
Chamber indeed focused on this physical dimension, it also concurred with the more general words in 
Barayagwiza, which ‘only’ demand egregious violations of the rights of the suspect, see n. 531 and 
accompanying text. Cf. also n. 1231 and accompanying text, ChP.], specifying that “Whether such a 
decision should be taken also depends entirely on the facts of the case and cannot be decided in the 
abstract. Accordingly, the level of violence used against the Accused must be assessed. Here, the 
Chamber observes that the assumed facts, although they do raise some concerns, do not at all show that 
the treatment of the Accused by the unknown individuals (…) was of such an egregious nature.”” 
(ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 








held that the violation of the rights of the defendant at the time of his prior arrest and 
detention could only be taken into account in two cases: if the court acted in concert 
with the external authorities, or if the defendant was the victim of torture or serious 
mistreatment.1214 
 
As will also be shown in Chapter X (some parts of Lubanga Dyilo must, however, 
already be discussed right now), this is not entirely clear. One could indeed argue 
that the ICC Appeals Chamber agreed with the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in that case 
that in the first situation of “concerted action”, violations must be considered,1215 but 
the serious mistreatment/torture point is less certain as this situation stems from the 
abuse of process doctrine, a doctrine which was explicitly rejected by the Appeals 
Chamber. Lack of clarity with respect to this point is also caused by the fact that the 
exact stance of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber on this point is uncertain. It namely 
explained  
 
that whenever there is no concerted action between the Court and the authorities of 
the custodial State, the abuse of process doctrine constitutes an additional guarantee 
of the rights of the accused; and that, to date, the application of this doctrine, which 
would require that the Court decline to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular case, 
has been confined to instances of torture or serious mistreatment by national 
authorities of the custodial State in some way related to the process of arrest and 
transfer of the person to the relevant international criminal tribunal [original footnotes 
omitted, ChP][.]1216 
 
The problem is that under the abuse of process doctrine in the Tribunal context, 
there is no requirement for the male captus to have been committed by national 
authorities. Jurisdiction can be refused, irrespective of the entity responsible. Think, 
for example, of the actions of the private individuals in the Nikolić case. However, 
whether this was a mistake by the Pre-Trial Chamber is not clear. On the one hand, 
it refers to Tribunal cases alone (Nikolić (Appeals Chamber), Kajelijeli and 
Dokmanović)1217 but on the other, the test from the Appeals Chamber’s decision in 
the Nikolić case was not very clear (see Subsection 3.1.4 of this chapter), Kajelijeli 
involved the actions of State authorities working at the behest of the ICTR and the 
exact paragraphs from the Dokmanović case to which the Pre-Trial Chamber refers 
contain examinations of national cases. (And in the national context, the abuse of 
process doctrine appears to require the involvement of authorities which can be 
linked to the prosecuting forum.) The following does not solve this issue either: one 
could argue that the Pre-Trial Chamber adheres to the normal abuse of process 
doctrine from the Tribunal context (not requiring the involvement of State 
                                                          
1214 Ibid., para. 19. 
1215 See n. 282 and accompanying text of Chapter X. 
1216 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 3 October 2006, 
p. 10. 








authorities) but only applies the specifics of the case before it to the theory at hand. 
However, even though a number of quotations from this decision can be seen as 
such specific applications,1218 this particular quotation cannot, for it is too generally 
formulated. Hence, it is not clear whether the Pre-Trial Chamber would refuse 
jurisdiction irrespective of the entity responsible or whether it would only do so in 
the case of a male captus committed by the national authorities of the custodial 
State.  
Because of the Appeals Chamber’s rejection of the abuse of process doctrine and 
the lack of clarity with respect to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s view of the abuse of 
process doctrine, it is not clear how the Appeals Chamber would act in the case of 
serious mistreatment/torture by, for example, private individuals. Although Chapter 
X will show that serious violations which occur when the ICC is involved in a case 
(including actions of third parties working at the behest of the ICC) and which entail 
that one can no longer speak of a fair trial, must/can1219 lead to the ending of the 
case (which will certainly be the case if the ICC itself, or third parties working for 
the ICC, are responsible for serious mistreatment/torture of the suspect), it is 
uncertain how the Appeals Chamber would react in the case of serious 
mistreatment/torture as such, even if (third parties working for) the ICC were not 
involved in the case.   
However, notwithstanding this lack of clarity, it will be shown below that the co-
investigating judges concluded that the ICC Appeals Chamber’s view in Lubanga 
Dyilo is the same as in the Nikolić case, namely that the application of the abuse of 
process doctrine – again, it should be remembered that the ICC Appeals Chamber 
explicitly rejected this doctrine – requires the existence of grave violations of the 
suspect’s rights, such as serious mistreatment/torture.1220  
The different cases having been discussed, the co-investigating judges looked at 
the specifics of the case before them and concluded “that they do not have 
jurisdiction to determine the legality of DUCH’s prior detention”.1221 The argument 
as to why this was so clearly followed what the co-investigating judges thought was 
the reasoning of the ICC Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga Dyilo case. The co-
investigating judges were namely of the opinion that neither situation, where one 
                                                          
1218 See ibid., pp. 9 (“[A]ny violations of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s rights in relation to his arrest and 
detention prior to 14 March 2006 will be examined by the Court only once it has been established that 
there has been concerted action between the Court and the DRC authorities [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]”) and 10: “[N]o issues has arisen to any alleged act of torture against or serious mistreatment of 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo by the DRC national authorities prior to the transmission of the Court’s 
Cooperation Request on 14 March 2006 to the said authorities”. 
1219 Chapter X will show that there is lack of clarity on this point as well, see the text following n. 255 
and accompanying text of that chapter. 
1220 See ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case 
File 002/14-08-2006, Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 21 and n. 1231 and 
accompanying text. See also C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, 
Working Paper No. 24 – April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), p. 49, n. 182. 
1221 ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 








could look at alleged irregularities prior to the arrest and detention of the now 
prosecuting forum (namely if the prosecuting forum acted in concert with the 
authorities causing the irregularities and if the defendant was the victim of torture or 
serious mistreatment), applied here.  
With respect to the first situation, the co-investigating judges explained that  
 
[t]he fact that the Extraordinary Chambers is part of the judicial system of the 
Kingdom of Cambodia does not lead to the conclusion that this special 
internationalised Tribunal acted in concert with the military court: the Extraordinary 
Chambers only became operational on June 22, 2007 (...). Prior to the initiation of this 
judicial investigation, the Co-Investigating Judges (who together form the sole 
authority empowered to decide upon matters of provisional detention) had no means 
of intervening. Once they were in a position to do so, they dealt with the issue. Thus, 
the time lapse between the lodging of the Introductory submission and the arrest 
warrant (12 days)[1222] cannot seriously be considered excessive or be characterised as 
negligence, given the time needed to review the case file.1223 
 
One can wonder whether the link between the ECCC and the Military Court is 
indeed as weak as the co-investigating judges present it here. Although it is, of 
course, true that the ECCC was not yet in operation when Duch was placed in 
detention, it was explained at the beginning of the examination of this case that on 
the basis of the ECCC law and apparently in anticipation of the birth of this new 
internationalised criminal tribunal, the Investigating Judge of the Cambodian 
Military Court issued detention orders for Duch on 20 February 2002, 2003 and 
2004 charging him with crimes against humanity and that on 28 February 2005, 
2006 and 2007, Duch’s ‘provisional’ detention (now for charges of war crimes and 
crimes against internationally protected persons but again pursuant to the ECCC 
law) was extended by the Investigating Judge.1224 Hence, it can be argued that, even 
if one cannot speak of concerted action here, there was certainly a link between 
Duch’s provisional detention, at least as from 2002, and the ECCC, even if the latter 
was not yet operational. It could be argued that this link entails the violations being 
seen as falling within the context of the ECCC case more generally and that as a 
result of that, the violations must be remedied by the ECCC. At this point, it may be 
interesting to refer to Mohan, who notes that  
 
                                                          
1222 On 18 July 2007, the co-prosecutors of the ECCC made an introductory submission requesting the 
co-investigating judges to investigate, arrest and detain five suspects (namely Duch, Chea Nuon, Sary 
Ieng, Thirith Ieng and Samphan Khieu) and on 30 July 2007, an arrest warrant was issued against Duch. 
1223 ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 
002/14-08-2006, Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 20. 
1224 See also Mohan 2009, p. 16, n. 86: “The charges against Duch and the orders placing him and 
holding him in detention by the Military Court were based on the crimes currently under the ECCC’s 
jurisdiction and the Military Court made specific reference to the ECCC’s authority to justify his Prior 
Detention. It appears therefore that Duch was merely being housed by the Military Court’s detention 








[t]he ECCC, as an organ of the Cambodian government, had a legal obligation to 
review and remedy the breach of the government’s obligation under Articles 9 and 14 
of the ICCPR to try Duch within a reasonable time or to release him. It was a patently 
poor excuse for the ECCC’s pre-trial courts to retort that Duch’s quarrel should have 
been with the Military Court and not the ECCC. Even if the ECCC was not to blame 
for Duch’s Prior Detention, as a court firmly located within the Cambodian court 
structure, the ECCC’s pre-trial courts were obliged to pronounce on the unlawfulness 
of Duch’s prior detention ordered and executed by another court and organ of the 
Cambodian government.1225 
 
This is reminiscent of the previously discussed issue on the problems caused by 
fragmentation of a suspect’s legal process over two or more systems and the idea 
that, if the first entity does not examine the irregularities in that process, it is up to 
the second entity to do so in order to prevent the suspect from falling into a legal 
vacuum. Mohan also asserts, among other things referring to the ICTR case of 
Kajelijeli and the ICC case of Lubanga Dyilo, that even if one did not regard the 
ECCC to be part of the Cambodian Government but a true international court,  
 
this does not detract from the ECCC’s obligation to look beyond its seat and examine 
alleged human rights violations committed by Cambodian national authorities against 
its defendants. The independence that international(ized) courts are clothed with is an 
independence from State interference, not a prerogative to dismiss human rights 
violations perpetrated by the State [emphasis in original, ChP].1226  
 
Hence, Mohan is also of the opinion that there is a clear link between Duch’s earlier 
provisional detention and the ECCC, and that as a result of this detention, which 
occurred in the context of the ECCC case more generally, the co-investigating 
                                                          
1225 Ibid., p. 17. See also ibid., p. 13: “It follows that where a branch of the Cambodian government fails 
to fulfil its obligations under the ICCPR, the ECCC, applying Cambodian criminal procedure as it is 
required to, must remedy such unlawful conduct. This is especially so where the government’s conduct 
impinges on a defendant’s due process rights. In such cases, the ECCC is expressly required to exercise 
its jurisdiction in accordance with “international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law, as 
set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the ICCPR.” From the perspective of both Cambodian and international 
law, therefore, the ECCC had a duty to inquire into and pronounce upon the legality of Duch’s Prior 
Detention [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See also ibid., p. 16. 
1226 Ibid., p. 17. See also ibid., pp. 17-18 for the link with Kajelijeli: “[A]s the ICTR’s Appeals Chamber 
has held, where national authorities hold a defendant in custody effectively on behalf of an international 
court, “a shared burden exists with regard to safeguarding the suspect’s fundamental rights in 
international cooperation on criminal matters.” That is because the tribunal has “overlapping 
responsibilities” with the national authorities and once it begins operation, it must ensure that “the case 
proceeds to trial in a way that respects the rights of the accused”. As a result, “if an accused is arrested 
or detained by a State at the request or under the authority of the Tribunal even though the accused is not 
yet within the actual custody of the Tribunal, the Tribunal has a responsibility to provide whatever relief 
is available to it to attempt to reduce any violations as much as possible” [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].” Note that the last words in fact stem from Judge Lal Chand Vohrah’s declaration in the Semanza 
case, see ns. 834, 985 and 1060 and accompanying text. See also ibid., p. 18 for the link with Lubanga 
Dyilo, where Mohan explains that the ICC Appeals Chamber “held that it was required to “see that the 
process envisioned in [national] law was duly followed and that the rights of the arrestee were properly 








judges should have looked into the irregularities which can be connected with this 
detention. 
With respect to the second situation, the co-investigating judges clarified that 
courts which have applied the abuse of process doctrine “have always considered 
the proportional relationship between the alleged violations and the proposed 
remedy”.1227 However, the subsequent words of the co-investigating judges reveal 
that they felt that they also had to take into account the seriousness of the crimes 
with which the suspect is charged, an element which this study also finds to be 
important as it is one of the many elements which a judge, under certain 
circumstances, should take into account when considering the most appropriate 
remedy in a certain case: “It is obvious that in a case of crimes against humanity, the 
proceedings should be stayed only where the rights of the accused have been 
seriously affected, at least, for example, to the degree in Toscanino.”1228 It can be 
argued that the choice of (at least!) the degree of seriousness from Toscanino is 
unfortunate as this test is extremely high; it is to be recalled that Toscanino was 
tortured for nearly three weeks. However, in the remainder of the text, one can also 
see lower thresholds, although one can assume that even those ‘lower’ thresholds 
(which apply irrespective of the entity responsible)1229 will still be very difficult to 
meet: 
 
The Co-Investigating Judges are (…) compelled to follow the solution adopted in 
Nikolic and Lubanga[1230] which requires, for the application of the abuse of [process] 
doctrine, the existence of grave violations of the rights of the Accused. Where it has 
not been established or even alleged that DUCH suffered incidents of torture or 
serious mistreatment prior to his transfer before the Extraordinary Chambers, the 
prolonged detention under the jurisdiction of the Military Court, in comparison with 
the crimes against humanity alleged against the Accused, cannot be considered a 
sufficiently grave violation of the rights of the Accused.1231  
 
Hence, the co-investigating judges did not have jurisdiction to review the legality of 
Duch’s prior detention, enabling them to continue with the trial. 
Although the co-investigating judges may have been right in deciding that the 
seriousness of the male captus suffered by Duch was not such as to divest 
jurisdiction, the conclusion that his prior detention cannot be reviewed can – again – 
be criticised. The judges should be able to review alleged irregularities which occur 
in the context of their case, even if the irregularities were not so serious as to refuse 
jurisdiction and even if there was no concerted action. If these were the only reasons 
                                                          
1227 ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 
002/14-08-2006, Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 21. 
1228 Ibid. 
1229 See the link with Nikolić and n. 1213. 
1230 As explained supra, it is doubtful whether this is in fact the position of the ICC Appeals Chamber in 
Lubanga Dyilo. 
1231 ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 








for a judge to review the irregularities, he would not be able to review a kidnapping 
by private individuals, not involving serious mistreatment and not involving 
concerted action between the kidnappers and the prosecuting forum. That, of course, 
would be very unfortunate as the judge in that case would close his eyes to issues 
which clearly have to be seen as falling within the context of his case and which it 
would be very unfair not to consider.  
Nevertheless, the co-investigating judges also made a statement which could 
perhaps be seen as an opening to a broader stance. Although they concluded that the 
trial, where Duch could enjoy “his full rights of defence”,1232 had to proceed, they 
also stated that a less far-reaching remedy was not to be excluded in the future: 
“[A]n eventual remedy for the prejudice caused by the prior detention (in the form 
of a reduction of sentence or by any other means decided by the Chambers) is not at 
issue during the investigative phase.”1233 This remark, which does not exclude the 
granting of remedies for irregularities, even if those remedies would not lead to the 
ending of the case, is, of course, to be welcomed for it adds the necessary range to 
the male captus discussion which can sometimes have too great a focus on the 
extreme solutions. Furthermore, it may mean that the prosecuting forum (if not the 
co-investigating judges in the investigative stage,1234 then this must be the ‘real’ 
judges in the trial proceedings) must examine the legality of irregularities which it 
finds as falling within the context of this case. After all, if the prosecuting forum 
does not examine these irregularities, it cannot grant an appropriate remedy. 
The final point left to be discussed by the co-investigating judges, now that they 
had established that the trial should proceed, was whether it was also necessary to 
detain Duch pending trial. Referring, among other things, to the seriousness of the 
crimes with which Duch was charged, the co-investigating judges were of the 
opinion that it was.1235 
On appeal, the lawyers for Duch tried to convince the judges  
 
why the more than eight years of prior detention violates both the relevant provisions 
of Cambodian law and applicable human rights law, as contained in Article 9 of the 
                                                          
1232 Ibid.  
1233 Ibid.  
1234 See the words: “[T]he Co-Investigating Judges consider that they do not have jurisdiction to 
determine the legality of DUCH’s prior detention.” (Ibid., para. 20.) 
1235 See ibid., paras. 22-23: “[T]he acts alleged against the Charged Person are of a gravity such that, 30 
years after their commission, they profoundly disrupt the public order to such a degree that it is not 
excessive to conclude that the release of the person concerned risks provoking, in the fragile context of 
today’s Cambodian society, protests of indignation which could lead to violence and perhaps imperil the 
very safety of the person concerned. Furthermore, because DUCH may be sentenced to life 
imprisonment, it is feared that he may seek, as a consequence, to flee any legal action. Consequently, 
taking into consideration that there is a well-founded belief that KAING GUEK EAV, alias DUCH, 
committed the crimes with which he is charged, that provisional detention is necessary to guarantee that 
the Charged Person remains at the disposition of justice and to protect his safety; and that, finally, it is 
necessary to preserve public order; because furthermore, no bail order would be rigorous enough to 









ICCPR, with reference to the jurisprudence related to the abuse of process doctrine 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].1236    
 
According to them, “this period of prior detention may be imputed to the judicial 
authorities responsible for the present case”.1237 Furthermore, they argued, “such 
prior detention was a bar to the exercise of a discretion to apply Internal Rule 
63(3)[1238] and consider the issue of a provisional detention order with respect to 
proceedings before the ECCC”.1239 This last point clarifies that the lawyers were 
requesting a male detentus remedy with respect to the proceedings related to the 
provisional detention order. However, that – again – does not mean that they also 
want a male detentus remedy for the entire proceedings. As already explained, it 
appears that Duch did not attack the complete proceedings before the ECCC 
(because he seemingly wished to stand trial), but only the power of the co-
investigating judges to order his provisional detention.  
The judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber asked themselves the question “whether 
previous actions by other than ECCC judicial authorities have caused a violation of 
(...) [Article 9 of the ICCPR, ChP] entailing consequences for decisions taken by 
organs of the ECCC”.1240 According to them, they could only take into account a 
violation of this provision “when the organ responsible for the violation was 
                                                          
1236 ECCC, Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of Kaing 
Guek Eav Alias “Duch”’, Criminal Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (PTC01), 3 December 
2007, para. 13. It may be interesting to quote the following excerpt of Mohan’s article which clearly 
shows how the subject of human rights for suspects of the most serious international crimes is often 
received: “When Duch’s Cambodian lawyer Kar Savuth suggested that Duch’s human rights had been 
violated because of his 8-year pre-trial detention by the Cambodian government prior to the hearing, the 
largely Cambodian audience erupted into laughter. Cambodian human rights activist Kek Galabru 
observed that “[t]his is Cambodian style, they laugh…it’s too much for them because they know that 
when he was torturing Cambodians there was no talk about the human rights of the victims. Even me, 
when I hear that, I laugh.” According to Galabru, the idea of conferring human rights to an alleged 
human rights violator is understandably laughable for local victims of the Khmer Rouge [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” (Mohan 2009, pp. 2-3.) 
1237 ECCC, Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of Kaing 
Guek Eav Alias “Duch”’, Criminal Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (PTC01), 3 December 
2007, para. 13. 
1238 Which reads: “The Co-Investigating Judges may order the Provisional Detention of the Charged 
Person only where the following conditions are met: a) there is well founded reason to believe that the 
person may have committed the crime or crimes specified in the Introductory or Supplementary 
Submission; and b) The Co-Investigating Judges consider Provisional Detention to be a necessary 
measure to: i) prevent the Charged Person from exerting pressure on any witnesses or Victims, or 
prevent any collusion between the Charged Person and accomplices of crimes falling within the 
jurisdiction of the ECCC; ii) preserve evidence or prevent the destruction of any evidence; iii) ensure the 
presence of the Charged Person during the proceedings; iv) protect the security of the Charged Person; 
or v) preserve public order.” 
1239 ECCC, Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of Kaing 
Guek Eav Alias “Duch”’, Criminal Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (PTC01), 3 December 
2007, para. 13. 








connected to an organ of the ECCC, or had been acting on behalf of any organ of the 
ECCC or in concert with organs of the ECCC”.1241  
It can be argued that this test is less far-reaching than the ‘attribution’ test of the 
DARS, see Chapter III, which clarifies, for example, that conduct which the now 
prosecuting forum acknowledges and adopts as its own, can also be attributed to 
it.1242 In addition, and again raising the (arguably important) point mentioned above, 
one can assert that besides this legal attribution test, the prosecuting forum should 
also be authorised to look more generally into pre-trial irregularities if it is of the 
opinion that these can be seen as falling within the context of its case, even if it is, 
strictly speaking, not responsible for them.1243 To again use the example of a 
kidnapping by private individuals before the kidnapped person is brought into the 
jurisdiction of the court: such conduct will not readily fall under the test used here 
by the ECCC (or the ‘acknowledges and adopts as its own’ test) but it would 
nevertheless be strange if the judges did not take into account the wrongs caused by 
such a kidnapping because it can be seen as falling with the context of the Tribunal 
case and because “all violations demand a remedy”.  
However, the judges of the ECCC did not use this test and only examined 
whether the prolonged detention of Duch could be legally attributed to the ECCC. In 
the end, referring, among other things, to the “concerted action” concept of the ICC 
Appeals Chamber’s decision in Lubanga Dyilo,1244 they concluded that this was not 
possible.1245 In this context, the judges also looked at the point made above, namely 
that the Military Court detained Duch from 2002 on the basis of the ECCC law. 
They found that “[t]o the extent that the Military court purported to base certain 
actions on the pre-amendment and amended ECCC Law, this cannot have been at 
the direction of the ECCC”1246 because the ECCC did not exist at that time. As 
already stated, the fact that the ECCC was not yet operational is indeed true and it is 
also accurate that this automatically means that the ECCC could not have directed 
the Military Court to detain Duch. Nevertheless, it is also clear that there exists a 
certain link between the ECCC and the provisional detention of Duch by the 
Military Court which justifies the judges of the ECCC looking at the irregularities 
committed in the context of their case. Be that as it may, the judges did not share 
                                                          
1241 Ibid.  
1242 Cf. also n. 483 for the context of international organisations. 
1243 See also ECCC, Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief [of The Center for Social Development & 
The Asian International Justice Initiative, ChP] Relating to the Appeal Challenging the Order of 
Provisional Detention of 31 July 2007’, Case No. 002/14-08-2006, 3 October 2007, paras. 20 and 23: 
“[T]he OCIJ [the Office of the co-investigating judges, ChP] had the jurisdiction to determine and 
declare whether or not the Prior Detention of more than 8 years amounted to a violation of the 
Appellant’s rights. (…) [T]he OCIJ should have proceeded to further acknowledge that it was a 
violation of his rights under the law. Instead, the OCIJ circumvented this issue by saying that it had no 
jurisdiction whatsoever to inquire into the matter.”  
1244 See n. 1214 and accompanying text. 
1245 See ECCC, Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of Kaing 
Guek Eav Alias “Duch”’, Criminal Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (PTC01), 3 December 
2007, para. 21. 








this view and hence concluded that they could not look into them. (Furthermore, 
they opined that the co-investigating judges had correctly decided that the 
substantive requirements for Duch’s provisional detention were met.)  
Nevertheless, the judges also made a statement which resembles the one made by 
the co-investigating judges in the 31 July 2007 decision1247 and which may open the 
door to a review of Duch’s detention at a later stage: 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber further observes that the Trial Chamber and the Supreme 
Court Chamber may determine, as submitted by the Co-Prosecutors, that it is 
appropriate to take any previous provisional detention, whether or not it was illegal, 
into account at a latter stage of the proceedings.1248 
 
This point played an important role in the remainder of the proceedings. On 15 June 
2009, the Trial Chamber of the ECCC considered the allegations of Duch. After 
having noted, among other things, the points that “the ECCC (...) is a separately 
constituted, independent and internationalised court”,1249 that “[t]he fact that the 
Military Court made reference to the ECCC law in its earlier orders (...) does not 
demonstrate continuity between the detention ordered by the Military Court and 
ECCC”1250 and that “[t]here is no evidence of any involvement by ECCC judicial 
authorities in the Accused’s Military Court file and in particular in its decisions 
concerning the detention of the Accused [original footnote omitted, ChP]”,1251 the 
judges made an unexpected but arguably welcome move: referring to the excerpt 
from the Barayagwiza case where the ICTR judges took responsibility for violations 
committed against the suspect, irrespective of the entity responsible, and even 
beyond the “constructive custody” of Barayagwiza,1252 the judges of the ECCC 
stated:  
 
Even if a violation of the Accused’s right cannot be attributed to the ECCC, 
international jurisprudence indicates that an international criminal tribunal has both 
the authority and the obligation to consider the legality of his prior detention. The 
ICTR Appeals Chamber decision in Barayagwiza held that a violation of an accused 
person’s rights under the law must be acknowledged by an international criminal 
tribunal before which he seeks relief, even if that violation cannot be attributed to that 
tribunal [original footnote omitted, ChP].1253 
 
                                                          
1247 See n. 1233 and accompanying text. 
1248 ECCC, Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of Kaing 
Guek Eav Alias “Duch”’, Criminal Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (PTC01), 3 December 
2007, para. 25. See also ibid., paras. 62-63. 
1249 ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 10. 
1250 Ibid., para. 14. 
1251 Ibid. 
1252 See n. 857 and accompanying text. 
1253 ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-








This task, the judges correctly observed, was separate from the situation where 
“previous violations of an Accused’s rights are so egregious that they may preclude 
or restrain the exercise of an international criminal tribunal’s jurisdiction on grounds 
of abuse of process and violation of the fundamental rights of the accused [original 
footnote omitted, ChP]”.1254  
Thus, judges of international criminal(ised) tribunals have a general 
responsibility to repair the pre-trial wrongs committed against the suspect in the 
context of the tribunal case, even if the tribunal was not responsible for them, and in 
addition to that, the judges even have discretion, in the case of very serious 
irregularities, to stop the proceedings under the abuse of process doctrine if they 
consider that to proceed with the case in such circumstances would undermine the 
court’s integrity.1255 
As a result, the judges of the ECCC had to ascertain whether Duch’s detention 
before the Military Court was a violation of his rights and if so, what kinds of 
remedies he was consequently entitled to.1256  
They concluded that Duch’s detention indeed constituted a violation of 
Cambodian domestic law1257 and also “contravene[d] his internationally-recognised 
right to a trial within the reasonable time and detention in accordance with the 
law”.1258  
                                                          
1254 Ibid. (Very remarkably, the judges referred here not only (correctly) to the Barayagwiza case, but 
also to paras. 26-35 of the ICC Appeals Chamber’s decision in Lubanga Dyilo. However, in those 
paragraphs, the ICC judges first explained and then rejected the abuse of process doctrine, see n. 238 
and accompanying text of Chapter X.) See also ibid., para. 35: “The case law of the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber nevertheless indicates that even where these violations cannot be attributed to an international 
tribunal or do not amount to an abuse of process, an accused may be entitled to seek a remedy for 
violations of his rights by national authorities [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
1255 It is again (see also n. 1211) interesting to note that the ECCC, which is focused on the (civil law) 
Cambodian legal system, looked at the – from the common law stemming – abuse of process doctrine. 
This confirms the idea that this doctrine (or a comparable doctrine with another label) may very well be 
used by courts with a more civil law background. Thus, the fact that the judges in the Pre-Trial Chamber 
(see the decision of 3 December 2007) did not go into the abuse of process doctrine, can probably not be 
seen as evidence for the idea that the ECCC does not want to apply the – from the common law 
stemming – abuse of process doctrine. See on this point Ryngaert 2008, pp. 727-728. 
1256 See ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 17. 
1257 See ibid., paras. 19-20: “In 1999, the Cambodian government (...) promulgated the Law on Duration 
of Pre-Trial Detention of 1999, which imposed a maximum ceiling of three years’ provisional detention 
in relation to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity charges. The Accused appears to have 
been held under this latter law for nearly eight years and therefore illegally until his transfer to the 
ECCC in July 2007. (...) There appears to have been no substantial and systematic investigation 
throughout the period of detention and there was a general lack of reasoning setting out the legal basis 
for the various detentions. It also appears from the military file that in some instances, the extension of 
the detention was ordered by the Prosecutor alone, and not the Investigating Judge. Further, several laws 
on which the Military Court relied appear to have been applied retroactively, in violation of the rights of 
the Accused under Cambodia and international law [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
1258 Ibid., para. 21. (This conclusion may not seem very surprising as the co-investigating judges, in their 
decision of 31 July 2007, had also noted that Duch’s detention was “problematic in light of international 
standards of justice and, more specifically, articles 9(3) and 14(3)(c) of the International Covenant on 








Notwithstanding this, they also concluded that there was nothing wrong with 
Duch’s provisional detention under the authority of the ECCC (as from 31 July 
2007). As a result, the only problem left to tackle was to determine the remedies 
Duch was entitled to with respect to his unlawful detention before the Military 
Court.  
However, before turning to the remedies with respect to the violations 
engendered by this detention, the judges also stipulated that Duch, if convicted, was 
entitled to credit for the duration of his pre-trial detention, not only the pre-trial 
detention under the authority of the ECCC (as from 31 July 2007)1259 but also the 
pre-trial detention under the authority of the Military Court (as from 10 May 
1999).1260 This was because Duch “would have been entitled to credit for time 
served from 10 May 1999 to 31 July 2007, had he been brought to trial before the 
Military Court”.1261 Now that the latter Court had terminated its case against Duch, 
Duch was no longer going to be brought before that Court.1262 Thus, it was 
appropriate that the ECCC would give Duch credit for these years, especially since 
Duch “was detained before the Military Court for investigations of allegations 
broadly similar to those being considered in this trial”.1263  
With respect to remedies for the violations committed in the context of Duch’s 
unlawful pre-trial detention, the judges referred to the observation of the Appeals 
Chamber in Nikolić that the correct “balance must ... be maintained between the 
fundamental rights of the accused and the essential interests of the international 
community in the prosecution of persons charged with serious violations of 
international humanitarian law [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.1264 It must be 
emphasised again that this balance must never be understood to mean that enforcers 
should be less concerned about the human rights of suspects of genocide than those 
of suspects of fraud.1265 All suspects are human beings and as such entitled to 
                                                                                                                                              
shall be entitled to a trial within a reasonable time period or to be released”, see n. 1196 and 
accompanying text.) 
1259 See ibid., para. 27. 
1260 See ibid., para. 28. 
1261 Ibid. 
1262 See ibid.  
1263 Ibid. 
1264 Ibid., para. 31. 
1265 For example, if authorities which can be linked to the prosecuting court have kidnapped a person, 
that court must decisively refuse jurisdiction if it does not want to legally approve such reprehensible 
conduct, whether the kidnapped person is charged with fraud or genocide. Cf. also Mohan 2009, pp. 24-
25: “The legitimacy of the Khmer Rouge trials require that an alleged genocidaire receives all the 
benefits of due process and legality he himself denied to his victims. To treat a genocidaire otherwise 
than with fairness would result in the tribunal descending to the same level of disrespect for the rule of 
law and render the proceedings a show trial [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Mogan (ibid., p. 25) also 
points to the influence such a decision could have on Cambodian justice system. (Cf. in that respect also 
the already-mentioned words of Swart 2001, p. 201, writing about the ICTY/ICTR and the “negative 
consequences that transcend the limited framework of the Tribunals”.) Indeed, internationalised criminal 
tribunals are even closer to a State’s own legal system than the ICTY/ICTR, which may increase the 








human rights. Moreover, every violation must be remedied.1266 However, the 
Appeals Chamber’s remark can be supported to the extent that it means that the 
seriousness of the crimes with which the suspect is charged (and hence the 
importance of continuing the trial) may play a role in determining the appropriate 
remedy in the case of a violation (in the context of the abuse of process doctrine1267 
and in the context of the consequences of a determination that the person’s 
arrest/detention was unlawful).1268  
As explained earlier, it must be admitted that that may mean that a suspect of 
less serious crimes may be better off than a suspect of serious crimes.1269 Imagine 
the situation that a suspect of minor domestic crimes becomes the victim of a 
kidnapping by private individuals in which the authorities of the now prosecuting 
forum were not involved and during which he was not mistreated before being 
brought to the national judge. In such a situation, it would not be surprising if the 
national judge were to refuse to exercise jurisdiction and to release the suspect 
because of, on the one hand, the rather serious male captus and, on the other, the 
minor importance of having this person prosecuted. However, if the person is 
charged with genocide, one can imagine that the judge (whether it be a judge at the 
national or at the tribunal level) would continue the case and grant the person other 
remedies. Although the seriousness of the male captus is the same in both cases, the 
importance of having this person prosecuted will probably tip the balance, ensuring 
that the trial will continue and that the suspect will receive other less far-reaching 
remedies for the wrongs he suffered. Notwithstanding this, a male detentus remedy 
is never excluded, even in the case of a suspect of very serious crimes.  
Returning to the Duch case, the judges then repeated, referring to Rwamakuba, 
the strict legal attribution test that “[v]iolations of an accused person’s rights by 
external authorities will only be attributed to an international tribunal where there 
                                                          
1266 Cf. also Swart 2001, p. 201 (see also n. 133): “Persons suspected or accused of international crimes 
should be no less entitled to respect for their basic individual rights than any other suspects or accused.” 
1267 See also Ryngaert (2008, p. 732), writing on the abuse of process doctrine: “It is a doctrine that the 
tribunal is not required to invoke, but that it may do if it believes that the fairness of the entire 
proceedings may suffer as a consequence of the prior violations. Because the tribunal’s decision is a 
discretionary one, it may rely on any criteria it deems fit in order to assess whether application of the 
abuse of process doctrine to the case would be warranted. There is no reason why gravity of the crime 
could not be one of them.” 
1268 See, for example, the discussion of this topic in the Dokmanović and Nikolić cases. 
1269 Cf. Ryngaert 2008, p. 720, writing about the abuse of process doctrine: “[A] high standard of 
applying abuse of process in international criminal law – resulting in less protection for the defendant’s 
rights – is appropriate, in the light of the grave crimes for which the defendants are prosecuted before 
international criminal tribunals.” Ryngaert refers in that respect, among other things, to the Eichmann 
case. Although it was explained earlier that the judges in Israel did not apply the male captus bene 
detentus principle because of the seriousness of the crimes with which Eichmann was charged, Ryngaert 
is not referring to the reaction of the Israeli judges, but to the reaction of the international community in 
general, see ibid., p. 732. As already explained in the context of the proceedings before the UNSC, it 
seems that in that context, the seriousness of Eichmann’s crimes was indeed taken into account to, in a 








has been concerted action between the international tribunal and those authorities in 
respect of these violations [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.1270  
However, the judges continued, referring to Barayagwiza (but in fact repeating 
verbatim the words of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo),1271 “[t]he 
abuse of process doctrine constitutes an additional guarantee of the rights of the 
accused”.1272 A little earlier (and see also Chapter X), it was argued that the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber incorrectly presented the abuse of process doctrine, demanding 
the involvement of “national authorities of the custodial State in some way related to 
the process of arrest and transfer of the person to the relevant international criminal 
tribunal [original footnote omitted, ChP]” (whereas the abuse of process arguably 
requires serious violations irrespective of the entity possible).1273 Very interestingly, 
the judges of the ECCC presented a slightly different version of the abuse of process 
doctrine, a version which, as concerns the above-mentioned point, is arguably better: 
 
The abuse of process doctrine constitutes an additional guarantee of the rights of the 
accused and may apply even in circumstances where there is no concerted action 
between the international criminal tribunal and the external authorities.[1274] This 
doctrine, which would require a tribunal to decline to exercise its jurisdiction in a 
partic[u]lar case, has been narrowly construed and limited to cases where the illegal 
conduct in question is such as to make it repugnant to the rule of law to put the 
accused on trial.[1275] Where the violations in question are not attributable to an 
international tribunal, this doctrine appears to be confined to instances of torture or 
serious mistreatment by the external authorities and has most usually been applied in 
relation to the process of arrest and transfer [emphasis added and original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].1276  
 
However, such serious situations did not apply here: “although the Accused’s prior 
detention amounted to a clear violation of his rights, absent allegations of torture or 
serious mistreatment by the national authorities,1277 this would appear insufficient to 
                                                          
1270 ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 32. 
1271 See n. 1216 and accompanying text. 
1272 ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 33. 
1273 See also n. 1216 and accompanying text. 
1274 Here, the judges referred to para. 73 of the first Barayagwiza decision where it was stated that 
“under the abuse of process doctrine, it is irrelevant which entity or entities were responsible for the 
alleged violations of the Appellant’s rights.” 
1275 Here, the judges referred to the ICC Appeals Chamber’s decision in Lubanga Dyilo, but again, it 
must be stressed that the judges in that decision explicitly rejected the abuse of process doctrine. See 
also ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 34, n. 55. 
1276 Ibid., para. 33. 
1277 Although the words now used are “national authorities”, this can be explained by the application of 
the theory to this specific case. However, that does not jeopardise the general test, which more broadly 








debar the exercise of the ECCC’s discretion to order provisional detention”.1278 One 
could argue that the judges placed too much emphasis on the often-used examples 
here: serious mistreatment/torture.1279 Conversely, they should assess for themselves 
whether Duch’s prior detention can be seen as such a serious male captus that it 
would be “repugnant to the rule of law” to put him on trial. 
However, what the judges did do correctly is to consequently note that besides 
the attribution test and the abuse of process doctrine, the Barayagwiza case 
indicated that “an accused may be entitled to seek a remedy for violations of his 
rights by national authorities [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.1280 One could, of 
course, think here of a reduction of the sentence and financial compensation. 
Although such remedies could, in the end, very well be appropriate here,1281 the 
judges, like the ones in Semanza, see footnote 1003, do not mention the fact that 
strictly speaking, Duch, like every person unlawfully arrested or detained, would 
first be entitled to the remedy of release:  
 
Should the Accused be convicted, the Chamber finds him to be entitled to a remedy, 
to be decided by the Chamber at the sentencing stage, for the time spent unlawfully in 
detention before the Cambodian Military Court between 10 May 1999 and 30 July 
2007. Where an Accused is acquitted, the international case law instead indicates that 
he may seek compensation before the national authorities responsible for the violation 
of his rights. If acquitted, the Accused would thus be entitled to pursue remedies 
available within the Cambodian national law in relation to time spent in detention and 
any violation of his rights whilst in the custody of the Cambodian Military Court 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].1282 
                                                          
1278 ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 34. 
1279 Interestingly in that respect is that the judges left out two important words which can be found in the 
ICC Pre-trial Chamber’s decision in Lubanga Dyilo, namely that the abuse of process doctrine has been 
restricted to serious mistreatment/torture to date (which does not exclude other examples in the future). 
See n. 1216 and accompanying text. 
1280 ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 35. 
1281 But see Mohan (2009, pp. 14-15), who still wrote at a time when the Trial Chamber had not yet 
issued its decision and who deemed these remedies only appropriate as an alternative option and thus 
found that Duch’s detention is so serious that the ECCC judges must invoke the abuse of process 
doctrine and stay the proceedings: “Duch’s continuous prior detention of more than 8 years without any 
demonstrable attempt to bring him to trial flouts Cambodian criminal procedure and is prima facie 
unlawful, violating his fundamental right to a trial within a reasonable time or to release. Having 
acknowledged that the prior detention was “problematic in light of international standards of justice”, 
the ECCC’s pre-trial courts should have proceeded to examine, determine and declare the illegality of 
this detention under both Cambodian and international law. Consistent with international jurisprudence, 
the ECCC’s pre-trial courts should have granted declaratory relief allocating responsibility for human 
rights violations to the Cambodian government and terminate proceedings in view of the egregious 
abuse of the court’s process. Alternatively, if the courts had come to the conclusion that Duch’s rights 
“have been violated, but not egregiously so”, they could have insisted that the ECCC’s Trial Chamber 
reduce the sentence imposed, in the event of a conviction or award Duch financial compensation for the 
violation, in the event of an acquittal [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
1282 See ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-








This is a very important decision for it confirms the Barayagwiza idea that every 
violation of the rights of the suspect in the context of a tribunal case, even if these 
violations have not been committed by authorities which can be linked to the 
prosecuting forum and even if the arrest/detention was not executed at the 
request/behest of the tribunal, hence beyond the scope of the suspect’s constructive 
custody, must be remedied. Thus, the tribunal will also take responsibility for 
wrongs for which it is not responsible, simply because these wrongs occur in the 
context of the tribunal case and because basic fairness demands that the now 
prosecuting forum, in whose context these violations were committed, repairs these 
wrongs. Therefore, it is not clear why the ECCC’s Trial Chamber states, in its very 
last words and after having shown that it will take responsibility for wrongs, even if 
it is not responsible for them,1283 that Duch should turn to the Cambodian authorities 
for compensation if he is acquitted. From cases such as Barayagwiza and Semanza, 
it is not apparent that compensation had to be sought from the national 
authorities.1284 After the sentence “international case law indicates...”, the judges of 
the ECCC refer to the Rwamakuba case. However, that case arguably only supports 
the idea that the judges, if certain violations cannot be seen as falling within the 
context of a tribunal case, do not need to take responsibility for these violations. 
That is very logical. After all, judges are not obliged to take responsibility for 
violations which have nothing to do with the tribunal case. However, if judges deem 
that certain violations do fall within the context of their case, they (and not the 
judges at the national level) should remedy these violations, whether a suspect is 
convicted or acquitted.  
 
6 FINAL INTERESTING OBSERVATIONS STEMMING FROM THE CONTEXT OF THE 
INTERNATIONALISED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
 
This study has found no other case in the context of the internationalised criminal 
tribunals other than Duch which so clearly goes into the male captus issue. 
Nevertheless, it may be interesting to mention a few final interesting observations 
from this context which address topics which, more generally, can be connected to 
this book’s central topic and which have been mentioned earlier in this chapter.  
                                                          
1283 After all, the ECCC will reduce the sentence of Duch, if the latter is convicted, because of the illegal 
detention for which the ECCC itself is not responsible. 
1284 In the Barayagwiza case, it was held “that for the violation of his rights the Appellant is entitled to a 
remedy, to be fixed at the time of judgement at first instance, as follows: a) If the Appellant is found not 
guilty, he shall receive financial compensation; b) If the Appellant is found guilty, his sentence shall be 
reduced to take account of the violation of his rights.” (See n. 922 and accompanying text.) In Semanza, 
it was stated “that for the violation of his rights, the Appellant is entitled to a remedy which shall be 
given when judgement is rendered by the Trial Chamber, as follows: (a) If he is found not guilty, the 
Appellant shall be entitled to financial compensation; (b) If he is found guilty, the Appellant’s sentence 
shall be reduced to take into account the violation of his rights, pursuant to Article 23 of the Statute.” 








For example, in the already briefly mentioned1285 Brima case before the 
SCSL,1286 Judge Itoe eloquently confirmed the idea already expressed in the 
Barayagwiza case1287 that a suspect must be able to ask the prosecuting forum to 
review the legality of his detention, even if the statute of the tribunal before which 
he stands does not contain an explicit possibility to file a writ of habeas corpus:  
 
It is my opinion that because the right to liberty is too sacred to be violated by 
whoever, any Court faced with or called upon to rule on applications of this nature, in 
whatever form they may be brought, should, for reasons based on the universal 
resolve and determination to uphold by all lawful means, respect by all and sundry 
and in all circumstances, of this entrenched fundamental human right, should 
entertain such applications and refrain from dismissing them merely on technical 
pretexts or niceties, geared at and designed to prevent them from being entertained 
and examined. (…) I agree with the submission of the Respondents that the procedure 
for granting a release through a Writ of “Habeas Corpus” features nowhere in the 
Rules for Procedure and Evidence which are applicable to the Special Court. 
However, entertaining this Writ is dictated by the imperatives of universally ensuring 
the respect of human rights and liberties.1288  
 
In another decision of the SCSL, the judges focused on the – for this study – most 
interesting situation of the abuse of process doctrine, the one which looks at the 
broad concept of a fair trial/the integrity of the proceedings:  
 
At the root of the doctrine of abuse of process is fairness. The fairness that is involved 
is not fairness in the process of adjudication itself but fairness in the use of the 
machinery of justice. The consideration is not only about unfairness to the party 
complaining but also whether to permit such use of the machinery of justice will 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.1289   
 
                                                          
1285 See n. 603 of Chapter III and ns. 205, 242 and 832 of the present chapter. 
1286 It must be noted that in the context of this internationalised criminal tribunal, one will also find 
allegations of illegal arrests/detentions/transfers, see, for example, SCSL, Trial Chamber, The 
Prosecutor against Moinina Fofana, ‘Decision on the Urgent Defence Application for Release from 
Provisional Detention’, Case No. SCSL-2003-11-PD, 21 November 2003 and SCSL, Trial Chamber, 
The Prosecutor against Allieu Kondewa, ‘Decision on the Urgent Defence Application for Release from 
Provisional Detention’, Case No. SCSL-2003-12-PD, 21 November 2003. However, in these cases, the 
claims of the Defence were quickly rejected. (See also n. 3 of Chapter IV.) 
1287 See n. 863 and accompanying text. 
1288 SCSL, Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor against Tamba Alex Brima, ‘Ruling on the Application for 
the Issue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus Filed by the Applicant’, Case No. SCSL-03-06-PT, 22 July 2003, 
p. 7. At ibid., p. 9, reference is then made to the para. 88 of the first Barayagwiza decision, see n. 863 
and accompanying text. (See also n. 929.) 
1289 SCSL, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor Against Morris Kallon (Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E)) 
and Brima Bazzy Kamara (Case No. SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E)), ‘Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: 








This observation was confirmed in the case Brima, Kamara and Kanu1290 where the 
judges subsequently clarified that, within the context of the abuse of process 
doctrine, one may also take into account, the element of the seriousness of the 
crimes with which the suspect is charged:  
 
The Trial Chamber wishes to emphasise that the operation of judicial discretion 
involves an assessment of the nature and severity of the crimes with which the 
accused is charged, weighed against the abuse of process that continuing the 
prosecution would engender.1291 
 
In the same case, the judges also supported the Barayagwiza reasoning that a 
tribunal may stay the proceedings under the abuse of process doctrine, even if 
authorities which can be connected to the tribunal were not responsible for the 
violations.1292 
The final words of this chapter are saved for to the newest internationalised 
criminal tribunal, the STL.1293 Although it is still unclear as to how the case against 
those who are allegedly responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 in Beirut 
which killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri and 22 others is going to 
develop, it is interesting to note that the STL may be confronted by Duch-like 
submissions in the future. On 30 August 2005, the Lebanese authorities arrested and 
detained four generals (Al-Sayyed, Al-Hajj, Azar and Hamdan), “pursuant to arrest 
warrants issued by the Lebanese Prosecutor General based on recommendations 
from the Commission that there was probable cause to arrest and detain them for 
conspiracy to commit murder in connection with the assassination of Rafiq Hariri 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP]”.1294 The ‘Commission’ mentioned here is the UN 
International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), the predecessor – of 
                                                          
1290 See SCSL, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor Against Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and 
Santigie Borbor Kanu, ‘Written Reasons for the Trial Chamber’s Oral Decision on the Defence Motion 
on Abuse of Process Due to Infringement of Principles of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and Non-
Retroactivity as to Several Counts’, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, 31 March 2004, para. 18. 
1291 Ibid., para. 25. The judges referred here to the following words stemming from the Mullen case (and 
not from the Bennett case as the SCSL judges indicated), see ibid., where mention is made of situations 
“in which the seriousness of the crime is so great relative to the nature of the abuse of process that it 
would be a proper exercise of judicial discretion to permit a prosecution to proceed or to allow a 
conviction to stand notwithstanding an abuse of process in relation to the defendant’s presence within 
the jurisdiction. In each case it is a matter of discretionary balance, to be approached with regard to the 
particular conduct complained of and the particular offence charged [emphasis in original and original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” 
1292 See ibid., para. 26. 
1293 See also Swart 2007, p. 1153. 
1294 STL, Pre-Trial Judge, ‘Submission of the Prosecutor to the Pre-Trial Judge Under Rule 17 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (Confidential), Case No. CH/PTJ/2009/004, 27 April 2009, para. 15. 
The Prosecutor of the STL refers here to the Report of the International Independent Investigation 
Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1595 (2005), Beirut, 19 October 2005 
(available at: http://www.stl-
tsl.org/x/file/TheRegistry/Library/BackgroundDocuments/ReportsoftheUNIIIC/2005-10-








sorts – of the STL’s OTP.1295 Although these generals were thus in detention from 
2005, the STL only began functioning on 1 March 2009.1296 As from 10 April 2009, 
when the Lebanese authorities “referred to the Prosecutor the results of the 
investigation and a copy of the court’s records regarding the Hariri case”,1297 and 
when the STL was thus officially seized of the case, the generals were detained 
under the legal authority of the STL.1298 According to Rule 17 (B) of the STL RPE, 
the Prosecutor must file “[a]s soon as practicable, (…) reasoned submissions 
together with any supporting material stating, for each person on the list, whether he 
requests the continuation of his detention”. In this context, Pre-Trial Judge Daniel 
Fransen stated on 15 April 2009:  
 
[I]n order to rule as soon as possible on whether these persons should continue to be 
detained and to ensure that the basic requirements for the protection of human rights 
are met, the Pre-Trial Judge holds that a time limit must be set for the filing of the 
Application by the Prosecutor. Indeed, the persons detained are presumed innocent 
and freedom is the principle, detention the exception.1299 
 
On 27 April 2009, the Prosecutor submitted his Application. Although he stressed 
that it did not “address the detention of the individuals in question prior to the 
                                                          
1295 See Art. 17 (‘Practical arrangements’) (a) of the Annex (‘Agreement between the United Nations 
and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon’) to UNSC Res. 
1757 of 30 May 2007: “Appropriate arrangements shall be made to ensure that there is a coordinated 
transition from the activities of the International Independent Investigation Commission, established by 
the Security Council in its resolution 1595 (2005), to the activities of the Office of the Prosecutor”. See 
further STL, Pre-Trial Judge, ‘Order Regarding the Detention of Persons Detained in Lebanon in 
Connection with the Case of the Attack Against Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and Others’, Case No. 
CH/PTJ/2009/06, 29 April 2009, para. 25: “[H]aving directed the work of the Investigation Commission, 
which began investigating in June 2005, having conducted his own investigations and received the 
records provided by the Lebanese authorities, the Prosecutor has an in-depth knowledge of the Hariri 
case file [emphasis added, ChP].” See finally C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and 
Detention’, Working Paper No. 24 – April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
(available at: https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), p. 54, noting that the 
UNIIIC “only later became the STL’s Office of the Prosecutor once the STL was established”. 
1296 See STL, Pre-Trial Judge, ‘Order Regarding the Detention of Persons Detained in Lebanon in 
Connection with the Case of the Attack Against Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and Others’, Case No. 
CH/PTJ/2009/06, 29 April 2009, para. 1. 
1297 STL, Pre-Trial Judge, ‘Order Setting a Time Limit for Filing of an Application by the Prosecutor in 
Accordance with Rule 17 (B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, Case No. CH/PTJ/2009/03, 15 
April 2009, para. 5. 
1298 See STL, Pre-Trial Judge, ‘Order Setting a Time Limit for Filing of an Application by the 
Prosecutor in Accordance with Rule 17 (B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, Case No. 
CH/PTJ/2009/03, 15 April 2009, para. 5. See also STL, Pre-Trial Judge, ‘Order Regarding the Detention 
of Persons Detained in Lebanon in Connection with the Case of the Attack Against Prime Minister 
Rafiq Hariri and Others’, Case No. CH/PTJ/2009/06, 29 April 2009, para. 5. 
1299 STL, Pre-Trial Judge, ‘Order Setting a Time Limit for Filing of an Application by the Prosecutor in 
Accordance with Rule 17 (B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, Case No. CH/PTJ/2009/03, 15 
April 2009, para. 7. In this order, the Pre-Trial Judge also referred to the importance of the right to 








deferral of the Hariri case to the Tribunal”,1300 he nevertheless explained how the 
suspects came into the power of the STL and that they had been arrested and 
detained in Lebanon as from 30 August 2005.1301 He explained “that information 
gathered to date in relation to the possible involvement of the four detained persons 
in the attack against Rafiq Hariri has not proved sufficiently credible to warrant the 
filing of an indictment against any of them”.1302 Because of that, he could not 
request their provisional detention and would not oppose their release.1303 However, 
he also clarified that his submission was “made without prejudice to any further 
action that the Prosecutor may wish to take in the future in relation to any 
person”.1304  
The Pre-Trial Judge, who also emphasised that he would only “address the 
matter of provisional detention at the current stage of the investigation”,1305 but 
nevertheless also noted “the context in which the Submission is made, that is to say 
the detention of these persons in Lebanon since 30 August 2005”,1306 agreed with 
the Prosecutor’s Application and thus released the generals. However, as was also 
mentioned by the Prosecutor, this was “without prejudice to any possible future 


















                                                          
1300 STL, Pre-Trial Judge, ‘Submission of the Prosecutor to the Pre-Trial Judge Under Rule 17 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (Confidential), Case No. CH/PTJ/2009/004, 27 April 2009, para. 5. 
1301 See ibid., para. 15. 
1302 Ibid., para. 29. 
1303 See ibid., para. 31. 
1304 Ibid., para. 33. 
1305 STL, Pre-Trial Judge, ‘Order Regarding the Detention of Persons Detained in Lebanon in 
Connection with the Case of the Attack Against Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and Others’, Case No. 
CH/PTJ/2009/06, 29 April 2009, para. 23. 
1306 Ibid., para. 37. 








As a result, it may very well be that in the future, if one of the four generals is re-
arrested at the request of the STL, that he, like Duch in the context of the ECCC, 
will complain about and ask for remedies with respect to his pre-trial detention in 
Lebanon, which may very well be seen as falling within the context of the STL case, 
even if the STL had only detained the generals under its legal authority as from 10 
April 2009.1308  
                                                          
1308 See also the following words from the statement of Mr Bellemare (then Commissioner of the 
UNIIIC and later Prosecutor of the STL), during the presentation of the UNIIIC’s eleventh report to the 
UNSC: “I cannot conclude my presentation without referring to the situation of the detainees in the 
Hariri case. This is an issue that is of interest to many, and rightly so. I can assure the Council that this is 
an issue that is also important to me. As I mentioned in my report, the Commission has continued to 
share with the Lebanese authorities all the information required to allow them to make a decision on the 
detainees. Moreover, the detention has been discussed with the Lebanese judicial authorities, with whom 
I have shared my views. Again, I can only reiterate, as the Minister of Justice of Lebanon forcefully did 
during a recent television interview, that the Commission gives information to the Lebanese judicial 
authorities, but that the power of the judicial authorities is absolute on these matters. If transferred to 
The Hague, the detainees will then be in a position to seek new remedies before the Tribunal. 
Meanwhile, as Minister Najjar said, no one gives orders to the Lebanese judiciary [emphasis added, 
ChP].” (UNSC, Sixty-third year, 6047th meeting, Wednesday, 17 December 2008, 10 a.m., New York, 
UN Doc. S/PV.6047), p. 4.) See also C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, 
Working Paper No. 24 – April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), p. 53, n. 206. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
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It is, of course, not an easy task to distil principles from so much case law, 
especially since many decisions did not excel in their clarity – to say the least. 
However, a few elements from these cases are definitely worth of attention and 
hence deserve to be mentioned here. The next section will address the principles 
distilled from the inter-State context discussed in Chapter V and the third section of 
this chapter will deal with the principles from the context of the international(ised) 
criminal tribunals, which was examined in Chapter VI of this book.  
 
2 PRINCIPLES DISTILLED FROM THE CASES BETWEEN STATES 
 
Before presenting the principles from this context, it should be reiterated (see also 
Chapter IV) that, due to the huge amount of available male captus case law in this 
context, the overview, even though it was rather extensive, consisted of ‘merely’ a 
selection of the most interesting cases. Hence, the principles must be accepted with 
caution for it is possible that if the overview consisted of even more cases, some 
principles might have been formulated a little differently. However, notwithstanding 
this caveat, it seems that the following conclusions, the accuracy of which has also 
been tested with help of views from literature, have a deal of support in the practice 
of courts in the inter-State context and therefore can be used for the purposes of this 
book. As will be shown in the following pages, the focus of this section is on the 
more recent cases. Although the older cases will also be used to show how the law 
has developed, the most interesting thing is, of course, to find out what the current 
status of the law is (acknowledging, of course, that some principles which are valid 
today may have deep roots in old cases).  
Most judges in the older male captus cases continued exercising jurisdiction, 
stating that they could not1 or did not want to (because it would make no difference 
anyway)2 look at the way a person was brought into the jurisdiction of the State of 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Scott. 








the now prosecuting court,3 even if irregularities might have been committed (by 
authorities from that State)4 in the pre-trial phase abroad (male captus bene 
detentus).5 As such, they adhered to the non-inquiry rule and a restricted notion of a 
fair trial, excluding that phase which had in fact ensured that the person was brought 
to the courtroom in the first place. The Jolis case was a clear exception to these male 
captus bene detentus cases, but it must also be remembered that in that case, there 
was an unambiguous protest (and a request for the return of Jolis) from the injured 
State (Belgium) against the illegal arrest executed by French authorities on Belgium 
territory. Such a protest was lacking in the above-mentioned male captus bene 
detentus cases, because there was no clear violation of State sovereignty (for 
example, because the male captus was allegedly committed by authorities from the 
State of residence,6 because the authorities of both States worked together in the 
arrest,7 because the State of residence did not have an effective government at the 
time of the male captus8 or because the person making the arrest could be seen as a 
private individual rather than a State agent)9 or, even if there was, the injured State 
did not protest.10 One can only guess what these courts would have decided if there 
had been a clear violation of State sovereignty followed by a protest and request for 
the return of the suspect, although the fact that most judges by that time adhered to 
the non-inquiry rule could mean that they would probably have stated that 
international matters were to be resolved by the Executives of the two States 
involved and not by the judge, who must only ensure that crimes are prosecuted.11 
                                                          
3 Some courts used both arguments, see, for example, Sinclair and Elliott.   
4 See, for example, Scott. 
5 It must be noted, however, that the male captus bene detentus maxim could not be seen as rule of 
customary international law. This is because customary international law demands that a State acts in a 
certain way (State practice), but also acts as such because that State believes it has a legal obligation 
under international law to do so (opinio iuris). However, the male captus bene detentus courts did not 
continue to exercise jurisdiction, notwithstanding the occurrence of a male captus, because they were of 
the opinion that international law dictated that solution. See Borelli 2004, p. 354: “[G]iven the absence 
of references by domestic courts to any international law norm providing for the application of the male 
captus doctrine and the consequent lack of opinio iuris, it would have been improper to qualify the 
principle as an international customary norm. Nevertheless, given the consistency of national case law 
on the matter, one could arguably have framed it as a “general principle of law recognized by civilised 
nations” [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See also ibid., n. 92: “Domestic courts have never claimed 
that the application of the male captus doctrine was required by international law. The doctrine was 
almost invariably applied on the basis of domestic law norms, in particular those regulating the 
relationship between the judiciary and the executive.” See also the remainder of this chapter with respect 
to male captus male detentus and customary international law. 
6 See, for example, Sinclair. 
7 See, for example, Elliott. 
8 See, for example, Ker. 
9 See, for example, Ker. 
10 See, for example, Scott. 
11 Cf. the Argoud case (where it was unclear whether there was such a formal protest and request for the 
return of Argoud but where the Court appeared to state that even if the injured State had formally 
protested the male captus and had requested the return of Argoud, this would have been of no concern to 
the Judiciary). For the, in the main text, above-mentioned traditional rationales of the male captus bene 
detentus rule, see also Michell 1996, p. 392 (see also ns. 6, 8 and 14 of Chapter V): “Traditionally, the 








Likewise, one can only surmise what the Court in Jolis would have decided had 
there not been a protest from Belgium; it may very well be that if Belgium had not 
complained about the matter, the case of Jolis would have continued as normal, 
especially since sovereignty violations by that time could only be brought forward 
by the injured State and not by the individual, whose role in the international plane 
was still insignificant.12 
With the arrival of human rights treaties such as the ICCPR and the rising status 
of the individual in the international context, judges appeared to pay more attention 
to concepts such as ‘fair trial’ and were more willing to look at the pre-trial phase 
abroad, independently of the question of whether or not there had been a protest 
from the injured State. This is arguably a good development if one does not want 
individuals to remain, in the words of Eichmann’s counsel, toys of States.  
Because of this development, one might argue that the era of male captus bene 
detentus is over and that male captus male detentus or ex iniuria ius non oritur is 
now the new preferred guideline for judges. However, looking at the alleged pre-
trial irregularities is not the same as issuing male captus male detentus decisions.  
Even though the old(-fashioned) version of the male captus bene detentus rule 
(in that judges cannot or will not look at how the suspect came into the jurisdiction 
of the State of the now prosecuting court) indeed seems to have been (rightly) 
abandoned,13 many judges still issue decisions which could be qualified as male 
captus bene detentus decisions; not because they state that they cannot or will not 
look at alleged pre-trial irregularities abroad (and hence that they are going to 
exercise jurisdiction, regardless of the circumstances in which the suspect came into 
the jurisdiction of the State of the now prosecuting court), but because they are of 
the opinion that, having investigated the pre-trial phase abroad, the alleged male 
captus in question is not serious enough to divest jurisdiction: (a not so serious) 
male captus bene detentus. 
Much will depend here on the exact circumstances and the question of how those 
circumstances are to be weighed in the balancing exercise which judges clearly 
prefer.14  
                                                                                                                                              
domestic due process guarantees. According to this view, a criminal defendant is entitled only to a fair 
trial, and forcible abduction does not affect the fairness of the trial itself. Second, there is a strong public 
interest in the prosecution of crime. The rule ensures that alleged offenders are brought to trial. Finally, 
the judiciary traditionally has held the view that courts are not the appropriate forum to adjudicate 
alleged violations of public international law by the executive. Instead, courts have adopted the position 
that any difficulties arising from an irregular arrest are best resolved diplomatically.” 
12 See, for example, Eichmann and Argoud. 
13 See, however, Vervuren, where the Court held that Sinclair was technically speaking still good law 
and Alvarez-Machain, where the judges followed Ker. Nevertheless, it must also be noted that both 
cases received sharp criticism. Note finally that in two other more recent (French) cases, Ramirez 
Sánchez, and, to a lesser extent, Barbie, the judges appeared to be especially interested in the fairness of 
the proceedings in court.  
14 The aftermath of Ebrahim has clearly shown that judges prefer the discretionary approach and not the 
automatic one as used in this South African case. This also means that the male captus bene detentus 
principle is still the starting point from which judges depart; in principle, they have jurisdiction. It only 








In some instances, the male captus is deemed to be so serious that judges are of 
the opinion that refusing jurisdiction is the only way to protect such values as 
respect for another State’s sovereignty,15 due process of law/human rights of the 
suspect16 and the rule of law/the integrity of the (executive/judicial) proceedings.17 
Much used in that respect is the abuse of process doctrine, which stems from the 
common law context but whose rationale can arguably also be found in the 
reasonings of judges from other legal contexts:18 courts in principle have jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                                              
specific case. Cf. also Rayfuse 1993, p. 893: “Courts in other jurisdictions, while accepting and restating 
the general proposition that the court has jurisdiction, have occasionally exercised their discretion in 
favour of a defendant [emphasis added, ChP]”. 
15 See, for example, one of the possibilities to refuse jurisdiction under the Toscanino exception (an 
abduction violating another State’s sovereignty and followed by a protest and request for the return of 
the suspect from the injured State), a possibility which was followed in Al-Moayad (and confirmed by 
the ECtHR). See also Ebrahim (where there was not even a protest from the injured State). A general 
male captus male detentus remark regarding respect for State sovereignty (where no protest from the 
injured State was mentioned as a requirement either) can also be found in the Beahan case, but in that 
case, the concrete end result could nevertheless be qualified as male captus bene detentus, for it was not 
established that the prosecuting State had committed an abduction violating another State’s sovereignty 
(the male captus necessary to lead to a male detentus result). 
16 See, for example, the other possibility to refuse jurisdiction under the Toscanino exception (see also 
the previous footnote), namely an abduction accompanied by serious mistreatment/serious human rights 
violations. This possibility was also followed in Al-Moayad (and confirmed by the ECtHR). See also 
Ebrahim for human rights considerations. (Note that it was explained in Chapter III of this book that the 
remedies which can be connected to violations of the relevant human rights (for example the release if 
the judge is of the opinion that a person’s arrest/detention is unlawful) as such cannot be equated with 
male detentus outcomes (refusal of jurisdiction/dismissal of the indictment). Nevertheless, it is clear that 
serious human rights violations in the male captus may lead to a male detentus result. Thus, it can be 
argued that the rise of human rights law has certainly played a role in the rise of the male captus male 
detentus rule, even though human rights law as such does not contain male detentus remedies.) 
17 See, for example, Hartley, Levinge, Ebrahim, Beahan and Bennett. Cf. for these values also more 
generally Sloan 2003 B, pp. 546-547: “By one approach, which may be summarized by the maxim male 
captus, male detentus, the national court would refuse jurisdiction where the circumstances of the 
accused’s capture were sufficiently irregular. Among the reasons given by these national courts for 
refusing jurisdiction in such circumstances have been the following: (i) the rule of law; (ii) the integrity 
of the executive branch (it must not be rewarded for illegal behaviour); (iii) the integrity of the judicial 
branch; (iv) the fairness of the legal process; and (v) respect for state sovereignty [original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].” 
18 See, for example, the 1985 Stocké case (see ns. 512-513 and 516-517 and accompanying text of 
Chapter V) and the decision the German Federal Constitutional Court issued one year later: BVerfG (3. 
Kammer des Zweiten Senats), Beschl. v. 3.6 1986 – 2 BvR 837/85. NJW 1986, Heft 48, pp. 3021-3022 
(see ns. 522-523 and 526 and accompanying text of Chapter V). Note that also in the Ebrahim case, 
words resembling the abuse of process doctrine were used: “The individual must be protected against 
illegal detention and abduction, the bounds of jurisdiction must not be exceeded, sovereignty must be 
respected, the legal process must be fair to those affected and abuse of law must be avoided in order to 
protect and promote the integrity of the administration of justice [emphasis added, ChP].” (Supreme 
Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 International Legal 
Materials (1992), p. 896.) Cf. also Nsereko 2008, p. 61: “Invoking the abuse of process doctrine, the 
South African court nullified the proceedings.” Note, however, that in that case, the Court did not state 
that judges had a discretion to consider whether the violations of these values had to lead to a refusal of 
jurisdiction. It simply stated that these violations entailed that the judges had no jurisdiction to try the 
case. See finally also Beahan (see n. 713 of Chapter V) and the reasoning of Acting Justice of Appeal 








(bene detentus) but will use their discretion not to exercise that jurisdiction (male 
detentus) if the male captus is so serious that to continue exercising jurisdiction 
would constitute an abuse of the court’s process.19  
Applying these general remarks to the different basic male captus situations 
presented in Chapter III of this book (disguised extradition, luring and abduction),20 
and starting with the abduction, one could argue that it appears that the more recent 
cases show that courts would refuse jurisdiction in the case of an abduction 
                                                          
19 Cf. also Schabas 2000, p. 567, writing on the abuse of process doctrine in the context of the ICTR: 
“[T]the remedy is well recognized in national legal systems and can reasonably be deemed to be an 
inherent power.” See also n. 878 of Chapter VI. 
20 Whose definitions arguably imply that they are executed intentionally. After all, one cannot, for 
example, ‘accidentally’ kidnap a person. These violations are seemingly the result of predetermined 
plans to commit the male captus. However, other male captus situations might occur which stem from 
negligence rather than from intent. This is an important difference. Not only with respect to the nature of 
the violation but also with respect to its consequences. For instance, irregularities in the pre-trial phase 
which have not been executed intentionally will probably lead to less serious consequences. See, for 
example, House of Lords, Lord Griffiths, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 
24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 152 (“[I]f a serious question arises as to the deliberate 
abuse of extradition procedures a magistrate should allow an adjournment so that an application can be 
made to the Divisional Court, which I regard as the proper forum in which such a decision should be 
taken [emphasis added, ChP]”), Court of Appeal, R v. Hartley, 5 August 1977, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 216 
(International Law Reports, Vol. 77 (1988), p. 335) (“There are explicit statutory directions that 
surround the extradition procedure. (…) And in our opinion there can be no possible question here of the 
Court turning a blind eye to action of the New Zealand police which has deliberately ignored those 
imperative requirements of the statute [emphasis added, ChP]”) and the Swiss case from 2007, where 
the Court was of the opinion that the Swiss could not be accused of mala fide conduct, but that that 
would be different if they, with the intent to circumvent an extradition procedure, had asked the 
Dominican officials to deport the suspect to Switzerland instead (see n. 477 and accompanying text of 
Chapter V). See also the Toscanino case where the judges held that “we view due process as now 
requiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it has been acquired 
as the result of the Government’s deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused’s 
constitutional rights [emphasis added, ChP].” (US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, United States v. 
Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 73-2732 (500 F 2d 267), p. 275.) Interesting in this ‘intent’ 
discussion are also the cases of Mackeson and Healy but the Court in Driver was of the opinion that 
these cases had been decided per incuriam (see n. 274 of Chapter V). See also Swart 2001, p. 206: 
“Dismissal of criminal cases as a result of official misconduct is a remedy accepted by the courts of 
many States. There is, of course, considerable variation in the way national legal systems make use of 
that remedy. Among other things, the choice will depend on the availability of other effective remedies 
for correcting the wrongs done to the accused. Usually, a relevant consideration is also whether 
unlawful conduct on the part of law officers shows an intent to prejudice the rights of the accused or 
instead constituted negligence [emphasis added, ChP].” For another view, see Michell 1996, pp. 495-
496: “The mere fact that a fugitive has been returned to the jurisdiction through a deportation which is 
unlawful under foreign law cannot in itself amount to an abuse of process, even when extradition might 
have been available. Rather, there must be evidence of action taken by domestic authorities to 
circumvent formal extradition procedures, and the fugitive cannot rely upon a violation of foreign law 
by foreign authorities alone. There must be evidence of unlawfulness on the part of the domestic 
executive, usually evidence that the violation of foreign law came at the instigation of the domestic 
authorities. Proof of actual intention on the part of the domestic authorities to circumvent extradition 
[proceedings] may not be required, however. It may be sufficient to demonstrate that the domestic 
authorities were ambivalent or unconcerned as to whether extradition proceedings have been 









(performed by the prosecuting State’s own agents on another State’s territory 
without the latter’s consent) which 1) was accompanied by serious human rights 
violations/serious mistreatment21 or 2) was followed by a protest and request for the 
return of the suspect from the injured State.22  
                                                          
21 See the aftermath of Toscanino, such as Lujan. Cf. also the 1986 decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (BVerfG (3. Kammer des Zweiten Senats), Beschl. v. 3.6 1986 – 2 BvR 837/85. 
NJW 1986, Heft 48, pp. 3021-3022), which involved an abduction without a protest and request for the 
return of the abducted suspect from the injured State. Here, the Court stated that jurisdiction could also 
be refused under domestic law if the situation could be qualified as an “extremely exceptional case”. 
The meaning of this rather general concept is not clear, but one could perhaps think here of Toscanino-
like circumstances, see also Wilske 2000, p. 334, n. 413 (commenting on this concept): “[D]as Gericht 
hatte hier möglicherweise die schweren Folterungen im Toscanino-Fall im Auge.” See also Grams 1994, 
pp. 70-71. See also more generally American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, 1987, para. 433 (‘External Measures In Aid Of Enforcement Of 
Criminal Law: Law Of The United States’, para. 2: “A person apprehended in a foreign state, whether 
by foreign or by United States officials, and delivered to the United States, may be prosecuted in the 
United States unless his apprehension or delivery was carried out in such reprehensible manner as to 
shock the conscience of civilized society.”  
22 See the aftermath of Toscanino, such as Verdugo. See also the German Stocké case: “Ein Blick auf die 
Staatenpraxis zeigt, daß Gerichte es nur dann allgemein ablehnen, ein Strafverfahren gegen einen 
völkerrechtswidrig Entführten zu betreiben, wenn der durch die Entführung verletzte Staat gegen die 
Unrechtshandlung protestiert und die Rückgabe des Entführten gefordert hat”. (BVerfG (1. Kammer des 
Zweiten Senats), Beschl. v. 17.7 1985 – 2 BvR 1190/84. NJW 1986, Heft 22, p. 1428.) See also more 
generally American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, 1987, para. 432 (‘Measures in Aid of Enforcement of Criminal Law’), Comment c 
(‘Consequences of violation of territorial limits of law enforcement’): “If a state’s law enforcement 
officials exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the latter’s consent, that state is 
entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to receive reparation from the offending state. If the 
unauthorized action includes abduction of a person, the state from which the person was abducted may 
demand return of the person, and international law requires that he be returned.” Perhaps, one could 
even refer here to the old (and already briefly mentioned, see n. 175 of Chapter III) 1935 Harvard 
Research in International Law’s Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, see the 
American Journal of International Law Supplement, Vol. 29 (1935), pp. 435-651. Art. 16 of this 
Convention contains the following male captus male detentus provision: “In exercising jurisdiction 
under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish any person who has been brought within its 
territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law or 
international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been 
violated by such measures.” This provision is even broader than the test requiring an abduction followed 
by a protest and request for the return of the suspect by the injured State (for it more generally demands 
a violation of international law and a lack of consent from the injured State) but it is, of course, clear 
that an abduction followed by a protest and request for the return of the suspect from the injured State 
would be covered by these more general words. This Draft Convention is obviously not legally binding 
but Deen-Racsmány is nevertheless of the opinion that it “carries great weight, as the drafters sought on 
the basis of extensive research to codify international custom as it stood at that time.” (Deen-Racsmány 
2001, p. 610.) See also Slater 2004, p. 155, n. 22: “The Harvard Research Project analyzed national 
criminal statutes, criminal procedure, and the writings of international scholars and jurists, to attempt to 
resolve the problem of gaps in overlapping jurisdiction. Based upon their inquiry into international 
criminal jurisdiction, the researchers produced the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to 
Crime.” Nevertheless, it must also be remarked that this specific provision is not devoid of lex ferenda 
either, see the commentary to this article (see the American Journal of International Law Supplement, 
Vol. 29 (1935), pp. 623-632), at, for example, pp. 623-624: “The principle thus formulated is in part a 
restatement of existing practice and in part a reconciliation of conflict between contemporary doctrines. 








In the Alvarez-Machain case, the second possibility was clearly quashed, but the 
immense (international) criticism directed against this decision shows that many 
States are seemingly of the opinion that jurisdiction must in fact be refused in the 
case of an abduction followed by a protest and request for the return of the suspect 
by the injured State. Because the US Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain, in the 
context of the abduction, used the word “shocking”, it has been suggested that 
Alvarez-Machain also brought about the end of the Toscanino mistreatment 
exception. However, it appears23 that this is not the case. Hence, in the US, courts 
would still refuse jurisdiction in the case of an abduction accompanied by serious 
mistreatment. Nevertheless, to the extent that States are of the opinion that Alvarez-
Machain has quashed both male detentus situations, one can argue that the criticism 
towards this decision in general is proof of the idea that many States are of the 
opinion that in those two situations (an abduction followed by a protest and request 
for the return of the suspect and an abduction accompanied by serious mistreatment) 
jurisdiction must be refused. 
However, is “many States” enough to argue that State practice more generally 
indicates that in those two circumstances, jurisdiction must be refused? This is not 
entirely clear. First of all, one has, of course, to cope here with the situation in the 
US, which does not recognise the second male detentus situation mentioned above. 
Moreover, with respect to the same male detentus situation, one should mention the 
situation in France: even though the Argoud case – in which the Supreme Court 
seemingly stated that even in the case of a protest and request for the return of the 
suspect, the Court will not refuse jurisdiction because international matters have to 
be solved by the Executives of the two States involved – cannot be seen as a recent 
case, it still appears to represent the current French position on this issue.24 Finally 
                                                                                                                                              
competence is indicated by the most persuasive considerations of policy. (…) It is not everywhere 
agreed that there may be no prosecution or punishment in reliance upon custody thus obtained “without 
first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been violated by such measures.” 
Thus the present article assures an additional and highly desirable sanction for international law in the 
matter of recovery of fugitives from criminal justice. It removes much of the incentive to such irregular 
or illegal recoveries as have been the source of international friction in the past. (…) It provides an 
added incentive for recourse to regular methods in securing custody of fugitives. And if, peradventure, 
the custody of a fugitive has been obtained by unlawful methods, the present article indicates an 
appropriate procedure for correcting what has been done and removing the bar to prosecution and 
punishment. The desirability of such a provision in a convention which embodies a comprehensive 
statement of the broad penal competence supported by contemporary practice would seem to require no 
emphasis. While it is frankly conceded that the present article is in part of the nature of legislation, it is 
not to be understood that the principle stated is without support in national jurisprudence or international 
practice.” 
23 See n. 206 and accompanying text of Chapter V. 
24 Cf. also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion to Determine Issues As 
Agreed Between the Parties And the Trial Chamber As Being Fundamental to the Resolution of the 
Accused’s Status Before the Tribunal in Respect of the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Under Rule 72 and 
Generally, the Nature of the Relationship Between the OTP and SFOR and the Consequences of Any 
Illegal Conduct Material to the Accused, his Arrest and Subsequent Detention’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 
29 October 2001, para. 14, where Nikolić’s Defence writes about the male captus bene detentus maxim, 
referring to the Argoud case: “[I]n some civil law jurisdictions, the maxim may still remain good law 








(and again with respect to the second male detentus situation), the (more recent) 
Israeli Vanunu case should be mentioned. Although it is not clear that Italy’s protest 
against the abduction was followed by a request for the return of Vanunu, one can 
imagine that even if such a request had been made, Israel would probably not have 
refused jurisdiction in this case.25  
The question now is whether these exceptions effectively negate the 
establishment of a certain norm in State practice. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ, 
writing on customary international law, clarified: 
 
In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that 
the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that 
instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been 
treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.26   
 
Interestingly, all the three cases mentioned above have received (much) criticism, 
which may constitute evidence for the idea that State practice more generally 
indicates that the two situations mentioned above should lead to a male detentus 
result.27  
                                                                                                                                              
Cour de Cassation in Re Argoud decided that French courts would only be deprived of jurisdiction if the 
State from which the accused was taken objected and sought his return. This position was reiterated in 
Barbie [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” Nevertheless, besides the fact that the judges in Argoud 
seemingly went further than that (see the main text), no such confirmation in Barbie has been found. 
25 The Scottish case Vervuren has not been mentioned here for it seems that Scottish courts, even if 
Sinclair is, strictly speaking, still the case to follow (see n. 13), may very well refuse jurisdiction in the 
more specific male captus situations mentioned above, where it can certainly be said that the 
prosecuting authorities do not come to court with clean hands. This could be derived from the fact that 
the Prosecution (and the Defence) in that case agreed that “if the United Kingdom authorities were 
guilty of some form of collusion, and did not come to court with clean hands, the courts were entitled to 
respond by, for example, sustaining a plea in bar of trial” and that Lady Paton noted this agreement 
without criticising it, see n. 738 and accompanying text of Chapter V. 
26 ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) (Merits), ‘Judgment’, 27 June 1986, para. 186. See also Loan 2005, p. 280. 
27 With respect to the Alvarez-Machain case, see, for example, Gluck 1994, pp. 630-631: “This 
consistent pattern of return notwithstanding, there have been incidents when the asylum state’s demand 
for repatriation was not honored even though the facts clearly showed that the abducting state had 
violated international law. The most blatant example of this was the Alvarez-Machain case (…). Such 
examples, however, do not indicate that there is no customary law requiring in cases of international 
abduction. International custom does not require that state practice be unanimous in order to acquire the 
force of law; some exceptions are allowed provided they are regarded as breaches of the general rule. 
[And then, Gluck, refers to exactly the same quotation from the ICJ mentioned in the main text, ChP.] 
Certainly the outrage engendered by the abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain by the United States shows 
that the “no abduction” rule is well established and that the failure to return the individual by the United 
States was not accepted as a harbinger of an emerging rule permitting such action [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” See also Zaid 1997, p. 861: “The outrage expressed by the international community 
following the Supreme Court’s decisions demonstrates that the “no abduction without consent” concept 
is well-established and still in force and that the United States’ failure to repatriate Alvarez-Machain 
following Mexico’s repeated demands did not serve to create a revision or exception to the rule.” With 
respect to the Vanunu case, see Wilske 2000, p. 348: “Aufgrund sehr eigenwilliger Vorstellungen Israels 
zum Inhalt und zur Geltungskraft des Völkerrechts kann Israel aber nicht als Beispiel für eine 








Additional support for this can be found in the confirmation of these two 
Toscanino possibilities by the German Federal Constitutional Court in the (male 
captus bene deditus) case of Al-Moayad, with whose findings the ECtHR agreed. 
Reference can also be made to the conclusion of the 2000 book from Wilske, who 
extensively discussed the topic of cross-border State-sponsored abductions in the 
inter-State context. (It was also this conclusion to which the German Federal 
Constitutional Court referred in Al-Moayad.) Wilske, who did not limit himself to 
the practice of courts,28 concluded:  
 
Gerade diese Entscheidung [namely the Alvarez-Machain decision, ChP] ist der 
Schlüssel zu einer geänderten Staatenpraxis, die die male captus, bene detentus-Regel 
zumindest im Fall eines Staatenprotestes wie auch bei schweren 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen eindeutig ablehnt.29  
 
Thus, it may indeed be the case that State practice more generally indicates that 
courts will refuse jurisdiction in these two situations.30 However, and this is an 
important point which needs to be mentioned here (see also footnotes 575-576 and 
accompanying text of Chapter V), Wilske goes a step further when he asserts, not 
only that more recent State practice indicates that male detentus will follow in these 
two situations, but also customary31 international law more generally: “Ein 
Strafverfahrenshindernis aus Völkerrechts ist immer dann anzunehmen, wenn der 
verletzte Staat protestiert hat. Dies gilt aber auch, wenn die Entführung von 
schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen begleitet war [emphasis added, ChP].”32 
However, before one can draw that conclusion, it must be clear that the other 
requirement of customary international law – alongside (State) practice – is also 
                                                                                                                                              
(see also n. 409 of Chapter V): “Les vues qu’exprime cet arrêt semblent être contraires à la pratique 
française qui a toujours nié la validité des arrestations opérées en territoire étranger, même en l’absence 
de toute protestation émanant de l’Etat dont la compétence territoriale a été lésée [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” (Kiss 1965, p. 937.) 
28 It must be noted that the present study ‘merely’ focused on the practice of courts, although some other 
manifestations of State practice (see the reactions of governments in the context of the Alvarez-Machain 
case) have also been reviewed. 
29 Wilske 2000, p. 336. 
30 Cf. also the following conclusion of Oehmichen 2007, p. 237: “Während früher die meisten nationalen 
Gerichte der „male captus – bene detentus“ Doktrin folgten, erfuhr dieses Prinzip eine erste 
Einschränkung durch den Toscanino-Fall in der Weise, dass ein Strafverfolgungshindernis in Fällen, in 
denen die Entführung mit schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen einher ging, angenommen wurde. 
Teilweise wurde als Bedingung für ein Strafverfolgungshindernis gefordert, dass der verletzte Staat 
gegen die Entführung protestiert hatte.”  
31 Although Wilske uses the word “Völkerrecht” (international law) here, it is clear that he is especially 
interested in customary international law (although customary international law is, of course, also 
international law), see Wilske 2000, p. 338: “Ziel der hier dargestellten Staatenpraxis war, eine Antwort 
auf die Frage zu erhalten, ob Völkergewohnheitsrecht einem Strafverfahren gegen völkerrechtswidrig 
entführte Personen entgegensteht [emphasis added, ChP].” 
32 Ibid., p. 340. See also ibid., p. 349: “Nach Auswertung der Staatenpraxis ist ein 
Strafverfahrenshindernis aus Völkerrechts immer dann anuznehmen, wenn der verletzte Staat protestiert 









met: opinio iuris sive necessitatis. Thus, the acts of States, for example through the 
decisions of their courts, must confirm the above-mentioned two male detentus 
situations (which may very well be the case), but in addition to that, the States must 
have acted in that way because they are convinced that it is “required and permitted 
or necessary under international law”.33 Is that also the case here?  
It appears that this is indeed the case with respect to the male detentus situation 
of an abduction followed by a protest and request for the return of the abducted 
person by the injured State. In that situation, the State (if not the Executive, then the 
Judiciary) arguably returns the suspect to the injured State because it is of the 
opinion that international law has been violated (namely the rule that a State cannot 
exercise police powers on another State’s territory without that State’s consent) and 
that this breach must be repaired. Hence, even though a conventional rule does not 
exist in international law that a State must return the abducted suspect to the State 
which protests and requests the return of the suspect (although such a rule could 
perhaps be gathered (in the future) from the rather influential DARS rules on 
restitution, see Subsection 4.1 of Chapter III), States nevertheless appear to be of the 
opinion that they would return the abducted suspect in such cases34 and would do so 
with international law considerations at the back of their minds. Hence, this rule – 
that a State (if not the Executive, then the Judiciary) must return the abducted 
suspect if the injured State protests and requests the return of the suspect – indeed 
seems to have the status of a rule of customary international law. Thus, one could 
assert more generally that international law (namely customary international law) 
demands that in such a case, a State (if not the Executive, then the Judiciary) must 
return the suspect.35 That would also mean that, in this specific situation, there 
would actually be no discretion for judges,36 but an obligation to refuse jurisdiction. 
                                                          
33 See the discussion of the Al-Moayad case for this definition. Note that Oehmichen, referring to 
Wilske, writes more generally that there is a conviction that the rule in question is law 
(Rechtsüberzeugung): “Zumindest in den Fällen, in welchen die Verhaftung von schweren 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen begleitet wurde order der betroffene Staat protestiert hat, hat sich eine 
Rechtsüberzeugung zu Gunsten der Annahme eines Strafvervolgungshindernisses herausgebildet 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Oehmichen 2007, p. 246.) 
34 See also Loan 2005, pp. 282-283: “It is widely recognized that when an abduction breaches a state’s 
sovereignty and the protesting state demands the return of the individual then the first duty on the 
abducting state is to return the individual [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
35 See also Michell 1996, pp. 424-427: “The duty to return is an established rule of customary 
international law. This custom is demonstrated through state practice, specifically in cases involving: 
Canada and the United States; the United Kingdom and the United States; Mexico and the United States; 
Spain and the United States; Germany and Switzerland; France and Germany; Italy and Switzerland; 
and the United Kingdom and South Africa. In all of these incidents the fugitive was returned by the 
abducting state to the injured state upon protest and a request for his return. Cases where the abducting 
state made this determination, either by the executive or its domestic courts, support the validity of this 
doctrine. Until Alvarez-Machain, the U.S. Supreme Court had never denied this rule of customary 
international law. In fact, federal appellate courts had never refused to return a fugitive when there was a 
protest and request for the fugitive’s return. Moreover, the rule is well-grounded in opinio juris. Thus, 
the assertion that there is no rule of customary international law requiring the return of a fugitive is 
inaccurate. Only the broad formulation of the rule (i.e., without the stipulations that the injured state 
must protest and request the fugitive’s return) is inaccurate. Where there is a violation of territorial 








With respect to the male detentus situation of an abduction accompanied by 
serious mistreatment; it is less clear that courts refuse jurisdiction in such cases 
because they believe international law dictates that they do so.  
On the one hand, it is true that international law considerations may also play a 
role here. One could think here of the situation that a judge is of the opinion that 
such mistreatment brings about violations of international human rights provisions. 
Even though these human rights provisions do not command a judge to refuse 
jurisdiction in the case of violations, such violations may nevertheless convince the 
judge that the male captus is so serious that he must refuse jurisdiction (see also the 
discussion on this topic in Chapter III).37  
However, on the other hand, even though international law considerations may 
play a role here, these considerations are arguably weaker than in the case of an 
abduction followed by a protest and request for the return of the suspect, in which 
case the judge arguably feels that the international system is disrupted by the 
violation and request for the return of the abducted suspect and that he must correct 
this international imbalance (by refusing jurisdiction and ordering the return of the 
suspect) if the Executive has not already done so. A judge confronted by an 
abduction accompanied by serious mistreatment appears to refuse jurisdiction 
mainly in the framework of domestic legal considerations.38  
                                                                                                                                              
customary international law requires that the fugitive be returned to the state from which he was 
abducted [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See also Gluck 1994, p. 630 (see also p. 654): “[A]n 
international custom has developed in cases of state-sponsored international abduction: when an asylum 
state protests an abduction and demands the return of an individual taken from its territory, the 
abducting state is under an international legal duty to return the individual to the asylum state.” See 
finally also American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States, 1987, para. 432 (‘Measures in Aid of Enforcement of Criminal Law’), Comment c 
(‘Consequences of violation of territorial limits of law enforcement’): “If a state’s law enforcement 
officials exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the latter’s consent, that state is 
entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to receive reparation from the offending state. If the 
unauthorized action includes abduction of a person, the state from which the person was abducted may 
demand return of the person, and international law requires that he be returned.” 
36 Cf. n. 14. 
37 A judge could argue that a violation of the customary international law prohibition of torture demands 
that a trial cannot continue if it has been preceded by torture. See also Wilske 2000, p. 271: “Der Schutz 
vor Folter ist Inhalt des Völkergewohnheitsrechts. Die Unvereinbarkeit von Folter mit einem 
ordnungsgemäßen Strafverfahren kann daher (…) mit völkerrechtlichen Verpflichtungen begründet 
werden [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Cf. also Swart 2001, p. 206 (not with respect to mistreatment 
but with respect to the human right to liberty and security): “[B]oth Article 9 of the ICCPR and Article 5 
ECHR make it imperative that a person be released if his detention was unlawful. I take it for granted 
that, in the case of more serious violations of these Articles, the nature of this particular remedy rules 
out any possibility of re-arresting the suspect or the accused.” If serious violations of the right to liberty 
and security would already lead to the ending of the case (which is arguably a good thing), one can 
assume that a judge will also refuse jurisdiction if he is confronted by serious violations of human rights 
provisions which deal with mistreatment/torture. 
38 See, for example, the Russell case: “While we may some day be presented with a situation in which 
the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar 
the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf. Rochin v. California (…), 
the instant case is distinctly not of that breed [emphasis added, ChP].” (US Supreme Court, United 








In that respect, one can wonder whether Wilske’s more broadly formulated 
conclusion, that (customary) international law in any event demands that in these 
two situations, jurisdiction must be refused,39 is entirely correct. Nevertheless, it 
appears that his first conclusion, that State practice shows that in such cases, 
jurisdiction must be refused (a conclusion which was confirmed by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court (and the ECtHR) in Al-Moayad),40 is accurate. This 
ultimately also means that, apart from the male captus situation whereby a State 
protests an abduction and requests the return of the abducted suspect, there is no 
international law rule demanding that a State (if not the Executive then the 
Judiciary) refuse jurisdiction.41  
It should be emphasised that State practice shows that in the above-mentioned 
two situations, courts will refuse jurisdiction; in those two cases, male captus bene 
detentus is rejected at any rate. However, that does not mean that courts may not 
utilise a lower male captus male detentus threshold in the case of abductions. There 
have also been male captus cases where courts have suggested a test which does not 
require a protest from the injured State or serious mistreatment. Examples in that 
respect are Levinge,42 Bennett,43 Ebrahim44 and Beahan.45   
                                                                                                                                              
Constitutional Court’s examination in its 1986 case (BVerfG (3. Kammer des Zweiten Senats), Beschl. 
v. 3.6 1986 – 2 BvR 837/85. NJW 1986, Heft 48, pp. 3021-3022) whether domestic considerations 
(namely those related to the rule of law and to Article 1, paragraph 1 of the German Grundgesetz) 
require that one can speak of an “extremely exceptional case” which demands the refusal of jurisdiction 
and about which concept Wilske states that “das Gericht hatte hier möglicherweise die schweren 
Folterungen im Toscanino-Fall im Auge.” (Wilske 2000, p. 334, n. 413.) See also Grams 1994, pp. 70-
71. 
39 See Wilske 2000, pp. 340 and 349. 
40 See ibid., p. 336. 
41 See also Loan 2005, p. 284: “While it may be desirable for domestic courts to refuse to endorse a 
state’s violation of its human rights obligations, there is no international obligation on domestic courts to 
decline jurisdiction over an abductee. The prevalence of the rule “male captus bene detentus” 
throughout the world [As Chapter V has shown, these latter words are probably too sweeping. Much 
will depend on the exact meaning of the words male captus bene detentus. However, it is clear that there 
are still many modern cases which can be summarised by the words male captus bene detentus. In that 
sense, Loan is right that, except for the situation in which the injured State protests and requests the 
return of the abducted suspect (see also n. 34), there is no rule of international law demanding courts to 
issue a male captus male detentus decision, ChP.], while controversial, is clear evidence of the non-
existence of any norm requiring states to decline the prosecution of abductees.” 
42 See, for example, the following general reasoning in that case (not focusing now on the specifics of 
the case, which did not involve a traditional kidnapping): “Where a person, however unlawfully, is 
brought into the jurisdiction and is before a court in this State, that court has undoubted jurisdiction to 
deal with him or her. But it also has a discretion not to do so, where to exercise its discretion would 
involve an abuse of the court’s process. Such an abuse may arise by reason of delay on the part of 
prosecuting authorities. But delay is only one variety of unfair or wrongful conduct on the part of those 
authorities. Other such conduct may exist, including wrongful and even unlawful involvement in 
bypassing the regular machinery for extradition and participating in unauthorised and unlawful removal 
of criminal suspects from one jurisdiction to another.” (Levinge v Director of Custodial Services, 
Department of Corrective Services, 23 July 1987, 89 FLR 142.) 
43 See, for example, the following general reasonings in that case (not focusing now on the specifics of 
the case, which did not involve a traditional kidnapping): “If British officialdom at any level has 








Nevertheless, it appears that these lower thresholds, even if they can be 
applauded,46 and even if these cases may be seen as evidence of a certain trend in 
                                                                                                                                              
law, the comity of nations and the rule of law generally if our courts allow themselves to be used by the 
executive to try an offence which the courts would not be dealing with if the rule of law had prevailed. It 
may be said that a guilty accused finding himself in the circumstances predicated is not deserving of 
much sympathy, but the principle involved goes beyond the scope of such a pragmatic observation and 
even beyond the rights of those victims who are or may be innocent. It affects the proper administration 
of justice according to the rule of law and with respect to international law.” (House of Lords, Lord 
Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England 
Law Reports 163.) See also House of Lords, Lord Griffiths, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ 
Court and another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 151: “In my view your Lordships 
should now declare that where process of law is available to return an accused to this country through 
extradition procedures our courts will refuse to try him if he has been forcibly brought within our 
jurisdiction in disregard of those procedures by a process to which our own police, prosecuting or other 
executive authorities have been a knowing party.” 
44 See Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), p. 896: “When the state is a party to a dispute, as for example in 
criminal cases, it must come to court with “clean hands”. When the state itself is involved in an 
abduction across international borders, as in the present case, its hands are not clean.” 
45 See, for example, the following general reasoning in that case (not focusing now on the specifics of 
the case, which did not involve a traditional kidnapping): “In my opinion it is essential that in order to 
promote confidence in and respect for the administration of justice and preserve the judicial process 
from contamination, a court should decline to compel an accused person to undergo a trial in 
circumstances where his appearance before it has been facilitated by an act of abduction undertaken by 
the prosecuting state. There is an inherent objection to such a course both on grounds of public policy 
pertaining to international ethical norms and because it imperils and corrodes the peaceful co-existence 
and mutual respect of sovereign nations. For abduction is illegal under international law, provided the 
abductor was not acting on his own initiative and without the authority or connivance of his 
government. A contrary view would amount to a declaration that the end justifies the means, thereby 
encouraging states to become law-breakers in order to secure the conviction of a private individual.” 
(Supreme Court, Beahan v. State, 4 September 1991, International Law Reports, Vol. 103 (1996), p. 
214.) 
46 After all, why should a suspect have to prove, for example, that the injured State protested the 
abduction if it has been established that he was abducted by agents from the now prosecuting State? 
(See also Pulkowski 2001, p. 1037: “[T]he concept of a human rights dimension that is independent of 
the state’s territorial rights casts doubt on the sustainability of the common view that a court of the 
abducting state must only relinquish its jurisdiction if the territorial state protests subsequently. How 
would the lack of subsequent protest by the territorial state do away with the human rights violation, 
after the individual has been captured by authorities which were undisputedly unlawful at the time of the 
capture?”. See further Frowein 1994, p. 185: “The return of the person cannot be made dependent upon 
the formal claim of the state from where the abduction took place. If individual rights in that context 
mean anything, the abducting state must be seen to be under an obligation to return the person 
independently of any request. A ‘male captus male detentus’ rule should be applied as a consequence of 
the violation of human rights.” See also Henkin 1990, pp. 310-311, who is of the opinion that the 
principle male captus bene detentus is “antedating the age of human rights”. See further Cazala 2007, p. 
838: “Le statut de cet adage est discutable au regard, ou au sein, du droit international contemporain, 
notamment dans sa dimension protectrice des droits de l’homme.” See finally Rayfuse 1993, p. 882: “It 
will be argued that State-sponsored abductions are a violation of the internationally recognised 
fundamental human rights to liberty and security of the person and freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
detention and that courts lack jurisdiction to try defendants who are brought before them in violation of 
these rights.”) Likewise, why should a suspect have to prove that he was seriously mistreated during this 
abduction? Should the fact that authorities of a State have resorted to an abduction in circumvention of 








State practice,47 do not have the same degree of support in the rest of the world as 
the two Toscanino possibilities. Hence, it is difficult to maintain that in any case 
involving an abduction (even one without serious mistreatment or without a protest 
and request for the return of the suspect), State practice (let alone customary 
international law) indicates that a court will issue a male detentus decision.48 
                                                                                                                                              
the injured State and whether or not the suspect was seriously mistreated in the course of this male 
captus? See Mann 1989, p. 419 and Michell 1996, p. 403. See also Loan 2005, p. 284 (writing on the 
Ebrahim and Bennett cases): “Such decisions should be applauded as not only giving effect to an 
individual’s rights, but also acting as a deterrent to future violations of international law. Only by 
declining to exercise jurisdiction can domestic courts maintain the integrity of international human 
rights and encourage states to abide by their international legal obligations [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” See further Hamid 2004, p. 85: “It is a long established legal principle that an illegal act does not 
give rise to any right; ex injuria jus non oritur. Since the act of abduction itself is illegal and invalid 
under international law, the abducting State does not have a right to subject the abducted individual to 
its laws and proceedings following such illegal abduction.” See also Gilbert 1998, p. 362 (writing on 
abduction): “Its manifest illegality ought not to be approved, implicitly at least, by the judiciary 
accepting jurisdiction to try the fugitive.” See also the following recommendation from the International 
Law Association: “Courts should refuse to permit prosecutions of persons brought before them by 
government-conducted or government-inspired abductions. In appropriate cases they should decline to 
exercise jurisdiction and should order the return of the abductee to the state from which he was 
abducted, without prejudice to future lawful extradition proceedings.” (International Law Association 
1994, p. 165.) See finally Resolution No. 9 relevant to the topic ‘The Protection of Human Rights in 
International Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ (unanimously approved at the closing session of the XV 
Congress of the International Association of Penal Law in Rio de Janeiro, 4-10 September 1994): 
“Abducting a person from a foreign country (…) in order to subject such a person to arrest and criminal 
prosecution is contrary to public international law and should not be tolerated and should be recognized 
as a bar to prosecution.” (Schomburg 1995, p. 105.)  
47 See Henquet 2003, pp. 118-119, writing that “[c]ourts increasingly decline to exercise jurisdiction 
where the forum State is complicit in an abduction of an accused from the territory of another State 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” Note, however, that after Henquet’s article was published, the Al-
Moayad case was issued. Although that case only presents the situations which must, in any event, lead 
to a male detentus result, thus not clarifying what the German Court’s own stance would be on a normal 
abduction not accompanied by serious mistreatment and not followed by a protest and request for the 
return of the suspect from the injured State, it is very well possible that it would follow the German case 
of 1986, which involved such an abduction from the Netherlands and which did not lead to the ending of 
the case. 
48 Cf. Knoops 2002, p. 241. It may be interesting to note that Wilske stated that (customary) 
international law at any rate/in any event (“immer dann”) demands that courts refuse jurisdiction if the 
abduction is followed by a protest (and a request for the return of the suspect) or if the abduction is 
accompanied by serious mistreatment. That may mean that he is of the opinion that customary 
international law would perhaps also require a male detentus result in less serious cases, not involving 
these two situations (one could hereby think of cases like Bennett and Ebrahim). That he writes, in the 
context of customary international law, about “die Überzeugung (…) daß im Regelfall einer 
völkerrechtswidrigen Entführung ein Strafverfahrenshindernis folgen muß” (Wilske 2000 p. 339), may 
also constitute evidence for that possibility. Although it is not entirely sure whether Wilske is indeed of 
the opinion that customary international law demands a male detentus result in other situations than the 
two above-mentioned ones, Pulkowski straightforwardly criticises the fact that “Wilske concludes that 
customary international law today bars a court from initiating criminal proceedings against an abducted 
individual.” (Pulkowski 2001, p. 1035.) This was because “the attempt to anchor the rule that courts 
have no jurisdiction over individuals abducted by state agents in customary international law meets with 
some systematic concerns with respect to both practice and opinio juris.” (Ibid.) He explains: 








What can be said about the other two techniques: luring and disguised 
extradition (and other less serious irregular methods not clearly falling within these 
three basic male captus situations, such as an informal transfer between two States 
without any procedural guarantees)?49 
Quite a few of the more recent cases show that such techniques, even if they can 





                                                                                                                                              
new rule of customary law. Strictly speaking, only the judgments of the British House of Lords ex parte 
Bennett and the South African Supreme Court in State v. Ebrahim can serve as precedents actually 
involving state-ordered kidnapping. The author predominantly relies on political declarations within or 
outside international institutions and academic writings in order to support his thesis. Therefore, some 
scepticism remains whether a departure from male captus bene detentus is really ‘in accordance with a 
constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question’. Furthermore, neither male captus bene 
detentus nor the alleged new rule to the contrary was applied by courts with a belief that such conduct 
was required by international law. The major precedents relied on by the author to support his thesis, the 
judgments ex parte Bennett and State v. Ebrahim, were both based exclusively on the interpretation of 
domestic law [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Ibid., pp. 1035-1036.) Although one must not forget 
that the judges in these two latter cases (and in other cases not mentioned by Pulkowski such as Levinge 
and Beahan, see ns. 42 and 45) also used international law considerations to dismiss the case, it is true 
that they were mainly basing their decisions on domestic grounds. (Cf. also De Sanctis 2004, p. 538.) 
However, even if they had based their findings on international law alone, one can indeed wonder with 
Pulkowski whether these cases, which support a low male captus male detentus threshold, have general 
support in State practice. Notwithstanding this, that does not do away with the fact, not mentioned by 
Pulkowski, but correctly observed by Wilske, that State practice appears to indicate that in two more 
specific situations (namely in the case of an abduction followed by a protest and request for the return of 
the suspect and an abduction accompanied by serious mistreatment) courts will refuse jurisdiction and 
that one could even argue that in the case of an abduction followed by a protest and request for the 
return of the suspect, customary international law indicates that courts will refuse jurisdiction. Finally, 
reference must also be made to Borelli. She first states that “[t]his brief survey of domestic case law 
related to cases of forcible abduction brings into question the qualification of the male captus doctrine as 
a “principle of law recognized by civilised nations”. (Borelli 2004, p. 361.) She then continues stating, 
referring to Wilske and the criticism of Pulkowski, that “it may still be premature to affirm the existence 
of a customary rule, or even of a “general principle of law”, compelling the courts to divest themselves 
from jurisdiction over abducted defendants [original footnote omitted, ChP]”. (Ibid.) However, one can 
argue that this does not exclude the fact that Borelli may also be of the opinion that customary 
international law indicates that courts will refuse jurisdiction in the case of an abduction followed by a 
protest and request for the return of the suspect as Borelli adheres to the following definition of the male 
captus bene detentus maxim: “According to this doctrine [of male captus bene detentus, ChP], in the 
absence of protest from another State, once an individual is brought within the jurisdiction, even if he 
was apprehended by irregular means (including forcible abduction), he may be tried in the apprehending 
State [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid., p. 353.) Hence, this may mean 
that Borelli is of the opinion that one can indeed not assert that customary international law demands 
that in every abduction case, a judge must opt for male detentus, but that this may be different when the 
injured State has protested the abduction (and has demanded the return of the suspect).   








the case – a point which can again be applauded50 – on the condition that the now 
prosecuting State’s own authorities were involved in the male captus.51  
                                                          
50 After all, one can argue that also in cases of luring and disguised extradition, the authorities have 
resorted to illegal means to obtain custody over the suspect and that courts in such cases should consider 
whether this is not already enough to divest jurisdiction. It is submitted that the low male detentus tests 
produced by cases such as Hartley, Levinge and Bennett (see also the following footnote) are much 
more appropriate if the court wants to protect values like State sovereignty, human rights, due process of 
law/the rule of law, including the integrity of the judicial and executive proceedings. Only a low male 
detentus standard can effectively deter the prosecuting authorities from using dubious methods in 
bringing a suspect to trial. (Recall the three functions of the use of supervisory powers, see ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-
AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 76: “[T]o provide a remedy for the violation of the accused’s rights; to 
deter future misconduct; and to enhance the integrity of the judicial process [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].”) See again (see also n. 46) the International Law Association’s recommendation that “[c]ourts 
should refuse to permit prosecutions of persons brought before them by government-conducted or 
government-inspired abductions. [Note that the International Law Association views a kidnapping by 
deception (luring) as a form of abduction, see International Law Association 1994, p. 162, ChP.] In 
appropriate cases they should decline to exercise jurisdiction and should order the return of the abductee 
to the state from which he was abducted, without prejudice to future lawful extradition proceedings. A 
court should adopt the same approach where the accused has been brought before it by deportation 
intended to circumvent the obligations imposed by extradition.” (Ibid., p. 165.) See also Resolution No. 
9 relevant to the topic ‘The Protection of Human Rights in International Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters’ (unanimously approved at the closing session of the XV Congress of the International 
Association of Penal Law in Rio de Janeiro, 4-10 September 1994): “Abducting a person from a foreign 
country or enticing a person under false pretences to come voluntarily from another country in order to 
subject such a person to arrest and criminal prosecution is contrary to public international law and 
should not be tolerated and should be recognized as a bar to prosecution. (…) Similarly, procedures such 
as deportation or expulsion, deliberately applied in order to circumvent the safeguards of extradition 
procedures should be avoided.” (Schomburg 1995, p. 105.) See finally also the general statement of 
Michell 1996, p. 500: “[I]t is my argument that domestic courts possess a discretion to stay proceedings 
against a fugitive brought before it in violation of the law of a foreign state; or in circumvention of 
regular extradition proceedings; or in order to prevent unlawfulness on the part of the domestic 
executive. In exercising its discretion to order a stay the court must weigh and evaluate the 
circumstances through which the fugitive came before it. The finding that there was no violation of 
customary international law (e.g., because the injured state consented to the abduction) should not 
prevent a domestic court from refusing to have its processes tainted by the executive’s illegal conduct. 
The rule of law rationales opposing the male captus bene detentus principle – that it brings the 
administration of justice into disrepute, encourages lawlessness, violates state sovereignty, disregards 
international human rights law, and undermines the international extradition network – are 
overwhelming.” 
51 See, for example, Hartley (where the New Zealand police was involved in a “short cut” ‘extradition’ 
from Australia), Levinge (where the Court formulated the following, rather general, male captus male 
detentus test: “Where a person, however unlawfully, is brought into the jurisdiction and is before a court 
in this State, that court has undoubted jurisdiction to deal with him or her. But it also has a discretion not 
to do so, where to exercise its discretion would involve an abuse of the court’s process. Such an abuse 
may arise by reason of delay on the part of prosecuting authorities. But delay is only one variety of 
unfair or wrongful conduct on the part of those authorities. Other such conduct may exist, including 
wrongful and even unlawful involvement in bypassing the regular machinery for extradition and 
participating in unauthorised and unlawful removal of criminal suspects from one jurisdiction to 
another.”), Bennett (where (as summarised by the Court in Westfallen) it had to be sorted out “whether it 
appears that the police or the prosecuting authorities have acted illegally or procured or connived at 
unlawful procedures or violated international law or the domestic law of foreign States or abused their 








That also means that courts will generally continue with the case if the 
prosecuting State’s own authorities were not involved in the male captus.52 An 
exception in this respect is the 1982 Swiss case of X (where no Swiss authorities 
were involved in the luring operation and the judge nevertheless halted the case), 
although it must also be emphasised that this Court did not refuse jurisdiction to try 
the case (male detentus) but refused to extradite the person to the State involved in 
the luring operation (male deditus).  
Notwithstanding the fact that quite a few of the more recent cases thus show that 
male captus techniques not involving abduction can still lead to a refusal to continue 
the case, on the condition that the now prosecuting State’s own authorities were 
involved in the male captus, there are also quite a few recent cases in which such 
                                                                                                                                              
footnote omitted, ChP].”) and Mullen (where the Court stated that “the British authorities initiated and 
subsequently assisted in and procured the deportation of the defendant, by unlawful means, in 
circumstances in which there were specific extradition facilities between this country and Zimbabwe. In 
so acting they were not only encouraging unlawful conduct in Zimbabwe, but they were also acting in 
breach of public international law.”). These cases show that there are hence quite some male captus 
male detentus cases which do not involve, for example, a protest from a third State. In that respect, the 
following statement from the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States from 
1987 can clearly be seen as outdated, see American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 1987, para. 432 (‘Measures in Aid of Enforcement of 
Criminal Law’), Reporters Notes, No. 2 (‘Rule of “male captus, bene detentus.”’): “Nearly all states 
have followed the rule that, absent protest from other states, they will try persons brought before their 
courts through irregular means, even through an abduction from another state in violation of 
international law.” That these cases show that judges may also refuse to exercise jurisdiction in arguably 
less serious cases than, for example, a genuine abduction, does not mean, however, that the male captus 
does not have to be rather serious, see, for example, House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry 
Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 163: “I regard 
it as essential to the rule of law that the court should not have to make available its process and thereby 
indorse (on what I am confident will be a very few occasions) unworthy conduct when it is proved 
against the executive or its agents, however humble in rank. And, remembering that it is not jurisdiction 
which is in issue but the exercise of a discretion to stay proceedings, while speaking of ‘unworthy 
conduct’, I would not expect a court to stay the proceedings of every trial which has been preceded by a 
venial irregularity.” Hence, the male detentus outcome will indeed normally be reserved for the more 
exceptional cases, see ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Prosecutor’s 
Response to Defence “Motion to Determine Issues as Agreed Between the Parties And the Trial 
Chamber…and the Consequences of Any Illegal Conduct Material to the Accused, His Arrest and 
Subsequent Detention”, filed 29 October 2001’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 12 November 2001, para. 10, n. 
14: “[I]n all cases, it is clear that the remedy of release of the accused and dismissal of the indictment 
against him are remedies of last resort, to be utilised only upon the satisfaction of strict criteria and in 
extreme circumstances”. (The Prosecution refers here to Lamb 2000, pp. 228-244.) However, it must 
also be remarked that the fact that male detentus constitutes an ultimum remedium does not necessarily 
mean that it will not be granted very often. Much will depend here on the conduct of the prosecuting 
authorities. See again House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and 
another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 163: “No ‘floodgates’ argument applies 
because the executive can stop the flood at source by refraining from impropriety.”  
52 See again the above-mentioned (see the previous footnote) cases of Hartley, Levinge, Bennett and 
Mullen. See also the male captus bene deditus case Al-Moayad. However, one can imagine that there 
might also be judges who will refuse jurisdiction if they deem the male captus so serious that they feel 
that jurisdiction must be refused, even if the authorities from the now prosecuting State were not 
involved in the male captus (for example, when the suspect is seriously mistreated in the process of his 








techniques had been used and where it was established that the prosecuting State’s 
own authorities had been involved in the male captus but where the court 
nevertheless did not refuse jurisdiction.53 Those cases show that a luring operation 
or a disguised extradition as such54 are not seen as such a serious male captus as to 
lead to the ending of the case.55 That might even be the case when the injured State 
(this can only be the State of residence in the case of a luring operation as the other 
male captus techniques (such as a disguised extradition) do not lead to a violation of 
State sovereignty) protests the male captus and requests the return of the suspect.56  
Related to this issue is the fact that the element of ‘seriousness of the alleged 
crimes with which a suspect is charged’ sometimes seems to play a role in the 
judge’s balancing exercise;57 perhaps a male captus has indeed occurred, but given 
                                                          
53 See, for example, Yunis (see also the following footnote) and Latif (where a luring operation executed 
by the prosecuting State’s own authorities did not lead to the ending of the case). Two other cases could 
also be mentioned here in that respect – with some marginal comments: in Stocké, the Court held that 
the prosecuting State’s authorities were not involved in the luring operation (or, if they were, were not 
acting on the State’s authority), but that, even if they were, the male captus was not serious enough to 
divest jurisdiction. In Schmidt, the fact that the State’s own authorities were involved in a luring case did 
not lead to the ending of the case either, but this was not a male captus bene detentus but a male captus 
bene deditus decision. 
54 Nevertheless, one can assume that if the suspect is seriously mistreated during a luring operation/a 
disguised extradition, the court may nevertheless refuse jurisdiction, see the reasoning in the Yunis 
luring case (in the following footnote). See also the 1985 Stocké luring case where the German Federal 
Constitutional Court stated that jurisdiction could be refused on the basis of national law if a certain 
male captus situation could be seen as an “extremely exceptional case”. Although it is not clear what the 
exact meaning is of this concept (although the more serious male captus situation of an abduction (as 
such) will not fall under the term, see the abduction case which was decided by the Constitutional Court 
one year later (see also n. 21)), it may be that the Court was thinking of Toscanino-like circumstances, 
see (again) Wilske 2000, p. 334, n. 413 (commenting on this concept): “[D]as Gericht hatte hier 
möglicherweise die schweren Folterungen im Toscanino-Fall im Auge.” See also Grams 1994, pp. 70-
71. 
55 See, for example, US District Court, District of Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, 
Crim. No. 87-0377 (681 F.Supp. 909), p. 920: “In cases where defendants have urged the court to 
dismiss the indictment solely on the grounds that they were fraudulently lured to the United States, 
courts have uniformly upheld jurisdiction.” This would, however, be different if the luring would meet 
the serious mistreatment threshold of Toscanino, see ibid.: “In this action, there is no dispute that United 
States law enforcement officers were fully involved in the planning and execution of defendant’s arrest. 
However, defendant has failed either to allege or to show any actions committed by these officers that 
meet the standard of outrageousness established by Toscanino and its progeny requiring this Court to 
divest itself of jurisdiction. The record in this proceeding has been reviewed with care and the Court 
fails to find the type of cruel, inhumane and outrageous conduct that would warrant dismissal under 
Toscanino.” 
56 This could, perhaps, be derived from the German male captus bene deditus decision in Al-Moayad. 
Although in that case, no German officials were involved in the luring operation, which was followed by 
a protest from the suspect’s State of residence (Yemen), the Court stated in a more theoretical exercise 
“that it is even doubtful under which preconditions the luring of a prosecuted person out of his or her 
state of residence by means of trickery – unlike the use of force – can be regarded as an act that is 
contrary to international law at all”. (See n. 584 of Chapter V and accompanying text.) That may mean 
that the German Federal Constitutional Court would not refuse to exercise jurisdiction in the case of a 
luring operation executed by German officials, even if the injured State protested the operation. 
57 See also Lamb 2000, pp. 237-238 (cf. also Henquet 2003, p. 123, referring to Lamb): “State practice 








the fact that the suspect’s alleged crimes are more serious and the continuation of 
the proceedings is hence of more importance, such a male captus will not lead to a 
male detentus/deditus outcome.58 
This can most clearly be discerned from cases such as Schmidt59 and Latif.60 In 
Mullen, such a balancing exercise was also used, but in that case, the English judges 
felt that it was more important to legally disapprove of the male captus (a disguised 
extradition in which the British authorities were involved) by refusing jurisdiction, 
even though Mullen was charged with (and in fact already convicted for) serious 
crimes, namely IRA terrorism.  
Admittedly, these are all English cases, but the idea that the seriousness of the 
alleged crimes should play a role in deciding whether or not jurisdiction/extradition 
has to be refused appears to have a broader basis in the more recent cases;61 such 
                                                                                                                                              
the balance will (...) tend to favour an otherwise-competent court’s upholding its jurisdiction, 
notwithstanding any defects which may be observed in the manner in which the accused was 
apprehended [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Note, however, that the words “any defects” are very 
broad and may lead to an Eichmann exception (where the trial is completely decoupled from the pre-
trial phase), which this study does not support. Furthermore, it must be noted that Lamb refers to the 
Eichmann case to back her assertion, which, as was shown in Chapter V, does not seem to be correct. 
Cf. also Nsereko 2008, pp. 66-67: “In balancing these interests, the courts take into account two major 
factors; the gravity of the offence or offences charged, and the degree of seriousness of the alleged 
violations. The graver the offence charged, the greater the need to bring the perpetrator to justice and 
consequently the courts are less ready to apply the doctrine by permanently staying the proceedings 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” Nsereko refers in this context to, among other things, three African 
cases which were not already mentioned in this study, namely the Namibian case R v. Heienreich (see 
ibid., p. 67), the Zimbabwean case In Re Mlambo (see ibid., p. 68) and the Botswanan case Sejammitlwa 
& Another (see ibid., p. 69). Although there was no need to address these cases in Chapter V of this 
book – from Nsereko’s article, it can be deduced that these cases did not involve international male 
captus cases, but ‘merely’ purely domestic cases where there was a delay in bringing the suspect to 
justice – such cases nevertheless show that judges take the seriousness of the alleged crimes into account 
when determining the consequences of alleged irregularities in the pre-trial phase of their case, an 
element which may also be taken into account by these judges when addressing international male 
captus cases. 
58 Hence (and recalling the three traditional rationales of the male captus bene detentus rule presented by 
Michell (see n. 11)), even if judges are of the opinion that they must use a broad concept of fair trial and 
even if they are of the opinion that they cannot simply refer international problems to their Executive 
(but must take their responsibility as agents of the international legal order), they may nevertheless be of 
the opinion that the second rationale (the importance of trying this person) is so great that jurisdiction 
should not be refused.  
59 Where the English judges – in a theoretical exercise (because the judges were of the opinion that the 
Bennett/abuse of process exercise was not applicable to extradition procedures) – found that Schmidt, 
given the seriousness of his alleged crimes (serious drug offences), would have to be extradited (bene 
deditus), even if he had been lured to England by an English police officer (male captus). 
60 Where the English judges found that the suspect (Shazad), given the seriousness of his alleged crimes 
(serious drug offences) had to be tried (bene detentus), even if he had been lured to England by a British 
customs officer (male captus). 
61 Older cases do not appear to explicitly defend this idea but sometimes, persons commenting on the 
cases have argued that the seriousness of the alleged crimes may have played a role. See, for example, 
Ker (about which an anonymous author wrote:  “The Court warned in Ker that it did “not intend to say 
that there may not be proceedings previous to the trial, in regard to which the prisoner could invoke in 
some manner … [the due process clause]; but for mere irregularities in the manner in which he may be 








ideas may also be identified in the Australian Levinge case,62 the French Barbie 
case,63 the German cases from 198664 and of Al-Moayad65 and the Namibian case 
                                                                                                                                              
…” 119 U.S. at 440. This warning hardly suggests that the Court considered due process to be limited to 
the guarantee of a fair trial; it does suggest that the Court doubted the wisdom of allowing one who has 
committed a serious offense to avoid trial altogether because his arrest was constitutionally defective 
[emphasis added, ChP].”) and Argoud (about which rapporteur Comte wrote: “Rarely – perhaps never – 
has a problem more difficult, more complex, more disturbing, been put before the conscience of the 
judiciary. Account must be taken of the need for repression which the exceptional gravity of the crimes 
makes in the highest degree imperative; the maintenance of the principles sanctifying the rights of the 
human person and the liberty of the individual, of which the courts are the guardians and the guarantors, 
must be safeguarded; the sovereignty of States must be recognized and the nature and the limits of the 
sanctions which it postulates must be made explicit. Above all, it is necessary (…) to preserve the 
independence and the dignity of French justice [emphasis in original, ChP].”). The (older) Eichmann 
case has also sometimes been referred to as a case in which the seriousness of the alleged crimes with 
which the suspect is charged constituted a reason why the judges opted for male captus bene detentus. 
However, this is arguably incorrect (see n. 626 and accompanying text of Chapter V): the judges in 
Eichmann did not take the element ‘seriousness of the alleged crimes with which the suspect is charged’ 
into account to defend their usage of the male captus bene detentus principle because they did not have 
to; they were namely of the opinion that this maxim constituted an established rule of law (hence 
applicable to anyone). 
62 See New South Wales Court of Appeal, Levinge v Director of Custodial Services, Department of 
Corrective Services, 23 July 1987, 89 FLR 151: “[I]t is necessary to balance the public interest in 
preventing the unlawful conduct against the public interest in having the charge or complaint 
determined. This is not to say that the end can justify the means and that the more serious the charge the 
greater is the scope for the prosecution to engage in unlawful conduct. But conduct which might be 
regarded as constituting an abuse of process in respect of a comparatively minor charge may not have 
the same character in respect of a serious matter.” 
63 See Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), Barbie, 6 October 1983, International Law Reports, Vol. 
78 (1988), p. 130: “The Chambre d'accusation [of the Court of Appeal] held that it was competent to 
examine the submissions made in the application, according to which the detention of Barbie was a 
nullity since it was the result of a ‘disguised extradition’. The Court of Appeal held that “In the absence 
of any extradition request, the execution of an arrest warrant on national territory, against a person who 
has not [this negation must be deleted, ChP] previously taken refuge abroad, is not subject to his 
voluntary return to France or to the institution of extradition proceedings. Furthermore, by reason of 
their nature, the crimes against humanity with which Klaus Barbie, who claims German nationality, is 
charged in France where those crimes were committed, do not simply fall within the scope of French 
municipal law but are subject to an international criminal order to which the notions of frontiers and 
extradition rules arising therefrom are completely foreign.” In giving this ruling … the Court of Appeal 
gave a proper legal basis to its decision, without inadequacy or contradiction.” This reasoning (focusing 
on the importance of prosecution and less on the way the suspect is brought to trial), plus the fact that 
the Supreme Court emphasises the fairness of the proceedings in the courtroom seem to imply that 
problems in the pre-trial phase (for example, a disguised extradition) are not really to be looked at in 
these kinds of cases. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the Supreme Court’s reasoning can also be 
read differently, namely that there was nothing wrong with Barbie’s transfer and that it can in fact be 
seen as a sort of extradition (or in any case as a transfer not prohibited by the French extradition law of 
1927). See ns. 500-501 and accompanying text of Chapter V. 
64 See BVerfG (3. Kammer des Zweiten Senats), Beschl. v. 3.6 1986 – 2 BvR 837/85. NJW 1986, Heft 
48, p. 3022: “Der (…) strafrechtliche Unrechtsgehalt der „Entführung“ wiegt weniger schwer gegenüber 
der Schuld des Bf. dessen hohe kriminelle Energie auch seine erheblichen Vorstrafen belegen.” It is to 
be noted that this case is more far-going than the other recent cases mentioned here which took the 
seriousness of the suspect’s alleged crimes into account because in the German case, the suspect was 
abducted by the German police from the Netherlands. It is submitted that even though the seriousness of 








Mushwena.66 Oehmichen, for example, concludes after her overview of national 
case law that “[t]eilweise wurde nach der Schwere des Delikts sowie nach der 
Schwere der Menschenrechtsverletzung differenziert”.67  
Concluding this section, one can easily see that a lot depends on the exact 
circumstances, on questions such as: what kind of male captus was involved,68 was 
                                                                                                                                              
in deciding whether or not the male captus is so serious that jurisdiction must be refused, judges should 
also understand that this discretion is relative; certain male captus techniques, such as an abduction 
executed by one’s own agents, should be deemed to be so serious that one should refuse jurisdiction, 
even if that person was charged with serious crimes.  
65 See German Federal Constitutional Court: In the Proceedings on the Constitutional Complaint of Mr. 
Al-M., and his Motion for a Temporary Injunction (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second 
Senate of 5 November 2003, 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., para. 3 b) bb) (3)), 43 International Legal Materials 
(2004), p. 785: “[R]ecent state practice also takes the seriousness of the crime with which the person is 
charged into account, which means that in this respect, it takes proportionality into consideration. The 
protection of high-ranking legal interests, which has been intensified on an international level in recent 
years, can lend itself to justifying the violation of a state’s personal sovereignty that possibly goes along 
with the use of trickery (cf. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. 
Dragan Nikolic, loc. cit., number 26). To the extent that the fight of most serious crimes such as the 
support of international drugs trade and of terrorism is concerned, luring someone out of a state’s 
territorial sovereignty by means of trickery is not, at any rate to the extent that would be required to 
demonstrate state practice, regarded as an obstacle precluding criminal prosecution. Nothing different 
can apply as regards the existence of an obstacle precluding extradition.” Although the German Federal 
Constitutional Court speaks of “recent state practice”, para. 26 of the Appeals Chamber’s decision in the 
Nikolić case essentially concerns the ICTY’s own views on this problem. One can wonder whether the 
views of the ICTY can be seen as evidence of State practice but perhaps, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court is mainly interested in the cases on which the ICTY trusts to support its view. 
However, in that case, one can wonder whether the word “recent (state practice)” is well chosen as the 
two cases mentioned by the ICTY were not decided that recently (namely in 1962 (the Eichmann case) 
and 1983 (the Barbie case)). In addition to this, although there are indeed indications that the Supreme 
Court of France may have taken the seriousness of the crimes with which Barbie was charged in its 
decision whether or not jurisdiction had to be declined (see n. 63), it was shown, see n. 584 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VI, that the ICTY’s reliance on the Eichmann case is incorrect as the 
Israeli courts did not continue with the exercise of jurisdiction because of Eichmann’s alleged heinous 
crimes, but because the male captus bene detentus maxim in those days was an accepted rule of law, 
applicable to anyone, whether that ‘anyone’ was charged with fraud or with crimes against humanity. 
See also n. 61. 
66 In this case, reference was also (see the previous footnote) made to the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s 
decision in Nikolić. Nevertheless, in this Namibian case, Acting Justice of Appeal Mtambanengwe was 
arguably primarily interested in the observations of the Nikolić judges themselves (and not so much in 
their (flawed) distillation of the principle ‘seriousness of the charges’ from State practice). That is, of 
course, unproblematic. 
67 Oehmichen 2007, p. 237. 
68 State practice shows that an abduction performed by the prosecuting State’s own agents on another 
State’s territory without the latter’s consent, accompanied by serious mistreatment or a protest and 
request for the return of the suspect, will lead to the ending of the case. (It could be argued that in the 
case of an abduction followed by a protest and request for the return of the suspect, there is even an 
obligation pursuant to customary international law). Less serious cases (such as an abduction without 
serious mistreatment or without a protest and request for the return of the suspect) may also lead to the 
ending of the case, but here, State practice is more diverse. With respect to male captus situations which 
are deemed even less serious, such as luring and disguised extradition, courts more readily continue to 








the male captus committed intentionally,69 who committed the male captus,70 did 
the male captus lead to a violation of another State’s sovereignty (including a 
protest and request for the return of the suspect),71 was the person seriously 
mistreated during the male captus72 and was the victim of the male captus charged 
with serious crimes?73  
In that respect, one must also be wary of general statements on the (customary 
international law) status of the male captus bene detentus rule for exactly what kind 
of male captus is involved must first be explored.74  
                                                          
69 See n. 20. 
70 See ns. 21-22 and 50-51 and accompanying text. See also n. 504 of the previous chapter: if a 
prosecuting forum’s own authorities are involved in the male captus, it is more likely that a male 
detentus will follow. 
71 See n. 41. See also n. 506 of the previous chapter: State practice shows that an abduction performed 
by the prosecuting State’s own agents on another State’s territory without the latter’s consent, followed 
by a protest and request for the return of the suspect, will lead to the ending of the case. (It could even 
be argued that in such a situation, there is even an obligation to refuse jurisdiction pursuant to customary 
international law.) See also n. 68. However, in other male captus situations, of which it is less clear 
whether they lead to a violation of international law in the first place, such as luring, a protest may not 
help, see Al-Moayad. Linked to this issue is the matter of the nationality of the suspect (see also n. 505 
of the previous chapter). One can imagine that States may protest the violation of their sovereignty, 
irrespective of the nationality of the abducted person (see also Fawcett 1964, p. 199). Nevertheless, one 
can assume that a protest will be more likely if the suspect is a national of the injured State. See, for 
example, Alvarez-Machain (Mexican national, male captus in Mexico, protest from Mexico), Jolis 
(Belgian national, male captus in Belgium, protest from Belgium) and Al-Moayad (Yemeni national, 
male captus in Yemen, protest from Yemen). Conversely, if the suspect is a national from the forum 
State and not from the State where the male captus took place, there may not be a protest, see, for 
example, Scott (English national, male captus in the Netherlands) and Ebrahim (South African national, 
male captus in Swaziland). 
72 See n. 21 and accompanying text. See also n. 508 of the previous chapter: State practice shows that an 
abduction performed by the prosecuting State’s own agents on another State’s territory without the 
latter’s consent, accompanied by serious mistreatment will lead to the ending of the case. See also n. 68. 
In fact, one can assume that courts will do so in any male captus situation, see, for example, the 
following reasoning from the Yunis luring case: “In this action, there is no dispute that United States law 
enforcement officers were fully involved in the planning and execution of defendant’s arrest. However, 
defendant has failed either to allege or to show any actions committed by these officers that meet the 
standard of outrageousness established by Toscanino and its progeny requiring this Court to divest itself 
of jurisdiction. The record in this proceeding has been reviewed with care and the Court fails to find the 
type of cruel, inhumane and outrageous conduct that would warrant dismissal under Toscanino.” (US 
District Court, District of Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, Crim. No. 87-0377 (681 
F.Supp. 909), p. 920. See also n. 177 and accompanying text of Chapter V.) 
73 See ns. 57-67 and accompanying text. See also n. 509 of the previous chapter: judges may more easily 
continue the case because of the seriousness of the crimes with which the suspect is charged, see, for 
example, Latif. 
74 Cf. also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
75: “[T]he case law (…) is far from uniform. In some national jurisdictions, the maxim male captus, 
bene detentus is more closely followed than in others. Furthermore, the case law on this particular issue 
is still developing and such developments are more advanced in some jurisdictions. In addition, the 
concept of forced cross-border abductions is not always interpreted the same way. Case law often differs 
also in that the facts on which decisions have to be taken are not at all identical.” See also ICTY, Trial 








After all, the maxim itself does not provide that differentiation.75 In that respect, 
one can only agree with these old, but still very pertinent words: 
 
It seems to me that legal maxims in general are little more than pert headings of 
chapters. They are rather minims than maxims, for they give not a particularly great 
but a particularly small amount of information. As often as not, the exceptions and 
disqualifications to them are more important than the so-called rules.76  
 
A final point that should be made is that it can be concluded that many cases, even if 
most judges have abandoned the old(-fashioned) version of male captus bene 
detentus cases such as Scott and even if many male captus male detentus cases have 
been issued by them,77 can still be qualified as male captus bene detentus decisions 
because jurisdiction will be exercised (bene detentus), notwithstanding the fact that 
a (not so serious) male captus has occurred. A more effective way to prevent a court 
from supporting the (at least after the Alvarez-Machain case) rather unpopular male 
captus bene detentus rule is to argue, not that the male captus was not serious 
enough to divest jurisdiction, but that no male captus occurred at all, even if there 
are indications that something irregular had happened.78 After all, if the court is of 
the opinion that no male captus occurred in the first place, it does not have to choose 
the unpopular male captus bene detentus rule.79   
                                                                                                                                              
Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 94: “[T]he case law (…) is 
rather diverse.” 
75 See, for example, Strijards 2001, pp. 96-97, Goldstone and Simpson 2003, p. 19, Hamid 2004, pp. 70, 
78 and 86 and Loan 2005, p. 284 (see n. 41). 
76 See Garner 2004, p. 1703, citing James Fitzjames Stephen in his 1883 History of the Criminal Law of 
England (Vol. 2, p. 94, n. 1). 
77 Cf. Borelli 2003, p. 808: “[I]n several relatively recent cases, domestic courts in a number of different 
states have started to challenge the male captus bene detentus rule. These courts have become willing to 
consider the way in which the defendant has been brought within their jurisdiction and to treat it as a 
circumstance that could preclude the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.” See also Borelli 2004, p. 361: 
“The divergent approaches taken by courts of very similar judicial systems demonstrate that (...) it 
would be extremely inaccurate to maintain, as some authors did until relatively recently, that “the 
violation of [international] law does not affect the validity of the subsequent exercise of jurisdiction over 
[illegally seized] offenders”, or that “with rare unanimity and undeniable justification the courts of the 
world have held that the manner in which an accused has been brought before the court does not and, 
indeed, cannot deprive it of its jurisdiction” [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” Borelli refers here to 
Brownlie 1998, p. 320 and Mann 1989, p. 414. It is perhaps saying that in the sixth edition of 
Brownlie’s book (Brownlie 2003), one will no longer find this remark.  
78 See, for example, Menten and the Swiss case from 2007. 
79 Cf. also Cazala 2007, p. 382: “[O]n verra en étudiant les critères de qualification de l’arrestation que 
le juge a une très nette tendance à reconnaitre la régularité de celle-ci dans des circonstances qui sont 
pourtant parfois très contestables (…). (…) L’étude de la jurisprudence permet de constater que l’adage 
male captus bene detentus est finalement très peu utilisé, les juges préférant avoir une conception assez 
étroite de l’arrestation irrégulière.” However, note also that Cazala is in particular focusing on the 
difference between the irregularities in the deprivation of liberty abroad and the formal arrest and 
detention in the prosecuting forum, see, for example, ibid., p. 844 (with respect to the case Ramirez 
Sánchez) and ibid., p. 844, n. 27 (with respect to the case Argoud). However, if a court states that the 








3 PRINCIPLES DISTILLED FROM THE CASES BETWEEN STATES AND 
INTERNATIONAL(ISED) CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
 
Chapter VI has arguably shown that tribunals nowadays reject the old-fashioned 
version of the male captus bene detentus maxim in that they do not support the idea 
that the tribunals have jurisdiction, regardless of the circumstances in which the 
suspect was brought before them. This may be explained by the fact that these 
tribunals, after a perhaps somewhat dubious start,80 have often stressed the 
importance of human rights, due process and fair proceedings81 and have generally 
not limited these concepts to the proceedings in the courtroom (but see the Trial 
Chamber’s decision of 8 July 2009 in Karadžić where the focus was arguably more 
on the fairness of the proceedings in court). In the words of Trial Chamber II in the 
Nikolić case: 
 
[T]his Tribunal has a responsibility to fully respect “internationally recognized 
standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its proceedings.” (…) 
[T]his Chamber concurs with the view expressed in several national judicial 
decisions, according to which the issue of respect for due process of law encompasses 
more than merely the duty to ensure a fair trial for the Accused. Due process of law 
also includes questions such as how the Parties have been conducting themselves in 
the context of a particular case and how an Accused has been brought into the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal [emphasis added, ChP].82 
 
This (welcome) position can be explained by the fact that when the tribunals 
discussed in this chapter came into being – as from the 1990s – concepts such as 
human rights and fair proceedings were already firmly established in the mindset of 
judges. The much older idea that a trial must continue, irrespective of what 
                                                                                                                                              
male captus occurred at all (unless one views the captus as the formal arrest in the prosecuting forum 
alone), but that it is in fact supporting the male captus bene detentus rule. 
80 See ICTY, Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a “Dule”, ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses’, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 10 August 
1995, paras. 28 and 30. 
81 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 40: “The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights is part of general international law and is applied on that basis. Regional human rights treaties, 
such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, 
and the jurisprudence developed thereunder, are persuasive authority which may be of assistance in 
applying and interpreting the Tribunal’s applicable law. Thus, they are not binding of their own accord 
on the Tribunal. They are, however, authoritative as evidence of international custom.” See also ICTY, 
Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise 
of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 110: “The Trial Chamber 
observes first that it attaches great importance to respect for the human rights of the Accused and to 
proceedings that fully respect due process of law. It is also duty-bound to respect the rights laid down in 
Article 21 of the Statute. This Tribunal has a paramount duty and responsibility to respect fully the 
norms developed over the last decades in this field, especially within, but not limited to, the framework 
of the United Nations.” 








happened in the course of bringing a suspect to justice had simply become out of 
step with these ideas.  
One key element in this discussion is the right to liberty and security, which is so 
important for this study. Because of its customary international law/general 
international law status (see also Chapter III), the significance of this right has often 
been emphasised, even if it is not to be found in the regulatory documents of the 
tribunal in question.83  
However, also in this context of the international(ised) criminal tribunals, it can 
be said that highlighting the importance of human rights, including the right to 
liberty and security, and looking at the way a person was brought into the 
jurisdiction of the court is not the same as issuing a male captus male detentus 
decision. In fact, although in the inter-State context, several male captus cases still 
resulted in a male detentus outcome,84 there was only one case in the context of the 
international(ised) criminal tribunals where a male captus led to a male detentus 
outcome: the Barayagwiza case before the ICTR. However, even that outcome was 
altered (into a bene detentus outcome, ‘softened’ with a reduction of the sentence) 
after the Government of Rwanda, which would not allow such a ‘big fish’ as 
Barayagwiza to escape justice, had suspended its cooperation with the Tribunal and 
after the Appeals Chamber had reviewed its decision. In that respect, it can be 
maintained that the tribunals, even if they do not support the old-fashioned version 
of the maxim and even if they do not explicitly champion the (at least after the 
Alvarez-Machain case unpopular) male captus bene detentus maxim, are more 
easily affiliated with the latter maxim than with its counterpart male captus male 
detentus.85 How can this be explained?  
                                                          
83 See ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić also known as “Pavo”, 
Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo, ‘Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal (Provisional Release) by 
Hazim Delić’, Case No. IT-96-21-AR72.4, 22 November 1996, para. 16: “The right to liberty is without 
question a fundamental human right. The Applicant has cited a number of international human rights 
instruments in this connection, but the proposition is axiomatic.” See also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 
1999, para. 79, n. 205: “We (…) see no reason to conclude that the protections afforded to suspects 
under Article 9 of the ICCPR do not also apply to suspects brought before the Tribunal.” See further the 
Dokmanović case where the judges looked at Artt. 9, para. 1 of the ICCPR and 5, para. 1 of the ECHR 
(see n. 198 and accompanying text of Chapter VI). See also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. 
Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the 
Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 110: “[T]his Tribunal has a responsibility to 
fully respect “internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its 
proceedings.” Such standards “are, in particular, contained in article 14 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights”; such standards are e.g. also contained in Articles 5 and 6 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950. This 
Chamber observes that these norms only provide for the absolute minimum standards applicable 
[emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
84 Think of cases like Ebrahim, Bennett, Toscanino, the two Swiss cases from 1967 and 1982 (albeit that 
one, more correctly, led to a male deditus outcome), Jolis, Samper and Mullen. 
85 See also Van der Wilt 2004, pp. 274 (‘abstract’) and 276 and Knoops 2005, p. 35, who argues that the 








The tribunals argue, as do most national courts, that they have, in principle, 
jurisdiction (bene detentus), but that a serious male captus situation can lead, under 
the discretionary86 abuse of process doctrine, to a male detentus outcome.87 In doing 
so, the tribunals have adopted a broad version of the abuse of process doctrine in 
that, in determining whether a male captus is so serious that jurisdiction should be 
refused, it may not matter if the entity committing the male captus cannot be linked 
to the tribunal.88 This stance clearly goes further than the national abuse of process 
                                                          
86 Note, however, that although judges have a discretion in either refusing or not refusing jurisdiction in 
certain cases, this discretion is only relative in certain serious cases. There might be such serious cases 
that the tribunals will have to refuse jurisdiction. See, for example, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor 
v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-
2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 30: “[C]ertain human rights violations are of such a serious nature that they 
require that the exercise of jurisdiction be declined [emphasis added, ChP].” See also ICTY, Trial 
Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, ‘Decision on Preliminary Motions’, Case No. IT-99-37-
PT, 8 November 2001, para. 48: “[T]he International Tribunal will exercise its discretion to refuse to try 
the accused if there has been an egregious breach of the rights of the accused [emphasis added, ChP].” 
The Chamber here referred to the Barayagwiza case, where, according to the ICTY Trial Chamber, the 
ICTR Appeals Chamber “stressed that the discretionary power to dismiss a charge is exercised “in light 
of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove detrimental to the court’s 
integrity”.” (Ibid., para. 50.) Besides the fact that this sentence does not run properly, the Trial Chamber 
also presents the ICTR observation as if it would mean that judges must exercise their power to dismiss 
the charge under these circumstances (“is exercised”), whereas the ICTR decision speaks of a discretion. 
The exact sentence of the ICTR decision namely reads: “It is a process by which Judges may decline to 
exercise the court’s jurisdiction in cases where to exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious and 
egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity [emphasis 
added, ChP].” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case 
No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74.) However, perhaps this difference only exists on 
paper; one can imagine that if the judges were to determine that to exercise jurisdiction under certain 
circumstances would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity, that there is only one option left, namely 
to refuse jurisdiction. (In any case, it would be very difficult for judges to explain why they would 
nevertheless continue to exercise jurisdiction if they have previously determined that to continue to 
exercise jurisdiction would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity.) Cf. in that respect also Jones and 
Doobay 2004, p. 95 (discussed in the context of the Bennett case in Chapter V). 
87 It may be interesting to note that this doctrine was also applied by the co-investigating judges (in their 
order of 31 July 2007) and the trial judges (in their decision of 15 June 2009) of the – on civil law 
focused – ECCC. This may constitute additional evidence for the idea that this concept, which has its 
roots in common law, can very well be used by non-common law courts as well, see ns. 878, 1211 and 
1255 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
88 See, for example, the Trial Chamber’s decision in Nikolić (with reference to the 1999 Barayagwiza 
decision): “[I]n a situation where an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe even subjected to 
inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to the Tribunal, this may 
constitute a legal impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction over such an accused. This would certainly 
be the case where persons acting for SFOR or the Prosecution were involved in such very serious 
mistreatment. But even without such involvement this Chamber finds it extremely difficult to justify the 
exercise of jurisdiction over a person if that person was brought into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
after having been seriously mistreated. This, the Chamber observes, is in keeping with the approach of 
the Appeals Chamber in the Barayagwiza case, according to which in cases of egregious violations of 
the rights of the Accused, it is “irrelevant which entity or entities were responsible for the alleged 
violations of the Appellant’s rights” [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial 
Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of 
Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 114.) See further ICTY, Trial 








doctrine where the involvement of the authorities of the prosecuting forum appears 
to be required.89  
On a more normative note, it can be argued that the tribunals’ broader version of 
the abuse of process doctrine is better and is in fact also appropriate for the inter-
State context, where courts may also be confronted by irregularities in the context of 
their case which are not committed by entities which can be connected with the now 
prosecuting court.90 The most important question a court should ask itself is whether 
the pre-trial irregularity, whichever entity committed it, is so serious that proceeding 
with the case would undermine the court’s integrity/sense of justice. That would 
normally be where authorities which can be connected to the prosecuting forum are 
involved in the irregularity, but this may not necessarily be the case.91 However, 
                                                                                                                                              
PT, 8 November 2001, para. 51, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 30, 
SCSL, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor Against Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie 
Borbor Kanu, ‘Written Reasons for the Trial Chamber’s Oral Decision on the Defence Motion on Abuse 
of Process Due to Infringement of Principles of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and Non-Retroactivity as to 
Several Counts’, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, 31 March 2004, para. 26, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal 
Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 206, ECCC, 
Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 002/14-08-
2006, Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 21, ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on 
Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 33, ICTY, 
Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on the Accused’s Holbrooke Agreement 
Motion’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, 8 July 2009, para. 85 and ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on Karadžić’s Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on 
Alleged Holbrooke Agreement’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, 12 October 2009, para. 47. 
89 See also Van der Wilt 2004, p. 278. 
90 See also Nsereko 2008, p. 69: “It needs to be emphasized again that where the violations are 
egregious, as was held by the Yugoslav Tribunal in the Nikolic case, it would not matter whether the 
state or prosecuting authorities were involved in such violations. In this connection, it is urged that 
national courts would do well to adopt this salutary stance [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
91 See, for another opinion, Lamb 2000, p. 237: “It bears emphasising that none of the national 
authorities previously cited suggest that a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, 
in circumstances where the authorities of the forum State have acted with propriety, merely because the 
authorities of another State or individual may have acted irregularly. Consequently, where the ICTY or 
its agents were themselves neither involved nor complicit in any irregularities which may have occurred 
in the course of effecting an arrest, these irregularities would not suffice to vitiate the ICTY’s 
jurisdiction, at least where that jurisdiction was otherwise well-founded. This consequence flows from 
the fact that the underlying purpose of the inherent jurisdiction of any judicial body to prevent an abuse 
of its own process is to impose a form of discipline and control over the law enforcement authorities of 
the forum State, an object which, in the case of the ICTY as with national courts, would not be promoted 
by preventing the trial of an accused on the basis of the prior unlawful conduct of a third State or 
unknown persons in effecting an arrest. [As the Bennett case has shown, however, this view, which can 
also be found in ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to 
“Defence Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the Prior 
Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-Related Abuse of Process Within the 
Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 72” filed 17 May 2001’, Case No. IT-
94-2-PT, 31 May 2001, para. 34, n. 9 and ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, 
‘Prosecutor’s Response to Defence “Motion to Determine Issues as Agreed Between the Parties And the 
Trial Chamber…and the Consequences of Any Illegal Conduct Material to the Accused, His Arrest and 
Subsequent Detention”, filed 29 October 2001’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 12 November 2001, para. 6, n. 5, 








even though the broad version of the abuse of process doctrine is interesting for both 
national and international courts, it is especially interesting for the tribunals because 
these do not have their own police force.92 That means that, besides the fact that 
they may be confronted by irregularities committed by private individuals (a 
situation which may occur in the context of any court, even a court which has a 
police force at its disposal), the tribunals may be confronted by irregularities 
committed by, for example, national police forces and international troops executing 
arrests/detentions/transfers on their behalf. Normally, there is nothing wrong with 
arrests/detentions/transfers executed by those entities at the request of the tribunal. 
In such cases, the tribunal may profit from the actions of third parties. However, 
there may also be instances where the consequences of the tribunal’s dependence on 
others are less fortunate, namely if something goes wrong in the pre-trial arrest and 
detention phase. It would be very easy but not a sign of real legal ‘maturity’ for the 
tribunal to only accept the positive side of the fact that it has no police force of its 
own.93 Hence, a liberal concept of the abuse of process doctrine is to be preferred.94 
                                                                                                                                              
and another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 161: “The discretion to stay is not a 
disciplinary jurisdiction and ought not to be exercised in order to express the court’s disapproval of 
official conduct. Accordingly, if the prosecuting authorities have been guilty of culpable delay but the 
prospect of a fair trial has not been prejudiced, the court ought not to stay the proceedings merely ‘pour 
encourager les autres’.” Cf. also n. 302 of Chapter V, ChP.] Official collusion in the unlawful conduct in 
question thus appears to be a necessary – but not a sufficient – condition for an otherwise-competent 
court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction over an offender brought before it by means of an irregular 
rendition [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See also ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Blagoje 
Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Brief of the United States of 
America on Review of Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others’, 
Case No. IT-95-9-AR108bis, 15 November 2000, p. 9: “A variety of other cases address the lawfulness 
of cross-border abductions, with some upholding the principle that an abduction in violation of the law 
of one State does not divest another State to which he is brought of jurisdiction to prosecute, and others 
suggesting that a State’s courts may exercise discretion to decline jurisdiction over an individual brought 
before them under such circumstances. However, when agents of the prosecuting State have not been 
shown to be complicit, there are no grounds for such discretion.” 
92 This could perhaps be seen as one of the ‘translations’/‘transpositions’ between the inter-State context 
and the tribunal context, cf. ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on 
Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 
October 2002, para. 76: “[T]he national case law must be “translated” in order to apply to the particular 
context in which this Tribunal operates.” 
93 In this context, one could also argue that the moment national police forces/international troops are 
executing arrest/detentions/transfers for the tribunal, they function as the tribunal’s enforcement arm, 
although this is in no way saying that these entities can thus be seen as organs of the tribunal. See for 
this point also ns. 340 and 375 of Chapter VI and accompanying text. See also Lamb 2000, p. 241. 
Nevertheless, one can imagine that the tribunal will more readily refuse jurisdiction in case national 
police forces/international troops working for the tribunal are involved in a serious male captus than in 
case an entity without any connection to the tribunal is involved in it, see also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, 
Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by 
the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 114: “[I]n a situation where an accused is 
very seriously mistreated, maybe even subjected to inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, or torture, 
before being handed over to the Tribunal, this may constitute a legal impediment to the exercise of 
jurisdiction over such an accused. This would certainly be the case where persons acting for SFOR or 








In addition, if the tribunal – and this also goes for a national court – did not remedy 
wrongs committed in its pre-trial phase, whichever entity committed those wrongs, 
the suspect would fall into a legal vacuum, a situation which must, of course, be 
prevented by the court which is ultimately prosecuting the case.95  
However, even if the tribunals adopt a broader version of the abuse of process 
doctrine than that at the national level, in that the tribunals would also refuse 
jurisdiction in the case of a serious male captus situation occurring in the pre-trial 
phase of their cases, irrespective of who committed this male captus situation, the 
male detentus threshold suggested in what is arguably the most authoritative case on 
this matter, the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision of Nikolić, still appears96 to be 
high.  
From this case, in which it was assumed that the suspect was brought into the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY by a forcible kidnapping executed by private individuals, 
one may deduce that jurisdiction would not be refused if, in the process of bringing 
a suspect of very serious crimes to justice, the sovereignty of a State is violated 
(arguably even if that State were to complain about the violation and request the 
return of the suspect), on the condition that, in the course of that process, the 
suspect’s rights are not violated to such an extent that jurisdiction must be refused.  
It is not hard to agree with the Appeals Chamber that “certain human rights 
violations are of such a serious nature that they require that the exercise of 
jurisdiction be declined”. However, because it was assumed that Nikolić was the 
victim of an abduction, because the Appeals Chamber was apparently not very 
impressed by the value of State sovereignty and because the Appeals Chamber, in 
justifying its approach, refers to passages from cases which particularly focus on 
serious mistreatment when writing about their male detentus threshold, it could be 
argued that the Appeals Chamber’s male detentus test appears to be mainly 
interested in the seriousness of the mistreatment inflicted on the suspect. This could 
mean that the Appeals Chamber would not be concerned about an abduction, as long 
as that abduction was not accompanied by serious mistreatment.97 
                                                                                                                                              
94 Cf. also ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, ‘Appeal of Decision of 
Holbrooke Agreement’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-05/18-AR73.4, 27 July 2009, paras. 109-111 (see also 
n. 738 of Chapter VI). 
95 See also Sluiter 2001, pp. 155-156, commenting on the Dokmanović case: “A positive aspect of the 
examination of in particular human rights instruments appears to be its full application to that part of the 
criminal procedure that takes place outside the courtroom. In this respect, the Chamber, in my view, 
acknowledged the overall responsibility of the ICTY for these procedures. This responsibility is based 
on the duty incumbent upon the Trial Chamber pursuant to Article 20 to ensure that the accused receives 
a fair trial and on the vertical co-operation relationship between States, which enables the Tribunals to 
impose modalities of execution. It is imperative that the defendant receives the full protection of human 
rights instruments and should not be the victim of the fragmentation of the criminal procedure over two 
or even more jurisdictions [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
96 See n. 98. 
97 As also explained in Chapter VI, although the Appeals Chamber’s reference to the Barayagwiza case 
(where there was no mistreatment of the suspect) and the test mentioned in that case (“It is a process by 
which Judges may decline to exercise the court’s jurisdiction in cases where to exercise that jurisdiction 
in light of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove detrimental to the court’s 








The problem with this male detentus test is that it is not entirely clear,98 given the 
general observations of the Appeals Chamber in Nikolić and other indications from 
that decision,99 whether this is the general male detentus test for the ICTY, 
                                                                                                                                              
Appeals Chamber’s other references are particularly focused on the mistreatment aspect. First of all, the 
Appeals Chamber refers to the Nikolić Trial Chamber’s words which specifically focus on the question 
whether Nikolić was seriously mistreated: “[W]here an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe 
even subjected to inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to the 
Tribunal, this may constitute a legal impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction over such an accused. 
This would certainly be the case where persons acting for SFOR or the Prosecution were involved in 
such very serious mistreatment.” (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 28.) 
See also ibid., para. 31: “In the present case, the trial Chamber examined the facts agreed to by the 
parties. It established that the treatment of the Appellant was not of such an egregious nature as to 
impede the exercise of jurisdiction. (…) [T]he Appeals Chamber concurs with the Trial Chamber that 
the circumstances of this case do not warrant, under the standard defined above, the setting aside of 
jurisdiction.” The Appeals Chamber also referred to a passage from the Toscanino case dealing with the 
national concept of due process. These words could, in itself, encompass a ‘normal’ abduction but the 
Toscanino test has later been interpreted as a very restricted male detentus possibility. An abduction as 
such is not enough. What is required is in fact an abduction accompanied by serious mistreatment. For 
example, the judges in the Yunis case stated that their case did not involve “the type of cruel, inhumane 
and outrageous conduct that would warrant dismissal under Toscanino.” (US District Court, District of 
Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, Crim. No. 87-0377 (681 F.Supp. 909), p. 920.) 
That the Appeals Chamber prefers that interpretation of the Toscanino case can also be derived from its 
reference to the paragraphs in the Dokmanović case where one can read: “[T]here was no “cruel, 
inhumane and outrageous conduct that would warrant dismissal under Toscanino” in the arrest of Mr. 
Dokmanović. The accused was not mistreated in any way on his journey to the Erdut base. There was 
nothing about the arrest to shock the conscience [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial 
Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko Dokmanović, 
‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 
October 1997, para. 75.) 
98 As explained in Chapter VI, the Defence in Nikolić was apparently also not very sure about the exact 
content of the Appeals Chamber’s male detentus test and therefore asked the Chamber for clarification, 
see ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli[ć], ‘Motion Requesting Clarification of 
the Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 20 June 
2003, para. 5: “[T]he defence respectfully requests clarification of exactly what test is contemplated by 
‘the standard defined above’ [see para. 31 of the Appeals Chamber’s decision, ChP], and where that 
above (…) is to be found in the instant judgement. The facts agreed by the parties encompassed 
kidnapping and the forcible removal by a person against his will from a sovereign jurisdiction to another 
jurisdiction without the leave of either, such having involved the prosecution and conviction of some of 
the perpetrators in Serbia. If it be the case that the defence is correct in interpreting the ‘standard’ simply 
thus, that the agreed subjective facts were not sufficient to establish an egregious violation, then the 
defence respectfully requests what ‘standard’ is applicable so as to form the watershed between 
illegality that, on the one hand is egregious and, on the other, is not. That, with respect cannot be an 
abstraction, as the use of the phrase ‘the standard defined’ implies just that, a defined test [emphasis in 
original, ChP].” However, the Appeals Chamber, declaring the request “frivolous”, considered that no 
clarification was required, see ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on 
Motion Requesting Clarification’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 6 August 2003, A 69. See also Sloan 2006, 
pp. 333-334. 
99 After all, the Appeals Chamber also bases its ‘serious violation’ criterion on cases such as Toscanino 
and Dokmanović, cases in which the prosecuting forum itself was involved in the (alleged) irregularity. 
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber, in its central question and last sentence from its strategy, makes use of 
the combination “violations (…) committed by SFOR, and by extension OTP [emphasis added, 








applicable to any male captus situation, or whether this is the more specific male 
detentus test for the situation applicable in that specific case, in which the OTP was 
not involved in the abduction.  
To raise a normative point again here, it is submitted that if the serious/egregious 
violation test is the male detentus test applicable to any male captus situation (even 
a male captus situation in which the OTP is involved), the serious/egregious 
violation test should definitely not be restricted to serious mistreatment 
circumstances.100 After all, that would mean that the Tribunal would not refuse 
jurisdiction in the case of an abduction, executed by the OTP, as long as that 
abduction was not accompanied by serious mistreatment. That cannot seriously be 
the Tribunal’s stance. As argued in the context of the Nikolić case, if the OTP were 
involved in an abduction, the ICTY should view this as such a serious male captus 
situation that it should resolutely refuse jurisdiction. In such a case, it should not 
matter whether or not the accused was seriously mistreated.101 The mere fact that the 
OTP would orchestrate an abduction should make the judges refuse jurisdiction. It is 
not so much the harm inflicted on the suspect (which might be minimal) or the harm 
inflicted on the sovereignty of a State102 which should lead to the refusal of 
jurisdiction here, it is above all the integrity and credibility of the Tribunal as an 
institution based on (international) (human rights) law which would be harmed if the 
trial were to continue.103 In that sense, neither should it matter whether a State has, 
                                                                                                                                              
(ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning 
Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, paras. 3 and 18.) That could mean that the 
conclusion of the Appeals Chamber, namely that the remedy of setting aside jurisdiction will almost 
never be the appropriate remedy, is also applicable to situations where the violations can be attributed to 
the OTP. 
100 Note, by the way, that a ‘normal’ arrest (not, for example, an abduction) accompanied by serious 
mistreatment may also constitute such a serious male captus that the Tribunal will refuse jurisdiction. 
See also Lamb who provides the following example of “an arrest which is so tainted by such illegality as 
to preclude the trial of the accused by the ICTY [original footnote omitted, ChP]” (Lamb 2000, p. 205): 
“For example, where the arrest of an indictee involved extreme, gratuitous violence or torture inflicted 
by Tribunal personnel and/or the international forces effecting the arrest, or where there has been 
official collusion in such abuses.” (Ibid., p. 205, n. 127.) 
101 In that respect, it can be argued that the Tribunal should follow the lower male detentus standards 
which can, for example, be found in cases like Bennett. See also Sloan 2006, p. 337: “The Appeals 
Chamber made no effort to reconcile the approach in the Toscanino case [perhaps it is better to speak 
here of the interpretation of this case by subsequent courts, ChP] with the jurisprudence of other states 
which did not require an egregious element to the violation of human rights of an accused in order for 
the court to reject jurisdiction [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
102 That might indeed be of less importance to an international criminal tribunal like the ICTY whose 
relationship with national States is of a superior, vertical and not of an equal, horizontal nature. 
However, as already explained (see n. 636 of Chapter VI), the fact that the sovereignty aspect “by 
definition cannot play the same role” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision 
on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 
October 2002, para. 100) in the context of the Tribunals does not mean that the Tribunal has a ‘carte 
blanche’ in violating the sovereignty of domestic States.  
103 Cf. also Sloan 2006, pp. 342-343: “If all the facts were brought to light and it became clear that 
SFOR had been involved in illegal behaviour, the nature of the violation of human rights and 
sovereignty would appear in a different light. Indeed, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a 








for example, protested and requested the return of the suspect.104 An abduction as 
such (with no further qualification) should lead to the ending of the case if the 
Tribunal wants to be taken seriously as a court of law. One could also mention 
practical considerations here; such an approach would arguably also be damaging to 
the entire mission of the Tribunal.105 In addition, neither should one forget that the 
negative consequences of proceeding with a case involving an abduction might not 
be limited to the context of the Tribunals. For national States/courts, these 
international institutions may be seen as examples to follow. If employees of a 
Tribunal are involved in an abduction and in a way get away with it (because the 
judges do not decline jurisdiction), then national States/courts can refer to the 
Tribunal’s approach to defend their own (potentially) dubious methods of bringing 
suspects to trial or to defend the ‘approval’ of such methods by proceeding with the 
case.106 That in turn would harm the integrity of these States/courts, the human 
                                                                                                                                              
SFOR’s intention to carry out illegal capture operations (...). Were such findings to have been made, the 
arrest process would have been found to be contaminated. The obligation of the Appeals Chamber, 
therefore, would have been to provide a remedy that reflected the ICTY’s intolerance of such conduct 
by making it clear that such behaviour in the future would be unlikely to lead to the prosecution of the 
accused. This might very well have taken the form of ordering the release of Nikolić”. See also Scharf 
2000, pp. 969-970, commenting on authorities condemning male captus techniques as international 
human rights violations: “These precedents would suggest that an international criminal tribunal would 
have to dismiss a case where the defendant has been abducted in violation of international law.” 
104 Although Section 2 of this chapter has shown that there seems to be a customary international law 
rule that courts will refuse jurisdiction in the case of an abduction followed by a protest and request for 
the return of the suspect, it was also remarked that judges will probably refuse jurisdiction in such cases 
to, among other things, protect the fragile legal international order based on the equality of sovereign 
States and to do what its Executive has failed to do, namely to return the suspect to the injured State. 
However, this rationale is less important in the ‘vertical’ context of, for example, the ICTY and ICTR, 
although it is not absent either (see the just-made observations that certain decisions of these Tribunals 
may also have their effect on the horizontal level). (Cf. also Van der Wilt 2004, pp. 294-295.) As a 
result, one can wonder whether this rule of customary international law (which, in principle, is also 
applicable to these Tribunals) can be applied mutatis mutandis into their context. Perhaps it could be 
argued that in such circumstances, there would be no obligation for the ICTY/ICTR to transfer the 
suspect back. Notwithstanding this, however, it has already been submitted that in the case of an 
abduction orchestrated by the Tribunals, the latter should return (conditionally, see n. 179 and 
accompanying text) the suspect back, whether or not there has been a protest from the injured State. 
105 See also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
65: “Both SFOR and the Tribunal are involved in a peace mission and are expected to contribute in a 
positive way to the restoration of peace and security in the area. Any use of methods and practices that 
would, in themselves, violate fundamental principles of international law and justice would be contrary 
to the mission of this Tribunal.” Cf. also Henquet 2003, p. 146: “The purpose of the Tribunal, indeed the 
legal basis for its establishment, is to contribute to the restoration of peace and security in the former 
Yugoslavia. Thus, it might be argued, if the Tribunal is to succeed in this task it must be perceived as 
credible and just. This requires it to uphold the highest standards of justice.” See also Van Sliedregt 
2001 B, pp. 82-83. 
106 In the words of Swart (when writing about the context of respect for international human rights): 
“[B]oth ad hoc Tribunals inevitably provide role models for national systems of criminal justice. Lack 
of respect for individual rights could, therefore, have negative consequences that transcend the limited 
framework of the Tribunals.” (Swart 2001, p. 201.) See also Carcano 2005, p. 91: “[N]ational courts, 








rights of their suspects and – what is far more important for the horizontal context 
than for the context of the Tribunals – the very foundation of the inter-State level 
itself, namely respect for another State’s sovereignty.107 Furthermore, this could also 
have consequences for the ICC, the context of which will be discussed in the next 
part of this book.108  
Luckily, however, there are also indications in the Appeals Chamber’s decision 
of Nikolić that the ICTY would refuse jurisdiction if the OTP were involved in an 
abduction as such (without serious mistreatment).109 This view can arguably also be 
                                                                                                                                              
international criminal law, may be influenced by the content of international decisions.” See further 
Smeulers 2007, p. 108 (writing about the concepts of human rights and due process of law): “The 
tribunal fulfills an important and exemplary function.” See finally Starr 2008, pp. 713-714: “At least 
some of the ICTs’ judges see the Tribunals as models for other courts’ treatment of defendants and point 
out that respecting due process is crucial to that mission. Indeed, the ICTs’ procedural rules and 
jurisprudence have repeatedly been cited by scholars discussing human rights in the context of domestic 
proceedings, by other international courts and commissions and advocates before those bodies, and by 
domestic courts interpreting their own international legal obligations [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
One could here think, for example, of the Al-Moayad and Mushwena cases discussed in Chapter V. 
107 See again (see also n. 519 and accompanying text of Chapter III) UNSC Res. 138 of 23 June 1960 
(S/4349), in which the Council, dealing with the Israeli abduction of Eichmann in Argentina, stated “that 
the repetition of acts such as that giving rise to this situation would involve a breach of the principles 
upon which international order is founded, creating an atmosphere of insecurity and distrust 
incompatible with the preservation of peace”. Cf. also Van der Wilt 2004, p. 295, who explains that if 
the Tribunal would knowingly make use of States carrying out violations of State sovereignty for the 
Tribunal, it would also jeopardise the peaceful coexistence. 
108 See also Sloan 2006, p. 333: “[T]o simply observe that the violation [of State sovereignty, ChP] may 
lead to ‘consequences for the international responsibility of the State or organization involved’, without 
establishing meaningful parameters regarding when such violations will be tolerated by the ICTY, gives 
a blank cheque to those who would violate state sovereignty in what they perceive to be the best 
interests of international criminal justice. If this were to be considered a precedent for capture of those 
indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) residing in non-cooperating member states, the 
ramifications could be very damaging to international peace and security [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].” 
109 It can, for example, be argued that the cases to which the Appeals Chamber refers would not exclude 
this. (However, as explained, the Appeals Chamber seems particularly interested in the serious 
mistreatment passages of some of these cases.) For example, the Barayagwiza case (where there was no 
mistreatment of the suspect) and the test mentioned in that case (“It is a process by which Judges may 
decline to exercise the court’s jurisdiction in cases where to exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious 
and egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity.” 
(ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-
19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74)) would not exclude a ‘normal’ abduction (without serious 
mistreatment). See also ibid.: “Under the doctrine of “abuse of process”, proceedings that have been 
lawfully initiated may be terminated after an indictment has been issued if improper or illegal 
procedures are employed in pursuing an otherwise lawful process [emphasis added, ChP].” 
Furthermore, one can also find evidence in the Toscanino case itself that a normal abduction would fall 
under its male detentus test, although the case has not been interpreted as such in subsequent cases. (See 
also Michell 1996, p. 403: “[T]hese later interpretations suggest incorrectly that Toscanino was 
primarily a “torture” case rather than a “forcible abduction” case.”) In addition, the Nikolić and 
Dokmanović cases arguably also include passages which can be seen as supporting a male detentus test, 
which could include a normal abduction, without serious mistreatment. In the Trial Chamber’s decision 
in Nikolić, the judges stated more generally: “Due process of law also includes questions such as how 
the Parties have been conducting themselves in the context of a particular case and how an Accused has 








found in the Trial Chamber’s decision of Nikolić110 and in cases which followed the 
Appeals Chamber’s decision, although many of them, probably because of the 
                                                                                                                                              
come to court with clean hands applies equally to the Prosecution coming to a Trial Chamber of this 
Tribunal. In addition, this Chamber concurs with the Appeals Chamber in the Barayagwiza case that the 
abuse of process doctrine may be relied on if “in the circumstances of a particular case, proceeding with 
the trial of the accused would contravene the court’s sense of justice”. However, in order to prompt a 
Chamber to use this doctrine, it needs to be clear that the rights of the Accused have been egregiously 
violated [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, 
‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-
94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 111.) In addition, neither should it be forgotten that the passage from the 
Dokmanović case, to which the Appeals Chamber refers, was (only) made in the context of luring. 
However, before the Trial Chamber in Dokmanović turned to this male captus situation, it had 
distinguished this situation from the male captus situation forcible abduction. This may mean that the 
Trial Chamber might have dismissed the case of Dokmanović if the OTP was not involved in a mere 
luring operation, but in an abduction operation. See also Scharf 1998, p. 371: “[T]he Trial Chamber 
focused on the distinction between “luring” (the means used to arrest Dokmanović) and “forcible 
abduction”, reckoning that the former was acceptable while the latter might constitute grounds for 
dismissal in future cases [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Next to these references, one could also 
point to the fact that in paras. 27 and 33 of its decision, the ICTY Appeals Chamber – in contrast to its 
central question and strategy – suddenly leaves out the part “and by extension (to) the OTP”, see also n. 
646 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
110 Where the judges, even though they focused on the mistreatment example of the abuse of process 
doctrine in their explanation that this doctrine can also be applied to third parties (in that serious 
mistreatment can also lead to the ending of the case, not only when entities which can (more or less) be 
connected to the Tribunal are involved in it, but also when entities with no connection to the Tribunal 
are involved in it), also stated more generally that “in order to prompt a Chamber to use this doctrine 
[the abuse of process doctrine, ChP], it needs to be clear that the rights of the Accused have been 
egregiously violated [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan 
Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case 
No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 111.) Furthermore, one can also point to the Trial Chamber’s 
confirmation of the approach taken in the first Barayagwiza decision, where the suspect was seriously 
mistreated by neither the national authorities nor the Prosecution but where the judges nevertheless 
dismissed the case, see ibid.: “[T]his Chamber concurs with the Appeals Chamber in the Barayagwiza 
case that the abuse of process doctrine may be relied on if “in the circumstances of a particular case, 
proceeding with the trial of the accused would contravene the court’s sense of justice”.” (Note, see also 
the previous footnote, that in the Barayagwiza case, it was stated as well that “[u]nder the doctrine of 
“abuse of process”, proceedings that have been lawfully initiated may be terminated after an indictment 
has been issued if improper or illegal procedures are employed in pursuing an otherwise lawful process 
[emphasis added, ChP].” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, 
‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74.)) But perhaps the clearest 
indication that the Trial Chamber in Nikolić would also refuse jurisdiction if staff of the Tribunal were 
involved in an abduction (whether or not that abduction was accompanied by serious mistreatment) can 
be found in the following words, see ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision 
on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 
October 2002, para. 111: “[T]his Chamber concurs with the view expressed in several national judicial 
decisions, according to which the issue of respect for due process of law encompasses more than merely 
the duty to ensure a fair trial for the Accused. Due process of law also includes questions such as how 
the Parties have been conducting themselves in the context of a particular case and how an Accused has 
been brought into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The finding in the Ebrahim case [where, it should be 
remembered, the suspect was the victim of a ‘normal’ abduction, without any serious mistreatment, 
ChP] that the State must come to court with clean hands applies equally to the Prosecution coming to a 








(partial) involvement of third parties in the male captus, focused in particular on the 
serious mistreatment example of the abuse of process doctrine.111  
Although one can seriously doubt that a tribunal would only refuse jurisdiction 
in the context of actions from third parties if these actions amounted to serious 
mistreatment or torture (this point will crop up again in a moment), it is in any case 
to be welcomed that the tribunal cases contain reasonings which entail that the 
judges would refuse jurisdiction if the OTP were to be involved in an abduction as 
such. After all, such a male captus can easily be seen as a ‘serious’ or ‘egregious’ 
violation under the Tribunals’ abuse of process doctrine.112 It may be illustrative 
here to refer again113 to the male detentus possibilities proposed by the OTP itself in 
the Nikolić case. An abduction orchestrated by the OTP could easily fall under the 
first possibility:  
 
a) [u]nambiguous, advertent[114] violations of international law which can be 
attributed[115] to the Office of the Prosecutor; and/or b) a residual category of cases 
where the violations in question are of such egregiousness or outrageousness that, 
irrespective of any lack of involvement on the part of the Prosecution, the Trial 
Chamber could not, in good conscience, continue to exercise its jurisdiction over the 
Accused [original footnote omitted, ChP].116  
                                                          
111 See, for example, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case 
No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 206: “While a Chamber may use its discretion under the 
circumstances of a case to decline to exercise jurisdiction, it should only do so “where to exercise that 
jurisdiction in light of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove detrimental 
to the court’s integrity.” For example, “in circumstances where an accused is very seriously mistreated, 
maybe even subject to inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to 
the Tribunal, this may constitute a legal impediment.” However, those cases are exceptional and, in 
most circumstances, the “remedy of setting aside jurisdiction, will . . . be disproportionate.” The 
Appeals Chamber gives due weight to the violations alleged by the Appellant; however, it does not 
consider that this case falls within the exceptional category of cases highlighted above [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].” Note that in this case, the Appeals Chamber arguably looked at violations on 
the part of both the national authorities and the Prosecution.  
112 See, for example, Henquet 2003, p. 123. See also the suggestion of this study, made in the Nikolić 
case, that the Tribunal should have stated more clearly that its male detentus test also contains the 
situation where employees of the Tribunal itself intentionally committed serious (procedural) 
irregularities in the process of bringing a suspect to trial, such as an abduction. See n. 633 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
113 See n. 478 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
114 A synonym of this word is ‘mindful’, a word which clarifies that there must have been a real intent 
from the Prosecution to violate international law. See also the word “conscious” in a comparable test 
from the Prosecution, see n. 116.  
115 The Prosecution was of the opinion that “[t]he mere subsequent acceptance by the Prosecution of 
custody of the Accused is not sufficient in and of itself to satisfy the required level of “collusion” and/or 
“official involvement.” According to the Prosecution, at least some form of adoption and approval by 
the Prosecution of such violations is required [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial Chamber 
II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 27.) 
116 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 28. It may be 
interesting to note that the Prosecution would also find the first situation to constitute egregious conduct, 








Although it might very well be argued that an abduction as such, orchestrated by the 
Prosecution, would almost certainly fall under this first notion of “[u]nambiguous, 
advertent violations of international law”, things are less clear with respect to that 
other important male captus situation, the method of luring. As already explained in 
Chapter III, even though a luring operation may arguably lead to a violation of the 
sovereignty of the suspect’s State of residence – for example, if agents of the luring 
State enter the territory of the State of residence to conduct police work – and of the 
suspect’s human rights, it was also conceded that luring is in certain aspects less 
reprehensible than abduction and that that fact may lead to less serious 
consequences.  
The ICTY Trial Chamber in Dokmanović went even further: it held that the 
luring of Dokmanović, in the course of which staff from the Prosecution entered the 
territory of the FRY, “is consistent with principles of international law and the 
sovereignty of the FRY”.117 This means that, according to this case, luring as such 
would not lead to a male detentus outcome. However, that may be different if that 
luring falls under the second notion mentioned above (“a residual category of cases 
where the violations in question are of such egregiousness or outrageousness that, 
irrespective of any lack of involvement on the part of the Prosecution, the Trial 
Chamber could not, in good conscience, continue to exercise its jurisdiction over the 
Accused”), cf. the cases of Stocké and Yunis, see footnotes 54 and 55.  
                                                                                                                                              
Prosecution’s own conduct would have to be in some way egregious [emphasis in original, ChP])” 
(ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to Defence 
“Motion to Determine Issues as Agreed Between the Parties And the Trial Chamber…and the 
Consequences of Any Illegal Conduct Material to the Accused, His Arrest and Subsequent Detention”, 
filed 29 October 2001’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 12 November 2001, para. 17). See also ICTY, Trial 
Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to “Defence Motion for Relief 
Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and 
Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-Related Abuse of Process Within the Contemplation of 
Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 72” filed 17 May 2001’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 31 May 
2001, para. 31: “a) unambiguous, conscious violations of international legality which can be attributed 
to the Office of the Prosecutor (i.e. the Prosecution’s own conduct would have to be in some way 
egregious); and/or b) a residual category of case[s] where the violations in question are of such 
egregiousness or outrageousness that, irrespective of any lack of involvement on the part of the 
Prosecution, the Trial Chamber could not, in good conscience, continue to exercise its jurisdiction over 
the accused. In such circumstances, his or her release may therefore be ordered so as to safeguard the 
integrity of the entire judicial process [emphasis in original, ChP].” The Prosecution formulated this test 
relying on Lamb 2000. See also Sloan 2003 A., p. 110, n. 183. The following male detentus test from 
the ECCC would arguably not exclude an abduction orchestrated by the Prosecution either: “The abuse 
of process doctrine (...), which would require a tribunal to decline to exercise its jurisdiction in a 
partic[u]lar case, has been narrowly construed and limited to cases where the illegal conduct in question 
is such as to make it repugnant to the rule of law to put the accused on trial [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” (ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 33.) 
117 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and Slavko 
Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case No. IT-








That may also be the case for other male captus situations with which the judges 
have to cope:118 if they are not seen as clear violations of international law on the 
part of the Prosecution, they may not lead to the ending of the case, unless in the 
course of this male captus situation such serious (other) violations/irregularities 
have occurred that the judges cannot, in good conscience, continue the case.119  
However, it should also be noted that the general reasonings of, for example, the 
Nikolić120 and Barayagwiza121 cases as mentioned in footnotes 109-110, cases which 
were decided after the Dokmanović case, may entail that tribunal judges confronted 
by luring-like situations are of the opinion that the Prosecutor has not come to court 
                                                          
118 Although Chapter VI has not seen male captus situations which can really be compared to the inter-
State concept of disguised extradition, there have been some cases in which the State of residence may 
have played a rather dubious role in the transfer of the suspect, see, for example, the Milošević case. 
119 It is reminded that judges, if they look into irregularities from authorities which can be linked to the 
State of residence, should persuade themselves of the fact that actual violations have in fact occurred. It 
can be maintained that judges should indeed only refuse jurisdiction in the most extreme cases and not 
in cases where it is clear that uncooperative States, executing arrests for the Tribunal, have violated 
procedures on purpose, even if these violations are rather serious, in an effort to ensure that a person’s 
trial would not continue because of these violations. In that respect, one must agree with the 
understandable and pertinent concerns of the Prosecution in Todorović that “it could defeat the purposes 
of justice if every illegality by a State authority, over which the Tribunal has no control, could vitiate a 
prosecution altogether. Indeed, any such doctrine might potentially encourage certain States, which have 
hitherto failed to fulfil their obligations of co-operation with the Tribunal, to hand accused persons over 
to the Tribunal but to ensure that there are serious irregularities in the process. The States concerned 
could thus claim that they are fulfilling their obligation to co-operate, while at the same time ensuring 
that the prosecution against the accused cannot proceed.” (ICTY, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. 
Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić a/k/a Miro Brko, Stevan Todorović a/k/a Stiv a/k/a Stevo 
a/k/a Monstrum and Simo Zarić a/k/a Šolaja, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to the “Notice of Motion for 
Evidentiary Hearing on Arrest, Detention and Removal of Defendant Stevan Todorović and for 
Extension of Time to Move to Dismiss Indictment” Filed by Stevan Todorović on 10 February 1999’, 
Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 22 February 1999, para. 51.) See also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. 
Dragan Nikolić, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to “Defence Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality 
of Arrest Following Upon the Prior Unlawful Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-
Related Abuse of Process Within the Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 
72” filed 17 May 2001’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 31 May 2001, paras. 34-35 and ICTY, Trial Chamber II, 
The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Prosecutor’s Response to Defence “Motion to Determine Issues as 
Agreed Between the Parties And the Trial Chamber…and the Consequences of Any Illegal Conduct 
Material to the Accused, His Arrest and Subsequent Detention”, filed 29 October 2001’, Case No. IT-
94-2-PT, 12 November 2001, para. 6. (See ns. 344 and 476 of Chapter VI.) 
120 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
111: “[T]his Chamber concurs with the view expressed in several national judicial decisions, according 
to which the issue of respect for due process of law encompasses more than merely the duty to ensure a 
fair trial for the Accused. Due process of law also includes questions such as how the Parties have been 
conducting themselves in the context of a particular case and how an Accused has been brought into the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The finding in the Ebrahim case that the State must come to court with 
clean hands applies equally to the Prosecution coming to a Trial Chamber of this Tribunal.” 
121 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74: “Under the doctrine of “abuse of process”, proceedings 
that have been lawfully initiated may be terminated after an indictment has been issued if improper or 








with clean hands, has resorted to illegal procedures, and thus that jurisdiction must 
be refused.122  
Interestingly (and returning, as promised, to the point of serious mistreatment), 
the words mentioned in the second male detentus possibility proposed by the 
Prosecution in Nikolić – “violations (…) of such egregiousness or outrageousness” – 
are not necessarily restricted to serious mistreatment.  
The abuse of process test of the tribunals can be found in the Barayagwiza case 
and entails that a judge, confronted by certain serious/egregious 
violations/improprieties/misconduct, may stop the proceedings of the case if he 
believes that to continue the case in these circumstances would be detrimental to the 
court’s integrity/sense of justice, irrespective of the entity responsible.123 Thus, the 
test ‘only’ requires such serious violations/irregularities that the judge cannot 
proceed with the case, not necessarily serious mistreatment/torture-like 
circumstances. One can see in the case law of the international(ised) criminal 
tribunals that the serious mistreatment element is very often used as the example to 
illustrate the concept of serious violations, especially, but not necessarily,124 in the 
context of actions of third parties. That is unproblematic, as long as one does not 
forget that the test itself is not a ‘serious mistreatment/torture test’. Serious 
mistreatment/torture is only an example of serious 
impropriety/misconduct/violations, but these concepts constitute the actual test. 
Nevertheless, it seems that some, perhaps inspired by the Trial Chamber’s words in 
                                                          
122 Cf. again (see also n. 112) the suggestion of this study, made in the Nikolić case, that the Tribunal 
should refuse jurisdiction if employees of the Tribunal itself intentionally committed serious 
(procedural) irregularities in the process of bringing a suspect to trial, such as an abduction. (See n. 633 
and accompanying text of Chapter VI.) See also n. 50 of the present chapter. As concerns the above-
mentioned element of intent: even though the words from the previous two footnotes do not contain this 
element (see also n. 20) as explicitly as the first male detentus possibility of the Prosecution (see ns. 114 
and 116), they can nevertheless be viewed as containing that element implicitly, see the idea that the 
Prosecution must come to court with clean hands and that jurisdiction may be refused when improper or 
illegal procedures are employed in pursuing an otherwise lawful process. 
123 See, for example, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, 
Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, paras. 74: “It is a process by which Judges may decline 
to exercise the court’s jurisdiction in cases where to exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious and 
egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity.” See also 
ibid., para. 77: “[T]he abuse of process doctrine may be relied on in two distinct situations: (1) where 
delay has made a fair trial for the accused impossible; and (2) where in the circumstances of a particular 
case, proceeding with the trial of the accused would contravene the court’s sense of justice, due to pre-
trial impropriety or misconduct.” In this context, it is also submitted that the judge should take a liberal 
stance. Hence, even if he is of the opinion, for example, that private individuals cannot violate human 
rights (see the Nikolić case), he should ask himself whether what happened to the suspect is nonetheless 
so serious that jurisdiction must be refused. In that respect, one can agree with the following words from 
the Appeals Chamber in Karadžić: “[T]he question before the Appeals Chamber is whether, assuming 
that the Appellant’s factual submission are accepted, proceeding with the trial of the Appellant would 
contravene to the Tribunal’s sense of justice or would be detrimental to the Tribunal’s integrity, due to 
pre-trial impropriety or misconduct amounting to serious and egregious violations of the Appellant’s 
rights [emphasis added, ChP].” (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision 
on Karadžić’s Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on Alleged Holbrooke Agreement’ (Public), Case 
No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, 12 October 2009, para. 51.) 








Dokmanović,125 a case issued prior to the Appeals Chamber’s decisions in 
Barayagwiza, have forgotten this,126 although it can be argued that the Karadžić 
case has correctly re-clarified the state of the law.127  
                                                          
125 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and 
Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case 
No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 75: “[T]here was no “cruel, inhumane and outrageous 
conduct that would warrant dismissal under Toscanino” in the arrest of Mr. Dokmanović. The accused 
was not mistreated in any way on his journey to the Erdut base. There was nothing about the arrest to 
shock the conscience [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” It is reminded that 
Toscanino was tortured for almost three weeks. 
126 See, for example, ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 
001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 33: “Where the violations in question are not 
attributable to an international tribunal, this doctrine appears to be confined to instances of torture or 
serious mistreatment by the external authorities and has most usually been applied in relation to the 
process of arrest and transfer [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also ECCC, Office of the Co-
Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 002/14-08-2006, 
Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 21: “It is obvious that in a case of crimes against 
humanity, the proceedings should be stayed only where the rights of the accused have been seriously 
affected, at least, for example, to the degree in Toscanino.” (As also explained in the previous footnote, 
it is to be recalled that Toscanino was tortured for nearly three weeks.) The co-investigating judges of 
the ECCC also used more generally words when they stated that they “are (...) compelled to follow the 
solution adopted in Nikolic and Lubanga which requires, for the application of the abuse of [process] 
doctrine, the existence of grave violations of the rights of the Accused” (ibid.), but the words following 
that quotation again show that the co-investigating judges apparently require serious 
mistreatment/torture-like circumstances: “Where it has not been established or even alleged that DUCH 
suffered incidents of torture or serious mistreatment prior to his transfer before the Extraordinary 
Chambers, the prolonged detention under the jurisdiction of the Military Court, in comparison with the 
crimes against humanity alleged against the Accused, cannot be considered a sufficiently grave violation 
of the rights of the Accused.” (Ibid.) See also Ryngaert 2008, p. 733: “In cases where the tribunal was 
not involved in the violations of the defendant’s rights, the tribunals have only been willing to find 
abuse of process – and on that basis stay the proceedings – if the defendant was subjected to torture or 
serious mistreatment. It was also this rather high standard that was applied by the ECCC co-
investigating judges in Duch.” See also ibid., p.  735: “Careful analysis of the tribunals’ case law (…) 
demonstrates that all tribunals that have heard abuse of process challenges relating to violations of the 
rights of the accused in which the tribunal itself played no role (either because it did not commit them, 
or because it did not act in concert with the responsible state) apply this same strict standard; only 
torture or serious mistreatment could give rise to a stay of the proceedings.” See finally also ibid., p. 
736: “Consequently, in spite of appearances, there is in reality no contradiction between the application 
of the abuse of process doctrine by the international (or internationalized) criminal tribunals; in the 
absence of concerted action by the tribunals and the entity responsible for the violations (typically the 
state in whose custody the accused was before being transferred to the tribunal), only torture or serious 
mistreatment by that entity will lead to a stay of proceedings on the basis of abuse of process. As argued 
above, this principle deserves support, as, under specific circumstances, the international community’s 
desire to bring perpetrators of heinous crimes to justice may outweigh the accused perpetrator’s ‘less 
fundamental’ due-process rights.” 
127 See, for example, ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on the 
Accused’s Holbrooke Agreement Motion’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, 8 July 2009, para. 85: “As 
for the example of “serious mistreatment” of the accused by a third party, such as torture or cruel and/or 
degrading treatment, there is no indication that the Accused suffered such serious mistreatment or that 
there was any other egregious violation of his rights, including his right to political activity. In any 
event, in the opinion of this Chamber, it could only be in exceptional circumstances that actions of a 
third party that is completely unconnected to the Tribunal or the proceedings could ever lead to those 








Leaving the matter of serious mistreatment for now and returning to that other 
male detentus possibility of the OTP, the violations of international law which can 
be attributed to the Prosecution: if the tribunals were indeed to refuse jurisdiction in 
the case of a ‘normal’ abduction performed by its own people – and it seems that 
they would – they would fall below the male detentus test at the inter-State level, 
which, after all, appears to require not only an abduction, but an abduction either 1) 
accompanied by serious violations/mistreatment or 2) followed by a protest and 
request for the return of the suspect. This lower threshold is to be applauded.128     
However, as stated earlier, even if the tribunals adopt this lower threshold and 
even if the abuse of process doctrine accepted by the tribunals seems broader than 
that at the inter-State level (which is also generally defined but which seems 
nevertheless restricted to actions by entities which can be connected to the 
prosecuting forum), the tribunals are still more readily affiliated with the male 
captus bene detentus rule because no male captus situation has, ultimately, led to a 
male detentus result. This may be explained by the following two factors.129  
                                                                                                                                              
See also ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, ‘Appeal of Decision of 
Holbrooke Agreement’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-05/18-AR73.4, 27 July 2009, para. 104: “The 
Barayagwiza Appeals Chamber never purported to exclude third-party conduct from scrutiny under the 
abuse of process doctrine or to limit such scrutiny only to extreme cases of severe physical mistreatment 
or torture.” (One can, however, wonder why Karadžić made this point in his appeal as the Trial 
Chamber apparently shared his view, see the above-mentioned quotation in this footnote and in 
particular the words “or that there was any other egregious violation of his rights”.) See finally also 
ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on Karadžić’s Appeal of Trial 
Chamber’s Decision on Alleged Holbrooke Agreement’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, 12 
October 2009, para. 47: “[T]he Trial Chamber adopted the common standard established by the Appeals 
Chamber in the Barayagwiza Decision and in the Nikolić Appeal Decision, and not a higher one, by 
considering whether the Appellant suffered a serious mistreatment or if there was any other egregious 
violation of his rights [emphasis added, ChP].” See finally ibid., para. 51: “[T]he question before the 
Appeals Chamber is whether, assuming that the Appellant’s factual submission are accepted, proceeding 
with the trial of the Appellant would contravene to the Tribunal’s sense of justice or would be 
detrimental to the Tribunal’s integrity, due to pre-trial impropriety or misconduct amounting to serious 
and egregious violations of the Appellant’s rights.” 
128 See n. 46. 
129 The following two factors assume the existence of a male captus. However, like courts at the inter-
State level, tribunals may also be of the opinion that no male captus occurred in the first place, even if 
one can doubt whether that is accurate. In that case, the judge does not have to turn to the male captus 
bene/male detentus discussion because the basic requirement for this discussion (the male captus) is 
lacking. See, for example, the Dokmanović case and the views of the judges in that case on the method 
of luring (see also ns. 197, 236, 267 and 327 and accompanying text of Chapter VI). See in that respect 
also Smeulers 2007, p. 109: “From the Dokmanović case, however, it can be concluded that the Trial 
Chamber does not easily qualify an arrest as illegal. Dokmanović had been lured into entering UNTAES 
territory in order to be arrested. Although the prosecutor was closely involved in the arrest, the Trial 
Chamber concluded that the arrest was not unlawful. This is a decision that can be heavily criticized, 
because it can be seen as a violation of Article 5 European Convention of Human Rights [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Sluiter 2001, p. 153. Cf. also Cazala 2007, p. 838: “[O]n verra en 
étudiant les critères de qualification de l’arrestation que le juge a une très nette tendance à reconnaître la 
régularité de celle-ci dans des circonstances qui sont pourtant parfois très contestables (…). (…) L’étude 
de la jurisprudence permet de constater que l’adage male captus bene detentus est finalement très peu 
utilisé, les juges préférant avoir une conception assez étroite de l’arrestation irrégulière.” Cf. in that 








First, as the tribunals do not have their own police force, the male captus will 
often be performed by third parties. This, of course, diminishes the seriousness of 
the male captus. If a judge is confronted by a male captus, he must determine, 
taking every single aspect of the case into account, whether that male captus is so 
serious that to continue the case would undermine his sense of justice/the integrity 
of the court/the concept of a fair trial broadly perceived. Now, as already explained 
in the context of the Karadžić case, it can be argued that the nature of the actor 
responsible for the male captus is, of course, an important element which should be 
taken into account here.130 It can certainly be maintained that the integrity of a 
tribunal will more easily be affected by a certain violation if that violation could be 
attributed to the tribunal. The Barayagwiza/Nikolić cases ‘only’ support the idea that 
serious violations can lead to the ending of the case, irrespective of the entity 
responsible,131 but not that actions by a third party may not be given less weight than 
                                                                                                                                              
Appeals Chamber in Barayagwiza, is release and dismissal of charges. But that remedy, as the 
Barayagwiza case ultimately illustrated, would be catastrophic for the ICTs. Thus, whenever defendants, 
after a long delay, have complained of speedy trial violations, the ICTs have construed that right 
narrowly and avoided granting remedies. It is possible that this narrow reading is simply correct and that 
the ICTs would have adopted it regardless of the remedial cost. But some contrary evidence is provided 
by the ICTs’ greater willingness to enforce the speedy trial right when they consider its scope before a 
potential violation, in contemplation of some procedural development that would delay trial [emphasis 
in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
130 Cf. also Sluiter 2003 B, pp. 946-947: “Crucial factors, in determining whether or not this remedy 
[this is the termination of the proceedings, ChP] should be provided for are the following: 1. The degree 
of attribution of the violation to the Tribunal, in particular the Prosecutor (…); 2. The nature of the 
violation of individual rights (violation of individual rights of an egregious nature (…) may constitute a 
legal impediment to exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal, regardless of whether or not the Tribunal, 
in particular the Prosecutor, had anything to do with that violation).”  
131 Arguably, the tribunal should apply a broad concept of abuse of process doctrine here, see also the 
discussion on this point in the context of the Nikolić case. Cf. also ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The 
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, ‘Appeal of Decision of Holbrooke Agreement’ (Public), Case No. IT-
95-05/18-AR73.4, 27 July 2009, paras. 109-111: “Within national jurisdictions, it will almost always be 
a single state authority which creates the criminal law, investigates and arrests individuals for breaches 
of it, and establishes the courts in which to hear the criminal case. It is also the same state authority 
which is represented by the prosecution that proceeds with the case. In these circumstances, it will be 
exceedingly rare for an actor unrelated to the state to be involved in the law enforcement and 
adjudication. As such, it is perhaps rational for an abuse or process doctrine operating in this context to 
look primarily or solely to misconduct attributable to the state – reserving only an extraordinary or 
residual category for abusive misconduct attributable to other unrelated actors. The exact opposite is 
true of international tribunals. These are highly decentralized institutions. Only the actors which create 
the criminal law (the UNSC) and which hear and prosecute cases for breaches of its (the Tribunal/OTP) 
are exclusively related to the central authority (the UN). As the Tribunal itself frequently points out, “the 
International Tribunal has no enforcement arm of its own – it lacks a police force.” As such, it is entirely 
dependent on a diverse range of actors to fill this critical role. A whole host of states, inter-state 
organizations and international agencies – as well as diplomats, special envoys, local authorities, and 
military personnel, – routinely fill the key roles of investigating crimes, sharing intelligence, and 
arresting and transferring suspects. This involvement may be formal or informal, and it may occur with 
or even without the Tribunal’s knowledge. Where so many diverse actors may be involved in creating, 
enforcing and adjudicating international criminal law – sometimes even without one another’s 
knowledge or consent – it is essential that the doctrine of abuse of process in this setting not be applied 








actions by parties which can be connected to the prosecuting forum if the judge has 
to determine whether a certain violation is so serious that it must lead to the ending 
of the case. 
The second factor which may explain why the tribunals are still more readily 
affiliated with the male captus bene detentus rule is that the judges, even if they 
establish that a serious male captus has occurred, also look at the other side of the 
coin, namely the fact that the suspect is charged with serious crimes and that the 
international community demands that such a suspect should, if possible, be 
prosecuted. Hence, the judges basically have to determine, taking every aspect of 
their case into account, what is more serious: the male captus or that this person is 
prosecuted. Although the definition of the abuse of process doctrine from paragraph 
74 of the first Barayagwiza decision132 does not explicitly mention the possibility of 
taking this element into account, the fact that the doctrine is discretionary would 
indeed seem to provide room for judges, both at the national and at the international 
level, to take into account every single aspect of the case, including the importance 
of continuing the case where the suspect is charged with very serious crimes, in 
determining whether or not to resort to the extreme remedy of the refusal of 
jurisdiction. One could hereby refer to the definition of the doctrine as quoted in 
paragraph 77 of the same decision133 or to the well-known definition from the 
Bennett case134 (to which the Barayagwiza decision also alluded).135 These last-
mentioned definitions more clearly show that within the context of the – for this 
book – most interesting abuse of process situation, that which focuses not on the 
fairness of the trial itself but on the broad concept of a fair trial/the integrity of the 
proceedings (see also Subsection 4.3 of Chapter III), a judge may be of the opinion 
that a serious violation has occurred but that, taking into account the particulars of 
the case (which could include the seriousness of the alleged crimes and the 
importance of prosecution), one cannot say that to continue with the case, 
notwithstanding this violation, would contravene the court’s sense of justice. 
                                                                                                                                              
discretionary authority to look at all the events that have led to the proceedings and decide, regardless of 
whom they are attributable, whether on the whole they breach the Accused’s rights or contravene the 
Court’s sense of justice [emphasis in original and original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
132 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74: “It is a process by which Judges may decline to 
exercise the court’s jurisdiction in cases where to exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious and 
egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity.” 
133 See ibid., para. 77: “[T]he abuse of process doctrine may be relied on in two distinct situations: (1) 
where delay has made a fair trial for the accused impossible; and (2) where in the circumstances of a 
particular case, proceeding with the trial of the accused would contravene the court’s sense of justice, 
due to pre-trial impropriety or misconduct [emphasis added, ChP].” 
134 See House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 
June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 161: “[A] court has a discretion to stay any criminal 
proceedings on the ground that to try those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process 
either (1) because it will be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) 
because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the 
circumstances of a particular case [emphasis added, ChP].” 
135 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 








Alongside these definitions stemming from the Barayagwiza case, one may also 
point to the fact that the judges in this case took into account more explicitly the 
seriousness of Barayagwiza’s alleged crimes in determining whether or not the case 
had to be stopped (although many will argue that they did not attribute enough 
weight to this element): 
  
The crimes for which the Appellant is charged are very serious. However, in this case 
the fundamental rights of the Appellant were repeatedly violated. What may be 
worse, it appears that the Prosecutor’s failure to prosecute this case was tantamount to 
negligence. We find this conduct to be egregious and, in light of the numerous 
violations, conclude that the only remedy available for such prosecutorial inaction 
and the resultant denial of his rights is to release the Appellant and dismiss the 
charges against him.136  
 
Thus, the judges seem to have relative freedom in invoking the doctrine, meaning 
that they will only refuse jurisdiction under the abuse of process doctrine if, taking 
all the different elements of the case into account, they deem that to proceed with 
the case would be detrimental to the court’s sense of justice/integrity. The word 
“relative” has been chosen here because one can understand that there might be such 
serious circumstances – one could think here of an abduction orchestrated by the 
Prosecution during which the suspect is seriously mistreated – that the judges would 
have no option but to refuse jurisdiction if they still want to be taken seriously as 
custodians of the law, even in the case of a suspect charged with serious crimes.137 
In addition, it should also be pointed out that even though the first situation of the 
abuse of process doctrine (the one looking at the fairness of the trial itself and which 
is not the focus of this study, see again Subsection 4.3 of Chapter III) is part of a 
discretionary doctrine, one can argue that the discretion in this situation is also 
relative: if it is clear that the suspect can no longer receive a fair trial (in the strict 
sense of the word) (the minimum requirement of any trial), one can assume/hope 
that judges will refuse jurisdiction, whether or not that suspect is charged with 
serious crimes.138 
                                                          
136 Ibid., para. 106. See for the element ‘seriousness of the charges’ also Judge Shahabuddeen’s 
‘Separate Opinion’ to the decision of 3 November 1999, under ‘1. Post-transfer delay’: “Matters to be 
taken into account in evaluating whether that consequence [namely lack of jurisdiction, ChP] follows 
from a breach of the requirement of promptitude include the seriousness of the offences with which the 
accused is charged. Here the offences were serious. But the requirement of promptitude was 
fundamental, and its breach was also grave, the delay extending to a little over three months. On 
balance, I respectfully agree with the Appeals Chamber that the administration of justice by the Tribunal 
would suffer from proceeding with the case notwithstanding the delay.” 
137 In that respect, one cannot agree with the so-called Eichmann exception, which concept supports the 
idea that the trial of a suspect charged with very serious crimes should be decoupled from its pre-trial 
phase, see Higgins 1994, pp. 72-73 and Michell 1996, pp. 423-424. However, this concept is not 
followed by the tribunals (and rightly so) as very serious cases may, at least in theory, still lead to the 
ending of the case. 
138 Cf. also the discussion on this point in the context of the Levinge case, see the text following n. 159 








The element of ‘seriousness of the alleged crimes’ can also be found in the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber’s decision in Nikolić. Although its methodology in distilling this 
principle from the inter-State context was arguably not without its flaws, it must not 
be forgotten that the Appeals Chamber, “[d]rawing on these indications from 
national practice”,139 also added some observations of its own on this matter and that 
such observations are not without authority. It stated that there is a legitimate 
expectation that persons accused of ‘Universally Condemned Offences’ are quickly 
brought to justice140 and that this expectation “needs to be weighed against the 
principle of State sovereignty and the fundamental rights of the accused”.141 This 
view has been affirmed by different chambers and tribunals,142 as a result of which 
one can safely assert that the seriousness of the suspect’s alleged crimes is definitely 
an element which the international(ised) criminal tribunals take into account in 
determining whether or not a certain male captus should lead to a male detentus.  
Again adding a normative note to this principle from the context of the 
international(ised) criminal tribunals: one can argue that, to a certain extent (see 
infra), it may indeed be appropriate for courts, both at the national and at the 
international level, to take into account the seriousness of the suspect’s alleged 
crimes when determining the consequences of a certain male captus. As long as 
there is no clear (inter)national law rule obliging judges to refuse jurisdiction in a 
certain male captus case143 and judges consequently have discretion, for example, 
under the abuse of process doctrine, to decide whether or not the exercise of 
jurisdiction should be refused, it seems very reasonable for them to take every aspect 
of the case into account here. And one of those aspects may be that the suspect is 
charged with international crimes, crimes of which the international community 
demands that they be prosecuted. Hence, there is nothing strange about the fact that 
a judge, under the abuse of process doctrine and confronted by a certain male 
captus, is of the opinion that, taking every aspect of the case into account (including 
                                                          
139 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 24. 
140 See ibid., para. 25. 
141 Ibid., para. 26. 
142 See, for example, SCSL, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor Against Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, ‘Written Reasons for the Trial Chamber’s Oral Decision on the 
Defence Motion on Abuse of Process Due to Infringement of Principles of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege 
and Non-Retroactivity as to Several Counts’, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, 31 March 2004, para. 25, 
ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 
23 May 2005, para. 206, ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional 
Detention’, Criminal Case File 002/14-08-2006, Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 
21, ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Decision on Preliminary Motions on the 
Indictment Pursuant to Rule 72 of the Rules’ (Public), Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, 14 December 2007, 
paras. 19 and 25, ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-
07-2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 31 and ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radovan 
Karadžić, ‘Decision on Karadžić’s Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on Alleged Holbrooke 
Agreement’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, 12 October 2009, para. 49. Note that this point 
could also (but more indirectly) be found in earlier cases, see, for example, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, 
Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, para. 126. 








the importance of prosecution), it would not contravene the court’s sense of justice 
to continue with the case, notwithstanding the male captus. It is certainly reasonable 
that, because of the seriousness of the alleged crimes involved, a court should do 
everything within the limits of the law to prevent the termination of the proceedings. 
However, what is not justified – and what the Appeals Chamber in Nikolić should 
have disapproved of more clearly – is that the seriousness of the alleged crimes may 
be used as an excuse to commit irregularities in the process of bringing suspects of 
such crimes to justice;144 it must be stressed that the view that one may take the 
seriousness of the crimes into account to a certain extent in deciding what the 
consequences of a certain male captus will be cannot in any way be seen as a green 
light for using male captus techniques in the context of international crimes.145 On 
the contrary: as already submitted, if the tribunal discovers that its own employees 
have orchestrated an abduction, it should resolutely refuse jurisdiction, even if the 
suspect is charged with very serious crimes. That would arguably be the only avenue 
to avoid further damage to the integrity of the proceedings.146 However, if less 
serious wrongs (by others?) have been committed in the pre-trial phase, it would 
                                                          
144 See also Sloan 2006, p. 334: “The Appeal Chamber’s focus on the serious nature of the crimes and 
the indignation of the international community, and its willingness to balance it against violations of 
human right or sovereignty (and, in the case of sovereignty, to find a good basis for not setting aside 
jurisdiction in the ‘universally condemned’ nature of the alleged offences) leaves the impression that the 
graver the alleged crime, the less troubled an international judicial body should be by the violation.” 
145 See also Swart 2001, p. 201: “Persons suspected or accused of international crimes should be no less 
entitled to respect for their basic individual rights than any other suspects or accused.” In that respect, 
this study cannot disagree more with views such as the one expressed by Mohit (2006, p. 144) who 
writes on the inter-State context: “It would be absurd to hold that terrorists and serious human rights 
violators should not be brought to trial by irregular means, for example, by abduction. The interests of 
society require that such offenders be brought to trial.” (Mohit (ibid.) stresses that “[t]hese methods 
should (…) be utilized by states only once they have exhausted all possible routes to secure the 
fugitive’s return by normal processes”, but even then, prosecuting authorities should not debase 
themselves by resorting to illegal means of obtaining custody over a suspect.) Cf. also De Sanctis 2004, 
p. 548: “By reason of their strict subject matter jurisdiction and their logistic limits, international 
tribunals are designed to prosecute a limited number of individuals, thus restricting the cases in which it 
might be held appropriate to have recourse to transnational abduction.” (De Sanctis is of the opinion that 
transnational abductions may be justified in the context of the tribunals, but not in the inter-State 
context, because this would encourage “transnational seizure of a potentially too broad category of 
persons.” (Ibid.) In his explanation (ibid.): “This is because this category [namely the category of 
suspects of ‘Universally Condemned Offences’, ChP] could be construed by domestic courts as 
including those suspected of acts of terrorism or even mere membership in a terrorist organisation. The 
legal definition of ‘terrorist act’ by national legislations is far more open to political considerations and 
influences than the notions of ‘crimes against humanity’ or ‘war crimes’. As a result it may often be the 
product of the political agenda of a government, rather than of a genuine commitment to the 
preservation of human security. In this context a justification of transnational abduction in violation of 
State sovereignty on the ground of the universal nature of the crime prosecuted, looses much of its 
soundness and should, therefore, be rejected.”) 
146 See also Starr 2008, p. 759: “[I]n a case of egregious abuse of process, an ICT could determine that 
even after taking into account all the countervailing interests, the windfall remedy of release with 








only seem natural for judges to opt for less far-reaching remedies which do not 
jeopardise the trial.147  
Although this position is arguably not particularly controversial – if judges have 
certain discretion in deciding what the consequences of a certain male captus will 
be, it seems natural that they should have the (relative) freedom to opt for those 
remedies which do not jeopardise the trial of a suspect charged with very serious 
crimes – one may wonder how one should then deal with the human right to habeas 
corpus, the right of a suspect to challenge the lawfulness of his detention and to be 
released in the case of an unlawful (arrest and) detention. A right which, given its 
customary international law/general international law status, is, in principle, also 
applicable to the context of the tribunals, even if their regulatory instruments do not 
contain such a provision.148 A right also which has also – surprisingly – not been 
invoked that often in the context of the tribunals.149  
                                                          
147 See also Lamb 2000, pp. 241 and 243: “[W]ithdrawal of the indictment altogether and the release of 
the accused would be required only in extreme cases, where any continuation of the trial proceedings 
would in all the circumstances be fundamentally incompatible with the right to a fair trial and the 
integrity of the judicial process. (…) [I]n most cases, the extreme remedy of release of a person indicted 
for the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law will not be seen to comport 
with justice. Nevertheless, the release of the accused must, in extremis, remain as the ultimate remedy 
on the grounds that it constitutes the strongest deterrent and sanction against the abuse of power by law 
enforcement personnel and serves as a remedy of last resort in those truly exceptional circumstances 
where the divestiture of its jurisdiction is thought by the Tribunal to be necessary to safeguard the 
integrity of the conduct of international criminal justice [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Starr 
2008, p. 747: “The most obvious and drastic remedy – release and dismissal of charges with prejudice – 
will never be a tenable remedy for procedural violations in international criminal trials, except perhaps 
in truly extraordinary cases. The charges are simply too serious.” See finally Sluiter 2003 B, p. 946 
(writing on the termination of the proceedings): “It seems now accepted that this remedy is not 
excluded, but still should not be taken lightly taking account of the nature of the accusations we are 
dealing with here.” 
148 Sluiter (2001, p. 152) notes that, because of the fact that the ICTY Statute and RPE “do not 
incorporate the right of persons not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention”, it is “of vital 
importance that the Tribunal applies these provisions [namely Artt. 9 of the ICCPR and 5 of the ECHR, 
ChP] to their full extent, including relevant case law pertaining to these provisions [emphasis added, 
ChP].” Hence, that should also include the habeas corpus provision of para. 4, including its remedy of 
release. Cf. in that respect also ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić 
also known as “Pavo”, Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo, ‘Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal 
(Provisional Release) by Hazim Delić’, Case No. IT-96-21-AR72.4, 22 November 1996, para. 16: “The 
right to liberty is without question a fundamental human right. The Applicant has cited a number of 
international human rights instruments in this connection, but the proposition is axiomatic. The right 
also entails the right to an effective remedy for deprivation or violation of that right.” See also ibid., 
para. 17 where it is clarified that this means that the Chamber must review the lawfulness of a person’s 
deprivation of liberty. Although it is not clearly stated as such, this must arguably also include a release 
if the deprivation of liberty is deemed unlawful. However, that was not the case here: “The mistake 
which the Applicant makes, however, is to consider that the Trial Chamber, by denying the motion for 
provisional release, has violated the Applicant’s right to liberty and that the Applicant is therefore 
entitled to an effective judicial remedy for that violation. The correct analysis is that the Trial Chamber 
is the effective judicial remedy for any alleged violation of the right to liberty. By applying to the Trial 
Chamber, the Applicant exercises his right to challenge the lawfulness of his detention and deprivation 
of liberty. The word “effective” does not mean that the Application has to succeed; this would be a 








This question is very interesting here as the remedy of release, in contrast to the 
remedy ‘refusal of jurisdiction’ under the abuse of process doctrine, is not 
discretionary: if a judge is of the opinion that a suspect’s detention (read: 
deprivation of liberty) is unlawful, he must, strictly speaking, release that person. In 
addition, this remedy must be granted to any suspect whose detention is considered 
unlawful; it cannot be restricted to suspects who are only charged with minor 
crimes.150 In other words, any suspect, whether charged with fraud or genocide, 
                                                                                                                                              
appropriate norms and human rights standards, which the Trial Chamber has done quite properly 
[emphasis in original, ChP].” See also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 88: “Although neither the 
Statute nor the Rules specifically address writs of habeas corpus as such, the notion that a detained 
individual shall have recourse to an independent judicial officer for review of the detaining authority’s 
acts is well-established by the Statute and Rules. Moreover, this is a fundamental right and is enshrined 
in international human rights norms, including Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Article 9(4) of the ICCPR, Article 5(4) of the ECHR and Article 7(6) of the ACHR [original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].” See further also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v Radoslav Brñanin, ‘Decision on 
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus On Behalf of Radoslav Brñanin’, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, 8 
December 1999, paras. 2-6, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, ‘Decision 
on the Defence Extremely Urgent Motion on Habeas Corpus and for Stoppage of Proceedings’, Case 
No. ICTR-96-15-I, 23 May 2000, paras. 27-28, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, paras. 112-113,  ICTY, Trial Chamber 
III, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, ‘Decision on Preliminary Motions’, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, 8 
November 2001, para. 38 and ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Samuel Musabyimana, 
‘Decision on Musabyimana’s Motion on the Violation of Rule 55 and International Law at the Time of 
his Arrest and Transfer’, Case No. ICTR-2001-62-T, 20 June 2002, para. 24. See also Zappalà 2002 A, 
p. 1195 (and Zappalà 2003, p. 75), Knoops 2003, p. 221, ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. 
Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan Todorović and Simo Zarić, ‘Separate Opinion of 
Judge Robinson’, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 18 October 2000, paras. 2-4 and 7, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Notice of Appeal’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR72, 9 January 
2003, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 11 and SCSL, Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor 
against Tamba Alex Brima, ‘Ruling on the Application for the Issue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus Filed 
by the Applicant’, Case No. SCSL-03-06-PT, 22 July 2003, pp. 7 and 9. Note that in the Kanyabashi 
case, the judges, after having referred to the rather broad scope of some national habeas corpus concepts 
(they provide, for instance, the example of the US writ of habeas corpus ad subiiciendum (see also n. 42 
of Chapter II) which “extends to all constitutional challenges” (ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor 
v. Joseph Kanyabashi, ‘Decision on the Defence Extremely Urgent Motion on Habeas Corpus and for 
Stoppage of Proceedings’, Case No. ICTR-96-15-I, 23 May 2000, para. 24)), stipulate that “[t]he 
Chamber restates that the Tribunal is not bound by any national law. It finds the notion of habeas corpus 
at the international level is limited to a review of the legality of detention. The Accused’s Motion, apart 
from the submission of violation of the right to protection from unlawful detention, is beyond that scope 
and, therefore, is not proper.” (Ibid., para. 28.) Although the judges do not mention this point very 
clearly, it can be argued that the concept of the right to protection from unlawful detention used by the 
judges must, of course, also encompasses the consequence of release if the detention (and arguably also 
the arrest) is to be considered unlawful, in conformity with what appears to be the scope of the habeas 
corpus concept at the international level, see, for example, Art. 9, para. 4 of the ICCPR, Art. 5, para. 4 
of the ECHR and Art. 7, para. 6 of the ACHR. 
149 See, however, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor versus J[u]v[é]nal Kajelijeli, ‘Decision on the 
Defence Motion Concerning the Arbitrary Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused and on the 
Defence Notice of Urgent Motion to Expand and Supplement the Record of 8 December 1999 Hearing’, 
Case No. ICTR-98-44-I, 8 May 2000, para. 11. 
150 Cf. also Knoops 2005, p. 36, noting that “there does seem to be a disjuncture between the approach 








must, strictly speaking, be released if the judge is of the opinion that his detention is 
unlawful.151  
However, as explained in Chapter III and in the examination of Chapter VI cases 
such as Dokmanović and Nikolić, this remedy is not without its problems: if a person 
has been the victim of an unlawful arrest/detention, he must, strictly speaking, be 
released. However, as was clarified, that does not prevent him being re-arrested on 
the spot and re-brought to trial. Although a person released by the ICTY/ICTR (in 
the Netherlands/Tanzania) cannot be re-arrested for 15 days, one can imagine that 
the ICTY/ICTR would then demand from all UN Member States (which must 
cooperate with these Tribunals) to immediately transfer the suspect back to the 
ICTY/ICTR the moment he sets foot on their soil. Thus, one can assume that there is 
a considerable chance that, after those two weeks, the person is immediately re-
arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in question. In such a case, 
the prosecuting authorities could assert that this ‘remedy’ (the ‘release’) has repaired 
the initial iniuria of the irregularity and that the trial can continue as normal. 
However, in that case, the suspect would only be granted a pro forma remedy, 
comparable with that at the national level (but then only extended over a longer 
period), which does not comport with the idea that a remedy must be real and 
effective. In addition, the pro forma release does not take account of the exact 
seriousness of the irregularity. In other words: it is not only a pro forma remedy but 
also an over-simplified remedy.  
Thus, it was suggested that this specific remedy should be avoided and that a 
judge should instead simply accord the most appropriate remedy, taking every single 
aspect of the case into account, not only, among other things, the seriousness of the 
irregularity, but also the seriousness of the alleged crimes and hence the importance 
of the continuation of the trial. If one follows that route, then one can still satisfy the 
common sense idea behind the immediate re-arrest mentioned above, namely that 
cases involving suspects of serious crimes must be continued if possible – although 
it should neither be forgotten that a truly serious male captus situation can lead to 
one remedy only, namely the ending of the case before that particular court, that is, a 
‘real’ release (without the possibility of re-arrest) – but one will also avoid the 
strange pro forma release and immediate re-arrest and replace it with real remedies, 
                                                                                                                                              
ICTY/ICTR, ChP], and that under human rights law, which does not render such a distinction between 
the nature of the alleged crimes in order to determine the enforceable rights of the accused.” 
151 In the Semanza case, the judges’ final conclusion was that Semanza’s right to be informed promptly 
of the nature of the charges against him and his right to challenge the lawfulness of his detention were 
violated. However, they also stated that “the remedy sought by the Appellant, namely his release, is 
disproportionate, in the instant case.” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, 
‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, para. 129.) However, although the remedy of (final) 
release may indeed not be a proportionate remedy in this case, the judges did not explain how their 
conclusion can be reconciled with the strict application of the law mentioned in the main text, which 
stipulates that such violations lead to an unlawful detention (see also Swart 2001, p. 204 who explains 
that “a failure to promptly inform the person of the reasons for his arrest and of any charges against him 
makes his detention illegal”), which in turn, according to para. 4 of Artt. 9 of the ICCPR or 5 of the 
ECHR, demands the remedy of release. See also the Duch case before the ECCC (see the text following 








such as a reduction of the sentence (in the case of a conviction) or compensation (in 
the case of an acquittal).152 The judge can then take the exact seriousness of the 
irregularity into account in determining how much the sentence should be reduced 
or how much compensation one should accord the suspect. For example, one could 
hereby look at the (perceived)153 involvement of the tribunal in the male captus 
situation (one could also think here of the question of whether private individuals 
were involved in the violation, see Chapter III), the seriousness of the unlawful 
arrest/detention/deprivation of liberty and the mistreatment suffered by the suspect 
in the operation.  
Such a solution would arguably be fairer to the suspect and better capable of 
putting flexibility into the system,154 which sometimes focuses only on the extreme 
outcomes bene/male detentus/(no) refusal of jurisdiction.155  
                                                          
152 See also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v the Prosecutor, ‘Decision 
(Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 31 March 2000, 
para. 75 (see n. 922 and accompanying text of Chapter VI), ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza 
vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, under ‘Disposition’, para. 6 (see 
n. 1004 and accompanying text of Chapter VI), ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, paras. 255 and 324 (see ns. 1082-
1083 and accompanying text of Chapter VI), ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. André 
Rwamakuba, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, 20 September 2006, para. 218 (see n. 1124 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VI) and ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, 
‘Decision on Appropriate Remedy’, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, 31 January 2007, para. 63 (see n. 1154 
and accompanying text of Chapter VI). Note that in the case of Rwamakuba, the judges issued an order 
for compensation as the suspect had already been acquitted. See also ECCC, Office of the Co-
Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 002/14-08-2006, 
Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 21 (see n. 1233 and accompanying text of 
Chapter VI), ECCC, Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of 
Kaing Guek Eav Alias “Duch”’, Criminal Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (PTC01), 3 
December 2007, para. 25 (see n. 1248 and accompanying text of Chapter VI) and ECCC, Trial 
Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 
2009, paras. 35-37 (see ns. 1280 and 1282 and accompanying text of Chapter VI). (See, however, for 
criticism on some parts of the ECCC Trial Chamber’s decision ns. 1283-1284 and accompanying text of 
Chapter VI). As explained in Chapter VI (see n. 246), this construction may be very appropriate, but one 
must not forget either that provisions like para. 5 of Art. 9 of the ICCPR and Art. 5 of the ECHR state 
that compensation should not only be awarded in the case of an acquittal. Compensation is, in principle, 
available to any person whose detention was considered unlawful, whether that person was later 
acquitted or not. See also Sluiter 2001, pp. 153-154: “[I]t is suggested that creative use be made of (a 
combination of) other available remedies, such as the reduction of the sentence in case of conviction – 
and financial compensation, rather than termination of the proceedings and the release of the accused 
[emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
153 Even though an international force working for the tribunal cannot be seen as an organ of the 
tribunal, one can imagine that the remedy for an abduction committed by such an international force will 
be greater than in the case of an abduction committee by private individuals having no connection with 
the tribunal whatsoever, see also n. 93. See also n. 154 of Chapter V. 
154 Cf. the words of Sluiter in n. 152.  
155 See, for example, the Trial Chamber’s decision in Nikolić (see n. 548 and accompanying text of 
Chapter VI), the Appeals Chamber’s decision in the same case (see the text following n. 557 and 
accompanying text of the same chapter) and the Tolimir case, see n. 700 and accompanying text of the 
same Chapter VI. Nevertheless, as explained, there are also tribunal cases where this focus is less 








Furthermore, this solution also avoids the (justified) criticism one may expect 
from various actors if a suspect of serious crimes is released for an irregularity 
which is not so serious as to lead to the ending of the case (in such serious cases, the 
public must understand that the court has no option but to refuse jurisdiction and to 
release (but now in a ‘real’ way) the suspect), but which nevertheless ensures that 
the detention must be qualified as unlawful and that, strictly speaking, the suspect 
must be released, for example, if a suspect’s right to be informed promptly of the 
nature of the charges against him has been violated. In fact, whereas at the national 
level, one can expect that a suspect of serious crimes would be immediately re-
arrested, the context of the ICTY/ICTR may engender more problems because of the 
above-mentioned two-week immunity period. As already stated, all UN Member 
States (which must cooperate with the ICTY and ICTR) will probably do everything 
in their power to ensure that a suspect of serious international crimes is immediately 
re-arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of the Tribunals, but one cannot exclude 
the possibility of the suspect fleeing to a non-UN Member State (which, in principle, 
has no obligation to cooperate with the Tribunals) or to a State which, even though it 
has an obligation to cooperate, will not do so. This problem will even be greater in 
the context of the internationalised criminal tribunals because in that context, third 
States are normally not obliged to cooperate with these institutions. That could mean 
that a suspect of international crimes, fleeing to such a State, could effectively evade 
prosecution because of an irregularity which will, strictly speaking, demand the 
release of the suspect, but which is not considered to be so serious that jurisdiction 
must be refused. That is to be avoided. Although the law should obviously be 
obeyed, one must also be careful not to apply the law in such a strict way that it 
leads to great injustice: summum ius, summa iniuria. This constitutes another reason 
to continue to exercise jurisdiction in these kinds of (less serious) male captus cases 
and to grant other remedies which do not jeopardise the trial itself.  
One may argue that the practical results of this construction would be the same 
as the remedies which are already granted in case law. That is indeed true: many 
cases will not lead to a refusal of jurisdiction, but to other less far-reaching 
remedies. However, it is submitted that the accuracy of the reasoning leading to 
these remedies is not unimportant either. And that accuracy in the case law can 
arguably be improved, see also footnote 151; judges simply grant appropriate 
remedies. They do not explain, for example, why they do not declare a situation of 
‘unlawful detention’ and invoke its subsequent remedy of release when they 
conclude that a suspect’s right to be informed promptly of the nature of the charges 
against him has been violated. Because of that, neither do they have to explain what 
kinds of problems come with a strict application of this remedy of release and how 
they would solve them. Perhaps, the above-mentioned construction may be helpful 
in that respect.  
Critics may state that taking into account the seriousness of the alleged crimes of 
the suspect (and hence the importance of prosecution) within the examination of 








presumption of innocence, as the quality of the suspect (who is, of course, innocent 
until proven guilty) plays a role in the judge’s balancing exercise. 
And indeed, it cannot be denied that there is some tension here. For example, 
under the abuse of process doctrine, a suspect of less serious crimes may be better 
off than a suspect of serious crimes. Recall (see the text following footnote 1269 and 
accompanying text of the previous chapter) the situation in which a suspect of minor 
domestic crimes becomes the victim of a kidnapping by private individuals in which 
the authorities of the now prosecuting forum were not involved and during which he 
was not mistreated before being brought to the national judge. In such a situation, it 
would not be surprising if the national judge were to refuse to exercise jurisdiction 
and to release the suspect because of, on the one hand, the rather serious male 
captus and, on the other, the minor importance of having this person prosecuted. 
However, if the person is charged with genocide, one can imagine that the judge 
(whether it be a judge at the national or at the tribunal level) would continue the case 
and grant the person other remedies instead. Although the seriousness of the male 
captus is the same in both cases, the importance of having this person prosecuted 
will probably tip the balance, ensuring that the trial will continue and that the 
suspect will receive other less far-reaching remedies for the wrongs he suffered.   
However, as explained earlier, because of the discretionary nature of the abuse of 
process doctrine, the judge is able to take every single aspect of the case into 
account in determining whether it would contravene the court’s integrity/sense of 
justice to continue the case, notwithstanding the irregularities. And one of these 
aspects is that the person standing before him is charged with very serious crimes of 
which the international community demands that they be prosecuted. There is no 
reason why this important element should not be taken into account here. In fact, the 
judge may be of the opinion that it would contravene the court’s sense of justice and 
other goals of its institution, such as, in the case of the ICTY, contributing to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace,156 if he were not to take the importance of 
prosecution into account.157  
                                                          
156 See UNSC Res. 827 of 25 May 1993: “The Security Council, (…) Convinced that in the particular 
circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the establishment as an ad hoc measure by the Council of an 
international tribunal and the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law (…) would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace [emphasis in 
original, ChP]”. 
157 Cf. also Ryngaert 2008, p. 731, who notes with respect to the Duch case: “[S]erious concerns may be 
raised over the use of the gravity of the crime as a free-standing criterion (...) in terms of the 
presumption of innocence. While Duch may be accused of grave and heinous crimes, he should remain 
innocent until a trial judge has determined his guilt – even if he is ready to confess and reveal the crimes 
committed by the Khmer Rouge. It would therefore appear unfair to rely on a presumption of his having 
committed grave crimes, a presumption that may tip the balance in favour of not staying the 
proceedings. Irrespective of the gravity of his crime(s), should not every suspect be entitled to the same 
due-process protection?” However, in the end, Ryngaert concurs with the vision of this study, see ibid., 
p. 732 (writing on the abuse of process doctrine): “Because the tribunal’s decision is a discretionary one, 
it may rely on any criteria it deems fit in order to assess whether application of the abuse of process 









However, this stance may be more complicated with respect to the remedy of 
release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention as that remedy is not 
discretionary; it applies to any suspect unlawfully detained. For example, in his 
commentary on the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision in Nikolić, Sloan notes: 
 
The Appeal Chamber’s focus on the serious nature of the crimes and the indignation 
of the international community, and its willingness to balance it against violations of 
human rights or sovereignty (and, in the case of sovereignty, to find a good basis for 
not setting aside jurisdiction in the ‘universally condemned’ nature of the alleged 
offences) leaves the impression that the graver the alleged crime, the less troubled an 
international judicial body should be by the violation. On the question of human 
rights, at least, such an approach must surely be misguided: it does not appear to 
comport with the presumption of innocence. Indeed, if our human rights are to be 
meaningful, the opposite approach would appear fitting. That is to say, when an 
accused is charged with a very serious crime – one of the type that is likely to 
engender severe public outrage, or in the words of the Appeals Chamber one that 
triggers the ‘legitimate expectation’ of ‘the international community’ – a judicial 
body must be most scrupulous in ensuring that the accused’s human rights are 
observed. For a court to provide no remedy for a human rights violation where the 
accused is charged with a traffic offence and subject to a fine would be regrettable; to 
provide no remedy where the accused is charged with mass murder or war crimes and 
subject to life imprisonment would be unconscionable [emphasis in original, ChP].158 
 
Many of these words are to be welcomed; as stated earlier, it can indeed not be the 
case that “the graver the alleged crime, the less troubled an international judicial 
body should be by the violation”. Furthermore, it is also not hard to agree with the 
idea that “a judicial body must be most scrupulous in ensuring that the accused’s 
human rights are observed” and that remedies are provided if violations occur.  
However, it is again (see also the text following footnote 660 and accompanying 
text of the previous chapter) submitted that neither should the – indeed very 
important – presumption of innocence be used in such a way as to lead to absurd 
results. One must not forget that the tribunals are prosecuting not just any suspects, 
but suspects charged with the most serious crimes known to the international 
community as a whole. For example, a judge at the ICTY cannot issue an arrest 
warrant unless he has confirmed the indictment of the Prosecution, an indictment 
                                                          
158 Sloan 2006, p. 334. Cf. also the report Extradition. European standards. Explanatory notes on the 
Council of Europe convention and protocols and the minimum standards protecting persons subject to 
transnational criminal proceedings, Council of Europe, December 2006, p. 140: “Issues of unlawful 
arrest and transfer to an international tribunal have been raised in the cases of Todorovic, Nikolic and 
Krajisnik [see for this latter case n. 659 of Chapter VI, ChP] before the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The tribunal found itself with a fundamental dilemma; namely, 
whether to encourage the apprehension of suspects and the bringing to justice of individuals who had 
engaged in serious crimes, on the one hand; or the safeguard of international legality and fundamental 
human rights, on the other. It seems that administration of justice considerations have prevailed in the 
reasoning of the ICTY, which, as mentioned above, poses certain questions concerning the presumption 
of innocence; an obligation found in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights [original 








which can only be prepared if the Prosecutor is of the opinion that a prima facie case 
exists. Although this fact does not, of course, mean that the person is guilty of the 
international crime – that would constitute a clear violation of the presumption of 
innocence – there is no reason why one should not take into account the fact that one 
is not dealing with a normal suspect here, but with a suspect against whom the 
independent Prosecutor and an impartial judge are of the opinion that a prima facie 
case exists and hence that there are reasons to assume that the person may be 
involved in extremely serious crimes of which the international community demands 
that they be prosecuted. This is not nothing. This is an important element which 
should be taken into account when determining the consequences of an unlawful 
arrest/detention. It is submitted that negating this important element and strictly 
applying the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention, a remedy 
which was already criticised for the fact that it can be used in a mere pro forma way 
and for the fact that it totally disregards the specifics of the exact male captus, can 
possibly lead to absurd results which no longer have anything to do with the concept 
of justice. For example, if a suspect of the ICTY/ICTR is not promptly informed of 
the reasons for his arrest, this would, strictly speaking, mean that his detention is 
unlawful and that he should be released. However, if the suspect is released, the 
Netherlands/Tanzania would not be able to re-arrest the suspect for 15 days. In that 
time, he could flee to a non-UN Member State (which, in principle, does not have an 
obligation to cooperate with the Tribunals) or to a State which, even though it has an 
obligation to cooperate with them, will not do so. That could mean that a suspect of 
international crimes, fleeing to such a State, could effectively evade prosecution 
because of an irregularity which is not considered so serious that jurisdiction must 
be refused but which, strictly speaking, would demand the release of the suspect. 
That is to be avoided. As stated supra, although the law should obviously be 
obeyed, one must also be careful not to apply the law in so strict a way that it leads 
to great injustice: summum ius, summa iniuria. 
In short, the human rights of all suspects must be respected. The fact that one is 
dealing with suspects of international crimes cannot in any way be used as an excuse 
to, in the words of Sluiter, “take a more ‘flexible’ stance towards – read: violate”159 
human rights or to argue that no violation occurred in the first place where such a 
violation was clearly present.160 Furthermore, when violations occur, appropriate 
                                                          
159 Sluiter 2007, p. 15 (own translation, ChP). 
160 Cf. Van der Kruijs (in his practical book on pre-trial detention in the Netherlands), who explains that 
detention is not often labelled as unlawful in the first place: “The investigating/examining judge 
(rechter-commissaris) does not often feel inclined to qualify the detention as unlawful. Many 
irregularities are deemed to be too minor to meet that qualification. The criterion appears to be that one 
must have acted flagrantly in violation of (the meaning of) the law. (...) In addition, there is the 
impression that the seriousness of the suspect’s alleged conduct plays a role in the sense that the more 
serious the fact, the more problems are ironed out by the investigating/examining judge (rechter-
commissaris) [own translation, ChP].” (Van der Kruijs 2004, p. 8.) This attitude, which was already 
mentioned in Chapter III (see n. 224 and accompanying text of that chapter) and which can also be 
found in Mohit 2006, p. 144 (“The moment the individual’s violations far outweigh the violation of the 
abduction, that abduction should be permissible and should not be considered a violation of human 








remedies must be granted. However, in granting these remedies, one must be careful 
that one does not potentially pave the way for absurd consequences which are 
counter to the concept of justice, for example, through a strict application of the 
remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention. In such a case, it 
would arguably be better to keep a suspect of international crimes in custody and to 
grant appropriate and real remedies instead,161 taking into account the seriousness of 
the male captus.162  
One could argue that this reasoning is valid a fortiori with respect to persons 
who have already been convicted, cf. the inter-State case Mullen. Even though the 
person’s ultimate guilt may not yet be legally established (for the person may, of 
course, appeal and may, perhaps, then be acquitted), his first conviction is 
                                                                                                                                              
with a suspect of serious crimes. However, the fact that one is dealing with such a suspect should, if 
possible, lead to remedies which do not jeopardise the trial because prosecution of these suspects is also 
of paramount importance. Arguably more correct in that sense is the reasoning of Baaijens-van Geloven. 
She explains, after having referred to the reasoning of the Dutch Supreme Court in its judgment of 25 
June 2002 (HR 25 juni 2002, NJ 2002, 625) that one can take into account the seriousness of the offence 
(this case did not deal with an international male captus situation and has therefore not been included in 
Part 3 of this book), that there are no objections of principle to this extension of the law by the Supreme 
Court (in the applicable provision of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure on the legal consequences 
of non-compliance with formal requirements (Art. 359a), one will not find this factor), as long as the 
seriousness of the offence is regarded as a weighting factor which only plays a role in determining the 
legal consequence (sanction) after the illegality has been identified. She continues stating that there has 
to be room for a balancing exercise and that all kinds of factors, including the seriousness of the offence, 
should be able to play a role here. Nevertheless, the seriousness of the offence cannot constitute a factor 
which determines the initial unlawfulness. (An exception, however, is the situation in which the 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity play a direct role in determining the lawfulness of an 
exercise of power. In such a case, the seriousness of the charges can also be of importance in 
determining whether the investigative acts were lawful or not. (See Baaijens-van Geloven 2004, pp. 
358-359. See also n. 617 of Chapter III.) 
161 Cf. Rule 5 (C) of the ICTY RPE: “The relief granted by a Trial Chamber under this Rule shall be 
such remedy as the Trial Chamber considers appropriate to ensure consistency with the fundamental 
principles of fairness.” (See n. 558 of Chapter VI.)  
162 See also Smeulers 2007, p. 109: “The severity of the charges must not have any influence on the 
rights to which the accused are entitled; suspects accused of even the most serious crimes are entitled to 
full respect of their individual human rights. The severity of the charges might, however, influence a 
careful balancing of what remedies can be used in order to repair violations.” One could assert that the 
tribunal, if it does not release a person charged with serious crimes if the Prosecution has not promptly 
informed the suspect of the reasons for his arrest, would also violate a human rights provision (see, for 
example, Art. 9, para. 4 of the ICCPR). However, one can wonder what is worse: a violation of a 
provision which is arguably not flawless (for example, because it is over-simplified and because it can 
be used as a pro forma remedy) or the fact that a suspect of whom there are considerable reasons to 
assume that he has committed a genocide escapes justice because of the simple fact that he was not 
promptly informed of the reasons of his arrest. In any case, the construction mentioned above, even if it 
may lead to a violation of a provision such as Art. 9, para. 4 of the ICCPR, cannot be used in any way as 
general support for reasonings which justify violations of human rights because one is dealing with 
suspects of international crimes. The construction can only be seen as a specific answer to a specific 
complication, namely on how to avoid the problems caused by the remedy of release, problems which 








nevertheless a fact and an important element which a judge should take into account 
in his balancing exercise – if he has not done so already at an earlier stage.163  
Two issues still need to be mentioned in this chapter.  
The first is that it was suggested above that “when violations occur, appropriate 
remedies must be granted”. This should arguably mean that all violations which 
occur in the context of a tribunal case must be remedied, not only if those violations 
can be attributed to the tribunal (although it is, of course, clear that the involvement 
of the tribunal may lead to more far-reaching remedies).  
This point is uncontroversial in the context of the abuse of process doctrine; in 
the context of the question of whether the male captus is so serious that the judges, 
in good conscience, can no longer proceed with the case, the tribunals have 
confirmed that they will look at the violations, irrespective of the entity responsible 
for those violations.164 (As explained at the start of this section, this is also the 
reason why it could be argued that the tribunals do not continue to exercise 
jurisdiction regardless of the way a person was brought into their jurisdiction, that 
the tribunals do not adhere to the old(-fashioned) idea behind male captus bene 
detentus.)  
However, this is far less certain regarding less serious violations which do not 
come within the domain of the abuse of process doctrine. Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that it would be quite odd for the tribunals to only look at the actions of third 
parties if those actions reach a certain seriousness. If the tribunal is willing, under 
the abuse of process, to take the ultimate responsibility for actions of third parties 
(namely by refusing jurisdiction), it should also be perfectly able to take 
responsibility for less serious violations. It would be strange for the tribunal to take 
responsibility for a suspect who suffered egregious violations, but to refuse to do so 
if the suspect suffered less serious violations because these violations could not be 
attributed to the tribunal. This does not matter with respect to serious violations in 
                                                          
163 See Starr 2008, pp. 757ff, also advocating an interest-balancing approach. Starr, who is of the opinion 
that “[i]nterest balancing (…) is inherent to criminal procedure – even if it has been largely excluded 
from the remedial stage [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP]” (ibid., p. 759), 
believes that one can deviate from the so-called “full remedy rule” under certain circumstances, see 
ibid., pp. 763-764: “[I]n cases involving mass human rights abuses, states and international tribunals 
have often issued less-than-full-remedies. Scholars have defended those remedies on the basis that it 
would be impossible to provide full reparation to all of the victims; impossibility is a built-in exception 
to the full remedy rule under Chorzów Factory [see ibid., p. 699 and n. 553 and accompanying text of 
Chapter III for the idea behind this full remedy rule, ChP]. But in mass-abuse situations, “impossibility” 
is often a legal fiction. In most such cases, it would not really be impossible to compensate all victims 
who bring claims. Rather, other competing interests make it undesirable – for instance, paying out such 
claims would undermine the state’s ability to provide services to other, innocent citizens. So a 
compromise approach is the best option. But if compromise is permissible in remedying the gravest 
human rights abuses, it is hard to see why it would not be permissible in smaller-scale cases [emphasis 
in original and original footnotes omitted, ChP].” One can indeed agree with this vision, but only in very 
clear cases where applying the normal rules may lead to absurd results, such as in the case of the remedy 
of release. However, in the view of this study, this interest-balancing approach should not be abused, for 
example, by justifying abductions of suspects of international crimes with the argument that full 
reparation (return of the suspect) is not necessary. 








the context of the abuse of process doctrine and neither should it matter with respect 
to ‘normal’ violations which do not lead to the ending of the case.165 Hence, the now 
prosecuting forum should not be selective in such important matters but take into 
account every violation which occurred in the context of its case.  
Although it could be asserted that the suspect must revert to the national level to 
have such violations repaired, such remedies cannot be effective once the suspect is 
in the custody of the tribunal. After all, even if the national judge were to decide that 
a suspect is entitled to be released or to have a reduction of his sentence for these 
violations (which one can doubt, by the way, will ever happen), the tribunal would 
not be bothered by these national pronouncements. Hence, to ensure that the suspect 
does not become the victim of the fact that his proceedings have been fragmented 
over two or more systems, it is fair that the final adjudicator, the tribunal, in the 
context of whose case these violations occurred, takes responsibility for every 
violation.166 This in turn also implies, of course, that a judge must be able to 
examine how the arrest/detention/transfer was made ‘on the ground’, for example, 
whether the entities making the arrest at the behest/request of the tribunal respected 
all the (national) arrest procedures. After all, if an arrest was clearly made in 
contravention of such procedures, it is difficult to maintain that a person’s right to 
liberty and security was not violated, even if all the rules of the tribunal (such as the 
issuance of a valid indictment and an arrest warrant) were adhered to.167  
                                                          
165 In the words of the judges of the ECCC: “Even if a violation of the Accused’s right cannot be 
attributed to the ECCC, international jurisprudence indicates that an international criminal tribunal has 
both the authority and the obligation to consider the legality of his prior detention. The ICTR Appeals 
Chamber decision in Barayagwiza held that a violation of an accused person’s rights under the law must 
be acknowledged by an international criminal tribunal before which he seeks relief, even if that violation 
cannot be attributed to that tribunal [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision 
on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 16.) This 
task, according to the judges, was separate from the situation where “previous violations of an 
Accused’s rights are so egregious that they may preclude or restrain the exercise of an international 
criminal tribunal’s jurisdiction on grounds of abuse of process and violation of the fundamental rights of 
the accused [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) See also ibid., para. 35: “The case law of the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber nevertheless indicates that even where these violations cannot be attributed to an 
international tribunal or do not amount to an abuse of process, an accused may be entitled to seek a 
remedy for violations of his rights by national authorities [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
166 See Sluiter 2001, p. 156: “It is imperative that the defendant receives the full protection of human 
rights instruments and should not be the victim of the fragmentation of the criminal procedure over two 
or even more jurisdictions.” 
167 This does not mean that the national judge can invoke certain national irregularities to refuse the 
transfer of the suspect to a tribunal like the ICTY/ICTR – he cannot, see the words of Swart at n. 24 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VI – but the international judges should take those irregularities into 
account when determining an appropriate remedy, for the simple reason that these irregularities occurred 
in the context of their case. It must be noted that Swart admits that “[t]he only, rather theoretical, 
situation in which transfer might be refused is that in which jus cogens would forbid a State to transfer a 
person.” (See again n. 24 and accompanying text of Chapter VI.) However, that would be the case if, for 
example, there is a considerable chance that the suspect be tortured by the Tribunal. In such a theoretical 
case (because one can assume that such a situation will indeed not occur), the national judge might 
validly refuse to transfer. However, that would arguably not be the case if the suspect is, for example, 
abducted from another State. Although the abduction may violate the ius cogens norm of non-








In this specific context, tribunal decisions have been issued which follow a rather 
non-inquiry168/male captus bene detentus-like view and which support the idea that 
the legality of the national arrest/detention proceedings cannot be examined.169 
However, there are also cases which can be interpreted as meaning that the tribunal 
will look into what happened at the national level and will in fact repair any 
violation which occurred in that context, even if the tribunal is, strictly speaking, not 
responsible for it.170   
                                                                                                                                              
arguably not constitute, in itself, a violation of a ius cogens norm. Furthermore, it must also be stressed 
that a suspect cannot invoke an irregularity which originated from a State’s failure to cooperate with the 
Tribunal either. For example, he cannot invoke a violation of a provision which stipulates that that State 
cannot transfer nationals to the Tribunal. It must concern genuine violations of real national provisions. 
In those cases, it can be argued that the irregularities must be considered and remedied by the judges at 
the Tribunal, for the simple reason that these irregularities occurred in the context of their case. 
168 See Sluiter 2003 B, p. 941. 
169 See, for example, ICTY, Trial Chamber I, Motion on Behalf of General Djorde Djukić, ‘Decision’, 
Case No. IT-96-19-Misc. 1, 28 February 1996, D211, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor versus 
Edouard Karemera, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion for the Release of the Accused’, Case No. ICTR-
98-44-I, 10 December 1999, para. 4.3, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Matthieu 
Ngirumpatse, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion Challenging the Lawfulness of the Arrest and Detention 
and Seeking Return or Inspection of Seized Items’, Case No. ICTR-97-44-I, 10 December 1999, para. 
56, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor versus J[u]v[é]nal Kajelijeli, ‘Decision on the Defence 
Motion Concerning the Arbitrary Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused and on the Defence Notice 
of Urgent Motion to Expand and Supplement the Record of 8 December 1999 Hearing’, Case No. 
ICTR-98-44-I, 8 May 2000, paras. 34-35, ICTR, Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Siméon 
Nshamihigo, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion Seeking Release of the Accused Person and/or Any 
Other Remedy on the Basis of Abuse of Process by the Prosecutor’, Case No. ICTR-2001-63-DP, 8 May 
2002, n. 2, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Joseph Nzirorera, ‘Decision on the Defence 
Motion Challenging the Legality of the Arrest and Detention of the Accused and Requesting the Return 
of Personal Items Seized’, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, 7 September 2000, para. 27 and ICTR, Trial 
Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion for Exclusion 
of Evidence and Restitution of Property Seized’, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, 12 October 2000, para. 28. It 
is unclear how the supporters of the idea that one cannot review the legality of the arrest/detention at the 
national level want to reconcile this idea with the established and uncontroversial idea that under the 
abuse of process doctrine, very serious violations may lead to the ending of the case, irrespective of the 
entity responsible, see n. 88 and accompanying text. After all, how can one establish that a serious 
violation has occurred if one cannot examine the national arrest/detention proceedings in the first place? 
See in that respect also ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ‘Decision on 
Submissions of the Accused Concerning Legality of Arrest’ (Public), Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, 18 
December 2008, para. 12: “The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the Accused are relevant to the 
Trial Chamber to the extent that they may affect the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over him.”  
170 See, for example, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, 
Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 85, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza v the Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case 
No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 31 March 2000, para. 74, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, paras. 78, 87 and 125, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, 
paras. 226-227, 232, 255 and 322, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba et alia, 
‘Decision on the Defence Motion Concerning the Illegal Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused’, 
Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, 12 December 2000, para. 23, ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. 
André Rwamakuba, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, 20 September 2006, para. 218 and ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, André Rwamakuba v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision on Appeal against Decision on 








Nevertheless, if it is indeed true that the case law contains both interpretations, it 
is submitted that the judge should opt for the second interpretation, the one which 
does investigate any pre-trial irregularities and which does not demand the 
attribution of the violations to the tribunal/the tribunal’s strict legal responsibility for 
the violations. Deterrence, the integrity of the proceedings and simple fairness 
towards the suspect (in that a suspect does not end up in a legal vacuum)171 demand 
that the now prosecuting forum remedies all the violations which have been 
committed in the context of its case.172 In the words of Zahar and Sluiter:  
 
When other entities bear primary responsibility for violations of human rights, what 
matters is the duty of every tribunal bench to protect the fairness and integrity of the 
trial by determining an appropriate remedy. Obviously, the trial does not start at the 
seat of the tribunal but extends to every act connected with it.[173] While this may be a 
heavy and seemingly unfair burden on the tribunals – they interact with a wide variety 
of actors, not all of whom may apply the highest standards of justice, and the tribunals 
are not in a position to change this – the reverse is even more unfair. The decision of 
the ICTR Trial Chamber [here, Zahar and Sluiter refer to the decisions of 
Nyiramasuhuko, Ngirumpatse, Kajelijeli, Karemera and Nzirorera, see n. 169, ChP] 
                                                                                                                                              
be admitted that the Rwamakuba case is arguably less far-going than the other above-mentioned cases). 
See finally also ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-
07-2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 16 (see n. 165). 
171 Cf. n. 849 and accompanying text of Chapter VI (in the context of the Barayagwiza case). 
172 See also Sluiter 2003 B, p. 945. As explained in Chapter VI, it is, of course, difficult to define the 
exact meaning of violations which have been committed in the context of a tribunal case but one clear 
example which should definitely fit this definition – besides the obvious example that organs of the 
tribunal have committed the violations themselves – are violations in the arrest and detention executed 
by States/international forces if the tribunal has requested that the suspect be arrested and detained by 
these parties, see, for example, the declaration of Judge Lal Chand Vohrah to the 2000 Semanza 
decision: “If an accused is arrested or detained by a state at the request or under the authority of the 
Tribunal, even though the accused is not yet within the actual custody of the Tribunal, the Tribunal has a 
responsibility to provide whatever relief is available to it to attempt to reduce any violations as much as 
possible, and this remedy must be proportional to the violations.” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent 
Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, Declaration by Judge 
Lal Chand Vohrah, para. 6.) Other situations may also very well fit the “in the context of” criterion, but 
these could be considered on a more case-by-case basis, cf. ibid., para. 7, n. 7. One could think here, for 
example, of irregularities which occur beyond the constructive custody of the tribunal in question, but 
which are nevertheless to be seen as irregularities which have been taken place in the context of a 
tribunal case, see, for example, the Barayagwiza and Duch cases. One could also think of an abduction 
such as the one suffered by Nikolić. This irregularity could not be attributed to the Tribunal and it could 
certainly not be seen as an arrest at the behest/request of the Tribunal, but it is, of course, an irregularity 
which has taken place in the context of the Tribunal case (namely in the context of the process of 
bringing a suspect into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal) and which should therefore be examined by the 
judges. 
173 This can be seen as another way of formulating the point mentioned above (see the previous 
footnote) that the judges must take into account all violations in the context of a tribunal case. See also 
Sluiter 2003 B, p. 945: “[T]he ICTY or ICTR Trial Chamber should exercise supervisory powers with 
respect to every violation of individual rights that occurs in the framework of its proceedings [emphasis 








not to review national activities is simply untenable from the perspective of the duty 
to ensure a fair trial [original footnote omitted, ChP].174 
 
This position, which is arguably better than the second,175 but which may admittedly 
be hard to accept for some practically orientated judges,176 can also ‘soften’ the 
(unpopular) male captus bene detentus image that the tribunals have; providing 
remedies for all violations which occurred in the context of their cases shows that 
the tribunals are not only concerned with prosecuting suspects of international 
crimes but also with ensuring fair proceedings for these suspects. In that context, 
one can also reassure those who object to this position that granting remedies may 
not have drastic consequences. One can assume that very often, a judge will only be 
confronted by minor violations. For those kinds of violations, small remedies will be 
appropriate, for example, a (minor) reduction of the sentence in the case of 
                                                          
174 Zahar and Sluiter 2008, pp. 285-286. See also Sluiter 2003 B, pp. 941-942: “From a practical point of 
view, the most vital question is, to what extent the ICTY should bear responsibility (in the sense of 
providing remedies) for human rights violations that have occurred in the framework of its proceedings. 
(…) [T]he trial forum must take account of every human rights violation that occurs in the framework of 
the criminal proceedings. This view finds its ultimate basis in simple fairness and in the nature of the 
relationship between the accused and the trial forum.” 
175 See also Gordon 2007, pp. 672-673 (referring to several of the cases mentioned in n. 169): “In a 
string of decisions ruling on defense motions for release, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda has consistently held that the Tribunal has “no jurisdiction over the conditions of any arrest, 
detention or other measures carried out by a sovereign State at the request of the Tribunal.” This has 
resulted in questionable due process jurisprudence [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Sluiter 
2003 B, p. 943: “When one looks at the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR one notices that the 
Chambers are generally aware of their obligation to ensure the fairness of the trial as a whole. The 
decisions of Trial Chamber II of the ICTR mentioned above [Sluiter refers here to several of the cases 
mentioned in n. 169, ChP] should be seen as unfortunate exceptions to this rule [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].”  
176 See also Starr 2008, pp. 724-725: “[T]he ICTs have held that they lack jurisdiction to review national 
authorities’ arrest methods and conditions of detention before transfer to Tribunal custody, even when 
the arrest and detention occur at the Tribunal Prosecutor’s request. That rule has been criticized on 
human rights grounds. But it has an obvious remedial-cost-avoidance advantage for the Tribunals, 
where the capture of suspects often depends on the cooperation of states with poor human rights records. 
If they were to assert jurisdiction to review arrest and detention methods, the Tribunals would probably 
be required to grant significant remedies (perhaps even release) in many cases [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” The same can, of course, be said of the quick rejections of male captus claims, see n. 3 
of Chapter IV and ns. 138, 801 and 1286 of Chapter VI. In n. 801 of Chapter VI, reference was made to 
the Akayesu judgment. Starr (2008, pp. 725-726) writes on this judgment: “[T]he Appeals Chamber held 
that the defendant had waived his unlawful detention claim. This holding relied on a stricter application 
of the waiver doctrine than the Appeals Chamber had applied in other contexts, suggesting an ad hoc 
form of remedial deterrence. (…) It might be understood best as a response to the Barayagwiza debacle 
less than a year earlier. Akayesu’s legal argument on appeal was based on the Appeals Chamber’s 
original decision in Barayagwiza. That precedent might have required release if the Appeals Chamber 
had found that Akayesu had similarly been detained impermissibly – which is at least a possibility, as 
Akayesu was arrested by Zambian officials several months before the ICTR issued an indictment against 
him. And the Appeals Chamber, having barely managed to preserve the continued viability of the 
Tribunal via its forced retreat in the Barayagwiza Review Decision, of course would have been anxious 
not to repeat the crisis. Again, while it is impossible to show conclusively that remedial costs drove the 
Appeals Chamber’s application of the waiver doctrine, the circumstances are suggestive [original 








conviction.177 This ensures that both the sense of justice of the person in question (in 
that his violations are remedied) and of the victims/the international community as a 
whole (in that a suspect of international crimes, if found guilty, receives an 
appropriate (which very often means stern) penalty for his deeds) are met.  
However, even if a tribunal issues a male detentus decision because of the 
serious male captus involved, one must understand that this does not mean that the 
suspect cannot be tried for his crimes at all. The fact that this prosecuting forum 
would refuse the case does not mean that the suspect cannot be tried elsewhere. The 
tribunal must not forget that it also has a responsibility to fight impunity, even if it is 
of the opinion that the suspect can no longer be tried before its own judges.178 Thus, 
if the State of residence of the suspect requests the return of the suspect, a tribunal 
could decide to make this return conditional, in that the suspect would only be 
returned to that State if the latter’s authorities are able and willing to prosecute the 
suspect before their own courts.179 If this cannot be guaranteed, the tribunal should 
transfer the suspect to another jurisdiction which can fairly prosecute the suspect. 
That jurisdiction could then take into account the fact that the suspect has suffered 
an irregular pre-trial phase and grant him certain remedies. Otherwise, the suspect 
would still not have received a ‘personal’ remedy repairing the wrongs. (The fact 
that the first court refuses jurisdiction and that the second court starts a new trial is 
not of any ‘advantage’ to the suspect. Although it is not the case that every remedy 
must be to the benefit of the suspect, it would arguably contravene the concept of 
fairness if the suspect is, for example, kidnapped, brought to a court which refuses 
jurisdiction, brought before a new court and then tried without the latter court 
providing him a remedy, such as a reduction of his sentence, which, in the suspect’s 
eyes, would effectively repair the wrongs suffered by him.) 
The second and last issue which needs to be discussed before turning to Part 4 of 
this book, is that the previous discussion primarily focused on violations of human 
rights/due process considerations. However, a few words on violations of State 
sovereignty in the context of the tribunals should still be made.  
It is the case that in the truly vertical context of the ICTY/ICTR (this is different 
for the internationalised criminal tribunals), “sovereignty by definition cannot play 
the same role”180 as in the horizontal context of equal, sovereign States, where “it is 
of utmost importance that any exercise of (...) national jurisdiction be exercised in 
full respect of other national jurisdictions”181 because “[o]bservance of this 
fundamental principle forms an important asset of peaceful co-operation between 
States”.182 
                                                          
177 See the case Semanza (see n. 1005 and accompanying text of Chapter VI). 
178 This was a correct point of criticism vented against the first Barayagwiza case. 
179 See also n. 354 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
180 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 100. 









Nevertheless, this does not, of course, constitute a carte blanche for such 
Tribunals, or States/international forces working for them, to violate the sovereignty 
of States.183  
Therefore, if an abduction, violating a State’s sovereignty, can be attributed to 
the Tribunal and if that abduction is followed by a protest and request for the return 
of the suspect, there is no reason why the Tribunal should not return the suspect to 
that State.  
It has been asserted that this would make no sense because the State in question 
would then be under an immediate new obligation to transfer the suspect back to the 
Tribunal: dolo facit qui petit quod [statim] redditurus est.184 However, if an 
abduction can be attributed to the Tribunal and if the judges of the Tribunal were to 
(correctly) find that this is such a serious male captus that jurisdiction must be 
refused, this maxim would arguably not apply, for there is no renewed obligation to 
transfer the suspect back to the Tribunal if that Tribunal has stated that it can no 
longer exercise jurisdiction over the case. However, as explained supra, what the 
Tribunal could do in such circumstances is to grant the return on a conditional basis, 
on the State of residence being under an obligation to prosecute the suspect itself. In 
less serious male captus cases, where the judge has not refused jurisdiction but 
where he may nevertheless be of the opinion that a violation of a State’s sovereignty 
(followed by a protest and request for the return of the suspect), strictly speaking, 
demands that the suspect is released and returned to that injured State, it would be 
better for the Tribunal not to return the suspect at all. After all, in such a situation, 
the above-mentioned maxim does apply. It would be rather strange for the suspect to 
be returned to a State which has an immediate obligation to re-transfer the suspect 
back to the Tribunal (which is, after all, still capable of trying the suspect). In fact, 
one could argue that if it is clear that that State might not cooperate with the 
Tribunal, it would be rather ridiculous to return the suspect to that State.185 Hence, it 
                                                          
183 Cf. also Sloan 2003 B, pp. 549-550: “While it is, of course, true that different considerations must 
apply as regards relations between the Tribunal and member states of the UN (clearly the Tribunal could 
not function if its relations with states were constrained in the same manner as between states), it is 
submitted that there must nevertheless be some limits on the ICTY’s power to intervene in a state. 
Indeed the Decision would have benefited from consideration of whether there are such limits on the 
ICTY, and, if so, what they are and whether Nikolić’s capture in violation of the law of the FRY 
violated them [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Lamb 2000, p. 223, 
n. 201: “Potentially at least, a State may plead lawful excuse, on the grounds that the ICTY (and hence 
by implication its orders) was instituted by the UN Security Council pursuant to a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (…) However, such a plea appears unlikely to succeed, on the 
grounds that while arrest warrants may constitute enforcement measures, these oblige custodial States to 
effect arrests or direct international forces to carry them out. They stop short of authorizing such States 
or forces to launch incursions into third States in order to do so”. 
184 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
104. 
185 Cf. also the UK submission in the Todorović case where it was argued: “It follows that even if 
Todorovic were to be released and returned to the FRY, the FRY would be under an absolute obligation 
immediately to hand him back to the Tribunal. The United Kingdom submits that it would be absurd for 








would arguably better in such a situation if the Tribunal holds the suspect in 
custody, continues the case and accords other remedies for the wrongs which 
occurred in the context of its case. 
                                                                                                                                              
while also requiring the FRY to hand him straight back to the Tribunal. It would be even more absurd to 
hold that there was a duty to return him to the FRY if there were any chance that the FRY would not 
comply with its obligations to the Tribunal.” (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Blagoje 
Simi[ć], Milan Simi[ć], Miroslav Tadi[ć], Stevan Todorovi[ć] and Simo Zari[ć], ‘Submissions of the 
United Kingdom Regarding Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber III, 18 October 2000’, Case No. 













GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE ARREST  




1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter will deal with the procedures as to how a suspect is arrested and 
brought into the jurisdiction of the ICC. The importance of these procedures cannot 
be stressed enough: the ICC instruments can have the most detailed provisions on, 
for example, the exact scope of a certain crime against humanity, the theory of 
command responsibility or the reparation regime for victims, but these provisions 
will only become truly relevant if a person is arrested and surrendered to The 
Hague. This is because – as has already been briefly mentioned in the very first 
pages of this book – the ICC does not recognise trials in absentia, that is, trials 
without the suspect (who is called the accused at trial, see footnote 1) being present 
in the courtroom.1 This means that unless a person is arrested and surrendered to 
                                                          
1 See Art. 63, para. 1 of the ICC Statute: “The accused shall be present during the trial.” (See also 
Sluiter 2003 C, p. 606.) It should be clarified that this does not mean that a person, which has already 
been arrested and surrendered to the ICC, can never be barred from attending a session in court. For 
example, para. 2 of the same article states: “If the accused, being present before the Court, continues to 
disrupt the trial, the Trial Chamber may remove the accused and shall make provisions for him or her to 
observe the trial and instruct counsel from outside the courtroom, through the use of communications 
technology, if required. Such measures shall be taken only in exceptional circumstances after other 
reasonable alternatives have proved inadequate, and only for such duration as is strictly required.” 
However, this rule applies to the situation when the person is already in the custody of the ICC. 
Conversely, the prohibition of in absentia trials mentioned above refers to the hypothetical situation 
that the ICC starts a trial when the person on trial is not there because he has not been arrested and 
surrendered to The Hague at all. In that case, the ICC thus starts a trial without having the person tried 
in its custody. In the in absentia discussion, the procedure from Art. 61, para. 2 of the ICC Statute 
should also be mentioned. This provision states: “The Pre-Trial Chamber may, upon request of the 
Prosecutor or on its own motion, hold a hearing in the absence of the person charged to confirm the 
charges on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial when the person has: (a) Waived his or her right to 
be present; or (b) Fled or cannot be found and all reasonable steps have been taken to secure his or her 
appearance before the Court and to inform the person of the charges and that a hearing to confirm those 
charges will be held. In that case, the person shall be represented by counsel where the Pre-Trial 
Chamber determines that it is in the interests of justice.” Although this procedure, which very much 
resembles the already discussed (see n. 76 and accompanying text of Chapter VI) Rule 61 of the 
ICTY/ICTR RPE, has more characteristics of the in absentia trial mentioned above, it must not be 
forgotten that Art. 61 of the ICC Statute ‘only’ deals with the pre-trial confirmation of charges hearing, 








The Hague, a proper trial will not take place.2 And if such a trial does not take 
place, the above-mentioned provisions can never become truly relevant. In short, if 
one does not want this to happen, a person needs to be arrested and surrendered 
first. In the words of Ruxton:  
 
The arrest process lies at the very heart of the criminal justice process: unless the 
accused are taken into custody, we will have no trials, no development of the law by 
the courts; and ultimately, no international justice. (...) [W]ithout arrest mechanisms 
that work, nothing will be achieved.3 
 
This feature is complicated by the fact (see again the very first pages of this book) 
that the ICC does not have its own police force. It is “a giant without arms and 
legs”4 who “needs artificial limbs to walk and work”5 so to speak, dependent on 
others to effectuate the arrest and surrender of the suspect to the ICC.6  
Before looking at the more specific arrest and surrender provisions (Section 3 of 
this chapter), the next section (Section 2) will first examine the more general 
cooperation regime between these ‘others’ (one could hereby think of States, 
organisations and international forces) and the ICC. After Section 3 (where special 
attention will be paid to the intriguing and crucial provision of Article 59, paragraph 
2 of the ICC Statute), the cooperation regime (of which the arrest and surrender 
provisions are obviously part) will be assessed for a second time (in Section 4) so 
that it is clear what kind of system ‘the others’ are truly involved in.  
                                                                                                                                              
in the main text: although some substantive concepts may already be addressed during this confirmation 
of charges hearing, they will only become truly relevant in the context of a proper trial. 
2 As also explained in n. 33 of Chapter I, it will be shown in Subsection 3.1 that a person can also be 
summoned to come to The Hague (without the necessity of arrest). However, as this book is focusing 
on the arrest proceedings, it has decided to give this chapter the title it now has. Finally, it must be 
noted that a suspect may also come voluntarily to The Hague. In that case, an arrest is, of course, not 
necessary either. Nevertheless, as also already discussed in n. 33 of Chapter I, one can assume that an 
arrest will normally be necessary (even taking into account the ICC case of Abu Garda, where this was 
not the case). 
3 Ruxton 2001, p. 19. See also Roper and Barria 2008, p. 458: “The inability to apprehend suspects not 
only undermines the credibility of a justice system but, more fundamentally, thwarts the prosecution of 
cases and ultimately denies the possibility of justice to individuals as well as the establishment of a 
historical record which can serve as a basis for possible national reconciliation. Therefore we regard the 
apprehension of suspects as a more fundamental problem than just enforcement – the inability to 
apprehend suspects undermines the entire international human rights regime.” See finally Swart 2002 
C, p. 1640: “The surrender of suspects and accused to the International Criminal Court is of vital 
importance to its proper functioning. The duty of States to arrest and surrender persons whose presence 
before the Court is needed is one of the cornerstones on which the Rome Statute rests. Historical 
precedents make the fundamental nature of the duty to arrest and surrender abundantly clear. Attempts 
to create an international system for the adjudication of war crimes and other international crimes in the 
aftermath of World War I have largely failed because surrender of persons could not be secured. On the 
other hand, the successes of the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo and of other 
tribunals erected after World War II would not have been possible without the operation of a smooth 
system for arresting and surrendering the accused.” 
4 See Cassese’s metaphor in Subsection 1.3 of Chapter I. 
5 See ibid. 








2 MODEL OF COOPERATION: A FIRST APPRAISAL 
 
To properly understand the cooperation regime of the ICC (and its position vis-à-vis 
other regimes), it may be worth briefly reviewing the two main cooperation regimes 
which have already been discussed in this book: the inter-State cooperation regime 
and the cooperation regime between States and the ICTY/ICTR.  
Here, the well-known distinction between ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ re-enters 
the scene, see Section 2 of Chapter VI. As may have become clear from n. 6 of that 
chapter, this book will look at the actual characteristics of a certain regime before 
giving it a certain label and will not use the more basic distinction that cooperation 
regimes between States are horizontal and cooperation regimes between States and 
international criminal tribunals are vertical in nature. (If one were to use that 
distinction, it is, of course, clear that the ICC’s cooperation regime with States can 
be seen as vertical, as the ICC, like, for example, the ICTY and the ICTR, can be 
seen as a real international criminal tribunal.) 
Horizontal regimes are based on consensus and equality: they are characterised 
by equal entities which cooperate with each other, because they want to do so.7  
Conversely, vertical cooperation regimes, such as the ones regulating 
cooperation between States and the ICTY or the ICTR – as has already been 
explained in Chapter VI – are based on superiority and non-equality: States must 
cooperate with the hierarchically higher Tribunals, whether they want to or not. In 
other words, (the cooperation regimes of) these Tribunals have been imposed on 
States:8 in UNSC Resolutions 827 and 955, respectively, one can read that the 
UNSC, on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, decided to establish these 
Tribunals and to clarify that all UN Member States have to cooperate fully with 
them.9  
                                                          
7 See also Swart 2002 B, p. 1590: “Cooperation between States in criminal matters is a matter freely 
entered into.” 
8 See also ibid., p. 1592. 
9 See UNSC Res. 827 of 25 May 1993, paras. 2 and 4 (“The Security Council, (...) Acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, (...) Decides hereby to establish an international 
tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a 
date to be determined by the Security Council upon the restoration of peace and to this end to adopt the 
Statute of the International Tribunal (...); (...) Decides that all States shall cooperate fully with the 
International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the 
International Tribunal (…) [emphasis in original, ChP].”) and UNSC Res. 955 of 8 November 1994, 
paras. 1-2: “The Security Council, (...) Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
(...) Decides hereby (…) to establish an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting 
persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such 
violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 
1994 and to this end to adopt the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (…); (...) 
Decides that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance 









In that respect, it seems that a cooperation regime containing a duty to cooperate 
– and it is clear that the ICC regime contains such a provision10 – is vertical in 
nature. However, this does not necessarily have to be the case. After all, one will 
also find obligations to cooperate in many horizontal instruments treaties. An 
example is Article 1 of the UN Model Treaty on Extradition,11 which can perhaps 
be seen as reflecting “the broadest common international denominator in the field of 
extradition”.12 Article 1 (entitled ‘Obligation to extradite’) reads: 
 
Each Party agrees to extradite to the other, upon request and subject to the provisions 
of the present Treaty, any person who is wanted in the requesting State for 
prosecution for an extraditable offence or for the imposition or enforcement of a 
sentence in respect of such an offence.   
 
However, although this horizontal instrument thus contains an obligation to 
cooperate/extradite, it is clear that this duty can in no way be compared with 
provisions such as Articles 86 and 89 of the ICC Statute,13 because the inter-State 
duty to extradite is applicable to both sides (“[e]ach Party agrees to extradite to the 
other”), whereas in the ICC context, only States are obliged to cooperate with the 
ICC (and not vice versa).14 In that respect, reciprocity is clearly lacking.15 In other 
words, even though the obligation to cooperate may not necessarily constitute a 
                                                          
10 See Art. 86 of the ICC Statute for the general obligation (“States Parties shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.”) and Art. 89, para. 1 of the ICC Statute for the more specific 
obligation with respect to arrest and surrender (“States Parties shall (...) comply with requests for arrest 
and surrender.”). 
11 See the Annex to UNGA Res. 45/116 of 14 December 1990. 
12 Swart 2002 B, p. 1591. For an example of a provision in an actual treaty, see Art. 1 (‘Obligation to 
Extradite’) of the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. (Conclusion: The Hague, 24 June 1980. Entry into force: 15 September 1983.) The text of 
this treaty can be found in Mevis, Reijntjes and Stamhuis 2004, pp. 17-23. 
13 See n. 10. 
14 Although it does not impose an obligation on the ICC to cooperate with States, it may nevertheless be 
interesting to note that the ICC Statute does contain a ‘mutual’ provision, see Art. 93, para. 10 of the 
ICC Statute: “(a) The Court may, upon request, cooperate with and provide assistance to a State Party 
conducting an investigation into or trial in respect of conduct which constitutes a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court or which constitutes a serious crime under the national law of the requesting 
State. (b) (i) The assistance provided under subparagraph (a) shall include, inter alia: a. The 
transmission of statements, documents or other types of evidence obtained in the course of an 
investigation or a trial conducted by the Court; and b. The questioning of any person detained by order 
of the Court; (ii) In the case of assistance under subparagraph (b) (i) a: a. If the documents or other 
types of evidence have been obtained with the assistance of a State, such transmission shall require the 
consent of that State; b. If the statements, documents or other types of evidence have been provided by 
a witness or expert, such transmission shall be subject to the provisions of article 68. (c) The Court 
may, under the conditions set out in this paragraph, grant a request for assistance under this paragraph 
from a State which is not a Party to this Statute.” Note, however, that the ICC Statute does not speak of 
“mutual assistance” itself. According to Swart, this is because the Statute “tries to avoid terminology 
that would be reminiscent of inter-State cooperation [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Swart 2002 B, 
pp. 1594-1595.) See also Rastan 2008, p. 432. 








vertical characteristic, the version in the ICC context in fact lives up to its vertical 
appearance.16  
Another vertical aspect of the ICC’s cooperation regime is the ICC’s position as 
the final arbiter in disputes.17 Sluiter explains:  
 
It is unthinkable that in a horizontal cooperation relationship, either the requesting or 
the requested side will resolve disputes regarding the duty to provide legal assistance. 
There is a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism in a vertical cooperation 
relationship where a hierarchically superior international criminal tribunal is assisted. 
The task of settling disputes of the requesting party is the most fundamental deviation 
from the horizontal legal assistance model as it is most indicative of a legal 
assistance relationship based on hierarchy.18 
 
The ICC’s status as the final arbiter in disputes can be found in Article 119, 
paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute, which states: “Any dispute concerning the judicial 
functions of the Court shall be settled by the decision of the Court.” According to 
Clark, commenting on this provision, questions concerning cooperation with and 
judicial assistance to the Court can probably be seen as part of the judicial functions 
of the ICC.19 It is interesting to note that Clark does not categorise an important 
point relating to the cooperation regime, namely “a failure by a State to comply 
with a request to cooperate”,20 under the subject of “[a]ny dispute concerning the 
judicial functions of the Court”. However, he does refer to Article 87, paragraph 7 
of the ICC Statute, which clarifies:  
 
Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court contrary 
to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its 
functions and powers under this Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect 
                                                          
16 Nevertheless, it is not as vertical as the duty in the context of the ICTY/ICTR as the latter duty is 
truly general in nature. See Swart 2002 B, p. 1595: “[A] duty that is for the Tribunals to specify in 
individual cases and that finds its limitations only in explicit provisions of the Statutes. This is not the 
system of the Court’s Statute. In Part 9 [This part is entitled ‘International Cooperation and Judicial 
Assistance’, ChP], the choice has been made to list the specific obligations of the States Parties 
exhaustively and to indicate their scope and contents as precisely as possible. It must be assumed that 
the general obligation to cooperate laid down in Article 86 of the Statute does not create a general 
supplementary and residual duty to cooperate in situations not covered by other articles. (…) In other 
words, while the Statutes of the Tribunals have created an ‘open’ system, that of the Court’s Statute is, 
at least in principle, a ‘closed’ one. In that fundamental respect, the system established by the Court’s 
Statute is more akin to the structure of inter-State cooperation [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” The 
words “in principle” used by Swart allude to the exception of Art. 93, para. 1 (l) of the ICC Statute 
which states: “States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part [this is Part 9, ChP] 
and under procedures of national law, comply with requests by the Court to provide the following 
assistance in relation to investigations or prosecutions: (…) Any other type of assistance which is not 
prohibited by the law of the requested State, with a view to facilitating the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”  
17 See Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 613-615.  
18 Ibid., p. 614. 
19 Clark 2008, pp. 1729-1730. 








and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council 
referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.  
 
Hence, it is indeed the case that ultimately either the ASP or the UNSC may have to 
decide on this issue,21 but it is the Court itself which decides whether or not this 
                                                          
21 In addition, “[f]ailing any action taken or recommended by the Assembly of States Parties or the 
Security Council, States Parties to the Statute or any Member State of the United Nations, as the case 
may be, may resort to remedies generally available to them under international law, with a view to 
ensuring compliance with requests for cooperation by the Court.” (Ciampi 2002, p. 1635.) See also 
Kaul and Kreß 2000, p. 169: “[R]eference to the customary international law on state responsibility is 
necessary to spell out the consequences of non-cooperation [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See 
further Rastan 2008, pp. 434-444. Strijards notes that the ICC “will be far more dependent on the 
willingness of States to comply with requests for cooperation” (Strijards 2001, p. 115) because it 
cannot, in principle, rely on “the backbone of the UN-Charter” (ibid.). See also Cogan 2002, p. 137. See 
further Scharf 2000, p. 944: “The experience of the ICTY suggests that states will frequently refuse to 
provide (…) cooperation despite their clear treaty obligations to comply with the Tribunal’s orders. The 
ICC’s only recourse in such a situation is to make a finding that the state has failed to cooperate and 
then refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties. The Assembly’s only enforcement mechanism is 
the issuance of a statement condemning the failure to cooperate – which is unlikely to have much effect 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Sluiter 2002 A, p. 134: “It is undeniable that the ICC faces 
greater difficulties in the field of legal assistance than the ad hoc Tribunals. The latter not only 
benefited from more extensive obligations for States, but also could rely, at least on paper, on the 
assistance of practically every State in the world.” The words “at least on paper” are important here; 
although it is true that the ICC in principle cannot rely on the backbone of the UN Charter, the 
experience of the UN ad hoc Tribunals (see also n. 121 of Chapter VI) has shown that, even if the 
ICC’s case is supported by a UNSC referral, such a backbone may not necessarily be of any help. See, 
for instance, Scharf 2000, p. 944: “[T]he experience of the ICTY indicates that, even in the most 
egregious of situations, the Security Council is unlikely to impose sanctions in the event of non-
cooperation with the ICC, especially where the target state’s trading partners include one or more of the 
Permanent Members of the Council which wield a veto.” See also Roper and Barria 2008, p. 464: “One 
might argue that having a consensus of the permanent members of the Security Council would provide 
the ICC with greater leverage with states in securing the surrender of suspects, but the history of the 
ICTY and the ICTR (both created under Chapter VII authority) demonstrates that this formal power 
still requires the genuine co-operation of the state”. See further Rastan 2008, pp. 438-439, the ICC 
OTP’s ‘Informal expert paper: Fact-finding and investigative functions of the office of the Prosecutor, 
including international co-operation’, 2003, available at: http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/490C317B-5D8E-4131-8170-7568911F6EB2/248459/372616.PDF, para. 5 and 
Gillett 2008, pp. 18-19. Like the ICTY/ICTR, the ICC will thus also very much depend on (other) 
mighty States and organisations in favour of its existence and functioning which are able and willing to 
put pressure on non-cooperative States. See also Rastan 2008, pp. 439-440 and Roper and Barria 2008, 
p. 467: “[W]e argue more generally that significant economic pressure may be one of the most effective 
tools available to third parties in order to support the activity of the ICC. (…) Especially for states 
which are highly export-dependent, third-party economic pressure may be one of the most important 
means by which the international community can assist the ICC in securing the apprehension of 
suspects.” (See also n. 116 of Chapter VI.) As already explained in Chapter VI, such pressure may not 
only be based on mere politics but may also have a legal foundation; it was stated at the beginning of 
this footnote that such actions can be based on the law of State responsibility. In this context, mention 
should be made of the concepts of ‘obligation to cooperate erga omnes’ and ‘obligation to cooperate 
erga omnes partes’ (see also Chapter VI) – erga omnes meaning towards everyone, towards the 
international community as a whole and erga omnes partes meaning towards all relevant parties, for 
example, towards all the members of the UN or towards all the members of the ICC’s ASP. Cf. also 
Kreß and Prost 2008 A, p. 1526, writing about the hypotheses of non-States Parties being obliged to 








procedure will be followed. Furthermore, this provision arguably is concerned with 
the consequences of non-cooperation rather than with whether or not one can speak 
of non-cooperation on the part of the State in question itself. This point of law 
appears to be the privilege of the ICC alone.22  
In short, there are unmistakably important vertical characteristics discernible in 
the general cooperation regime between the ICC and States,23 but the previous 
pages have also shown that the ICC’s regime may not be as vertical as that of the 
ICTY and the ICTR.24 This last point can be confirmed by a key element 
underpinning the ICC’s regime, which is that, unlike the cooperation regimes of the 
ICTY/ICTR, the cooperation regime of the ICC is not imposed on States; in 
principle, it is only applicable to States that decide to become a party to the ICC 
Statute, which is basically a normal international treaty.25 Hence, even though the 
ICC cooperation regime may indeed contain important vertical elements, States can 
still decide for themselves whether they want to be bound by this regime or not. 
This is also observed by Swart, who states that   
 
                                                                                                                                              
pursuant to customary international law: “In both hypotheses the obligation applies erga omnes and as a 
consequence thereof every UN Member State or, respectively, every State has a legal interest in the 
non-States Parties’ cooperation [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Note that countermeasures taken by 
the ASP against the non-cooperating State are based on the fact that the non-cooperative State’s 
obligation to cooperate applies erga omnes partes, towards all the members of the ASP, see ibid., p. 
1530.)  
22 See Clark 2008, p. 1730, n. 29. After having stated in the main text that “questions concerning 
cooperation with and judicial assistance to the Court” can probably be seen as part of the judicial 
functions of the ICC, Clark continues to write in the footnote: “In the event that the Court is unable to 
achieve what it wants from a State Party, some questions may end up before the Assembly of States 
Parties or the Security Council for “enforcement”. See article 87 para. 7 (...). The judges would no 
doubt take the view that this would not be an opportunity for the Assembly to resolve the dispute by 
second-guessing the Court on matters of law.” See finally Pellet 2002 B, p. 1843 who states about Art. 
87, para. 7 of the ICC Statute that this provision “empowers the Court to make findings on all questions 
relating to cooperation between States and the ICC, yet leaves the last word to the Assembly of States 
Parties or the Security Council.” 
23 Another example is provided by Currie 2007, p. 380, referring to Artt. 57, para. 3 (d) and 99, para. 4 
of the ICC Statute: “Where the Pre-Trial Chamber determines that there is no competent mechanism or 
authority to respond to a cooperation request, it may even authorize the Prosecutor to conduct 
investigations on the territory of a party state, without that state’s consent [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” (See also Rastan 2008, pp. 437-438.) Swart, however, notes in this context: “Even so, all this is 
a rather far cry from the system of Articles 18 and 17 of the ad hoc Tribunals’ Statutes, with their broad 
powers for the Prosecutor to carry out investigations on the territory of States, and from the practice 
that has developed on their basis. Arguably, the system of the Statute is, in these respects, definitely 
inferior to that of the Tribunals’ Statutes, and the fear is, therefore, warranted that this will have 
negative consequences for the proper functioning of the Court.” (Swart 2002 B, p. 1598.) See also Kaul 
and Kreß 2000, p. 171: “[T]he possibility for the Prosecutor to conduct on-site investigations, though at 
least included as such, is regrettably limited in scope.” 
24 See ns. 16 and 23. 
25 See Artt. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith”: pacta sunt servanda) and 34 (“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a 
third State without its consent”: pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt) of the Vienna Convention on the 








[t]he general answer must surely be that the Statute has created a regime of 
cooperation that is a mixture of the ‘horizontal’ and the ‘vertical’. The basic 
difference between the ad hoc Tribunals and the Court is that the latter’s Statute rests 
on a consensual basis [emphasis added, ChP].26 
 
One can make a comparison here with respect to cooperation between the ICC and 
organisations. The latter cannot become a party to the ICC Statute (which is only 
reserved for States) but if they consent to cooperate, they may nevertheless sign a 
cooperation agreement with the Court on the basis of Article 87, paragraph 6 of the 
ICC Statute.27 In that case, it can be argued, the organisation is also obliged to 
cooperate with the ICC.28 An example in that respect is the ‘Agreement between the 
International Criminal Court and the European Union on Cooperation and 
Assistance’,29 which also contains a duty to cooperate for both parties.30 
                                                          
26 Swart 2002 B, p. 1594. 
27 “The Court may ask any intergovernmental organization to provide information or documents. The 
Court may also ask for other forms of cooperation and assistance which may be agreed upon with such 
an organization and which are in accordance with its competence or mandate.” Other provisions in the 
ICC Statute mentioning the interaction between the ICC and organisations (not focusing on the UN 
now) are Artt. 15, para. 2, 44, para. 4, 54, para. 3 (after the Lubanga Dyilo case a very well-known 
provision, see n. 523 and accompanying text of Chapter X), 73, 87, para. 1 (b), 93, para. 9 (b) and 116 
of the ICC Statute. 
28 See also Ciampi 2002, p. 1633: “Article 87(6) does not explicitly deal with the consequences of a 
failure of an intergovernmental organization to cooperate with the Court. Cooperation by an 
intergovernmental organization or arrangement is, in principle, a voluntary one. It is perfectly 
conceivable, however, that an intergovernmental organization, including a peacekeeping force, might 
assume an international treaty obligation to cooperate or be under a corresponding obligation because 
of a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In any such cases, it would incur 
international responsibility in case of failure to cooperate, and the Court – it is submitted – would have 
the inherent power to make a finding as to the organization’s failure to cooperate [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” See also Rastan 2008, p. 444. To this, one can add that an organisation may also be 
obliged to cooperate with the ICC if the obligation to cooperate stems from a customary international 
law rule, see Kreß and Prost 2008 A, p. 1526. 
29 ‘Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on Cooperation and 
Assistance’. Date of signature: 10 April 2006, date of entry into force: 1 May 2006, available at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/6EB80CC1-D717-4284-9B5C-
03CA028E155B/140157/ICCPRES010106_English.pdf (ICC-PRES/01-01-06) or at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:115:0049:0049:EN:PDF (this is the Council 
Decision of 10 April 2006 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the International 
Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and assistance (2006/313/CFSP), OJ L 115, 28 
April 2006, p. 49) and: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:115:0050:0056:EN:PDF (OJ L 115, 28 April 
2006, pp. 50-56, this is the Agreement itself). It may also be interesting to note that the ICC has 
concluded several agreements with other organisations, such as the ‘Negotiated Relationship 
Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations’ (ICC-ASP/3/Res.1, 
adopted and entered into force on 4 October 2004 and available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/916FC6A2-7846-4177-A5EA-5AA9B6D1E96C/0/ICCASP3Res1_English.pdf) 
and the ‘Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross on Visits to Persons deprived of Liberty Pursuant to the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court’ (ICC-PRES/02-01-06, adopted on 29 March 2006, entered into force on 13 April 2006 
and available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A542057C-FB5F-4729-8DD4-








Hence, the obligation to cooperate with the ICC, in principle, only applies to 
entities which agree to cooperate with the ICC. In principle, because there are three 
situations where this is not the case.  
Before reviewing these three situations, however, it is appropriate to connect the 
above-mentioned point regarding the cooperation between the ICC and 
organisations with the importance of cooperation with international (peacekeeping) 
forces explained in Chapter VI. As mentioned in that chapter, such assistance could 
be vital to the functioning of the tribunal in question. In the more specific context of 
the ICC,31 one should also take into account the fact that the ICC may only start a 
case if, among other things, 1) there has been no national investigation or 
prosecution of the case; 2) the State investigating or prosecuting the case is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution or 3) the 
State has investigated and has decided not to prosecute the person concerned but the 
decision not to prosecute resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State 
genuinely to prosecute.32  
Hence, very often, the State which has to surrender has been unable or unwilling 
to investigate and prosecute a certain case itself.33 Although this need not 
necessarily imply that that State is also unable or unwilling to cooperate with the 
ICC, there may still be a considerable overlap.34 And, of course, if a State cannot or 
                                                                                                                                              
merits to be mentioned here is the ‘Co-operation agreement between the office of the prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Police Organization-Interpol’, signed on 22 
December 2004 and available at: 
http://www.interpol.com/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/cooperation/agreements/ICC2005.asp. 
30 See Art. 4 of the Agreement (which is entitled ‘Obligation of cooperation and assistance’): “The EU 
and the Court agree that, with a view to facilitating the effective discharge of their respective 
responsibilities, they shall cooperate closely, as appropriate, with each other and consult each other on 
matters of mutual interest, pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement while fully respecting the 
respective provisions of the EU Treaty and the Statute. In order to facilitate this obligation of 
cooperation and assistance, the Parties agree on the establishing of appropriate regular contacts between 
the Court and the EU Focal Point for the Court.” The sanctions mechanism in the case of non-
compliance can also be found in this Agreement, see its Art. 18 (‘Settlement of Disputes’): “All 
differences between the EU and the Court arising out of the interpretation or application of this 
Agreement shall be dealt with through consultation between the Parties.” For more information on the 
cooperation regime between the ICC and the EU, see Paulussen 2010. 
31 See also Rastan 2008, p. 444 and the ICC OTP’s ‘Informal expert paper: Fact-finding and 
investigative functions of the office of the Prosecutor, including international co-operation’, 2003, 
available at: http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/490C317B-5D8E-4131-8170-
7568911F6EB2/248459/372616.PDF, para. 91. 
32 See Art. 17, para. 1 (a) and (b) of the ICC Statute. 
33 This is, of course, different when the surrendering State is not the same State as the State which is the 
subject of an ICC investigation. One could hereby think of the surrender of Bemba Gombo (see Section 
3 of Chapter X): this suspect plays a central role in the ICC’s investigation in the situation of the CAR 
but was arrested in and surrendered by Belgium.   
34 See Harmon and Gaynor 2004, p. 412, n. 26: “[T]he ICC Statute contains a potentially irreconcilable 
tension: on the one hand, the ICC is entirely dependent on the willingness of states to execute arrest 
warrants (…) and, on the other, its jurisdiction can only be exercised where a state is unable or 
unwilling to prosecute (…). If an accused flees to a state which is willing to locate and arrest the 
fugitive, all is well. But if the accused remains in the state which is unable or unwilling to prosecute 








does not want to cooperate, the help of international forces is very welcome. 
Another relevant point in the context of the ICC is the previously mentioned fact 
(see footnote 47 of Chapter I) that the Court will often have to deal with ongoing 
conflicts.35 Consequently, the assistance of peacekeeping forces on the ground may 
prove to be instrumental to the ICC’s success.36 One of the provisions in which 
                                                                                                                                              
726: “Now, inability or unwillingness to prosecute the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
cannot automatically be equated to inability or unwillingness to cooperate with the latter. The two 
concepts are, however, related. For example, the “total” or “substantial” collapse – or unavailability – 
of a national judicial system which results in the “inability” of the State to investigate and prosecute 
crimes before its national authorities may well also result in the inability of that State to cooperate with 
the Court in its investigations and prosecutions. In the case of “unwillingness”, the possibility of a 
coincidence – between unwillingness to prosecute and unwillingness to cooperate – is even more 
evident.” See finally Swart and Sluiter 1999, p. 92. 
35 Note that the fact that there is an ongoing conflict does not necessarily mean that it will be harder for 
the ICC to have a person arrested. Although Roper and Barria (2008, p. 465) “believe that the ICC will 
be more successful in gaining the surrender of suspects after hostilities have ended”, Burke-White 
(2008, p. 480) has criticised this point of view, stating: “Their logic is that ‘Intervening in an ongoing 
conflict makes the political ramifications of any investigation more acute.’ True enough, but those 
increased political ramifications during a conflict may actually increase, rather than limit, the ICC’s 
bargaining power. Prior to the end of a conflict, both the government of the territorial state and 
international actors may have particularly strong interests in apprehending a suspect, precisely because 
such an apprehension could help to bring about an end to the conflict. Once the conflict is over, in 
contrast, there may be far less urgency attached to apprehending indictees and the Court’s bargaining 
power may decline. Compare, for example, the limited pressure to secure the apprehension of Radovan 
Karadžić and Ratko Mladić in Bosnia and Herzegovina, more than ten years after the end of that 
conflict, with the growing foreign and domestic political support for either a peace deal or the 
apprehension of Joseph Kony during the conflict in Uganda. The very political urgency created by an 
ongoing conflict may well increase the ICC’s bargaining power [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
(Note, of course, that by now, Karadžić has been taken into custody by the ICTY.)  
36 See also Kreß and Prost 2008 A, p. 1527. In Chapter VI, the point was examined whether OTP staff 
could also be involved in the arrest itself. Zhou (2006, p. 211) argues with respect to the ICC context 
that “no rule in the ICC Statute prevents per se the Prosecutor from participating in enforcement 
operations within the limits set out under the ICTY regime. The large discretion conferred by Article 
54(1)(b) [of the ICC Statute, which, among other things, states that “[t]he Prosecutor shall (…) Take 
appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court”, ChP], along with the use in this provision of the term ‘shall’, rather suggest 
that if the Prosecutor believes that the participation of his office in an operation to capture a person 
indicted by the ICC is required, he would then be under an obligation to provide the appropriate 
participation from his office for the operation.” See also C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: 
Arrest and Detention’, Working Paper No. 24 – April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance 
Studies (available at: https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), p. 37. Gillett 
(2008, p. 19) in turn notes that the augmentation of the ICC’s ability to obtain suspects could be 
achieved “by explicitly granting the Prosecutor powers of arrest through an amendment to the Rome 
Statute. However, obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority of State Parties’ support to amend the 
Statute would be difficult. The amendment would likely be seen as too great an encroachment on state 
sovereignty and the discretion to choose when and how to deliver an accused to the Court. Furthermore, 
a muscled-up Court would present a threat to the preeminence of the Security Council in the 
international legal order, due to the cross-border nature of such arrests.” In this context, one can, of 
course, also mention the idea of an international arrest team executing arrest warrants for the ICC. 
However, as already clarified in n. 107 of Chapter VI, this does not appear to be politically feasible 
(yet). See also Sadat, who writes about the fact that the ICC lacks a police force and who notes that “it 








interaction between the ICC and organisations is mentioned37 is Article 54 of the 
ICC Statute (‘Duties and powers of the Prosecutor with respect to investigations’). 
Paragraph 3 (c) of this article reads: “The Prosecutor may: (…) Seek the 
cooperation of any State or intergovernmental organization or arrangement in 
accordance with its respective competence and/or mandate”.38 The word 
“arrangement” has been added “to ensure that peacekeeping forces are included. 
Even in the absence of an express reference in Article 87(6), the Court is thus in a 
position to cooperate with all kinds of peacekeeping forces, acting within their 
mandate [original footnote omitted, ChP].”39  
As it became clear from the experience of the ICTY that commanders in the 
field may be reluctant to arrest and surrender suspects, especially if the mandate of 
the peacekeeping force they are working for is rather ambiguous (see Section 2 of 
Chapter VI), it is evident and paramount that such a mandate be unequivocal and 
specific.40  
Preferably, the aim should be to create an explicit obligation for troops to 
cooperate with the ICC, comparable with the mandates of UNTAES (Croatia), 
                                                                                                                                              
precedent for doing so [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Sadat 2002, p. 120.) With respect to the last 
point, Sadat hereby refers to Art. 25 (‘International Constabulary’), para. 1 of the 1943 Draft 
Convention for the creation of an International Criminal Court of the London International Assembly, 
which states: “Near the Court there shall be a body of International Constabulary which will be charged 
with the execution of the orders of the Court and of the Procurator General.” (Historical Survey of the 
Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction (Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General), 
UNGA, ILC, Lake Success, New York, 1949, UN Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.1, available at:  
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_7_rev1.pdf, p. 102.) Cf. finally C. Ryngaert, 
‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, Working Paper No. 24 – April 2009, Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), pp. 44-45. 
37 See also n. 27. 
38 Note that this provision is very broad and thus can include many forms of assistance, not only those 
related to arrest and surrender, but also those which have to do, for example, with the freezing of assets 
of suspects. Cf. also n. 300. 
39 Ciampi 2002, p. 1621. Kreß and Prost (2008 A, p. 1527) note, writing on the absence of the term 
‘arrangement’ in Art. 87, para. 6 of the ICC Statute, that “[t]his omission was not deliberate so that the 
general rule of systematical interpretation should apply pursuant to which the complementary rules in 
Part 5 [This part is entitled ‘Investigation and Prosecution’, ChP] and Part 9 must be coherent. The 
Court is thus in a position to cooperate with all kinds of peacekeeping forces within the latter’s 
mandates. (…) Such a cooperation may extend, in particular, to the arrest and surrender of a person 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Rastan 2008, p. 444.  
40 See also Scharf 2000, p. 964: “If the ICC is to act in the aftermath of international or internal 
conflicts, it is likely that United Nations or coalition peacekeeping forces will be deployed to areas 
where persons indicted by the ICC are located. Where these troops are commissioned by the U.N. 
Security Council or a specific peace agreement, they can be given the authority to arrest such persons 
pursuant to the ICC’s arrest warrants. The experience of the ICTY, however, suggests that the force 
commanders will be reluctant to undertake this role. It is therefore important that the Security Council 
Resolution or peace agreement specifically give the troops the responsibility as well as the authority to 








KFOR (Kosovo) and UNMIL (Liberia),41 although it must also be admitted that this 
may not always be politically feasible.42 
Such an obligation does not appear to exist in the current mandate of 
peacekeeping forces active in regions where ICC suspects are present. One example 
relates to the situation in Uganda and the case of the LRA leaders who are believed 
to move between northern Uganda, eastern DRC and southern Sudan.43 In June 
2006, (then) UNSG Annan issued a report44 (already alluded to in this book)45 in 
which he looked at the possibilities of UNMIS (the UN peacekeeping force in 
Sudan) and MONUC (the UN peacekeeping force in the DRC) countering the threat 
caused by the LRA, something of which the Prosecutor would, of course, very 
much be in favour.46 In relation to UNMIS, Annan stated:  
 
UNMIS has no mandate to arrest and can only detain individuals who attack, or 
threaten to attack, United Nations personnel or installations or local populations 
within the immediate vicinity of United Nations installations. (…) Detainees would 
have to be immediately handed over to the Sudanese authorities. While the Sudan is 
not a State party to the Rome Statute, it has signed a memorandum of understanding 
with the International Criminal Court pledging to hand over the indicted LRA leaders 
to The Hague.47  
 
Hence, the situation with UNMIS is clear: UNMIS soldiers have no mandate to 
arrest ICC suspects, although they can detain them and deliver them to national 
officials who will then surrender them to The Hague if these suspects (threaten to) 
                                                          
41 See ns. 66 and 1174-1175 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
42 One would think that an extended mandate, in favour of the ICC, may be more easily reached in the 
case of a peacekeeping force under the authority of the EU (where every Member State is a party to the 
ICC Statute) than in the case of a peacekeeping force under the authority of the UN (where there are 
still many States not party to the Statute and even some opposing the Court). See also Ciampi 2006, p. 
735, n. 47. Cf. finally C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, Working 
Paper No. 24 – April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), p. 44, noting that an EU-led operation, 
because all EU States are parties to the ICC Statute, may have a duty to execute arrests. 
43 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Uganda, In the Case of The Prosecutor vs. Joseph Kony, 
Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, ‘Submission of Information on 
the Status of the Execution of the Warrants of Arrest in the Situation in Uganda’ (Public Document), 
ICC-02/04-01/05, 6 October 2006, p. 2. 
44 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolutions 1653 (2006) and 1663 (2006), 29 June 2006, 
S/2006/478. 
45 See n. 49 of Chapter I. 
46 See, for example, the following words from the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo, taken from 
the ‘Eleventh Diplomatic Briefing of the International Criminal Court. Compilation of Statements’, The 
Hague, 10 October 2007 (available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/E1900488-5437-4771-
BA50-45271FD9AE72/278575/ICCDB11St_en_fr.pdf), p. 6: “Joseph Kony and the three other indicted 
commanders have become a regional power, threatening stability in the sub region. We ask all States 
parties to support collaborative efforts between the DRC and Uganda to address the issue of arrests; we 
hope that the support of MONUC will remain forthcoming.” 
47 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolutions 1653 (2006) and 1663 (2006), 29 June 2006, 








attack UN personnel or installations or local populations within the immediate 
vicinity of UN installations. With respect to MONUC, Annan explained: 
 
Through resolution 1565 (2004) and subsequent resolutions, MONUC is mandated, 
inter alia, to use force to deter attacks that could threaten the political process and to 
ensure the protection of civilians. Acting in support of the Government of National 
Unity and Transition of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it should also (…) 
assist in the promotion and protection of human rights; and continue to cooperate 
with efforts to ensure that those responsible for serious violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law are brought to justice.48 
 
Although this statement is still couched in fairly general terms, a few paragraphs 
later, the UNSG turns to the specific context of the ICC:  
 
MONUC is aware of its mandate to detain the LRA leaders who have been indicted 
by the International Criminal Court, and would seek to do so if it came across them 
while carrying out its mandated duties. The captured LRA leaders would have to be 
immediately handed over to the Congolese authorities who, since the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo is a State party to the Rome Statute and has other agreements 
with the Court, would then be expected to hand over the suspects for arraignment in 
The Hague.49 
 
This language, which closely resembles the language of the North Atlantic 
Council’s resolution of 16 December 1995 (see Section 2 of Chapter VI), stating 
that “IFOR should detain any persons indicted by the International Criminal 
Tribunal who come into contact with IFOR in its execution of assigned tasks”, 
seems to mean that MONUC has certain duties, but that arresting and detaining ICC 
suspects is not one of them. However, if MONUC soldiers, in carrying out these 
duties, were to come across those suspects, they would be authorised, and indeed 
would try (“would seek”), to detain them. The detainees would then have to be 
handed over to the DRC authorities which in turn would have to surrender the 
suspects to the ICC.  
Hence, although arrests are not excluded, they are not within the mandate 
(UNMIS) or within what MONUC actually should do. Arresting LRA leaders and 
surrendering them to the ICC is principally the responsibility of the States 
themselves.50   
                                                          
48 Ibid., para. 27. 
49 Ibid., para. 31. See for more information also Rastan 2008, pp. 445-446. 
50 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolutions 1653 (2006) and 1663 (2006), 29 June 2006, 
S/2006/478, paras. 51-52: “While recognizing the threat posed by LRA, I should like to reiterate that, 
since UNMIS and MONUC already have challenging tasks to perform in their respective areas of 
responsibility, they should channel their capacities and resources primarily to address those challenges. 
(…) Dealing with the regional implications of LRA activities lies within the area of national 
responsibility of the Governments in the region. UNMIS and MONUC can provide assistance, within 
their existing mandates and capabilities, but should not be seen as an alternative to authorities in the 








Another example is linked to the conflict in Darfur, Sudan. The peacekeeping 
force employed in that region, the joint UN/AU force UNAMID, does not – much 
to the ICC’s displeasure – have the authority, let alone the obligation, to arrest ICC 
suspects.51  
A point which should also be mentioned in this context is the fact that although 
one should, of course, respect the mandate of the specific international force, one 
should also be careful that States, which may have strict obligations to arrest and 
surrender suspects, do not circumvent this obligation by deploying international 
forces with an ambiguous mandate.52    
Finally, it must be stressed that the exact arrest procedures of peacekeeping 
forces, if they have the mandate to arrest suspects, is not very clear. In the 
remainder of this chapter, the crucial Article 59 of the ICC Statute (‘Arrest 
proceedings in the custodial State’) will be examined in detail. However, this 
provision focuses on arrests by national States alone, see its paragraph 1: “A State 
Party which has received a request for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender 
shall immediately take steps to arrest the person in question in accordance with its 
laws and the provisions of Part 9.”53 Hall explains that a literal interpretation of 
Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute would lead to the following scenario: 
                                                          
51 See ‘UN decision on Darfur wins global applause’, Agence France Presse, 1 August 2007 (available 
at: http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=newsdetail&news=1751): “The UN resolution authorises the UN-AU 
force to take ‘the necessary action’ to protect its personnel, ensure security and freedom of movement 
for humanitarian workers, prevent attacks and threats against civilians and back implementation of the 
Darfur Peace Agreement. However, it does not authorise foreign troops to pursue alleged war criminals 
sought by the International Criminal Court (ICC) – an omission that drew a sharp warning from the 
tribunal based in The Hague. ‘We want to recall that the international community has called for these 
two arrests. This issue should not be ignored,’ an advisor to ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, told 
AFP.”  
52 See also Zhou 2006, p. 215 (writing on the context of the ICTY) who notes, after having referred to 
the in Chapter VI mentioned (see its n. 71 and accompanying text) quotation from the Todorović case 
about the purpose of Art. 29 of the ICTY Statute: “The Tribunal foresaw and, I believe, rightfully 
wanted to prevent the awkward situation in which individual states are compelled to execute arrest 
warrants but a collective entity comprising the membership of these same individual states could evade 
the same request for cooperation and judicial assistance.” Zhou, however, also foresees some problems 
with the ICC in that respect for this latter Court has created a specific procedure for organisations 
whereas the ICTY in the Todorović case simply applied the general obligation to cooperate for States to 
international organisations. See ibid., p. 216: “[A]ssuming the ICC Statute would have been the 
governing statute in the former Yugoslavia and all NATO states members were also States Parties of 
the Rome Treaty, it would have ensued that the Tribunal would have power to issue and transmit an 
arrest warrant to a State Party like France but could only ask NATO for its cooperation in the arrest of 
indicted persons found in Pale in Eastern Bosnia, which was, at the time, a sector under the authority of 
the French NATO forces. (…) In my view, the vital importance of the role of intergovernmental 
organizations should have been reflected in the ICC Statute by treating them on the same footing as the 
individual states.” 
53 See also Sluiter 2009, p. 468: “[I]t is unclear what legal regime applies to arrests performed by non-
State entities, such as (peace-keeping) forces.” Similarly, it is unclear what the role of the Prosecutor 
can be as concerns the execution of arrest warrants in unable States, see Hall 2008 B, p. 1151: “[I]t is 
not clear what the scope of the Prosecutor’s powers is when taking specific investigative steps pursuant 
to article 57 para. 3 (d) when a State Party is unable to do so. Presumably, national legislation could 








[M]ilitary police of a State Party (custodial State) serving in a peace-keeping 
operation might carry out an arrest in the territory of another State. A literal 
interpretation of paragraph 2 would suggest that the military police would have to 
send the arrested person promptly back to a court in the custodial State, both when 
the courts in the territorial State were open and when the judicial system has 
collapsed.54 
 
However, Hall also notes that  
 
a degree of flexibility in the implementation of article 59 that is consistent with the 
purpose of the Statute may be possible, such as bringing the person promptly before a 
court of the custodial State sitting in the State with jurisdiction where the person was 
arrested or prompt surrender to the Court, provided that the safeguards for the rights 
of the suspect, as envisaged in article 59, were fully respected and kidnapping in 
violation of international law was prohibited. In this respect, the Court should reject 
the approach of the ICTY in (…) [and then, reference is made to Dokmanović and the 
2002 decision in Nikolić, ChP], to allegations that the accused was kidnapped in 
violation of international law.55 
 
Of course, in the situation that the peacekeeping forces directly surrender the 
suspect to the ICC,56 the judges of that latter Court must check, just as the national 
                                                                                                                                              
likely to be presented with a number of other novel situations not expressly addressed in article 59 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].” One of those novel situations will now be discussed in the main 
text. 
54 Ibid., p. 1151, n. 20.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Cf. Gillett 2008, p. 21, writing on “unable” States and suggesting agreements “between peacekeeping 
forces and the territorial State in which they were located, granting the former the authority to carry out 
arrests in the host state’s territory. Ideally, such agreements would contain “assisted arrest” clauses 
allowing peace-keepers to execute arrest warrants and to hand the accused directly to the ICC in cases 
of substantial or total collapse of the State’s judicial or governmental infrastructure.” Gillett even 
proposes in this context the creation, by the ICC’s ASP, of a multilateral reciprocal treaty, see ibid., p. 
27: “The acceptance of ad hoc assisted arrest operations, while a positive development in the struggle to 
try those accused of the most serious crimes known to mankind, would not be an ideal long-term 
solution to the problem of impunity. To provide an ongoing, regulated basis for assisted arrests to be 
conducted in States unable to execute warrants through their own agents, the Assembly of State Parties 
of the ICC would need to conclude an assisted arrest agreement as a subsidiary instrument to the Rome 
Statute. Within this agreement, State Parties would provide a prior and continuing consent to assistance 
in executing ICC arrest warrants in situations where they are unable to do so through their own agents, 
and also would reciprocally agree to aide in the execution of ICC arrest warrants within other State 
Parties’ territories, when those States are unable to do so [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Cf. also 
Rastan 2008, p. 454: “The ‘unable’ state could invite capable states or an international peacekeeping 
presence on its territory to assist it in fulfilling its duties towards the Court. Moreover, although the 
Court’s non-compliance procedure is normally discussed with reference to a state’s ‘unwillingness’ to 
co-operate, the Court could possibly treat ‘inability’ also as a failure to comply with a co-operation 
request. Rather than indicating the international wrongfulness of non-co-operation, the purpose of such 
a finding would be to invite the ASP or the Security Council, as appropriate, to consider the matter with 
a view to promoting co-operation. Such considerations may, for example, take the form of the Security 
Council modifying the mandate of relevant peacekeeping operations to enable regional co-operation 








authority would do in normal situations (see infra), whether the arrest and detention 
was properly executed and whether the suspect’s rights were respected (among 
other things).  
Going back to the three situations where non-States Parties to the ICC Statute 
may be obliged to cooperate, the first of these is when the UNSC simply determines 
that this should be so. This can, for example, be the case if the Council, through a 
resolution based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, has referred a situation to the 
ICC pursuant to Article 13 (b) of the ICC Statute,57 in which it decides that States 
not party to the Statute must also cooperate with the ICC.58 For example, in the 
previously mentioned (see Section 2 of Chapter VI) UNSC Resolution 1593 of 31 
March 2005, the UNSC referred the situation of Darfur, Sudan to the ICC. The 
relevant section of this resolution reads:  
 
The Security Council, (...) Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, 1. Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; 2. Decides that the Government of 
Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and 
provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this 
resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no 
                                                                                                                                              
surrender operations, or may lead to the exertion of political pressure through issue-linkage to secure 
co-operation from a hitherto ‘unwilling’ state [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See finally C. 
Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, Working Paper No. 24 – April 2009, 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), pp. 42-43, writing on the situation of 
arrests by peacekeeping forces in unwilling States: “One could (…) easily imagine a Yugoslavia- or 
Sudan-like situation of international troops being deployed in a certain area, and the local authorities 
opposing this deployment and any arrest the troops may effectuate. For such a situation, a direct 
transfer from international custody to ICC custody, without the State acting as an intermediary, appears 
desirable. There is no legal basis in the State-centered Statute for such a method, though. If the 
territorial State is indeed not willing to cooperate, a possible solution could however be for the 
international forces to have the arrestee first transferred to a State that is willing to cooperate. After all, 
persons could be surrendered to the ICC by any State on the territory of which that person may be 
found, arguably irrespective of how their presence on that territory was brought about. In order to 
forestall challenges to the legality of such a detour, a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the 
transfer by international forces may possibly be sought [emphasis in original and original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].” 
57 “The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance 
with the provisions of this Statute if: (...) (b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to 
have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations”. This is one of the three possibilities for the ICC to exercise 
jurisdiction. The other two are a State referral (see Artt. 13 (a) and 14 of the ICC Statute) and a proprio 
motu investigation of the Prosecutor (see Artt. 13 (c) and 15 of the ICC Statute).  
58 As argued earlier (see Section 2 of Chapter VI), the referral as such does not seem to create a duty of 
cooperation for all UN Member States with the ICC. This arguably depends on the exact content of the 
decision. Note, by the way, that the UNSC may also determine that non-States Parties have to cooperate 
with the ICC, even if the Council has not referred a case itself to the ICC, see Ciampi 2002, p. 1611: 
“[A]n obligation to cooperate with the Court could also be imposed by the Security Council in cases 
referred to the Court by a State or initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu should the Security Council 








obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other 
international organizations to cooperate fully (…) [emphasis in original, ChP].      
 
In other words, Sudan is also under a legal obligation to cooperate with the ICC, 
even though that State is not a party to the ICC.59 The same goes for the States 
which can be considered “parties to the conflict in Darfur” – States which may not 
have ratified the ICC Statute either.  
The second situation in which there exists an obligation for a State not party to 
the ICC Statute to cooperate is if such a State a) accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC 
on an ad hoc basis with respect to a particular crime (see Article 12, paragraph 3 of 
the ICC Statute),60 or b) cooperates with the ICC “on the basis of an ad hoc 
arrangement, an agreement (...) or any other appropriate basis”.61 In both cases, the 
non-State Party has a duty to cooperate with the ICC. This is clear with respect to 
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute,62 but less so with respect to the situation 
under b, pursuant to Article 87, paragraph 5 (a) of the ICC Statute, which does not 
explicitly mention such a duty. Nevertheless, as States cooperating under Article 
87, paragraph 5 (a) of the ICC Statute are confronted by a comparable63 sanctions 
                                                          
59 Note, however, that the UNSC does not state that other States not party to the ICC Statute (besides 
Sudan and those States which are not party to the ICC but which are involved in the conflict in Darfur) 
must cooperate with the ICC. It is therefore not very accurate to state: “The statement in Resolution 
1593 ‘‘that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur shall co-operate fully 
with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution’’ 
clearly shows that all non-party states, including Sudan, must co-operate with and assist the ICC 
accordingly [emphasis added, ChP].” (Zhu 2006, p. 92.) (Unless Zhu, when speaking of “all non-party 
states”, is, of course, only referring to the parties to the conflict in Darfur. In that case, it is true that all 
States have an obligation to cooperate with the ICC, whether they are parties to the ICC or not.) 
60 “If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that 
State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court 
with respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any 
delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.” This was done by Côte d’Ivoire in 2003, see ICC, Press 
Release, ‘Registrar confirms that the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire has accepted the jurisdiction of the 
Court’, 15 February 2005, ICC-CPI-20050215-91, available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/FA0D49A0-69D4-4676-9E77-567B25321CBA.htm. 
61 Art. 87, para. 5 (a) of the ICC Statute. 
62 See the last sentence of this provision: “The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without 
any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.” Palmisano 1999, p. 393, states about this issue: 
“This means that once a State has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction over a specific case, this State 
should no longer be considered a third State, as its position becomes equivalent to that of a State party 
to the Statute. (...) From the standpoint of its legal qualification, Art. 12(3) should be considered a 
treaty stipulation in favour of third States. This provision allows, in fact, third States interested in 
effectively prosecuting a given crime, to accede, in relation to that crime only, to the judicial 
mechanism provided for by the Statute, on condition that they expressly accept the Court’s jurisdiction 
and the obligation of cooperation and judicial assistance set out in Part 9 of the Statute [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” That would thus also mean that in the case of non-cooperation, the sanctions 
mechanism for ‘normal’ State Parties (see para. 7 of Art. 87 of the ICC Statute) would also be 
applicable to the ‘accepting State’. Schabas is, however, not sure about this, see Schabas 2004, p. 77. 
63 The mechanism is not identical as can be seen in the following two footnotes. See also Zhu 2006, pp. 
107-108, where he argues and explains that “[t]he distinction (...) shows the somewhat differing 
obligations, in terms of co-operation, of states parties and states not party to the Rome Statute.” (Ibid., 








mechanism64 as States Parties are in the case of non-cooperation,65 it may be 
concluded that the former also have a duty to cooperate.66 67 
A third, and more ‘external’, duty to cooperate with the ICC for non-State 
Parties (but then only with respect to a specific category of war crimes) may be 
found in the Geneva Conventions, whose provisions must be complied with by 
                                                                                                                                              
delegations that weaker language should be used with respect to States not parties to the Statute. It is 
not easy, though, to find a solid justification for a distinction in substance as the non-cooperating State 
infringes its obligations in both cases [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
64 See para. 5 (b) of Art. 87 of the ICC Statute: “Where a State not party to this Statute, which has 
entered into an ad hoc arrangement or an agreement with the Court, fails to cooperate with requests 
pursuant to any such arrangement or agreement, the Court may so inform the Assembly of States 
Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, the Security Council.” 
65 See para. 7 of Art. 87 of the ICC Statute: “Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to 
cooperate by the Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from 
exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and 
refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to 
the Court, to the Security Council.” See for more information on this provision, Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 
615-616.  
66 See also Ciampi 2002, p. 1617: “When an ad hoc arrangement with respect to the investigation and 
prosecution of a given crime within the jurisdiction of the Court or an agreement to cooperate with the 
Court in a wider set of cases is concluded with a State not party, such a State undertakes an 
international obligation to cooperate with the Court vis-à-vis all States Parties to the Statute. (...) [T]his 
State is free to determine how far it is prepared to go in assuming an obligation to arrest and surrender. 
The extent of the obligation to cooperate will depend on the content of the agreement. In this respect, 
however, it seems hardly likely that a non-party State will bind itself to an obligation which is broader 
in scope than that provided for under the Statute for State Parties. The third State will probably accept 
to cooperate with the Court to a more limited extent, e.g. by only undertaking to give some, but not all, 
forms of cooperation specified under Part 9 [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Zhu 2006, p. 
107. 
67 Note, however, that the sanctions mechanism of Art. 87, para. 5 (b) of the ICC Statute and the 
quotation of Ciampi in the previous footnote only speak of a non-State Party which has entered into an 
ad hoc arrangement or an agreement with the ICC. Does there also exist a duty to cooperate with 
respect to a non-State Party which has been invited by the ICC to cooperate on “any other appropriate 
basis”? On the one hand, one could argue that the non-reference to cooperation on “any other 
appropriate basis” implies that a non-State Party cooperating with the ICC on another basis than an ad 
hoc arrangement or an agreement does not have a duty to cooperate. On the other hand, one could also 
read these two paragraphs in context and argue that the sanctions mechanism of Art. 87, para. 5 (b) of 
the ICC Statute only mentions the two clearest examples of Art. 87, para. 5 (a) of the ICC Statute but 
that this does not mean that the safety net of Art. 87, para. 5 (a) of the ICC Statute (namely cooperation 
on “any other appropriate basis”) is not covered by the sanctions mechanism of Art. 87, para. 5 (b) of 
the ICC Statute (meaning that a State cooperating on that basis also has a duty to cooperate). That a 
State cooperating on “any other appropriate basis” has a duty to cooperate is also confirmed by 
Condorelli and Ciampi. They argue: “As is well known, according to Article 86 and subsequent 
provisions laid down in Part IX of the Rome Statute, states party to the Statute are under an obligation 
to cooperate with the Court. As a treaty-based obligation, this obligation is not binding upon third 
states, unless they have agreed to cooperate with the Court by way of a declaration of acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the Court or on an ad hoc arrangement or agreement with the Court. However, states not 
party to the Statute may also be brought under an international obligation to cooperate with the Court 
by ‘any other appropriate basis’. And such an ‘appropriate basis’ could be provided by a resolution of 
the Security Council under Article 41 of the UN Charter, imposing obligations upon all Member States 
to apply measures to give effect to SC decisions [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Condorelli and 








every State in the world.68 Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions reads that 
“[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the 
present Convention in all circumstances”. Furthermore, the Geneva Conventions 
also make it clear that States have a certain duty with respect to the perpetrators of 
grave breaches of the Conventions,69 also known as war criminals.70   
 
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons 
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, 
and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It 
may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, 
hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, 
provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.71   
 
This universally accepted aut dedere aut iudicare obligation with respect to grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions72 might be read broadly so that the term 
dedere would not necessarily be limited to other States but would also apply to an 
international institution such as the ICC. That would mean that States have a duty 
either to prosecute suspects of those grave breaches or hand them over (dedere) to 
                                                          
68 If not because a certain State is a party to these Conventions, then surely because the Conventions 
can be seen as reflecting customary international law, applicable to any State. See Zhu 2006, p. 92. 
69 For GC I (Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949), see its Art. 50: “Grave breaches to which the preceding 
Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or 
property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully 
and wantonly.” For GC II (Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949), see its Art. 51. (The text is the 
same as that of Art. 50 GC I.) For GC III (Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War of August 12, 1949), see its Art. 130: “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall 
be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the 
Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the 
forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial 
prescribed in this Convention.” For GC IV (Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949), see its Art. 147: “Grave breaches to which the preceding 
Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or 
property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including 
biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful 
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to 
serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and 
regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” 
70 See also International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law. Answers to 
your Questions, Geneva, October 2002 (available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0703/$File/ICRC_002_0703.PDF!Open), p. 35. 
71 Artt. 49 GC I, 50 GC II, 129 GC III and 146 GC IV. 








States or the ICC.73 Even if such a broad reading of the Geneva Conventions were 
dismissed, it could be argued that the words “to ensure respect” are so broadly 
formulated that they could encompass a duty to cooperate with the ICC. It seems 
that Zhu adheres to this idea when he states:  
 
While legal obligations are created on the basis of the principle that it is necessary to 
“ensure respect” “in all circumstances,” it is still not very clear from the four Geneva 
Conventions which steps states should take and through which procedures. However, 
one of the objectives of establishing the ICC is to pursue serious violations of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions. States not party to the ICC but party to the Geneva 
Conventions are obliged to “ensure respect” “in all circumstances”; this includes the 
extended obligation to co-operate with the ICC. In any event, the obligation to co-
operate should be understood as requiring nonparty states at least to make an effort 
not to block actions taken by the ICC to punish or prevent serious violations of the 
Geneva Conventions.74 
 
                                                          
73 Cf. also Swart 2002 C, p. 1688: “It is widely held that the relevant provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions do not exclude handing over the accused to an international criminal court whose 
competence has been recognized by the Contracting Parties. In this approach, surrender of an accused 
to an international court constitutes compliance with the treaty obligation to extradite or prosecute 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].”  
74 Zhu 2006, p. 94. Cf. also Ciampi 2002, p. 1609: “One may argue that, according to current customary 
international law, all States are under an obligation to cooperate at least with respect to some of the 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court (e.g. in relation to war crimes set out in the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, the provisions of which are generally held to correspond to customary 
rules). But it is doubtful whether a general rule of this kind – were it deemed to exist under customary 
international law – may imply an obligation to comply with requests by the Court for cooperation 
outside the Statute framework, for States which do not become a party to it [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” See finally Kaul and Kreß 2000, p. 172 (“[T]he obligation of all states under customary 
international law not only to respect but also to ensure the respect of international humanitarian law 
adds a useful complement to the cooperation regime [original footnotes omitted, ChP].”) and Palmisano 
1999, pp. 420-421: “An obligation to cooperate with the ICC (or, better, with the States parties to the 
Rome Statute acting together by means of the ICC) may in fact deem to be inherent in the decision of 
the States parties to such conventions [Palmisano here mentions conventions such as the Geneva 
Conventions, the Torture Convention, the Genocide Convention and the Apartheid Convention (the 
latter two will be discussed in the main text in a few moments), ChP] to realize advanced forms of 
international cooperation in criminal matters, in order to achieve a better prevention and repression of 
the relevant crimes in comparison with the prevention and repression which is usually achieved 
unilaterally by each State or by means of bilateral (State-to-State) channels of extradition and mutual 
judicial assistance. In other words, these States consider clearly it to be in their common interest, and in 
the interest of the international community as a whole, to prosecute persons accused of war crimes or 
crimes against humanity in an international coordinated way. States which have solemnly accepted 
multilateral treaty provisions aimed at achieving prevention and punishment of specific crimes by 
means of international cooperation and judicial assistance cannot therefore refuse in good faith their 
assistance to other States parties to the same conventions, only because these latter States have decided 
to prosecute the crimes in question, in given cases and under particular conditions, by means of a 
common judicial organ [original footnote omitted, ChP].” In his footnote, Palmisano also refers to 
UNGA Res. 3074 (XXVII) of 3 December 1973 (‘Principles of international co-operation in the 
detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity’) in which the UNGA stated, among other things, in para. 4 that “States shall assist each other 








In this respect, one should also mention the UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)75 and the UN 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
(Apartheid Convention).76 These conventions are even more specific in providing 
the possibility, in Articles VI and V respectively, that persons charged with 
genocide/apartheid77 shall/may78 be tried by an international penal tribunal which 
has jurisdiction over these crimes with respect to those States which have accepted 
that tribunal’s jurisdiction.79 Obviously, the ICC could be that international penal 
tribunal. However, States which are not party to the ICC Statute would then still 
need to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC, for example, through the previously 
mentioned Article 12, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute.80 “The real importance of 
these conventions”,81 Swart therefore notes, “lies elsewhere”:82  
 
They both oblige all Parties to punish persons who have committed crimes of 
genocide or apartheid on their territory. It would seem that the parties to the 
conventions may be considered to have complied with that obligation by accepting 
the jurisdiction of the Court in the case at hand and surrendering the person 
concerned to the Court.83      
 
                                                          
75 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, approved and proposed for 
signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 
(entered into force: 12 January 1951). 
76 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted and 
opened for signature, ratification by General Assembly resolution 3068 (XXVIII) of 30 November 1973 
(entered into force: 18 July 1976). 
77 The crime of apartheid also falls within the jurisdiction of the ICC, namely as a crime against 
humanity, see Art. 7, paras. 1 (j) and 2 (h) of the ICC Statute. 
78 The verb “shall” is used in the Genocide Convention, whereas the verb “may” is used in the 
Apartheid Convention. 
79 Art. VI of the Genocide Convention reads: “Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the 
act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to 
those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.” Art. V of the Apartheid 
Convention reads: “Persons charged with the acts enumerated in article II of the present Convention 
may be tried by a competent tribunal of any State Party to the Convention which may acquire 
jurisdiction over the person of the accused or by an international penal tribunal having jurisdiction with 
respect to those States Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.” 
80 See Swart 2002 C, p. 1687: “As long as they have not done so, it is not possible to construe a direct 
obligation for them to surrender persons to the Court on the basis of the two UN conventions.” 
However, Palmisano (1999, pp. 421-423) is of the opinion that “the obligation of cooperation and 
judicial assistance should include, in our view, the duty upon all States parties, including those which 
are not parties to the Rome Statute, to cooperate directly with an organ like the ICC and upon its direct 
request. (…) [I]n all cases (…) an express refusal to cooperate directly with the Court, or any clear lack 
of good faith in granting judicial assistance to it, would constitute, in our view, a violation by third 
States which are parties to instruments such as the Genocide Convention or the Apartheid Convention, 
of the obligation to afford the greatest measure of mutual cooperation and judicial assistance imposed 
by them.” 










It may be interesting in this context to look at the 2007 Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro case before the ICJ. In this case, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
requested the Court to adjudge and declare  
 
[t]hat Serbia and Montenegro has violated and is violating its obligations under the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide for having 
failed and for failing to punish acts of genocide or any other act prohibited by the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and for 
having failed and for failing to transfer individuals accused of genocide or any other 
act prohibited by the Convention to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia and to fully co-operate with this Tribunal.84   
 
This is an implicit reference to the above-mentioned (see footnote 79) Article VI of 
the Genocide Convention.85 Although the ICJ concluded that Serbia86 “cannot be 
charged with not having tried before its own courts those accused of having 
participated in the Srebrenica genocide” (for Srebrenica is not located in the 
territory of Serbia),87 it did state that Serbia had violated other obligations stemming 
from the Convention. It explained that once an international penal tribunal, such as 
the ICTY,88 has been established,   
 
Article VI obliges the Contracting Parties “which shall have accepted its jurisdiction” 
to co-operate with it, which implies that they will arrest persons accused of genocide 
who are in their territory – even if the crime of which they are accused was 
committed outside it – and, failing prosecution of them in the parties’ own courts, 
that they will hand them over for trial by the competent international tribunal.89 
 
This is what Serbia had not done,90 and by failing to comply, Serbia became the 
first State in history to violate the Genocide Convention.91 The considerations of the 
                                                          
84 ICJ, Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ‘Judgment’, 26 February 
2007, para. 440. 
85 See ibid., para. 441. 
86 The proceedings were initially instituted against the FRY, but as from February 2003 (after a change 
of that State’s name), the Respondent was Serbia and Montenegro and finally, as from 3 June 2006 
(after the independence of Montenegro), the Respondent was the Republic of Serbia, see ibid., para. 1. 
87 Ibid., para. 442. See also ibid.: “Article VI only obliges the Contracting Parties to institute and 
exercise territorial criminal jurisdiction; while it certainly does not prohibit States, with respect to 
genocide, from conferring jurisdiction on their criminal courts based on criteria other than where the 
crime was committed which are compatible with international law, in particular the nationality of the 
accused, it does not oblige them to do so.” 
88 See ibid., para. 445. 
89 Ibid., para. 443. 
90 See ibid., paras. 448-449. The ICJ hereby paid special attention to the role of General Mladić (see 
ibid., para. 448): “[T]he Court cannot but attach a certain weight to the plentiful, and mutually 
corroborative, information suggesting that General Mladić, indicted by the ICTY for genocide, as one 
of those principally responsible for the Srebrenica massacres, was on the territory of the Respondent at 
least on several occasions and for substantial periods during the last few years and is still there now, 








ICJ in this case certainly leave room for arguing that the ICC would also come 
under the definition of ‘international penal tribunal’. In fact, the ICC seems to fit 
the probable intention of the Genocide Convention’s drafters even more closely 
than the ICTY.92  
On a final note and moving away from specific treaties, it may be worth 
mentioning that Swart notes that “[t]here can be little doubt that customary 
international law imposes a primary duty on States which have themselves been 
implicated in international crimes to repress them. Surrender of the alleged 
offenders to the Court may free them from that obligation.”93 However, as 
mentioned by Swart, it must be borne in mind that in that case, the aut dedere (to 
perhaps the ICC) aut iudicare obligation only applies to States which are 
themselves implicated in those international crimes: “It is, however, more open to 
doubt whether the obligation to extradite or prosecute has become a rule of jus 
cogens with regard to other States [original footnote omitted, ChP].”94  
Now that a few characteristics of the ICC’s general cooperation regime have 
been presented, the next section will focus on the more specific arrest and surrender 
provisions.  
 
3 THE ARREST AND SURRENDER REGIME 
 
3.1 The arrest and surrender regime Part I  
 
However, before doing that, it is worth pointing out that the ICC regime speaks of 
surrender (meaning “the delivering up of a person by a State to the Court, pursuant 
to this Statute”)95 and not of extradition (meaning “the delivering up of a person by 
                                                                                                                                              
is living and arrest him. In particular, counsel for the Applicant referred during the hearings to recent 
statements made by the Respondent’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, reproduced in the national press in 
April 2006, and according to which the intelligence services of that State knew where Mladić was 
living in Serbia, but refrained from informing the authorities competent to order his arrest because 
certain members of those services had allegedly remained loyal to the fugitive. The authenticity and 
accuracy of those statements has not been disputed by the Respondent at any time.” 
91 See ibid., para. 471: “The Court, (…) by fourteen votes to one, Finds that Serbia has violated its 
obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by 
having failed to transfer Ratko Mladić, indicted for genocide and complicity in genocide, for trial by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and thus having failed to co-operate with 
that Tribunal”. 
92 See ibid., para. 445: “The notion of an “international penal tribunal” within the meaning of Article VI 
must at least cover all international criminal courts created after the adoption of the Convention (at 
which date no such court existed) of potentially universal scope, and competent to try the perpetrators 
of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III. The nature of the legal instrument by 
which such a court is established is without importance in this respect. When drafting the Genocide 
Convention, its authors probably thought that such a court would be created by treaty: a clear pointer 
to this lies in the reference to “those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted [the] jurisdiction” of 
the international penal tribunal [emphasis added, ChP].” 
93 Swart 2002 C, p. 1688. 
94 Ibid. Nevertheless, “it may well acquire that character in the future.” (Ibid., p. 1663.) 








one State to another as provided by treaty, convention or national legislation”).96 
This difference goes beyond mere semantics and shows that the term extradition 
(deriving from the horizontal context), including all its characteristics, does not 
apply to the ICC regime.97 Examples in that respect are the refusal to extradite 
                                                          
96 Art. 102 (b) of the ICC Statute. 
97 In the words of Sluiter: “The purpose of this distinction is to ensure that traditional extradition law is 
not applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the special surrender regime. The application of traditional 
extradition law creates a number of obstacles to the effective and expeditious capture of war criminals. 
For this reason, the ICTY and ICTR statutes and rules consistently avoid the term “extradition,” and 
instead use the word “transfer” or “surrender.” (...) The drafting history illustrates that the distinction 
between surrender and extradition was not simply about terminology and “legal sophistry.” The entire 
ICC legal assistance law, in addition to the ICC surrender regime, aspired to base itself on different 
principles and content when compared to traditional cooperation models between sovereign states 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 607-609.) See also Swart 2002 C, p. 1678: 
“Article 102 has been included in the Statute in order to make clear that the handing over of a person to 
the International Criminal Court is fundamentally different in nature from the handing over of a person 
within the framework of extradition between States.” See also Maogoto 2004, p. 120, Prost 2005, p. 81 
and Ciampi 2006, p. 721. Cf. also the terminology used in the context of the EAW (Council Framework 
Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States (2002/584/JHA), OJ L 190/1 of 18 July 2002, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:190:0001:0018:EN:PDF.) Here also, the 
concept of surrender was introduced to make clear that the regime of the European Arrest Warrant 
could not be compared with the normal extradition context, see para. 5 of the above-mentioned 
Framework Decision: “The objective set for the Union to become an area of freedom, security and 
justice leads to abolishing extradition between Member States and replacing it by a system of surrender 
between judicial authorities.” (See also Vierucci 2004, p. 279.) See on this point also Deen-Racsmány 
(2007, p. 175), who makes a comparison between ICC surrender and surrender under the EAW. In 
contrast to the other authors mentioned above, she believes that “[u]nlike the EAW, apart from 
proscribing a (semantic) distinction between ‘extradition’ and ‘surrender’ in Article 102, the ICC 
Statute does not evidence any intention to establish substantially new procedures. Indirectly, it even 
confirms the applicability of procedures existing under domestic (extradition) law to surrendering the 
accused to the Court [original footnote omitted, ChP]”. The provisions to which she refers (Artt. 89 and 
91 of the ICC Statute) to back her assertion will be further discussed infra. To mention a final 
interesting point on the interaction between the ICC and the EAW: note that the EAW, although it 
cannot be used directly between EU Member States and the ICC, can be used between EU Member 
States themselves. As such, it will not only be useful in national efforts to prosecute ‘ICC crimes’ (see 
Art. 2, para. 2, 30th indent of the EAW: “The following offences, if they are punishable in the issuing 
Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years 
and as they are defined by the law of the issuing Member State, shall, under the terms of this 
Framework Decision and without verification of the double criminality of the act, give rise to surrender 
pursuant to a European arrest warrant: (...) crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court”) – this is the idea of the ICC’s complementarity principle – it may also be helpful with respect to 
efforts by the ICC to prosecute the crimes over which it has jurisdiction. In the words of Vierucci: 
“[A]lthough the Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person ‘to any state on 
the territory of which that person may be found’, between the moment of transmission of the ICC 
request and its execution within the state, the person sought out might have crossed that state’s 
boundaries to escape apprehension. This is likely to occur in the EU territory, given the principle and 
practice of free circulation of persons. In such circumstances, the EAW may constitute an effective 
means for an EU Member State to locate and apprehend a person wanted by the Court who has taken 
refuge within the EU boundaries. For example, if the Court requests Spain to hand over a national who 
happens to be on the territory of another EU member, the requested state, instead of simply notifying 








nationals,98 the refusal to extradite persons accused of having committed political 
offences and the double criminality requirement.99 This clearly points to a vertical 
rather than a horizontal regime.100 
Now, with respect to the substantive arrest and surrender provisions, the first 
important provision (in the ICC Statute)101 dealing with the arrest and surrender 
regime is Article 58 of the ICC Statute (‘Issuance by the Pre-Trial Chamber of a 
warrant of arrest or a summons to appear’). If the Pre-Trial Chamber, on the 
application of the Prosecutor,102 is satisfied that 1) there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that a certain person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court103 and 2) the arrest of this person appears necessary,104 it shall issue a 
(possibly sealed)105 warrant of arrest.106 Such an arrest warrant must contain  
                                                                                                                                              
down, arrest and have the person surrendered, if necessary, through the Schengen Informatic System or 
Interpol [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Vierucci 2004, p. 277.) 
98 See, however, Deen-Racsmány (2007, p. 190): “The semantic distinction between ‘surrender’ and 
‘extradition’, the fact that the ICC is not a state, or even the nature and purpose of the ICC may not 
suffice to render a constitutional ban on the extradition of nationals inapplicable.” 
99 The fact that these grounds for refusal can be invoked at the horizontal level also shows that the 
obligation to cooperate/extradite in that context is limited and incomparable with the obligation to 
cooperate/surrender in the ICC context. For more information on the question as to why these grounds 
for refusal are and should be invalid in the context of the ICC, see Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 636-642. For the 
sake of completeness, it may be good to note that the ICC Statute does contain, however, the (inter-
State extradition) exception of speciality, see Art. 101 of the ICC Statute. Nevertheless, it should also 
be noted that this is not a real ground to refuse surrender. “Rather, it imposes conditions on the legal 
consequences of surrender.” (Ibid., p. 643.) For criticism related to the inclusion of this exception in the 
ICC Statute, see ibid., pp. 643-644 and Swart 2002 B, p. 1596 (or Swart 2002 C, pp. 1698-1701). 
100 See Kreß and Prost 2008 C, p. 1646 (writing on the reasons why the distinction extradition/surrender 
was made): “Such a clear distinction at the terminological level should, as was the underlying thinking, 
at the same time contribute to a growing awareness on the national level for the substantial differences 
between horizontal and vertical cooperation [emphasis in original and original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
101 Although this study will, where necessary, also look at the relevant provisions of the ICC RPE, the 
focus is on the ICC Statute. Cf. also Swart 2002 C, p. 1677, who notes that “the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (…) have a role to play, albeit a very modest one, apparently.” (At the time Swart wrote his 
piece, the ICC RPE were not yet adopted.)  
102 This application must contain: “(a) The name of the person and any other relevant identifying 
information; (b) A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court which the person 
is alleged to have committed; (c) A concise statement of the facts which are alleged to constitute those 
crimes; (d) A summary of the evidence and any other information which establish reasonable grounds 
to believe that the person committed those crimes; and (e) The reason why the Prosecutor believes that 
the arrest of the person is necessary.” (Art. 58, para. 2 of the ICC Statute.) 
103 See Art. 58, para. 1 (a) of the ICC Statute. 
104 See Art. 58, para. 1 (b) of the ICC Statute. This may be the case “(i) To ensure the person’s 
appearance at trial; (ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the 
court proceedings; or (iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the 
commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction of the Court and which 
arises out of the same circumstances.” (Ibid.) 
105 In all the three ICC male captus cases discussed in this book (Lubanga Dyilo, Bemba Gombo and 
Katanga), the ICC used this technique stemming from the context of the UN ad hoc Tribunals, see ns. 
1, 297 and 367 and accompanying text of Chapter X. Schabas (2007, p. 261) notes, however, that 
“[t]here is no explicit authorisation in the Statute or the Rules for issuance of sealed warrants, and in 








(a) The name of the person and any other relevant identifying information; (b) A 
specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court for which the 
person’s arrest is sought; and (c) A concise statement of the facts which are alleged 
to constitute those crimes.107    
 
Alongside an arrest warrant, the Pre-Trial Chamber may also issue a summons to 
appear.108 This is a less drastic measure to make a person appear before the ICC: 
although it may restrict a person’s liberty,109 it does not involve arrest and 
detention, cf. also footnote 2. Thus, a summons to appear, which, by the way, 
contains comparable requirements to those of an arrest warrant,110 gives the suspect 
a chance to ‘voluntarily’111 go to The Hague.  
                                                                                                                                              
106 Note that, in contrast to the situation at the ICTY/ICTR, the ICC does not require the confirmation 
of the indictment (but only the reasonable grounds threshold) before arrest warrants can be issued, see 
n. 50 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. Sluiter (2006 A, p. 152) is of the opinion that “[t]his 
change in procedure is to be commended” for “[i]t avoids the need for numerous and confusing 
subsequent amendments in the indictment.” 
107 Art. 58, para. 3 of the ICC Statute. 
108 See Art. 58, para. 7 of the ICC Statute: “As an alternative to seeking a warrant of arrest, the 
Prosecutor may submit an application requesting that the Pre-Trial Chamber issue a summons for the 
person to appear. If the Pre-Trial Chamber is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the person committed the crime alleged and that a summons is sufficient to ensure the person’s 
appearance, it shall issue the summons, with or without conditions restricting liberty (other than 
detention) if provided for by national law, for the person to appear.”    
109 One could hereby think of the measure that: “(a) The person must not travel beyond territorial limits 
set by the Pre-Trial Chamber without the explicit agreement of the Chamber; (b) The person must not 
go to certain places or associate with certain persons as specified by the Pre-Trial Chamber; (c) The 
person must not contact directly or indirectly victims or witnesses; (d) The person must not engage in 
certain professional activities; (e) The person must reside at a particular address as specified by the Pre-
Trial Chamber; (f) The person must respond when summoned by an authority or qualified person 
designated by the Pre-Trial Chamber; (g) The person must post bond or provide real or personal 
security or surety for which the amount and the schedule and mode of payment shall be determined by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber; (h) The person must supply the Registrar with all identity documents, 
particularly his or her passport.” (Rule 119, para. 1 of the ICC RPE.) 
110 See Art. 58, para. 7 of the ICC Statute: “The summons shall contain: (a) The name of the person and 
any other relevant identifying information; (b) The specified date on which the person is to appear; (c) 
A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court which the person is alleged to 
have committed; and (d) A concise statement of the facts which are alleged to constitute the crime.” 
111 Although this word was used by the ICC judges themselves (“In the Chamber’s view, the issue 
raised by article 58 of the Statute is whether or not the arrests of these persons appear to be necessary. 
The application of article 58(7) of the Statute is restricted to cases in which the person can and will 
appear voluntarily before the Court without the necessity of presenting a request for arrest and 
surrender as provided for in articles 89 and 91 of the Statute.” (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in 
Darfur, Sudan, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali 
Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under 
Article 58(7) of the Statute’ (Public), ICC-02/05-01/07, 27 April 2007, para. 117)), one can wonder 
how ‘voluntary’ the coming to The Hague of people summoned to appear really is. The formulation of 
Art. 60, para. 1 of the ICC Statute may also confirm this: “Upon the surrender of the person to the 
Court, or the person’s appearance before the Court voluntarily or pursuant to a summons, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber shall satisfy itself that the person has been informed of the crimes which he or she is alleged 
to have committed, and of his or her rights under this Statute, including the right to apply for interim 








An example of the correlation between an arrest warrant and a summons to 
appear can be found in the case of the Sudanese suspects Ahmad Harun and Ali 
Kushayb.  
In his application in this case,112 the Prosecutor first opted for the summons to 
appear,113 on the grounds that the Sudanese Government had previously been quite 
cooperative and that these summonses might therefore also have a positive result.114 
Nevertheless, the Prosecutor also remarked that his choice was based on past 
experiences only and that the issuance of the summonses could easily work out 
differently and negatively.115 If that were to happen, the Prosecution argued, arrest 
warrants would have to be issued.116 The Pre-Trial Chamber, however, decided 
otherwise. In its decision on the application of the Prosecutor,117 it stated that 
Kushayb was detained and could therefore not be summoned to appear before the 
ICC.118  
                                                                                                                                              
a person may come before the ICC in three different ways: first, following the surrender of the person 
to the Court; second, upon the person’s voluntary appearance; and, thirdly, pursuant to a summons to 
appear [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
112 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur, The Sudan, ‘Prosecutor’s Application under 
Article 58(7)’ (Public Redacted Version), ICC-02/05, 27 February 2007. 
113 Ibid., para. 273: “After a careful analysis of the relevant information, the Prosecution (…) has 
assessed at this stage, and respectfully submits, that a summons to appear should be the alternative first 
pursued by the Court. This route was introduced in Article 58 in the Statute in Rome as a less intrusive 
one. The Prosecution’s present assessment is that a summons could prove sufficient to ensure the 
persons’ appearance.” 
114 See ibid., para. 274: “In particular, the Prosecution considers worthy of the Chamber’s consideration 
that the Government of the Sudan, which would serve the summons, and would have to facilitate and 
follow up on the summons, thus far has in practice provided a degree of cooperation in response to the 
Prosecution’s requests. (…) [T]he Prosecution foresees the possibility that the Government could 
cooperate in facilitating the appearance of those persons against whom a summons may be used.” 
115 See ibid., para. 274: “The Prosecution cannot prejudge, as a matter proceeds to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, the subsequent decisions that will be taken by the Government of the Sudan in relation to this 
new phase of the proceedings. The prosecution can only call the attention of the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
past instances.” 
116 See ibid., para. 278: “[T]he Prosecution submits that a number of circumstances could lead it to 
modify its assessment of the likelihood that a summons to appear would prove sufficient in ensuring the 
persons’ appearance. In this regard the Prosecution submits that any official response or action of the 
Sudanese Government, or of HARUN or KUSHAYB, to the filing of this application, to the effect that 
they will resist or fail to comply with any decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber on this matter, would 
modify this assessment of the OTP and would justify, in the Prosecution’s view, and subject to the Pre-
Trial Chamber’s determination, the issuance of warrants of arrest.” 
117 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Ahmad 
Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), 
‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute’ (Public), ICC-02/05-
01/07, 27 April 2007. 
118 See ibid., paras. 119-121: “119. Regarding Ali Kushayb, the Chamber notes that he is reported to be 
in prison upon a warrant of arrest issued by the Sudanese authorities and that the Prosecution has not 
presented any information that would lead to the conclusion that Ali Kushayb would appear voluntarily 
before the Court while being detained by the Sudanese authorities. 120. Moreover, the Chamber is of 
the view that issuing a summons to appear for a person currently detained by national authorities would 
be contrary to the object and purpose of article 58(7) of the Statute. Indeed, the possibility provided for 








With respect to Harun, the Pre-Trial Chamber noted that the Prosecution had 
found that he had shown a willingness to cooperate in the past, but that he had also 
concealed evidence.119 More generally, it pointed to the fact that the Sudanese 
Government had stated that it would not cooperate with the ICC.120 As a result, the 
requirements of Article 58, paragraph 7 of the ICC Statute (see footnote 110) were 
not met.121 By contrast, the requirements of Article 58, paragraph 1 of the ICC 
Statute were met, meaning that the Pre-Trial Chamber could issue warrants of arrest 
for these persons,122 which in fact it did the very same day.123  
Whereas the summons to appear as such may lead to the appearance of the 
suspect at the ICC, the arrest warrant by itself is not enough. If the ICC wants a 
certain State to (provisionally)124 arrest a suspect, the arrest warrant needs to be 
followed by a request to arrest and surrender.125  
                                                                                                                                              
than detention), and the list of those conditions provided for in rule 119 of the Rules, clearly indicate 
that a summons to appear is intended to apply only to persons who are not already being detained. 121. 
In addition, although the Prosecution alleges in its application that Ali Kushayb could appear before the 
Court under a summons to appear while remaining in custody in the context of the Sudanese legal 
proceedings, it does not indicate how this would be possible under the legal framework provided for by 
the Statute and the Rules. Under this framework, it is not possible to envisage a surrender, even a 
temporary surrender as provided for in rule 183 of the Rules and which seems to be referred to 
implicitly in the Prosecution Application, without the prior issuance of a warrant of arrest [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
119 See ibid., para. 122. 
120 See ibid., para. 123. 
121 See ibid., para. 124. 
122 See ibid., p. 43. 
123 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Ahmad 
Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), 
‘Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun’ (Public Document), ICC-02/05-01/07, 27 April 2007 and ICC, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad 
Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), ‘Warrant of Arrest 
for Ali Kushayb’ (Public Document), ICC-02/05-01/07, 27 April 2007. 
124 A provisional arrest is only possible in urgent situations. See Art. 92 of the ICC Statute: “1. In 
urgent cases, the Court may request the provisional arrest of the person sought, pending presentation of 
the request for surrender and the documents supporting the request as specified in article 91 [see n. 126, 
ChP]. 2. The request for provisional arrest shall be made by any medium capable of delivering a written 
record and shall contain: (a) Information describing the person sought, sufficient to identify the person, 
and information as to that person’s probable location; (b) A concise statement of the crimes for which 
the person’s arrest is sought and of the facts which are alleged to constitute those crimes, including, 
where possible, the date and location of the crime; (c) A statement of the existence of a warrant of 
arrest or a judgement of conviction against the person sought; and (d) A statement that a request for 
surrender of the person sought will follow. 3. A person who is provisionally arrested may be released 
from custody if the requested State has not received the request for surrender and the documents 
supporting the request as specified in article 91 within the time limits specified in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. [According to Rule 188 of the ICC RPE, the time limit shall be 60 days from 
the date of the provisional arrest, ChP.] However, the person may consent to surrender before the 
expiration of this period if permitted by the law of the requested State. In such a case, the requested 
State shall proceed to surrender the person to the Court as soon as possible. 4. The fact that the person 
sought has been released from custody pursuant to paragraph 3 shall not prejudice the subsequent arrest 
and surrender of that person if the request for surrender and the documents supporting the request are 
delivered at a later date.” It is interesting here to note that these provisions on provisional arrest, in 








Article 89, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute (‘Surrender of persons to the Court’) 
reads:  
 
The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together 
with the material supporting the request outlined in article 91,[126] to any State on the 
territory of which that person may be found[127] and shall request the cooperation of 
that State in the arrest and surrender of such a person. States Parties shall, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Part [this is Part 9 of the ICC Statute, see also 
footnote 16, ChP] and the procedure under their national law, comply with requests 
for arrest and surrender.  
 
                                                                                                                                              
mention the possibility of release after a certain time-limit even before the surrender of the person to the 
ICC. As clarified in Chapter VI, the UN ad hoc Tribunals only mention a time-limit after the transfer of 
the person to the Tribunal. Swart therefore concludes that “[f]rom the point of view of protecting basic 
rights of individual persons, the system of the Statute is definitely superior to that of Rule 40 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” (Swart 2002 C, p. 1702.)  
125 See Art. 58, para. 5 of the ICC Statute: “On the basis of the warrant of arrest, the Court may request 
the provisional arrest or the arrest and surrender of the person under Part 9.” 
126 Art. 91 of the ICC Statute (‘Contents of request for arrest and surrender’) reads: “1. A request for 
arrest and surrender shall be made in writing. In urgent cases, a request may be made by any medium 
capable of delivering a written record, provided that the request shall be confirmed through the channel 
provided for in article 87, paragraph 1 (a) [this general paragraph states that “[t]he Court shall have the 
authority to make requests to States Parties for cooperation. The requests shall be transmitted through 
the diplomatic channel as may be designated by each State Party upon ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession. Subsequent changes to the designation shall be made by each State Party in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” ChP]. 2. In the case of a request for the arrest and surrender 
of a person for whom a warrant of arrest has been issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 58, the 
request shall contain or be supported by: (a) Information describing the person sought, sufficient to 
identify the person, and information as to that person’s probable location; (b) A copy of the warrant of 
arrest; and (c) Such documents, statements or information as may be necessary to meet the 
requirements for the surrender process in the requested State, except that those requirements should not 
be more burdensome than those applicable to requests for extradition pursuant to treaties or 
arrangements between the requested State and other States and should, if possible, be less burdensome, 
taking into account the distinct nature of the Court. 3. In the case of a request for the arrest and 
surrender of a person already convicted, the request shall contain or be supported by: (a) A copy of any 
warrant of arrest for that person; (b) A copy of the judgement of conviction; (c) Information to 
demonstrate that the person sought is the one referred to in the judgement of conviction; and (d) If the 
person sought has been sentenced, a copy of the sentence imposed and, in the case of a sentence for 
imprisonment, a statement of any time already served and the time remaining to be served. 4. Upon the 
request of the Court, a State Party shall consult with the Court, either generally or with respect to a 
specific matter, regarding any requirements under its national law that may apply under paragraph 2 (c). 
During the consultations, the State Party shall advise the Court of the specific requirements of its 
national law.” 
127 Note that the ICC, in contrast to the ICTY/ICTR, can only issue ‘normal’ requests for arrest and 
surrender and not international arrest warrants, see Rule 61 of the ICTR/ICTR RPE and n. 85 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VI. In this context, Swart remarks: “Apparently, the framers of the 
Statute did not want to follow the example of the ad hoc Tribunals in creating a special procedure in the 
case of refusal of States to comply with requests for arrest and surrender, designed to provide some sort 









Here, one can see that the ICC does not view national procedural law as irrelevant 
to its arrest and surrender system128 and that the regime may be even less vertical 
than initially thought.129 Nevertheless, one must also understand that “national law 
procedures should not obstruct the surrender of accused persons to the Court”.130 
With respect to national substantive law (which, by the way, may sometimes be 
hard to discern from national procedural law),131 it is worth repeating that the 
traditional refusal grounds for extradition are not valid in the context of the ICC.132 
Nevertheless, the arrest and surrender procedures of the ICC Statute contain 
provisions that may be understood as referring to more substantive obstacles. For 
example, the above-mentioned Article 89 of the ICC Statute refers to Article 91 of 
the ICC Statute,133 paragraph 4 of which states: 
 
Upon the request of the Court, a State Party shall consult with the Court, either 
generally or with respect to a specific matter, regarding any requirements under its 
national law that may apply under paragraph 2 (c). During the consultations, the State 
Party shall advise the Court of the specific requirements of its national law. 
 
And Article 91, paragraph 2 (c) of the ICC Statute, in turn, states that the request for 
arrest and surrender shall contain or be supported by:  
 
Such documents, statements or information as may be necessary to meet the 
requirements for the surrender process in the requested State, except that those 
                                                          
128 See also Art. 88 of the ICC Statute (entitled ‘Availability of procedures under national law’): “States 
parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all of the forms of 
cooperation which are specified under this Part [this is again Part 9 of the ICC Statute, ChP].” 
129 Art. 89, para. 1 of the ICC Statute refers to Art. 91 of the ICC Statute, which, in turn, refers to Art. 
87 of the ICC Statute (entitled ‘Requests for cooperation: general provisions’). According to the latter 
article’s para. 1 (a), “[t]he Court shall have the authority to make requests to States Parties for 
cooperation. The requests shall be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or any other appropriate 
channel as may be designated by each State Party upon ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” 
Furthermore, para. 2 of the same Art. 87 stipulates that “[r]equests for cooperation and any documents 
supporting the request shall either be in or be accompanied by a translation into an official language of 
the requested State or one of the working languages of the Court, in accordance with the choice made 
by that State upon ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” Sluiter (2003 C, pp. 619-620) (see 
also (almost identically) Maogoto 2004, p. 118) notes that “[t]hese regulations are similar to those in 
the Inter-State Cooperation Model. It is clearly a concession to states in favour of a more horizontally 
oriented cooperation model [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” More information on Art. 87 of the ICC 
Statute can be found in Kreß and Prost 2008 A. 
130 Young 2001, p. 349. 
131 See ibid., p. 341: “Whether a national law is procedural in nature is not always easy to discern. For 
example, a constitutional prohibition against arbitrary arrests may be used to test the validity of the 
criminal process, but it is also a substantive right of the accused.”   
132 Swart argues that the reference to national procedures “makes clear that substantive grounds for 
refusing surrender which are normal in domestic extradition law do not matter here [emphasis added, 
ChP].” (Swart 2002 C, p. 1680.) See also Young 2001, p. 345 (“It was understood that this qualification 
[in accordance with (…) the procedure under (…) national law, ChP] referred only to procedural laws 
and not to the substantive laws of the State.”) and Kaul and Kreß 2000, pp. 166-167 (“The obligation to 
surrender persons to the Court is not subject to substantive national law.”). 








requirements should not be more burdensome than those applicable to requests for 
extradition pursuant to treaties or arrangements between the requested State and other 
States and should, if possible, be less burdensome, taking into account the distinct 
nature of the Court.    
 
Although Young is of the opinion that “[a] wide interpretation of article 91(2)(c), 
which would open the door to (…) [the traditional grounds of refusal in extradition, 
ChP], should not be accepted in light of its drafting history and the principle of 
complementary effective prosecution”,134 he admits that the ICC Statute is 
ambiguous “[o]n the issue of whether States Parties may impose an evidential 
sufficiency requirement for surrender”.135  
Another not so vertical feature of the ICC arrest and surrender procedures can be 
found in the above-mentioned Article 91, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute on 
consultations in the case of problems.136 Arguably, consultations are not 
                                                          
134 Young 2001, p. 350. 
135 Ibid. See also ibid., p. 346: “[A]rticle 91 was not intended to preserve or resurrect extradition refusal 
grounds. If article 91(2)(c) was intended to recognize any domestic authority to refuse surrender, it was 
only limited to cases where the evidence supporting the commission of the offence was insufficient for 
surrender [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Kaul and Kreß (2000, p. 166) explain that this provision 
constitutes a compromise package (caused by the negotiators’ dilemma of “necessity, on the one hand, 
of meeting (...) constitutional concerns and, on the other hand, of not creating a serious loophole which 
could be abused to circumvent the obligation to surrender”) but not a ground for refusal. Recall also the 
argument made by Deen-Racsmány as alluded to in n. 97 of this chapter (referring to Artt. 89 and 91 of 
the ICC Statute). 
136 See for another concrete example the reference to consultations in Art. 89, para. 2 of the ICC Statute, 
a provision which deals with ne bis in idem claims and which also mentions the possibility of 
postponement of surrender: “Where the person sought for surrender brings a challenge before a national 
court on the basis of the principle of ne bis in idem as provided in article 20, the requested State shall 
immediately consult with the Court to determine if there has been a relevant ruling on admissibility. If 
the case is admissible, the requested State shall proceed with the execution of the request. If an 
admissibility ruling is pending, the requested State may postpone the execution of the request for 
surrender of the person until the Court makes a determination on admissibility.” The general provision 
on consultations can be found in Art. 97 of the ICC Statute (‘Consultations’): “Where a State Party 
receives a request under this Part [this is again Part 9 of the ICC Statute, ChP] in relation to which it 
identifies problems which may impede or prevent the execution of the request, that State shall consult 
with the Court without delay in order to resolve the matter. Such problems may include, inter alia: (a) 
Insufficient information to execute the request; (b) In the case of a request for surrender, the fact that 
despite best efforts, the person sought cannot be located or that the investigation conducted has 
determined that the person in the requested State is clearly not the person named in the warrant; or (c) 
The fact that execution of the request in its current form would require the requested State to breach a 
pre-existing treaty obligation undertaken with respect to another State.” Another example of a provision 
where postponement of (surrender) requests is regulated is Art. 95 of the ICC Statute (‘Postponement of 
execution of a request in respect of an admissibility challenge’). (Note that – the also quite generally 
formulated – Art. 94 of the ICC Statute (‘Postponement of execution of a request in respect of ongoing 
investigation or prosecution’) “only pertains to requests for forms of cooperation other than surrender 
with article 89 para. 4 being its counterpart as far as requests for surrender are concerned.” (Kreß and 
Prost 2008 B, p. 1589.) Art. 89, para. 4 of the ICC Statute reads: “If the person sought is being 
proceeded against or is serving a sentence in the requested State for a crime different from that for 
which surrender to the Court is sought, the requested State, after making its decision to grant the 








characteristic of a vertical relationship in which the requesting actor has a 
hierarchically higher status and tells the ‘requested’ (read: ordered) entity what to 
do.137  
Before addressing the remaining arrest and surrender provisions, it should be 
emphasised that “a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear has 
been issued under article 58”138 (as well as an accused person)139 can make a 
challenge on the basis of Article 19 of the ICC Statute (‘Challenges to the 
jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case’). Although admissibility 
matters are not relevant to the male captus discussion,140 jurisdiction challenges 
most assuredly are, even if Article 19 of the ICC Statute does not explicitly mention 
a male captus situation as an example of a jurisdictional challenge. (In fact, Article 
19 of the ICC Statute does not mention any examples of jurisdictional challenges.) 
One can certainly imagine that a suspect who is the victim of a serious male captus 
situation will use this provision in the future. Even if such a male captus challenge 
is, strictly speaking, not a challenge to the ICC’s jurisdiction, but to its exercise of 
jurisdiction, one should not focus too strongly on this difference. After all, if a 
suspect making such a challenge succeeds, the ICC will refuse to exercise 
jurisdiction over that person, meaning that the person can no longer be tried before 
the ICC. In other words: it will have lost jurisdiction ratione personae with respect 
to that person.141 Article 19 of the ICC Statute stipulates that a challenge can, in 
principle, only be made prior to or at the commencement of the trial.142 
                                                          
137 See also Swart and Sluiter 1999, pp. 103-105. 
138 Art. 19, para. 2 (a) of the ICC Statute. 
139 In addition, jurisdictional challenges can also be made by States, see Art. 19, para. 2 (b) and (c) of 
the ICC Statute. 
140 See Art. 17, para. 1 of the ICC Statute: “Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 
1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being investigated or 
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision 
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; (c) The person 
concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the 
Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3; (d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify 
further action by the Court.” 
141 Cf. also ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 19: “[T]he Appeals 
Chamber wishes to clarify that what is at issue here, is not jurisdiction ratione materiae but jurisdiction 
ratione personae. Jurisdiction ratione materiae depends on the nature of the crimes charges. The 
Accused is charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. As such, there is no question that 
under the Statute, the International Tribunal does have jurisdiction ratione materiae. In this case, 
jurisdiction ratione personae depends instead on whether the Appeals Chamber determines that there 
are any circumstances relating to the Accused which would warrant setting aside jurisdiction and 
releasing the Accused. It is to this determination that the Chamber now turns.” (See also n. 591 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VI.) Cf. finally ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 206: “[T]he Appeals 
Chamber does not find that these newly and more detailed submitted breaches rise to the requisite level 
of egregiousness amounting to the Tribunal’s loss of personal jurisdiction.” (See also n. 1047 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VI.) 








Furthermore, the Pre-Trial Chamber (prior to the confirmation of the charges) or the 
Trial Chamber (after confirmation of the charges) shall look at the challenges and 
their decisions on these challenges can be appealed to the Appeals Chamber.143 
Returning now to the arrest and surrender provisions themselves, if a State Party 
has received a request for (provisional) arrest and surrender, and if (potential) 
problems with competing requests144 or other international obligations States may 
have145 are solved,146 the first paragraph of Article 59 of the ICC Statute (‘Arrest 
proceedings in the custodial State’) clarifies that the State “shall immediately take 
steps to arrest the person in question in accordance with its laws and the provisions 
of Part 9”. The reference to “its laws” (which, by the way, may also refer to 
provisions from human rights treaties)147 reaffirms that the arrest and surrender 
regime of the ICC contains horizontal elements as well. In the words of Swart:  
 
As is generally the case for cooperation between the Court and States under the 
Rome Statute, the provisions on arrest proceedings in the custodial State present an 
interesting mixture of elements inspired by traditional inter-State practice and the law 
of the ad hoc Tribunals.148 
 
3.2 The arrest and surrender regime Part II: Article 59, paragraph 2 of the 
ICC Statute  
 
After the suspect has been arrested, he   
 
shall be brought promptly before the competent judicial authority in the custodial 
State which shall determine, in accordance with the law of that State, that: 
 
(a) The warrant applies to that person; 
(b) The person has been arrested in accordance with the proper process; and 
(c) The person’s rights have been respected.149   
 
As will also be shown in the next chapter (where the drafting history of this 
provision will be reviewed), this habeas corpus-like provision is one of the most 
important in the arrest and surrender proceedings, where the national and 
international levels meet, and therefore deserves a subsection of its own.  
                                                          
143 See Art. 19, para. 6 of the ICC Statute. 
144 See Art. 90 of the ICC Statute. For more information on this topic, see, for example, Sluiter 2003 C, 
pp. 629-631. 
145 See Art. 98 of the ICC Statute. For more information on this topic, see, for example, ibid., pp. 631-
633. 
146 This is, of course, a huge deviation from the regimes of the ICTY/ICTR, which were covered by Art. 
103 of the UN Charter (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”). See also Swart 2002 C, pp. 1680-1681, Ciampi 
2002, p. 1631 and Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 612 and 629-630. 
147 See Swart 2002 A, p. 1252. 
148 Ibid., p. 1251. 








Before turning to the main problem connected with this provision, it is worth 
first establishing the precise meaning of the three elements to be determined by the 
competent judicial authority. The first is quite plain: whether the person standing 
before the judicial authority is indeed the person sought by the ICC. The second and 
third elements are less clear, however.150  
To start with the second, what does “arrested in accordance with the proper 
process” mean? This is probably different from State to State, but its scope is 
potentially rather broad. In the words of El Zeidy: 
 
One commentator argues that although Article 59(2) does not ‘tackle the criteria of 
proper process’, it implies that the arrest warrant ‘be duly served on the person 
arrested’. This interpretation seems insufficient. What is meant by these words is a 
matter to be determined and clarified either through domestic implementation of the 
Statute or by the national judge of the requested state. Several possibilities may be 
taken into account in considering the implications of this provision. The first 
possibility is that the provision refers to the law of criminal procedure that regulates 
the process of arresting a person under investigation and presenting him/her to the 
national judge. A second possibility refers to the lawfulness of the domestic arrest 
warrant executing the international arrest warrant issued by the ICC.[151] Finally, one 
may extend the argument to include the way in which the person has been brought 
before the domestic court in general (if the means are illegal they may include: 
deportation, luring or trickery-abductions or other uses of force).[152] (...) It could be 
argued, therefore, that the meaning is broad enough to carry with it all unlawful 
means of deprivation of liberty [original footnote omitted, ChP].153  
 
In addition, one must not forget (see footnote 147 and accompanying text) that the 
process not only needs to be in conformity with national law,154 but that neither can 
this national law, of course, violate international (human rights) law.155  
                                                          
150 Nevertheless, one can already note that the idea that the national authority must perform these 
checks can be welcomed. (Recall that Swart noted in the context of the ICTY/ICTR (see Section 2 of 
Chapter VI) that the arrest and transfer provisions of these Tribunals are “mainly concerned on the 
duties of States vis-à-vis the Tribunals” (Swart 2002 A, p. 1251) and “[t]o a certain extent (...) neglect 
the rights of the individual persons concerned”. (Ibid.) See also Sluiter 2003 C, p. 622.) 
151 See n. 127. 
152 Although Art. 59 of the ICC Statute (‘Arrest proceedings in the custodial State’) only seems to focus 
on the proceedings in the custodial State, and not on, for example, operations which may occur in a 
third State and in which a suspect may be involved before being brought before the competent judicial 
authority of the custodial State, one can assume (or perhaps hope) that that authority will also look at, 
for example, allegations of trans-border male captus situations. (In that respect, all the different inter-
State situations discussed in Chapters IIII and V remain of relevance to the ICC context.) In addition, 
one must also be aware of the fact that Art. 59 of the ICC Statute assumes the issuance of a request for 
arrest and surrender/for provisional arrest. However, one can also imagine that a male captus may 
already have taken place before such a request has been issued. One could hereby think of a person who 
claims to have been placed in illegal detention even before the ICC had sent its official requests. This 
point will come back in the ICC cases of Lubanga Dyilo and Katanga (see Sections 2 and 4 of Chapter 
X). (Cf. also the Duch case, see Subsection 5.1 of Chapter VI.) 
153 El Zeidy 2006, pp. 454-455.  
154 See the words “in accordance with the law of that State”. Although there is thus room for national 








The third element is also not very clear. Swart writes that “[o]ne may think here 
of the rights of the person under national law and human rights treaties to which the 
requested State is a party. Equally relevant are the provisions of Article 55[156] of 
the Statute itself.”157 One could also think here of Article 21, paragraph 3 of the 
ICC Statute, which states, among other things, that “[t]he application and 
interpretation of law pursuant to this article [this is the law of the ICC as can be 
found in Article 21 of the ICC Statute, ChP] must be consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights”. (This crucial provision will be discussed in detail in 
Section 4 of Chapter IX.)  
With respect to the most important right in which this book is interested, 
although Article 59 of the ICC Statute does not give the arrested person an explicit 
right to have the lawfulness of his arrest and detention checked by a court, such a 
right “may nevertheless follow from human rights conventions to which the 
requested State is a party”.158 An analogy to international human rights law may be 
helpful here, even if Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute itself does not use 
this term (but speaks of “[t]he person’s rights”), which may mean that the drafters 
of the ICC Statute may have wanted to give their term a connotation other than that 
                                                                                                                                              
obligation to comply with the Court’s requests.” (Ibid., p. 453.) Cf. in that respect the already-
mentioned (see n. 130 and accompanying text) remark from Young when he addressed national 
procedural law and stated that “national law procedures should not obstruct the surrender of accused 
persons to the Court.” (Young 2001, p. 349.) 
155 See Hall 2008 B, p. 1152: “The arrest proceedings are governed by the law of the custodial State. 
Article 59 does not address the criteria of proper process. Basically, it means that the warrant be duly 
served on the person arrested and that the process be consistent with international law and standards 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See also Swart 2002 A, pp. 1252-1253: “The expression ‘proper 
process’ seems primarily to refer to the national law of the requested State, including its obligations 
under human rights conventions.” 
156 Art. 55 of the ICC Statute (‘Rights of persons during an investigation’) reads: “1. In respect of an 
investigation under this Statute, a person: (a) Shall not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself or 
to confess guilt; (b) Shall not be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any 
other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (c) Shall, if questioned in a 
language other than a language the person fully understands and speaks, have, free of any cost, the 
assistance of a competent interpreter and such translations as are necessary to meet the requirements of 
fairness; and (d) Shall not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, and shall not be deprived of his 
or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established in this 
Statute. 2. Where there are grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court and that person is about to be questioned either by the Prosecutor, or by 
national authorities pursuant to a request made under Part 9, that person shall also have the following 
rights of which he or she shall be informed prior to being questioned: (a) To be informed, prior to being 
questioned, that there are grounds to believe that he or she has committed a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; (b) To remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the 
determination of guilt or innocence; (c) To have legal assistance of the person’s choosing, or, if the 
person does not have legal assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where 
the interests of justice so require, and without payment by the person in any such case if the person does 
not have sufficient means to pay for it; and (d) To be questioned in the presence of counsel unless the 
person has voluntarily waived his or her right to counsel.”  
157 Swart 2002 A, p. 1253. See also Young 2001, pp. 341, 349 and 351, Swart 2002 C, p. 1689, Sluiter 
2003 C, p. 621 and Hall 2008 B, p. 1152.   








of ‘human rights’.159 Looking for the moment only at the human right to liberty and 
security – paragraph 2 (c) may, of course, encompass many other rights – and 
taking the ICCPR’s human right to liberty and security as an example here, it was 
already explained in Subsection 2.2.1 of Chapter III that not only must a person’s 
deprivation of liberty be “on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure 
as are established by law” (lawful); it must not be arbitrary either.160 Hence, not 
only must the deprivation be legal (“on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law”), “[t]he law itself must not be arbitrary, and 
the enforcement of the law in a given case must not take place arbitrarily”.161  
Now, it is true that the competent authority of the custodial State cannot check 
the substantive part of the legality requirement, namely whether the deprivation of 
liberty was made “on such grounds (...) as are established by law”.162 That is up to 
                                                          
159 See also Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 622-623. It may be interesting to note that the Dutch authorities, when 
addressing Art. 59, para. 2 of the ICC Statute, refer to “the rights which the person pursuant to national 
and international law enjoys in this situation”, see the Explanatory Memorandum to the International 
Criminal Court Implementation Act (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2001-2002, 28 
098 (R 1704), Uitvoering van het Statuut van het Internationaal Strafhof met betrekking tot de 
samenwerking met en bijstand aan het Internationaal Strafhof en de tenuitvoerlegging van zijn 
vonnissen (Uitvoeringswet Internationaal Strafhof), Nr. 3, Memorie van Toelichting), p. 25: “The 
reference to article 59, paragraph 2 of the [ICC] Statute has been included because the Statute 
prescribes that the public prosecutor [the officier] checks with respect to a(n) (provisionally) arrested 
person whether there is perhaps a case of mistaken identity, whether the (national) arrest procedure has 
been correctly applied and whether the rights which the person pursuant to national and international 
law enjoys in this situation, have been respected [own translation, ChP].” See also the Dutch 
Explanatory Memorandum to the approval of the ICC Statute (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 
Vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 27 484 (R 1669). Goedkeuring van het op 17 juli 1998 totstandgekomen 
Statuut van Rome inzake het Internationaal Strafhof (Trb. 2000, 120), Nr. 3, Memorie van Toelichting), 
p. 50: “When the Dutch judge, on the basis of Article 59, para. 2 (c), assesses whether the rights of the 
arrested person have been respected, that assessment includes, among other things, the rights stemming 
from the Constitution and the ECHR [own translation, ChP].” See also Hall 2008 B, p. 1152: “The 
rights referred to in this Subparagraph would include both rights under national and under international 
law, including the rights recognized in article 55”. 
160 See Nowak 2005, p. 223. 
161 Ibid., p. 224. 
162 Note that the Dutch Government clarifies at p. 50 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the approval 
of the ICC Statute (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 27 484 (R 1669). 
Goedkeuring van het op 17 juli 1998 totstandgekomen Statuut van Rome inzake het Internationaal 
Strafhof (Trb. 2000, 120), Nr. 3, Memorie van Toelichting) that “the person who has been arrested at 
the request of the International Criminal Court must be brought immediately before the national judge 
who shall determine the validness and lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty (gegrondheid en 
rechtmatigheid van de vrijheidsbeneming) [own translation, ChP].” However, this is arguably not what 
Art. 59 of the ICC Statute stipulates. It is not for the competent judicial authority to determine the 
validness/the substantive grounds for the arrest – this is the prerogative of the ICC. Hence, the national 
authority can only to a certain extent review the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty. (It appears, 
however, that the Dutch Government, agrees with this latter point when it writes, at the same page, that 
“the only point which the competent judicial authority can absolutely not check is whether the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, in view of the parameters established by article 58 [of the ICC Statute], was entitled to issue 
the (in that article defined) warrant of arrest [own translation, ChP].” Hence, it seems that the Dutch 
Government agrees that the competent judicial authority cannot look at the correctness of the 








the ICC163 and not up to the competent (judicial)164 authority of the custodial State 
to decide, see Article 59, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute: “It shall not be open to the 
competent authority of the custodial State to consider whether the warrant of arrest 
was properly issued in accordance with article 58, paragraph 1 (a) and (b).”165 
                                                          
163 See also Rule 117, para. 3 of the ICC RPE: “A challenge as to whether the warrant of arrest was 
properly issued in accordance with article 58, paragraph 1 (a) and (b), shall be made in writing to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber. The application shall set out the basis for the challenge. After having obtained the 
views of the Prosecutor, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall decide on the application without delay.” 
164 Although it is possible that this will often be the same judicial authority as the one of Art. 59, para. 2 
of the ICC Statute, paras. 3, 4 and 5 of Art. 59 of the ICC Statute do not speak of the competent judicial 
authority, but of the competent authority in the custodial State. Hence, it appears that no competent 
authority of the custodial State, whether judicial or executive, can consider whether the warrant of 
arrest was properly issued in accordance with article 58, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of the ICC Statute. It 
seems that the idea that “[i[t shall not be open to the competent authority of the custodial State to 
consider whether the warrant of arrest was properly issued in accordance with article 58, paragraph 1 
(a) and (b)” has a rather broad application (see also the previous footnote and its reference to Rule 117, 
para. 3 of the ICC RPE, which generally states that such a challenge must be made with the ICC) but it 
must also be admitted that the just-quoted words can be found in a provision which deals with an 
application of interim release, see Art. 59, para. 4 of the ICC Statute. This may mean that the competent 
authority may not consider whether the warrant of arrest was properly issued in accordance with article 
58, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) merely in the context of such an application of interim release, which does 
not exclude that problems related to the arrest warrant may nevertheless constitute, for example, a 
reason for the Executive [which, as clarified above, can also play a role in the surrender, see also n. 
179, ChP] to refuse surrender altogether. See also Sluiter (2009, pp. 469-470) who, however, writes 
about the “national court” in the context of Art. 59, para. 4 of the ICC Statute, whereas it was clarified 
above that this provision speaks of “competent authority in the custodial State” more generally: “One 
also notices in Article 59 (4) that it is not open to the national court to consider whether the arrest 
warrant was properly issued in accordance with Article 58 of the Statute. However, this seems to me 
very much moving problems around. Whereas the national court may not do this, the executive branch 
could still raise this as an obstacle to cooperation, applying Article 97. Thus, a national court, which 
operates in extradition in conjunction with the executive, could inform the Minister of Justice of any 
doubts it has in relation to the legality of an arrest warrant issued by the ICC. Though this may not be a 
ground for interim release, it can be a reason not to cooperate [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
165 See for the contents of Art. 58, para. 1 (a) and (b) of the ICC Statute ns. 103-104 and accompanying 
text. As such, the competent authority can be compared (note, however, that extradition is not the 
correct concept in the ICC proceedings!) with a judge from a requested State who extradites a person to 
the court of the requesting State. (See also the Dutch Explanatory Memorandum to the approval of the 
ICC Statute (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 27 484 (R 1669). 
Goedkeuring van het op 17 juli 1998 totstandgekomen Statuut van Rome inzake het Internationaal 
Strafhof (Trb. 2000, 120), Nr. 3, Memorie van Toelichting), p. 50.) Such a judge cannot check either 
whether there are, for example, substantial grounds to believe that this person has committed a certain 
crime. This is the privilege of the court of the requesting State. Cf. in that respect also the European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (also known as the Venice Commission) – the Council of 
Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters – Report on Constitutional Issues Raised by the 
Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted by the Commission at 
it[s] 45th Plenary Meeting (Venice, 15-16 December 2000), Strasbourg, 15 January 2001, CDL-INF 
(2001) 1 Or.Fr. and available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL-INF(2001)001-e.asp), in 
which it first remarked that “it has been claimed that Article 59 paras. 4 and 5 [of the ICC Statute, these 
provisions will be examined in a few moments in the main text, ChP] endanger the principle of habeas 
corpus as outlined specifically within Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights.” The 
Commission then explained that “the character of deprivation of liberty in question is not of the nature 
foreseen in Article 5 para. 1 (c) of the European Convention of Human Rights, which states that a 








Nevertheless, it can arguably check several other elements of the concept of the 
right to liberty and security, namely the procedural part of the legality requirement 
and, to a certain extent, the prohibition of arbitrariness.  
The procedural part of the legality requirement is uncontroversial: that the 
competent judicial authority can check whether the arrest was made in accordance 
with the correct procedures can also be discerned from the previously examined 
Article 59, paragraph 2 (b) of the ICC Statute.  
The prohibition of arbitrariness is a little more complicated: as mentioned above, 
it contains two elements, namely that the law on which the arrest was made (and 
this seems to include both substantive and procedural law) was not itself arbitrary, 
and that the enforcement of the law in this specific case was not arbitrary. This last 
element implies that one should look at the correctness of the specific manner in 
which an arrest was made.166  
To start with the first element, as with the point already made that the competent 
(judicial) authority cannot check whether the ICC is correct in deciding that there 
are substantive grounds for an arrest warrant, it can be argued that neither can the 
competent judicial authority check whether the substantive law on which the arrest 
was made was arbitrary or not; whether the suspect is arrested on the basis of a 
national arrest warrant stemming from the custodial State’s legislation 
implementing its cooperation obligations with the ICC or whether the suspect is 
arrested on the basis of the ICC request for (provisional) arrest and surrender itself, 
the ultimate substantive legal basis for the arrest will be the ICC Statute, and it is, of 
course, not for the competent judicial authority in the custodial State to determine 
that the ICC Statute is arbitrary. (In fact, one can safely state that the ICC Statute, 
even though it is not perfect, can never be awarded that accolade.) However, can the 
                                                                                                                                              
reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to 
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so”. It is rather a deprivation of liberty 
within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 (f) which authorises a deprivation of liberty if it is “...the lawful 
arrest or detention of a person ... against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
extradition.” In effect, the surrender of a person to an international organisation can be assimilated in 
this respect to an extradition. The scope of the obligation contained within Article 5 para. 4 is not 
identical for each type of deprivation of liberty; indeed this is particularly so as regards the scope of the 
judicial review required. The Convention requires a review of the necessary conditions for the legality 
of a deprivation of liberty of an individual in relation to paragraph 1 of Article 5. In respect of Article 5 
para. 1 (f), the competent authority is not required to examine whether a “reasonable suspicion” exists 
to believe that the person arrested and detained has committed a crime, nor whether there is risk of 
fleeing, collusion or commission of other crimes. These elements are related to police custody and 
interim detention before criminal trial (envisaged in Article 5 para. 1 (c)). In the context of detention 
under Article 5 para. 1 (f), the judicial authority must investigate whether the detention was “lawful” 
with the frame of this provision; it must thus verify whether a procedure of extradition is effectively 
underway. The competent authority is not therefore asked to look into the elements referred in Article 
58 paras. [1, ChP] (a) and (b) of the Statute of Rome [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See also n. 182 
and accompanying text. 
166 See also Nowak 2005, p. 225 (or n. 218 and accompanying text of Chapter III): “Cases of 
deprivation of liberty provided for by law must not be manifestly disproportional, unjust or 
unpredictable, and the specific manner in which an arrest is made must not be discriminatory and must 
be able to be deemed appropriate and proportional in view of the circumstances of the case [original 








competent judicial authority verify whether the procedural legality of the 
deprivation of liberty was in conformity with the prohibition of arbitrariness? In 
principle, this would seem possible. Since the arrest is executed on the basis of 
national procedural law, the competent judicial authority must be able to ascertain 
whether these procedures are not themselves arbitrary. However, it may be assumed 
that this will not be the case (too often). After all, the national procedures must, of 
course, be in conformity with the arguably non-arbitrary ICC Statute.  
Although the substantive and procedural legal bases for the deprivation of 
liberty will not readily be labelled arbitrary, this may be different with respect to the 
second element of arbitrariness, which relates to the enforcement of the law in a 
specific case. Even if the arrest was based on the correct grounds and executed in 
accordance with a prescribed procedure, and even if these substantive and 
procedural legal bases are generally to be viewed as non-arbitrary, the factual 
execution of the specific arrest on the ground may still be qualified as arbitrary or 
incorrect. And arguably, this is surely something the competent judicial authority 
can and should review.  
The fact that Swart, Sluiter and Hall all note the relevance, for the scope of 
Article 59 of the ICC Statute, of Article 55 of the ICC Statute (which also mentions, 
in a very general way, the importance of the non-arbitrariness of arrests and 
detentions)167 may constitute additional proof for the above-mentioned view.168   
                                                          
167 See the already-mentioned (see n. 156) Art. 55, para. 1 (d) of the ICC Statute: “In respect of an 
investigation under this Statute, a person: (…) Shall not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, 
and shall not be deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedures as are established in this Statute.”  
168 See Swart 2002 A, p. 1253, Sluiter 2003 C, p. 621 and Hall 2008 B, p. 1152. The fact that Swart 
notes that “a determination of whether there has been a violation of the person’s right not to be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention and not to be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds, 
and in accordance with such procedures, as are established in the Statute, mentioned in Article 55(1)(d), 
is largely outside the competence of the national authority” (Swart 2002 A, pp. 1253-1254), does not 
necessarily have to contradict this. After all, as explained in the main text, it is indeed true that a 
considerable part of the right to liberty and security cannot be checked by (“is largely outside the 
competence of”) the competent (judicial) authority in the custodial State, namely the substantive part of 
the legality requirement and part of the prohibition of arbitrariness. However, what the competent 
judicial authority in the custodial State can arguably check is whether the arrest was made in 
accordance with the correct national procedures. (The reference in Art. 55, para. 1 (d) of the ICC 
Statute to the fact that deprivation of liberty is only possible “in accordance with such procedures as are 
established in this Statute” probably means that all the arrest and detention provisions in the ICC 
Statute, including Art. 59, which, in turn, refers to, among other things, national procedural law, must 
be complied with before one can speak of a proper deprivation of liberty in the context of the ICC.) 
Furthermore, the competent judicial authority in the custodial State can arguably also check parts of the 
prohibition of arbitrariness. See in that respect also Young 2001, who first notes the relevance of Art. 
55 of the ICC Statute for the domestic arrest and surrender procedures (at p. 341) but then states (at pp. 
352-353) that “[a] difficult issue arises when the individual raises a rights complaint which requires 
consideration of the merits of the allegations, such as a complaint of arbitrary detention. There are a 
number of reasons why national courts should defer determination of this issue to the ICC without 
exploring the factual underpinnings of the arrest warrant. First, the Statute provides that in deciding an 
interim release application, the national court is not to consider whether the warrant of arrest was 
properly issued. The intent of this prohibition would be undermined if an accused could circumvent it 








Now that the scope of these three elements has been addressed, it is time, as 
promised, to turn to the main problem connected with this provision, namely the 
indistinctness with respect to the question as to what will happen if the competent 
judicial authority in the custodial State finds that a person has not been arrested in 
accordance with the proper process or that his rights have not been respected169 (if 
the person standing before that authority is not the one sought by the ICC, then he 
is, of course, not to be surrendered to the ICC).170 It may be asked, for example, 
whether the authority in that case is authorised, after consultation with the ICC – 
this is obligatory, pursuant to Article 97 of the ICC Statute171 – to actually release 
that person (other than granting interim release pending surrender, which is in any 
case a possibility pursuant to Article 59, paragraphs 3-6 of the ICC Statute (these 
provisions will be dealt with shortly)). In addition, it can be wondered if the 
national authority not only has the possibility to release a person (which, as already 
clarified in Subsection 4.4 of Chapter III, may not preclude the possibility of a new 
arrest)172 but perhaps also has the possibility to refuse the surrender in the case of a 
                                                                                                                                              
Secondly, States that do not have an evidential sufficiency requirement would nevertheless be forced to 
review the factual allegations in an arbitrary detention challenge. Such a result would undermine the 
Statute’s aim to ensure the least burdensome means to surrender. Thirdly, the ICC is the more suitable 
forum to decide an issue of arbitrary detention. The Court would be better placed to apply definitions of 
international crimes to standardize the legal tests for verifying the legality of the individual’s detention. 
Furthermore, it is only after surrender that the accused is entitled to full disclosure of the prosecution’s 
evidence, which can be extremely helpful to the defence in preparing the complaint or in deciding 
whether to raise the issue. Finally, there are safeguards in the Statute which attempt to minimize the 
degree of impairment to the individual’s liberty interest [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” Arguably, 
this view does not seem to contradict this study’s position either as it is true that it is not up to the 
competent judicial authority in the custodial State to consider a claim of arbitrary arrest if that means 
that this authority must look at the substantive legal grounds on the basis of which the arrest has been 
made. This is indeed the ICC’s domain. However, this does not say anything about the other elements 
of the prohibition of arbitrariness which, it is submitted, can very well be checked by the competent 
judicial authority in the custodial State. 
169 See also Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 624-625.  
170 See, for example, Sections 25, 27, para. 2 and 30, para. 4 of the ‘Kingdom Act of 20 June 2002 to 
implement the Statute of the International Criminal Court in relation to cooperation with and the 
provision of assistance to the International Criminal Court and the enforcement of its decisions’ 
(available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/a24d1cf3344e99934125673e00508142/b7883c35b0a31661c1256d79005c007c!OpenDocument) 
(Dutch International Criminal Court Implementation Act) which clarify that the District Court in The 
Hague shall declare the surrender to be inadmissible in its ruling if the person brought before it is not 
the person whose surrender has been requested and that the Minister of Justice in that case shall refuse 
the ICC’s request. See also Young 2001, p. 350: “If the reviewing judicial officer is not satisfied that 
the person named in the arrest warrant is the arrested person then that person should ordinarily be 
released [original footnote omitted, ChP].” This indeed seems the most logical thing to do, even if the 
ICC Statute does not mention this outcome. See also ibid., n. 112: “The Statute, however, does not 
expressly stipulate this. Instead, art. 97(b) simply lists this determination as an example of when the 
State Party must consult with the Court without delay in order to resolve the matter.”  
171 See for the contents of Art. 97 of the ICC Statute n. 136. 
172 Cf. in that respect, for example, also the release of a provisionally arrested person “if the requested 
State has not received the request for surrender and the documents supporting the request as specified in 
article 91 within the time limits specified in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence” (Art. 92, para. 3 of 








serious173 violation of the elements mentioned in Article 59, paragraph 2 (b) and (c) 
of the ICC Statute.174   
First of all, it should be stressed that “the ICC Statute does not envisage any 
ground for denying a request for arrest and surrender”.175 Recall in that respect the 
non-applicability in the ICC context of the traditional grounds for refusal of 
extradition, such as the surrender of nationals, the surrender of persons accused of 
having committed political offences and the double criminality requirement. 
Nevertheless, the previously discussed unclear scope of Article 59 of the ICC 
Statute may perhaps create other obstacles. Although it is true that this provision 
does not explicitly mention the possibility of a release or, further, a refusal to 
surrender if the competent judicial authority in the custodial State determines that 
the person concerned has not been arrested in accordance with the proper process or 
                                                                                                                                              
from custody pursuant to paragraph 3 shall not prejudice the subsequent arrest and surrender of that 
person if the request for surrender and the documents supporting the request are delivered at a later 
date.” See also the release in the context of Rule 182, para. 2 of the ICC RPE (“[w]hen the time limit 
provided for in article 89, paragraph 3 (e), has expired”): “such a release is without prejudice to a 
subsequent arrest of the person in accordance with the provisions of article 89 or article 92”. (Art. 89, 
para. 3 (e) of the ICC Statute states: “If an unscheduled landing occurs on the territory of the transit 
State, that State may require a request for transit from the Court as provided for in subparagraph (b). 
The transit State shall detain the person being transported until the request for transit is received and the 
transit is effected, provided that detention for purposes of this subparagraph may not be extended 
beyond 96 hours from the unscheduled landing unless the request is received within that time.”)  
173 A rather simple procedural violation should, of course, not lead to a refusal. See also Young 2001, p. 
350: “Putting aside for the moment human rights considerations, it is difficult to accept that every 
procedural error should lead to the refusal of a surrender request. Most procedural breaches will likely 
be technical ones where the individual suffers little if any prejudice in making full answer and defence 
to the charges. Absent such prejudice, failing to surrender due to a procedural defect undermines the 
principle of effective prosecution and amounts to a failure to cooperate in breach of the Statute.” Note, 
however, that a judge may perhaps refuse surrender in cases of violations, which may not have caused 
much “prejudice in making full answer and defence to the charges”, but which are nevertheless to be 
considered very serious. As already earlier explained, most male captus cases will not affect the 
fairness of the trial in the strict sense of the word, but the concept of a fair trial broadly perceived/the 
integrity of the proceedings. 
174 For the sake of completeness, it may also be good to note that one can also ask oneself whether a 
State may also refuse surrender for quite some other reasons related to the human rights context, for 
instance, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that by surrendering the person to the ICC, human 
rights will be violated. Although this point, which can be connected with the well-known Soering case 
before the ECtHR (see for more information Van den Wyngaert 1990 and n. 610 of Chapter V), has 
nothing to do with pre-trial irregularities and the male captus discussion, it may, however, be 
interesting to provide one famous quote from the ECtHR in the Naletilić case (ECtHR (Fourth Section), 
‘Decision as to the admissibility of Application No. 51891/99 by Mladen Naletilić against Croatia’, 4 
May 2000). In this case, the suspect, who was awaiting transfer in Croatia to the ICTY, claimed, among 
other things, under Art. 6, para. 1 of the ECHR that the ICTY is not an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. (See ibid.) The European Court (ibid.) recalled “that exceptionally, an issue 
might be raised under Article 6 of the Convention by an extradition decision in circumstances where the 
applicant risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial. However, it is not an act in the nature of an 
extradition which is at stake here, as the applicant seems to think. Involved here is the surrender to an 
international court which, in view of the content of its Statute and Rules of Procedure, offers all the 
necessary guarantees including those of impartiality and independence.” For more information on this 
issue, see, for example, Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 645-648. 








that the person’s right have not been respected,176 it does not explicitly exclude 
these options either. An analogy can be drawn here to Article 59, paragraph 2 (a) of 
the ICC Statute: this provision also does not state that a State can refuse to 
surrender a suspect if he is not the person in whom the ICC is interested, but it is 
obvious that any State, after consultation with the ICC pursuant to Article 97 of the 
ICC Statute (it must again be stressed that this avenue is always to be taken),177 will 
release a person if that person is not the person ‘wanted’ by the ICC.  
Hence, the case is perhaps not as clear-cut as it seems.178 It appears that it is up 
to the national authorities to decide in their national laws what position they wish to 
follow.179 And this may differ from State to State. Of course, in this context, a 
                                                          
176 See also ibid., pp. 80-81: “[I]f the judge finds any procedural irregularities or a violation of the rights 
of the person, the ICC Statute does not authorise him or her to take remedial action in relation to such 
failings. In recognition of this, some domestic laws specifically prohibit such action by the domestic 
judge and provide for a report to be submitted back to the ICC. If the applicable legislation is not 
specific on this point, an argument to that effect should be mounted based on the language of the 
Statute [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
177 Although Art. 97 of the ICC Statute does not mention problems related to human rights/due process 
considerations (it does, however, mention the problem that the arrested person is not the person in 
whom the ICC is interested), it must not be forgotten that the problems listed in Art. 97 of the ICC 
Statute (“(a) Insufficient information to execute the request; (b) In the case of a request for surrender, 
the fact that despite best efforts, the person sought cannot be located or that the investigation conducted 
has determined that the person in the requested State is clearly not the person named in the warrant; or 
(c) The fact that execution of the request in its current form would require the requested State to breach 
a pre-existing treaty obligation undertaken with respect to another State.”) are not exhaustive, see the 
words: “Such problems may include, inter alia”. (See n. 136.) 
178 See also Young 2001, p. 318: “The substantive problem of domestic law objections to surrender 
cannot be dismissed simply on the basis of the orthodox position that international law trumps national 
law. The Statute itself considers the processing of arrest and surrender requests as essentially a matter 
of national law.” In that respect, the system of the ICC is clearly different from the system of the 
ICTY/ICTR where Rule 58 of the ICTY/ICTR RPE (see also n. 22 and accompanying text of Chapter 
VI) stated that “[t]he obligations laid down in Article 29 of the Statute [or Art. 28 of the ICTR Statute, 
ChP] shall prevail over any legal impediment to the surrender or transfer of the accused or of a witness 
to the Tribunal which may exist under the national law or extradition treaties of the State concerned.” 
See also Young 2001, p. 340. 
179 To give one concrete example of a domestic situation, in the ICC’s host State, the Netherlands, it is 
the public prosecutor (officier van justitie) at The Hague District Court which questions the arrested 
person in accordance with, among other things, Art. 59, para. 2 of the ICC Statute, see the Dutch 
International Criminal Court Implementation Act (see n. 170) Sections 14 (with respect to provisional 
arrest) and 18 (with respect to arrest). Here, no mention is made of a possibility to release. However, 
according to para. 1 of Sections 16 (with respect to provisional arrest) and 20 (with respect to arrest), 
the investigating/examining judge (rechter-commissaris) may, if the ICC has been consulted on this 
issue, order “that on account of urgent and exceptional circumstances the deprivation of liberty (...) be 
ended or discontinued or suspended subject to conditions. The conditions to be imposed shall in any 
event be designed to prevent absconding.” Although it is not clear from the text of the provision itself 
whether the investigating judge can only grant interim releases pending surrender (or whether he can 
also grant more final releases blocking the surrender), it arguably addresses interim releases only. This 
can be derived from the second paragraph of Section 16 (see also the second paragraph of Section 20, 
referring to the second paragraph of Section 16) where one can read that “[t]he investigating judge shall 
not make an order as referred to in subsection 1 until the ICC, having been consulted for this purpose 
through the intermediary of Our Minister, has made recommendations pursuant to article 59, 








State’s view of the male captus discussion (see Chapter V) may perhaps also have a 
role to play, even if the competent judicial authority in the custodial State is not 
there to decide whether or not it can exercise jurisdiction over the case 
notwithstanding the male captus (because the ICC and the ICC alone will decide 
whether to try the case (or not)).180 This may mean that a State in favour of the male 
captus bene detentus rule may perhaps be more readily inclined to surrender a 
person than a State adhering to the male captus male detentus rule, and vice 
versa.181 However, it may also be the case that a judge following a male captus 
bene detentus stance in normal cases, see the English Bennett case, will not do so if 
he is not going to try the suspect, but if he is merely going to surrender him to 
another jurisdiction, such as the ICC, see the English male captus bene deditus case 
of Schmidt.182 (Note that here, the cases Bennett and Schmidt have been chosen 
                                                                                                                                              
(Art. 59, para. 5 of the ICC Statute deals with interim release (pending surrender).) In addition, it can 
also be derived from the fact that the judicial authority holding the surrender hearing, the District Court 
in The Hague (see Chapter 4 of the Dutch International Criminal Court Implementation Act), which, 
according to Section 26, para. 3, also has possibilities to release comparable with the one of the 
investigating judge, cannot declare the surrender inadmissible except for in the situation that the person 
brought before it is not the person whose surrender has been requested by the ICC, see Section 27. This 
means that the District Court, except for in the above-mentioned situation, always has to declare the 
surrender admissible. This, however, does not necessarily have to mean that a serious unlawful arrest, 
for example, can never lead to a refusal to surrender the person in question to the ICC. This is because 
the Dutch surrender system not only has a judicial but also a political phase, involving the Minister of 
Justice (see also Sluiter 2004 A, p. 163). Although the District Court apparently cannot declare the 
surrender inadmissible in the case of, for example, an unlawful arrest, it must send the Minister not only 
its ruling, but also “its advisory opinion on the action to be taken on the request for surrender.” (Section 
28, para. 2.) Such an advisory opinion could, of course, contain negative advice (see also ibid., p. 165), 
for example, in case a serious male captus situation has occurred. Now, the Minister of Justice must 
make the final surrender decision and there are many possibilities for him, again after having consulted 
with the ICC, to refuse the surrender. This may perhaps also include the possibility of the serious male 
captus situation. Although this point is not explicitly mentioned in the list of possible reasons to refuse 
surrender (see Section 7), this list is not limitative. 
180 See also El Zeidy 2006, p. 455 (n. 29).  
181 See also Bekou and Shah 2006, p. 528: “[S].10(1)(b) of the South African Act stipulates that persons 
may not be surrendered to the Court if they have not been ‘arrested in accordance with procedures laid 
down by domestic law’. S.10(1)(c) of the Act goes on to provide that surrender may not be executed if 
‘the rights of the person, as contemplated in Chapter 2 of the Constitution have not been respected’. 
This is analogous to the approach to domestic prosecutions following procedural irregularities taken by 
the South African [Supreme] Court (…) in the Ebrahim case [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Bekou 
and Shah then go on noting that “[t]his emphasis on the rights of individuals [which is also present in 
the draft Senegalese cooperation legislation to which the authors refer on the same page, ChP] is worthy 
of praise, but, in terms of the processes set out by the Rome Statute, it is not compliant. A violation of 
an individual’s rights does not constitute a reason for non-surrender to the Court.” However, even 
though it is true that the ICC Statute does not contain an explicit reason for non-surrender because of 
such violations, one cannot say that such a refusal is non-compliant with the ICC law either. After all, 
Art. 59 of the ICC Statute is silent on the consequences of the determination, by the competent judicial 
authority, that the suspect has not been arrested according to the proper process or that his rights have 
not been respected. 
182 See also n. 165. However, as was also shown in the Schmidt case, one can agree with Justice Sedley 
of the Divisional Court in that case that all courts (whether it is a trial court or an ‘extraditing’ court) 
have an obligation to prevent abuse of their process, see n. 331 and accompanying text of Chapter V. 








merely to illustrate the problem; in the UK, another mechanism applies concerning 
the cooperation with the ICC, see footnotes 187 and 190.)  
The vision a certain State has on the division of responsibilities between the 
State and the ICC may also be important in the context of this determination. For 
example, a State may be of the opinion that at the stage of the proceedings of 
Article 59 of the ICC Statute, it is purely operating on behalf of the ICC183 and that 
it is only there to (swiftly) arrest and surrender the person to the ICC. That may lead 
to the conclusion that the competent judicial authority in the custodial State, 
although it must make a determination with respect to the arrest and detention, 
cannot grant a remedy which would jeopardise the surrender.184 (However, in that 
                                                                                                                                              
cooperation regimes of the UN ad hoc Tribunals (but see n. 22 of Chapter VI), one could argue that also 
a court which is merely there to surrender the suspect to the ICC should be careful that its process is not 
abused and hence that it may steps to prevent such abuse. Cf. also Currie 2007, pp. 385-386: “In 
Canada (…), where the surrender process is assimilated to the domestic extradition procedure, any 
request for surrender by the ICC will engage a judicial hearing wherein it is well-established that the 
judge is competent both to scrutinize the process for compliance with domestic human rights norms, 
and to adjudicate claims of abuse of process. Particularly under the latter heading, it would be entirely 
within the discretion of the extradition court to dismiss the surrender proceedings where the 
circumstances of the fugitive’s detention were manifestly illegal, particularly if domestic or foreign 
police forces were implicated [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
183 Cf. in that respect El Zeidy 2006, p. 458. After having referred to the Milošević v. The Netherlands 
case (see ns. 222 et seq. and accompanying text) where the Dutch District Court stated that it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider an application for release filed by Milošević because the Netherlands “had 
transferred its jurisdiction” to the ICTY (see also n. 418 and accompanying text of Chapter VI), he 
explains: “Thus, it could equally be argued that at the stage when Article 59 applies, that is after an 
arrest warrant has already been issued against a person, the state in question has already transferred its 
jurisdiction to the ICC. Although the ICC Statute is based on the principle of complementarity, which 
grants primacy to national courts, technically the state in question loses its primacy and the ICC gains 
control over the case once the case has been rendered admissible. The fact that Article 59(2) expressly 
leaves part of the proceedings to national authorities does not mean that the ICC lacks competence over 
the case. At this stage, the state involved is executing part of the proceedings on behalf of the ICC 
[emphasis in original, ChP].” 
184 See Zhu 2006, p. 104: “In principle, in order to ensure the operation and success of the Court, the 
transfer of accused to the Court by states should not to be refused on any grounds.” See also Young 
2001, pp. 347-348: “The unique relationship between States Parties and the ICC supports an 
interpretation favouring a strict and unimpeded surrender regime in the Statute. Further support for this 
interpretation can also be found in the Statute’s underlying purposes. The Statute represents an 
agreement amongst States Parties to enforce laws prohibiting the worst international crimes, in 
accordance with principles of effective prosecution and complementarity. Assuming a case is 
admissible, the principle of effective prosecution favours an expeditious and unimpeded surrender to 
the Court. Unless the Court is allowed to exercise jurisdiction, the accused will be free from 
prosecution. Effective prosecution can also be undermined by protracted domestic litigation over 
surrender. Delays will tend to jeopardize the truth-seeking function of the prosecution as witnesses tend 
to be more difficult to locate, and memories fade with time. Implicit in the principle of complementarity 
is the notion that States and the ICC have their respective spheres of competence. As States are 
responsible for executing arrest and surrender requests within their territory, it should be left to their 
courts to review the validity of that execution process. On the other hand, any issues relating to the 
conduct of the prosecution and trial should be left to be decided by the ICC after surrender. While the 
principle of complementarity involves some deference to state sovereignty interests, it should still be 
seen as a means to implement effective prosecution, not a substitute for such prosecution. Sensitivity to 








case, the determination of the competent judicial authority in the custodial State that 
an arrest was, for example, not executed according to the correct procedures may 
play a role in the proceedings before the ICC, once the suspect has been surrendered 
to The Hague.)185 Currie, for example, argues: “What is missing from the Rome 
Statute is any entitlement of the requested state to decline to surrender a fugitive on 
the basis of an illegal arrest of some sort. (…) It seems clear that the intention is for 
the ICC to deal with any arrest irregularities itself.”186 
However, a State may also believe that its competent judicial authority has an 

















                                                                                                                                              
prosecution. In other words, complementarity informs the question of whether the ICC or States should 
prosecute, but a prosecution there must be. Under Part 9, the Statute imposes obligations of ‘ends’ and 
leaves States to decide the ‘means’ to achieve them. The manner of implementation should be respected 
so long as the substance of the obligation is satisfied. Thus complementarity is best understood as 
affording a margin of appreciation to the manner in which States implement their Part 9 duties insofar 
as effective prosecution is not compromised, e.g. by creating undue delays or otherwise tainting the trial 
process [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
185 See also Young 2001, p. 352: “If remedial issues for rights violation should generally be left to be 
decided post-surrender in the ICC, then one might ask why the custodial State should have any 
competence to consider such violations. It is conceivable that the custodial State may order non-trial 
related remedies short of releasing the individual or excluding evidence at trial, e.g. ordering damages 
for physical or mental harm. But more importantly, by allowing individuals to raise these issues in the 
domestic forum, an evidential record of the complaint may be created and used as the factual basis for 
an application in the ICC. The individual will likely benefit from this opportunity, while memories are 
fresh and witnesses are more accessible. Additionally, one should not ignore the possibility of detainees 
filing human rights complaints against the custodial State in international fora. Where this occurs, the 
international human rights tribunal will require that the applicant exhaust local remedies or otherwise 
demonstrate that the remedies were unavailable or ineffective [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 








that this involvement does not exclude the granting of (far-reaching) remedies in the 
case of (serious) violations.187 A State taking this stance may perhaps argue that its 
                                                          
187 Cf. in that respect, for example, Sluiter who certainly sees a role for the competent judicial authority 
in the custodial State with respect to the supervision of human rights and who argues that the remedy of 
release, after consultation with the ICC, may indeed be among the remedies which the competent 
judicial authority in the custodial State can grant: “Do the national authorities grant the remedies they 
deem appropriate? Although this may follow from the role attributed to the national authorities, as 
envisaged by Article 59(2), the competent national court cannot grant remedies that may impede the 
execution of the request without first consulting with the court. As such, immediate release would be in 
violation of a state’s obligations under the Statute [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Sluiter 2003 C, 
p. 625.) One of Sluiter’s footnotes (ibid., n. 66) states: “The abduction of the person accompanied by 
serious mistreatment is an exception for egregious violations of human rights in the apprehension of the 
requested person. [This phrase was not correctly printed in this journal (cf. also n. 499 of Chapter V). It 
should read: “One could, however, make an exception for egregious violations of human rights in the 
apprehension of the requested person (for example, abduction of the person accompanied by serious 
mistreatment).” After the author of this study had asked Sluiter about these words, the latter confirmed 
this (and kindly provided the correct words), ChP.] In this situation, the competent national judge may 
rightfully assume that his duties under Article 59(2) do not tolerate any further detention.” See also 
ibid., p. 644: “National courts should serve as the first protectors of the individual rights of arrested 
persons, with the ICC serving an important supervisory role.” Note that the text at ibid., pp. 625-626 
(“A court may not easily grant the release of a person accused of the most serious international crimes. 
However, with respect to serious human rights violation in the course of or following the arrest, the 
effective legal remedies provision may be indispensable in preserving the integrity of the subsequent 
international criminal proceedings [original footnotes omitted, ChP].”) also seems to confirm that the 
competent judicial authority in the custodial State can grant the remedy of release, but this text has also 
been misprinted in the journal in question. The original (by Sluiter provided) text shows that Sluiter is 
not addressing the competent judicial authority in the custodial State here, but the ICC itself: “As far as 
the legal remedies are concerned to be provided by the Court [the capital ‘C’ clearly shows that Sluiter 
is writing about the ICC here, ChP], it is self-evident that the Court will not easily grant the release of a 
person accused of the most serious international crimes. Yet, in case of serious human rights violations 
in the course of or following arrest the provision of effective legal remedies may be indispensable with 
a view to preserving the integrity of the subsequent international criminal proceedings [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].” Be that as it may, Sluiter is in any case of the opinion that a release is 
amongst the remedies available to the competent judicial authority in the custodial State confronted by 
a male captus. Whether the remedy of a refusal to surrender is also at the authority’s disposal in the 
case of a male captus is less clear. Although Sluiter mentions the possibility that human rights 
considerations may lead to an “obstacle to surrender” – this may include a refusal to surrender, although 
it must be admitted that a decision to release could also already be seen as a (temporary) obstacle to 
surrender – see ibid., p. 651 (“Following the procedure envisaged by Article 97, the requested state 
must not be hesitant to review the surrender in light of human rights obligations and must submit to 
human rights considerations, if necessary, as an obstacle to surrender.”), he appears to connect this 
remedy not with past human rights violations, but with possible future violations, see ibid., pp. 647-
648: “[I]t may be difficult to imagine a situation in which the Soering jurisprudence [see ns. 610 of 
Chapter V and 174 of the present chapter, ChP] may prevent surrender to the court. (…) It would go too 
far, however, to categorically exclude the possibility of the “Soering ground for refusal” in relation to 
international criminal proceedings.” Although Sluiter does refer to male captus situations, which may, 
of course, involve human rights violations (see ibid., pp. 648-650), he does not seem to explicitly 
connect the remedy of refusal to surrender to such violations. (Note nevertheless, as already mentioned 
in this footnote, that he does consider that the remedy of release may be an appropriate remedy for 
“egregious violations of human rights in the apprehension of the requested person”, and that such a 
release may not be limited to a formal release, but to a real release, blocking the surrender, see also 
Sluiter’s use of the concept of ‘release’ in the ICTY Dokmanović case, see Chapter VI.) To provide a 








competent judicial authority should in fact be able to grant remedies such as release 
in the case of an irregular arrest, because the ICC Statute prima facie does not 
contain this remedy (see Article 55 of the ICC Statute188 and Chapter IX, where the 
                                                                                                                                              
a refusal. This seems to imply that serious human rights violations can lead to a refusal. And indeed, he 
also mentions this possibility. However, a little later, he argues that the competent judicial authority 
should not have the jurisdiction to order a stay of the proceedings. See Young 2001, p. 352: “The 
principle of effective prosecution implies that not every violation results in a refusal to surrender, 
especially since rights violation can vary greatly in severity. It must be remembered that a State’s 
refusal to surrender, when no country is willing and able to prosecute, is equivalent to a judicial stay of 
proceeding, which is tantamount to an acquittal. To warrant such an outcome, the rights violation must 
be so egregious that it is not reasonably possible for the accused to be guaranteed a fair trial. Most 
rights violations do not rise to this level and can be remedied by something short of a stay of the 
proceedings. (…) While rights violations may be remedied by a stay of proceeding or exclusion of 
evidence, it is suggested that the judicial officer in a surrender proceeding should not be given the 
jurisdiction to order these two remedies. These remedies have significant ramifications for the trial, and 
accordingly its implications should be left for the ICC to decide after surrender. Without the capability 
of obtaining all the relevant evidence, domestic courts will often be in a difficult position to decide on 
these issues pre-surrender.” El Zeidy (2006, p. 456) is also of the opinion that “the national judge 
should not be competent to decline jurisdiction or stay proceedings at this point” (as is the case in the 
British ICC implementation act, see ibid. and n. 190), even though he admits that, because Art. 59 of 
the ICC Statute has not arranged anything in this respect, national laws (such as the ICC 
implementation acts of New Zealand, Australia and South Africa, see ibid.), may provide otherwise, see 
ibid., p. 455: “The apparent shortcoming of Article 59(2)(b) and (c) lies in the fact that the paragraphs 
lack any reference to a remedy in case of a state’s failure to comply, thus leaving this problem to be 
resolved by the national authorities of the state. This leaves the national judge with wide discretionary 
powers to rule on the legality of the process (yet excluding the grounds set out in Article 58(1)(a) and 
(b)). For example, a manifest procedural error such as unlawful arrest and detention, or a violation of 
the person’s rights, or any form of illegal rendition may sometimes result in a decision by the 
competent authorities to release the person in question [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (It may be 
interesting to note that El Zeidy, after these words, states (in n. 29) that “[t]his may prompt the Court to 
decline to exercise jurisdiction” and then refers to the male captus discussion, mentioning both the bene 
detentus cases of Eichmann and Alvarez-Machain and the male detentus cases of Hartley, Ebrahim and 
Toscanino.) Hall argues that the judicial authority can award reparations in the case of violations, but 
that “neither the determination by the national judicial authority that the suspect’s rights were violated 
nor the remedies it adopted could prevent surrender to the Court.” (Hall 2008 B, p. 1152.) It may, 
however, be good to note that Hall, when writing about the possible forms of reparation, also refers to 
restitution. As shown in Subsection 4.1 of Chapter III, where – it must be noted – reparation was not 
used in the human rights context but in the context of State responsibility, restitution means the re-
establishment of the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed. Restitution in the 
case of an unlawful arrest could thus mean the release of the unlawfully arrested person. That would 
mean (if Hall also accepts this reparation/remedy in the case of an unlawful arrest) that the release does 
not mean that the person will not be surrendered to the ICC. After all, whatever form of reparation 
(including restitution which may mean the release of the unlawfully arrested person) is chosen, it will 
not lead, according to him, to the non-surrender of the suspect to the ICC. Be that as it may, lesser 
forms of reparation, such as compensation, in any case seem to be a possibility, see Oosterveld, Perry 
and McManus 2002, p. 785 (writing about the Swiss cooperation law with the ICC): “The Swiss Law 
provides compensation for unjustified detention. The procedures and conditions for awards of 
compensation for the unjustified detention of persons subject to arrest and surrender to the ICC are the 
same as those provided in Switzerland under its federal law [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
188 Zappalà (2002 A, p. 1183) welcomes Art. 55 of the ICC Statute (“These provisions are certainly the 
most advanced text on the protection of pre-trial rights of persons during international criminal 
investigations. No such provisions were contained in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, nor are 








drafting history of this provision will be examined) and that at least one judicial 
authority, be it a national or international one, should be able to grant such a remedy 
if the suspect is not to become the victim of a process which is fragmented over two 
or more legal systems – a situation which can very easily occur.189  
The competent judicial authority could hereby refer to the important status of the 
remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest and detention, see the habeas 
corpus rights of Articles 9, paragraph 4 of the ICCPR and 5, paragraph 4 of the 
ECHR.190  
                                                                                                                                              
indisputable that, in the ICC Statute, there has been a clear attempt to improve the protection of rights 
relating to the administration of criminal justice, on the assumption that this is one of the parameters 
that will be examined in evaluating the fairness of the proceedings before the ICC.”), but also criticises 
the most interesting (at least for the purpose of this book) provision here, para. 1 (d). However, he does 
not criticise the fact that the remedy of release is missing; he criticises the fact that the provision is in 
fact too faithful to other international texts (which, to a certain extent, is true, but also untrue given the 
fact that the remedy of release is missing). (The other remedy in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention 
(compensation) is also missing in this article, but it can be found in another article, namely in Art. 85, 
para. 1 of the ICC Statute.) See ibid., pp. 1197-1198: “[I]ts main defect is in its being too faithful to the 
other international texts. In particular, this fidelity becomes a defect when the ICC norm refers to other 
rules of the Statute without explicitly specifying which rules (‘on such grounds and in accordance with 
such procedures as are established in the Statute’). While this kind of drafting was necessary in 
international instruments concerning interstate judicial cooperation as the drafters could not be aware of 
the content of national laws on arrest and detention, the same reasoning does not apply to the Statute. 
Hence, it does not seem appropriate to refer to the criteria set forth in the Statute, without referring 
either to the criteria themselves or to the article(s) where they are expressed. As it stands the rule does 
not contain any precise content and it is therefore necessary to look at other norms of the Statute to 
identify the precise regulation to be applied in such cases. The grounds for arrest and concrete 
guarantees for persons arrested are provided for in the Statute elsewhere.” (And then, reference is made 
to Art. 58 of the ICC Statute.) See also ibid., p. 1202: “Finally, a substantial criticism may be raised to 
the regulation of the rights of individuals in the ICC Statute. It relates to the issue of personal liberty. In 
spite of the generally very advanced model in terms of protection of individual rights, the protection of 
the right to liberty does not seem sufficiently developed. The normative framework for measures for 
provisional detention should have been more detailed. The Statute, although respectful at least of the 
minimum requirements, more for its silence than for express norms, comes close to abridging 
international human rights standards. It can be affirmed that in the field of the right to liberty and the 
issue of provisional detention, the evolution from the Nuremberg model towards more developed forms 
of international criminal justice has been less remarkable [original footnote omitted, ChP].” The 
footnote in question (40) reads: “Naturally, this can be explained by the peculiar nature of these 
Tribunals, the absence of enforcement agents, the difficulties in securing the presence of defendants and 
so on. This, however, in spite being a serious problem should not be a justification for contrasts with 
internationally recognized standards to be applied in the administration of criminal justice.” 
189 Cf. also Klip 1997, p. 309, writing on the inter-State context and the ECHR: “The European 
Convention on Human Rights was drafted on the presumption that all implementation and applicability 
of the law is a responsibility of a single (clearly identified) state. The developments described no longer 
correspond to that presumption. States can also cooperate in a violation of the Convention. It seems fair 
to say that, the more states are responsible for ensuring the guarantees of the Convention, the less 
protection exists in reality [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
190 For another view, see Rastan 2008, p. 433: “The role of national bodies in relation to Court requests, 
moreover, is strictly confined. In arrest proceedings, for example, while the judicial authorities of the 
custodial state are to determine whether proper process has been served and the arrested person’s rights 
have been respected, they may not examine the legality of the warrant itself or rule on a habeas corpus 
challenge.” See also Samuels 2006, p. 19, writing about the International Criminal Court Act 2001 








The competent judicial authority may even decide that the stronger remedy of 
refusal to surrender (note again that a release does not preclude the re-arrest and 
hence the surrender) may be appropriate, for example, in the (admittedly rather 
theoretical but not inconceivable) case that the competent judicial authority has 
credible information that the ICC itself is responsible for a male captus operation. 
Furthermore, it may also argue that Article 59 of the ICC Statute only stipulates 
minimum requirements191 and that it cannot be prevented from granting greater 
protection in the field of due process/human rights.192  
What should also be taken into account is the previously mentioned point (see 
footnote 34 and accompanying text) which can be connected to the concepts of 
inability and unwillingness; very often, the State which has to surrender a person to 
the ICC is considered unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute a certain case 
itself. Although this may not necessarily mean that that State is also unable or 
unwilling to cooperate with the ICC, there may still be a considerable overlap. 
Now, if a State is clearly unwilling to cooperate with the ICC, it could, of course, 
abuse Article 59 of the ICC Statute and argue that a person, even if this is not the 
case, was not arrested in accordance with the proper process or that the person’s 
rights were not respected, and that this determination should lead to that person’s 
release or even a refusal to surrender.193 In such cases, one may be tempted to argue 
that it should not be up to the national authorities to grant far-reaching remedies or 
even to review the arrest and detention,194 see also footnote 119 of Chapter VII.  
                                                                                                                                              
the Prosecutor will then issue a warrant, which must be endorsed in a pre-trial ICC chamber, requesting 
the Member State where the accused happens to be to be arrested and surrendered. The Member State, 
i.e. in the UK the Secretary of State, must comply; in effect the surrender will be automatic. The 
suspect has certain rights (…) [b]ut the warrant cannot be challenged on the merits. (…) The UK court 
will simply make a delivery order and he will be handed over. Reliance upon the Bail Act, habeas 
corpus, judicial review or Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights will not avail, 
provided that the ICC powers have been complied with. A Pinochet-type case lasting many months and 
going to the highest court in the land will not happen.” Indeed, in Chapter 7 of this Act, one can read in 
Part 2 (‘Arrest and Delivery of Persons’) under 5 (‘Proceedings for Delivery Order’), para. 8: “If the 
court determines (a) that the person has not been lawfully arrested in pursuance of the warrant, or (b) 
that the person’s rights have not been respected, it shall make a declaration or declarator to that effect, 
but may not grant any other relief.” (See also n. 187.) 
191 See Young 2001, p. 341. 
192 It should, by the way, be noted that Art. 119 of the ICC Statute (‘Settlement of disputes’) does not 
seem to jeopardise the possibility of a State granting remedies obstructing the surrender of the suspect. 
Although the ICC may, after the State has notified the ICC that it cannot surrender the person in 
question and after consultations, determine that the State in question is nevertheless obliged to 
surrender the person, this State can still refuse to do so. In other words: Art. 119 of the ICC Statute 
cannot force a State to surrender a person: it only gives the ICC the power to have the final say in 
settling the dispute. This means that the ICC, pursuant to Artt. 119 and 87, para. 7 of the ICC Statute, 
can make a finding that the State in question has failed to comply with the request to cooperate by the 
Court and refer the matter to the ASP or, where the UNSC referred the matter to the Court, to the 
UNSC. 
193 Cf. the concerns of the ICTY Prosecutor in Todorović and Nikolić, see ns. 344 and 476 of Chapter 
VI. 
194 Gillett (2008, p. 23, writing about the topic of “assisted arrests”, arrests executed by other States or 
international forces, see also n. 56) suggests with respect to “unable” States that the procedure of Art. 








One could think here of the situation in Darfur. Even though Sudan may be 
obliged, pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, to “cooperate fully” 
with the ICC (which may195 mean it should follow the normal arrest and surrender 
provisions that apply to States Parties), “Sudan has always openly expressed its 
dissatisfaction with the Court and its intention not to cooperate”.196 Sluiter very 
clearly points to the dangers of abusing Article 59 of the ICC Statute in such 
situations: 
 
Elsewhere[197] I argue that this provision – the purpose of which is laudable, namely 
improving the protection of arrested persons in the custodial state – may in the hands 
of uncooperative states turn out to be a Trojan horse. Article 59 grants arrested 
individuals a number of rights, but the question is whether, in case these rights are 
violated, domestic courts can take binding and final decisions as to the appropriate 
remedy. For example, if Sudanese police officers do not comply with the proper 
procedural rules (Article 59(2)(b)), can the competent court decide that the arrested 
person has to be released, with prejudice to the arresting authorities? Article 59 does 
not provide for such a far-reaching remedy, but does not exclude it either. It does, 
however, allow for granting interim release pending the surrender process, and the 
ICC appears not to be able to exercise much control over this. In a way, it is a 
paradox that the state that is generally uncooperative is expected to implement in 
good faith the protection of Article 59; it is almost an invitation for abuse [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].198 
                                                                                                                                              
of substantial state collapse, where an assisted arrest would generally be envisaged, it is unlikely that 
the competent authorities in the territorial state would be operational. However, the failure to accord the 
accused with such an initial appearance would be a significant breach of the provisions of the Statute. 
Consequently, if, following an assisted arrest, the initial appearance could not be held either in the 
regular courts or in a specially constituted tribunal in the territorial state, then, as a fallback position, it 
could be held on the territory of the state making the arrest. This possibility is left open through the 
Statute’s use of the term “custodial State” in Article 59, rather than the term “the State on the territory 
of which a person may be found” as is used in relation to transfers of requests for arrest [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” 
195 The exact meaning of these words is, however, unfortunately unclear, see Sluiter 2008 B, pp. 876ff. 
Sluiter further shows that this uncertainty may also have its effect on a person’s right to liberty and 
security, see ibid., pp. 877-878: “An individual enjoys the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest 
and detention. This implies that any deprivation of liberty should take place ‘in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law’; at a minimum, procedures must have a legal basis and correspond to the 
requirements of foreseeability and accessibility. One may wonder whether this standard is met when the 
arrest and detention ultimately hinge on the vague aspiration of ‘full cooperation’, without further 
concretization. In any event, an arrested person is deprived of adequate opportunity to challenge arrest 
and subsequent surrender if he cannot even have the slightest clue as to the content of the obligations 
incumbent upon Sudan [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
196 Ibid., p. 873. For instance, even when he was not yet under investigation by the ICC himself, 
“President Omar Bashir took an oath “thrice in the name of Almighty Allah that I shall never hand any 
Sudanese national to a foreign court.”” (E. Reeves, ‘Darfur and the International Criminal Court’, 
Middle East Report Online, 29 April 2005, available at: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero042905.html.) 
As noted above (see n. 47 and accompanying text), this is different for the matter of the LRA leaders as 
Sudan has signed a memorandum of understanding with the ICC pledging to hand over these persons to 
The Hague. 
197 See Sluiter 2009, p. 468. 








Sluiter therefore concludes, and it is hard not to agree with him, that 
 
Part 9 is not a very helpful legal tool in obtaining cooperation from a state like 
Sudan. For the future, the Assembly of States Parties would be well advised to re-
assess Part 9 in light of the Court’s experiences with the Darfur situation. Undeniably 
in my view, more corrective mechanisms must be inserted in relation to clearly 
uncooperative states.199 
 
A view that is linked to the above-mentioned “unable or unwilling” formula is that 
in any case, whatever the situation may be at the national level, the ICC – if the 
suspect asks for this or when the ICC itself is aware of certain irregularities – 
should also check the correctness of the arrest and surrender procedures at the 
national level. This is because it may very well be the case that, if it is determined 
by the ICC that the State in question is unable to investigate or prosecute a case 
itself, the State’s national legal system may be in ruins. In fact, this is not so 
unusual in the conflict zones or post-conflict zones in which the ICC is 
investigating. In this context, one can wonder how thorough the national check 
pursuant to Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute will be.200 In addition, one 
can imagine that a State will be under considerable pressure from the international 
community to surrender the person in its custody to the ICC as soon as possible. 
Hence, it may at least be wise – but probably also legally mandatory under certain 
circumstances; the following chapters will examine this last point in more detail – if 
the ICC judges were also to check for themselves, thereby functioning as an extra 
safety net, whether the national arrest and detention have been executed as they 
should have been and if not, to grant the suspect the appropriate remedies.201  
                                                          
199 Ibid., p. 883. Sluiter therefore recommends, among other things, that “the Assembly of States Parties 
should recognize that Part 9 of the Statute is ill-suited for (i) Security Council referrals affecting states 
non-parties and (ii) uncooperative states. It is advisable to amend the Statute in two respects. First, a 
degree of flexibility regarding the cooperation law applicable in case of Security Council referrals is 
fully justified. Second, the Statute must provide for stronger corrective mechanisms in relation to 
uncooperative states. For example (…), the protection offered by Article 59 cannot – even in 
exceptional circumstances, such as an uncooperative state – result in the (interim) release of the arrested 
person.” (Ibid., p. 884.) (Arguably, the word “even” must be deleted here: Art. 59 of the ICC Statute 
clearly permits, and Sluiter also acknowledges this, see ibid., p. 883, an interim release and perhaps also 
a ‘real’ release. However, one can agree with Sluiter that in exceptional cases, such as with 
uncooperative States, these remedies should not be allowed.) Cf. also Henquet 1999, p. 998, writing 
about the cooperation obligations of States in the context of a UNSC referral: “It would have been 
preferable if the drafters of the ICC Statute had made adequate arrangements in Part 9 of the ICC 
Statute.” 
200 See also Sluiter 2006 A, p. 153. 
201 See also Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 644 (“National courts should serve as the first protectors of the 
individual rights of arrested persons, with the ICC serving an important supervisory role.”) and 651, 
where he writes that the ICC Statute “makes the right to liberty and security of persons its primary 
concern by imposing clear obligations on the arresting and detaining state. The respect for this right in 
practice depends on the question of whether the arresting and detaining state and the ICC can mutually 
supervise their respective activities. Thus, the court should supervise the legality of the arrest and 
detention at the national level. The provision of effective legal remedies, if necessary, is an 








A final interesting point in this context is the previously mentioned fact202 that, 
in certain situations, domestic authorities may argue that the national situation is 
one of emergency/war, justifying a certain derogation from human rights 
provisions. In such situations, domestic authorities may be of the opinion that the 
arrest/detention of a suspect was in accordance with the domestic procedures, even 
if these procedures omit human rights provisions. One can question what the ICC 
should do in such situations if it reviews, as an extra safety net, these national 
procedures. In principle, such arrests/detentions cannot indeed be seen as violating 
national law. Nevertheless, one can argue that the ICC should also ensure that every 
suspect in the context of an ICC case receives a minimum of human rights 
protection. See in that respect, for example, Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC 
Statute which states that “[i]n respect of an investigation under this Statute, a 
person: (…) Shall not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, and shall not be 
deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedures as are established in this Statute.” As clarified in footnote 168, the 
reference in this provision to the fact that deprivation of liberty is only possible “in 
accordance with such procedures as are established in this Statute” probably means 
that all the arrest and detention provisions in the ICC Statute, including Article 59 
of the ICC Statute, which, in turn, refers to, among other things, national procedural 
law, must be complied with before one can speak of a proper deprivation of liberty 
in the context of the ICC. Hence, in reviewing whether this human right has been 
complied with in the context of an ICC case, ICC judges should not only check 
whether the national procedures (which may deviate from the normal procedures 
                                                                                                                                              
Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Decision on the powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber to review proprio motu the pre-trial 
detention of Germain Katanga’ (Urgent, Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/07, 18 March 2008, p. 8: 
“[A]ccording to articles 55, 57 and 67, one of the functions of the Chamber is to be the ultimate 
guarantor of the rights of the Defence, including the right “not to be deprived of his or her liberty 
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established in the Statute””. 
Note that Art. 67 of the ICC Statute (‘Rights of the accused’), strictly speaking, only applies to accused, 
to persons of whom the charges have been confirmed, to persons at the actual trial (see also n. 30 of 
Chapter I). However, it is also clear that some elements of this provision have a pre-trial dimension. 
See, for example, Rule 121 of the ICC RPE (‘Proceedings before the confirmation hearing’), para. 1: 
“A person subject to a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear under article 58 shall appear before the 
Pre-Trial Chamber, in the presence of the Prosecutor, promptly upon arriving at the Court. Subject to 
the provisions of articles 60 and 61, the person shall enjoy the rights set forth in article 67.” See also 
Schabas 2008, p. 1251: “[R]ights during an investigation are set out in a distinct provision of the 
Statute. Nevertheless, the phrase “in the determination of any charge” is essentially identical to the 
wording of the international models, such as article 6 para. 1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The European Court of Human Rights considers this to be “the official notification given to an 
individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence” or an 
act that has “the implication of such an allegation and which likewise substantially affects the situation 
of the suspect”. An individual might become “substantially affected”, to borrow the Strasbourg 
terminology, once a State party has asked that a case be examined, or upon the application by the 
Prosecutor to initiate an investigation. If notions of complementarity are factored in, the right may even 
be extended to encompass proceedings under domestic law prior to exercise of jurisdiction of the Court 
[emphasis in original and original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See also n. 261. 








because of the emergency situation) have been complied with. They must also 
check whether the arrest/detention in general can be seen as non-arbitrary. These 
general words, including the still-to-discuss paragraph 3 of Article 21 of the ICC 
Statute (see the next chapter), can be used by the ICC judges to ensure that every 
suspect receives the same minimum human rights protection, whatever the domestic 
situation may be.203   
The above exposition shows that it is difficult to come up with a clear-cut 
solution to the problems engendered by Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute. 
As previously explained, much will depend on the national situation and how a 
State views its duties vis-à-vis the ICC. Nevertheless, one can agree with most 
authors that States should be very reluctant to refuse the surrender of a suspect. 
Even though the national competent judicial authority is, of course, in the best 
position to consider the national regulations, the ICC is seemingly best positioned 
to consider all the different elements playing a role in the process of an arrest and 
surrender. Hence, it would be very unfortunate if the ICC were not to even get the 
chance to consider these matters. The fact that under certain circumstances States 
could abuse Article 59 of the ICC Statute in refusing surrender also argues in favour 
of such a position. If a State has determined pursuant to Article 59, paragraph 2 of 
the ICC Statute that the arrest of the suspect was not in accordance with the proper 
procedure or that the rights of the suspect were not respected, but nevertheless 
decides to surrender the person to the ICC, its determinations can then be taken into 
account at the ICC level so that the ICC judges can consider them (and accord 
appropriate remedies).204 
                                                          
203 Sluiter notes that “one can imagine a difference in degree of the ICC’s supervisory role; clearly, its 
supervision of respect for national process should be far more marginal than supervision of the 
internationally protected rights of each arrested person.” (Sluiter 2009, p. 472.) As clarified in the main 
text, it is indeed true that the ICC judges should focus on human rights (so that every suspect receives 
the same minimum protection) rather than on national procedures (which may, after all, differ from 
State to State and which may be very low in protection because of a derogation caused by an 
emergency situation), see ibid., p. 474: “In my view, the purpose of Article 59 is not only to ensure the 
application of a (national) legal framework to the implementation of arrest warrants, but also the 
application of a framework and overall practice which are consistent with international human rights 
standards. A different view, dramatically decreases protection and subjects an arrested person to the 
whims of domestic law and approaches. As these may vary for each State, we furthermore may be 
confronted with unacceptable inequality in treatment.” Nevertheless, as also clarified in the main text, 
one must not forget either that supervising human rights may also, de facto, involve a review of 
national procedures. For example, if the ICC wants to check whether a suspect’s right to liberty and 
security was not violated, it must also examine whether the arrest/detention at the national level was 
executed in conformity with the correct (national) procedures. In addition, a focus on human rights is 
good, but not enough. As earlier submitted in this study, it may very well be that (serious) irregularities 
occur which need to be remedied, but which may, strictly speaking, not be seen as proper human rights 
violations. (One could hereby think of an abduction performed by private individuals. The judge 
reviewing this male captus may be of the opinion that private individuals cannot violate human rights 
and thus that no human rights violation has occurred, see n. 123 of Chapter VII and Subsection 3.2 of 
Chapter III.) 
204 See the already-mentioned situation in the UK as described in n. 190. See also Bekou and Shah 
2006, pp. 528-529, describing the comparable approach taken by Uganda: “S.30 of the Ugandan Bill 








Nevertheless, certain extreme circumstances – and obvious problems such as the 
fact that the person arrested is not the person in which the ICC is interested – may 
also lead to justified refusals on the part of the custodial State, for example, in the – 
again highly unlikely but not impossible – situation that the suspect arrived in the 
custody of the custodial State because of an abduction orchestrated by the ICC. 
Similarly, the State may refuse surrender on the basis of the Soering and Naletilić 
jurisprudence,205 even though it is expected/hoped that this will not happen. If, 
however, the State ultimately decides not to surrender the person in question, it 
should try to ensure that the person is brought to justice elsewhere. The fact that the 
State deems the ICC not to be the appropriate authority for adjudication – for 
example, because of the two above-mentioned extreme circumstances – does not 
mean that the person in question may then not be judged by a national court which 
also has jurisdiction over that person and which has nothing to do with the 
deficiencies of the ICC, cf. also the point made earlier that a male detentus outcome 
cannot be equated with impunity of the suspect. (In that case, the surrendering court 
may perhaps request the other national court to take into account the due 
process/human rights violations committed at the pre-trial stage and to grant 
appropriate remedies.) 
Although a refusal may thus be seen as an exception, a State may very well be 
right to argue that a release (which does not preclude a re-arrest and surrender) may 
constitute the correct legal remedy if one accepts that human rights law, which, in 
principle, includes the remedy of release as can be found in Articles 9, paragraph 4 
of the ICCPR and 5, paragraph 4 of the ECHR, is to be taken into account when 
looking at the scope of Article 59 of the ICC Statute. Nevertheless, judges may also 
be of the opinion in such circumstances, see also earlier chapters of this book, that 
the remedy of release is problematic (because it may be seen as an over-simplified 
pro forma remedy for an unlawful detention and because it may lead to a suspect 
absconding) and should therefore be avoided. Judges may then argue that they will 
surrender the suspect instead, while requesting the ICC that the suspect receives an 
                                                                                                                                              
the lawfulness of arrest and determine whether the rights of the arrestee were respected or not. Should 
the magistrate determine that the arrest was conducted unlawfully or that the rights of the individual 
were violated, then a declaration should be made to that effect. Such a declaration should then be 
transmitted to the Court, giving the Court the opportunity to assess the allegations and, should they be 
upheld, to decide upon the appropriate remedy. The magistrate ‘may not grant any other form of relief’, 
apart from requiring an explanation for the unlawful behaviour. Therefore, under Ugandan legislation, 
surrender will still go ahead [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Bekou and Shah very much favour this 
approach (see ibid., p. 529): “[M]any States Parties have not opted to use such processes. Instead, there 
is a tendency to deal with domestic procedural and rights issues themselves, rather than submit such 
issues for adjudication by the Court. This is understandable in the sense that to allow the Court 
effectively to pass judgment on the failures of a domestic system is an intrusion into the realms of State 
sovereignty which is, of course, zealously guarded. Such an approach is only compliant with the Rome 
Statute if the remedies for a rights violation do not preclude surrender to the Court. [But see n. 181, 
ChP.] The Ugandan method is clearly preferable and should be adopted by other African States. This 
approach allows the Court to determine whether a violation of the individual’s rights is so grave as to 
constitute an abuse of process that would render a trial against the interests of justice, or, in less severe 
situations, compensation to be awarded [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 








appropriate remedy for the pre-trial irregularities, taking all the different aspects of 
the case into account. 
 
3.3 The arrest and surrender regime Part III  
 
Now that paragraph 2 of Article 59 of the ICC Statute has been examined in more 
detail, it is time to look at its other paragraphs (and at the remaining provisions of 
the ICC arrest and surrender regime). Paragraphs 3-6 of Article 59 of the ICC 
Statute address a person’s right to apply for interim release/bail206 pending 
surrender (this is different from interim release pending trial, which will be 
discussed infra).207 The fact that there exists such a possibility on paper constitutes 
an important deviation from the ‘pure’ vertical arrest and surrender regimes of the 
ICTY and ICTR where it is, in principle, impossible for national authorities to 
release a person pending surrender/transfer.208 Yet it is fair to wonder how often 
this will actually happen in the future. According to paragraph 4 of this provision, 
“the competent authority in the custodial State shall consider whether, given the 
gravity of the alleged crimes, there are urgent and exceptional circumstances to 
justify interim release”.209 The words “exceptional circumstances”, of course, are 
reminiscent of the criticised Rule 65 of the ICTY/ICTR RPE which also contained 
(until 1999 and 2003, respectively) this requirement.210 In addition, the national 
authority must also take into account the ICC’s recommendations relating to the 
request for interim release pending surrender.211 One can imagine that these 
conditions will not easily lead to an interim release. However, as also explained in 
Chapter VI, even though the formulation of this provision may be problematic212 
                                                          
206 See Prost 2005, p. 81.  
207 See Art. 59, para. 3 of the ICC Statute: “The person arrested shall have the right to apply to the 
competent authority in the custodial State for interim release pending surrender.” 
208 See Swart 2002 A, p. 1254, Sluiter 2003 C, p. 623 and Hall 2008 B, p. 1153. See also n. 1028 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
209 The remainder of this paragraph stipulates that the competent authority in the custodial State shall 
consider “whether necessary safeguards exist to ensure that the custodial State can fulfil its duty to 
surrender the person to the Court. It shall not be open to the competent authority of the custodial State 
to consider whether the warrant of arrest was properly issued in accordance with article 58, paragraph 1 
(a) and (b).” This last point is very important and has already been discussed earlier, namely that the 
competent authority may not perform the substantive legality check of the habeas corpus concept; the 
authority may not examine whether the arrest was made on the correct grounds. This is the domain of 
the ICC alone.   
210 See n. 97 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
211 See Art. 59, para. 5 of the ICC Statute: “The Pre-Trial Chamber shall be notified of any request for 
interim release and shall make recommendations to the competent authority in the custodial State. The 
competent authority in the custodial State shall give full consideration to such recommendations, 
including any recommendations on measures to prevent the escape of the person, before rendering its 
decision.” The influence of the ICC on this issue can also be identified after the release has been 
granted, see para. 6 of Art. 59 of the ICC Statute: “If the person is granted interim release, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber may request periodic reports on the status of the interim release.” 
212 But see Sluiter 2009, p. 469: “[T]he reference to ‘urgent and exceptional circumstances to justify 
interim release’ is reminiscent of the ICTY and ICTR approach to pre-trial detention as a rule. 








and may receive the same criticism as the older version of Rule 65 of the 
ICTY/ICTR RPE,213 one can expect that with a different provision on interim 
release pending surrender, the factual outcome may very well also be that detention 
is the rule and release the exception. And furthermore, the fact that the competent 
authority will not quickly provisionally release a person pending surrender in the 
context of ICC proceedings, may very well have justified grounds, such as social 
disturbance and the risk of absconding, grounds which have their origin in the 
seriousness of the person’s alleged crimes. 
A few observations from Swart about the detention pending surrender which 
deserve to be mentioned here is that first, “[t]he rights of the person being held in 
custody and the treatment he will receive are determined by the laws of the 
requested State”;214 secondly, that “the time spent in detention by the convicted 
person on the territory of the requested State in accordance with an order of the 
Court must be deduced from a sentence of imprisonment”215 and thirdly, that  
 
Article 85(1) grants an enforceable right to compensation to anyone who has been the 
victim of unlawful arrest or detention. It does not seem to matter whether the 
unlawfulness of arrest or detention was due to the conduct of the Court or that of the 
requested State.216  
 
                                                                                                                                              
Article 58 that it is necessary to arrest the person concerned, and any deviation from that decision 
should be based on very strong grounds.” 
213 See Vandermeersch 2004, p. 153, n. 116 (writing about Art. 59, para. 4 of the ICC Statute and its 
counterpart in the Belgian (draft) Implementation Law): “In other words, detention is regarded as the 
rule to which release is the exception: this is at odds with municipal criminal law on pre-trial 
detention.” This is also noted, for example, by Oosterveld, Perry and McManus (2002, pp. 782-783) 
with respect to the Swiss cooperation law: “The general principle is that persons should be kept in 
detention pending surrender to the Court [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Khan 2008, p. 
1162, discussing the “onerous requirements of Article 59(4)”: “Article 59 (detention in the custodial 
state) effectively creates a presumption in favour of custody by making detention the norm unless 
“there are urgent and exceptional circumstances to justify interim release” [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” Prost (2005, p. 81) writes that “[t]he test applicable to such bail applications is a high one and 
probably varies from the normal tests applicable to common crimes under domestic laws.” However, 
the test may not be that different from the national level if the national judge is not dealing with 
common crimes but with serious crimes, see Swart (2002 A, p. 1254), who notes that the fact that the 
competent authority must “balance the gravity of the alleged crimes against any urgent and exceptional 
circumstances that may justify interim release” reflects “current practices in the field of extradition”.  
214 Swart 2002 A, p. 1255. 
215 Ibid. (Note that Art. 78, para. 2 of the ICC Statute also states that “[t]he Court may deduct any time 
otherwise spent in detention in connection with conduct underlying the crime.”) 
216 Ibid. See also Sluiter 2009, p. 468: “[W]hen the procedure of Article 59 is not followed – or not 
followed correctly – there is a direct basis for the applicability of Article 85, in my view. The latter 
provision stipulates that ‘anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation’. Put in these broad terms, adopting verbatim the wording of Article 
9 (5) ICCPR, it should not matter who was responsible for the unlawful arrest, and certainly applies in 
my opinion to direct violation of the Court’s own statutory provision [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 








The broad responsibility enclosed in this provision, which will not be found in the 
context of the ICTY and ICTR,217 and which will be returned to in the remainder of 
this book, is to be welcomed since it minimises the chance that a suspect falls into a 
legal vacuum caused by the fragmentation of his criminal process over two or more 
legal systems. 
Finally, the last paragraph of Article 59 of the ICC Statute states that “[o]nce 
ordered to be surrendered by the custodial State, the person shall be delivered to the 
Court as soon as possible”.218   
One can imagine that a person who believes that his rights were not respected at 
this stage but whose claims were rejected by the custodial State, may try to argue 
before human rights bodies such as the ECtHR and the HRC that the custodial 
State, in rejecting these claims, violated its obligations under human rights treaties. 
Much attention has already been paid to the human rights context and the view of 
the human rights courts on the right to liberty and security and the right not to be 
arrested/detained so at this point, it will suffice to establish whether litigation before 
these human rights bodies is in fact possible in the context of the ICC surrender 
phase.219 In addition, one might wonder what would happen if these bodies were 
indeed to determine that the custodial State violated certain human rights provisions 
to which a suspect was entitled. Would this also have an effect on the ICC 
proceedings, for example? Finally, the question arises as to whether ICC decisions 
themselves can also be assessed by such supervisory bodies.      
First of all, it would seem, naturally taking into account that much also depends 
on the situation in the custodial State,220 that a suspect may indeed file a complaint 
in this context221 but that the tribunal in question will probably not wait for a 
decision to be rendered. The Milošević v. The Netherlands case may serve as an 
example. As was already explained in Chapter VI, after he was transferred to the 
ICTY on 29 June 2001, Milošević “brought summary civil proceedings (kort 
geding) against the Netherlands State before the President of the Regional Court 
(arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague”.222 He asked the Court primarily to 
                                                          
217 See also Gordon 2007, p. 669: “Article 85 of the Rome Statute recognizes a degree of ICC “cradle-
to-grave supervisory power” by granting an “enforceable right to compensation” for anyone who has 
been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention. Once again, there is no comparable provision in the 
statutes or rules of the ad hoc Tribunals [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
218 Art. 59, para. 7 of the ICC Statute. 
219 Although this topic is discussed here, in the context of the provisions where a person has not yet 
been surrendered to The Hague, litigation before the human rights bodies may perhaps also take place 
after a person’s surrender to the ICC, see El Zeidy 2006, p. 460. 
220 Obviously, a State needs to be a party to a certain human rights instrument. One may also think of 
the question whether, if so, individuals can file complaints with the supervisory body in question. 
221 See Sluiter 2003 C, p. 625: “[D]epending on the custodial state, the arrested person may request the 
international human rights courts or supervisory mechanisms to review the arrest and surrender in light 
of the state’s obligations under certain human rights treaties [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
222 ECtHR (Second Section), ‘Decision as to the admissibility of Application No. 77631/01 by 
Slobodan Milošević against the Netherlands’, 19 March 2002, p. 3. For the Dutch kort geding, see 
Arrondissementsrechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, Sector Civiel Recht – President, Vonnis in kort geding van 
31 augustus 2001, gewezen in de zaak met rolnummer KG 01/975 van: Slobodan Milošević tegen de 








order the defendant, the Dutch State, to release him unconditionally because, among 
other things, “[t]he so-called Tribunal, elements in the Serbian government and the 
defendant blatantly kidnapped and abducted him in a coordinated action, which 
must be regarded as a flagrant breach of his human rights”.223 However, the 
President of the District Court in The Hague determined that the Netherlands had 
transferred its jurisdiction to hear an application for release from detention to the 
Tribunal and hence that this, or any other, Dutch court did not have jurisdiction to 
decide on Milošević’s application for release.224  
Such a decision would probably also be rendered in the ICC context if that 
context is confronted by a similar case. After all, with the exception that Dutch law 
would be applicable to the pre-surrender phase (see Article 59, paragraphs 1 and 2 
of the ICC Statute), once the suspect has been surrendered to the ICC, he can no 
longer apply to the Dutch authorities for release.225  
To return to the ICTY context, after the decision of the District Court, Milošević 
“lodged an appeal against this judgment, but withdrew it again as of 17 January 
2002”,226 apparently because he believed that it would be to no avail since the 
District Court had stated that the Dutch courts (plural!) have no jurisdiction to 
decide on the application. Finally, on 20 December 2001, Milošević’s counsel 
lodged a series of complaints with the ECtHR,227 but the European Court quickly 
declared his entire application inadmissible, explaining that domestic remedies had 
not been exhausted. Although Milošević claimed that the judgment of the District 
Court (which stated that Dutch courts have no jurisdiction to decide on the 
application) showed that no adequate and effective domestic remedies were 
available, the ECtHR stated that  
 
the applicant did not make use of the opportunities offered by Netherlands law to 
challenge this finding; he withdrew his appeal to the Court of Appeal and in so doing 
also deprived himself of the possibility of lodging a subsequent appeal on points of 
law to the Supreme Court. The Court reiterates that the existence of mere doubts as 
                                                                                                                                              
nat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/012854276cd2950dc1256da20051ac68!OpenDocument. 
See finally also Strijards 2001, p. 97. 
223 The English translation of the Dutch kort geding at: http://icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/012854276cd2950dc1256da20051ac68!OpenDocument. 
224 See ibid.  
225 See Bevers, Blokker and Roording 2003, p. 151: “Article 88 of the ICC Implementation Act, like 
Article 17 of the Implementation Act for the ICTY, provides that Dutch legislation is not applicable to 
detention by and on behalf of the Court in its premises.” Sluiter (2004 A, p. 173, n. 50) wonders 
“whether this position is in line with recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, on 
the basis of which a certain ‘residual responsibility’ could be established for the ‘host-state’ in respect 
of human rights violations committed by the international organisations on its territory.” This point will 
also be discussed in the main text (and in n. 243) in a few moments. 
226 ECtHR (Second Section), ‘Decision as to the admissibility of Application No. 77631/01 by 
Slobodan Milošević against the Netherlands’, 19 March 2002, p. 4. 
227 Milošević claimed that the following rights of the ECHR had been violated: Art. 5, paras. 1 (among 
other things, because of his unlawful transfer from the FRY to The Hague), 2 and 4, Art. 6, paras. 1, 2 








to the prospects of success of a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not 
a valid reason for failing to exhaust domestic remedies (...).228 
 
The ICTY had not adjourned its proceedings pending the ECtHR proceedings229 
and it is to be expected that the ICC will not do so either. However, it is still unclear 
what would have happened if the human rights body in question had determined 
that the surrendering State had violated its human rights obligations. Would this 
also have an effect on the ICC proceedings? This question basically boils down to 
the issue of the extent to which the ICC is bound by decisions from these human 
rights bodies. In principle, the ICC is not bound by these decisions as it is not a 
party to the ECHR/ICCPR.230 Nevertheless, as will also be shown in the next 
chapter, human rights law, and this includes decisions from human rights bodies, 
may still have considerable influence on the ICC proceedings. Therefore, the case 
may not be as clear-cut as initially thought. This point will be further discussed in 
the next chapter.  
A related question is to what extent human rights bodies can review the ICC 
decisions themselves. For example, if a suspect believes that certain ICC decisions 
or procedures have violated his human right to liberty and security, can he then go 
to such supervisory bodies as the HRC and the ECtHR? Although human rights 
law, including decisions from human rights bodies, may influence the decisions of 
the ICC judges, see again the next chapter, these decisions themselves cannot be 
reviewed by the supervisory bodies for consistency. The ICC itself “is not subject to 
the human rights international supervisory mechanisms [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]”.231 This is because “[a]ll supervisory mechanisms regarding human rights 
only receive complaints against states”.232 Klip has criticised this situation233 in the 
                                                          
228 Ibid., p. 6. 
229 See also El Zeidy 2006, p. 461, who likewise refers to the Naletilić case (see n. 174) where “the 
ICTY proceeded with the surrender of the accused to the Tribunal without waiting for a decision of the 
ECHR.” 
230 See also ibid. 
231 Sluiter 2003 C, p. 646. 
232 Klip 1997, p. 301. See also Zappalà 2003, p. 9.  
233 See Klip 1997, p. 310: “It should not be neglected that the [European] Court [of Human Rights] 
itself established an important nexus: “the Convention must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions (…) and it is designed to safeguard the individual in a real and practical way as regards those 
areas with which it deals.” In the light of the developments described in this article, it requires that 
complaints against two or more states concerning international cooperation and complaints against a 
collectivity of states concerning decisions of organisations established by these states, be declared 
admissible. The question of the individual responsibility of a state should be dealt with after 
establishing that a violation of the Convention took place. To declare an application inadmissible on the 
ground that it is not directed against one party but to a collectivity of states (…) would make the 
Convention meaningless for a lot of violations in the field of international criminal law [original 








context of the ICTY/ICTR234 and the (then future) ICC,235 a point that has also been 
aired by Sluiter.236  
One can question whether States, which have responsibilities in the field of 
human rights protection, do not circumvent human rights safeguards by, for 
example, establishing international courts whose decisions cannot be reviewed by 
national courts or supervisory bodies. It is interesting to refer in that respect to the 
1999 case Waite and Kennedy v. Germany before the ECtHR, which involved 
another international organisation, the ESA (European Space Agency). Waite and 
Kennedy complained that Germany had violated Article 6, paragraph 1 of the 
ECHR (which, among other things, states that everyone is entitled to a hearing by a 
tribunal), because “they had been denied access to a court for a determination of 
their dispute with ESA in connection with an issue under German labour law”.237 
Although Waite and Kennedy were able to bring their problem to the attention of 
several German courts, their applications were declared inadmissible as the German 
courts found that ESA could rely on its immunity from their jurisdiction238 – an 
immunity which would also be available to the ICC incidentally.239 The European 
Court wondered whether “this degree of access limited to a preliminary issue was 
sufficient to secure the applicants’ “right to a court””.240 This point also involved 
the matter of immunity from jurisdiction of course. In this context, the European 
Court stressed more generally the importance of immunity from jurisdiction 
accorded to international organisations,241 but also warned:  
                                                          
234 See ibid., pp. 300ff. 
235 See ibid., p. 304. 
236 See, for example, Sluiter 2007, pp. 19-20. Nevertheless, Zappalà (2003, pp. 13-14) argues: “At this 
stage of development of the international community, an institutional relationship between human 
rights monitoring systems and international criminal tribunals or the ICC does not exist, nor is it 
realistic to think it will be set up in the near future. (…) In the international legal order each subsystem 
tends to be self-contained and to operate as a ‘monad’. Additionally, there does not seem to be an 
appropriate international organ to conduct such a review: regional human rights courts, on account of 
their non-universal character, are not suitable as they do not have international legitimacy, while the 
UN Committee does not really operate as a judicial body. The most realistic perspective is to strengthen 
human rights protection within the system and ensure that rules are thoroughly respected both by 
national and international organs. Nonetheless, a monitoring process need not be realized perforce on 
an institutional basis, but may be effectively conducted by States, NGOs, international media, and the 
academic community [original footnote omitted, ChP].”    
237 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, Application No. 26083/94, 
‘Judgment’, 18 February 1999, para. 43. 
238 See ibid., para. 51. 
239 See Bevers, Blokker and Roording 2003, pp. 152-153: “If a suspect appeals to a Dutch court in 
relation to a procedure before the ICC, the Dutch court will be obliged to honour a claim of immunity.” 
240 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, Application No. 26083/94, 
‘Judgment’, 18 February 1999, para. 58. 
241 Ibid., para. 63: “Like the Commission, the Court points out that the attribution of privileges and 
immunities to international organisations is an essential means of ensuring the proper functioning of 
such organisations free from unilateral interference by individual governments. The immunity from 
jurisdiction commonly accorded by States to international organisations under the organisations’ 
constituent instruments or supplementary agreements is a long-standing practice established in the 
interest of the good working of these organisations. The importance of this practice is enhanced by a 








The Court is of the opinion that where States establish international organisations in 
order to pursue or strengthen their cooperation in certain fields of activities, and 
where they attribute to these organisations certain competences and accord them 
immunities, there may be implications as to the protection of fundamental rights. It 
would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention, however, if 
the Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility under the 
Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such attribution. It should be 
recalled that the Convention is intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory rights, 
but rights that are practical and effective. (…) For the Court, a material factor in 
determining whether granting ESA immunity from German jurisdiction is 
permissible under the Convention is whether the applicants had available to them 
reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the 
Convention.242  
 
Hence, much will also depend on the level of human rights protection afforded by 
international organisations in their own proceedings. If this level is adequate, then 
there is no need to doubt the appropriateness of the fact that their decisions cannot 
be reviewed by supervisory bodies. If the protection is inadequate, then the 
possibility cannot be excluded that the Netherlands, as the host State of the ICC, 
can be held internationally responsible for serious violations.243 As the ICC 
instruments give such a prominent place to human rights protection (as Chapter IX 
will show), it is to be expected that the ECtHR, if it ever has to consider this issue, 
will argue that as the ICC proceedings provide sufficient human rights protection, it 
                                                          
242 Ibid., paras. 67-68. 
243 See also Bevers, Blokker and Roording 2003, p. 153: “The [Dutch] Minister of Justice concluded on 
the basis of this case law [Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, ChP] in the context of the ICC 
Implementation Act that the ECHR permits the transit of jurisdiction to an international organization, 
and that state responsibility only arises in exceptional cases in which there is a flagrant and gross 
violation of the ECHR [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Cf. in that respect Sluiter (referring to Waite 
and Kennedy v. Germany, but also to Beer and Regan v. Germany (ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of 
Beer and Regan v. Germany, Application No. 28934/95, ‘Judgment’, 18 February 1999, para. 57) and 
Matthews v. United Kingdom (ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Matthews v. the United Kingdom, 
Application No. 24833/94, ‘Judgment’, 18 February 1999, para. 32)) who writes about the “residual 
responsibility” which “could be established for the ‘host-state’ in respect of human rights violations 
committed by the international organisations on its territory.” (See Sluiter 2004 A, p. 173, n. 50 and n. 
225 of this chapter.) See further Zappalà 2003, pp. 12-13. One may also refer to the Dutch 
Government’s Explanatory Memorandum to the International Criminal Court Implementation Act 
(Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2001-2002, 28 098 (R 1704), Uitvoering van het 
Statuut van het Internationaal Strafhof met betrekking tot de samenwerking met en bijstand aan het 
Internationaal Strafhof en de tenuitvoerlegging van zijn vonnissen (Uitvoeringswet Internationaal 
Strafhof), Nr. 3, Memorie van Toelichting). Here, one can read (at pp. 6-7) that Artt. 9, para. 4 of the 
ICCPR and 5, para. 4 of the ECHR do not oblige the surrendering judge to assess the jurisdiction and 
admissibility of a case before the ICC – in fact, the ICC Statute does not allow it – but that nevertheless 
extraordinary cases may arise in which, because of the surrender of a person to the ICC, a (gross) 
violation of a ECHR right may threaten to materialise. (See also the Naletilić case, see ns. 174 and 
229.) If such a situation occurs, then the Dutch Minister of Justice can take this into account when 
making his decision on the request to surrender. (The fact that the Netherlands, to a certain extent, has 
transferred jurisdiction to the ICC does not relieve it completely from that State’s obligations stemming 








is justified that ICC decisions cannot be challenged before national courts or 
supervisory bodies.244 However, much will perhaps also depend on the actual 
decisions in practice and on whether they actually implement the human rights 
protection provided for in the ICC documents.245 Finally, it must be remarked that 
the host State of the ICC, the Netherlands, has pointed out in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the act regulating its cooperation obligations with the ICC that it 
“reserves the right to review ICC decisions which require the active cooperation of 
the host-state in light of obligations incumbent on the Netherlands under the ECHR 
[original footnote omitted, ChP]”.246 
Going back to the actual arrest and surrender provisions of the ICC, once the 
person is surrendered (via the territories of other States)247 to the Court or appears 
in The Hague voluntarily or pursuant to a summons, “the Pre-Trial Chamber shall 
satisfy itself that the person has been informed of the crimes which he or she is 
alleged to have committed, and of his or her rights under this Statute”.248  
One of these rights is the (already briefly mentioned, see footnote 207 and 
accompanying text) right to interim release pending trial.249 Although Article 60, 
paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute grants this right to any person appearing before the 
Court (even those voluntarily appearing in The Hague), it is arguably only relevant 
for arrested or detained persons as only these can be released. The first sentence of 
Article 60, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute does in that respect arguably not refer to 
a specific situation but to the only situation applicable here: “A person subject to a 
warrant of arrest may apply for interim release pending trial.”  
Be that as it may, if an arrested person applies for interim release pending trial, 
he shall250 only be released (with or without conditions) if the conditions of Article 
58, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute – these are the previously discussed conditions 
                                                          
244 Note that in the Naletilić case, the ECtHR remarked that the ICTY “offers all the necessary 
guarantees including those of impartiality and independence” (see also n. 174). This arguably also goes 
for the ICC. It can even be maintained that the regime of the ICC can be seen as an improvement when 
compared to the regime of the ICTY (and that of the ICTR), see Sluiter 2003 C, p. 647: “The ICC 
Statute appears to offer all the necessary safeguards during the pre-trial, trial and sentence execution 
phases. It is an improvement from the ICTY and ICTR legal frameworks [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]”. 
245 See also ibid., p. 648: “The proof of the pudding will, as always, be in the eating.” 
246 Sluiter 2003 B, pp. 947-948 (and Sluiter 2004 A, p. 172). See Explanatory Memorandum to the 
International Criminal Court Implementation Act (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 
2001-2002, 28 098 (R 1704), Uitvoering van het Statuut van het Internationaal Strafhof met betrekking 
tot de samenwerking met en bijstand aan het Internationaal Strafhof en de tenuitvoerlegging van zijn 
vonnissen (Uitvoeringswet Internationaal Strafhof), Nr. 3, Memorie van Toelichting), p. 46. 
247 See Art. 89, para. 3 of the ICC Statute for more information on the topic of transit. 
248 Art. 60, para. 1 of the ICC Statute. The fact that this article speaks about a person’s appearance 
voluntarily or pursuant to a summons is additional fuel for the uncertainty regarding the idea that a 
summons to appear has anything to do with a voluntary coming to The Hague. See also n. 111.  
249 See Art. 60, para. 1 of the ICC Statute. 
250 There is no discretion here. See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande 
de mise en liberté provisoire de Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”’ (Public Document), [ICC-]01/04-01/06 (OA 








which must be fulfilled if the ICC wants to issue an arrest warrant – are not met.251 
This means that a person can be released if the Pre-Trial Chamber is not satisfied 
that 1) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and 2) the arrest (read: the continued 
detention) of the person appears necessary.252  
To give an example of the second element, in the Lubanga Dyilo case, the Pre-
Trial Chamber found that the suspect’s detention remained necessary for two 
reasons: to ensure his appearance at trial and to prevent him from obstructing the 
proceedings of the Court.253 The Pre-Trial Chamber thereby considered, among 
other things, that  
 
because of the gravity of the crimes with which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is charged, 
there is a substantial risk that he may wish to abscond from the jurisdiction of the 
Court[254] (…) and (…) that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo now knows the identities of 
certain witnesses; that the Prosecution states that if Thomas Lubanga Dyilo were to 
be released and were thus to be in a position to have completely unmonitored 
communications with the outside world, there would be a risk that he would, directly, 
                                                          
251 See Art. 60, para. 2 of the ICC Statute: “A person subject to a warrant of arrest may apply for 
interim release pending trial. If the Pre-Trial Chamber is satisfied that the conditions set forth in article 
58, paragraph 1, are met, the person shall continue to be detained. If it is not so satisfied, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber shall release the person, with or without conditions.” 
252 For example “(i) To ensure the person’s appearance at trial; (ii) To ensure that the person does not 
obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court proceedings; or (iii) Where applicable, to prevent the 
person from continuing with the commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the 
jurisdiction of the Court and which arises out of the same circumstances.” (See Art. 58, para. 1 (b) of 
the ICC Statute.)  
253 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of 
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Application for the interim release of 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 18 October 2006, p. 5. 
254 The Chamber hereby refers to two judgments of the ECtHR, namely Tomasi v. France (ECtHR 
(Chamber), Case of Tomasi v. France, Application No. 12850/87, ‘Judgment’, 27 August 1992, para. 
89) and Mansur v. Turkey (ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Mansur v. Turkey, Application No. 16026/90, 
‘Judgment’, 8 June 1995, para. 52). In the first case, the Court stated with respect to the ground for 
continuing detention ‘seriousness of the alleged offences’ that “[t]he existence and persistence of 
serious indications of the guilt of the person concerned undoubtedly constitute relevant factors, but the 
Court considers, like the Commission, that they cannot alone justify such a long period of pre-trial 
detention.” In the second case, the relevant paragraph is arguably 55 (instead of 52): “52. It falls in the 
first place to the national judicial authorities to ensure that, in a given case, the detention of an accused 
person pending trial does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must examine all the facts 
arguing for or against the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due 
regard to the principle of presumption of innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for individual 
liberty and set them out in their decisions on the applications for release. (…) The persistence of 
reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for 
the validity of the continued detention, but, after a certain lapse of time, it no longer suffices; the Court 
must then establish whether the other grounds cited by the judicial authorities continue to justify the 
deprivation of liberty (…). 55. The Court points out that the danger of an accused’s absconding cannot 
be gauged solely on the basis of the severity of the sentence risked. It must be assessed with reference 
to a number of other relevant factors which may either confirm the existence of a danger of absconding 








or indirectly with the help of others, exert pressure on the witnesses, thus obstructing 
or endangering the court proceedings (…) [original footnotes omitted, ChP].255 
 
One can see here that the gravity of the crimes with which the suspect is charged 
again (see Article 59, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute (regulating the interim release 
pending surrender)) is an element to be taken into account when considering an 
application for interim release, even if the element is referred to less directly in 
Article 60 of the ICC Statute than it is in Article 59 of the ICC Statute.256  
With respect to the first element, the first sentence of Article 60, paragraph 2 of 
the ICC Statute refers to interim release pending trial and, of course, a person with 
respect to whom the Pre-Trial Chamber believes that there are still “reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court” but whose arrest/detention is not deemed necessary (for example, 
because that person has promised – and the judges believe him – that he will show 
up in court anyway), may be granted interim release pending trial. However, even 
though the provision speaks of “interim release pending trial”, the release may also 
be more definite in the sense that it blocks the continuation of the trial). After all, if 
the Pre-Trial Chamber is of the opinion that there are no “reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”, 
then there is, of course, no reason to proceed with the trial. In that case, a person 
should obviously not merely be granted interim release pending trial (because there 
will not be a trial in the future) but a ‘final’ release.  
Every decision on a request for interim release by the Pre-Trial Chamber shall 
be periodically reviewed (at least every 120 days)257 and alongside this, the Pre-
Trial Chamber may also review its decision whenever the person in question or the 
                                                          
255 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Application for the interim release of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 18 October 2006, pp. 5-6. See also ICC, Trial 
Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision reviewing the Trial Chamber’s ruling on the detention of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo in accordance with Rule 118(2)’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 1 February 2008, para. 10: 
“In relation to the requirements of Article 58(1)(b)(i), the Chamber considers that the defendant faces 
grave charges and if released is likely to return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the 
probable consequence that the Court would no longer be able to ensure his attendance at trial. 
Furthermore, the Chamber considers that the defendant is highly unlikely to attend his trial voluntarily. 
For these reasons the Chamber concludes that it is necessary to continue to detain the defendant.” 
256 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté provisoire de 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”’ (Public Document), [ICC-]01/04-01/06 (OA 7), 13 February 2007, para. 136: 
“The Appeals Chamber is not persuaded by the argument of the Appellant that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
should not have taken into account the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed by the Appellant. As 
the Prosecutor correctly notes, the Pre-Trial Chamber did not take into account the gravity of the crimes 
in isolation but as part of its consideration that the Appellant might abscond. If a person is charged with 
grave crimes, the person might face a lengthy prison sentence, which may make the person more likely 
to abscond.” 








Prosecutor requests the Pre-Trial Chamber to do so.258 It is important to understand 
that these reviews will only take place after a decision on a request for interim 
release has been taken. The Pre-Trial Chamber is thus not obliged to review every 
120 days the detention of a suspect who has not first requested interim release.259 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the ICC should disregard the total duration 
of the detention. This ‘assignment’ can be found in the rather vaguely formulated260 
paragraph 4 of Article 60 of the ICC Statute:  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber shall ensure that a person is not detained for an unreasonable 
period prior to trial due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor. If such delay occurs, 
the Court shall consider releasing [there is thus no obligation to release here, ChP] 
the person, with or without conditions.261  
                                                          
258 See Art. 60, para. 3 of the ICC Statute.  
259 This was clarified in ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Application for the interim 
release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 18 October 2006, p. 4: 
“CONSIDERING (…) that the two abovementioned provisions [namely Art. 60, para. 3 of the ICC 
Statute and Rule 118, para. 2 of the ICC RPE, ChP] appear after provisions which specifically deal with 
applications for interim release brought after the person subject to a warrant of arrest has been 
surrendered to the Court; CONSIDERING, therefore, that the ruling on “[…] detention” referred to in 
article 60(3) of the Statute and rule 118(2) of the Rules cannot be confused with the warrant of arrest 
issued pursuant to article 58 of the Statute ordering the initial detention of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
(…).” See also the following confirmation by the Appeals Chamber: “94. The ruling that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is required to review pursuant to article 60 (3) of the Statute is the determination that it has 
made in response to an application for interim release pending trial under article 60 (2). This is clear 
from the order of the statutory provisions. As the Pre-Trial Chamber correctly pointed out, both article 
60 (3) and Rule 118 (2), which require the Pre-Trial Chamber to review its ruling on release or 
detention, appear directly after provisions which provide for applications for interim release by the 
person subject to a warrant of arrest. It is therefore logical to interpret the review under article 60 (3) to 
follow from, and be dependent upon, a ruling on a previous application by the detained person for 
interim release. 95. The Appeals Chamber does not accept the arguments of the Appellant that the 
ruling referred to in article 60 (3) must be read more broadly and that the Warrant of Arrest amounts to 
such a ruling.” (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case 
of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté 
provisoire de Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”’ (Public Document), [ICC-]01/04-01/06 (OA 7), 13 February 
2007, paras. 94-95.) 
260 See Khan 2008, pp. 1167-1168. 
261 Cf. in that respect the more general provision in Art. 67, para. 1 (c) of the ICC Statute that an 
accused shall be entitled to be tried without undue delay. As stated earlier (see n. 201), although Art. 67 
of the ICC Statute, in principle, applies at the trial stage, it may also have pre-trial dimensions. This 
also goes for Art. 67, para. 1 (c) of the ICC Statute, see Schabas 2008, pp. 1258-1259: “The provision is 
identical to that of its model in the ICCPR. (…) Case law and academic comment on the ICCPR 
provision have considered that the time limit begins to run at the moment the suspect or accused is 
informed that the authorities are taking steps towards prosecution [emphasis in original, ChP].” See also 
ibid., p. 1273: “Although article 67 applies at the trial stage of the proceedings, it may be threatened by 
pre-trial events, such as irregular or illegal investigation, either by the national authorities or by the 
Prosecutor’s office. The Statute provides the Court with the power to exclude evidence in cases of 
abuse but there may be breaches of article 67 for which this may be an insufficient or inappropriate 
remedy. For example, what is the Court to do in cases of violation of the right to a speedy trial, set out 








Thus, it may very well be the case that the judges, every time they have to review 
the decision on interim release, are of the opinion that at that specific moment in 
time, detention is in principle justified, but that does not prejudice their discretion to 
release a person nonetheless (namely when, taking the whole period together, this 
person is in unreasonably long pre-trial detention because the Prosecution delays his 
detention unreasonably). This provision is, in other words, completely independent 
of the above-mentioned provision (Article 60, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute).262 
In finding out exactly what is meant by an “unreasonable period prior to trial 
due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor”, it is first of all worth stressing that this 
provision focuses on the (in)activity of the Prosecutor alone. For example, if a 
suspect is detained by a State, at the request of the ICC, and becomes the victim of 
an unreasonable period of pre-trial detention caused by the fact that the Prosecutor 
simply forgot about the case (that this is not impossible was clearly shown in the 
Barayagwiza case),263 a suspect, when surrendered to the ICC, may refer to Article 
60, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute. However, if the Prosecutor has done his best 
and if the delay is caused by (in)activity of the State itself, the person will not be 
released pursuant to this article. Likewise, if the Registry or another organ is 
responsible for the delay, release, pursuant to this provision, will not follow. This is 
strange and has consequently been (correctly) criticised.264 However, again, even if 
in such circumstances, a suspect is not released on the basis of Article 60, paragraph 
                                                          
262 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté provisoire de 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”’ (Public Document), [ICC-]01/04-01/06 (OA 7), 13 February 2007, para. 4: 
“Article 60 (4) of the Statute is independent of article 60 (2) in the sense that even if a detainee is 
appropriately detained pursuant to article 60 (2), the Pre-Trial Chamber shall consider releasing the 
detainee under article 60 (4) if the detainee is detained for an unreasonable period prior to trial due to 
inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor.” See also ibid., paras. 98 and 120. 
263 See ns. 865-869 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
264 See Khan 2008, p. 1167, who notes that the provision “does not protect a person from unreasonable 
lengths of detention, but only unreasonable lengths of detention occasioned by inexcusable delay by the 
Prosecutor [emphasis added, ChP].” He then continues (ibid.): “There is no provision allowing for 
release to ameliorate a person[’]s detention for an unreasonable period caused by inexcusable delay 
occasioned by other factors, such as insufficiency in the number of judges, lack or insufficiency of 
court rooms, or budgetary and resource problems. This is unsatisfactory. It will not matter to accused 
persons whether their detention for an “unreasonable period” is the fault of the Prosecutor, the judges, 
the Registry or any other third party. All organs of the Court should be clearly prohibited from 
unnecessary, never mind inexcusable delays, and paragraph 4 suffers from the defect of only focusing 
on inexcusable delay on the part of the Prosecutor.”  Indeed, one could refer here to the above-
mentioned Barayagwiza case that one should be concerned about the violations, irrespective of the 
entity responsible, see the famous dictum of the ICTR at ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 73 
(see n. 841 and accompanying text of Chapter VI). This reasoning was also referred to, in the context of 
Art. 60, para. 4 of the ICC Statute, in the still-to-discuss Katanga case (see Section 4 of Chapter X), see 
ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of [the] Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ‘Response of the Defence to the Prosecution’s Observations on the 
Pre-Trial Detention of Mr. Germain KATANGA, pursuant to the Statute and the Rules’ (Public), ICC-








4 of the ICC Statute, other bases for release may nevertheless exist in the context of 
the ICC. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following two chapters.  
Another point must be made here. In a 2007 decision from the Lubanga Dyilo 
case, the Appeals Chamber referred to its male captus decision issued a couple of 
months earlier, a decision (also from the Lubanga Dyilo case) which will be 
examined at length in Section 2 of Chapter X, to explain the scope of Article 60, 
paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute. It held: 
 
The Appeals Chamber also sees no merit in the argument of the Appellant that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber in its consideration of article 60 (4) of the Statute should have 
taken into account the periods that the Appellant had spent in detention and house 
arrest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Appeals Chamber has already 
noted in paragraph 42 of the (…) “Judgment on the Challenge to Jurisdiction” (…) 
that the alleged crimes for which the Appellant had been held in detention in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo prior to his surrender to the Court were separate 
and distinct from the alleged crimes that led to the issuance of the warrant for his 
arrest. There is no reason to depart from this finding in the present appeal. As noted 
by the Appeals Chamber in paragraph 44 of the Judgment on the Challenge to 
Jurisdiction, issues regarding prior detention are relevant where they are part of the 
“process of bringing the Appellant to justice for the crimes that form the subject-
matter of the proceedings before the Court.” As the Appellant’s prior detention was 
not part of that process and was thus not part of the detention pursuant to the Warrant 
of Arrest issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber, there is no reason to take that period into 
account for the purpose of article 60 (4) of the Statute.265 
 
It can be argued that the use of the 2006 male captus decision of the Appeals 
Chamber (which in itself can be criticised, see Section 2 of Chapter X), is odd as 
that decision did not look at the scope of Article 60, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute; 
it looked more generally at the effect of pre-trial irregularities on the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. However, the fact that the Appeals Chamber, in its decision of 2006, wants 
to restrict itself to examining irregularities when these are part of “the process of 
bringing the [a]ppellant to justice for the crimes that form the subject-matter of the 
proceedings before the Court” does not mean that this (criticisable) scope should 
also be followed in the context of Article 60, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute. That 
latter provision is, in principle, clear when it talks about an unreasonably long pre-
trial detention due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor. Although that implies 
that the Prosecutor must be involved in the case, this does not necessarily have to be 
                                                          
265 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté provisoire de 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”’ (Public Document), [ICC-]01/04-01/06 (OA 7), 13 February 2007, para. 121. 
Note that this reasoning was also confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Katanga case, a case 
which will be addressed in more detail in Chapter X as well, see ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Decision on the powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber to review proprio motu the 









triggered by an ICC arrest warrant and thus by detention based on the ICC charges. 
It may be the case that the suspect is already in custody at the national level for 
other crimes and that the Prosecutor is interested in prosecuting this case, but is not 
yet ready. If there is a danger that the suspect will be released at the national level, 
it is not impossible that the Prosecutor may informally request the national 
authorities to keep the suspect in custody so that he has more time to prepare the 
arrest warrant. If the Prosecutor in such a case also causes inexcusable delay in 
preparing the arrest warrant, it could very well be argued that the suspect, on arrival 
in The Hague, can use Article 60, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute. Even if the 
national detention was based on other crimes and even if an arrest warrant was not 
yet issued, one could argue that in such a case, the suspect suffered from an 
unreasonably prolonged pre-trial detention as a result of inexcusable delay caused 
by the Prosecutor as well.  
Now, in which other situations can one say that a person is “detained for an 
unreasonable period prior to trial due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor”? In 
fact, this can be any delay caused by the Prosecutor which cannot be justified. 
Hence, the Prosecutor must be able to demonstrate that every step he took in the 
pre-trial stage was aimed at bringing a case to trial as soon as possible, of course 
acknowledging that the Prosecutor also needs time (and given the complexity of 
trials at the international level, a fair amount of it) to prepare his case before going 
to trial.266 However, one can assume that this will normally be the case and that the 
Prosecutor will do everything in his power to bring a case to court as quickly as 
possible. If a delay nevertheless occurs in this context, for example because of the 
complexity of the case, it should not be qualified as unreasonable. Only if the 
Prosecutor is not doing his job properly and, as a result, causes an inexcusable 
delay, may the ICC judges release the suspect. In any case, much will depend on the 
facts of the case.267  
                                                          
266 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté provisoire de 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”’ (Public Document), [ICC-]01/04-01/06 (OA 7), 13 February 2007, para. 123: 
“Nor is the Appeals Chamber persuaded by the argument of the Appellant that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
should not have taken into account the location and amount of evidence when determining the 
reasonableness of the period of detention because such factors would always be present in international 
criminal proceedings. This contention is unfounded. While it is likely that most of the cases that will 
come before the Court will tend to be complex, this alone does not mean that the complexity of the 
case, and in particular the amount and location of the evidence, cannot be taken into account when 
assessing the reasonableness of the period of detention pursuant to article 60 (4) of the Statute. The 
Appeals Chamber notes in this context the references by the Prosecutor to decisions of the ICTY and 
ICTR, where the complexity of the case was taken into consideration in respect of the reasonableness of 
the period of pre-trial detention.” See also Khan 2008, p. 1168. 
267 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté provisoire de 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”’ (Public Document), [ICC-]01/04-01/06 (OA 7), 13 February 2007, para. 122: 








It is unclear whether the remedy of release as mentioned in Article 60, paragraph 
4 of the ICC Statute only refers to an interim release/a release pending trial or 
perhaps also to a ‘final’ release with prejudice/obstructing the continuation of the 
trial, comparable with the outcome of the first Barayagwiza decision.268 As the 
provision is ‘surrounded’ by provisions in which the term ‘interim release’ can be 
found, one may think that Article 60, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute refers only to 
an interim release. On the other hand, the provision itself only speaks of the general 
term release, which does not exclude a more permanent release,269 see in that 
respect also the release of Articles 9, paragraph 4 of the ICCPR or 5, paragraph 4 of 
the ECHR. Although these provisions do not speak of releases with prejudice either, 
it is very well possible that a judge confronted by very serious violations of a 
person’s human right to liberty and security may nevertheless be of the opinion that 
these provisions allow him to release a person with prejudice. Cf. also in that 
respect the reasoning mentioned above when discussing Article 60, paragraph 2 of 
the ICC Statute: this provision does not exclude a final release either, namely if 
there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. The fact that the provision uses quite harsh 
words (“unreasonable period” and “inexcusable delay”) may also lead to the 
assertion that a final release must not be excluded. One could hereby argue that the 
rights of the suspect may have been so seriously violated by the unreasonable pre-
trial detention due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor, that it would undermine 
the integrity of the Court to proceed with the case. In fact, one could even refer here 
to the first abuse of process situation (the one on which this study did not focus and 
which looks at the trial proceedings itself), namely that such delay could jeopardise 
the fairness of the trial in the strict sense.270 In that view, an interim release (which 
after all does not jeopardise the trial itself) would constitute too light a remedy for 
the serious violations suffered by the suspect.  
                                                                                                                                              
any period of detention prior to trial cannot be determined in the abstract, but has to be determined on 
the basis of the circumstances of each case.” See also Khan 2008, p. 1167. 
268 See also Fernández de Gurmendi and Friman 2002, p. 305, n. 91. 
269 See, however, Knoops 2003, p. 220 (or Knoops 2002, p. 226), who argues that the remedy of release 
in Art. 60, para. 4 of the ICC Statute “seems to exclude the more rigorous remedy and specific view 
endorsed by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in both Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor and Semanza v. 
Prosecutor. Considering the diverse subject matter that habeas corpus writs may address as to the 
legality of detention, the “gliding scale” approach of the Appeals Chamber seems more favourable 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” One can agree with Knoops on this last point, however. As earlier 
explained in the context of Artt. 9 of the ICCPR and 5 of the ECHR, the remedy of release is unclear 
and over-simplified. As a result, the judges should keep the suspect in custody and provide the most 
appropriate remedy, taking the exact circumstances of the case into account. Cf. also n. 45 and 
accompanying text of Chapter IX. 
270 See House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 
June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 161: “[A] court has a discretion to stay any criminal 
proceedings on the ground that to try those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process 
either (1) because it will be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) 
because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the 








A point that should also be made about this provision is the already briefly 
mentioned discretionary power of the ICC to release the person in question: “If such 
delay occurs, the Court shall consider releasing the person, with or without 
conditions [emphasis added, ChP]”.271 One can question whether there is not some 
tension between this provision and what appears to be its international human rights 
counterpart (although that provision seems to be more clearly focused on releases 
pending trial only) which states more pointedly that a person shall be released 
pending trial if he is not tried within a reasonable time and which does not even use 
the more reproachful word “inexcusable”.272 Nevertheless, the discretion from 
Article 60, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute would be appropriate if the provision is 
indeed used as a sort of abuse of process tool: if the judge is of the opinion that this 
provision can be used to stop the process in very serious cases of delay, he should 
definitely have discretion in deciding whether or not this far-reaching remedy is to 
be granted, taking every single aspect of the case into consideration.273 
A final aspect of this provision to be discussed here is that, assuming for now 
that this provision will only lead to a provisional release, that is, a release pending 
trial, one can imagine that there might indeed be good reasons not to grant interim 
release under this provision too readily (even when the unreasonable detention is 
the result of inexcusable delay caused by the Prosecutor). It should be borne in 
mind that when the Pre-Trial Chamber releases a person pursuant to Article 60, 
paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute, it does so because of an unreasonable detention due 
to inexcusable delay caused by the Prosecutor. It does not release the person 
because it is not convinced that 1) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and 2) the arrest 
(read: the continued detention) of the person appears necessary. In other words, if 
the Pre-Trial Chamber releases a person under Article 60, paragraph 4 of the ICC 
Statute, it remains convinced that the conditions of Article 58, paragraph 1 (a) and 
(b) of the ICC Statute apply. (If it were not so convinced, the Chamber would 
already have to release the person under Article 60, paragraph 2 of the ICC 
                                                          
271 Note in that respect the difference with Art. 60, para. 2 of the ICC Statute where it is clarified that if 
the grounds for detention are lacking, “the Pre-Trial Chamber shall release the person, with or without 
conditions [emphasis added, ChP].” 
272 See, for example, Art. 9, para. 3 of the ICCPR (“Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge 
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power 
and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that 
persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear 
for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the 
judgement.”) and Art. 5, para. 3 (c) of the ECHR (“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with 
the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to 
release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”). In the next 
chapter, the correlation between provisions of the Statute and international human right provisions will 
be further addressed. 
273 This would be different, however, in case it is determined that the delay has entailed that one can no 
longer speak of a fair trial in the strict sense of the word (see n. 270 and accompanying text). In such a 
case, jurisdiction should be refused, see the text following n. 159 and accompanying text of Chapter V. 








Statute.)274 It is not unusual for the Pre-Trial Chamber not to quickly release a 
person if it still believes that 1) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and 2) the arrest 
(read: the continued detention) of the person appears necessary. After all (and again 
referring to the observations of the Pre-trial Chamber in that respect), 
 
because of the gravity of the crimes with which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is charged, 
there is a substantial risk that he may wish to abscond from the jurisdiction of the 
Court (…) and (…) that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo now knows the identities of certain 
witnesses; that the Prosecution states that if Thomas Lubanga Dyilo were to be 
released and were thus to be in a position to have completely unmonitored 
communications with the outside world, there would be a risk that he would, directly, 
or indirectly with the help of others, exert pressure on the witnesses, thus obstructing 
or endangering the court proceedings (…) [original footnotes omitted, ChP].275 
 
If the judges of the ICC believe that these risks remain, it is not strange for a person 
not to be released very quickly in the case of an unreasonably prolonged detention 
as a result of inexcusable delay caused by the Prosecutor. In fact, one can even 
assert that, besides the fact that very serious cases of delay should lead to the real 
ending of the case, it is rather odd to release a person in less serious cases if one is 
still of the opinion that arrest/detention is necessary. See in that respect also the 
problems related to the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful 
arrest/detention. Perhaps, it may also be better in the context of this provision of the 
ICC Statute that the remedy of release (which may lead to social disturbance and a 
risk of absconding) is avoided and that other, appropriate remedies for the delay are 
                                                          
274 See also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of 
The Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to Defence Appeal Against the 
‘Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté provisoire Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’’ (Public), ICC-01/04-
01/06, 1 November 2006, para. 19: “[I]t is only natural that before analysing the applicability of Article 
60 (4) the Chamber decided to, as required by Article 60 (2), satisfy itself as to whether the conditions 
for detention in Article 58 continued to apply. If they did not, then the Applicant would have been 
entitled to release, independently of any determination under Article 60 (4), which would have actually 
become unnecessary. Once the Chamber satisfied itself that the condition continued to apply, it 
proceeded to discuss whether the requirements for release under Article 60 (4) had been met in the 
present case [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
275 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Application for the interim release of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 18 October 2006, pp. 5-6. See also ICC, Trial 
Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision reviewing the Trial Chamber’s ruling on the detention of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo in accordance with Rule 118(2)’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 1 February 2008, para. 10: 
“In relation to the requirements of Article 58(1)(b)(i), the Chamber considers that the defendant faces 
grave charges and if released is likely to return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the 
probable consequence that the Court would no longer be able to ensure his attendance at trial. 
Furthermore, the Chamber considers that the defendant is highly unlikely to attend his trial voluntarily. 








granted instead.276 Although certain conditions may prevent this277 – conditions 
which are, by the way, absent from paragraph 4 of Articles 9 of the ICCPR and 5 of 
the ECHR – the risk of absconding may even be greater in the context of the ICC 
than in the context of the ICTY/ICTR. After all, whereas all UN Member States are 
obliged to cooperate with the ICTY/ICTR, there are many States in the world which 
do not need to cooperate with the ICC because they are not States Parties. If a 
suspect were able to flee to such a State, he might very well escape justice. Such an 
escape is possible as the ICC and its host State, the Netherlands, have agreed – like 
the ICTY has done with the Netherlands and the ICTR has done with Tanzania278 – 
that the Netherlands cannot re-arrest a suspect released from the ICC without 
conviction for a period of fifteen days.279  
Be that as it may, one cannot escape the more general observation, considering 
that releases will not be granted too readily in the context of ICC proceedings (see 
both the interim release pending surrender and (perhaps to a lesser extent)280 the 
interim release pending trial), that the international human rights rule that “[i]t shall 
not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody”281 
will probably not apply to the ICC282 (or perhaps to any international criminal 
                                                          
276 One could hereby think of a reduction of the sentence or financial compensation, comparable with 
the Barayagwiza solution. The reduction or compensation could then depend on the question how 
unreasonable the detention (caused by the inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor) was. (Note that 
compensation is already a remedy for unlawful arrest/detention more generally (whether a person is 
acquitted or not) accepted by the Statute, see Art. 85, para. 1 of the ICC Statute. See also Rules 173-175 
of the ICC RPE.) See also n. 269. 
277 “The Pre-Trial Chamber shall ensure that a person is not detained for an unreasonable period prior to 
trial due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor. If such delay occurs, the Court shall consider releasing 
the person, with or without conditions [emphasis added, ChP].” 
278 See n. 243 of Chapter VI. 
279 See Art. 51 (‘Limitation to the exercise of jurisdiction by the host State’) of the ‘Headquarters 
Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the Host State’ (ICC-BD/04-01-08, Date of 
entry into force: 1 March 2008): “1. The host State shall not exercise its jurisdiction or proceed with a 
request for assistance or extradition from another State with regard to persons surrendered to the Court 
in accordance with Part 9 of the Statute, persons granted interim release or persons who appear before 
the Court voluntarily or pursuant to a summons, for any acts, omissions or convictions prior to the 
surrender, the transfer or the appearance before the Court except as provided for in the Statute and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 2. Where a person referred to in paragraph 1 of this article is, for any 
reason, released from the custody of the Court without conviction, that paragraph shall continue to 
apply for a period of fifteen consecutive days from the date of his or her release.” 
280 See Khan 2008, pp. 1162-1163: “Article 59 (detention in the custodial state) effectively creates a 
presumption in favour of custody by making detention the norm unless “there are urgent and 
exceptional circumstances to justify interim release”. The same language, however, is absent from 
Article 60. It is suggested that absent such clear language, the onerous requirements of Article 59(4) 
should not be transplanted or read into Article 60 in any way [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See 
also O’Dowd 2004, p. 99: “The criteria applicable by the national authority appear more restrictive than 
those governing the ICC’s power to grant interim release”. 
281 Art. 9, para. 3 of the ICCPR. 
282 See also O’Dowd 2004, p. 99: “The relevant provisions of Articles 59 and 60 have already been the 
subject of scholarly comment and analysis. There seems to be a general consensus that, whatever 








tribunal, cf. the discussion in Chapter VI on Rule 65 of the ICTY/ICTR RPE).283 
However, as previously explained, the fact that release will not often284 be granted 
may have legitimate grounds, such as the risk of absconding and social disturbance 
– grounds which have their origin in the seriousness of the person’s alleged crimes. 
                                                                                                                                              
exception, given the gravity of the crimes within the court’s jurisdiction [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].” 
283 See the text following n. 93 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. See also n. 4 of Chapter VI (with 
respect to the IMTs of Nuremberg and Tokyo) and C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest 
and Detention’, Working Paper No. 24 – April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
(available at: https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), p. 55. It may be 
interesting to note that the remark of STL Pre-Trial Judge Fransen that “freedom is the principle, 
detention the exception” (see n. 1299 and accompanying text of Chapter VI), and his subsequent order 
to provisionally release the generals in question, can in that respect be seen as break with this situation. 
However, the kinds of crimes prosecuted at the STL (which is, by the way, not a ‘real’ international 
criminal tribunal, but an internationalised criminal tribunal) may also play a role here. Although they 
are of a serious nature, they fall outside the category of core international crimes prosecuted by, for 
example, the ICTY/ICTR/ICC (and the IMTs of Nuremberg and Tokyo), see Swart 2007, pp. 1153-
1154. 
284 Although the ICC keeps repeating that pre-trial detention is not the general rule but the exception 
(see, for example, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the 
Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Decision on the powers of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to review proprio motu the pre-trial detention of Germain Katanga’ (Urgent, 
Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/07, 18 March 2008, pp. 6-7; ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Decision on the Conditions of the Pre-Trial Detention of Germain Katanga’ 
(Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/07, 21 April 2008, p. 6; ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the 
Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision on 
Application for Interim Release’ (Public), ICC-01/05-01/08, 16 December 2008, para. 31; ICC, Pre-
Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision on Application for Interim Release’ (Public), ICC-01/05-01/08, 14 
April 2009, para. 36 and ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the 
Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo and Convening Hearings with the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Portugal, the 
Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, and the Republic of South 
Africa’ (Public Document), ICC-01/05-01/08, 14 August 2009, paras. 36 and 77), in practice, one can 
expect not many provisional releases. An exception in that respect can be found in the Pre-Trial 
Chamber II’s decision of 14 August 2009 in the Bemba Gombo case (see ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
‘Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and Convening Hearings with the 
Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Italian Republic, and the Republic of South Africa’ (Public Document), ICC-01/05-
01/08, 14 August 2009) but in the end, this decision, by which Judge Trendafilova ordered the 
conditional interim release of Bemba Gombo, was also reversed by the Appeals Chamber, see ICC, 
Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against Pre-Trial Chamber II’s 
“Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and Convening Hearings with the 
Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Italian Republic, and the Republic of South Africa”’ (Public Redacted Version), ICC-
01/05-01/08 OA 2, 2 December 2009. Cf. also C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and 
Detention’, Working Paper No. 24 – April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 








Furthermore, neither must one forget that this situation may also very well be 
applicable to national courts dealing with serious/international crimes.285  
Leaving this interesting matter for now and taking the above-mentioned Articles 
59 (including 55) and 60 of the ICC Statute together, it can be asserted that they 
cover quite a considerable part of the important habeas corpus concept as laid down 
in Articles 9, paragraph 4 of the ICCPR and 5, paragraph 4 of the ECHR286 and as 
such constitute improvements when compared to the legal context of the ICTY and 
ICTR.287 For example, Article 60, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute ensures that the 
ICC judges address the substantive legality part (namely that the deprivation of 
liberty must be on such grounds as are established by law) and provides the remedy 
of release if these grounds are lacking. In addition, the national authority must 
verify whether the person was arrested in accordance with the proper process, 
thereby fulfilling the procedural legality part (namely that the deprivation of liberty 
must take place in accordance with such procedure as is established by law). In 
addition, the prohibition of arbitrariness also enters the ICC’s arrest and surrender 
regime via Article 55 of the ICC Statute. However, as already explained, the exact 
scope of these provisions and the exact division between the national authority and 
the ICC is not very clear. Hence, it is equally unclear whether the ICC arrest and 
surrender regime is in full conformity with the above-mentioned international 
habeas corpus rights.288 This could have been solved if an unequivocal right were 
                                                          
285 See n. 213 and the remark of Swart. 
286 See in that respect also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the admissibility of the appeal 
of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la 
confirmation des charges” of 29 January 2007 (…)’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 OA8, 13 
June 2007, para. 13: “The human right [and then the ICC judges refer to Artt. 21, para. 3 of the ICC 
Statute, 9, para. 4 of the ICCPR, 5, para. 4 of the ECHR and 7, para. 6 of the ACHR, ChP] of a person 
to have recourse to judicial review of a decision affecting his liberty is entrenched in article 60 of the 
Statute [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
287 See Sluiter 2009, p. 462. See also ibid., p. 467. 
288 It may be interesting to note that the Dutch Government is, however, of the opinion that Artt. 59 and 
60 of the ICC Statute do not violate the Dutch version of the Artt. 9, para. 4 of the ICCPR and 5, para. 4 
of the ECHR: Art. 15, para. 2 of the Dutch Constitution (see also Bevers, Blokker and Roording 2003, 
p. 137). This provision reads: “Anyone who has been deprived of his liberty other than by order of a 
court may request a court to order his release. In such a case he shall be heard by the court within a 
period to be laid down by Act of Parliament. The court shall order his immediate release if it considers 
the deprivation of liberty to be unlawful.” (Note, by the way, that this provision also speaks of release if 
the deprivation of liberty more generally is unlawful and not merely of release if the detention is 
unlawful, see n. 583 and accompanying text of Chapter III.) (For more information on Art. 15 of the 
Dutch Constitution, see Mevis and Blom 2000.) In its Explanatory Memorandum to the approval of the 
ICC Statute (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 27 484 (R 1669). 
Goedkeuring van het op 17 juli 1998 totstandgekomen Statuut van Rome inzake het Internationaal 
Strafhof (Trb. 2000, 120), Nr. 3, Memorie van Toelichting), the Dutch Government addresses Art. 15, 
para. 2 of the Dutch Constitution and then states at p. 8: “Now that the Rome Statute contains a 
provision dealing with judicial intervention in case of a deprivation of liberty, one cannot object to 
approval from this point of view. In that respect, one can refer to Articles 59 and 60 of the Rome 
Statute (and their clarifications). Therefrom, it is shown that an arrested person has the right to request 
the national judge for interim release and, at a later stage of the procedure, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the 








included in the ICC regime (whether at the national or at the international ICC 
level) for a suspect to challenge the legality of his arrest and detention and to be 
released if his deprivation of liberty is deemed unlawful. However, such a right is 
missing, which is rather peculiar, given the fact that the entire right to liberty and 
security, including its habeas corpus part, can be considered to have, at least, the 
status of customary international law/general international law.289 This intriguing 
point will be returned to in the next chapter.  
Returning to the actual arrest and surrender provisions, “within a reasonable 
time after the person’s surrender or voluntary appearance before the Court, the Pre-
Trial Chamber shall hold a hearing to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor 
intends to seek trial”.290 On the basis of this hearing to confirm the charges, which 
under certain circumstances may be held in the absence of the person in question,291 
the Pre-Trial Chamber shall “determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the 
crimes charged”.292 If the judges believe that there is sufficient evidence to confirm 
the charges, then the person in question will be committed to a Trial Chamber for 
trial on the confirmed charges.293 In that case, the trial phase before the ICC will 
commence, thereby ending the pre-trial phase (and this chapter’s section). 
 
4 MODEL OF COOPERATION: A SECOND APPRAISAL 
 
Now that the more specific arrest and surrender regime (which is part of the general 
cooperation regime) has been discussed, the nature of the ICC cooperation regime 
can be determined more accurately. Section 2 has shown that the ICC’s cooperation 
regime – in particular294 because States can in principle decide for themselves 
whether they want to be bound by it – is already less vertical than, for example, the 
                                                                                                                                              
one can wonder whether this fully covers the habeas corpus concept (as mentioned in Artt. 15, para. 2 
of the Dutch Constitution, 9, para. 4 of the ICCPR or 5, para. 4 of the ECHR). 
289 See Chapter III of this book. 
290 Art. 61, para. 1 of the ICC Statute. 
291 See Art. 61, para. 2 of the ICC Statute: “The Pre-Trial Chamber may, upon request of the Prosecutor 
or on its own motion, hold a hearing in the absence of the person charged to confirm the charges on 
which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial when the person has: (a) Waived his or her right to be 
present; or (b) Fled or cannot be found and all reasonable steps have been taken to secure his or her 
appearance before the Court and to inform the person of the charges and that a hearing to confirm those 
charges will be held. In that case, the person shall be represented by counsel where the Pre-Trial 
Chamber determines that it is in the interests of justice.” See also n. 1. See finally n. 76 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VI for more information on a comparable provision in the context of the 
ICTY/ICTR: Rule 61 of the ICTY/ICTR RPE. 
292 Art. 61, para. 7 of the ICC Statute. 
293 See Art. 61, para. 7 (a) of the ICC Statute. The same article explains (see (b) and (c)) the other 
possible outcomes of the confirmation of the charges hearing. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall “(b) Decline 
to confirm those charges in relation to which it has been determined that there is insufficient evidence; 
(c) Adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecutor to consider: (i) Providing further evidence or 
conducting further investigation with respect to a particular charge; or (ii) Amending a charge because 
the evidence submitted appears to establish a different crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.” 








cooperation regime between the ICTY or the ICTR and States, but the previous 
section has identified even more horizontal elements.  
For example, the ICC arrest and surrender regime contains the (inter-State 
extradition) exception of speciality,295 generally pays much attention to national 
procedural law, specifies possibilities to consult with the ICC and even to 
postpone296 requests for arrest and surrender (to which the quite horizontal general 
provisions related to requests for cooperation also apply),297 acknowledges to a 
certain extent an evidentiary requirement,298 regulates potential problems with 
competing requests and other international obligations States may have and 
authorises (at least on paper) interim releases at the national level.   
No longer restricting the focus on the arrest and surrender regime, one can see 
comparable horizontal elements in the ICC cooperation regime more generally.299 
In fact, with respect to requests for assistance other than for arrest and surrender,300 
                                                          
295 See n. 99. 
296 See n. 136. 
297 See Art. 87 of the ICC Statute and n. 129. 
298 See Art. 91, para. 2 (c) of the ICC Statute. 
299 See, for example, Artt. 73 (“If a State Party is requested by the Court to provide a document or 
information in its custody, possession or control, which was disclosed to it in confidence by a State, 
intergovernmental organization or international organization, it shall seek the consent of the originator 
to disclose that document or information. If the originator is a State Party, it shall either consent to 
disclosure of the information or document or undertake to resolve the issue of disclosure with the 
Court, subject to the provisions of article 72. If the originator is not a State Party and refuses to consent 
to disclosure, the requested State shall inform the Court that it is unable to provide the document or 
information because of a pre-existing obligation to confidentiality to the originator.”) and 93, para. 9 (i) 
of the ICC Statute (“In the event that a State Party receives competing requests, other than for surrender 
or extradition, from the Court and from another State pursuant to an international obligation, the State 
Party shall endeavour, in consultation with the Court and the other State, to meet both requests, if 
necessary by postponing or attaching conditions to one or the other request.”). Swart (2002 B, p. 1595) 
notes that national authorities have much more discretion in handling requests of assistance than they 
had in the context of the ICTY/ICTR: “Here, the Statute appears to steer a middle course between the 
law of the Tribunals and the practice of inter-State cooperation.” 
300 Note that such requests may also be useful to boost the pressure on suspects and their support 
networks and, as such, may contribute to more arrests and surrenders, see, for example, Art. 93, para. 1 
(k) of the ICC Statute: “States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and under 
procedures of national law, comply with requests by the Court to provide the following assistance in 
relation to investigations or prosecutions: (…) The identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of 
proceeds, property and assets and instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, 
without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties”. Prost (2005, p. 91) notes that “[t]he ICC 
Statute does not specifically provide for the Court to issue a freezing or seizure order with respect to 
assets. However, it is possible that the Pre-Trial Chamber may be empowered to do so under Article 
57(3)(a) by the Prosecutor [original footnote omitted, ChP].” This provision reads: “In addition to its 
other functions under this Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber may: (a) At the request of the Prosecutor, 
issue such orders and warrants as may be required for the purposes of an investigation”. See also n. 38 
and accompanying text and its reference to the broad provision Art. 54, para. 3 (c) of the ICC Statute 
(“The Prosecutor may: (…) Seek the cooperation of any State or intergovernmental organization or 
arrangement in accordance with its respective competence and/or mandate”). Furthermore, asset 
freezing could, of course, also be imposed by the UNSC when a situation has been referred to the ICC 








there are even clauses which “come close to a ground for refusal”,301 such as when 
a particular measure of assistance is prohibited in the requested State on the basis of 
an existing fundamental legal principle of general application (Article 93, paragraph 
3 of the ICC Statute) or when a request concerns the production of documents or 
disclosure of evidence which relates to the State’s national security (Article 93, 
paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute).302 It is because of characteristics of this kind that 
Kaul and Kreß rightfully state, after having reiterated the point already alluded to 
above that “[t]he Statute’s cooperation regime does not include the traditional 
interstate grounds for refusal to cooperate”,303 that “Part 9 rather makes use of more 
sophisticated instruments of conflict resolution”.304  
In other words, the ICC’s cooperation regime (including its arrest and surrender 
rules) does have vertical characteristics, but it is clearly not as vertical in nature as 
that of the ICTY and the ICTR.305 This is recognised by many authors, who use, 
however, different ways to describe this point. Sluiter (and subsequently 
Maogoto),306 for example, admitting that the ICC regime is not as vertical as that of 
the ICTY and the ICTR,307 concludes “that the ICC surrender regime is still of 
predominantly hierarchical, vertical nature”.308 Swart (and subsequently Rastan)309 
for his part makes the more neutral statement that “the Statute has created a regime 
of cooperation that is a mixture of the ‘horizontal’ and the ‘vertical’”.310 Prost 
                                                          
301 Kaul and Kreß 2000, p. 170.  
302 See also Art. 72 of the ICC Statute (‘Protection of national security information’). Ciampi (2002, p. 
1630) notes that “with respect to a request by the Court for a type of assistance which is not specified 
under Article 93(1)(a)-(k), the obligation is limited to assistance ‘which is not prohibited by the law of 
the requested State’ (Article 93 (1)(l)”.  
303 Kaul and Kreß 2000, p. 170. 
304 Ibid. Cf. also Rastan 2008, p. 433: “[C]o-operation is made subject to numerous qualifications, any 
one of which could impact on the provision of judicial assistance.” 
305 See also Fernández de Gurmendi and Friman 2002, pp. 328-329. 
306 See Maogoto 2004, p. 133. 
307 See Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 650-651: “In general, the ICC surrender regime is weaker than that of the 
ICTY and ICTR. (...) From the perspective of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC cooperation model is 
disappointing.” 
308 Sluiter 2003 C, p. 651. Cf. also the view of the Dutch Government: “The relationship between the 
International Criminal Court on the one hand and the national legal system on the other hand is more 
vertical than horizontal [own translation and emphasis added, ChP].” (Explanatory Memorandum to the 
International Criminal Court Implementation Act (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 
2001-2002, 28 098 (R 1704), Uitvoering van het Statuut van het Internationaal Strafhof met betrekking 
tot de samenwerking met en bijstand aan het Internationaal Strafhof en de tenuitvoerlegging van zijn 
vonnissen (Uitvoeringswet Internationaal Strafhof), Nr. 3, Memorie van Toelichting), p. 4.) See finally 
Bevers, Blokker and Roording 2003, p. 142: “The relations between states in inter-state extradition 
procedures are of a horizontal nature. In this case, however, the relationship is more hierarchical, 
whereby the Criminal Court is placed above the national legal orders [emphasis added, ChP].” 
309 See Rastan 2008, p. 432. 
310 Swart 2002 B, p. 1594. See also Swart 2002 C, p. 1640: “It is clear that these provisions [the 
provisions of the Rome Statute with regard to arrest and surrender, ChP] have been strongly influenced 
by the examples of both ad hoc international criminal tribunals and that lessons have been drawn from 
their experiences. On the other hand, there is much in them that reminds one of the traditional features 
of extradition law. In a sense, the system of the Rome Statute is a compromise between traditional 








asserts that the regime is “modelled on State to State schemes for international 
cooperation, but there are important differences”.311 A new and original way to 
typify the ICC (cooperation) regime, hence deserving some more attention here, is 
presented by Currie. He introduces the term ‘lateral’.  
 
[I]t may be useful to identify, if not a new paradigm, then at least a new label that 
defines the unique set of relationships within which the ICC exists. A term that 
suggests itself is “lateral”. Without delving too deeply into dictionary definitions of 
the term, it is appealing because it evokes a sort of continuum, where the Court and 
states are always to one side of each other. Certainly as between the Court and 
member states the relationship is not “horizontal,” as the member states do bear 
certain obligations to surrender jurisdiction to the Court in some circumstances and 
are obligated to cooperate with the Court in various ways when this occurs. Neither, 
however, is the relationship “vertical,” as there is a substantial measure of primacy 
accorded to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the states themselves, and even 
the cooperation obligations are tempered and qualified in various ways that 
differentiate the relationship from that, say, between the ICTY and UN member 
states [original footnote omitted, ChP].312 
 
This may still be somewhat difficult to visualise, but Currie’s explanation of the 
lateral effect of the complementarity principle (as stated above, Currie discusses the 
term lateral not only in the context of the ICC cooperation regime but in the context 
of the ICC regime as a whole) is perhaps clearer (at least for persons familiar with 
the beautiful game of rugby):  
 
The convoluted design of the complementarity regime was deliberate, the objective 
being both to create opportunities for legitimate international criminal trials, and “to 
encourage national institutions to comply with their responsibilities under 
international humanitarian law to investigate and prosecute”. This, arguably, is the 
“lateral” effect of complementarity – in the sense of a lateral pass on the rugby pitch, 
where the player best-placed to pursue the objective is handed the ball, but with more 
of a compulsory flavour [original footnote omitted, ChP].313  
 
But even if this does not ring a bell,314 Currie also explains his term very clearly in 
the context of the cooperation regime:  
 
The system (...) is one of mutual support (and doubtless no little friction) between the 
Court and state parties. The Rome Statute envisions a Court with some power but 
mandates ongoing consultations and negotiations as the mode by which the criminal 
justice work gets done in the pre-trial phase. Formally states must cooperate, but 
there are roadblocks to be thrown up and some provisions that may amount to 
                                                          
311 Prost 2005, p. 73. 
312 Currie 2007, p. 378.  
313 Ibid., p. 379. 
314 Those who wish to become familiar with (the lateral pass in) rugby are commended to the 









grounds for refusal of a Court request. Both vertical and horizontal approaches were 
combined, and distorted, in order to produce a mutually agreeable package. The 
Court and its members work laterally, in parallel fashion, ostensibly moving towards 
the same goal of ensuring international crime is punished and impunity 
extinguished.315 
 
Currie’s metaphor of the rugby pitch and the term ‘lateral’ will be returned to later 
in this book (this was also the reason why different descriptions of his submission 
have been presented here), but now that the ICC’s cooperation regime (and the 
arrest and surrender provisions in particular) have been clarified in more detail, it is 
time to first address the internal evaluative framework of this book. 
                                                          








CREATING AN INTERNAL EVALUATIVE 






As stated in Section 2 of this book’s first chapter, this study does not merely want to 
describe and analyse the current ICC position on the male captus issue (this will be 
done in the next chapter), it also wants to assess it. In Part 3 of this book, an external 
framework was created which should enable the reader, after having read the 
following chapter, to see how similar or different the ICC position with respect to 
the male captus issue is in comparison with the position of other courts. However, 
the aim of this study’s assessment is broader than comparing the ICC decisions with 
decisions from other courts. It will also include an internal evaluative assessment, 
which focuses on what the ICC is actually obliged to do according to its own legal 
framework. With the help of this less non-committal framework, one should be able 
to see how the ICC decisions are doing vis-à-vis its own law.  
The central provision of this framework is Article 21 of the ICC Statute (entitled: 
‘applicable law’).1  
It constitutes “the first codification of sources of international criminal law”2 and 





                                                          
1 Note that the discussion on the law of the ICC is predominantly, and, taking into account the nullum 
crimen sine lege principle (of Art. 22 of the ICC Statute), understandably, focused on substantive law 
issues, such as the exact scope of the crimes which the ICC must adjudicate. See also Edwards 2001, p. 
369, n. 193. Nevertheless, as Art. 21 of the ICC Statute refers to, among other things, documents which 
discuss many issues of procedural law (such as the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) 
and human rights (which arguably also cover procedural human rights), it is submitted that Art. 21 of 
the ICC Statute also has a procedural law dimension and may thus also be looked at for the present 
procedural law discussion on male captus bene/male detentus. Cf. also Caracciolo 2000, p. 225, 
Edwards 2001, p. 368 and Degan 2005, p. 79. 
2 Hafner and Binder 2004, p. 165. See also McAuliffe deGuzman 2008, p. 703. 
3 See Pellet 2002 A, p. 1053: “[T]he system of sources to which the Statute refers is extremely complex, 









1. The Court shall apply:  
 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence;  
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law 
of armed conflict;  
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of 
legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that 
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles 
are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally 
recognized norms and standards. 
 
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions. 
 
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent 
with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction 
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, 
colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or 
social origin, wealth, birth or other status. 
 
In the following pages, these paragraphs will be looked at in detail to determine 
their exact scope. It must be emphasised that the entire article will be reviewed so 
that the reader has sufficient information on all these provisions, even if this study 
comes to the conclusion that the answer to the male captus problem can already be 
found in an early paragraph, thereby perhaps – this will be dealt with in the 
following pages – making it unnecessary to continue looking for answers.   
 
2 ARTICLE 21, PARAGRAPH 1 
 
2.1 Correlation between the three parts of paragraph 1 
 
Before examining the actual content of the first part – part (a) – of paragraph 1, it is 
worth first reviewing the correlation between that paragraph’s three parts. One may 
encounter some problems here. On the one hand, one could argue that the sources 
mentioned in part (a) are clearly superior to those of part (b) and (c) given the words 
“in the first place” (part (a)), “in the second place, where appropriate” (part (b)) and 
“failing that” (part (c)).4 In the words of Edwards: 
 
                                                          
4 See also, for example, Pellet 2002 A, p. 1078: “Article 21 (…) stipulates the superiority of the Statute 
compared with the other sources of law which the Court may apply. This is witnessed by the 
enumeration of the sources itself: ‘in the first place…’, the Statute; ‘in the second place’, and only 
‘where appropriate’, treaties and the principles and rules of international law; and, ‘failing that’, general 








Article 21 provides that all law to be applied by the Court to resolve all issues is to be 
drawn from seven sources of “applicable law” listed within article 21. The sources are 
listed hierarchically, in a manner reminiscent of the sources of international law 
contained in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Thus, the 
applicable law is to be consulted in the following order: (1) the Rome Statute itself; 
(2) the Elements of Crimes; (3) the Rules of Procedure; (4) “where appropriate,[5] 
applicable treaties;” (5) “where appropriate…the principles and rules of international 
law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;” 
(6) “general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world;” and (7) “principles and rules of law as interpreted” in previous 
Court decisions.[6] The Court is instructed to begin with the first-listed source and 
proceed to a lower-ranked source only if the first source proves inadequate, until the 
Court identifies the appropriate law to resolve the issue at hand [original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].7 
 
On the other hand, Verhoeven is of the opinion that “[i]ntrinsic primacy of those 
rules [namely the rules from part (a), ChP] over the treaties and principles of 
international law referred to in paragraph 1(b) of Article 21 does not exist”.8 One 
can, however, wonder in that case as to the meaning of the words “in the second 
place, where appropriate”. Verhoeven explains:   
 
The mention of a ‘second place’ only means that such treaties, principles or rules only 
apply to issues that are not settled by the first category rules, either because the 
Statute is incomplete in certain respects, or because the point at stake is not as such 
concerned with its provisions (the existence of a state of war or the validity of a 
treaty, for instance), i.e., with the (judicial) activity of the ICC. This is probably the 
meaning that is to be given to the rather strange terms: ‘where appropriate’ (should 
ever a rule be applied ‘where inappropriate’?). Needless to say, such a 
‘complementarity’ does not imply or entail any ‘superiority’ of the rules of the first 
category over the ones of the second.9 
 
Thus, Verhoeven, in contrast to Edwards, is of the opinion that part (b) is equal in 
status to part (a), meaning that those parts should be considered together. The 
terminology used in Article 21 may lead to the same conclusion. The fact that part 
                                                          
5 The meaning of “where appropriate” is not clear to Edwards, see Edwards 2001, p. 384, n. 264 (“The 
Rome Statute suffers from its use of the unfortunate adjective “appropriate” to describe the “applicable 
treaties” as a source of law in article 21(1)(b).”) and p. 385, n. 266: “Again, we have the imprecise and 
ambiguous “where appropriate” language. “Appropriate” has been defined as: “suitable or fitting for a 
particular purpose.” This offers little guidance.” 
6 Note that the seventh source is not part of para. 1, but of para. 2 of Art. 21 of the ICC Statute. As such, 
it is not part of the hierarchy of para. 1 either; it is only a discretionary source (“The Court may apply 
principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions [emphasis added, ChP]”) which the 
ICC may seemingly always apply, not only when the first six sources have brought no relief. 
7 Edwards 2001, pp. 369-370.  
8 Verhoeven 2004, p. 11. 
9 Ibid. Following that reasoning, one could also argue that part (c) complements parts (a) and (b) 
(namely if the latter parts have brought no relief) and as such should not be seen as inferior to these parts 








(c) begins with the words “failing that” seems to mean that it can only be applied 
when the above-mentioned provisions, namely parts (a) and (b), have brought no 
relief, hence implying that those parts should be considered together. Stated 
otherwise, if one is of the opinion that part (b) can only be looked to if part (a) has 
left a legal lacuna, then why does part (b) not start with the identical words “failing 
that”?10 If one accepts this view, then part (b) should not only be looked to if part (a) 
has not brought a solution to the case at hand but in fact every time part (a) is 
applied.  
Now, if part (a) does not provide an answer to a certain problem, one can, of 
course, turn to the rules from part (b) (comparable with the view of Edwards). 
However, what happens if part (a) does provide an answer and that answer is 
inconsistent with part (b)? One can argue that, in Edwards’ view, part (a) must then 
be followed as one should only turn to part (b) if part (a) has not provided the 
answer to the problem. However, what is Verhoeven’s position on this? This is not 
very clear: the above-mentioned quotation seems to indicate that such a problem 
will never occur as the rules from part (b), even though they should be considered 
when applying part (a), will only be followed if part (a) leaves a legal lacuna, see the 
words “such treaties, principles or rules only apply to issues that are not settled by 
the first category rules”.11 Nevertheless, Verhoeven also explains: 
 
General international law should indeed be duly taken into consideration – even if it 
is not strictly ‘applicable’ – when applying the first category rules. There is no reason 
to construe the latter in a way that is inconsistent with the former, if this is not clearly 
the intent of the drafters of the statute; the rarity of general international law rules 
governing either the functioning of courts or the punishment of crimes considerably 
limits, however, the practical relevance of this point. But it concerns in any case 
general international law only, i.e., rules that are necessarily in force between all the 
                                                          
10 See also an older (namely the 1993) version of Art. 21 (then Art. 28) which read: “The Court shall 
apply: (a) this Statute; (b) applicable treaties and the rules and principles of general international law; (c) 
as a subsidiary source, any applicable rule of national law.” (Report of the Working Group on a Draft 
Statute for an International Criminal Court, to be found in: Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session, 3 May – 23 July 1993, UNGA OR, Forty-eighth 
session, Supplement No. 10, A/48/10, p. 111.) 
11 See also Verhoeven 2004, pp. 8-9: “Apart from treaties expressly aimed at in the Rome Statute, there 
is no difficulty in accepting that other ‘treaties’ or ‘rules of international law’ could normally be 
applicable to the extent they are relevant to deciding issues which are not dealt with in the specific ICC 
provisions, i.e., in the Statute, in the Elements of Crime or in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
[emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” With “treaties expressly aimed at in the Rome 
Statute”, Verhoeven means, for example, Art. 98 of the ICC Statute (see ibid., p. 8, n. 5). This article 
(‘Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender’) reads: “1. The Court may 
not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic 
immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of 
that third State for the waiver of the immunity. 2. The Court may not proceed with a request for 
surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a 
person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State 








members of the international community; it cannot be maintained when treaties, i.e., 
rules specific to some states only are concerned, provided they are not declaratory of 
customary international law.12 
 
Does this mean that general international law (and treaties which are declaratory of 
customary international law) are also applied if part (a) does provide an answer and 
that, in such an event, part (b) supersedes part (a) unless this was clearly not the 
drafters’ intent? The words “[g]eneral international law should indeed be duly taken 
into consideration – even if it is not strictly ‘applicable’ – when applying the first 
category rules. There is no reason to construe the latter in a way that is inconsistent 
with the former” appear to indicate this, but this seemingly contrasts with 
Verhoeven’s earlier remarks that part (b) only applies to issues which are not settled 
by part (a). In other words: Verhoeven argues that “[t]here is no reason to construe 
the latter in a way that is inconsistent with the former”, but how can one construe 
part (a) inconsistently with part (b) if part (a) does not say anything? 
The remainder of Verhoeven’s words do not clarify this. They read as follows: 
 
To the extent the application of treaties and general international law rules results 
from the existence of lacunae in the statute, the (b) of paragraph 1 could have started 
with terms identical to the ones used at the beginning of its (c): ‘failing that’, i.e., 
failing – as far as (b) is concerned – an adequate answer in the rules referred to in the 
(a) of the paragraph.13  
 
The words “[t]o the extent the application of treaties and general international law 
rules results from the existence of lacunae in the statute [emphasis added, ChP]” 
show that treaties and general international law may also be applied by the judges in 
cases other than those where part (a) has left lacunae. However, this may mean two 
different things. On the one hand, this may confirm the idea presented above that 
part (b) must be applied, even if part (a) does provide an answer. On the other hand, 
“[t]o the extent the application of treaties and general international law rules results 
from the existence of lacunae in the statute” may also confirm the previously 
mentioned idea that part (b) may only be applied if part (a) has left a legal lacuna 
because part (a), in itself, can also refer, for example, to treaties, see footnote 11 and 
the reference to Article 98 of the ICC Statute. In such a case, the judges will also 
apply treaties, not as part (b) (because part (a) has left a legal lacuna), but simply as 
part (a).  
Leaving aside these scholarly discussions for now, it may be worth noting that 
the ICC has also pronounced itself on the issue of the exact correlation between part 
(a) and the other parts of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute. In the still-to-
discuss male captus decision of Lubanga Dyilo (see Section 2 of Chapter X), the 
Appeals Chamber explained, referring to another decision from the Appeals 
Chamber issued half a year earlier, that  
                                                          
12 Ibid., p. 11. 








[t]he previous decision of the Appeals Chamber in Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo “Judgement on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary 
Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal” 
is instructive on the interpretation of article 21 (1) of the Statute of the Statute, 
particularly whether a matter is exhaustively dealt with by its text or that of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, because in that case no room is left for recourse to the 
second or third source of law to determine the presence or absence of a rule governing 
a given subject [original footnote omitted, ChP].14  
 
The Appeals Chamber states here that if part (a) is exhaustive on the matter, there is 
no need to look to parts (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute.15 
                                                          
14 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
34. 
15 It should be noted that this idea is probably from the Appeals Chamber in its decision of December 
2006 itself because the Appeals Chamber’s decision of 13 July 2006 (to which the December decision 
refers) can, strictly speaking, not be seen as support for that view. In that case, a case involving the issue 
of victim participation, the Prosecution did not agree with a decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I to uphold a 
certain application of victims to participate in the proceedings related to the situation in the DRC. (See 
ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Judgment on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision 
Denying Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 13 July 2006, para. 1.) It sought leave to 
appeal this decision under Art. 82 (‘Appeal against other decisions’), para. 1 (d) of the ICC Statute 
which reads: “Either party may appeal any of the following decisions in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence: (…) A decision that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair 
and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and for which, in the opinion of 
the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially 
advance the proceedings.” However, this appeal was refused. (See ibid., para. 2.) As a consequence, the 
Prosecution sought “the review of the above decision, albeit a review of an extraordinary nature, styled 
“Extraordinary Review”, in that no provision is made in the Statute or the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence for such an “extraordinary” step.” (Ibid., para. 3.) According to the Prosecution, the Statute 
left “a lacuna apt to be filled by the provisions of article 21 (1) (c) of the Statute introducing what are 
termed general principles of law deriving (…) from the national legislation of countries adhering to “the 
principal legal systems of the world” [original footnote omitted, ChP]”. (Ibid., para. 5.) The Appeals 
Chamber did not agree. It found that the Prosecution’s general principle of law did not exist (see ibid., 
para. 32) and that, perhaps even more importantly, part (c) of para. 1 of Art. 21 of the ICC Statute could 
not be looked at in the first place (see ibid.). This was because part (a) was exhaustive of the matter; 
there was no gap/legal lacuna here to be filled by part (c) (see ibid., para. 39). However, this statement 
can arguably not be seen as evidence for the idea that part (b) (which was not under examination in this 
decision) cannot be applied either if part (a) is exhaustive on the matter. It is recalled that part (c) starts 
with the words “[f]ailing that”, words which are absent in the context of part (b). That may mean that it 
is indeed true that part (c) can only be looked at if parts (a) and (b) have left a legal lacuna, but that does 
not say anything on the (perhaps different) correlation between parts (a) and (b). In that sense, the 
Appeals Chamber, in its December 2006 decision, is probably only referring to the July 2006 decision 
because the latter is instructive on the question as to whether a certain issue is exhaustively dealt with by 
the ICC legislation or not. In any case, the July 2006 decision can arguably not be seen as evidence for 
the idea that one may not turn to parts (b) and (c) if part (a) is exhaustive on the matter because part (b) 
was simply not discussed in this decision. For another opinion on this matter, see Bitti 2009, p. 296: 
“[T]he decision by the Appeals Chamber is a clear affirmation that the external sources of law described 








This view is similar to that of Edwards and to that of Verhoeven, if one is of the 
opinion that Verhoeven’s words must be interpreted to mean that parts (b) and (c) 
will only be applied if part (a) has left a legal lacuna. However, the Appeals 
Chamber’s view contrasts with Verhoeven’s position if one is of the opinion that 
Verhoeven’s words must be interpreted to mean that part (b) must also be looked to 
if part (a) does provide an answer and that part (a) can only overrule part (b) if this 
was clearly the intent of the drafters (because part (a), in principle, cannot be 
construed inconsistently with part (b)).  
It must be stressed that the views of authors like Edwards and Verhoeven, even if 
they are not followed by the ICC in a certain decision, will remain interesting for the 
future because the ICC, see Article 21, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute, is not obliged 
to follow its own decisions.16 That may mean that later Chambers may not follow 
the above-mentioned decision of the Appeals Chamber and may turn instead to the 
theories of authors like Edwards and Verhoeven to solve their problems.  
Almost a year later, a Trial Chamber also discussed the correlation between the 
different elements of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute, see the following 
passage (which is about the issue of whether ‘witness proofing’ – the preparation of 
witnesses before trial – can be applied in the context of the ICC).  
 
[I]f ICC legislation is not definitive on the issue, the Trial Chamber should apply, 
where appropriate, principles and rules of international law. In the instant case, the 
issue before the Chamber is procedural in nature. While this would not, ipso facto, 
prevent all procedural issues from scrutiny under Article 21(l)(b),[17] the Chamber 
does not consider the procedural rules and jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals to be 
automatically applicable to the ICC without detailed analysis.  
 
45. The ICC Statute has, through important advances, created a procedural framework 
which differs markedly from the ad hoc tribunals, such as, for example, in the 
requirement in the Statute that the prosecution should investigate exculpatory as well 
as incriminatory evidence, for which the Statute and Rules of the ad hoc tribunals do 
not provide. Also, the Statute seemingly permits greater intervention by the Bench, as 
well as introducing the unique element of victim participation. Therefore, the Statute 
moves away from the procedural regime of the ad hoc tribunals, introducing 
additional and novel elements to aid the process of establishing the truth. Thus, the 
procedure of preparation of witnesses before trial is not easily transferable into the 
system of law created by the ICC Statute and Rules. Therefore, while acknowledging 
the importance of considering the practice and jurisprudence at the ad hoc tribunals, 
the Chamber is not persuaded that the application of ad hoc procedures, in the context 
                                                                                                                                              
only be applied when a gap arises in the application of the Statute or the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence which has to be filled by subsidiary sources in order to give effect to the provisions of the 
Statute or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” 
16 “The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions [emphasis 
added, ChP].” 
17 This is, by the way, additional evidence for the assertion that Art. 21 of the ICC Statute has a 








of preparation of witnesses for trial, is appropriate [emphasis in original and original 
footnote omitted, ChP].18 
 
Unfortunately, this passage does not go into the question of whether principles and 
rules of international law must also be looked at if part (a) does provide an answer to 
a certain problem. It only says that the judges should apply, where appropriate, 
principles and rules of international law if ICC legislation is not definitive on the 
issue. These words as such do not exclude that the ICC may also apply principles 
and rules of international law if the ICC legislation does provide an answer to a 
certain matter.19 After all, they do not say that the principles and rules of 
international law will only be looked if ICC legislation does not provide an answer. 
Nevertheless, the passage is still interesting. Not only for a question which still 
needs to be discussed infra, but also for the fact that it clarifies the rather unclear20 
words “where appropriate”. These words must apparently be understood to mean: 
‘where it (according to the judges) fits’ (the quite specific system of the ICC). This 
signifies that if the instruments of part (a) leave a legal lacuna, which will probably 
not happen too readily given their highly detailed character,21 the ICC must 
(“shall”)22 apply solutions from applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law, but only if the judges find it appropriate to transplant these 
solutions into the sui generis system of the ICC. Hence, the obligation to apply 
(“shall”) is tempered with discretion (“where appropriate”).23 
 
2.2 Article 21, paragraph 1 (a)  
 
Leaving aside this issue for now and focusing on the actual content of part (a), only 
the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence need to be examined here, as 
the Elements of Crimes focus merely on substantive law issues. (They “shall assist 
the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6 [genocide], 7 [crimes 
against humanity] and 8 [war crimes]”.)24 Although they are not explicitly 
mentioned in part (a), the Regulations of the Court, which were adopted for the 
Court’s routine functioning,25 may also be looked at.26  
                                                          
18 ICC, Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and 
Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 30 November 2007, 
paras. 44-45. 
19 Although it must, of course, be recalled that if the ICC judges were to take that stance, they would not 
follow the (still authoritative) Appeals Chamber’s position on this matter, see supra. 
20 See n. 5 and n. 9 and accompanying text. 
21 See Bitti 2009, pp. 295-296 and 300, Nerlich 2009, p. 316 and Vasiliev 2009, pp. 212-213. 
22 See the first words of Art. 21 of the ICC Statute: “The Court shall apply”. 
23 See in that respect also the meaning attached to these words by McAuliffe deGuzman: “The inclusion 
of the phrase “where appropriate” serves to emphasize the discretion that the Court enjoys in 
determining when treaties or principles and rules of international law are applicable.” (McAuliffe 
deGuzman 2008, p. 705.) 
24 Art. 9, para. 1 of the ICC Statute. 








Do these documents take a position on the male captus bene/male detentus 
discussion? One can be very brief here; none of these instruments say anything on 
this subject.  
Now, silence on the part of the proper instruments of the ICC does not 
necessarily mean that there is a lacuna which must be filled by parts (b) or (c) of 
paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute.27 In this context, one should turn to 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the general rule of 
interpretation)28 and the supplementary means of interpretation as found in Article 
32 of the same Convention.29 After all, in the end, the ICC Statute is ‘just’ a normal 
international treaty between States as any other treaty to which this Convention 
applies.30 Via textual/contextual/teleological interpretation (Article 31, paragraph 
                                                                                                                                              
26 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and 
Witness Proofing’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 8 November 2006, para. 28 where the Pre-
Trial Chamber includes the regulations under the scope of Art. 21, para. 1 (a) of the ICC Statute: 
“Unlike the first component of the definition of the practice of witness proofing advanced by the 
Prosecution, the Chamber observes that the goals and measures encompassed by the second component 
of such a definition are not covered by any provision of the Statute, the Rules or the Regulations. 
Therefore, the Chamber, prior to undertaking any analysis under article 21 (3) of the Statute, shall first 
analyse whether this second component is embraced by any provision, rule or principle which could be 
considered as part of the applicable law of the Court pursuant to article 21 (1) (b) and (c) of the Statute 
[emphasis added, ChP].” See also ibid., para. 11. Although there are more regulations within the context 
of the ICC (such as the Regulations of the Registry), what is meant here are the Regulations of the 
Court, see ibid. See also Nerlich 2009, pp. 311-312 and n. 29. The hierarchy between the proper 
instruments of the ICC is: Statute > RPE > Regulations of the Court, see Pellet 2002 A, p. 1077. Note, 
however, that Vasiliev (2009, p. 213) also mentions the Regulations of the Registry within the context 
of part (a) of para. 1 of Art. 21 of the ICC Statute.   
27 See also Nerlich 2009, p. 312, n. 31: “[T]he mere fact that the legal instruments of the ICC are silent 
on a specific issue or do not provide for a specific remedy does not necessarily mean that (…) a lacuna 
exists. Rather, it has to be analysed whether the fact that the founding documents do not provide for a 
specific rule must be construed as a decision against such a rule, or whether the non-existence of such a 
rule is unintended. Only in the latter case may the ICC rely on the sources listed in Article 21 (1) (b) or 
Article 21 (1) (c) of the Statute.” 
28 “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the 
purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and 
annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” 
29 “Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) 
leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.” 
30 See also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Judgment on 








1)31 or recourse to the travaux préparatoires of the treaty (Article 32), one can find 
out how a certain provision is to be understood if this is not entirely clear. It may be 
that these means of interpretation show that it was the clear intention of the drafters 
not to include a certain rule/remedy in the treaty. In that case, there is, of course, no 
legal uncertainty or lacuna because the Statute is clear, namely that the remedy/rule 
cannot be relied upon in the context of the ICC. This will be further discussed infra, 
in the context of a problem related to the male captus issue, namely the fact that the 
ICC Statute contains a right to liberty and security but not (see also Chapter VIII) its 
remedy of release. Via the above-mentioned means of interpretation, one may be 
able to ascertain whether the fact that the remedy of release was not incorporated in 
the right to liberty and security was a deliberate choice by the drafters (in which 
case there would not be a lacuna) or whether it is unclear why this remedy is lacking 
(in which case there would be a lacuna, justifying recourse to parts (b) and (c) of 
paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute). This method is unproblematic in the 
context of the right to liberty and security as there is at least a provision whose terms 
can be interpreted. However, this is not the case with respect to the male captus 
issue as the proper instruments of the ICC do not seem to say anything on the 
problem as to the effect of a male captus on the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.  
However, perhaps an examination of a number of provisions from the proper 
instruments of the ICC which could be seen as being (indirectly) relevant to the 
male captus discussion may show that the drafters were more in favour of either 
male captus bene detentus or male captus male detentus. Likewise, it is conceivable 
that an examination of the travaux préparatoires may shed some light on this issue.  
To start with an examination of the ICC’s proper instruments; in the Preamble of 
the ICC’s Statute (which is “an integral part of the Statute”),32 one can find a very 
                                                                                                                                              
Decision Denying Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 13 July 2006, para. 33: “The 
interpretation of treaties, and the Rome Statute is no exception, is governed by the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969), specifically the provisions of articles 31 and 32 [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” See also ibid., para. 6. See also ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, 
Article 58’ (Under Seal, Ex Parte, Prosecution Only), ICC-01/04-01/07, 10 February 2006 (see Annex 2 
to ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Court Record not 
available, confidential document, ICC-01/04-02/06, 10 February 2006), para. 43. See finally Edwards 
2001, p. 363. 
31 Cf. also ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of 
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the 
Establishment of a Timetable’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 15 May 2006, Annex I 
(‘Discussion of the Decision on the Final System of Disclosure’), para. 1 and ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing’ (Public Document), 
ICC-01/04-01/06, 8 November 2006, para. 8. 
32 Bergsmo and Triffterer 2008, p. 4. See also para. 2 of Art. 31 (‘General rule of interpretation’) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty 
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to 
the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) 
any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty 








important, if not the most important, objective of the ICC, namely “that the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured”.33 One can imagine 
that such a goal might perhaps lead to the acceptance, if not explicitly then 
implicitly, of male captus bene detentus.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the Preamble, which reminds States that the ICC is 
complementary to the national level and thus that national States also have an 
important task in the prosecution of suspects of international crimes,34 warns those 
States that “nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any State Party to 
intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs of any State”,35 arguably 
tends towards a more general disapproval of male captus bene detentus. Although a 
condemnation of a male captus technique36 which violates the non-intervention 
principle does not, as such, exclude the application of the maxim male captus bene 
detentus, one can assume that an entity condemning such a technique may have 
more problems in upholding the male captus bene detentus maxim than an entity not 
publicly denouncing such a technique. The words ‘more general disapproval’ have 
been chosen here as this warning is addressed to States and not (so much) to the ICC 
itself. Nevertheless, the ICC also seems to take this warning into account when more 
generally stating in the Preamble: “Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations [emphasis in original, ChP]”.37 In addition, such 
warnings are not limited to purely inter-State situations, for example where a 
                                                          
33 See also Young 2001, p. 321, writing on the “overriding purpose of effective prosecution”. See also 
ibid., p. 355: “The principle of effective prosecution is the Court’s raison d’être.” 
34 See the following words from the Preamble: “Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes”; “Emphasizing that the 
International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions [emphasis in original, ChP]”. 
35 See also the following words from the Preamble: “Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, and in particular that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations [emphasis in original, ChP]”. (However, one must 
also be aware of the fact that these latter words were mainly inserted to emphasise that States must not 
commence wars, because wars lead to the crimes which the ICC wishes to prevent, see Bergsmo and 
Triffterer 2008, p. 12.) 
36 It may be good to mention that the ICC Statute itself condemns abduction, namely in the context of 
enforced disappearances (as a possible crime against humanity), see Art. 7, paras. 1 (i) and 2 (i) of the 
ICC Statute. 
37 One investigative possibility of the ICC Prosecutor may perhaps be seen as going against these 
principles, see again (see also n. 23 of the previous chapter) Currie 2007, p. 380, referring to Artt. 57, 
para. 3 (d) and 99, para. 4 of the ICC Statute: “Where the Pre-Trial Chamber determines that there is no 
competent mechanism or authority to respond to a cooperation request, it may even authorize the 
Prosecutor to conduct investigations on the territory of a party state, without that state’s consent 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” However, besides the fact that this possibility is not without 
conditions (such as the fact that the Prosecutor must first send a request for assistance), it cannot be seen 
as a possible male captus route as Art. 99, para. 4 is only applicable to the requests of Artt. 93 and 96 of 
the ICC Statute, which deal with other forms of assistance than arrest and surrender. Furthermore, the 
provision can only be used for requests “which can be executed without any compulsory measures”. 
(Art. 99, para. 4 of the ICC Statute.) One could hereby think, for example, of “the interview of or taking 








suspect of international crimes is not (initially) ‘wanted’ by the ICC.38 Such 
warnings also apply to situations where the States interact with the ICC. One could 
hereby think of the situation where State A threatens to abduct an ‘ICC wanted’ 
person from State B before surrendering him to the ICC premises in The Hague, see 
the remark of Museveni in the very first chapter of this book. Thus, the Statute 
warns States not to violate international law not only in the inter-State context, but 
also in the context of the ICC, namely when those States are part of that permanent 
Court’s enforcement mechanism.  
Another feature of the ICC, mentioned in the Preamble,39 which can be taken 
into account here is the fact that it is permanent.40 This feature has also been briefly 
mentioned in the first chapter of this study. What if the ICC were an ad hoc tribunal 
whose mandate was ending some day and what if, for example, Al Bashir, suspect in 
the Darfur case, were still not apprehended because Sudan continued to refuse to 
cooperate with the ICC? It is not difficult to imagine that an ad hoc tribunal, under 
pressure by the international community and the victims, both demanding results, 
might perhaps be more easily inclined than a permanent court to look for more 
‘creative’ (and perhaps even illegal) methods in arresting the suspect. This is not 
because a permanent court may not feel the heat from the international community 
or victims at a certain point: it will (see also Subsection 1.3 of the first chapter).41 
However, if the ICTY in its final days of existence is involved in a not-wholly legal 
operation to bring Mladić before the Tribunal and if the judges, because of the 
seriousness of the crimes with which the suspect is charged, decide not to refuse 
jurisdiction, the ICTY may receive criticism for both actions but such criticism 
would be irrelevant for its future success as the ICTY will cease to exist. The ICC, 
on the other hand, is permanent and will need the constant goodwill of the 
international community (read: its enforcers) if it wants to have suspects surrendered 
to The Hague. It can be argued that such a feature may make an operation such as 
that mentioned above, in a way ‘approved’ by a male captus bene detentus decision, 
less likely.  
Of course, it may also be argued that some States may criticise the Court if it 
were to issue a male captus male detentus decision in such a situation, cf. the 
reaction of Rwanda in the context of the first Barayagwiza decision. However, one 
must not forget that the criticism in that decision was perhaps not so much directed 
                                                          
38 See the following words from the Preamble: “Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes [emphasis in original, ChP]”. 
39 And also in Art. 1 of the ICC Statute. 
40 See the Preamble (“Determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to 
establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court [emphasis in original, ChP]”) and Art. 
1 of the ICC Statute: “An International Criminal Court (…) is hereby established. It shall be a 
permanent institution”. 
41 The moment the international community or the victims get impatient and start mounting pressure is, 
of course, not linked with the (non-)permanent character of the court in question. After all, although the 
ICC may be permanent, the victims do not have eternal life. The same goes, of course, also for the 
suspects themselves as justice cannot be done if they have already deceased. Expeditiousness is thus 








towards the fact that the ICTR can issue a male captus male detentus decision, but 
more that it did so in this specific case (where the violations were probably indeed 
not so serious as to refuse jurisdiction) and that it did not properly take care of the 
aftermath of its decision, forgetting that it has a more general responsibility to fight 
impunity, whether before the ICTR or not. It may very well be the case that the ICC 
will have to make a male captus male detentus decision in the future. However, if it 
does, it must clearly explain to the international community why such a decision 
would be necessary under the specific circumstances and what it has done to ensure 
that the suspect, now that he can no longer be tried before the ICC, will be tried 
elsewhere.  
Alongside the more general international law dimension, to be found in the ICC 
Statute’s Preamble, the Statute also has a clear human rights dimension, even if the 
protection of the human rights of the suspect/accused is not mentioned as an 
explicit42 objective of the ICC Statute as such.43 One of the most important 
provisions in that respect is paragraph 3 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute, which 
states, among other things, that “[t]he application and interpretation of law pursuant 
to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights”. 
In an effort not to complicate matters too much at this stage, this crucial 
provision will only be discussed at the end of this chapter. The fact that this is the 
final paragraph of Article 21 of the ICC Statute also justifies this. Nevertheless, it 
can already be clarified here that there is no internationally recognised human right 
to a male captus male detentus outcome. Hence, this provision does not seem to 
provide new insights into the present male captus discussion, although it does, of 
course, stress the importance of human rights in the context of the ICC.  
Another general human rights provision can be found in Article 54 (‘Duties and 
powers of the Prosecutor with respect to investigations’), paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC 
Statute, which states that “[t]he Prosecutor shall (…) Fully respect the rights of 
persons arising under this Statute”.  
In addition to these general provisions, there are more specific rights which may 
be of interest here.  
A number of them were already mentioned in the previous chapter where the 
arrest and surrender provisions were examined.44 Although, as already explained at 
                                                          
42 Note, however, that, as already explained, the ICC reaffirms the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and that purpose number three has a clear human rights dimension: “To 
achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion [emphasis added, 
ChP]”. See also Edwards 2001, p. 366.  
43 See ibid.: “Though the Preamble reaffirms the principles of the U.N. Charter, which endorse 
international human rights, it does not expressly state that human rights safeguards are an object or 
purpose of the Rome Statute.” 
44 An interesting provision which has not yet been mentioned earlier (because it is not part of the ICC’s 
arrest and surrender provisions) is Art. 85, para. 3 of the ICC Statute. This provision states: “In 
exceptional circumstances, where the Court finds conclusive facts showing that there has been a grave 
and manifest miscarriage of justice, it may in its discretion award compensation, according to the 








the beginning of this subsection, none of them explicitly take a position on the male 
captus discussion, there is one provision which could perhaps be seen as 
constituting a possible male detentus avenue for a serious male captus, namely 
Article 60, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute.45 However, if so, that provision is 
restricted to irregular detentions. Is the ICC Statute silent on irregular arrests? 
Here, one must turn to Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute, a provision 
which has already been reviewed in Chapter VIII. This article reads: “In respect of 
an investigation under this Statute, a person: (…) Shall not be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest or detention, and shall not be deprived of his or her liberty except on such 
grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established in this Statute.” 
Although this right does not explicitly take a position on the male captus discussion 
and although the inclusion of this right does not necessarily mean that the ICC 
would never issue a decision which could be summarised with the words male 
captus bene detentus,46 one could argue that serious violations of this right may 
nevertheless lead to a male detentus outcome. However, this previously mentioned 
idea, that serious violations of the right to liberty and security can lead, not to 
‘merely’ a normal release, but to a real ending of the case/a male detentus 
outcome,47 of course, first assumes the existence of the remedy of release. However, 
                                                                                                                                              
detention following a final decision of acquittal or a termination of the proceedings for that reason.” It 
could perhaps be argued that a serious male captus can be seen as a grave and manifest miscarriage of 
justice which may lead to the termination of the proceedings. However, even though the concept of 
miscarriage of justice has been addressed in the context of male captus cases, see, for example, the case 
of Dokmanović (see n. 187 and accompanying text of Chapter VI) the case of Barayagwiza (see ns. 817 
and 918 and accompanying text of Chapter VI), the case of Semanza (see n. 960 and accompanying text 
of Chapter VI) and (especially) the case of Rwamakuba, see ns. 1130, 1134, 1136 and 1138 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VI, these cases also show that the concept of ‘miscarriage of justice’ is 
not so much linked with the question as to how a person came into the jurisdiction of the now 
prosecuting court but more with the question as to whether the judges can fairly establish if the person 
standing before them is guilty or not. One may hereby think, in particular, of evidentiary issues. For 
example, if evidence has been manipulated or withheld to enforce a conviction from the judges, a 
miscarriage of justice has occurred, as a result of which that person has been wrongfully detained and 
can claim compensation. Although such irregularities may, of course, very well be committed in the 
context of a male captus situation, the male captus situation itself does arguably not constitute the 
miscarriage of justice. Another provision which may finally be mentioned here is Art. 55, para. 1 (b) of 
the ICC Statute, which could be relevant for male captus situations involving serious mistreatment: “In 
respect of an investigation under this Statute, a person: (…) Shall not be subjected to any form of 
coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”. 
45 “The Pre-Trial Chamber shall ensure that a person is not detained for an unreasonable period prior to 
trial due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor. If such delay occurs, the Court shall consider releasing 
the person, with or without conditions.” Cf. in that respect also the more general provision in Art. 67, 
para. 1 (c) of the ICC Statute that an accused shall be entitled to be tried without undue delay, see also 
ns. 201 and 261 of Chapter VIII. 
46 See, however, Gillett 2008, p. 24. After having discussed the male captus bene detentus approach, he 
argues: “However, in addition to the questionable legal and political merits of the doctrine, Article 
55(1)(d) of the Rome Statute makes it very clear that there is no room for such an approach before the 
ICC.” (See also n. 43 of Chapter I.) 
47 See the following, already earlier-mentioned, words of Swart 2001, p. 206: “[B]oth Article 9 of the 








the remedy of release is missing here; as mentioned in the previous chapter, the ICC 
Statute does not contain a habeas corpus provision comparable with Article 9, 
paragraph 4 of the ICCPR and Article 5, paragraph 5 of the ECHR which entitles a 
person to challenge the legality of his arrest and detention and to be released if his 
(arrest and) detention is deemed unlawful.48 
This is rather strange, given the fact that the entire right to liberty and security, 
including its habeas corpus element, can be considered to have, at least, the status of 
customary international law/general international law.49 This point was already 
observed by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in 1999:  
 
The ICC Statute does not include the right of a person provisionally arrested or 
arrested to a judicial determination without delay on the lawfulness of detention and 
to release if detention is unlawful, as provided for in Article 9 (4) of the ICCPR and 
Principles 32[50] and 37[51] of the Body of Principles. The Statute provides for the 
right of a person arrested by national authorities (under Article 59) or surrendered to 
the Court (under Article 60) to apply for interim release pending surrender or trial, 
respectively, but does not provide for the right to challenge the lawfulness of 
detention. The draft Rules should explicitly provide for this very important right. Its 
omission is curious given that the Statute, in Article 85 (1), grants an “enforceable 
right” to compensation to “anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or 
detention,” in accordance with Article 9 (5) of the ICCPR.52 
 
The question of how the omission of this remedy from the right to liberty and 
security must be interpreted will be examined infra, but first, this study will delve 
into the ICC’s travaux préparatoires to see whether they say anything on the real 
                                                                                                                                              
unlawful. I take it for granted that, in the case of more serious violations of these Articles, the nature of 
this particular remedy rules out any possibility of re-arresting the suspect or the accused.” 
48 See also Hall 2008 A, p. 1105. 
49 See Chapter III of this book. 
50 Principle 32 of the Body of Principles (for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment) (UNGA Res. 43/173 of 9 December 1988, available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/bodyprinciples.htm) reads: “1. A detained person or his counsel 
shall be entitled at any time to take proceedings according to domestic law before a judicial or other 
authority to challenge the lawfulness of his detention in order to obtain his release without delay, if it is 
unlawful. 2. The proceedings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present principle shall be simple and 
expeditious and at no cost for detained persons without adequate means. The detaining authority shall 
produce without unreasonable delay the detained person before the reviewing authority.” 
51 Principle 37 of the Body of Principles (for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment) (UNGA Res. 43/173 of 9 December 1988, available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/bodyprinciples.htm) reads: “A person detained on a criminal charge 
shall be brought before a judicial or other authority provided by law promptly after his arrest. Such 
authority shall decide without delay upon the lawfulness and necessity of detention. No person may be 
kept under detention pending investigation or trial except upon the written order of such an authority. A 
detained person shall, when brought before such an authority, have the right to make a statement on the 
treatment received by him while in custody.” 
52 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, ‘Pre-Trial Rights in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, 
International Criminal Court Briefing Series, Vol. 2, No. 3, February 1999, available at: 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/LCHRPreTrialRightsFeb99.pdf. See also Edwards 2001, pp. 329-








male captus issue. This is not only interesting, but in fact necessary as the above-
mentioned examination has not clarified whether the provisions in the ICC Statute, 
including its object and purpose, can be seen as clearly in favour of either male 
captus bene detentus or male captus male detentus. After all, it is indeed true that 
the main purpose of the ICC is to effectively prosecute suspects of international 
crimes (which would suggest more easily male captus bene detentus) but it is also 
clear that this goal cannot be pursued at any cost; international law, due process and 
human rights (including the right to a fair trial) must also be respected.53 That, 
including the fact that the ICC is of a permanent character and thus in need of the 
constant goodwill of the international community, may lead more readily to male 
captus male detentus.  
                                                          
53 See also the very first Strategic Goal (‘Quality of Justice’) as can be found in the ICC’s first Strategic 
Plan (ICC, ASP, Fifth session, The Hague, 23 November to 1 December 2006, ‘Strategic Plan of the 
International Criminal Court’, ICC-ASP/5/6, 4 August 2006 (available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-6_English.pdf), p. 5: “Conduct fair, effective and 
expeditious public proceedings in accordance with the Rome Statute and with high legal standards, 
ensuring full exercise of the rights of all participants [emphasis in original, ChP]”. See also the mission 
of the ICC at p. 4 of the same plan: “As an independent judicial institution in the emerging international 
justice system, the International Criminal Court will: ▪ Fairly, effectively and impartially investigate, 
prosecute and conduct trials of the most serious crimes; ▪ Act transparently and efficiently; and ▪ 
Contribute to long lasting respect for and the enforcement of international criminal justice, to the 
prevention of crime and to the fight against impunity.” See finally on this plan its para. 22, which states: 
“The core functions of the Court are to carry out investigations, prosecutions and trials. The manner in 
which these activities are conducted is fundamental to the Court’s achieving the aims of the Rome 
Statute. The Court can only realize these aims if its activities are fair, effective and impartial.” In 2008, 
the ‘Revised strategic goals and objectives of the International Criminal Court 2009 – 2018’ were 
issued, but the first goal of the ICC (now entitled ‘A Model of International Criminal Justice’) has not 
changed, see the Annex to ICC, ASP, Seventh session, The Hague, 14 – 22 November 2008, Report on 
the activities of the Court, ICC-ASP/7/25, 29 October 2008 (available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP7/ICC-ASP-7-25%20English.pdf). See further ICC, Appeals Chamber, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for 
Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal’ 
(Public Document), ICC-01/04, 13 July 2006, para. 37: “The self-evident purpose of the Statute is to 
make internationally punishable the heinous crimes specified therein in accordance with the principles 
and the procedure institutionalized thereby [emphasis added, ChP].” See also the 1993 preliminary 
version of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute, in which one can read the following commentary on the purpose 
of the future ICC: “The purpose of the establishment of the Tribunal, contemplated in article 1, is to 
provide a venue for the fair trial of persons accused of crimes of an international character, in 
circumstances where other trial procedures may not be available or may be otherwise less preferable.” 
(Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, to be found in: 
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session, 3 May – 23 July 1993, 
UNGA OR, Forty-eighth session, Supplement No. 10, A/48/10, p. 101.) See finally Edwards 2001, pp. 
366-367 and Young (2001, p. 321) who first notes that “[t]he principle of effective prosecution requires 
that conditions exist to contribute to a reliable outcome at trial [original footnote omitted, ChP]” and 









Although it is often stated that the ICC has no official travaux préparatoires,54 
the documents which come closest to the official records of the Rome Conference 
may be found in paragraph 23 of the Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (although these may not give the full picture to some).55 Here, it is stated that 
the Conference drew up the ICC Statute on the basis of: 
 
the deliberations recorded in the records of the Conference (A/CONF.183/SR.1 to 
SR.9) and of the Committee of the Whole (A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.1 to SR.42) and the 
reports of the Committee of the Whole (A/CONF.183/8) and of the Drafting 
Committee (A/CONF.183/C.1/L/64, L.65/Rev.1, L.66 and Add.1, L.67/Rev.1, 
L.68/Rev.2, L.82-L.88 and 91) (…).56     
 
In addition to this, it may also be worth looking at pre-Rome documents. This may 
not only be instructive;57 one could even argue that these documents fall under the 
legal definition of the travaux préparatoires. In the words of Ris: 
 
Travaux préparatoires consist of the written record of negotiations preceding the 
conclusion of a treaty. Lord McNair defined travaux préparatoires as “all the 
documents, such as memoranda, minutes of conferences, and drafts of the treaty 
under negotiation.” Travaux préparatoires thus include materials which documents 
                                                          
54 See Cassese 1999, p. 145: “First of all, unlike most multilateral treaties concluded under the auspices 
of the United Nations, in the case of the Rome Statute there hardly exist preparatory works reflecting the 
debates and negotiations that took place at the Rome Diplomatic Conference.” 
55 See Edwards 2001, p. 368, n. 191: “Some would argue that the travaux pr[é]paratoires can only 
consist of official documentation, as otherwise the door would be open for fraudulent assertions of what 
transpired during the negotiations. Like news reports, the unofficial documents are unchecked for 
accuracy by the delegates. The Final Act of the Rome Conference identified the recording of the Rome 
Conference deliberations as follows: “On the basis of the deliberations recorded in the records of the 
Conference (A/CONF.183/SR.1 to SR.9) and of the Committee of the Whole (A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.1 to 
SR.42) and the reports of the Committee of the Whole (A/CONF.183/8) and of the Drafting Committee 
(A/CONF.183/C.1/L/64, L.65/Rev.1, L.66 and Add.1, L.67/Rev.1, L.68/Rev.2, L.82-L.88 and 91), the 
Conference drew up the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” (…) However, it is 
abundantly clear that voluminous written material, and oral discussions were not memorialized in the 
conference records referred to in the Final Act.” 
56 Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court (to be found in United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 
1998, OR, Vol. I: Final Documents, A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. I), pp. 65ff), para. 23 (p. 69 of the above-
mentioned document A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. I)). 
57 See the ‘Letter dated 24 June 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 
Security Council’, 15 July 2005 (S/2005/458), Annex II: Report to the Secretary-General of the 
Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste 
(then East Timor) in 1999, 26 May 2005, para. 452: “There is no authoritative compilation of travaux 
préparatoires for the Statute that may serve as a supplementary means of interpretation in accordance 
with article 32 of the Vienna Convention. Nonetheless, references to drafts negotiated in advance of the 








the negotiations and other circumstances that culminated in the formal conclusion of a 
treaty [original footnotes omitted, ChP].58 
 
If travaux préparatoires consist of all the documents that culminated in the formal 
conclusion of a treaty (including drafts of the treaty in question) then there is no 
reason to maintain that the travaux préparatoires can only be found in the period of 
the Rome Conference itself (the summer of 1998) as the negotiations for the ICC 
Statute (including the drafting of statutes) started much earlier.  
Before the Statute was negotiated in Rome in the summer of 1998, several drafts 
and reports on the ICC had already been prepared by commissions and committees. 
The following documents were reviewed:59 the 1993 Report of the Working Group 
on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court,60 the 1994 ILC’s Draft 
Statute for an International Criminal Court,61 the 1995 Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,62 the 1996 
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Volume I (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during 
March-April and August 1996)63 and Volume II (Compilation of Proposals),64 the 
Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court as can be found in the 1998 Report 
of the Inter-Sessional Meeting – again of the Preparatory Committee – from 19 to 30 
January 1998 in Zutphen, the Netherlands65 and the Draft Statute for the 
International Criminal Court as can be found in the final 1998 Report of the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.66 
In one of these pre-Rome documents, one can find a small surprise. In paragraph 
122 of the 1996 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court (Volume I: ‘Proceedings of the Preparatory 
                                                          
58 Ris 1991, p. 112. 
59 One could go even further back in time. Edwards (2001, pp. 341 and 343), for example, also mentions 
the 1951 and 1953 ILC Draft Statutes and the 1981 Bassiouni Draft. Nevertheless, it is submitted that 
the 1993 document, the first document reviewed here, is certainly ‘old’ enough, as the ILC Draft, a 
document which appeared one year later, “was used as a starting point for negotiations at formal and 
informal pre-Rome Conference sessions”. (Ibid., p. 351.) Cf. also Arsanjani 1999, p. 22: “The Rome 
Conference was the culmination of a negotiating process that began in 1989 with a request by the 
General Assembly to the International law Commission to address the establishment of an international 
criminal court. In 1993 the Assembly asked the Commission to elaborate a draft statute for such a court 
as a matter of priority. The Commission completed its draft in 1994 [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
60 See the Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session, 3 May – 23 
July 1993, UNGA OR, Forty-eighth session, Supplement No. 10, A/48/10, pp. 100-132. 
61 See the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, to be found in: Report of the International 
Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May – 22 July 1994, UNGA OR, Forty-ninth 
session, Supplement No. 10, A/49/10, pp. 43ff.  
62 UNGA OR, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/50/22, 6 September 1995). 
63 UNGA OR, Fifty-first Session Supplement No. 22 (A/51/22, 13 September 1996). 
64 UNGA OR, Fifty-first Session Supplement No. 22A (A/51/22, 13 September 1996). 
65 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 16 March – 3 April 
1998, UNGA A/AC.249/1998/L.13, 4 February 1998. 
66 This report (A/CONF.183/2, 14 April 1998) can be found in: United Nations Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 








Committee during March-April and August 1996’),67 which falls under the general 
problem of the trigger mechanism of the ICC and the more specific issue 
‘Acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction, State consent requirements and the 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction: articles 21 and 22’,68 one can read:  
 
Some delegations supported the requirement, set out in article 21 (1) (b), calling for 
the consent of the custodial State and the State where the crime was committed. In 
their view, such a consent requirement was essential, since the Court could not 
function without the cooperation of these States. A comment was made that custody 
over a suspect, however, should be in accordance with international law; the maxim 
male captus, bene detentus should have no application to the jurisdiction of the 
Court. It was further stated that, as a general rule, the number of States whose consent 
was required should be kept to the minimum. Otherwise, the likelihood of one of 
these States not being party to the Statute would increase, precluding the Court from 
initiating proceedings [underlined emphasis in original and italicised emphasis added, 
ChP].69  
 
This comment, which seems to have been made particularly in the context of 
international law in general (and not so much in the context of international human 
rights law),70 was made by the Jamaican delegate Patrick Robinson71 and repeated 
by him in 1997 during the 52nd session of the UNGA’s Sixth (Legal) Committee:  
 
We would also wish to emphasize, as we did in our Statement at the 49th Session that, 
if a system is adopted whereby acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction is required by 
the custodial State in relation to a specific crime, the Statute must stipulate that such a 
State must have acquired custody in accordance with international law. For we cannot 
presume to be establishing a Court on the basis of the principles of international law, 
and at the same time, give succour to the maxim, male captus, bene detentus.72  
  
Comparable statements, although it is not sure whether the words male captus bene 
detentus were also used, were issued during the Rome negotiations. The first 
statement is again from Patrick Robinson, made during the 30th meeting of the 
Committee of the Whole on 9 July 1998.73 In the ‘Summary records of the meetings 
                                                          
67 UNGA OR, Fifty-first Session Supplement No. 22 (A/51/22, 13 September 1996). 
68 Ibid., p. 28. 
69 See also Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 25 March – 
12 April 1996, ‘Summary of the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee During the Period 25 March 
– 12 April 1996’, Rapporteur: Mr Jun Yoshida (Japan), A/AC.249/1, 7 May 1996, para. 139. 
70 See the context in which this comment was made, namely the question of States’ consent in the 
process of cooperation with the ICC.  
71 Although this study could merely assume that it was Mr Robinson who made the statement (see his 
comparable statement in the next footnote and accompanying text), Mr Robinson himself was so kind as 
to confirm this assumption. 
72 ‘Statement by Mr. Patrick Robinson, of the Jamaican delegation to the Sixth Committee on Agenda 
Item 150: Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ (23 October 1997, New York), available at: 
http://www.un.int/jamaica/item150.htm.  
73 See document A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.30 of 20 November 1998 (United Nations Diplomatic 








of the Committee of the Whole’, one can read: “He [Patrick Robinson, ChP] 
supported option 3 for article 7, paragraph 1,[74] but proposed the addition at the end 
of subparagraph (b) of the phrase “in accordance with international law”. The Court 
should not have jurisdiction on the basis of an unlawful arrest.”75  
The second statement was made a couple of hours later by the Mexican delegate 
González Gálvez, during the 31st meeting of the Committee of the Whole.76 In the 
‘Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole’, one can read the 
following words, which (again) focused on traditional international law (between 
States):  
 
Option 1 in article 7 was the most promising,[77] subject to certain amendments. Its 
paragraph 1 (b) should be amended by the addition of the words “in accordance with 
                                                                                                                                              
15 June – 17 July 1998, Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 30th Meeting, Held at the 
Headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations on Thursday, 9 July 1998, 
at 3 p.m.) or pp. 305ff of document A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II): United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 
1998, OR, Vol. II, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of 
the Whole). 
74 See p. 11 of document A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53 of 6 July 1998 (Discussion Paper prepared by the 
Bureau of the Committee of the Whole on Part 2 of the Draft Statute: Jurisdiction, Admissibility and 
Applicable Law): “Option 3 Where a situation has been referred to the Court by a State Party or where 
the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation, the Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to a crime 
referred to in article 5 provided that the following States are Parties to the Statute or have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crime in question in accordance with article 7 ter: (a) The 
State on the territory of which the act or omission in question occurred or, if the crime was committed 
on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft; and (b) The State that has 
custody of the suspect with respect to the crime.” 
75 Para. 14 of document A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.30 of 20 November 1998 (United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, 
15 June – 17 July 1998, Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 30th Meeting, Held at the 
Headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations on Thursday, 9 July 1998, 
at 3 p.m.) or p. 306 of document A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II): United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 
1998, OR, Vol. II, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of 
the Whole). 
76 See document A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.31 of 20 November 1998 (United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, 
15 June – 17 July 1998, Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 31st Meeting, Held at the 
Headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations on Thursday, 9 July 1998, 
at 6 p.m.) or pp. 313ff of document A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II): United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 
1998, OR, Vol. II, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of 
the Whole). 
77 See pp. 10-11 of document A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53 of 6 July 1998 (Discussion Paper prepared by the 
Bureau of the Committee of the Whole on Part 2 of the Draft Statute: Jurisdiction, Admissibility and 
Applicable Law): “Option 1 In the case of article 6, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 if one or more of the following States are 
Parties to the Statute, or have accepted jurisdiction in accordance with article 7ter: (a) The State on the 
territory of which the act or omission in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a 








international law”, to exclude the possibility of nationals of one country being 
kidnapped and brought before the courts of another country in violation of the rights 
of the territorial State.78 
 
González Gálvez made a comparable statement four days later, during the 34th 
meeting of the Committee of the Whole on 13 July 1998.79 In the ‘Summary records 
of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole’, one can read: “In article 7, he 
[González Gálvez, ChP] was in favour of option 1 for paragraph 2,[80] but there was 
a problem regarding subparagraph (b), which could be solved by the addition of the 
words “as long as the detention was in accordance with international law”.”81 
However, the different options (to which both delegates made suggestions) did not 
make it through. Although this fact seems to have been one of the reasons for at 
least one delegation (namely the Mexican one) to abstain in the vote,82 the non-
                                                                                                                                              
suspect with respect to the crime; (c) The State of which the accused of the crime is a national; or (d) 
The State of which the victim is a national.” 
78 Para. 35 of document A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.31 of 20 November 1998 (United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, 
15 June – 17 July 1998, Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 31st Meeting, Held at the 
Headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations on Thursday, 9 July 1998, 
at 6 p.m.) or p. 317 of document A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II): United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 
1998, OR, Vol. II, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of 
the Whole). 
79 See document A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34 of 20 November 1998 (United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, 
15 June – 17 July 1998, Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 34th Meeting, Held at the 
Headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations on Thursday, 13 July 
1998, at 3 p.m.) or pp. 327ff of document A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II): United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June 
– 17 July 1998, OR, Vol. II, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the 
Committee of the Whole). 
80 See p. 9 of document A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59 of 10 July 1998 (A proposal by the Bureau of the 
Committee of the Whole on Part 2 of the Draft Statute (Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law): 
“Option 1 In the case of article 6, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction with 
respect to a crime referred to in articles 5 ter and 5 quarter if one or more of the following States have 
accepted jurisdiction in accordance with article 7 bis or ter: (a) The State on the territory of which the 
act or omission in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the 
State of registration of that vessel or aircraft; (b) The State that has custody of the accused/suspect with 
respect to the crime; (c) The State of which the accused/suspect of the crime is a national; or (d) The 
State of which the victim is a national.” 
81 Para. 113 of document A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34 of 20 November 1998 (United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, 
15 June – 17 July 1998, Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 34th Meeting, Held at the 
Headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations on Thursday, 13 July 
1998, at 3 p.m.) or p. 334 of document A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II): United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June 
– 17 July 1998, OR, Vol. II, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the 
Committee of the Whole). 
82 In the ‘Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole’, one can read: “Further 
specific reservations by his [González Gálvez, ChP] delegation pertained (…) to the powers given to the 








inclusion of the suggested words of these two delegates does not say much about the 
general opinion of the 120 States which voted in favour of the ICC Statute with 
respect to the male captus issue as the relevant documents do not clarify why these 
suggestions were not accepted. It may indeed be that they were not accepted because 
the other delegations were of the opinion that the ICC should follow the male captus 
bene detentus rule, but it may also have been the case, and this is more likely, that 
they were not accepted for other reasons, for example, because the other delegates 
did not agree with the exact formulation. As explained earlier in this book, because 
many different male captus situations can be identified, one should be wary of 
making general statements on the male captus bene/male detentus maxim. The other 
delegations may have been of the opinion that the suggestions mentioned above 
were too generally formulated, and that these matters should not be regulated in 
abstracto in the ICC Statute itself, but that it should be up to the judges to 
determine, on a case-by-case basis, and taking every aspect of the specific case into 
account, what the consequences of a certain male captus will be. 
Be that as it may, the examination of several provisions from the ICC Statute and 
its travaux préparatoires have brought no clarity with respect to the male captus 
issue. Hence, this arguably means that on this issue, there is a legal lacuna which 
must be filled by looking at parts (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC 
Statute.  
However, before doing so, it is time to return to the problem related to the male 
captus issue, that of the release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention. As 
explained earlier, how should the deletion of the remedy of release from the right to 
liberty and security, as can be found in Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC 
Statute, be viewed? Should it be seen as a deliberate choice by the drafters that this 
remedy is not applicable to suspects or was it simply forgotten or not deemed 
essential enough to mention in the ICC Statute?  
It would, of course, be far clearer if the ICC Statute were unequivocally to have 
stated that the remedy is not applicable to suspects unlawfully arrested or detained, 
but that is not the case here.  
Furthermore, neither does the context of a provision such as Article 55 of the 
ICC Statute bring any relief. On the one hand, one could argue that the fact that that 
other, and also very broadly formulated,83 remedy in the case of an unlawful 
arrest/detention – financial compensation – was not left out of the ICC Statute, see 
                                                                                                                                              
to trial in foreign countries.” See para. 67 of document A/CONF.183/SR.9 of 25 January 1999 (United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, Rome, Italy, 15 June – 17 July 1998, Summary Record of the 9th Plenary Meeting, Held at the 
Headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations on Friday, 17 July 1998, 
at 10.30 p.m.) or p. 126 of document A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II): United Nations Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 
1998, OR, Vol. II, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of 
the Whole). 








Article 85, paragraph 1,84 may mean that the negotiators did not want to connect the 
general remedy of release with the right of liberty and security. This is the expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius argument: “[t]he expression of one thing is the exclusion 
of another”.85 On the other hand, one could also assert that this provision is in fact 
the best evidence that there is hence a right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s 
arrest and detention (which normally includes the remedy of release if that 
arrest/detention is unlawful).86 The fact that the remedy of release is missing does 
not necessarily mean it is unavailable. Cf. in that respect the discussion in the 
previous chapter with respect to Article 59 of the ICC Statute. Neither does this 
provision mention the remedy of release/refusal of surrender if the competent 
judicial authority determines that the person standing before it is not the one in 
whom the ICC is interested, but it is, of course, obvious that that authority can 
release the person/refuse surrender of that person if that person is not the one whom 
the ICC seeks to prosecute. In this context, one could also refer to Rule 185 of the 
ICC RPE (‘Release of a person from the custody of the Court other than upon 
completion of sentence’), paragraph 1, which may perhaps be seen as evidence for 
the assertion that the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention is 
covered by the proper instruments of the ICC: 
 
Subject to sub-rule 2, where a person surrendered to the Court is released from the 
custody of the Court because the Court does not have jurisdiction, the case is 
inadmissible under article 17, paragraph 1 (b), (c) or (d), the charges have not been 
confirmed under article 61, the person has been acquitted at trial or on appeal, or for 
any other reason, the Court shall, as soon as possible, make such arrangements as it 
considers appropriate for the transfer of the person, taking into account the views of 
the person, to a State which is obliged to receive him or her, to another State which 
agrees to receive him or her, or to a State which has requested his or her extradition 
with the consent of the original surrendering State. In this case, the host State shall 
facilitate the transfer in accordance with the agreement referred to in article 3, 
paragraph 2, and the related arrangements [emphasis added, ChP]. 
 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that this provision is very generally formulated. 
Finally, the object and purpose of the ICC Statute are not very illuminating either 
as both the importance of prosecution (which may more readily lead to a denial of 
the remedy) and prosecution in a correct, human rights respecting way (which may 
                                                          
84 “Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to 
compensation.” See also Chapter 10 of the RPE.  
85 Garner 2004, p. 1717. Cf. also Edwards 2001, p. 371, writing about the (comparable) inclusio unius 
est exclusio alterius argument. See finally Acquaviva 2007, p. 633 (writing on Art. 85 of the ICC Statute 
more generally): “[T]hat rule would seem to exclude the possibility of immediate release of the accused 
subject to the most serious violations, a remedy still contemplated by ICTY judges, at least in extreme 
cases.” 
86 See also Zappalà 2003, p. 77: “[I]t must be remembered that the fact that Article 85 of the ICC Statute 
provides for a right of compensation for unlawful arrest necessarily implies the existence of a right to 








more readily lead to an acceptance of the remedy) are stressed, see also supra (in the 
context of the male captus problem).  
As textual/contextual/teleological interpretation of this provision has brought no 
relief (Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), one should turn, 
again, to the travaux préparatoires of the ICC Statute (Article 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties). These may possibly shed a light on the 
question why this remedy of release is lacking in the ICC Statute. It is important to 
find out whether the drafters – perhaps anticipating the problems of a court without 
an enforcement arm87 or being aware of the problems of the remedy already 
identified in Chapter III of this study – may have deliberately left out this remedy of 
release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention. After all, if that were the case, 
then part (b) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute (which, as will be 
shown, does include this remedy of release) cannot be looked at because part (a) is 
clear – in that the remedy of release is not available to suspects unlawfully 
arrested/detained – and hence does not leave a legal lacuna which must be filled by 
part (b). That would not only be the position of Edwards, but also of the judges in 
the December 2006 decision of the Appeals Chamber mentioned supra. They would 
argue that ICC legislation is exhaustive on the matter (namely in that the drafters 
only wanted to maintain the general words which can be connected to the right to 
liberty and security88 and not the more specific remedy of a release in the case of an 
unlawful arrest/detention) and hence that part (b) does not need to be looked to. 
Finally, one could argue that the views of Verhoeven would also lead to this result. 
This is, of course, unproblematic if one interprets Verhoeven’s words to support the 
idea that part (b) will only be applied if part (a) has left a legal lacuna. However, 
even if one follows the interpretation that Verhoeven’s words mean that part (b) 
must also be applied if part (a) does provide an answer, one would reach the same 
result because “[t]here is no reason to construe the latter in a way that is inconsistent 
with the former, if this is not clearly the intent of the drafters of the statute 
[emphasis added, ChP]”. Hence, even if part (b) can be applied if part (a) has 
provided an answer and even if part (a) cannot be construed inconsistently with 
general international law, this is different when this was clearly the drafters’ intent. 
If it was clearly the drafters’ intention to leave out the remedy of release, then part 
(b)/general international law cannot be applied in this view.  
However, if it is not clear that the drafters intended to delete this remedy (for 
example, because an examination of the travaux préparatoires shows that the 
deletion may have been caused by the complexities of the negotiations leading up to 
the ICC Statute),89 then part (a) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute can 
be qualified as unclear, leaving a legal lacuna and justifying looking to part (b).  
                                                          
87 Cf. the final words of n. 188 of the previous chapter. 
88 Namely that a person shall not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, and shall not be deprived 
of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established in 
this Statute. 
89 Cf. in that respect Edwards, writing about the search and seizure right to privacy: “It might be argued 
that the conspicuous omission of the express search and seizure privacy right evidences the drafters’ 








In short, one must now turn to the travaux préparatoires of the ICC Statute to 
see whether these provide an answer to this issue. In this context, the same 
documents which were examined with respect to the male captus issue will be 
reviewed here. 
First of all, the documents which come closest to the official records of the Rome 
Conference, which can be found in paragraph 23 of the Final Act of the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court,90 say nothing on the omission of the remedy of 
release.  
Thus, it may be good to also look at the pre-Rome documents, namely the 1994 
ILC’s Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court,91 the 1995 Report of the Ad 
Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,92 the 1996 
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Volume I (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during 
March-April and August 1996)93 and Volume II (Compilation of Proposals),94 the 
Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court as can be found in the 1998 Report 
of the Inter-Sessional Meeting – again of the Preparatory Committee – from 19 to 30 
January 1998 in Zutphen, the Netherlands95 and the Draft Statute for the 
International Criminal Court as can be found in the final 1998 Report of the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.96  
With respect to the 1994 document, it is first interesting to note that the provision 
on arrest (Article 28) says nothing on illegal arrests or detentions or their 
consequences.97 Nevertheless, in the commentary to this provision, the more general 
                                                                                                                                              
right was omitted not because the drafters believed that suspects and accused persons did not deserve the 
right, but rather because delegates believed that the right was or should be incorporated elsewhere in the 
treaty’s collateral instruments.” (Edwards 2001, p. 349.) 
90 See n. 55 and accompanying text. 
91 See the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, to be found in: Report of the International 
Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May – 22 July 1994, UNGA OR, Forty-ninth 
session, Supplement No. 10, A/49/10, pp. 43ff. Note that the 1993 preliminary version of this Draft 
Statute will not be mentioned in this overview as it does not deal with releases in the case of unlawful 
arrests/detentions. (It only addresses releases on bail, see Art. 35, Report of the Working Group on a 
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, to be found in: Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session, 3 May – 23 July 1993, UNGA OR, Forty-eighth 
session, Supplement No. 10, A/48/10, p. 116.)  
92 UNGA OR, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/50/22, 6 September 1995). 
93 UNGA OR, Fifty-first Session Supplement No. 22 (A/51/22, 13 September 1996). 
94 UNGA OR, Fifty-first Session Supplement No. 22A (A/51/22, 13 September 1996). 
95 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 16 March – 3 April 
1998, UNGA A/AC.249/1998/L.13, 4 February 1998. 
96 This report (A/CONF.183/2, 14 April 1998) can be found in: United Nations Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 
1998, OR, Vol. III, Reports and other documents (A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. III)), pp. 5-92. 
97 However, para. 2 does clarify that a provisional detention, without a confirmation of the indictment, 
cannot last forever: “A suspect who has been provisionally arrested is entitled to release from arrest if 
the indictment has not been confirmed within 90 days of the arrest, or such longer time as the 








remark is made that “[p]rovisions dealing with the arrest and detention of an 
accused person are drafted so as to ensure compliance with relevant provisions of 
the ICCPR, especially article 9”.98 Article 29 (‘Pre-trial detention or release’) is 
more specific and most interesting for this discussion. Here, the right to liberty and 
security can be found, including the remedy of release if the arrest or detention99 is 
deemed unlawful.100 What does the commentary to this provision say? First, the 
general remark is again made that this provision “is drafted so as to ensure 
conformity with article 9 of the ICCPR”.101 What follows next, at first sight, quite 
clearly describes the different responsibilities of the national judicial officer and the 
ICC in the arrest and detention procedure and therefore merits reproduction here in 
its entirety:  
 
It requires that any person arrested pursuant to a warrant issued under article 28 
should be brought promptly before a judicial officer of the State in which the arrest 
occurred, who should determine, in accordance with the procedures applicable in that 
State, whether the warrant has been duly served and that the rights of the accused 
have been respected. The Commission acknowledges that there is some risk in 
entrusting these powers to a State official (usually a magistrate or some similar person 
exercising similar functions under national law) rather than before an organ of the 
Court. However, it is essential under article 9 (3) of the ICCPR that this preliminary 
opportunity for review of the arrest be provided promptly, and in practice this can 
only be done in this way. Since ex hypothesi the arresting State will be cooperating 
with the Court, there is no reason to expect that this preliminary procedure will cause 
difficulties. (…) On the other hand, release whether unconditionally or on bail 
pending trial is a matter for the Presidency. In conformity with article 9 (4) of the 
                                                                                                                                              
of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May – 22 July 1994, 
UNGA OR, Forty-ninth session, Supplement No. 10, A/49/10, p. 97. 
98 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, to be found in: Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May – 22 July 1994, UNGA OR, Forty-ninth 
session, Supplement No. 10, A/49/10, p. 97. 
99 This, by the way, again confirms the position taken in this study that a judge must not only release a 
person if he finds that his detention is unlawful, but also if his arrest is unlawful. This is arguably to be 
welcomed for it is the entire deprivation of liberty (arrest and detention) which should matter. See n. 583 
and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
100 See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May – 22 
July 1994, UNGA OR, Forty-ninth session, Supplement No. 10, A/49/10, p. 98: “1. A person arrested 
shall be brought promptly before a judicial officer of the State where the arrest occurred. The judicial 
officer shall determine, in accordance with the procedures applicable in that State, that the warrant has 
been duly served and that the rights of the accused have been respected. 2. A person arrested may apply 
to the Presidency for release pending trial. The Presidency may release the person unconditionally or on 
bail if it is satisfied that the accused will appear at the trial. 3. A person arrested may apply to the 
Presidency for a determination of the lawfulness under this Statute of the arrest or detention. If the 
Presidency decides that the arrest or detention was unlawful, it shall order the release of the accused, 
and may award compensation. 4. A person arrested shall be held, pending trial or release on bail, in an 
appropriate place of detention in the arresting State, in the State in which the trial is to be held or if 
necessary, in the host State [emphasis added, ChP].” 
101 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, to be found in: Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May – 22 July 1994, UNGA OR, Forty-ninth 








ICCPR, it is provided that a person arrested pursuant to a warrant issued under article 
28 may apply to the Court for a determination of the lawfulness under this Statute of 
the arrest or detention: see paragraph 3. The Court must decide whether the arrest and 
detention were lawful, and if not it shall order the release of the accused. In the case 
of wrongful arrest it may award compensation accordingly, as required by article 9 
(5) of the ICCPR (…). The Commission believes that the full range of guarantees to 
suspects and accused persons should be provided in the draft Statute.102    
 
Hence, in this version of the right, both the national judicial officer and the ICC 
review the legality of the arrest (and detention). Notwithstanding this, only the ICC, 
in the form of the Presidency, has the power to release a person. The national 
authorities are merely there to check whether the rights of the suspect have been 
respected. In that respect, one can wonder why the Commission states that it is 
aware of the fact “that there is some risk in entrusting these powers to a State 
official (…) rather than before an organ of the Court”. After all, the national 
authorities cannot release the suspect. An explanation may therefore be that the ICC 
finds it risky to involve the national authorities, not in the enforcement of ICC 
requests to arrest and the like (which is, of course, a normal feature of an 
international criminal court without its own police force), but in the actual legal 
process, for example, because a legal determination of what happened in the pre-
trial phase made at the national level may have consequences for the legal phase in 
The Hague.  
Be that as it may, it is also interesting to note that the following phrase from 
Article 29, paragraph 3 of this 1994 document, even though it states quite generally 
that “[i]f the Presidency decides that the arrest or detention was unlawful, it shall 
order the release of the accused, and may award compensation”,103 is preceded by 
the words: “A person arrested may apply to the Presidency for a determination of 
the lawfulness under this Statute of the arrest or detention [emphasis added, ChP]”. 
This is reminiscent, of course, of the present Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC 
Statute, stating that a person under investigation “[s]hall not be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention, and shall not be deprived of his or her liberty except on 
such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established in this 
Statute [emphasis added, ChP]”. In Chapter VIII, see footnote 168 of that chapter, it 
was argued that this probably means that all the arrest and detention provisions in 
the ICC Statute, including Article 59 of the ICC Statute, which in turn refers to, 
among other things, national procedural law, must be complied with before one can 
speak of a proper deprivation of liberty in the context of the ICC. In that respect, 
national law would also enter this habeas corpus provision. The reference to 
national law in the 1994 document is not absent either, although it is more 
restricted.104 One can, of course, speculate as to what would happen under this 
                                                          
102 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, to be found in: Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May – 22 July 1994, UNGA OR, Forty-ninth 
session, Supplement No. 10, A/49/10, pp. 98-99. 
103 See n. 100. 








regime if a suspect were arrested or detained in clear contravention of the national 
legal rules of the State where he was arrested/detained (including that State’s 
international legal (human rights) obligations). It seems that in such a case, the 
national legal authority would conclude that the suspect’s rights were violated but 
would not have the power to order his release. Although this power of release is 
explicitly granted to the Presidency, the latter would only release a person if the 
arrest/detention was unlawful under the Statute. And since the reference to national 
law, in this 1994 Statute, is quite restricted, one can wonder whether the Presidency 
could release a person in such a case. A more general statement that an arrest or 
detention cannot be arbitrary (which is present in the current Statute) might have 
solved this, but such a general statement is lacking in the 1994 document.  
Perhaps because of this possible lacuna in the suspect’s human rights protection, 
questions regarding the exact scope of this right cropped up in the 1995 Ad Hoc 
Committee’s report. For example, Annex I of this report (entitled ‘Guidelines for the 
consideration of the question of the relationship between States parties, non-States 
parties and the International Criminal Court’) includes the following questions on 
the issue ‘accused’s challenges to the lawfulness of detention’:  
 
- Decided by the court (art. 29(3)) or by national authorities? - Does recourse to the 
court under article 29(3) exclude accused’s fundamental rights under national law to 
challenge in national courts the lawfulness of detention? If not, what is locus standi of 
the international criminal court in proceedings before a national court?105 
 
In the 1996 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, another effort was made to divide the responsibility 
between the national authorities and the ICC in the context of reviewing the legality 
of the actual arrest and detention. In Volume I of this report, suggestions were made 
to shift responsibility to review the legality of the arrest and detention to the national 
authorities. The ICC could then review such issues as the legality of the arrest 
warrant and the orders for detention. Although it is not mentioned very clearly, it 
seems that the national authority would in that case also be authorised to release a 
person in the case of an unlawful arrest or detention – though the Statute must make 
guidelines (for the national authorities?) “for the grounds for detention and release 
for those occasions when the Court [through the national authorities?, ChP] has 
custody of the suspect”.106 Another excerpt from the report related to this discussion 
                                                          
105 See UNGA OR, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/50/22, 6 September 1995), p. 53. In the 
report itself (and not its annex), one can read comparable information in paras. 147-152 and in paras. 
204 and 216. 
106 UNGA OR, Fifty-first Session Supplement No. 22 (A/51/22, 13 September 1996), para. 243. The 
entire paragraph goes: “It was felt that article 29 on pre-trial detention or release needed further 
clarification in respect, inter alia, of the determination by the judicial officer of the warrant duly served 
and the purpose of such determination. It was suggested that the determination of the lawfulness of the 
arrest or detention, as well as bail, should be made by the relevant national authorities. A view was 
expressed that what the Court could determine was the lawfulness of its arrest warrants and its requests 








is not very clear either. Although it states (arguably quite broadly) “that the 
requested State should ensure that the views of the Prosecutor in regard to any 
release of the suspect or the accused should be brought to the attention of the 
judicial officer [emphasis added, ChP]”107 (this could thus also encompass a release 
after a determination of the unlawfulness of the arrest or detention), this sentence is 
preceded by the words: “It was further suggested that issues of detention prior to 
surrender, including bail or provisional release, should be determined by national 
authorities and not by the International Criminal Court, as envisaged in the draft 
statute.”108 The words “issues of detention prior to surrender” could, of course, 
include the situation that the surrender would never take place because a person has 
already been released as a result of an unlawful arrest or detention, but is seems that 
the sentence containing the words “any release” seems more focused on ‘mere’ 
interim releases pending/prior to surrender/trial.   
However, in Volume II of the 1996 report, under the question ‘If the Court (or 
the appropriate national authorities) decides that the arrest or detention was illegal, 
what are the consequences of that decision?’,109 the proposals not only state that the 
ICC must review the legality of the arrest warrants and the orders for detention (as 
                                                                                                                                              
detention and release for those occasions when the Court had custody of the suspect [emphasis added, 
ChP].” 
107 Ibid., para. 323. The entire paragraph goes: “On the question of the role of national authorities, in 
particular the judiciary, in the execution of the Court’s requests for provisional arrest, pre-surrender 
detention or surrender of the accused to the Court, there was general support for the view that the Statute 
should permit involvement of national courts in the application of national law where those 
requirements were considered fundamental, especially to protect the rights of individuals, as well as to 
verify procedural legality. Mention was made in this connection, of the difficulties that many States 
would have with a direct enforcement of an arrest warrant issued by the Court, as opposed to an indirect 
enforcement through available national mechanisms. It was suggested that, as a minimum, it should be 
possible to challenge in a national court of the requested State a document purporting to be a warrant – 
without the examination of the warrant in relation to substantive law – and that there should be a 
national forum in which to adjudicate upon any admissibility dispute, at least as regards double 
jeopardy. It was further suggested that issues of detention prior to surrender, including bail or 
provisional release, should be determined by national authorities and not by the International Criminal 
Court, as envisaged in the draft statute. It was considered necessary, however, that the requested State 
should ensure that the views of the Prosecutor in regard to any release of the suspect or the accused 
should be brought to the attention of the judicial officer. In this regard, it was emphasized that there 
must be a very close working relationship between the Prosecutor and States parties in implementing the 
Court’s request for assistance and surrender, and that the Statute should be sufficiently flexible so as to 
take this into account, while at the same time giving due attention to the rights of the individuals and the 
State’s international obligations. The view was also expressed that the transfer of the accused to the 
Court or to the detaining State could be an appropriate point for shifting the primary responsibility over 
the accused from the national authorities to the International Criminal Court. With regard to the question 
of who should execute surrender, it was suggested that, for practical reasons, the Statute should provide 
for an option for execution by the custodial State, although there was also the view in favour of 
execution, in principle, by officials of the Court only [emphasis added, ChP].” 
108 Ibid. (See the previous footnote). 








one can find back in Volume I),110 but also that the ICC must decide more generally 
on the lawfulness of the arrest and detention.111 This possible discrepancy between 
Volume I and Volume II may be explained by the fact that these proposals are not 
exhaustive,112 but they show in any case that there was as yet no clear consensus in 
1996 on the division of responsibility in this area and on the exact scope of the right, 
including perhaps (but probably not) the question of whether or not the remedy of 
release was to be included in this right.113 A final interesting point from Volume II 
                                                          
110 See, for example, Proposal No. 4: “If the Presidency decides that the arrest warrant or order of 
detention was unlawful, it shall order the withdrawal of all requests for surrender and for provisional 
arrest made pursuant to the warrant of order, and may award compensation.” (Ibid., p. 143.) 
111 See ibid., pp. 143-144. Proposal No. 1 (identical to the 1994 ILC Draft) goes: “A person arrested may 
apply to the Presidency for a determination of the lawfulness under this Statute of the arrest or detention. 
If the Presidency decides that the arrest or detention was unlawful, it shall order the release of the 
accused, and may award compensation.” (Ibid., p. 143.) Proposal No. 2 reads: “If the Preliminary 
Investigations Chamber decides to release the person concerned because his arrest or detention was 
unlawful, it may award him compensation.” (Ibid.) Proposals Nos. 3 and 5 do not go into the matter of 
release. Proposal No. 3 goes: “The Court shall make compensation to those who were: (a) pronounced 
innocent by an irrevocable adjudication; (b) arrested or detained for the purpose of prosecution, 
although the prosecution against him did not eventually take place; (c) arrested or detained but the 
lawfulness of that arrest or detention was denied in accordance with this Statute; or (d) illegally inflicted 
losses upon by an officer of the Court, intentionally or negligently in the course of performing its duties. 
Procedures and criteria for compensation shall be provided in the rules, including the expenses to be 
borne by a complaint State if that State lodged a complaint without enough reason.” (Ibid.) The 
(incomplete) Proposal No. 5 reads: “A person arrested may apply to the Presidency for a determination 
of the lawfulness under this Statute of the arrest or detention. The Presidency shall in any case review ex 
officio every 30 days the lawfulness under this Statute of the arrest or detention. If the Presidency 
decides...[emphasis in original, ChP]”. (Ibid.) The last proposal, No. 6, is a combination of Proposals 
Nos. 1, 2 and 4. It does state more generally that the reviewing authority shall order the release in the 
case of an unlawful arrest or detention, but this sentence is preceded by the sentence in which the 
request of the accused is limited to the lawfulness ‘of any arrest warrant or order of determination’: “A 
person arrested may apply to the Presidency for a determination of the lawfulness under this Statute of 
any arrest warrant or order of determination issued by the Court. If the Presidency decides that the arrest 
or detention was unlawful under the Statute, it shall order the release of the accused, and may award 
compensation.” (Ibid., p. 144.) 
112 See the note at ibid., p. 108 (where Part 4 (‘Investigation and Prosecution’) starts): “The following is 
a compilation prepared by an informal group dealing with procedural questions, fair trial and rights of 
the accused covering parts 4, 5 and 6. It neither represents a text agreed upon among delegations nor 
suggests that every provision should be included in the Statute. It contains only written proposals. 
Proposals for some of the articles have been consolidated to various degrees by some of their authors 
and may not necessarily represent the views of all the delegations who submitted proposals. The order 
of the articles as well as the proposed content and headings are only of an indicative character and have 
not been finally agreed upon. The compilation does not prejudice discussion on other topics related to 
the establishment of an international criminal court.” 
113 One could argue that the proposals mentioned in ns. 110-111 in general would accept this remedy. It 
is true that Proposal No. 3 does not mention the remedy of release, but this proposal only seems to focus 
on the question in which situations one should provide compensation. Proposal No. 4 does not mention 
release either but it seems clear that if the ICC withdraws requests for surrender, the person who was to 
be surrendered will also be released. Finally, Proposal No. 5 does not mention release either but this 
proposal is incomplete. Besides the proposals mentioned under the question ‘If the Court (or the 
appropriate national authorities) decides that the arrest or detention was illegal, what are the 
consequences of that decision?’, it may also be good, for the sake of completeness, to refer to a proposal 








of the 1996 report is that the following general statement (which was still lacking) 
was proposed: “No person shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. Nor 
shall any person be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance 
with such procedures as are established by the rules of the Court.”114 Even if the last 
sentence were only to refer to the provisions of the Statute (and not, for example, to 
national procedures, although provisions in the Statute may, of course, in turn refer 
to national procedures), the first sentence is generally formulated and, given the 
word “nor”, clearly separated from the second sentence, which would mean that any 
deprivation of liberty in the context of an ICC case, including the crucial part at the 
national level, must be non-arbitrary.  
During the Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Preparatory Committee in Zutphen in 
January 1998, another Draft Statute was prepared.  
In the new Article 29 (Article 53), the division of responsibility had apparently 
finally been settled: the national judicial authority was there to “determine, in 
accordance with the law of that State, that the warrant applies to that person and the 
person has been arrested in accordance with the proper process and that the person’s 
rights have been respected”.115 What would happen were the national judge to 
decide that the person had been arrested or detained unlawfully remains unclear. In 
any case, the remedy of release is not explicitly mentioned.116 Conversely, the ICC 
does have the explicit power to release a person but here again, the formulation of 
the provision is quite ambiguous. Although it states quite generally that the ICC – 
whether in the form of the Presidency or the Pre-Trial Chamber – shall order the 
release of the person in the case of an unlawful arrest or detention under the 
Statute117 – note, however, the previously mentioned and possibly restrictive power 
of the words “under the Statute”118 – this sentence is preceded by the following 
                                                                                                                                              
UNGA OR, Fifty-first Session Supplement No. 22A (A/51/22, 13 September 1996), p. 145. Paras. 2 and 
3 go as follows: “2. A person arrested shall be brought promptly before a judicial officer in the custodial 
State who shall determine, in accordance with the law of that State, that the person has been arrested in 
accordance with the proper process and that the person’s rights have been respected. 3. A person 
arrested may apply to the Presidency for a determination of the lawfulness under this Statute of any 
arrest warrant or order of determination issued by the Court. If the Presidency decides that the arrest or 
detention was unlawful under the Statute, it shall order the release of the accused, and may award 
compensation.” This proposal is very much reminiscent of the old Art. 29 (paras. 1 and 3) from the 1994 
ILC document, see n. 100. 
114 See Proposal No. 4 (at UNGA OR, Fifty-first Session Supplement No. 22A (A/51/22, 13 September 
1996), p. 130) to the question “Is it possible – and on which grounds – to order measures restricting or 
suppressing the liberty of an accused before the indictment?” (ibid., p. 128). 
115 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 16 March – 3 April 
1998, UNGA A/AC.249/1998/L.13, 4 February 1998, p. 102, para. 2. 
116 The national judicial authority, on the other hand, does have the explicit right to grant interim release 
but that is, of course, quite another issue. (See ibid., para. 3.) The same right is explicitly granted to the 
ICC as well, see ibid., para. 4. 
117 See ibid., para. 8: “If the [Presidency] [Pre-Trial Chamber] decides that the arrest or detention was 
unlawful under the Statute, it shall order the release of the person, [and may award compensation] [in 
accordance with article...] [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
118 However, note also that that refers to the provisions in the Statute, which, in turn, may refer to 
national proceedings (which are more often mentioned in this document than in the one of 1994). It must 








restricting words: “A person arrested may apply to the [Presidency] [Pre-Trial 
Chamber] for a determination of the lawfulness under this Statute of any arrest 
warrant or order of detention issued by the Court.” The question thus arises as to 
whether the ICC would also have the power to release a person if more generally it 
finds that his arrest or detention was unlawful under the Statute or whether this 
remedy would only be granted if the arrest warrant or order of detention is found to 
be unlawful.  
The final pre-Rome document, the report of the Preparatory Committee from 14 
April 1998,119 presents two options for the present discussion. In the provision on 
pre-trial detention or release (now numbered as Article 60), one can read that the 
national judicial authority and the ICC have exactly the same authority as already 
granted to them in the Zutphen Draft.120 Nevertheless, one page later, one will find a 
heading entitled ‘Further option for articles 58 to 61’. In a footnote in this report, 
one can read the rationale behind this inclusion, which, by the way, also received 
criticism for omitting “procedures of a substantive nature which have been included 
in the text of the same articles above”:121  
 
                                                                                                                                              
the following general statement which could offer a broad protection, both with respect to the provisions 
of the ICC Statute and the national law provisions on arrest and detention. This statement was made in 
the context of (then) Art. 52 (cf. the old Art. 28 from the 1994 Draft), the provision on arrest: “No 
person shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. Nor shall any person be deprived of his liberty 
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by the rules of the 
Court.” (Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 16 March – 3 
April 1998, UNGA A/AC.249/1998/L.13, 4 February 1998, p. 100, para. 1.) In a footnote attached to 
this statement (see ibid., n. 171), which was put between brackets, one can read that “[i]t was suggested 
that this provision could be moved to article 47[26], paragraph 6.” 
119 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
Document A/CONF.183/2, 14 April 1998, to be found in United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 
1998, OR, Vol. III, Reports and other documents (A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. III)), pp. 5-92.  
120 For the national context, see United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998, OR, Vol. III, Reports 
and other documents (A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. III)), pp. 48-49 (Art. 60, para. 3): “A person arrested shall 
be brought promptly before a competent judicial authority in the custodial State who shall determine, in 
accordance with the law of that State, that the warrant applies to that person and the person has been 
arrested in accordance with the proper process and that the person’s rights have been respected.” For the 
international context, see ibid., p. 49 (Art. 60, para. 9): “A person arrested may apply to the [Presidency] 
[Pre-Trial Chamber] for a determination of the lawfulness under this Statute of any arrest warrant or 
order of detention issued by the Court. If the [Presidency] [Pre-Trial Chamber] decides that the arrest or 
detention was unlawful under the Statute, it shall order the release of the person, [and may award 
compensation] [in accordance with article...] [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Note also that the 
general statement, which could be found in Art. 52 of the Zutphen Draft and about which it was 
suggested that it be moved to another provision (see n. 118), can now be found in the new provision on 
arrest (Art. 59), but also here, one can read, again in a footnote (see ibid., p. 48, n. 156), that “[i]t was 
suggested that this provision could be moved to article 54, paragraph 10.” 
121 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998, OR, Vol. III, Reports and other documents 








The proposal represents a simplified and somewhat restructured text for articles 58 to 
61. This simplified version of these articles has been achieved as a result of the 
adoption of the framework outlined in document A/AC.249/1998/WG.4/DP.36 and 
the withdrawal or abbreviation by many delegations of their proposals currently 
contained in document A/AC.249/1998/L.13 [this is the Zutphen Draft, ChP]. This 
reflects a decision by many of the authors to move away from national positions 
towards a single, straightforward procedural approach, acceptable to delegations 
representing different national legal systems. The proposal does not attempt to resolve 
issues such as the trigger mechanism or powers of the Prosecutor. Similarly, it does 
not attempt to incorporate at this time procedures relating to challenges to 
admissibility or jurisdiction. The purpose of the proposed text, if delegations agree, is 
to provide a basis for a more focused and efficient discussion in Rome of the 
procedural stages addressed in the above articles 58 to 61.122 
 
Although the most relevant article for the present discussion so far was entitled ‘Pre-
trial detention or release’, the remedy of release was left out in the title of the most 
relevant article under this new proposal: Article 59 (‘Arrest proceedings in the 
custodial State’). In this article, one can read that the national judicial authority has 
maintained its powers, which again do not explicitly mention a remedy (including 
the remedy of release) if this authority determines that a person was not arrested 
according to the proper process or that his rights were violated.123 With respect to 
the ICC’s role in this context, it states:  
 
[4. Pending a decision on [surrender][extradition], a person may apply to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber for a determination of the lawfulness under this Statute of any arrest warrant 
issued by the Court. If the Pre-Trial Chamber decides that the arrest warrant was 
unlawful under the Statute, it shall order the release of the person. [original footnote 
omitted, ChP]]124 
 
What one can see here is that the legality test of the ICC has been restricted to the 
arrest warrant alone.125 The previously mentioned and broader formulation “if the 
Presidency/Pre-Trial Chamber decides that the arrest or detention was unlawful 
under the Statute, it shall order the release of the person” has suddenly disappeared. 
Moreover, the footnote attached to this proposal reads: “Serious questions were 
                                                          
122 Ibid., p. 50, n. 166. 
123 See ibid., p. 51, Art. 59, para. 2: “A person arrested shall be brought promptly before a competent 
judicial authority in the custodial State who shall determine, in accordance with the law of that State, 
that the warrant applies to that person, that the person has been arrested in accordance with the proper 
process, and that the person’s rights have been respected.” 
124 Ibid., p. 51, Art. 59, para. 4. 
125 Note, however, that in document A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.40 of 1 July 1998 – a discussion paper 
of the Committee of the Whole’s Working Group on Procedural Matters – one can see that the scope of 
Art. 59, para. 4 was apparently perceived to be bigger. The Working Group listed a number of 
(potential) functions of the Pre-Trial Chamber and (potential) function 12 reads: “Determination of 
lawfulness of arrest pending surrender. Article 59 (4).” See also the French version of this document: 
“Déterminer la légalité de l’arrestation en attendant la remise. Article 59 [(]4).” The Spanish version 
does, however, focus on the arrest warrant alone: “Determinación de la legalidad de la orden de 








raised about the grounds on which such a challenge would be based and whether this 
provision was needed at all in the light of the procedures for judicial review of the 
arrest warrant and judicial confirmation of the charges for trial.”126  
As can be seen in the final Statute, the new streamlined proposal (‘Further option 
for articles 58 to 61’) was indeed accepted to a great extent. This means that first, 
the role of the national judicial authority was maintained (without explicitly 
mentioning the possibility for this authority to release a person if it is decided that 
the person was not arrested according to the proper process or that his rights were 
violated)127 and secondly, that the more generally formulated power of the ICC to 
release a person in the case of an unlawful arrest or detention (which could still be 
found in the first (but not second, streamlined) option of the final report of the 
Preparatory Committee) was deleted. The new and restricted power of the ICC as 
proposed in the streamlined proposal, namely to release a person in the case of an 
unlawful arrest warrant, was also deleted,128 following the remark mentioned above, 
namely “whether this provision was needed at all”.129  
Has this review brought a solution to the question of whether it was clearly the 
intent of the drafters of the ICC Statute not to grant the remedy of release to a 
person unlawfully arrested or detained? This is an important question but also one 
which is very difficult to answer.  
On the one hand, one could argue that this was indeed the intention of the 
drafters. After all, how else can one explain the fact that this remedy was omitted in 
the final Statute whereas one could still read the following words in the 1998 final 
report of the Preparatory Committee (this is not the streamlined proposal): “If the 
[Presidency] [Pre-Trial Chamber] decides that the arrest or detention was unlawful 
under the Statute, it shall order the release of the person, [and may award 
compensation] [in accordance with article…] [original footnote omitted, ChP].”130 
This can only point to a deliberate choice not to grant this remedy to persons 
unlawfully arrested or detained.   
On the other hand, one could also argue that it is not clear that the drafters of the 
ICC really wanted this remedy not to be available to suspects and that it may very 
                                                          
126 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998, OR, Vol. III, Reports and other documents 
(A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. III)), p. 51, n. 172. 
127 See also Sluiter 2003 C, pp. 624-625: “[T]he provision is silent as to what happens upon a 
determination that a person’s rights have in fact been violated. Do the national authorities grant the 
remedies they deem appropriate?” 
128 See also the version of Art. 59 from the Report of the Working Group on Procedural Matters 
(A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.2 of 24 June 1998). 
129 See n. 126 and accompanying text. 
130 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 17 July 1998, OR, Vol. III, Reports and other documents 
(A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. III)), p. 49 (Art. 60, para. 9). Note, however, the possible restrictions of this 
article, namely the fact that it speaks of “unlawful under the Statute [emphasis added, ChP]” and the fact 
that this phrase was preceded by this one: “A person arrested may apply to the [Presidency] [Pre-Trial 
Chamber] for a determination of the lawfulness under this Statute of any arrest warrant or order of 








well be the case that they thought that the remedy would be moved to another part of 
the Statute or that it was unnecessary to mention it at all (because it was clear that 
such a remedy, perhaps on the basis of implied powers,131 could be granted in 
situations of unlawful arrest and detention). That view can be supported by the 
following three arguments.  
The first argument has to do with the disappearance of the above-mentioned 
words that “If the [Presidency] [Pre-Trial Chamber] decides that the arrest or 
detention was unlawful under the Statute, it shall order the release of the person, 
[and may award compensation] [in accordance with article…] [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” This deletion was triggered by the new streamlined proposal in the 
final report of the Preparatory Committee. This (simplified!) proposal was ‘only’ 
negotiated “to provide a basis for a more focused and efficient discussion in Rome 
of the procedural stages in the above articles 58 to 61”. This purpose, combined with 
the proposal’s disclaimer that it “does not attempt to incorporate at this time 
procedures relating to challenges to admissibility or jurisdiction”, may be used as an 
argument to state that the negotiators did not want to delete the remedy of release in 
the case of an unlawful arrest/detention altogether, but only at this time (to speed up 
the negotiations) and only in this place (the negotiators may have thought that the 
remedy was perhaps going to be included in the articles pertaining to the challenges 
to admissibility or jurisdiction). In that context, one may again refer, see supra, to 
the release from Rule 185 (‘Release of a person from the custody of the Court other 
than upon completion of sentence’), paragraph 1 of the ICC RPE.  
The second argument is that the drafters may have thought that the possibility for 
release in the case of an unlawful arrest or detention was included in the powers of 
the national judicial authority. In the first (1996) report of the Preparatory 
Committee, it was stated “that the transfer of the accused to the Court or to the 
detaining State could be an appropriate point for shifting the primary responsibility 
over the accused from the national authorities to the International Criminal 
Court”.132 That could mean that the ICC is of the opinion that the pre-surrender 
phase is mainly the responsibility of the national judicial authority and that – apart 
                                                          
131 See El Zeidy 2006, p. 458: “[T]he ICC ‘must be deemed’ to have implied powers to rule on any 
violation resulting from the non-compliance with the terms of the Statute, which are essential to the 
‘performance’ of its functions, despite the lack of an explicit provision to that effect.” That is indeed 
true, although it must also be stressed that one must not resort to implied powers too quickly in the 
context of the ICC either. See Swart and Sluiter 1999, pp. 102-103: “Can it be excluded that the Court 
will, in the future, assert powers which, “although not expressly conferred, arise by necessary 
implication as being essential to the performance of its duties”? In our view, this question should not a 
priori be answered in the affirmative, although it should be borne in mind that given the detailed 
character of the Statute, it was clearly the objective of the framers to limit the powers of the Court to 
those set out in the Statute [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also ibid., p. 96: “In Rome, there was 
an overall and widely supported desire to eliminate the need for judge-made law of the kind developed 
by the ad hoc Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.” See finally Ciampi 2003, pp. 1614-1615 and the ICC 
OTP’s ‘Informal expert paper: Fact-finding and investigative functions of the office of the Prosecutor, 
including international co-operation’, 2003, available at: http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/490C317B-5D8E-4131-8170-7568911F6EB2/248459/372616.PDF, paras. 9-10. 








from the fact that the ICC ensures that the national judicial authority, at a minimum, 
follows the procedure mentioned in Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute133 and 
is able to grant the suspect interim release pending surrender134 – it is up to the 
national judicial authority to determine what happens if it finds that a person was, 
for example, not arrested in accordance with the proper process or that his rights 
were not respected. Although this runs counter the fact that the remedy of release 
has never been explicitly mentioned in the context of the powers of the national 
judicial authority135 and that the commentary of the first Draft Statute was quite 
clear in that respect (namely that the national authority would not have that power), 
the indistinctness of Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute (see Chapter VIII 
and the scholarly views presented there) may not exclude such power either.  
If that were indeed the division of responsibility envisaged (which, by the way, 
was never very clear),136 then it would be less strange for the remedy of release in 
the international context, which was already focused on the ICC procedures as from 
1994,137 to ‘shrink’ even more in subsequent years.138 After all, in that division, one 
can assume, at least in theory, that if a suspect is surrendered to the Court and if the 
national judicial authority had indeed the possibility to release a person in the case 
of an unlawful arrest or detention, then the fact that he is being surrendered means 
that his arrest and detention were in fact lawful. In other words: if his arrest and 
                                                          
133 Namely to determine that: “(a) The warrant applies to that person; (b) The person has been arrested 
in accordance with the proper process; and (c) The person’s rights have been respected.” One may argue 
that even though this procedure is not formulated as a right/remedy, it very much resembles the idea of 
habeas corpus. 
134 See Art. 59, paras. 3-6 of the ICC Statute. 
135 See Art. 29, para. 1 of the 1994 ILC Draft, Art. 53, para. 2 of the 1998 Zutphen Draft and Art. 59, 
para. 2 of the 1998 Draft Statute in the final report of the Preparatory Committee (streamlined version). 
136 See UNGA OR, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/50/22, 6 September 1995), p. 53 where one 
can read the following questions on the issue ‘accused’s challenges to the lawfulness of detention’: “- 
Decided by the court (art. 29(3)) or by national authorities? - Does recourse to the court under article 
29(3) exclude accused’s fundamental rights under national law to challenge in national courts the 
lawfulness of detention? If not, what is locus standi of the international criminal court in proceedings 
before a national court?” 
137 See the words “lawfulness under this Statute” in Art. 29, para. 3 of the 1994 ILC Draft. 
138 From a quite full (but again possibly restricted, see the previous footnote) remedy in the case of an 
unlawful arrest or detention (Art. 29, para. 3 of the 1994 ILC Draft: “A person arrested may apply to the 
Presidency for a determination of the lawfulness under this Statute of the arrest or detention. If the 
Presidency decides that the arrest or detention was unlawful, it shall order the release of the accused, 
and may award compensation.”), via a remedy which looks the same as the ILC one but which is 
preceded by more restrictive words (Art. 53, para. 8 of the 1998 Zutphen Draft: “A person arrested may 
apply to the [Presidency] [Pre-Trial Chamber] for a determination of the lawfulness under this Statute of 
any arrest warrant or order of detention issued by the Court. If the [Presidency] [Pre-Trial Chamber] 
decides that the arrest or detention was unlawful under the Statute, it shall order the release of the 
person, [and may award compensation] [in accordance with article...] [original footnote omitted, ChP].”) 
to the (ultimately deleted) remedy of release if the arrest warrant was found unlawful (Art. 59, para. 4 of 
the 1998 Draft Statute in the final report of the Preparatory Committee (streamlined version): “[4. 
Pending a decision on [surrender][extradition], a person may apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber for a 
determination of the lawfulness under this Statute of any arrest warrant issued by the Court. If the Pre-
Trial Chamber decides that the arrest warrant was unlawful under the Statute, it shall order the release of 








detention were already found to be lawful by the national judicial authority 
(evidenced by the fact that the suspect was not released but in fact surrendered), 
then one could argue that there would be no need for the ICC to grant a remedy of 
release and thus to include it in the Statute.139 Nevertheless, the fact that the ICC 
itself would not be able to grant a remedy of release is not the same as arguing that a 
person unlawfully arrested or detained in the context of the ICC case does not 
deserve the remedy of release altogether.  
The third argument to argue that it is very unlikely that the drafters really did not 
want suspects of the ICC to enjoy the (customary international law) remedy of 
release in the case of an unlawful arrest or detention can be explained by the fact 
that the ICC has granted a prominent position to human rights law in the ICC 
Statute. This can not only be inferred from the still-to-discuss paragraph 3 of Article 
21, but also from, for example, the explicit idea mentioned in the 1994 Draft Statute 
that the drafters wanted the provisions on arrest and detention to be in conformity 
with the ICCPR. Hence, in the same way as the authorities mentioned in footnote 
863 of Chapter VI argued that a habeas corpus remedy is present in the legal 
frameworks of their Tribunals, even if their Statutes/Rules do not contain such an 
explicit remedy, it could be argued that the ICC must have this power.140 In this 
context, it could be asserted that only granting compensation to persons unlawfully 
arrested/detained does not comply with (the preventative objective of) human rights 
law.141  
Because of the above-mentioned arguments, it is the belief of this study that it is 
hard to maintain that it is clear that the drafters of the ICC Statute intentionally 
deleted the remedy of release because they did not want this remedy to be available 
for a suspect unlawfully arrested or detained. Since the ICC legislation is arguably 
unclear on this point, and thus leaves a legal lacuna, there is justification for looking 
to part (b) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute.  
In short, part (b) must be looked to, not only in the case of the real male captus 
bene/male detentus question, but also in the case of the issue related to the male 
captus discussion, namely the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful 
arrest/detention (because the ICC instruments are unclear and thus also leave a legal 
lacuna on this matter). 
                                                          
139 One could, however, wonder in that case why the remedy of compensation, in contrast to release, was 
included but that may then be explained by the fact that the ICC may have thought it appropriate, even if 
the suspect was already released by the national judicial authority, to compensate him financially 
because it was in the context of the ICC proceedings against him that he was unlawfully arrested or 
detained. 
140 See also Hall 2008 A p. 1105: “Perhaps the most important right which has not been expressly 
recognized in the Rome Statute is the right guaranteed in article 9 para. 4 of the ICCPR (…) to have the 
Court review the lawfulness of detention and, if that detention is unlawful, to be released. Although the 
Court has the inherent power to provide this remedy, the failure to include it expressly in the Rome 
Statute is certainly to be regretted [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Hall’s footnote (n. 53) refers to a 
number of authorities also mentioned in n. 863 of Chapter VI. 
141 Cf. in that respect DeFrancia 2001, p. 1409: “An enforceable right to compensation in the case of 
illegal arrest will not necessarily serve as a deterrent to unlawful detention and could potentially lead to 








2.3 Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) 
 
Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) reads: “In the second place, where appropriate, 
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the 
established principles of the international law of armed conflict”. This part, 
including the third part, which will be addressed in a moment (‘general principles of 
law’), is reminiscent of Article 38, paragraph 1 of the ICJ Statute,142 which is 
“widely recognised as the most authoritative statement as to the sources of 
international law [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.143 This is not that strange as 
these parts were indeed inspired by Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.144  
 
2.3.1 Applicable treaties 
 
There are a number of treaties which could be applied by the ICC, of which two 
important ones shall be mentioned here. However, before doing so, it should first be 
stated that these treaties are silent on the male captus issue. As a result, they are only 
of interest with respect to related issues, such as, for example, the remedy of release 
in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention.  
The first treaty is the previously mentioned (and used) Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. As clarified earlier, in the end, the ICC Statute is ‘just’ a normal 
international treaty between States as any other treaty to which this Convention 
applies.145  
The second treaty which is often viewed as applicable to the ICC and which may 
be interesting here is the ICCPR. In the words of Edwards:  
 
The ICCPR and other such treaties will likely be deemed “applicable treaties” 
because a substantial number of Rome Statute signatories and ratifiers have adhered 
to the ICCPR; the travaux pr[é]paratoires repeatedly refer to incorporation of ICCPR 
provisions into the Rome Statute;[146] ICCPR rights are customary international law, 
which is an article 21 source of applicable law [this will be discussed when 
addressing the terms “principles and rules of international law”, ChP]; and because 
the ICC’s status as an inter-governmental organization created under U.N. auspices 
renders the ICCPR applicable to the ICC.147 
                                                          
142 “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the 
provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”  
143 Shaw 2003, p. 66. See in that respect also Raimondo 2008, p. 150: “In Article 21, paragraph 1 one 
may identify the so-called ‘proper law’ of the ICC (…) and the traditional sources of international law, 
namely conventions, custom, and general principles of law, notwithstanding the peculiar wording 
employed by the drafters of the Statute [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
144 See Arsanjani 1999, p. 28. 
145 See also Edwards 2001, p. 385. 
146 See n. 30 and accompanying text. 








McAuliffe deGuzman, when writing about the term ‘applicable treaties’, also 
mentions the ICCPR:  
 
Treaties may be relevant for two purposes. First, a particular treaty may have a direct 
bearing on a case. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights is relevant to determining the international human rights of the accused.[148] 
Second, widely ratified treaties may be viewed as evidence of the “rules and 
principles of international law”. In this regard, for example, the Genocide 
Convention, along with its [travaux], and the Hague and Geneva Conventions may be 
relevant to the determination of an issue before the Court.149 
 
The second example of McAuliffe deGuzman is connected to another part of Article 
21 (namely the part “rules and principles of international law”) and will be 
discussed in a few moments, but her first example apparently views the ICCPR as a 
treaty that can be applied as such, under the terms “applicable treaties”, in part (b). 
Pellet has criticised this observation, however. He is of the opinion that all these 
treaties referred to (except for one) have to be seen as part of the “rules and 
principles of international law.”150 However, whether one agrees with this or not 
does not really matter with respect to the practical outcome: if it is determined that 
                                                          
148 See also Degan 2005, p. 80: “The applicable treaties (other than the Rome Statute itself) may, for 
instance, include the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or regional conventions 
such as the 1950 European Convention on the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with protocols 
attached to it. The provisions of these applicable treaties concerning fair trial and similar problems that 
are perhaps not entirely regulated by the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC 
can be of special importance.”  
149 McAuliffe deGuzman 1999, p. 440. 
150 See Pellet 2002 A, pp. 1068-1070. After having presented the exact same observation of McAuliffe 
deGuzman as mentioned here, he states: “This is not very convincing. In neither of these two cases are 
the treaties in question applicable as such. Although it is true that the 1966 Covenant (or the 1907 and 
1949 Conventions) may be relevant in determining the principles to be applied by the Court, the latter 
will be seen as principles and rules of general international law, and not as conventional norms. The 
ICTY has proceeded in this manner on several occasions. (...) It is difficult to imagine, however, a 
situation in which the Court would have to apply a treaty other than its Statute, unless two or more 
States agreed to accord it some specific jurisdiction or to require the application of particular principles. 
In any case, it is most unlikely, given that the Court has only been granted limited subject-matter 
jurisdiction, that it would be obliged, or even able, to apply such agreements. There is, however, an 
exception to this general principle. It is a consequence of the unfortunate drafting of Article 8(2)(a) of 
the Statute, which defines war crimes, in particular as ‘[g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949’. (...) This is regrettable for a number of reasons. In the first place, Article 8(2)(a) (...) 
rewrites common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. (...) Secondly, the express reference to the 1949 
Convention only serves to underline the absence of any reference to the 1977 Protocols (...). Finally, and 
most importantly, rather than being a step forward, the express reference to the Geneva Conventions is a 
step back compared with the London and Tokyo Statutes of the International Military Tribunals, which 
did not refer to any text in particular: ‘conventionalizing’ the incrimination gives the false impression 
that the right to pursue criminals depends on the ratification of the treaty in question. The universal 
character of the crime and its customary definition are thus weakened. As for the reference to 
‘applicable treaties’ in Article 21 of the Rome Statute, the reference to the 1949 Conventions, pointless 
and open to criticism, stems from the eminently debatable criminal law vision, according to which only 









part (a) leaves a legal lacuna (as was argued supra), then part (b), which both 
authors believe covers the ICCPR, may be applied, whether one views the ICCPR to 
be an applicable treaty or a rule/principle of international law. Whether the judges 
actually apply provisions from the ICCPR, which includes the remedy of release in 
the case of an unlawful arrest/detention, will then depend on the question as to 
whether they believe it is also appropriate to transplant the remedy of release into 
the specific context of the ICC – recall the words “where appropriate”.151 As already 
clarified several times in this study, the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful 
arrest/detention is not without problems. This may convince the judges, even though 
they may have to admit that they are, in principle, obliged to apply the remedy 
(“shall”), will use their discretion not to do so.  
 
2.3.2 Principles and rules of international law 
 
The exact meaning of the remainder of the above-mentioned part of the first 
paragraph of Article 21 of the ICC Statute is also unclear: “the principles and rules 
of international law, including the established principles of the international law of 
armed conflict”.152 First, it is appropriate to determine whether there is a clear 
difference between rules and principles and if so, what this difference encompasses. 
McAuliffe deGuzman addresses both categories separately and is thus of the opinion 
                                                          
151 See n. 20 and accompanying text. 
152 In contrast, the more on substantive law issues focused “established principles of the international 
law of armed conflict” seem less vague but they do not say anything about the male captus discussion. 
Well-known principles in this context are, for example, the principles of necessity and proportionality. 
See for more concrete rules Degan 2005, pp. 80-81: “Established principles of the international law of 
armed conflict consist most often of customary rules confirmed in codification conventions. Hence, they 
include numerous provisions from the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two 1977 Protocols, but 
not the definitions of their “grave breaches”. These “established principles” may include, inter alia, 
rules concerning proper qualification of armed conflicts; specific prohibitions of reprisals against 
protected persons, buildings or equipment; localities and zones under special protection and on 
demilitarized zones; conditions to be fulfilled for belligerent occupation; neutrality in a conflict; or rules 
of the warfare at sea, when there is room for their application. These rules are most often conventional, 
but can also be found in the practice of warfare.” Note, by the way, that these “established principles of 
the international law of armed conflict” may very well be identified in decisions from institutions 
specifically dealing with the international law of armed conflict such as the ICTY and ICTR. However, 
as will be shown infra: if one is of the view that the principles and rules of international law (of which 
the established principles of the international law of armed conflict form part) in essence mean 
customary international law and if one follows the traditional (statal) concept of customary international 
law, then these decisions can only identify existing and not create new principles. (See also the 
discussion on this point in the examination of the Al-Moayad case, see Subsection 2.2 of Chapter V.) 
For an arguably middle-road solution (using the word “consolidate”: strengthen), see Caracciolo 2000, 
p. 227: “[T]he explicit reference to the established principles of the international law of armed conflict 
seems excessive, since it is in any case a branch of international law, even though it could enable the 
Court to apply those principles consolidated in the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals for Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.” Nevertheless, even though the jurisprudence of the UN ad hoc Tribunals may 
thus perhaps be looked at to examine the more substantive principles of the international law of armed 
conflict, this does not mean that the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals on more procedural 
issues such as male captus situations also fall under this term. (It may perhaps fall, however, under the 








that principles and rules should be distinguished from each other. She believes that 
“[t]he “principles” of international law referred to in article 21 include such widely 
recognized principles as the principles of proportionality and the principle of 
legality (nullum crimen sine lege) [original footnote omitted, ChP]”153 whereas the 
phrase “rules of international law”, even though its exact content is not clear, in any 
case covers customary international law: 
 
Apart from treaties, rules of customary law are traditionally treated as the most 
persuasive source of international law. It is unclear, therefore, why the drafters of the 
ICC Statute eschewed use of the word “custom” in identifying the applicable law. It 
may be that the concept of gradually evolving custom was considered too imprecise 
for the purposes of international criminal law. Nonetheless, since custom represents 
the primary source of rules in the international legal system, the phrase “rules of 
international law” must be interpreted as encompassing customary rules.154       
 
On the other hand, Pellet believes that, although a distinction may be drawn between 
the principles and rules of international law,155 both in fact refer to customary 
norms.156 He thus argues, when discussing the “principles and rules of international 
law” in general: “The sibylline drafting of this provision (...) gives cause for 
perplexity. Why use such an indirect expression when a simple reference to 
international custom would have sufficed?”157 This again is reminiscent of the 
                                                          
153 Less certain about the meaning of the principles of international law is Verhoeven, see Verhoeven 
2004, p. 9: “Customary rules are surely part of the ‘rules’ referred to in the (b) of paragraph 1 of Article 
21, their ‘generality’ contrasting with the ‘particular’ character of conventional rules binding only the 
contracting states this is clear. The mention of ‘principles’, apart from rules, is, however, vague. What is 
indeed the exact nature of those ‘principles’, as distinguished from rules? Normally, they should be 
different from the ‘general principles of law’ aimed at in the (c) of said paragraph, ... at least to avoid 
confusions. But what then are those ‘principles’ and where are they coming from? One explanation 
could be that they constitute what is referred to in French doctrine as the ‘principes généraux du droit 
internationa[l]’, as opposed to the ‘principes généraux de droit international’, i.e. general rules making 
explicit some basic requirements of interstate relations whose binding character does not rest on a 
general practice of states as ‘vitalized’ by the opinio juris, which makes the issue somewhat mysterious. 
That said, the explanation possibly is also that the reference to ‘principles’ is simply illustrating an – 
unfortunate – language habit aiming at basic customary rules ... which clearly is the case as far as the 
‘established principles of the international law of armed conflicts’ mentioned at the end of the (b) of 
paragraph 1 are concerned.” 
154 McAuliffe deGuzman 1999, p. 442.  
155 See Pellet 2002 A, p. 1072: “Is it necessary to make a distinction between ‘principles’ of 
international law on the one hand, and ‘rules’ on the other? Undoubtedly not, at least with regard to their 
nature: in both cases, they are customary norms. One may thus consider that the double reference is a 
verbal tic, a ‘ready-made’ expression to refer to custom. It remains that under international criminal law, 
the appropriateness of reliance on ‘principles’ (except as an aid to interpretation of ‘rules’) is open to 
question. Upon a more rigorous inspection, the word ‘rules’ has a more precise connotation and implies 
a higher degree of determinacy than the term ‘principles’; and the nullum crimen principle could be 
breached by the undiscerning application of the latter if they were to be relied upon to found a 
conviction [original footnote omitted, ChP].”    
156 See also Vasiliev 2009, pp. 210-211, n. 63, criticising McAuliffe deGuzman. 
157 Pellet 2002 A, p. 1070. See also ibid, p. 1071: “It may be that the letter of Article 21(1)(b) of the 








above-mentioned Article 38 of the ICJ Statute which states that the ICJ shall apply, 
among other things, “international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law”. Although it may seem practical and logical to draw an analogy to 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute (as already mentioned: the drafters of the ICC Statute 
were also inspired by this article), one should not forget that the words used in the 
Statute are different from those of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and thus may have a 
different meaning.158 Edwards, for example, asserts that the words “international 
law” in Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) of the ICC Statute is broader than customary 
international law.159 It may indeed be the case that the “principles and rules of 
international law” are broader than mere customary international law, but many 
agree that the principles and rules of international law, in any case, cover customary 
international law.160 Hence, before delving into the question of whether the 
principles and rules of international law also cover more than just customary 
international law, the latter concept will first be examined.  
 
                                                                                                                                              
provision refers, exclusively, to customary international law, of which the ‘established principles of the 
international law of armed conflict’ clearly form an integral part.” It is not very clear whether Pellet is of 
the opinion that the whole of Article 21 (1)(b) is referring to customary international law or only the part 
“the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international 
law of armed conflict”. Although the above-mentioned quotation can be found under the heading ‘The 
Principles and Rules of International Law’, he is in fact referring twice to “Article 21 (1)(b)” which 
includes “applicable treaties”. However, this may not be that important as Pellet, in contrast to the 
“principles and rules of international law”, does not give much weight to the reference “applicable 
treaties”: “That is not to say that (...) [the reference to treaties among the sources of law to be applied by 
the Court] is clearly indispensable, or even useful.” (Ibid., p. 1068.) 
158 Cf. also Arsanjani 1999, p. 28 (who served as the Secretary of the Committee of the Whole of the 
Rome Conference, the organ of the Conference responsible for the development of the ICC Statute): 
“Even though the three categories [this is 1) the three sources mentioned in para. 1 (a); 2) the two 
sources mentioned in para. 1 (b) and 3) the source mentioned in para. 1 (c), ChP] were inspired by 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, they are substantially and structurally 
different from that article.” See in that respect also McAuliffe deGuzman 1999, p. 436: “The applicable 
law elaborated in article 21 derive generally from the sources enumerated in article 38 of the ICJ Statute. 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute represents the most authoritative statement of the sources of general 
international law. The ICC Statute modifies the approach taken in the ICJ Statute to fit the context of 
international criminal law [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
159 See Edwards 2001, p. 387: “Under Rome Statute, article 21(1)(b), “international law” (or public 
international law) includes bodies of law beyond just customary international law. For example, under 
article 21(1)(b), “international law” also includes the areas of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
160 See Sadat 2000, p. 918: “[T]he Statute itself contemplates that the Court will use customary 
international law outside the ICC Statute in its decisions. Article 21, on applicable law, permits the 
Court to apply “where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, 
including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].”” See also Caracciolo 2000, p. 227 (“Since the Court constitutes an international jurisdiction (...) 
the second category of sources of law which it can apply could only be treaties and customary 
international law [original footnote omitted, ChP]”), Gallant 2003 A, p. 787 (“[P]rinciples and rules of 
international law (presumably meaning international custom) [original footnote omitted, ChP]”), 
Schabas 2004, pp. 91-92 (“There is no express mention of customary international law, but it is surely 
covered by the reference to ‘principles and rules of international law’.”) and Degan 2005, p. 80. See 








2.3.2.1 Customary international law… 
 
What does customary international law say on the male captus problem? To answer 
this question, one may turn to the conclusion of Section 2 of Chapter VII of this 
book. And now, something special has cropped up; even though the non-committal 
external evaluative framework of this study was (merely) created to see how 
different or similar the current ICC position on the male captus problem is in 
comparison with the position of other courts, this external evaluative framework has 
now entered, via the concept of customary international law, the less non-committal 
internal evaluative framework, a framework established to see how the actual ICC 
position should be assessed in view of the Court’s own law.  
Section 2 of Chapter VII of this book has clarified that one cannot generally state 
that either male captus bene detentus or male captus male detentus has reached 
customary international law status, because such general assertions do not do justice 
to the enormous variety of possible male captus situations and the different ways 
how those varying situations were received by courts. In fact, Chapter VII 
concluded that only one male captus situation can probably be seen as having 
customary international law status, namely the situation that judges will refuse 
jurisdiction in the case of an abduction performed by the authorities of the 
prosecuting forum followed by a protest and request for the return of the suspect by 
the injured State. That would mean that in such a situation, the ICC, if it is also of 
the opinion that the principles and rules of international law cover customary 
international law, and if it believes that it is appropriate to transplant this rule into 
the specific system of the Court, would have to refuse jurisdiction. As also pointed 
out in the context of the ICTY and ICTR, however,161 one can ask whether this 
would indeed be appropriate as one could argue that national courts would probably 
refuse jurisdiction in such cases to protect the fragile international legal order based 
on the equality of States (and to repair what the Executive should have done). 
However, for the ICTY and ICTR – and this also goes for the ICC (but to a lesser 
extent)162 – the concept of State sovereignty plays a less important role (even if that 
observation, of course, cannot constitute a carte blanche to violate State 
sovereignty); a protest from a State will have less influence in the rather vertical 
context of the ICC than it will have in the horizontal context of States. However, 
even if this customary international law rule, for that reason, cannot be transplanted 
into the context of the ICC, and that Court would hence not have to follow it, it is 
submitted that the ICC, like the ICTY and ICTR, should resolutely refuse 
jurisdiction if it were implicated in an abduction, whether or not that abduction was 
followed by a protest and request for the return of the suspect from the injured State.  
Of course, a very interesting and exciting163 question to be addressed now is 
whether Section 3 of Chapter VII (the principles distilled from the 
                                                          
161 See n. 652 of Chapter VI. 
162 Because the ICC is not as ‘vertical’ as the ICTY and ICTR are, see Chapter VIII of this study. 
163 See also Bitti 2009, p. 296: “The most exciting issue in relation to Article 21 (1) (b) has been the 








international(ised) criminal tribunals’ male captus case law) may also enter the 
internal evaluative framework. Can these principles perhaps also fall under the 
notion of customary international law?  
Focusing first on the decisions of the ICTY/ICTR, this would seem difficult to 
accept under the traditional concept of customary international law, whose two 
constituent elements are 1) State practice (“the actual behaviour of states”)164 and 2) 
opinio iuris sive necessitates (“the belief by a state that behaved in a certain way 
that it was under a legal obligation to act that way”).165 As explained earlier in 
Chapter V (in the context of the Al-Moayad case), decisions from international 
criminal tribunals can, of course, be consulted to find out whether a certain rule 
exists in State practice as many of these international cases, see also Chapter VI of 
this book, include overviews of national positions on certain matters.166 It is 
unproblematic if those overviews (and hence the decisions to be found in those 
overviews) are examined by judges to determine the position of States towards a 
certain rule. However, decisions of international tribunals as such (which do not 
delve into the practice of States) arguably have nothing to do with the practice of 
States, even though these tribunals were established by States. 
However, this may perhaps be different with respect to (the decisions of) 
internationalised criminal tribunals, such as the ECCC. Although it is true that these 
Extraordinary Chambers are established and supported with help of the international 
community and that they try international crimes, they also form part of the 
domestic system of Cambodia. It could be asserted that although their decisions are 
issued by chambers in which both national and international judges participate (the 
majority are however of local origin), they are nevertheless to be seen as decisions 
from, in essence, a Cambodian court and thus as evidence of the practice of 
Cambodia. This may be different, however, with respect to other internationalised 
criminal tribunals such as the SCSL, which is arguably more ‘international’ in 
nature than the ECCC because the majority of the SCSL judges are international and 
because the Court does not form part of the domestic system of Sierra Leone. In 
short, it is clear that much will depend on the specific nature of these tribunals to 
find out whether their decisions can be seen as expressions of State practice.  
                                                          
164 Shaw 2003, p. 70. 
165 Ibid., p. 71.  
166 Cf. also ibid., p. 78, explaining that rules of State practice can be found in, for example, the decisions 
of international judicial institutions: “It is how states behave in practice that forms the basis of 
customary law, but evidence of what a state does can be obtained from numerous sources. A state is not 
a living entity, but consists of governmental departments and thousands of officials, and state activity is 
spread throughout a whole range of national organs. There are the state’s legal officers, legislative 
institutions, courts, diplomatic agents and political leaders. Each of these engages in activity which 
relates to the international field and therefore one has to examine all such material sources and more in 
order to discover evidence of what states do. The obvious way to find out how countries are behaving is 
to read the newspapers, consult historical records, listen to what governmental authorities are saying and 
peruse the many official publications. (...) In addition, one may note resolutions in the General 
Assembly, comments made by governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission, 
decisions of the international judicial institutions, decisions of national courts, treaties and the general 








Nevertheless, the above-mentioned observations are based on the traditional 
concept of customary international law, which is interested in the practice of States. 
However, one can ask whether the formation of customary international law can still 
be seen as the privilege of States. It is clear that in today’s world, the monopoly of 
States on the international scene is diminishing and the influence of non-State 
entities such as international organisations and tribunals is growing, especially in the 
field of international criminal law.167 One could argue that this development 
demands that, if one wants to determine whether a certain rule exists in customary 
international law, one should look to the practice of the international community in 
general and not only to the statal dimension of this community.168 See, in that 
respect, the following words on the concept of customary international law from the 
German Al-Moayad case: 
 
[I]ts evolution depends on two preconditions: firstly, on conduct that is continuous in 
time and as uniform as possible, and which takes place with a broad and 
representative participation of states and other subjects of international law with law-
making authority; secondly on the opinion that is behind this practice “to act in the 
framework of what is required and permitted or necessary under international law” 
(opinio iuris sive necessitatis (…)) [emphasis added, ChP].169  
 
It is therefore legitimate to ask oneself questions such as: 
 
Has the concept of state practice as an element of custom become outdated, at least in 
some fields of international law? On the same vein, how much does the jurisprudence 
of the courts like the ICTY have influence on the subsequent practice and opinio 
juris, or could it be said that decisions themselves crystallize or even create new 
customary norms [emphasis in original, ChP]?170 
                                                          
167 See also Zahar and Sluiter 2008, p. 93: “The formula of state practice plus opinio juris represents the 
theory of ‘custom’ in its elementary form, yet in a world of non-state organizations whose purpose is to 
unite, regulate, critique, or compete with states, the notion of customary law and the mechanisms of its 
formation have been broadened”. 
168 It appears that tribunals themselves have already accepted this, see, for example, Degan 2005, p. 75 
(who, by the way, also notes that “the ICJ tried to legislate by asserting the existence of new “customary 
rules” without proof of any former State practice and opinio juris [original footnote omitted, ChP]”): 
“The ICTY and ICTR (…) do not refer in their decisions to former State practice and opinio juris as the 
only, or even as the main, evidence of customary law. They rather rely on the practice of former ad hoc 
military tribunals established by Allied Powers after World War II in occupied Germany and in the Far 
East, as well as to their own practice. They thus call that former judicial practice, as a whole, 
“customary law” [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Cf. also Verhoeven 2004, p. 18: “[T]here does not 
exist many conventional or customary rules concerning the punishment of criminals in international law, 
despite the few elements contained in the statutes or case-law of the ad hoc international tribunals that 
were established as a result of conflicts”. 
169 German Federal Constitutional Court: In the Proceedings on the Constitutional Complaint of Mr. Al-
M., and his Motion for a Temporary Injunction (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second Senate 
of 5 November 2003, 2 BvR 1506/03, B., I., para. 3 a)), 43 International Legal Materials (2004), p. 782. 
170 Working Group on International Criminal Law, European University Institute (Law Department), 
Meeting of 9 May 2007 (devoted to the issue of : ‘Customary International Law in International 








Arajärvi has dedicated an entire doctoral thesis to these questions,171 which are 
important and very interesting, but clearly go beyond the compass of the present 
study. Because the results of Arajärvi’s research are not available yet, this study will 
play safe and use the traditional notion of customary international law, which 
focuses on what States do/believe.172 
However, that does not mean that the decisions from the ICTY and ICTR on the 
male captus issue may not enter the internal evaluative framework of this study in 
another way. This will be discussed in the next subsection when addressing the 
question of whether the concept of “principles and rules of international law” 
encompasses more than just customary international law. 
However, before doing so, a few words must be dedicated to the remedy of 
release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention. One can be very brief here: as 
already explained earlier in this book, the right to liberty and security, including the 
remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention, can be seen as having 
customary international law status. One can refer here, for example, to the fact that 
the ICCPR has many (165) States Parties. Thus, if the (ICCPR) remedy of release 
would not already fall under the notion “applicable treaties”, it will in any case be 
covered by the “principles and rules of international law”. Hence, it is definite that 
this remedy falls under part (b) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute. 
                                                                                                                                              
http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Law/ResearchTeaching/WorkingGroups/WGOnCri
minalLaw9May07.pdf, p. 15. 
171 Ibid., p. 2: “Noora [Arajärvi] subsequently illustrated some of the main research questions on which 
her PhD will focus, for instance: whether it is necessary to use the ‘words and language’ of traditional 
customary international law for international customary criminal law; whether the case-law and 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals represent a ‘new source’ of law; whether the concept of ‘state 
practice’ in customary law is out of date [emphasis in original, ChP].” 
172 This does not mean, however, that this study is not aware of the fact that in the world of today, in 
which non-State entities play an increasingly important role, ‘modern’ customary international law may 
be more focused on opinio iuris than on State practice. See Roberts 2001, p. 758: “What I have termed 
traditional custom results from general and consistent practice followed by states from a sense of legal 
obligation. It focuses primarily on state practice in the form of interstate interaction and acquiescence. 
Opinio juris is a secondary consideration invoked to distinguish between legal and nonlegal obligations. 
Traditional custom is evolutionary and is identified through an inductive process in which a general 
custom is derived from specific instances of state practice. (…) By contrast, modern custom is derived 
by a deductive process that begins with general statements of rules rather than particular instances of 
practice. This approach emphazises opinio juris rather than state practice because it relies primarily on 
statements rather than actions. Modern custom can develop quickly because it is deducted from 
multilateral treaties and declarations by international fora such as the General Assembly, which can 
declare existing customs, crystallize emerging customs and generate new customs [emphasis in original 
and original footnotes omitted, ChP].” However, this is clearly a different discussion than the questions 
posted by Arajärvi. Roberts indeed shows that modern customary international law tends to look more at 
opinio iuris, but she is still focused, like this research, on what States do (or more importantly in modern 
customary international law: what States, for example in international organizations such as the UNGA, 
declare to which rules they will abide by). Thus, Roberts’ customary international law definition is still 
focused on the statal context. The emphasis is, however, more on what States declare than on what they 
actually do. Arajärvi arguably goes a step further and wonders whether this statal context altogether 
(whether the focus is on State practice or on the opinio iuris of States) in itself is losing importance to, 









However, here also (see the final words of Subsection 2.3.1), it must be stressed that 
the ICC will only apply that remedy if it is of the opinion that it is appropriate to 
transplant this remedy into the specific context of the ICC, which may be difficult in 
view of the identified problems which can be connected to this remedy.  
 
2.3.2.2 …or more? 
 
Although many agree that customary international law is covered by the concept of 
“principles and rules of international law”, this notion may encompass more than 
just customary international law.173 Might it be possible that the practice of the 
international criminal tribunals (which do not fall under the traditional concept of 
State practice/customary international law) falls under the term ‘principles and rules 
of international law’? Even if the practice of other international (criminal) tribunals 
may not easily fit into the specific system of the ICC (in the sense that it would 
often not be “appropriate” to apply solutions from other international criminal 
jurisdictions), one can ask why the words “international law” would be ab initio 
restricted to the traditional, statal context of international law. This is especially odd 
for the international criminal law context in which the ICC operates and in which 
the practice of the other international criminal tribunals (but also the practice of 
human rights bodies) may be of particular interest. Although it is true that it is often 
stated that the principles and rules of international law refer to customary 
international law, which, if one follows the traditional view, is limited to the statal 
context, it is also true that the words do say something different and that the ICC 
might use this different terminology to include the practice of other international 
(criminal) institutions not also linked to the statal context.174  
In fact, it seems that the ICC itself holds the same opinion on this issue. At the 
beginning of this chapter, a passage from the Lubanga Dyilo case about ‘witness 
proofing’ (the preparation of witnesses before trial) was presented in the context of 
explaining the correlation between parts (a) and (b) of Article 21, paragraph 1 of the 
ICC Statute. (This was the passage in which the meaning of the words “where 
appropriate” was also elucidated.) It had already been revealed by then that this 
excerpt was also very interesting for the discussion as to whether the practice of the 
other international criminal tribunals may fall under the notion “principles and rules 
of international law”. The more complete passage goes as follows:  
                                                          
173 See in that respect the already-mentioned words (see n. 159 and accompanying text) of Edwards: 
“Under Rome Statute, article 21(1)(b), “international law” (or public international law) includes bodies 
of law beyond just customary international law. For example, under article 21(1)(b), “international law” 
also includes the areas of international human rights law and international humanitarian law [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Edwards 2001, p. 387.) See also Nerlich 2009, p. 313: “[I]t is submitted that 
certain principles of international criminal law (…) may be subsumed under this term.” 
174 See Degan 2005. p. 80: “Under “principles and rules of international law”, it should be understood to 
include customary rules of general international law. Probably because of the frequent misuse of these 
terms in the past, they were not referred to as such. But this less precise wording has the advantage that 
the Court will not need to prove the customary character of “principles and rules” it wishes to apply, 








43. Turning to the practices of international criminal tribunals and courts, the 
prosecution submitted that the practice of witness proofing is here permissible, 
endorsed and well established. The Trial Chamber notes, as has been established by 
recent jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals of the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, that witness proofing, in the sense advocated by the 
prosecution in the present case, is being commonly utilized at the ad hoc Tribunals. 
 
44. However, this precedent is in no sense binding on the Trial Chamber at this Court. 
Article 21 of the Statute requires the Chamber to apply first the Statute, Elements of 
Crimes and Rules of the ICC. Thereafter, if ICC legislation is not definitive on the 
issue, the Trial Chamber should apply, where appropriate, principles and rules of 
international law. In the instant case, the issue before the Chamber is procedural in 
nature. While this would not, ipso facto, prevent all procedural issues from scrutiny 
under Article 21(l)(b), the Chamber does not consider the procedural rules and 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals to be automatically applicable to the ICC 
without detailed analysis. 
 
45. The ICC Statute has, through important advances, created a procedural framework 
which differs markedly from the ad hoc tribunals, such as, for example, in the 
requirement in the Statute that the prosecution should investigate exculpatory as well 
as incriminatory evidence, for which the Statute and Rules of the ad hoc tribunals do 
not provide. Also, the Statute seemingly permits greater intervention by the Bench, as 
well as introducing the unique element of victim participation. Therefore, the Statute 
moves away from the procedural regime of the ad hoc tribunals, introducing 
additional and novel elements to aid the process of establishing the truth. Thus, the 
procedure of preparation of witnesses before trial is not easily transferable into the 
system of law created by the ICC Statute and Rules. Therefore, while acknowledging 
the importance of considering the practice and jurisprudence at the ad hoc tribunals, 
the Chamber is not persuaded that the application of ad hoc procedures, in the context 
of preparation of witnesses for trial, is appropriate [emphasis in original and original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].175 
                                                          
175 ICC, Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and 
Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 30 November 2007, 
paras. 43-45. See also the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in the same case where the judges did not 
concur with the conclusion of the Prosecutor but did not seem to disapprove of the idea that decisions 
from other tribunals might be used under certain circumstances either: “29. The Prosecution asserts that 
the practice of witness proofing as defined by the Prosecution “is a widely accepted practice in 
international criminal law” and therefore the Prosecution implies that it should be considered as part of 
the applicable law of the Court pursuant to article 21 (1) (b) of the Statute. 30. In support of this 
submission, the Prosecution cites (i) two Trial Chamber decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (“the ICTY”); (ii) one Trial Chamber decision of the Sierra Leone Special 
Court (“the SLSC”); and (iii) the statement of Justice Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“the ICTR”), to the UN Security Council on 29 June 2004. 31. Firstly, 
the Chamber observes that the Prosecution has not put forward any jurisprudence from the ICTR 
authorising the practice of witness proofing as defined by the Prosecution. The Chamber also observes 
that the precedent from the SLSC relied on by the Prosecution does not deal with the practice of witness 
proofing but addresses “the related legal issues of the exclusion of supplemental statements of 
prosecution witnesses on the grounds that they contain or introduce new allegations against the Accused 








Thus, even though the practice of the ICTY/ICTR (and this may perhaps also be 
valid for other international (judicial) institutions such as the HRC, the ECtHR and 
certain internationalised criminal tribunals) is not automatically applicable 
to/binding on the ICC system (which, of course, seems very logical given the latter’s 
relative sui generis character),176 neither is it impossible that it might be applied by 
the ICC judges if those judges, after a detailed analysis, are of the opinion that 
certain practices from these tribunals can be transplanted into the specific system of 
the ICC as a principle/rule of international law. In that case, the jurisprudence of 
the other tribunals is not merely a source from which inspiration may be drawn 








                                                                                                                                              
part of the Prosecution.” Moreover, the Chamber finds that out of the two ICTY Trial Chamber 
decisions cited by the Prosecution, the decision in the Jelisić case does not refer to the practice of 
witness proofing prior to the witness testimony because it is confined to the issue of contact with a 
witness once the witness has taken the stand and made the solemn undertaking. 32. Hence, the only 
decision identified by the Prosecution in which the practice of witness proofing is expressly authorised 
is the 10 December 2004 decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICTY in the Limaj case. Moreover, 
such a decision, despite authorising the practice of witness proofing, does not regulate in detail the 
content of such a practice. 33. Under these circumstances the Chamber finds that the Prosecution 
assertion that the practice of witness proofing as defined by the Prosecution in the Prosecution 
Information “is a widely accepted practice in international criminal law”, is unsupported [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].” (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Practices of Witness 
Familiarisation and Witness Proofing’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 8 November 2006, paras. 
29-33.) Bitti 2009, pp. 297-298 notes with respect to this decision that “[t]he question which should 
have been answered first is to what extent “practices in international criminal law” may be seen as 
“principles and rules of international law” under Article 21 (1) (b) of the Rome Statute.” 
176 Cf. also Bitti 2009, p. 296. 
177 See, for example, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Uganda, ‘Decision on Prosecutor’s 
Application for Leave to Appeal in Part Pre-Trial Chamber II’s Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Applications for Warrants of Arrest under Article 58’ (Under Seal, Ex Parte, Prosecutor Only), ICC-
02/04-01/05, 19 August 2005, paras. 18 et seq., where reference is made to the case law of the ICTY, 
ICTR and SCSL and ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
‘Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, VPSR4, 
VPSR5 and VPRS6’ (Public Redacted Version), ICC-01/04, 17 January 2006, paras. 51-53, where the 
Pre-Trial Chamber referred to several cases of the ECtHR and the IACtHR to back its opinion on the 
role of the victims in the proceedings of the ICC. See also El Zeidy 2006, p. 462 and Nerlich 2009, pp. 
305-306, n. 3. See finally the ICC’s male captus decisions of 3 October 2006 and 14 December 2006 (to 
be discussed in the second section of the next chapter), where reference was made to male captus cases 








is applicable to the ICC, namely principles and rules of international law.178 Hence, 
in that case, the conclusions from Section 3 of Chapter VII, the conclusions with 
                                                          
178 See also Friman 2003, p. 380 (writing about the law on evidence): “It is not entirely clear (…) on 
which basis the ICC may make use of the laws of evidence as developed by the Tribunals. However, it 
is arguable that such practice constitutes “principles and rules of international law” and, thus is 
applicable “where appropriate”.” See also El Zeidy 2006, p. 462: “Although Article 21 does not state 
clearly whether decisions of the other international judicial bodies is considered an applicable source of 
law, arguably the phrase ‘principles and rules of international law’ mentioned in Article 21(1)(b) covers 
those decisions as a secondary source.” El Zeidy (ibid.) then refers to a decision by the ICC’s Pre-Trial 
Chamber II which, according to him, “treated the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals as being covered 
by the ‘principles and rules of international law’ as long as they do not go ‘beyond the scope of article 
21’ [original footnote omitted, ChP].” The decision El Zeidy refers to is ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
Situation in Uganda, ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s Position on the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II to 
Redact Factual Descriptions of Crimes From the Warrants of Arrest, Motion for Reconsideration, and 
Motion for Clarification’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/05, 28 October 2005 and the paragraph in 
question (19) reads: “As to the relevance of the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, the matter must be 
assessed against the provisions governing the law applicable before the Court. Article 21, paragraph 1, 
of the Statute mandates the Court to apply its Statute, Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence “in the first place” and only “in the second place” and “where appropriate”, “applicable 
treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the 
international law of armed conflict”. Accordingly, the rules and practice of other jurisdictions, whether 
national or international, are not as such “applicable law” before the Court beyond the scope of article 
21 of the Statute. More specifically, the law and practice of the ad hoc tribunals, which the Prosecutor 
refers to, cannot per se form a sufficient basis for importing into the Court’s procedural framework 
remedies other than those enshrined in the Statute.” Vasiliev is a little more hesitant in that respect. He 
explains, referring to the words of El Zeidy and this paragraph: “Although it is sometimes accepted that 
the case law of other international criminal tribunals could become applicable at the ICC as ‘the 
principles and rules of international law’ under Article 21(1)(b), it is more accurate to say that this 
jurisprudence is not a source, but only serves, where appropriate, as the evidence of such principles and 
rules. If one were to borrow the formula of the ICJ Statute, it would amount to a ‘subsidiary means for 
the determination of the rules of law’ by the ICC in the context of its own procedural regime. The 
emerging ICC jurisprudence has embraced this view [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Vasiliev 2009, 
p. 222.) Cf. also Nerlich 2009, p. 313: “[I]n order to identify principles and rules of international law, 
the ICC may turn to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals as well as the jurisprudence of other 
international courts.” However, it is submitted that the judges can not only use the jurisprudence of other 
tribunals to identify principles and rules of international law stemming from other sources; if the judges 
are of the opinion that certain practices of these tribunals, in themselves, constitute principles and rules 
of international law, such principles and rules can, of course, also be applied. In any case, prudence is 
warranted here. See Kreß 2007, p. 543: “Pre-Trial Chamber II has already stressed, and rightly so, that 
anyone should, in the ongoing process of moulding the pertinent law, beware of hastily adopting the 
established acquis of both ad hoc Tribunals.” See also Schabas 2007, p. 196: “[O]ne of the Pre-Trial 
Chambers of the International Criminal Court has cautioned against mechanistic application of the case 
law of the ad hoc tribunals”. See finally, and very eloquently, Nerlich 2009, p. 325: “[T]he ICC will not 
have to reinvent the wheels that have already been invented by the ad hoc tribunals. But before 
mounting such wheels, the Court will have to consider carefully whether they really fit. Otherwise, the 
ICC may jolt, and the reliance on the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals would not strengthen, but 
weaken the jurisprudence of the Court.” A last interesting point that should be mentioned here has to do 
with the 1993 preliminary version of the 1994 ILC Draft. In that 1993 version, Art. 21 (then 28) read: 
“The Court shall apply: (a) this Statute; (b) applicable treaties and the rules and principles of general 
international law; (c) as a subsidiary source, any applicable rule of national law.” In the commentary to 
this provision, one can read: “[I]t is (…) understood that the expression “rules and principles of general 
international law” includes “general principles of law”, so that the Court can legitimately have recourse 








respect to the external evaluative framework of this study which focused on the 
international(ised) criminal tribunals, may also enter the internal evaluative 
framework of this study via the concept of “principles and rules of international 
law”. 
That would mean that certain established practices of the international criminal 
tribunals which can be linked to the male captus discussion can also be applied by 
the ICC if the judges are of the opinion that it is appropriate to transplant those 
practices, as principles/rules of international law, into the specific ICC system. One 
could hereby think of the acceptance of a broad concept of abuse of process (in that 
jurisdiction may be refused in very serious male captus cases, irrespective of the 
entity responsible) and the fact that the seriousness of the crimes with which the 
suspect is charged can be taken into account when applying the abuse of process 
doctrine. With respect to the related issue of the remedy of release, one could think 
of the fact that all these tribunals have stressed the importance of habeas corpus, 
even if the regulatory instruments of the tribunal in question did not explicitly 
contain such a provision.  
However, if the ICC judges were of the opinion that it would not be appropriate 
to transplant the established practices of the international criminal tribunals with 
respect to the male captus issue, as principles and rules of international law, into the 
specific system of the ICC, or if they were of the opinion that one should not look at 
the jurisprudence of these tribunals in the context of this provision at all, then part 
(c) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute must be examined. Perhaps this 
part may then bring more clarification on how the ICC judges should decide a 







                                                                                                                                              
whenever it needs guidance on matters not clearly regulated by treaty.” (Report of the Working Group 
on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, to be found in: Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session, 3 May – 23 July 1993, UNGA OR, Forty-eighth 
session, Supplement No. 10, A/48/10, p. 111.) (See also the Draft Statute for an International Criminal 
Court, to be found in: Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 
2 May – 22 July 1994, UNGA OR, Forty-ninth session, Supplement No. 10, A/49/10, p. 103.) This 
could be seen as additional evidence for the assertion that the practice of other international criminal 
tribunals could fall under part (b). Even though this passage has been criticised, see Pellet 2002 A, p. 
1071 (“why [corpus of] criminal law, given that the Article related to international law?”) and n. 113 
(“The ILC here confuses the general principles of international law (which are of a customary nature) 
and the general principles of law mentioned in Art. 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ”), the ICC 
Prosecutor has already referred to it to back his assertion that “[t]he applicability of the jurisprudence of 
international Tribunals is supported by Article 21 of the Rome Statute and its drafting history.” (ICC, 
Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Uganda, Case 01/05, ‘Update of Proposed Treatment of All Relevant 
Documents of the Record and Application for Entry of Reasons for Sealing into Public Record’ (Public 








2.4 Article 21, paragraph 1 (c) 
 
This third part of paragraph 1 reads: 
 
Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would 
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not 
inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally 
recognized norms and standards. 
 
One would only turn to this source, “the most controversial aspect of article 21”,179 
if sources such as the proper instruments of the ICC (paragraph 1 (a)) and those 
focused on international law (paragraph 1 (b)) bring no relief (“failing that”). In the 
words of Edwards: 
 
[I]t was evident to the drafters that the lacuna might need to be filled, as it was 
impractical, if not impossible, for each applicable rule or principle of law to be 
enumerated in the Rome Statute. Instances would undoubtedly arise in which superior 
sources of international law contained in the hierarchy would either be silent or would 
fail to provide a relevant, appropriate law to apply. The drafters concluded that the 
Court would turn to national law, but would only glean principles from it without 
adopting it wholesale. (…) The rationale is that if a common principle exists within 
the domestic laws of nations, such a principle ought to be attributable to international 
law to fill in the gap [original footnotes omitted, ChP].180 
 
Now, can one identify a general principle of law with respect to the male captus 
problem?181 To answer this, one must first know what, according to this article, a 
general principle of law is and how it can be found. Pellet is of the opinion that these 
general principles of law “are covered by section (c) of the above provision [this is 
Article 38, paragraph 1 of the ICJ Statute, ChP] under the title ‘general principles of 
                                                          
179 McAuliffe deGuzman 1999. p. 442. See also ibid., p. 437. 
180 Edwards 2001, pp. 406-407. 
181 It must again (see also n. 1) be stressed that although these principles are predominantly referred to 
when discussing substantive law issues, it is submitted that these principles may also relate to the 
procedural context. After all, national law is used to fill the legal lacunae of the other sources of Art. 21 
but the latter may not be restricted to substantive law issues only. As a result, national law may also be 
looked at if parts (a) and (b) of para. 1 of Art. 21 of the ICC Statute have no answer to a certain 
procedural question. Cf. in that respect the scope of the “general principles of law recognized by 
civilised nations” (Art. 38, para. 1 of the ICJ Statute) with which the general principles of law from Art. 
21 of the ICC Statute may be compared (see also the following footnote and accompanying text): “The 
importance of the “general principles” in litigation before international tribunals is not limited to the 
area of substantive law. Many questions of procedure and evidence (...), which necessarily arise in treaty 
and non-treaty cases alike, are not regulated by specific provisions of treaty or charter; in filling the gap, 
an international court will expressly or silently resort to procedural and evidentiary principles which are 









law recognized by civilised nations’ [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.182 According 
to him, “the general principles of law require a triple mental operation: a comparison 
between national systems, the search for common ‘principles’, and their 
transposition to the international sphere”.183 He explains that it is not necessary, 
however, to make a comparison of all national legal systems as the Statute refers to 
national laws of legal systems of the world.184 
 
[I]t is (…) necessary (…) only to ensure, by ‘polling’, that the norms in question are 
effectively found in the ‘principal legal systems of the world’. These can probably be 
reduced to a small number in the contemporary world: the family of civil-law 
                                                          
182 Pellet 2002 A, p. 1073. In the travaux préparatoires of Art. 38, para. 1 of the ICJ Statute, one can 
find, among other things, the following two well-known examples of general principles of law: res 
iudicata and good faith, see Cheng 1953, p. 25. In Appendix 1 of his book, entitled ‘Draft Code of 
General Principles of Law’, Cheng enumerates 16 articles, among which the above-mentioned two, but 
also other interesting examples, such as Art. 3: “Responsibility involves an obligation on the part of the 
State concerned to make integral reparation for the damage caused, in so far as it is the proximate result 
of the failure to comply with the international obligation. The State shall, wherever possible, make 
restitution in kind. If this is not possible, a sum corresponding to the value which restitution in kind 
would bear shall be paid. Whenever restitution in kind, or payment in lieu of it, does not cover the entire 
loss suffered, damages shall be paid in order that the injured party may be fully compensated. The 
damage suffered shall be deemed to be the proximate result of an act if it is the normal and natural 
consequence thereof, or if it would have been foreseen by a reasonable man in the position of the author 
of the act, or if it is the intended result of the act.” (Ibid., p. 397.) (Cf. n. 553 of Chapter III and its 
reference to the Chorzów case.) In addition, on p. 187 of his book, Cheng speaks of the “general 
principle: ex injuria non oritur jus.” However, one can seriously doubt whether this latter principle is 
still valid in the context of this book’s topic, given the fact that Chapter VII has clearly shown that many 
decisions can still be qualified as male captus bene detentus cases, see also n. 208. 
183 Pellet 2002 A, p. 1073. It is clear that domestic views cannot automatically be transplanted into the 
specific international system of the law. Hence, also here, the ICC judges appear to have a certain 
discretion before they apply the national views, cf. the words “where appropriate” in the context of part 
(b) of para. 1 of Art. 21 of the ICC Statute. Pellet hereby refers to a quotation from the Blaškić case (see 
ibid., p. 1074) in which the Trial Chamber applied the national (US) ‘ripeness doctrine’ (under which “a 
court should refrain from determining issues that are only hypothetical or speculative, or at any rate 
devoid of sufficient immediacy and reality as to warrant adjudication” (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, ‘Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the 
Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997’, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108 bis, 29 October 1997, para. 
22)). The Appeals Chamber however determined “that it is inappropriate to resort to this doctrine in 
these proceedings” (ibid.) because, amongst other things, “it appears to the Appeals Chamber to be 
inapposite to transpose it into international criminal proceedings. The Appeals Chamber holds that 
domestic judicial views or approaches should be handled with the greatest caution at the international 
level, lest one should fail to make due allowance for the unique characteristics of international criminal 
proceedings.” (Ibid., para. 23.) See also the (by Pellet applauded, see Pellet 2002 A, pp. 1075-1076) 
words of Cassese in the Erdemović case: ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović, 
‘Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese’, Case No. IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1997, paras. 2-6. 
See finally Bitti 2009, p. 300: “[E]ven if such a principle existed, it would be difficult to apply it before 
an international criminal court since the structure of courts in a State is fundamentally different from the 
structure of an international court.” 
184 See Pellet 2002 A, p. 1073. Pellets on the same page also refers to the indeed clearer French version 
of these terms: les lois nationales représentant les différents systèmes juridiques du monde, this is the 








countries, the common law, and, perhaps, Islamic law [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].185   
 
This view was also used by the Prosecutor in his ‘Application for Extraordinary 
Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to 
Appeal’,186 in which he delved into “the law of 24 national jurisdictions representing 
both the Civil [sometimes also referred to as “Romano-Germanic”,187 ChP] and the 
Common law traditions, and the law of a further three jurisdictions with a strong 
Islamic law component”188 in order to find a general principle of law.189 
However, Article 21, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute goes further. It talks of 
  
general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of 
the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not 
inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally 
recognized norms and standards [emphasis added, ChP]. 
 
According to Pellet, it seems legitimate that the ICC, on the basis of the first part of 
the italicised words, “give[s] priority to the legal systems with which the defendant 
is familiar [original footnote omitted, ChP].”190 Verhoeven explains that “the intent 
probably is to refer to the state or states which would be competent according to the 
connecting criteria traditionally used by states to determine criminal jurisdiction 
(place of the crime, nationality of the accused or of the victim, etc.)”.191  
That national aspect will, however, not be analysed in this research because the 
framework of this chapter aims to be of general application, potentially interesting 
for every male captus case the ICC is confronted by. Thus, what is sought here are 
the general principles which may be applicable to any case/defendant and not to a 
specific crime/case/defendant. This means that one cannot look to “the national laws 
                                                          
185 Ibid., pp. 1073-1074. 
186 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Prosecutor’s 
Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying 
Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 24 April 2006, para. 16 (explicitly referring to Pellet). 
187 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Judgment on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision 
Denying Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 13 July 2006, para. 25. See also ns. 5 and 8 
and accompanying text of Chapter IV. 
188 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Prosecutor’s 
Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying 
Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 24 April 2006, para. 21. 
189 It must be noted that although the Appeals Chamber dismissed the Prosecutor’s application because it 
found, among other things, 1) that his suggested principle did not exist and 2) that Art. 21, para. 1 (c) of 
the ICC Statute did not have to be looked at in the first place (see ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary 
Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal’ (Public 
Document), ICC-01/04, 13 July 2006, para. 32, see also n. 15) it arguably did not attack the Prosecutor’s 
method in finding his general principle of law. 
190 Pellet 2002 A, p. 1075. 








of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime” as a general 
framework is supposed to be ‘crime/case/defendant-neutral’. Of course, when 
deciding a specific male captus case, the ICC judges may perhaps look at “the 
national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime” – 
even if this study is of the opinion that this appears to be in contradiction with the 
concept of general principles192 – but it goes beyond the scope of this general 
framework to take this element into account.193 In addition, even if the ICC judges 
were to look to the general principles of law derived from “the national laws of 
States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime”,194 those principles 
                                                          
192 Saland shows that this provision (like many others in the Statute) was not so much the result of legal 
logic, but rather of political compromise: “Where views diverged widely was on the direct applicability 
of national law. Some thought that national law was directly applicable. Others were of the view that 
national law should only be an indirect source, with the Court deriving common principles from the 
different legal systems. The debate showed a great majority in favor of the latter approach which was 
subsequently reflected in sub-paragraph (c), but the former represented a view held strongly by Japan 
(which later changed position), China, some Arab countries and Israel. During the Rome Conference the 
issue of the role of national law was settled by a compromise originally proposed by Norway and 
followed up by Canada and the United States. After the reference to “national laws of legal systems of 
the world”, from which the Court would derive general principles, it was inserted that those national 
laws would include “as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime.” There is of course a certain contradiction between the idea of deriving general 
principles, which indicates that this process could take place before a certain case is adjudicated, and 
that of looking also to particular national laws of relevance to a certain case; but that price had to be paid 
in order to reach a compromise.” (Saland 1999, pp. 214-215.) Cf. also Verhoeven 2004, p. 10: “[T]he 
exact purpose of that specification (‘including …’) remains unclear. Apparently, a national law as such 
is not a legal system; if it were, the reference to the latter would indeed be useless. But how could a 
national law not be part of a legal system if it does not by itself constitute such a system? This is 
difficult to understand. In other words, the national laws of the legal systems of the world’ necessarily 
include – at least at first sight – ‘the national laws of states that would normally exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime’. What then is the reason for making a reference to them expressly?” 
193 Furthermore, it has also been argued that these specific words of part (c) of para. 1 of Art. 21 of the 
ICC Statute only relate to substantive criminal law issues, and not to procedural criminal law issues 
(such as the ones discussed in this book), see the following words of Klamberg on his very practical 
‘ICL Database & Commentary’ (available at: http://www.iclklamberg.com/Statute.htm): “It is submitted 
that the first part of Article 21(1)(c) covers principles relating to substantive as well as procedural law, 
while the latter part of the article, which allows the Court to also apply “the national laws of States that 
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime provided”, relates only to national substantive 
criminal law (such as practice regarding prison sentences) and not procedural rules.” See also Pellet 
2002 A, p. 1075, n. 138: “This system brings to mind the directions set out in Arts. 24 and 23, 
respectively, of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, which invite the ad hoc Tribunals to ‘have recourse 
to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts’ of, respectively, former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.”  
194 It is to be stressed that if the judges were to do so, they would have to focus on the general principles 
derived from those national laws and not on the national laws themselves. See Pellet 2002 A, p. 1076: 
“[T]here is never any question of purely and simply applying the law of any State; for which one may 
give thanks. As has been pointed out, ‘[t]he application as such of national law before an international 
tribunal is very problematic for a variety of reasons, not least the variation and possible inconsistency of 
relevant domestic norms with regard to the same international situation. Reference to national legal 
concepts via, for example, general principles of law, on the other hand, is accepted international 








still have to be consistent with “this Statute and with international law and 
internationally recognized norms and standards” (the second part of the italicised 
words).195 Furthermore, also here, it seems that those principles can only be applied 
if the ICC judges are of the opinion that it is appropriate to transplant those 
principles into the context of the ICC case (“as appropriate”). Hence, the importance 
of the national legal context is perhaps less significant than this provision suggests. 
This seems apt: if this were not the case, then a suspect from State A may be 
confronted by a different legal system than a suspect from State B, even if they are 
both prosecuted before the same international court. This is clearly to be avoided for 
reasons of legal certainty and equality.196 In addition, it would also obstruct the 
development of international criminal law as a distinct field of law.197 
With respect to the exact meaning of the words “not inconsistent with this 
Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and 
standards”, they are reminiscent of the previously discussed paragraph 1 (b) (“the 
principles and rules of international law”) and the still-to-discuss paragraph 3 
(“internationally recognized human rights”) of Article 21 of the ICC Statute. It is 
hereby submitted that the words “international law and internationally recognized 
norms and standards” are indeed covered by the words from paragraph 1 (b) and 
paragraph 3 and therefore will not be examined here separately.198  
                                                                                                                                              
customary law which may become apparent [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also McAuliffe 
deGuzman 1999, p. 443. 
195 McAuliffe deGuzman states on these words: “Provided that the Court conducts broad comparative 
law analysis in arriving at general principles, this provision should prove relatively unimportant. Such 
general principles constitute international law and therefore cannot, by definition, be inconsistent with 
international law. They are also unlikely to conflict with the ICC Statute, which represents a codification 
of international law. Nonetheless, this qualifier is significant in that it emphasizes that the Statute and 
norms of international law always take precedence over principles derived from national laws [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” (McAuliffe deGuzman 1999, p. 444.) Moreover, Verhoeven quite rightly 
points out: “Since the general principles referred to in (c) are only applicable in the absence of one of 
the rules referred to in paragraph 1, (a) (Statute, Elements of Crimes, Rules of Procedure and Evidence) 
or (b) (‘treaties and rules and principles of international law’), it is difficult to understand how they 
could be contradicting a – by hypothesis – non-existent rule.” (Verhoeven 2004, p. 12.) 
196 See also Chin 1998, p. 341: “The principles which the Court applies must be independent of links to 
the individual case in question. To provide otherwise would be to risk breaching the principle of 
equality before the law in that different principles might be applied depending on which states would 
“normally exercise jurisdiction” in that particular case. What the Court should be doing is deriving these 
general principles from an overall survey of the legal systems of the world without giving particular 
attention to any one national legal system [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
197 See Shaw 1998, pp. 68-69: “The dangers of importing into international criminal proceedings, norms 
of national law, which may vary from instance to instance depending upon the identity of the accused, 
must be clear. Inconsistency and lack of clarity would become distinct risks and the concept of 
autonomous international criminal law in practice threatened. International courts are used to dealing 
with municipal law concepts within the context of general principles of law as means of filling lacunae 
in the norms of public international law. Using the particular national laws of particular states as a direct 
source of law for an international criminal court should be avoided [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
See also McAuliffe deGuzman 1999, p. 439 (and n. 25 in specific), presenting the arguments of those 
opposing the importance of national law, and Caracciolo 2000, p. 223.  
198 Cf. in that respect also, for example, Human Rights Watch’s ‘Summary Of The Key Provisions Of 








It is now worth looking at whether there exist general principles of law which 
can be connected to the male captus problem. Which exact sources must be 
consulted to find them? The ICC Statute speaks of “general principles of law 
derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world”. This seems 
to point to legislation/statutory law, including perhaps constitutions (as they can be 
seen as the supreme laws of States). However, in the common law system, legal 
rules/‘the law’ are/is not only formed by legislators but to a great extent also by 
judges. For example, when the Prosecutor in his above-mentioned application 
reviewed the civil law system, the focus was clearly on statutory law such as 
national codes of criminal procedure,199 but in his review of the common law 
system, he looked at both statutory law (including a constitution)200 and law formed 
by case law201 to find out ‘the law’ of these legal systems in relation to his claimed 
principle.202 Hence, it seems, even though it must be admitted that this matter 
                                                                                                                                              
statute.htm). Here, it used the words “international human rights” to refer to the last words of (now) Art. 
21, para. 1 (c) of the ICC Statute: “Article 33 provides that the law to be applied by the court will be 
firstly, the statute, elements of crimes and the rules of evidence and procedure, secondly, international 
law and thirdly, general principles derived from national systems so far as consistent with international 
human rights.” See also Degan 2005, p. 81. 
199 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Prosecutor’s 
Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying 
Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 24 April 2006, ns. 24-25 and paras. 24-25. 
200 See ibid., para. 26. 
201 See ibid. 
202 See also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Judgment on 
the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 
Decision Denying Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 13 July 2006, paras. 26 (“To begin 
the Prosecutor referred the Appeals Chamber to the relevant law finding application in fourteen 
countries belonging to the Romano-Germanic system of justice (...) exemplifying in his view a practice 
recognizing competence to the appeals court to review decisions disallowing an appeal. A right to do so 
is conferred by statutory law, often referred to as a “complaint motion” [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].”) and 28 (“The citations of the Prosecutor with regard to countries adhering to the common law 
system of justice (...) are on the one hand confined as in the case of the Romano-Germanic systems of 
law to statutory provisions allowing for a decision by the hierarchically higher court to grant “special 
leave” to hear an appeal and on the other hand to the jurisdiction of an hierarchically higher court to 
grant writs of certiorari and mandamus. These writs derive[d] from England [and] evolved in the context 
of common law, acknowledging power to the High Court a branch of the Supreme Court to oversee the 
exercise of judicial functions by inferior courts [original footnotes omitted, ChP]”.). See also the 
following decision of the ICC’s Trial Chamber in the Lubanga Dyilo case: “[T]he Trial Chamber does 
not consider that a general principle of law allowing the substantive preparation of witnesses prior to 
testimony can be derived from national legal systems worldwide, pursuant to Article 21(1)(c) of the 
Statute. Although this practice is accepted to an extent in two legal systems, both of which are founded 
upon common law traditions, this does not provide a sufficient basis for any conclusion that a general 
principle based on established practice of national legal systems exists. The Trial Chamber notes that the 
prosecution’s submissions with regard to national jurisprudence did not include any citations from the 
Romano-Germanic legal system [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICC, Trial 
Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses 








remains quite unclear,203 that case law may be looked at in the common law 
context.204 Indeed, one could argue that case law may be looked at in the context of 
the civil law system as well if a topic is not regulated in legislation and if judges 
consequently have created ‘the law’ on this issue themselves. As was shown earlier, 
the male captus bene/male detentus problem seems to be such an area: it appears 
that how a judge is to decide on a male captus is not normally prescribed by 
legislation; it is often left to the discretion of the judge himself to decide what the 
consequences of a certain male captus on the jurisdiction of the court are.205 As a 
consequence, the analysis of decisions from judges can arguably be resorted to in 
order to determine ‘the law’ of a certain legal system. (In addition, one could argue 
that a certain rule in case law may also say something about the written law – if 
there exists such written law – as most judges will merely apply the existing law 
instead of creating new law themselves.) As a result, it is submitted that the 
overviews of Chapter V – which focused on, but which were not restricted to, the 
common and civil law context206 – and the principles distilled in Section 2 of 
                                                          
203 See Cogan 2002, p. 117, n. 30: “It is unclear whether domestic case law can be considered under the 
Article 21(1)(c) rubric “general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world”.” 
204 Cf. also Bos 1984, p. 270: “Examining continental legal orders or systems, codes are destined to 
figure prominently on the list of objects for study. In common law countries, case-law will command 
most of one’s attention. Generally speaking, legal doctrine should be looked at closely [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].”  
205 Cf. also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of 
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) 
(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, 
para. 28: “The power to stay proceedings is par excellence a power assumed by the guardians of the 
judicial process, the judges, to see that the stream of justice flows unpolluted.” 
206 Note that cases from States with an Islamic law component were not absent either in these overviews 
(see, for example, ns. 623 and 630 of Chapter V) but it must be admitted that their influence on the male 
captus discussion does not seem to be grand. In that context, one may also refer to Hamid’s article from 
2004 which was used in this study as well. The fact that Hamid, in 2004 an associate professor and now 
a professor of law at the International Islamic University Malaysia, did not refer in his overview of the 
practice of national courts towards the male captus rule to States with an Islamic law component (other 
than the Israeli courts in Eichmann), may also constitute evidence for the assertion that there are not 
many (known) male captus cases from the Islamic law tradition. Be that as it may, it must also be 
stressed that in order to find a general principle of law, one could argue that the principle must, at least, 
be found in the common and civil law system, arguably still the most important systems of law for the 
ICC, see also n. 7 and accompanying text from Chapter IV. (See also the hesitant (“perhaps”) referral by 
Pellet to the Islamic law tradition (Pellet 2002 A, pp. 1073-1074: “[I]t is (…) necessary (…) only to 
ensure, by ‘polling’, that the norms in question are effectively found in the ‘principal legal systems of 
the world’. These can probably be reduced to a small number in the contemporary world: the family of 
civil-law countries, the common law, and, perhaps, Islamic law [original footnotes omitted, ChP].”) 
That means that if the overviews of Chapter V, which mainly addressed (but again, were not limited to) 
the common and civil law context, do not bring about a common principle, one could argue that there is 
no general principle of law which could be applied by the ICC. See in that respect also ICC, Trial 
Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses 
for Giving Testimony at Trial’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 30 November 2007, para. 41:  “[T]he Trial 








Chapter VII can be used to determine whether there exist general principles related 
to the male captus problem. Hence, here also, the results from the external 
evaluative framework can be used for the internal evaluative framework.   
With respect to the male captus bene/male detentus maxim itself, the overviews 
of Chapter V have clearly shown that one cannot make the general assertion that one 
of these maxims can be seen as a general principle of law nowadays. After all, many 
different male captus decisions were issued, one leading to a bene detentus and 
another leading to a male detentus outcome, depending on the exact circumstances 
of the case. Hence, even if it could be argued that male captus bene detentus was a 
general principle of law in the old days207 (but see the French Jolis case), it can be 
maintained that this is not the case in this day and age. Likewise, because decisions 
are still issued which could be seen as male captus bene detentus decisions, it is 
arguably also very hard to maintain that the male captus male detentus/ex iniuria ius 
non oritur maxim can be seen as a general principle of law.208  
However, there are certainly elements from the male captus case law which were 
shared by most systems of law, elements which may perhaps – again taking into 
account the overviews of this study being extensive but not exhaustive – be seen as 
general principles of law falling under the terminology used in Article 21, paragraph 
1 (c) of the ICC Statute.209 For example, one could think of the fact that most courts 
confronted by a male captus will use their discretion, for instance (in the common 
law system) under the abuse of process doctrine, to balance all the different 
elements of the case to decide whether or not the male captus is so serious that 
                                                                                                                                              
witnesses prior to testimony can be derived from national legal systems worldwide, pursuant to Article 
21(1)(c) of the Statute. Although this practice is accepted to an extent in two legal systems, both of 
which are founded upon common law traditions, this does not provide a sufficient basis for any 
conclusion that a general principle based on established practice of national legal systems exists. The 
Trial Chamber notes that the prosecution’s submissions with regard to national jurisprudence did not 
include any citations from the Romano-Germanic legal system [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
207 See Borelli 2004, p. 654. (Note only that Borelli is not referring here to Art. 21 of the ICC Statute but 
to the concept as mentioned in Art. 38 of the ICJ Statute (‘general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations’).) 
208 See also Bugnion 2002, p. 531 (who, like Borelli (see the previous footnote), is also writing on the 
concept as can be found in Art. 38 of the ICJ Statute): “En doctrine, on doit en premier lieu constater 
que la maxime “ex iniuria jus non oritur” connaît de sérieuses exceptions, aussi bien dans l’ordre 
interne qu’en droit international, de telle sorte qu’il n’est pas certain qu’on puisse y reconnaître l’un des 
principes généraux du droit mentionnés à l’article 38, chiffre 1, lettre c, du Statut de la Cour 
internationale de Justice [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also ibid., p. 531, n. 16: “En ce qui 
concerne le droit interne, on peut mentionner la maxime “male captus, bene judicatus” en vertu de 
laquelle une cour pénale se déclare compétente pour juger un prévenu, même si ce dernier a été conduit 
devant elle par des moyens illégaux, par exemple à la suite d’un enlèvement dans un autre État.” But see 
Shaw 2003, p. 98 (writing on general principles of law): “A further principle to be noted is that of ex 
injuria jus non oritur, which posits that facts flowing from wrongful conduct cannot determine the law 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also n. 182.  
209 It must be noted that to find these elements, one can look at all the male captus decisions and not 
only at those where the courts issued a certain decision because they were of the opinion that 
international law dictated them to do so. That latter point is only important for the customary 








jurisdiction must be refused.210 In addition, most courts seem to refuse jurisdiction 
only if their own authorities are involved in the male captus. Finally, it appears that 
quite a number of courts – although it is unclear whether “quite a number” is enough 
to lead to a general principle of law pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (c) of the 
ICC Statute – would also take into account the seriousness of the crimes with which 
the victim of the male captus is charged in deciding whether or not jurisdiction must 
be refused.  
The above-mentioned elements can be connected with the actual male captus 
problem itself, but it is also worth addressing the related issue of the remedy of 
release here. Can this remedy, of which it was earlier established that it has 
customary international law/general international law status, be seen as a general 
principle of law?  
In this context, it may be instructive to refer to the 1993 research from Cherif 
Bassiouni, who reviewed all the national legal systems having a written constitution 
(139 in total)211 in order to see whether certain rights had become general principles 
(of international law).212 Of the 11 rights examined,213 at least two should be 
                                                          
210 It may be interesting to note that Starr, whose support for an interest-balancing approach was already 
mentioned in n. 163 of Chapter VII, is of the opinion that such an approach can find support in the 
concept of equity, a concept which has been qualified as a general principle of law recognised by 
civilised nations under Art. 38, para. 1 (c) of the ICJ Statute. See Starr 2008, p. 764: “[I]nternational 
courts could find support for an interest-balancing approach in the tradition of equity, which has often 
been treated as a source of international law. The case law of the ICJ has increasingly incorporated 
certain equitable principles, and arbitral tribunals have long done so. One influential early argument for 
equity as a formal source of international law came from Judge Hudson’s separate opinion in the River 
Meuse case [PCIJ, The Diversion of Water from the Meuse, ‘Judgment’, 28 June 1937, Publications of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A./B., Fascicule No. 70 (pp. 73-80), ChP], in which 
he argued for application of the “clean hands” principle. Judge Hudson wrote that “principles of equity 
have long been considered to constitute a part of international law” and, specifically, qualify as “general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations” – a source of law under the ICJ Statute. While stating 
that the Chorzów Factory rule [see n. 553 and accompanying text of Chapter III and n. 182 of the 
present chapter, ChP] is “sound” as a “general principle,” he argued that courts devising remedies in 
particular cases “cannot ignore special circumstances which may call for the consideration of equitable 
principles.” [original footnotes omitted, ChP]” In fact, even the ICC Prosecutor, in its examination of 
Art. 21 of the ICC Statute and its nexus with Art. 38 of the ICJ Statute, has referred to the same case of 
the PCIJ, see ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Prosecutor’s 
Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying 
Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 24 April 2006, para. 19: “The jurisprudence stemming 
from the Permanent Court of International Justice, the International Court of Justice, the Iran-U.S. 
Mixed Claims Tribunal and the ICTY provides relevant examples of the type of general principles of 
law identified and applied by international judicial bodies: ○ The Diversion of Water from the Meuse 
Case: Lord Hudson held that “It would seem to be an important principle of equity that where two 
parties have assumed an identical or a reciprocal obligation, one party which is engaged in a continuing 
non-performance of that obligation should not be permitted to take advantage of a similar non-
performance of that obligation by the other party.” He thus appears to have understood “principles of 
equity” as being principles common to national legal systems generally and part of international law by 
virtue of article 38 (…) (3) of the Statute of the PCIJ [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
211 See Cherif Bassiouni 1993, p. 244: “This research focuses on all national legal systems which have a 
written constitution irrespective of their inclusion in any one of the major families of legal systems.” 
212 Although Cherif Bassiouni in the end was trying to find “internationally recognized general 








mentioned here.214 The first is the more general right to life, liberty and security of 
the person, “a cornerstone of international human rights law and of civil rights in all 
countries which recognize the supremacy of the rule of law”.215 Cherif Bassiouni 
concludes that this right can be found explicitly, “(in whole or in part) sometimes 
together and sometimes separately”,216 in 51 national constitutions. The more 
specific right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention was even found in at least 
119 constitutions (including constitutions adhering to the Islamic law system).217 Of 
                                                                                                                                              
whether the rights examined were found in ten international instruments), it is fair to say that the part of 
his study dedicated to the national context can be compared with the present discussion on the national 
general principles of law. See ibid., p. 247: “[T]he identification of principles of criminal justice 
procedures is done by identifying and then comparing basic criminal procedure rights in various national 
legal systems in order to determine the existence of “general principles” common to the major legal 
systems of the world.” (It is therefore perhaps a little confusing that he also refers to “general principles” 
when he arguably means “internationally recognized general principles”/“general principles of 
international law”, see ibid., p. 239: “The rights found in the [international] instruments evidence their 
international recognition, while their counterparts in the national constitutions evidence national legal 
recognition. The congruence of both indicate the existence of a “general principle”.” See also ibid., pp. 
239-240: “This study uses a purely empirical model of searching for repetition and similarity among the 
various rights to prove that similar rights evidence the existence of principles common to international 
law and national law, and that they are binding “general principles of law”.”) 
213 Those 11 are the following: 1) the right to life, liberty, and security of the person (pp. 254ff), 2) the 
right to recognition before the law and equal protection of the law (pp. 258ff), 3) the right to be free 
from arbitrary arrest and detention (pp. 259ff), 4) the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, 
and degrading treatment or punishment (pp. 262ff), 5) the right to be presumed innocent (pp. 265ff), 6) 
the right to a fair trial and corresponding subrights (such as the right to have procedures established by 
law) (pp. 267ff), 7) the right to assistance of counsel and corresponding subrights (pp. 280ff), 8) the right 
to a speedy trial (pp. 285ff), 9) the right to appeal (p. 286), 10) the right to be protected from double 
jeopardy (pp. 288ff) and 11) the right to be protected from ex post facto laws (pp. 290ff).  
214 Other interesting rights are for example the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment or punishment and the right to a fair trial and corresponding subrights (such as the 
right to have procedures established by law). 
215 Cherif Bassiouni 1993, p. 254. This crucial right can at least be traced back to Art. 39 of the 1215 
Magna Carta: “No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any other 
way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his 
peers and by the law of the land.” (Howard 1998, p. 45.) 
216 Cherif Bassiouni 1993, p. 255.  
217 See ibid., p. 261. See also n. 239 of Chapter V of this book, where the following view of the US 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the context of the civil case of Alvarez-Machain was 
presented: “Unlike transborder arrests, there exists a clear and universally recognized norm prohibiting 
arbitrary arrest and detention. This prohibition is codified in every major comprehensive human rights 
instrument and is reflected in at least 119 national constitutions.” (US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 
Alvarez-Machain v. United States et al. (No. 99-56762) and Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa et al. (No. 99-
56880), 3 June 2003 (331 F.3d 604), p. 620.) Not very surprisingly, the Court of Appeals also referred 
here to the study of Cherif Bassiouni. The Supreme Court in the same case agreed that Cherif 
Bassiouni’s study showed “that many nations recognize a norm against arbitrary detention” (US 
Supreme Court, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain et al. (No. 03-339) and United States v. Alvarez-Machain et 
al. (No. 03-485), 29 June 2004 (542 US 692), p. 736, n. 27) but it was also of the opinion that this was 
to no avail to Alvarez-Machain, who, it is recalled, was arguing that there exists, in customary 
international law, “a general prohibition of “arbitrary” detention defined as officially sanctioned action 
exceeding positive authorization to detain under the domestic law of some government, regardless of the 
circumstances.” (Ibid., p. 736.) This was, according to the Supreme Court, because the consensus of the 








all 11 rights examined, none is acknowledged more frequently.218 Hence, one can 
safely conclude that the right to liberty and security/the right not to be arrested or 
detained arbitrarily can be seen as a general principle of law.219  
However, can the more specific remedy of release (in contrast to the more 
general right to liberty and security or the right not to be arrested or detained 
arbitrarily) also be seen as a general principle of law? Although Cherif Bassiouni’s 
survey does not explicitly say so, one can argue that this is indeed the case. To back 
this assertion, it is arguably not necessary to examine all the constitutions reviewed 
by Cherif Bassiouni. As was already shown in Chapter III and as will again be 
shown infra when discussing paragraph 3 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute, the 
ICCPR, in which the right to liberty and security, including the remedy of release, 
can be found, has many (165) States Parties. The fact that a State has joined an 
international treaty means that the content of that treaty is part of that State’s law, 
whether that State adheres to a dualistic system of law (by which international law 
must be implemented in national laws first) or a monistic system of law (by which 
international is directly applicable in the national State).  
A study by Maki shows that the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful 
(arrest or) detention was accepted by many States even before the ICCPR was 
drafted. In her article ‘General Principles of Human Rights Law Recognized by All 
Nations: Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest and Detention’, she refers to the previously 
mentioned220 1964 UN Commission on Human Rights’ ‘Study of the Right to 
Everyone to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile’.221 Maki explains 
that the Commission first examined various national arrest and detention procedures 
and then prepared the so-called “Draft Articles” on the right to be free from arbitrary 
arrest and detention.222   
 
The Draft Articles were a compilation of selected laws from various countries, which 
rendered the fullest protection of the right to liberty and security of person in regard 
to arrest and detention. The Draft Articles represent the highest standards for 
individual protection as determined by the Commission; they represent those 
standards to which laws and practice should conform [emphasis in original, ChP].223  
 
These Draft Articles were then sent to UN Member States for comment. “The 
comments received were individual state assessments of the Draft Articles vis-à-vis 
                                                          
218 See Cherif Bassiouni 1993, p. 292. 
219 Cf. also Rayfuse 1993, pp. 890-891 (who is also claiming that these rights have customary 
international law status, see n. 197 and accompanying text of Chapter III): “Among the most well-
recognised and documented fundamental human rights are the right to liberty and security of the person 
and the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention. (…) These rights are (…) guaranteed by the 
constitutions of many nations”. 
220 See ns. 216 and 583 of Chapter III. 
221 Commission on Human Rights, Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, 
Detention and Exile, UN Doc. E/CN.4/826/Rev.1 (1964). 
222 See Maki 1980, p. 284. 








each state’s own existing legal system.”224 It turned out that the 48 governments 
submitting comments – and “representing a wide diversity of legal systems”225 – 
were “in surprising agreement”226 with these Draft Articles. Maki argues that  
 
[a] careful examination of the comments to the Draft Articles indicates that certain 
provisions of the Draft Articles can be summarized into principles upon which all 
commenting countries can agree. (…) The summaries are meant to include only those 
principles of the Draft Articles which are totally acceptable to the countries 
submitting comments.227 
 
Alongside the main summarised principle that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest or detention”,228 the second summarised principle reads: “Anyone who is 
arrested or detained shall be entitled to initiate proceedings before an authority in 
order to challenge the legality of his arrest or detention and obtain his release from 
that authority without delay if it is unlawful.”229 Maki notes: “It is significant that 
none of the countries submitting comments to the Draft Articles suggested that the 
result of the proceeding be anything but the detainee’s release, if the arrest or 
detention is unlawful.”230 According to Maki, additional information on States’ 
municipal laws and procedures regarding this topic, to be found in the 1950 
Yearbook on Human Rights231 “supports the assertion that the summarized 
principles are general principles of law recognized by all nations”.232  
Hence, one could conclude that not only the general right to liberty and 
security/the right not to be arrested or detained arbitrarily but also its more specific 
habeas corpus provision (including release in the case of an unlawful (arrest or) 
detention) can be seen as a general principle of law. This is also confirmed by 
Rodley. After having concluded that there is strong evidence that the following two 
elements, namely “(a) the right in criminal cases of a detained person to be brought 
promptly before a judge and (b) the right of anyone deprived of liberty to challenge 
the lawfulness of detention and to be released if the detention is found to be 
unlawful”,233 express a rule of general international law,234 he turns to the national 
level, explaining: 
 
While (...) the rights referred to here are frequently not respected, yet there are few 
legal systems that do not have provisions reflecting them in their ordinary law. This 
suggests that, rather than binding only the parties to the relevant instruments, the 
                                                          
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid., pp. 285-286.  
226 Ibid., p. 286. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid., p. 295. 
230 Ibid. 
231 See ibid., p. 300. 
232 Ibid., p. 301. 
233 Rodley 1999, p. 340. See also n. 416 of Chapter III. 








principles have universal application, reflecting as they appear to do ‘general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ (...) [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].235 
 
Finally, reference should be made to the following words from a very recent report, 
which, even though it is limited in scope,236 confirms the importance of the remedy 
of release in the case of an unlawful (arrest and) detention, although it is also true 
that special procedures may apply to high level suspects such as alleged terrorists:237 
 
Lawful detention (…) requires not only a procedure prescribed by law and that 
everyone who is arrested is informed promptly, in a language which he understands, 
of the reasons for his arrest and the charge against him, but as an extra safeguard that 
everyone arrested or detained is entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness 
of such deprivation of liberty will be decided speedily by a court and his release 
ordered if the detention is not lawful (habeas corpus). Although countries report that 
special conditions and procedures apply with regard to special categories of detainees 
(notably organised criminals and terrorists), (…) by and large under normal 
circumstances they all comply with these requirements.238 
 
                                                          
235 Ibid., pp. 340-341. 
236 See Brants 2009, p. 2: “The AIDC [Académie Internationale de Droit Comparé/International 
Academy of Comparative Law, ChP] reporters received answers to their questionnaire from fourteen 
countries, in alphabetical order: the Republic of Croatia, the Czech Republic, England & Wales, 
Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, the 
United States of America and Venezuela [original footnote omitted, ChP].” With respect to Switzerland, 
Brants explains (at ibid., p. 2, n. 5): “Partly because of the unique situation in Switzerland, where 
profound reforms of criminal process are taking place, the Swiss reporter was unable to answer the 
questionnaire in a form that made comparison feasible. For this reason, the reporters have elected to 
omit references to Switzerland from the general report as reproduced here.” See also ibid., p. 5 (writing 
on both the AIDC report and a report from AIDP, the Association Internationale de Droit 
Pénal/International Association of Penal Law, a report which examined 17 States, namely Argentina, 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Croatia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States): “In conclusion, what do 
these two general reports have to tell us about the state of criminal justice in the world in what must 
surely be termed a troubled global era? As a prior remark, it should be noted that it is difficult to 
generalise about the world, with ten of the fourteen national reports for the AIDC and thirteen of the 
seventeen for the AIDP being from European countries. South American and Asian countries are sorely 
underrepresented, and the continent of Africa not at all (with the exception of South Africa, which is 
hardly the most representative of African nations).” 
237 This is elaborated in more detail in the AIDP report (see the previous footnote), under the question 
whether the legal system of the State in question allows for limiting the right to habeas corpus with 
respect to serious offences, see Vervaele 2009, p. 89: “[I]n all reporting countries, except in the US, the 
right to habeas corpus applies to all offences, including serious offences and terrorist offences. No 
special rules of proactive detention have been elaborated, but some countries do report administrative 
forms of liberty-limiting or liberty-depriving measures. What has changed in some reporting countries is 
the moment ab quo when the habeas corpus procedure can be triggered, in other words the delay 
between the police detention and the subsequent judicial review. (…) What has also changed is the 
maximum duration of pre-trial detention.” 








Concluding this subsection, one can argue that if the ICC judges are of the opinion 
that parts (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute have brought no 
relief, then one may turn to part (c) and that following elements may perhaps be 
applied by the ICC judges as general principles of law, namely the fact that 
discretion can be used to decide whether or not the male captus is so serious that 
jurisdiction must be refused, that jurisdiction will normally only be refused if the 
prosecuting forum’s own authorities are involved in the male captus and that 
unlawfully arrested/detained persons must be released. Furthermore (but it is less 
clear whether this may also constitute a principle), in the balancing exercise, the 
seriousness of the crimes with which the victim of the male captus is charged can be 
taken into account. 
However, also with respect to part (c) (cf. the words “where appropriate” in the 
context of part (b)), the ICC judges will probably only use these solutions from the 
national level if they believe that it is appropriate to transplant these solutions into 
the specific context of the ICC, recall again the words of Pellet: “[T]he general 
principles of law require a triple mental operation: a comparison between national 
systems, the search for common ‘principles’, and their transposition to the 
international sphere [emphasis added, ChP]”.239 That could mean that the ICC 
judges may follow the principles which can be related to the proper male captus 
issue mentioned above but may be more reluctant with respect to the problematic 
remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention.   
  
3 ARTICLE 21, PARAGRAPH 2 
 
This paragraph states that “[t]he Court may apply principles and rules of law as 
interpreted in its previous decisions”. The word “may” shows that other ICC 
decisions do not need to be followed by the ICC judges examining a male captus 
situation and hence cannot be part of an internal evaluative framework which is 
aimed at finding out whether certain ICC decisions are in conformity with what the 
law of the ICC prescribes the judges to decide. After all, and in contrast to the first 
paragraph (“[t]he Court shall apply [emphasis added, ChP]”) and the still-to-discuss 
third paragraph (“[t]he application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article 
must be consistent with [emphasis added, ChP]”), the second paragraph is non-
obligatory in nature. If the ICC is not obliged to follow its own decisions, if there is 
no stare decisis, a view stating that although a certain ICC decision has outcome A, 
but ought to have outcome B (because the ICC, in another decision, reached that 
outcome B) is, of course, not convincing. In other words, one cannot assert, on the 
basis that the ICC previously reached outcome B, that the ICC must now also follow 
that conclusion if the Court is not obliged to follow that decision. This is clearly 
different from paragraph 1, discussed above, and paragraph 3, which will be 
addressed in the following section: as their language is mandatory, their content can 
                                                          








easily be used in an internal evaluative framework to find out whether a certain ICC 
decision is in conformity with those paragraphs.240  
 
4 ARTICLE 21, PARAGRAPH 3 
 
The third and final paragraph of this crucial article in the ICC Statute reads: 
 
The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent 
with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction 
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3,[241] age, race, 
colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or 
social origin, wealth, birth or other status. 
 
It can be argued that paragraph 3, in principle, is not a source of law as such, but a 
provision stating that the application and interpretation of law from the first two 
paragraphs must be consistent with the principle of non-discrimination (which will 
not be further discussed here) and internationally recognised human rights.242 In that 
                                                          
240 Even though the ICC judges do not need to follow previous ICC case law, one can imagine that 
judges will often refer to decisions of other Chambers. Indeed, this has already happened. (See Bitti 
2009, pp. 292-293.) In that context, one can also wonder whether the case law of the Appeals Chamber, 
in practice, will be considered by other Chambers to be of special importance. (See also Degan 2005, p. 
82.) This is not the case (which is consistent with the Statute), but Bitti also rightly shows that this may 
cause some problems in the future: “[T]he case-law of the Appeals Chamber does not seem to be placed 
on a higher level than the case-law of other Chambers of the Court, which seems to be in line with the 
wording of Article 21 (2) which refers to the Court and does not give a particular weight to the 
jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber. This will certainly produce some instability in the jurisprudence 
of the ICC for the next decades as Chambers are not bound by their previous case law and the 
modification of their composition, taking into consideration the fact that judges shall hold office for a 
term of nine years and are not eligible for re-election, may provoke important changes in the 
jurisprudence in all Chambers of the ICC, including the Appeals Chamber [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” 
241 This provision reads: “For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to 
the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any 
meaning different from the above.” 
242 See, for example, Edwards 2001, p. 369: “Recognizing that international law is dynamic and always 
evolving, the Rome Statute drafters noted the impracticality of precisely delineating within the Rome 
Statute or its collateral instruments every principle and rule of law to be used by the Court. They 
arguably saw a need for flexibility, while incorporating precision and certainty in identifying the 
applicable law to be used. Therefore, a balance was struck between a full exposition and a flexible 
approach, resulting in a list of sources of law, identified in articles 21(1) and 21(2), as constrained by 
article 21(3) in their interpretation and application [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” Note, however, 
the following words of Bitti: “The most important source of law (in addition to the Statute and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence), is likely to be Article 21 (3) of the Statute, i. e., “internationally recognized 
human rights”.” (Bitti 2009, p. 300.) See also ibid., p. 304: “[I]nternationally recognized human rights 
may constitute an additional source of law.” Nevertheless, even though these words can be interpreted 
as meaning that Bitti is of the opinion that para. 1 and para. 3 present the same kinds of sources, it will 
be explained in n. 253 that Bitti believes that there is certainly an important difference here, namely in 
that para. 1 enumerates the formal sources of law, whereas para. 3 provides a material source of law, cf. 
also the still-to-discuss vision of Pellet (see n. 253 and accompanying text), explaining the difference 








respect, it ‘only’ colours the application and interpretation of law from the first two 
paragraphs and hence in principle does not ‘produce’ new law itself.243 
Nevertheless, such a consistency test may go a relatively long way and may, 
although strictly speaking perhaps not as such,244 but nevertheless de facto, function 
as a provision allowing the entry of new law into the ICC context.245 This can be 
explained as follows: when one is looking for a provision/rule under paragraph 1 of 
Article 21 of the ICC Statute, one should not only take into account the most 
specific provision of the ICC Statute relevant to the case at bar, but also the more 
general provisions which are always applicable to any ICC case. If those generally 
formulated provisions were also subject to a consistency test with internationally 
                                                          
243 See Edwards 2001, p. 370: “When the Court resolves a legal issue, it must identify the “applicable 
law” from the article 21 sources list before determining the “consistency question”. See also the 
following and already-mentioned (see n. 26) quotation from the ICC decision on ‘witness proofing’: 
“Unlike the first component of the definition of the practice of witness proofing advanced by the 
Prosecution, the Chamber observes that the goal and measures encompassed by the second component 
of such a definition are not covered by any provision of the Statute, the Rules or the Regulations. 
Therefore, the Chamber, prior to undertaking any analysis under article 21 (3) of the Statute, shall first 
analyse whether this second component is embraced by any provision, rule or principle which could be 
considered as part of the applicable law of the Court pursuant to article 21 (1) (b) and (c) of the Statute 
[emphasis added, ChP].” (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Practices of Witness 
Familiarisation and Witness Proofing’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 8 November 2006, para. 
28.) See also ibid., para. 10: “[T]he Chamber recalls the general principle of interpretation set out in 
article 21 (3) of the Statute, according to which “the application and the interpretation of law pursuant to 
this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights”. In this regard, the 
Chamber considers that prior to undertaking the analysis required by article 21 (3) of the Statute, the 
Chamber must find a provision, rule or principle that, under article 21 (1) (a) to (c) of the Statute, could 
be applicable to the issue at hand [emphasis added, ChP].” 
244 See Vasiliev 2009, pp. 218-219: “The provision does not serve as a regular channel for the direct 
import of ‘external’ human rights standards, but as a principle guiding the interpretation and application 
of the ICC’s own legal framework. Indeed, in exceptional circumstances, the Article could be used for 
interpreting and applying that framework in a manner that comes close to devising a new procedural 
remedy. However, seeing it as an extraordinary trouble-shooting device would not be fully accurate. 
Even where not explicitly foreseen in the Statute or Rules, the said remedy will certainly lie in the broad 
competences of the judges and/or the relevant rights of the participants (for example, the duty to ensure 
and the right to receive a fair trial). Thus, the ‘revelation’ of a potential remedy by the judges would not 
be gap-filling by way of direct application of the standards specified in Article 21(3), but rather a logical 
corollary of the interpretation and application of the ICC in light of those standards [original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].” 
245 Cf. also Arsanjani 1999, p. 29: “While the original intent behind this paragraph may have been to 
limit the court’s powers in the application and interpretation of the relevant law, it could have the 
opposite effect and broaden the competence of the court on these matters.” See also Sluiter 2009, p. 464: 
“[T]he potential of Article 21 (3) is enormous, especially from a defence perspective. The provision is a 
clear rejection of ‘black letter lawyering’, and entails that the effect and importance of written law is 
quite relative.” However, notwithstanding this potential, Sluiter is pessimistic about the actual effect of 
Art. 21, para. 3 of the ICC Statute in the future, see ibid., pp. 466-467: “One wonders whether Article 21 
(3) may have any effect in filling gaps within the Statute; in other words, could it serve as a basis for 
some sort of law-making by the judiciary? (…) As in a number of areas, (…) the Judges have already 
turned the Statute into something which it is not and which i[t] i[s] not intended to be, I am therefore not 
confident that Article 21 (3) will in practice have the effect, which it should have bearing in mind its 








recognised human rights, new law may indeed enter into the ICC context (although 
some will say that this is not new law, but the existing law, interpreted and applied 
consistently with internationally recognised human rights). One could hereby think, 
for example, of Article 1 of the ICC Statute which states: 
 
An International Criminal Court (‘the Court’) is hereby established. It shall be a 
permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over 
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this 
Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The 
jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this 
Statute. 
 
It could be argued that this entails that whenever the ICC exercises its jurisdiction, 
whenever it is involved in a case, that involvement, that exercise of jurisdiction, 
must be applied and interpreted in conformity with those internationally recognised 
human rights which are relevant to the ICC’s functioning. That exercise of 
jurisdiction/involvement, of course, includes the proceedings in the courtroom, 
when the ICC is actually trying the case, but it would also include the exercise of 
jurisdiction/involvement in the pre-trial phase246 and hence also, for example, the 
actions of third parties when these parties make arrests/detentions/surrenders at the 
request of the ICC, even though Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute seems to 
apply to the ICC only.247 Before continuing on this topic, it should be remarked that 
this is the path the ICC should follow in any case: ensuring that whenever the ICC is 
involved in a case (including the actions of third parties working at the behest of the 
ICC), that involvement is consistent with internationally recognised human rights. 
However, it can be argued that it would even be fairer for the ICC to take its 
responsibility for violations in the context of its case more generally. Although 
arrests/detentions made at the behest of the ICC will cover a large part of the ICC’s 
arrest/detention ‘stock’, the ICC may always be confronted by male captus claims 
which go beyond such situations (cf. abduction by private individuals). It would be 
highly just if the ICC, as the ultimate prosecuting forum, would also repair those 
violations, even if it was not involved in the male captus.  
                                                          
246 See ibid., p. 465: “The protection of Article 21 (3), like the protection of the right to a fair trial, 
should extend to the pre-trial phase. Any other approach deprives individuals of essential protection and 
may make the Court the beneficiary of activities it would not wish to be associated with.” See also ibid., 
pp. 472 and 474 (where he connects Art. 21, para. 3 of the ICC Statute with Art. 59 of the ICC Statute). 
On the last page, he writes, for example, that “[t]he proposed interpretation is therefore that the 
reference to ‘rights’ in Article 59 (2) be interpreted independently from the national law; what matters 
are internationally protected rights of the arrested person.” 
247 See Edwards 2001, p. 348: “The human rights obligations imposed by article 21(3) extend to all law 
to be applied and interpreted by the ICC, and to all aspects of the operation of the Court, including acts 
of the Prosecutor, the judges, and the Assembly of States Parties, and, quite probably, to acts of States 
parties themselves, IGOs [inter-governmental organisations, ChP] and others who cooperate with the 
ICC [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See also ibid., n. 93: “Though article 21(3) arguably may not 
directly apply to States Parties, IGOs, or others who might engage in cooperation with the ICC, States 
Parties and other entities that do cooperate may be required to comply with norms contained in article 








Returning to the internationally recognised human rights which are relevant to 
the ICC’s functioning in the context of the pre-trial phase, one could think here, for 
example, of a broad concept of the right to a fair trial, a right which should, as will 
be shown infra, definitely be seen as an internationally recognised human right.248 
Thus, one may argue that the complete exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction, the entire 
proceedings must be in conformity with those internationally recognised human 
rights which are relevant to the ICC, even if these rights are not explicitly mentioned 
in the ICC Statute. See also in that respect the following words of Edwards: 
 
Perhaps the most compelling argument favoring the existence of a search and seizure 
privacy right under the Rome Statute [which does not mention this right, ChP] is that 
the right is an “internationally recognized human right,” which must be enforced by 
the Court because Rome Statute, article 21(3) mandates the Court to apply all law 
“consistent with internationally recognized human rights.” Thus, all “internationally 
recognized human rights” relevant to the Court’s functioning must be enforced. Since 
the search and seizure right to privacy is relevant to the right to a fair trial, such 
privacy rights must be enforced [original footnote omitted, ChP].249 
 
In such cases, no conflict will arise as there is no original provision from the ICC 
Statute which can be viewed as being in contrast with the newly applied human 
right. However, what happens if there does exist a provision in the Statute, but that 
provision is viewed as being incompatible with internationally recognised human 
rights? Arsanjani writes on this subject:  
 
While the original intent behind this paragraph may have been to limit the court’s 
powers in the application and interpretation of the relevant law, it could have the 
opposite effect and broaden the competence of the court on these matters. It provides 
a standard against which all the law applied by the court should be tested. This is 
sweeping language, which, as drafted, could apply to all three categories in Article 
21. For instance, if the court decides that certain provisions of the Elements of Crimes 
or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are not compatible with the standards set out 
                                                          
248 Note that the ICC Statute does not contain an explicit provision entitled ‘the right to a fair trial’, but 
many aspects of this right are regulated in several provisions of the ICC Statute. One could hereby think, 
for instance, of Art. 64, para. 2 (“The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and 
is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims 
and witnesses”), Art. 67 (entitled ‘Rights of the accused’) and Art. 69, para. 4 (“The Court may rule on 
the relevance or admissibility of any evidence, taking into account, inter alia, the probative value of the 
evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair trial or to a fair evaluation of the 
testimony of a witness, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”) of the ICC Statute. 
249 Edwards 2001, p. 372. See also Gallant 1999, p. 707 (also writing on this right): “[T]he Court must 
apply all internationally recognized human rights relevant to its activities [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” See also Hafner and Binder 2004, p. 172: “[A]ny discriminatory application of the Statute would 
be prevented by paragraph 3. Furthermore, the measures designed to implement the duties arising from 
the Statute have to be taken with due respect for human rights. In other words, an arrest or a house 
search of a suspect will have to be guided by the relevant human rights standards (i.e. the right to 








in paragraph 3 of Article 21, it would not have to apply them. The provision also lays 
down special rules of interpretation for Article 21.250 
 
Although Arsanjani in 1999 was still uncertain about this paragraph’s exact scope 
(see the words “could” in the above-mentioned quotation), Pellet (in 2002) is more 
confident. After having referred to part of the above-mentioned quotation by 
Arsanjani, Pellet states: “Nothing then, should prevent the Court from refusing to 
apply an Element of Crimes, a Rule of Procedure and Evidence, or even a provision 
of its Statute, if its application were considered to infringe an ‘internationally 
recognized human right’.”251 This is because the words of paragraph 3 indicate that 
“these ‘internationally recognized human rights’ take precedence over all other 
applicable rules [original footnote omitted, ChP].”252 Pellet explains in that context 
that the  
 
formal hierarchy created between the sources of applicable law is overlaid by another 
substantial hierarchy between the applicable norms: some are superior to others, not 
by reason of their formal source, but due to their subject-matter or their veritable 
substance [emphasis in original, ChP].253 
 
In that sense, the previously explained correlation between the different parts of 
paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute should be re-assessed. (This was also 
the reason not to discuss paragraph 3 in the context of paragraph 1 for it would 
unnecessarily complicate matters at that stage.) After all, part (a) of paragraph 1 of 
Article 21 of the ICC Statute must be interpreted and applied in accordance with the 
internationally recognised human rights of paragraph 3. That means that one would 
have to take into account this third paragraph before one could conclude whether or 
not part (a) of paragraph 1 leaves a legal lacuna which must be filled by parts (b) 
and (c).254 In other words, one would have to take one additional step, the 
                                                          
250 Arsanjani 1999, p. 29. 
251 Pellet 2002 A, p. 1080. 
252 Ibid. See also Sluiter 2002 C, p. 46.  
253 Pellet 2002 A, p. 1077. See also Vasiliev 2009, pp. 214-215: “Norms falling under internationally 
recognized human rights and the non-discrimination principle remain valid at all stages of the law 
determination process under Article 21(1), no matter what source they are derived from. These norms 
defy the ‘hierarchy of sources’, since their applicability is not dependent on the category of sources 
indicated in Article 21(1)(a) to (c). As vigilant ‘watchdogs’ entrusted with a task to ensure order within 
the boundaries of the ICC legal regime, the standards specified in Article 21(3) prevail, by virtue of 
higher normative force, over any other applicable norm of the ICC law, by shaping the manner in which 
it must be interpreted and applied. In this sense, the said standards are ‘extra-hierarchical’ [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].” Cf. also Bitti, referring to Pellet, who is of the opinion that para. 3 constitutes 
a material source of law (as opposed to the formal sources of law as can be found in para. 1). See Bitti 
2009, pp. 287-288. See also ibid., pp. 293-294. (See also n. 242.) 
254 See also the following words from the Al Bashir case: “[T]he consistent case law of the Chamber on 
the applicable law before the Court has held that, according to article 21 of the Statute, those other 
sources of law provided for in paragraphs (1)(b) and (1)(c) of article 21 of the Statute, can only be 
resorted to when the following two conditions are met: (i) there is a lacuna in the written law contained 
in the Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules; and (ii) such lacuna cannot be filled by the 








consistency test of paragraph 3, in examining part (a) of paragraph 1. However, that 
also means that if there are certain rules of customary international law (part (b)) or 
general principles of law (part (c)) which can be seen as representing internationally 
recognised human rights (paragraph 3), these rules already become relevant in 
examining the law of part (a), namely as part of the consistency test of paragraph 3 
with which part (a) must comply. Put another way, one can still be of the opinion 
that part (b) can only be looked to if part (a) has left a legal lacuna, and that part (c) 
will only be examined if parts (a) and (b) have brought no relief, but this correlation 
is only valid to the extent that parts (b) and (c) do not represent internationally 
recognised human rights. If they do, they become part of paragraph 3 and thus of the 
examination of part (a) of paragraph 1. In the same vein, and returning to the words 
of Verhoeven: if his words must be interpreted to mean that parts (a) and (b) of 
paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute ought to be considered together and that 
part (b) will supersede part (a) in the case of conflict, unless it was the specific 
intention of the drafters that part (a) be inconsistent with part (b), this position may 
still be valid, but not if the norms of part (b) can be seen as internationally 
recognised human rights. If that were the case, then part (b), ‘coloured’ by 
paragraph 3, would take precedence, even if this would go against the intention of 
the drafters.255  
Hafner and Binder, however, disagree with Pellet’s view of the ‘super-
legality’256 of internationally recognised human rights.257 They present seven 
considerations which, according to them, indicate the superiority of the Statute over 
                                                                                                                                              
the Law of the (…) Treaties and article 21(3) of the Statute [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICC, Pre-
Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir (“Omar Al Bashir”), ‘Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’ (Public Redacted Version), ICC-02/05-01/09, 4 March 2009, para. 44.) 
See also ibid., para. 126. 
255 Cf. on this issue also Vasiliev 2009, p. 214 (following the view of Pellet): “In case of a – at this stage 
admittedly hypothetical – collision of a statutory norm with a rule of customary law or a general 
principle of law, the norm originating from the Statute would not prevail over such a rule or principle 
automatically, solely on the basis of its origin in the Statute. Consideration has to be given to the 
normative weight of the provision derived from the source other than the Statute, as it may hold a higher 
position in the normative hierarchy. Specifically in the ICC context, a hallmark of the norms occupying 
a supreme position in such hierarchy is their subject-matter: more precisely, the pertinence to 
internationally recognized human rights and non-discrimination principle according to Article 21(3). 
This Article requires the Court to apply and interpret the law flowing from the sources listed in Article 
21(1)(a) to (c) in the manner consistent with these standards [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
256 See Pellet 2002 A, pp. 1079-1081. 
257 See also Gallant 1999, pp. 702-703: “[I]nternationally recognized human rights are adopted as part of 
the ICC Statute, and are superior to Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted under the Statute. They 
are not stated as superior to the ICC Statute itself. (...) Thus, should there be an explicit inconsistency 
between a provision of the ICC Statute and an internationally recognized human right, there is no 
automatic preference for the right.” Cf. also Verhoeven 2004, pp. 14-15, arguing the same, but then with 
respect to the substantive provisions of the ICC Statute, see ibid., p. 15: “[I]t could probably be contrary 
to the very purpose of the Rome statute to look at its – at least substantial as opposed to procedural or 
organizational – criminal provisions as not being of a ‘general’ nature. If this is true, there cannot be an 








paragraph 3.258 Although Hafner and Binder, as well as Pellet are of the opinion that 
this discussion is mainly an academic one as the Statute will not easily contradict 
internationally recognised human rights,259 the previous pages have clarified that 
this may not always be that easy to determine.  
The remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention constitutes, of 
course, an excellent example in that respect. It was argued supra that it is not clear 
that the drafters of the Statute intentionally deleted the remedy of release in the case 
of an unlawful arrest/detention from the general right to liberty and security/the right 
not to be arrested or detained arbitrarily. Because of that, it was submitted, part (b) 
(which includes customary international law and hence the remedy of release) could 
be applied by the ICC judges, “where appropriate”, because part (a) left a legal 
lacuna. It was also argued that the remedy of release could be applied by the judges 
if they were of the opinion that parts (a) and (b) had failed to provide an answer to 
the problem. In that case, the remedy of release could be applied as a general 
principle of law under part (c) (if the judges are of the opinion that this domestic 
principle can be transplanted into the context of the ICC).  
The information on paragraph 3 has changed this position, however. After all, in 
interpreting part (a) of paragraph 1 (the right to liberty and security without the 
remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention), the ICC judges must 
take into account paragraph 3. Assuming for now that the remedy of release can be 
seen as (part of) an internationally recognised human right (which, given its 
customary international law/general international law status, appears to be the case, 
although this will be examined in more detail infra), this entails that the right to 
liberty and security, as can be found in the ICC Statute, must be interpreted as 
encompassing the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention. 
Although this may seem to engender the same outcome as that of the position 
discussed earlier (where it was said that the remedy of release could be applied as a 
rule of customary international law or as a general principle of law) this is arguably 
not the case. After all, the remedy of release from part (b) could only be applied by 
the judges “where appropriate”, if the judges were of the opinion that this solution 
could be transplanted into the specific context of the ICC. Likewise, the remedy of 
release as a general principle of law had to be transposed in the international sphere, 
to use the words of Pellet. That may mean that judges may modify a certain 
principle from the national level so that it can ‘fit’ the specific ICC context. Hence, 
in these two situations, the judges have some freedom of movement with respect to 
the rules of customary international law/general principles of law. However, that 
does not seem to be the case with respect to paragraph 3. The law to be applied and 
interpreted must be in accordance with paragraph 3.260  
                                                          
258 See Hafner and Binder 2004, pp. 173ff.  
259 See ibid., p. 173, n. 42 and Pellet 2002 A, p. 1082. 
260 Cf. also Sluiter 2009, p. 463: “The provision (…) posits the view that ‘internationally recognised 
human rights’ are applicable fully, and thus need not be ‘re-interpreted’ in light of the unique mandate 
and context of the ICC. More concretely, the mandatory and specific content of Article 21 (3) of the 









That would mean that the remedy of release, in principle, would have to be 
applied. Not taking into account for the moment the problems which can be related 
to this remedy and how these problems are to be solved (this will be discussed 
infra), this outcome is perhaps not so problematic because this study argued that it 
was not clearly established that the drafters of the ICC Statute intentionally wanted 
to delete this remedy. However, matters may turn out to be more complicated if one 
is of the opinion, on the basis of the information presented in the previous pages, 
that it was in fact clearly the intention of the drafters to delete this remedy. In that 
case, one must ascertain which solution takes precedence here: the intention of the 
drafters (no remedy of release) or the remedy of release pursuant to paragraph 3 
(again assuming for now that this remedy can be seen as (part of) an internationally 
recognised human right). In that case, one may either follow Pellet (whose approach 
would lead to the remedy of release) or Hafner and Binder (whose approach would 
not lead to the remedy of release).261  
Returning now to the seven considerations presented by Hafner and Binder, the 
first is that “[t]he literal interpretation of Article 21(3) can be seen as expressing the 
primacy of the ICC Statute”.262 Although it is true that paragraph 3 of Article 21 of 
the ICC Statute does not explicitly mention the superiority of the human rights, it 
does state that the interpretation and application of the ICC law (including the 
Statute) must be consistent with internationally recognised human rights, thereby 
apparently granting a higher status to human rights. The second consideration has to 
do with the formulation and the structure of Article 21 of the ICC Statute. Hafner 
and Binder state: 
 
If the drafters had wanted to introduce a super-legality of human rights, they would 
have had to draft Article 21 in a different way. For instance, the drafters could have 
made the consistency of the applicable law with human rights a precondition for its 
application by the Court. (i.e. with the formulation: “subject to its consistency with 
human rights, the Court shall apply […]”). Furthermore, if a super-legality of human 
rights had been intended, it would have been more sensible to place the duty to 
comply with them at the beginning of Article 21 rather than simply adding a 
paragraph 3.263 
 
This is not very convincing. It may be true that the phrase should have been 
formulated differently and placed at the beginning of Article 21 of the ICC Statute if 
a ‘super-legality of human rights’ was intended (although one could even doubt 
that),264 but this in no way prejudices the above-mentioned meaning of the present 
                                                          
261 According to Sluiter, practice is not clear yet, although the provision does not seem to be used as a 
corrective tool for the ICC Statute: “Looking at the practice of the ICC, one has difficulty assessing the 
effect of Article 21 (3) of the Statute. In my view, it tends to be used to confirm provisions and practice 
in place; any corrective force cannot (yet?) be discerned.” (Ibid., p. 464.) 
262 Hafner and Binder 2004, p. 174. 
263 Ibid. 
264 It is arguably not that strange to first explain what the law is and then to explain how this law should 








phrase, which is formulated as it is and which is placed at the end of Article 21 of 
the ICC Statute.  
The third consideration explains that in several cases in the ICC Statute, such as 
Article 69, paragraph 7265 and Article 17, paragraph 2,266  
 
international human rights standards are directly referred to in the Statute on an equal 
footing and have the same status in the hierarchy of norms as the Statute itself. In 
fact, these provisions would not be necessary, if the superiority of human rights were 
established by Article 21(3).267   
 
Although this is undoubtedly true, it may be that Hafner and Binder have perhaps 
too much faith in the internal consistency of the Statute, a treaty whose different 
parts were drafted by different working groups. It may very well be that these 
inconsistencies are only drafting inaccuracies which do not bring with them the 
meaning argued by Hafner and Binder.268  
The fourth, and more convincing, consideration argues that “the ICC Statute 
establishes an extensive and well considered set of rules and mechanisms to achieve 
its object and purpose”269 and that “[i]f one allows a notion as imprecise as 
“internationally recognized human rights” to trump the Statute, the sophisticated 
mechanism of the Statute seems at risk [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.270 It is 
indeed true that the ICC Statute is quite sophisticated – note, however, the possible 
drafting inaccuracies mentioned above – and that “the entire Statute demonstrates an 
effort to restrain the margin of appreciation of the judges to the greatest possible 
extent [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.271 Nevertheless, it must also have been 
clear to the drafters that they could not foresee every detail by which the ICC judges 
                                                          
265 “Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or internationally recognized human rights 
shall not be admissible if: (a) The violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or 
(b) The admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the integrity of 
the proceedings.” 
266 “In order to determine unwillingness [of a State to carry out the investigation or prosecution, ChP] in 
a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by 
international law, whether …”. 
267 Hafner and Binder 2004, p. 175. 
268 See also Pellet 2002 A, p. 1083: “[T]he Statute bears the mark of the rush with which it was drafted 
and the process of compromise, which are ominous for its credibility. Some of the formulae finally 
retained are open to technical criticism, or incoherent. Others are useless.” See also n. 192, where 
Saland explained that a certain provision may not have been the result of legal logic, but rather of 
political compromise. See further Edwards 2001, p. 343, n. 70: “The divergent backgrounds and relative 
levels of expertise and experience of Rome Conference delegates contributed to internal inconsistencies 
in the Rome Statute and its collateral instruments, and contributed to the lack of clarity on various treaty 
terms”. Cf. finally Henquet 1999, p. 986, writing on another inaccuracy in the ICC Statute: “Pursuant to 
article 59(7), the custodial state is to deliver the person to the ICC when so “ordered.” This is confusing 
because (…) the term ‘order’ does not feature in Part 9 of the ICC Statute. Perhaps this is the result of 
the speedy and somewhat isolated negotiations of the Working Group on International Co-operation and 
Judicial Assistance, and the Working Group on Procedural Matters at the Rome Conference.” 










could be confronted in the future. Although it seems indeed correct, especially 
within the context of a criminal court, that judges should first and foremost follow 
the proper instruments of the ICC, it also seems reasonable that a provision which is 
in contravention of an internationally recognised human right – on the exact 
meaning of this concept, see infra – should not be applied by them.  
The fifth consideration is more of an exception to the fourth consideration. It 
states that “an exception exists which results from the inviolability of certain core 
human rights, namely those considered to constitute peremptory norms of general 
international law (ius cogens). They trump the provisions of the ICC Statute by their 
very nature.”272 This point is related to the actual content of the term internationally 
recognised human rights and will be examined infra.  
The sixth observation is a summary of the previous five273 and the seventh 
explains that everything referred to above only concerns the Statute as the other 
rules from Article 21 must indeed be consistent with internationally recognised 
human rights.274  
It has probably become clear from the above-mentioned comments with respect 
to the views of Hafner and Binder that this study is more in favour of Pellet’s view. 
However, the considerations also showed that the meaning of the concept of 
internationally recognised human rights is still unclear. What can be said on this 
issue? Pellet explains in this context: 
 
One cannot help but think, in this respect, of ‘peremptory norms of general 
international law’, as defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Without doubt, Article 21(3) of the Statute does not give the ICC express 
jurisdiction to declare null the totality of a treaty, or even one of its provisions, which 
is contrary to ‘internationally recognized human rights’, although this would be the 
effect of a breach of jus cogens under Article 53 of the Vienna Convention. 
Nevertheless, it creates a sort of international ‘super-legality’ by clearly authorizing 
the Court to hold such a norm to be ‘ultra vires’ and thus inapplicable. This provision 
is all the more remarkable because it extends the ambit of this ‘super-legality’ not 
                                                          
272 Ibid. See also Degan 2005, pp. 82-83: “The matter is here not of “super-legality”. The matter is only 
of confirmation of peremptory norms of general international law in that domain, including the principle 
of non-discrimination. These norms are obligatory for judges in any national or international criminal 
proceedings, even if they were not expressly provided.” 
273 Hafner and Binder 2004, p. 176: “One can conclude from the above and notwithstanding the 
exception concerning peremptory norms that wording, structure and context of Article 21 indicate a 
primacy of the Statute.”  
274 Ibid., pp. 176-177: “The wording of paragraph 3 (…) suggests that rules that are guiding the 
application and interpretation of the Statute (as are the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as well as the 
Elements of Crimes) would be trumped in case of an inconsistency with “internationally recognized 
human rights”. (…) As regards Article 21(1.b) (…) one can easily argue that a treaty inconsistent with 
human rights should not be applied by the Court. It would simply not be “appropriate” to apply a treaty 
or a rule of international law contradicting human rights. [It is hard not to agree with this. However, why 
then would it be possible to apply the Statute (also a treaty) if it would contradict human rights? Would 
that then be “appropriate”?, ChP.] In the case of Article 21(1.c), the necessary consistency of general 









only to fundamental human rights, traditionally quoted as examples of peremptory 
rules, but to all internationally recognized human rights [emphasis in original and 
original footnotes omitted, ChP].275  
 
Although this quotation explains that these rights are not restricted to fundamental 
human rights/peremptory norms (of general international law)/ius cogens,276 their 
exact scope is still not clear. According to Hafner and Binder, who look at both the 
use of these words in international instruments and their literal interpretation,  
 
[n]o uniform content is attributed to the phrase in international relations. One can 
however presume that rights considered as peremptory norms as well as [universal, 
ChP][277] customary international law classify as “internationally recognized”. The 
rights stipulated in the major universal human rights instruments (UDHR, CESR, 
CCPR, CERD, CAT, CEDAW, CRC) enjoy a presumptio iuris of international 
recognition unless the contrary has been established.278  
 
                                                          
275 Pellet 2002 A, pp. 1080-1081. See for this difference also the already discussed (see Chapter III) 
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
1987, para. 702 (‘Customary International Law of Human Rights’), comment under ‘m’ (‘Consistent 
pattern of gross violations of human rights’): “All the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration and 
protected by the principal International Covenants (...) are internationally recognized human rights, but 
some rights are fundamental and intrinsic to human dignity.” 
276 Cf. also Vasiliev 2009, p. 214, n. 76: “It appears reasonable to argue that jus cogens should also be 
read into Article 21(3).” 
277 See Hafner and Binder 2004, pp. 186-187, explaining that this term “covers all human rights 
recognized as universal customary international law. (…) [A] practice has to be accepted as law by the 
subjects of international law, which could participate in this practice or whose interests are affected. 
These States should represent the different geographic regions as well as the different socio-political 
systems of the world although there is no requirement that all States participated in the creation of the 
norm [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Hence, even though the rights must have universal (and not 
merely regional) customary international law-status, it is not required that the rights are universally 
recognised (recognised by all States). See ibid., p. 185: “[P]roposals to use “universal human rights” or 
“universally recognized human rights” were rejected by either the Preparatory Committee or the Rome 
Conference as they were considered to be too limiting. Therefore, one can conclude that for a human 
right to be accepted as “internationally recognized” standard in terms of paragraph 3, recognition by the 
international community needs to be widespread but not total [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See 
also see Edwards 2001, p. 377: “Article 7(1)(h) and Draft Elements, article 7(1)(h)(3), in reciting a list 
of anti-discrimination groups or collectivities, might easily have described the groups or collectivities as 
“internationally recognized” (as in article 21(3)) rather than as “universally recognized.” This suggests 
that “universally recognized” differs from “internationally recognized,” and that in fact “universally 
recognized” reflects a more select group than “internationally recognized,” and that proof of 
“universally recognized” would have a higher threshold than proof for “internationally recognized.” (…) 
[I]t is appreciated that “internationally recognized” is perhaps not be defined as “universally 
recognized,” and that “universally recognized” is the narrower of the two categories [original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].” See finally Bitti 2009, p. 301. Nevertheless, it must also be noted that in para. 38 of 
ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Judgment on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision 
Denying Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 13 July 2006, the judges used the words 
“internationally” and “universally” (recognised human rights) interchangeably. 








Finally, ICC judge Pikis stated in the Lubanga Dyilo case that “[i]nternationally 
recognized may be regarded those human rights acknowledged by customary 
international law and international treaties and conventions”.279 
One could argue that the habeas corpus right, the right to challenge the 
lawfulness of one’s detention and to be released in the case of an unlawful 
arrest/detention, can definitely be seen as an internationally recognised human right. 
This was already assumed because of its customary international law/general 
international law status as established in Chapter III of this book, but the above-
mentioned observations on the meaning of this specific ICC term do not contradict 
this.  
This – again – means that the ICC judges, if they were to follow the view of 
Pellet, must apply this remedy, even if it was clearly the intention of the drafters not 
to grant it. However, as clarified, that problem does not arise here as this study is of 
the opinion that it cannot clearly be established that it was the intention of the 
drafters to delete this remedy in the context of the ICC.  
This may indeed be the case, but the fact that the remedy of release, in principle, 
should be applied by the ICC judges does not make the problems which can be 
related to this over-simplified and pro forma remedy and which were discussed at 
length in this study suddenly disappear. Because of this, judges, it is submitted, 
could opt for the solution presented in this research; they could, while realising that 
this remedy, in principle, has to be respected and thus that remedies must be granted 
in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention, keep the suspect in custody instead and 
grant proper remedies, depending on the exact circumstances of the case.280  
They could thereby also rely on the right to an effective remedy, a right which 
can certainly be seen as an internationally recognised human right. Support for that 
view can be found in the ICTR Rwamakuba case, in which the judges explained that 
a right to an effective remedy for violations of human rights “undoubtedly forms 
part of customary international law”281 and is expressly provided for in many 
international human rights instruments.282 In addition, the judges stated,  
                                                          
279 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s “Application for Leave to Reply to 
‘Conclusions de la défense en réponse au mémoire d’appel du Procureur’” (Public Document), ICC-
01/04-01/06, 12 September 2006, Separate opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 3. 
280 The idea that one has, in principle, to respect the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful 
arrest/detention, even if one does not apply this remedy, is important. After all, if one does not even 
assume that one has, in theory, an obligation to grant the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful 
arrest/detention first, one will not be very inclined either to grant other remedies replacing that remedy 
of release (such as a reduction of the sentence or financial compensation). See in that respect also the 
comments made in the context of the Kanyabashi case, see n. 863 of Chapter VI. 
281 ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, ‘Decision on Appropriate Remedy’, 
Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, 31 January 2007, para. 40. See also M. Federova, S. Verhoeven and J. 
Wouters, ‘Safeguarding the Rights of Suspects and Accused Persons in International Criminal 
Proceedings’, Working Paper No. 27 – June 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
(available at: 
http://www.ggs.kuleuven.be/nieuw/publications/working%20papers/new_series/wp27.pdf), p. 21. 
282 See ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, ‘Decision on Appropriate 








[r]elying upon international human rights instruments, and particularly the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Appeals Chamber of this 
Tribunal has recognized on several occasions [the judges refer here to the cases of 
Barayagwiza, Semanza and Kajelijeli, ChP][283] that an Accused has a right to an 
effective remedy [original footnote omitted, ChP].284 
 
The judges then concluded that they had the power to grant an effective remedy for 
human rights violations and that this power arose out of “the combined effect of the 
Tribunal’s inherent powers and its obligation to respect generally accepted 
international human rights norms”.285 
It was explained at the beginning of this section that internationally recognised 
human rights, and thus also the granting of remedies for violations, would be 
applicable whenever the ICC exercises its jurisdiction, whenever the ICC is 
involved in a specific case, including the actions of third parties working at the 
behest of the ICC. However, it was also argued that it would even be fairer for the 
ICC to remedy any violation in the context of its case more generally, whether or 
not the ICC was involved in the case.  
In granting the remedies, the ICC judges should, of course, give proper weight 
to, among other things, the (seriousness of the) human rights violations which 
occurred in the case in question and the involvement of the ICC in the violations.286 
                                                                                                                                              
Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, the 
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, the UN Declaration of 
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, the ECHR, the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the American Convention of Human Rights [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) 
283 See ns. 919, 997 and 1081 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. See also n. 1124 and accompanying 
text of the same chapter. 
284 ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, ‘Decision on Appropriate Remedy’, 
Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, 31 January 2007, para. 41. 
285 Ibid., para. 45. See also ibid., para. 47: “[T]his power is essential for the carrying out of judicial 
functions, including the fair and proper administration of justice.”  
286 Cf. also Sluiter 2009, pp. 470-471. At these pages, Sluiter writes about violations in the context of 
Art. 59 of the ICC Statute. As argued before, violations in which the ICC (or third parties working at the 
behest of the ICC) is involved already fall under the scope of Art. 21, para. 3 of the ICC Statute. This 
means that in such cases, the ICC would be obliged pursuant to this latter provision (which includes the 
right to an effective remedy) to repair violations. However, even though Sluiter writes about Art. 59 of 
the ICC Statute, his words at the end of this footnote can arguably also be seen as support for the idea in 
the main text that the ICC should remedy any violation occurring in the context of its case more 
generally, whether or not the ICC (or third parties working at its behest) was involved in the violations: 
“It is self-evident that violations in the application of Article 59 need to be addressed by the Court. Only 
the latter is in a position to effectively address any violation and has in that respect an obligation to 
ensure the fairness of the trial as a whole. In itself, this imposes a duty upon the Court to address 
relevant violations, including those committed by others than organs of the Court. Traditionally, one can 
identify three compelling reasons to do so: 1. to offer a remedy for violation of rights (cp. Article 85); 2. 
to prevent future violations, via deterrence; 3. to preserve the integrity of court proceedings. [This 
(hopefully) reminds the reader of the Barayagwiza case, see n. 849 and accompanying text of Chapter 
VI. See also n. 171 and accompanying text of Chapter VII, ChP.] These are alternative reasons and 








This may then lead to a refusal of jurisdiction (and a ‘real’ release, cf. the abuse of 
process doctrine) or to the continuation of the trial and other, less far-reaching 
remedies such as a reduction of the sentence or financial compensation.287 This is 
arguably the fairest solution for the suspect (and also, by the way, for the other 
interests involved here).288  
Three points still need to be discussed in this chapter. The first is that the above-
mentioned words of Hafner and Binder only refer to truly international treaties. 
Although one could argue that the rights which can be found in regional instruments 
(such as the ACHR) and which have been clarified by regional institutions (such as 
the ECtHR) are to a certain extent also international (namely inter-State) in nature, 
Hafner and Binder are of the opinion that “[t]he epitheton “international” (...) must 
be understood as reaching beyond a solely regional recognition. This particular 
interpretation does not only result from the practice of international negotiations, but 
also from the global significance of the ICC.”289 Notwithstanding this, one can 
assume that the ICC will probably also refer to regional treaties and case law from 
regional supervisory bodies interpreting those regional treaties if these constitute 
support for the assertion that a certain human right must be seen as internationally 
recognised or if they shed an authoritative light on how to interpret certain 
provisions from the ICC instruments.290 (This also means that all the cases from the 
human rights supervisory bodies discussed in this book, not only those from the 
                                                                                                                                              
decide how to react. For example, the very fact that there has not been concerted action between the ICC 
Prosecutor and national authorities may result in the non-applicability of the second rationale, but does 
not mean that measures should not be taken sub 1 or 3 [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
287 Perhaps, the remainder of the already-mentioned words of Sluiter (see n. 260) may be viewed as 
support for the idea that the problematic remedy of release may be replaced by other appropriate 
remedies: “The provision (…) posits the view that ‘internationally recognised human rights’ are 
applicable fully, and thus need not be ‘re-interpreted’ in light of the unique mandate and context of the 
ICC. More concretely, the mandatory and specific content of Article 21 (3) of the Statute appears to 
prevent Judges from adjusting the content of human rights law to the unique ICC-context; while this 
offers certain safeguards, a too rigid stance on this matter should be rejected. What matters is not that 
human rights cannot be re-interpreted, but that this exercise should be conducted on adequate reasons, 
cautiously and not by definition result in a loss of protection.” (Sluiter 2009, p. 463.) 
288 As explained earlier, the right to a fair trial can definitely be seen as an internationally recognised 
human right under para. 3 of Art. 21 of the ICC Statute. See in that respect the remainder of the already-
mentioned (see n. 279 and accompanying text) words of Judge Pikis in the Lubanga Dyilo case: 
“Internationally recognized may be regarded those human rights acknowledged by customary 
international law and international treaties and conventions. The right to a fair trial belongs to this class 
of rights.” (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of 
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s “Application for Leave to 
Reply to ‘Conclusions de la défense en réponse au mémoire d’appel du Procureur’” (Public Document), 
ICC-01/04-01/06, 12 September 2006, Separate opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 3.) See also 
Verhoeven 2004, p. 14. 
289 Hafner and Binder 2004, pp. 187-188. 
290 Cf. also Sluiter 2002 C, p. 46: “Given the universal aspiration of the Court, it first and foremost 
includes universal human rights law, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the Convention against Torture (CAT), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CROC). Regional human rights treaties play in principle a less prominent role, but may be applied in 
practice frequently, because of the highly developed character of certain regional human rights systems, 








HRC, but also from, for example, the ECmHR and ECtHR, may become relevant 
for the ICC judges under this provision.) In fact, it seems that the ICC has already 
adopted this stance.291 One very interesting example in that respect292 is the 
                                                          
291 See also Bitti 2009, p. 301: “It seems that the jurisprudence of the Court has given a broad meaning 
to “internationally recognized human rights”. It has relied heavily on the jurisprudence of regional 
courts such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter American Court of Human Rights, and 
also on resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.” See also Sluiter 2009, p. 466.  
292 However, there are more examples. See, for example, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, 
Article 58’ (Under Seal, Ex Parte, Prosecution Only), ICC-01/04-01/07, 10 February 2006 (see Annex 2 
to ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Court Record not 
available, confidential document, ICC-01/04-02/06, 10 February 2006), paras. 11-12: “In the Chamber’s 
view, the review which article 58 (1) of the Statute requires that the Chamber undertake is consistent 
with the fact that, apart from other collateral consequences of being the subject of a case before the 
Court, the fundamental right of the relevant person to his liberty is at stake. Accordingly, the Chamber 
emphasises that it will not take any decision limiting such a right on the basis of applications where key 
factual allegations are fully unsupported. As required by article 21 (3) of the Statute, the Chamber 
considers this to be the only interpretation consistent with the “reasonable suspicion” standard provided 
for in article 5 (1) (c) of the European Convention on Human Rights and the interpretation of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in respect of the fundamental right of any person to liberty under 
article 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See also 
ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Judgment on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision 
Denying Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 13 July 2006, para. 38, where the judges use 
the words “internationally” and “universally” (recognised human rights) interchangeably and even 
introduce a new term, namely ‘indispensable right of man’: “Like every other article of the Statute, 
article 82 must be interpreted and applied in accordance with internationally recognized human rights, 
as declared in article 21 (3) of the Statute. Is a right to appeal against every decision of a hierarchically 
subordinate court to a court of appeal, or specifically an interlocutory decision of a criminal court to the 
court of appeal, acknowledged by universally recognized human rights norms? The answer is in the 
negative. Only final decisions of a criminal court determinative of its verdict or decisions pertaining to 
the punishment meted out to the convict are assured as an indispensable right of man. This is reflected in 
article 14 (5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and many regional conventions 
and treaties giving effect to universally recognized human rights norms. This right is assured to the 
accused under article 81 of the Statute [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also ICC, Appeals 
Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s “Application for Leave to Reply to ‘Conclusions de la 
défense en réponse au mémoire d’appel du Procureur’” (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 12 
September 2006, Separate opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, paras. 3 and 6, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Decision on the Applications for Participation in 
the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, VPSR4, VPSR5 and VPRS6’ (Public Redacted Version), 
ICC-01/04, 17 January 2006, paras. 81, 115-116, 131, 145-146, 161, 172 and 182, ICC, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor vs. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Application for the interim release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’ 
(Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 18 October 2006, pp. 5-8 and ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ (Public Redacted Version with Annex I), ICC-01/04-01/06, 
29 January 2007, para. 38 (referring to case law of the ECtHR): “To define the concept of “substantial 
grounds to believe”, the Chamber relies on internationally recognised human rights jurisprudence.” See 
finally ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ 
(Public Redacted Version), ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008, para. 65 (referring to the above-








following statement of Judge Pikis in his separate opinion to a(nother) decision from 
the Lubanga Dyilo case: 
 
Article 21 (3) of the Statute ordains the application and interpretation of every 
provision of the Statute in a manner consistent with internationally recognized human 
rights. Internationally recognized human rights in this area, as may be distilled from 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international and regional treaties 
and conventions on human rights, acknowledge a right to an arrested person to have 
access to a court of law vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the lawfulness and 
justification of his/her detention. Such a right is afforded to the arrestee from the 
outset [emphasis added and original footnotes omitted, ChP].293 
 
These words can not only be seen as evidence for the above-mentioned idea that 
regional human rights treaties may also be relevant in the context of paragraph 3,294 
but also as additional evidence for the idea that a person arrested/detained is entitled 
to challenge the lawfulness of his detention295 and, in principle (but see: supra), to 
be released in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention, even though the remedy of 
release is not explicitly mentioned here by Pikis.296 This is so, even if the proper 
instruments of the ICC do not explicitly contain this right.  
                                                                                                                                              
Confirmation of Charges (“the Lubanga Decision”) in the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo (“the Lubanga case”), the Chamber relied on internationally recognised human rights 
jurisprudence for its interpretation of the evidentiary standard of “substantial grounds to believe” in 
accordance with article 21(3) of the Statute. In the current case, the Chamber sees no compelling reason 
to depart from its application of the standard as established in the Lubanga case”. 
293 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté provisoire de 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”’ (Public Document), [ICC-]01/04-01/06 (OA 7), 13 February 2007, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 16. 
294 See also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of 
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s “Application for Leave to 
Reply to ‘Conclusions de la défense en réponse au mémoire d’appel du Procureur’” (Public Document), 
ICC-01/04-01/06, 12 September 2006, Separate opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 3, where 
Judge Pikis refers to the UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR, ACHR and ACHPR to argue that “[t]he extent to 
which the right to a fair trial has been proclaimed as a legal norm and its incorporation in international 
instruments denotes comprehensive assent to its emergence as a principle of customary international law 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also Verhoeven 2004, p. 14, commenting on para. 3: “[T]hose 
rights normally are the rights listed in the universal or regional treaties protecting human rights, to the 
extent at least that they have a customary (general) character [emphasis added, ChP].” 
295 See also n. 201 of the previous chapter. (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
‘Decision on the powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber to review proprio motu the pre-trial detention of 
Germain Katanga’ (Urgent, Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/07, 18 March 2008, p. 8: “[A]ccording to 
articles 55, 57 and 67, one of the functions of the Chamber is to be the ultimate guarantor of the rights of 
the Defence, including the right “not to be deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedures as are established in the Statute””.) 
296 But see ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of 
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté 








The second point which still needs to be addressed here is the following. In the 
examination of paragraph 3, the problem with respect to the remedy of release was 
discussed. The real male captus problem was not examined as it could be argued – 
this may already have become clear from information provided earlier in this book – 
that there is no internationally recognised right to a male captus male detentus 
outcome. Notwithstanding this, paragraph 3 may still become relevant for the real 
male captus problem, namely for its human rights dimension. As explained at the 
beginning of this section, judges may look to paragraph 3, not only with respect to 
specific provisions of part (a), but also with respect to the more general provisions 
which are always applicable to any ICC case (such as Article 1 of the ICC Statute). 
Thus, they may be of the opinion that any exercise of jurisdiction, whenever the ICC 
is involved in a case, that exercise of jurisdiction, that involvement must be in 
conformity with internationally recognised human rights. Although there is no 
internationally recognised human right to a male captus male detentus outcome, 
judges may nevertheless be of the opinion that serious violations of other 
internationally recognised human rights, such as the right to liberty and security and 
the right to a fair trial broadly perceived, should lead to a refusal of jurisdiction 
nonetheless. In that case, part (a), interpreted and applied consistently with 
paragraph 3, may already solve the problem, in which case there would be no need 
to resort to parts (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute. 
However, it must also be understood that this would ‘only’ cover the human rights 
dimension of the male captus issue, an issue which clearly goes beyond that 
dimension. (Recall the other values which can be violated by a male captus 
situation, such as State sovereignty and the rule of law.)  
The third and final point that should be mentioned here is what happens if the 
judges cannot decide the case on the basis of Article 21 of the ICC Statute. What if 
paragraph 1, interpreted and applied consistently with paragraph 3, leaves a legal 
lacuna and subsequently resorting to paragraph 2, again interpreted and applied 
consistently with paragraph 3, brings no relief either? What should the judges do in 
such a case of non liquet?297 Should the judges permit a certain rule advocated by 
either the Defence or the Prosecution, stating that it can be allowed now that it is not 
prohibited? Or should they opt for a more restrictive approach, arguing that it is 
prohibited, now that it is not allowed? This is not very clear. However, perhaps, the 
                                                                                                                                              
2007, Separate Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 16, ns. 19 and 20. In these footnotes, which 
can be connected to the words “international [footnote 19] and regional [footnote 20] treaties” in the 
main text, one will find references to the entire Artt. 9 of the ICCPR and 5 of the ECHR (and other 
regional provisions on the right to liberty and security). Cf. also n. 286 of the previous chapter. (ICC, 
Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the admissibility of the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la confirmation des charges” of 29 
January 2007 (…)’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 OA8, 13 June 2007, para. 13: “The human 
right [and then the ICC judges refer to Artt. 21, para. 3 of the ICC Statute, 9, para. 4 of the ICCPR, 5, 
para. 4 of the ECHR and 7, para. 6 of the ACHR, ChP] of a person to have recourse to judicial review of 
a decision affecting his liberty is entrenched in article 60 of the Statute [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].”) 








fact that the Appeals Chamber has stated (see also supra) that one can only resort to 
part (b) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute if part (a) is not exhaustive 
on a certain matter may mean that it is more in favour of the restrictive approach.298  
Be that as it may, one can also assume that a non liquet will not occur too often, 
given the extensive regulation of the law within the ICC’s proper instruments. This 
is especially so if one agrees with the argument made above that one should also 
apply and interpret the more general provisions of the ICC Statute (such as its 
Article 1) consistently with internationally recognised human rights. And if that 
brings no relief, one can always resort to the safety net of parts (b) and (c) of 
paragraph 1 and finally to paragraph 2 (all interpreted and applied consistently with 
paragraph 3).  
Now that the law which the ICC judges must apply in deciding their cases has 
been examined in detail, it is time to determine the current ICC position on the male 
captus issue. This will be done in the next chapter, the final chapter of this part of 
the book. 
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In this chapter, the current ICC position on the male captus issue will be sought. 
Section 2 will deal with arguably the most authoritative case of the ICC, that of 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, which relates to the situation in the DRC. The third section 
will address the allegations of irregularities in the surrender of Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, a case stemming from the situation in the CAR. In this case, the allegations 
were less serious and the male captus issue less prominent in the discussions, 
meriting a briefer examination of the case. Finally, Section 4 will examine the 
(aftermath of the) male captus allegations of Germain Katanga, whose case also 
pertains to the situation in the DRC. Admittedly, the examinations of the cases of 
Lubanga Dyilo and Katanga are quite extensive, closely following the original texts 
of the different motions/responses/observations/decisions, but this can be explained 
by the fact that in this chapter, the two main subjects of this book, the male captus 
topic and the ICC context come together. This deserves more detailed examination, 
especially now that in only those two cases, the male captus topic played a major 
role.  
 
2 LUBANGA DYILO 
 
Already in the very first case in which a suspect was surrendered to the ICC, that of 
Lubanga Dyilo, a(n alleged) male captus problem occurred. On 10 February 2006, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC issued a sealed warrant of arrest against Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, charging him with the war crime of enlisting children under the age 
of fifteen, the war crime of conscripting children under the age of fifteen and the 
war crime of using children under the age of fifteen to participate actively in 
hostilities.1 After a request for his arrest and surrender (dated 24 February 2006)2 
                                                          
1 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Warrant of Arrest’ (Under seal), ICC-01/04-01/06, 10 February 
2006, p. 4. 
2 See CPI, La Chambre Préliminaire I, Situation en République Démocratique du Congo, Affaire Le 








was sent to the authorities in the DRC on 14 March 2006, Lubanga Dyilo was 
formally arrested within the context of the ICC proceedings on 16 March 2006 and 
surrendered to The Hague the following day. However, by that time, he was already 
in custody. Lubanga Dyilo claimed that had been illegally deprived of his liberty by 
the Congolese authorities from as early as August 2003. In more detail, counsel for 
Lubanga Dyilo asserted on 23 May 2006: 
 
Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo travelled to Kinshasa in July/August 2003 in connection 
with the policy of reconciliation and integration of the political forces in Ituri into 
national politics at the invitation of the national government and the international 
community. Nonetheless, he was deprived of his liberty when he arrived in Kinshasa 
and was placed under house arrest from 13 August 2006[3] and prohibited from 
leaving the town. No arrest warrant was issued against him. No order was issued in 
this respect.4 
 
Counsel continued, stating that two years later, on 2 March 2005, Lubanga Dyilo 
was imprisoned at the Centre pénitencier/pénitentiaire5 et de rééducation de 
Kinshasa.6 Here also, irregularities allegedly occurred: 
 
No arrest warrant was served on him at that time or subsequently. Two supposed 
“arrest warrants” appear in the case-file: - the document dated 19 March 2006[7] for 
“endangering national security”, bearing no confirmation of receipt signature, - the 
document dated 29 March 2006[8] for “murder and unlawful detention followed by 
torture,” bearing no confirmation of receipt signature (…)[.] During his detention in 
the DRC, he did not appear before an auditeur militaire each month, as required by 
military law, or where appropriate, quod non.9 
 
                                                                                                                                              
Dyilo adressée à la République Démocratique du Congo’ (Sous scellés), ICC-01/04-01/06, 24 février 
2006. 
3 This must be: 13 August 2003, see ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Application for Release’ (Public), 
ICC-01/04-01/06, 23 May 2006, para. 9. 
4 Ibid., para. 3. 
5 Although the Defence writes pénitencier here, the organs of the ICC use the term pénitentiaire, see, for 
example, n. 371 and accompanying text. 
6 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Application for Release’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 23 May 
2006, para. 3. 
7 Given the fact that by that time, Lubanga Dyilo was already in The Hague, this date is obviously 
incorrect. It must be 19 March 2005, see also ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s 
Submission of Further Information and Materials’ (Under Seal, Ex Parte, Prosecutor Only), ICC-01/04-
01/06, 25 January 2006, para. 3: “The detention file on Thomas LUBANGA DYILO contains the DRC 
arrest warrants against him of 19 March 2005 and of 29 March 2005.” 
8 See the previous footnote. 
9 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Application for Release’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 23 May 








According to Lubanga Dyilo’s counsel, these points, namely Lubanga Dyilo’s 
“arbitrary detention with no judicial examination phase against him”10 and the “fact 
that he was never heard by any Congolese court”,11 were repeated when Lubanga 
Dyilo appeared on 16 March 2006 before the representative of the Auditeur Général 
des FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo: the DRC 
armed forces), the Premier Avocat Général des FARDC/of the DRC armed forces 
(in the context of the ICC surrender proceedings).12 The allegations were, however, 
very swiftly rejected by the Premier Avocat Général the same day: 
 
- [A]s regards the arbitrary detention, that such was warranted by the existence of 
serious, grave and corroborating indicia against the accused and the risk that he 
might abscond; - that if he was not heard by any Congolese court it was because his 
case was still investigated by the state prosecution officer [emphasis in original, 
ChP];13  
 
The fact that the Premier Avocat Général/Auditeur Général of the DRC armed 
forces looked into these allegations (even if only briefly) shows that the review of 
the competent judicial authority in the context of Article 59 of the ICC Statute may 
not be restricted to the correctness of the official ICC arrest procedures, but may 
also include the domestic phase prior to the official ICC arrest. That is to be 
welcomed. After all, it may very well be the case that this part must be seen as 
falling within the context of an ICC case and it is important that every alleged 
violation which took place in that context is considered and, if needed, remedied.  
After having provided the above-mentioned background information, counsel for 
Lubanga Dyilo turned to the merits of his case. He divided this part of the 
application in three sections: 1. Unlawful detention in the DRC prior to 16 March 
2006 (paragraphs 8-20 of the application), 2. Violations of the Rome Statute 
(paragraphs 21-23 of the application) and 3. Violations of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence (paragraphs 24-29 of the application).  
With respect to the first section, he maintained that the above-mentioned 
irregularities in the DRC had brought about a number of violations of (inter)national 
                                                          
10 Ibid., para. 6. 
11 Ibid. See also the arguments of Lubanga Dyilo’s counsel Flamme during Lubanga Dyilo’s initial 
appearance before the ICC on 20 March 2006 (the transcripts of this session are available at: 
http://www.amicc.org/docs/Lubanga%20Arraignment.pdf): “We have to realise that my client has been 
deprived of his liberty since August 2003. He has been confined to forced residence in Kinshasa, and 
following that he was incarcerated on the date which is in the record. If I remember correctly, in March 
2005. I questioned my client concerning the conditions in which he was arrested and deprived of his 
liberty and incarcerated. I was informed that this arrest was not under any specific warrant and that no 
hearing was held such as should have been held according to national and international standards, and 
therefore he was kept incarcerated for approximately one year without having right -- access to any trial 
and without having been informed of any of the charges held against him.” (P. 9 of the document.) 
12 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Application for Release’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 23 May 









law provisions, such as Articles 17,14 1815 and 19, paragraph 216 of the Congolese 
Constitution,17 Article 9 of the ICCPR18 and Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR.19  
In this context, counsel for Lubanga Dyilo interestingly (see also footnote 395 
and accompanying text of Chapter III and footnote 202 and accompanying text of 
Chapter VIII) turned to the topic of derogation, maintaining “that there existed no 
situation within the DRC (insofar as it existed in Kinshasa at the time, quod non) 
that justified suspending the legal safeguards against arbitrary arrests and unlawful 
detention”.20  
Counsel then turned to the violations in more detail, some of which were 
mentioned earlier.21 It was also emphasised that it had been unlawful to bring 
Lubanga Dyilo before the military judicial authorities because he was “president of 
the UPC (Union des Patriotes Congolais) political party”22 and “was never a soldier 
(…) in the official Congolese army or, insofar as it is relevant, in the FPLC [Forces 
Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo, ChP]”.23 According to him, this had led 
to a violation of the right to a fair and impartial trial, a violation which had not 
                                                          
14 “A person’s individual freedom shall be guaranteed. This shall be the rule and detention shall be the 
exception. A person may be prosecuted, arrested, detained or convicted only under the law and in the 
forms which [it] provides [emphasis in original, ChP][.]” (Ibid., para. 8.) 
15 “Any person arrested must be informed forthwith of the reasons for his arrest and of any charges 
against him in a language which he understands. He must be informed of his rights forthwith. Any 
person kept in police custody shall have the right to contact his family or lawyer immediately. The 
period spent in police custody may not exceed 48 hours. Upon expiry of this period, any person in 
custody must be released or made available to the competent judicial authority [emphasis in original, 
ChP].” (Ibid.)  
16 “All persons shall be entitled to have their case heard by a competent judge within a reasonable time 
[emphasis in original, ChP][.]” (Ibid.)  
17 Counsel for Lubanga Dyilo also referred to violations of the Congolese Code of Criminal Procedure, 
see ibid., para. 11. 
18 See ibid., para. 8. 
19 See ibid., para. 13. 
20 Ibid., para. 8. 
21 See ibid., para. 9: “The applicant was not informed of the grounds for his arrest (…) when he was 
deprived of his liberty on 13 August 2003 or when he was imprisoned on 2 March 2005. No warrant of 
arrest was served on him. No case file was made available to him. No judicial examination was 
conducted. He was not therefore informed of the grounds for his arrest or of the charges against him. He 
was kept in detention arbitrarily for over 18 months. [These 18 months probably refer to his alleged 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty before his detention (between 13 August 2003 and 2 March 2005) and 
not to his alleged arbitrary detention, which ‘only’ lasted for about a year, ChP.] Furthermore, the 
applicant was not brought before the competent judicial authority within the 48 hour time-limit.” It was 
also maintained that “the two supposed arrest warrants” (ibid.) (see also ns. 7-9 and accompanying text) 
did not change this, see ibid.: “[E]ven if the documents entitled “arrest warrant” are considered valid and 
as having been served upon the applicant, note must be taken of the fact that the charges are not clearly 
set out therein: - the two arrest warrants specify completely different charges which, furthermore, also 
differ from those specified in the documents entitled “decision on extension of provisional detention” in 
which “genocide” and “crimes (…) against humanity” are stated; - the two supposed arrest warrants do 
not set out any facts. It follows that the applicant was never informed of the charges against him or of 
the reasons for those charges.” 
22 Ibid., para. 10. 








suddenly disappeared now that the ICC had taken over the case.24 Counsel argued 
that even if Lubanga Dyilo had to be brought before the military authorities, these 
military proceedings were nonetheless characterised by many irregularities.25  
He concluded this section of the application, stating that because of his arbitrary 
arrest and unlawful detention at the national level, Lubanga Dyilo should have been 
released in the DRC.26 Now that this had not happened, his subsequent surrender to 
the ICC also had to be considered unlawful.27 What mattered greatly to the Defence 
was also the fact that the ICC “took into consideration the possibility that the 
applicant had been arbitrarily arrested and that he might subsequently be released”.28 
In other words, the Defence claimed that the ICC issued the arrest warrant against 
Lubanga Dyilo, among other things, because it was aware of the possibility that 
Lubanga Dyilo was indeed arbitrarily arrested/detained at the national level and that 
that could lead to his release. According to the Defence, this was “tantamount to 
saying that the ICC did not meet its obligations as set out in this application, that is, 
to ensure that arrests and detentions effected under national law are lawful”.29 It 
must be noted that it is, of course, primarily the obligation of the arresting/detaining 
State to ensure that arrests and detentions are executed in accordance with national 
law.30 Nevertheless, as explained earlier, as one can assume that the national review 
of Article 59 of the ICC Statute may not always be very thorough, it would be wise 
for the ICC, as an extra safety net, to supervise the legality of the national 
proceedings in that respect. In fact, it would not only be wise,31 it would arguably 
even be mandatory if the arrest/detention were seen as falling within the context of 
the ICC’s investigation (see Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute:32 
                                                          
24 See ibid.: “The subsequent referral of his case-file to the ICC cannot “cleanse” the proceedings and 
“wash away” the initial violations of the right to a fair and impartial trial.” 
25 See ibid., paras. 14-19. To provide a few examples, it was argued that no order was issued by the 
auditeur militaire to restrict his liberty on 13 August 2003 (see ibid., para. 15), that “the commander of 
the unit of which the applicant is alleged to be a member (quod non) was not kept informed” (ibid.), that 
no arrest warrant was served on him (see ibid., para. 16), that the so-called arrest warrants (see again ns. 
7-9 and accompanying text) were “not dated with the day of the arrest but with a latter date” (ibid.) (note 
that in this paragraph, the application confusingly states that the date of arrest was 2 March 2006, 
instead of 2 March 2005), that he “did not appear before the auditeur militaire each month, as should 
have been the case” (ibid., para. 17), that no investigation was carried out (see ibid.), that “the extension 
of detention on remand was not authorised by the competent court and no hearing was held nor any 
order issued in this respect” (ibid., para. 18) and that the 16 March 2006 hearing was out of time and 
carried out before an incompetent court (see ibid., para. 19). 
26 See ibid.  
27 See ibid. 
28 Ibid., para. 20. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See Art. 59, para. 1 of the ICC Statute: “A State Party which has received a request for provisional 
arrest or for arrest and surrender shall immediately take steps to arrest the person in question in 
accordance with its laws and the provisions of Part 9.” See also Art. 89, para. 1 of the ICC Statute: 
“States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the procedure under their 
national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender.” 
31 See also n. 201 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII. 
32 “In respect of an investigation under this Statute, a person: (…) Shall not be subjected to arbitrary 








applicable as from the initiation of the investigation) or if the ICC were otherwise 
involved in that arrest/detention (see Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute: 
applicable as from the moment the ICC gets involved in the case). These provisions 
arguably demand such a supervisory role. With respect to the last provision, it is 
worth recalling (see Section 4 of the previous chapter) that Article 21, paragraph 3 
of the ICC Statute undoubtedly contains the right to an effective remedy. Hence, it 
can be argued that Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute prescribes that the 
final adjudicator, the ICC, ensures that violations which occur as from the moment 
the ICC is involved in a case are remedied.  
With respect to the second section (violations of the Rome/ICC Statute), counsel 
for Lubanga Dyilo claimed, not very surprisingly (see supra), that Article 55, 
paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute was violated; according to the Defence, this was 
in fact acknowledged by the Congolese judicial authorities.33 Furthermore, the 
Defence was of the opinion that because the ICC’s Prosecutor had decided to 
disregard this unlawfulness, the formal ICC arrest had to be considered illegal as 
well.34   
Alongside Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute, it was argued that “a 
flagrant violation”35 of Article 59, paragraphs 1-3 of the ICC Statute had occurred.36 
Finally, Article 89, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute had allegedly been violated.37 
                                                                                                                                              
accordance with such procedures as are established in this Statute.” This provision arguably entails that 
the ICC has an obligation to repair violations of the suspect’s right to liberty and security which take 
place in the context of an ICC’s investigation, violations which by definition take place at the national 
level. However, although this provision will cover most part of an ICC case, it is submitted that the ICC 
should go one step further and also accept responsibility for violations which more generally occur in 
the context of an ICC case. After all, Art. 55, para. 1 (d) of the ICC Statute ‘only’ speaks of rights “[i]n 
respect of an investigation”. However, situations may occur which, strictly speaking, cannot be seen as 
falling within the ICC investigation, but which are nevertheless to be seen as falling more generally 
within the context of the ICC case and as such should be considered by the judges. One could hereby 
think of the irregular arrest and detention of a person about whom the arresting authority has stated for 
years that this person ought to be tried by the ICC and that it will hold the suspect in detention until the 
ICC makes a move. If the ICC indeed consequently starts an official investigation and requests the 
surrender of the person, the ICC judges may be of the opinion that the irregular arrest and detention has 
to be seen as falling within the context of the ICC case, even if the investigation, at the time of the 
irregular arrest and detention, was not yet officially initiated. Cf. also Hall 2008 A, p. 1093: “The 
chapeau of paragraph 1 states expressly that it applies “[i]n respect of an investigation”. However, it is 
likely that the Court will hold that the fundamental rights recognized in article 55 para. 1 apply at other 
stages of proceedings and even before an investigation is opened, including during a preliminary 
examination.” 
33 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Application for Release’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 23 May 
2006, para. 21. See also ibid., para. 19. 
34 See ibid., para. 21. 
35 Ibid., para. 22. 
36 See ibid.: “- the applicant was not arrested in accordance with its laws, - he did not appear before the 
competent judicial authority, - the authority before which he appeared disregarded the fact that the 
applicant had not been arrested according to the normal procedure, in spite of the fact that this was 
acknowledged in the reasons given in its order, - that same authority failed to have regard for the fact 
that the applicant’s rights had not been respected. One of the direct consequences of the fact that the 








With respect to the third section (violations of the ICC RPE), counsel for 
Lubanga Dyilo argued that Rules 117, paragraph 138 and 121, paragraph 139 of the 
ICC RPE had been violated.  
Regarding the first rule, the Defence claimed that the ICC had not fulfilled its 
duty in ensuring that Lubanga Dyilo’s detention in the DRC was lawful and that it 
had not verified “the lawfulness of the proceedings relating to the arrest and 
detention of the applicant in the DRC”. As stated above, one can easily argue that 
the ICC should indeed be the final supervisor of the legality of a suspect’s arrest and 
detention, at least as from the moment the ICC is involved in a case. However, 
whether this assumed task can be derived from Rule 117, paragraph 1 of the ICC 
RPE, which, among other things, only states that the ICC “shall take measures to 
ensure that it is informed of the arrest”, seems doubtful. The Defence also claimed 
that this rule was violated because Lubanga Dyilo had only received a copy of the 
request for arrest and surrender and not a copy of the arrest warrant.40 A copy of the 
actual arrest warrant was allegedly only received on 17 March 2006, when Lubanga 
Dyilo had already been transferred out of the DRC.41 Because of that, he was no 
longer in a position “to be apprised of the charges brought against him by the ICC 
and to exercise all the rights set down, in particular, in article 89 (2) of the Statute 
and rule 117 before departure from his national territory [emphasis in original but 
bold and underlined emphasis changed into italicised emphasis, ChP]”.42 
Regarding the second rule, the Defence claimed, among other things, that 
Lubanga Dyilo had “been detained for more than two months without being 
informed promptly of the cause of the charges against him”.43 As a result, Article 67 
of the ICC Statute, via Rule 121 of the ICC RPE, had been violated.44     
In the penultimate section of the application, the Defence returned to the 
violations which occurred in the DRC. It explained that the ICC Prosecutor had to 
be held responsible 
 
                                                                                                                                              
that this made it impossible for him to request provisional release before his country’s courts [emphasis 
in original but bold and underlined emphasis changed into italicised emphasis, ChP].” 
37 See ibid., para. 23. 
38 “The Court shall take measures to ensure that it is informed of the arrest of a person in response to a 
request made by the Court under article 89 or 92. Once so informed, the Court shall ensure that the 
person receives a copy of the arrest warrant issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 58 and any 
relevant provisions of the Statute. The documents shall be made available in a language that the person 
fully understands and speaks.” 
39 See n. 201 of Chapter VIII for the contents of this provision. Note that the title of the paragraphs 
addressing this violation speaks about Rule 11 of the ICC RPE but this is clearly a mistake, see ICC, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor 
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Application for Release’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 23 May 2006, para. 29. 
(This is, by the way, not the first error/unclear point in this application.) 
40 See ibid., para. 26. 
41 See ibid.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., para. 29. 








for the extended period the applicant spent in arbitrary detention in the DRC, in 
compliance with article 55 (1) (d) of the Statute and further to his failure to intercede 
in the DRC. This holds all the more true since he was aware that he would apply to 
the Court for the applicant’s arrest. Moreover, the ICC clearly has the duty not to 
endorse or assist in the violation of fundamental rules of international law.45  
 
It further explained, with reference to the Loizidou case from the ECtHR,46 that 
Article 1 of the ECHR “imposes upon member states a general obligation to protect 
the relevant rights of all persons under their jurisdiction”47 and that “[t]he Court’s 
case-law may be applied by analogy to the present instance insofar as the ICC takes 
the view that the matter came under its jurisdiction only as of the date the applicant 
was transferred to The Hague”.48 
Moreover, the Defence referred to Article 12 (‘Aid or assistance in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act’) of (an older version of) the 
previously alluded to49 ILC’s draft articles on the responsibility of international 
organisations,50 and argued that 
 
since the ICC’s mandate as set down in the statute encompasses the prevention of 
crime, the Court may not simultaneously punish crimes such as unlawful detention 
and deprivation as war crimes and crimes against humanity and yet draw advantage 
from the “fruits” of the applicant’s unlawful detention.51   
 
This is, again, a view one can adhere to, but one can question to what extent Article 
12/1352 of the draft articles on the responsibility of international organisations can 
be seen as support for that position. After all, is taking advantage of a certain 
situation the same as aiding or assisting in its irregularities?53  
Not very surprisingly, the Defence in this context also referred to the 
Barayagwiza case and its dictum that under the abuse of process doctrine, it is 
                                                          
45 Ibid., para. 30.  
46 Cf. also n. 369 of Chapter III. 
47 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Application for Release’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 23 May 
2006, para. 31. 
48 Ibid., para. 33. 
49 See n. 483 of Chapter VI. 
50 This article reads: “An international organization which aids or assists a State or another international 
organization in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the State or the latter organization 
is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) That organization does so with knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) The act would be internationally wrongful if 
committed by that organization.” (Note that this Art. 12 has become Art. 13 in the 2009 document 
mentioned in n. 483 of Chapter VI.) 
51 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Application for Release’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 23 May 
2006, para. 32. 
52 See n. 50. 









irrelevant which entity is responsible for the violations of the suspect’s rights.54 
However, in doing so, it did not explain how this doctrine can be incorporated into 
the system of the ICC/Article 21 of the ICC Statute, see the previous chapter. This 
important point will be returned to infra.   
In the final section of the application, the conclusions, the Defence emphasised 
the importance of the presumption of innocence and again referred to the 
Barayagwiza case. Finally, it requested the release of Lubanga Dyilo. It is not 
entirely clear whether the release requested here must be seen as a release with 
prejudice to the Prosecutor; the reference to the Barayagwiza case can be seen as 
support for such a remedy, but in the application, one can also find references to less 
far-reaching releases.55  
This lack of clarity with respect to the remedy also became apparent when the 
Pre-Trial Chamber asked the Defence to which State Lubanga Dyilo had to be 
released if he were to be granted interim release.56 Although Lubanga Dyilo’s 
application does not clarify whether the remedy requested is a release or a release 
with prejudice to the Prosecutor, it is also clear that the remedy requested was in any 
case not an interim release. In that respect, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s request shows 
that Lubanga Dyilo’s application was not read/understood correctly. This point was 
also clarified by the Defence when it, in response to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
request, made clear that the remedy requested was not an interim release, but a 
release based on Rule 185 of the ICC RPE (see on this rule also the text following 
footnote 86 and accompanying text of the previous chapter).57 However, also in this 
response, the exact sort of release requested (with prejudice or not) was not 
elucidated.       
On 13 June 2006, Deputy Prosecutor Bensouda filed her response to Lubanga 
Dyilo’s application for release. She also noted that the application was not a request 
for interim release. According to her, it rather seemed to be a challenge to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction,58 “based on the alleged illegality of Thomas LUBANGA DYILO’s 
prior detention in the DRC and of the process of his arrest for and surrender to the 
                                                          
54 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Application for Release’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 23 May 
2006, para. 33. 
55 See ibid., para. 20: “The applicant should have been released in the DRC before being lawfully 
arrested in accordance with current DRC legislation for the purposes of the international arrest warrant 
[emphasis added, ChP].” Note that such a release may encompass a pro forma release – in that Lubanga 
Dyilo is released and immediately re-arrested by the authorities. Such a remedy should, of course, be 
avoided. (This point was already often made earlier in this book.) Note finally that in the context of the 
ICC, there does not exist a term like ‘international arrest warrant’, see n. 127 of Chapter VIII.  
56 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Order on the application for release’ (Public Document), ICC-
01/04-01/06, 29 May 2006. 
57 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Submission relative to the Order of 29.5.2006’ (Public 
Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 31 May 2006. 
58 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to Application for Release’ (Public 








Court [original footnote omitted, ChP]”59 and pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC 
Statute,60 an article which has already been predicted will play a role within the 
male captus discussion, see footnote 141 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII. 
(Bensouda correctly clarified the fact that Rule 185 of the ICC RPE only deals with 
the procedure after the ICC has decided to release the suspect and that it does not 
constitute, in itself, a basis for release.)61  
Turning to the merits of the case, she first looked at the alleged illegality of 
Lubanga Dyilo’s arrest and detention in the DRC.  
She opined “that the information on the duration of Thomas LUBANGA 
DYILO’s alleged house arrest and subsequent detention in the DRC is, at the very 
least, misrepresenting the facts”.62 According to her, the allegation that Lubanga 
Dyilo had been deprived of his liberty since 13 August 2003 was “both 
unsubstantiated and factually incorrect”,63 among other things, because “the 
evidence and information available to the Prosecution shows that he throughout 
2003 and 2004 was able to move freely and to communicate, without restrictions, 
with whomever he wanted, including individuals within the UPC and the FPLC 
[original footnote omitted, ChP]”.64 It was further argued that he was only placed 
“under various forms of house arrest for about two weeks immediately prior to 19 
March 2005”,65 the date of his arrest. 
With respect to the proceedings in the DRC as from 19 March 2005, the 
Prosecution was “aware of the criticism expressed by international NGOs in relation 
to the DRC proceedings, including, inter alia, in respect of Thomas LUBANGA 
DYILO”.66 See in that respect, for example, the following words from Human 
Rights Watch, writing about the “poorly functioning judicial system”67 of the DRC:  
 
In some of the few cases where justice has been pursued, authorities have failed to 
observe international standards of due process. In February and March a number of 
influential armed group leaders from Ituri were arrested in Kinshasa following the 
killings of nine U.N. peacekeepers. Several of those arrested, including Thomas 
Lubanga, Floribert Njabu[68] and Germain Katanga,[69] were accused by Human 
Rights Watch and others of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Authorities 
                                                          
59 Ibid. 
60 See ibid., para. 7. 
61 See ibid.  
62 Ibid., para. 8. 
63 Ibid., para. 9. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid., para. 10. 
66 Ibid., para. 12, n. 35. 
67 Human Rights Watch, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo. Elections in sight: “Don’t Rock the Boat”?’, 
15 December 2005 (available at: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/drc1205/drc1205.pdf), 
p. 14. See also ibid., p. 16, where Human Rights Watch writes about the “absence of a functioning 
judicial system” and the “absence of an independent and effective judiciary”. 
68 One can expect that Njabu, if he is brought before the ICC one day, will raise similar allegations as 
Lubanga Dyilo. 
69 Not very surprisingly, Katanga also argued that his arrest and detention in the DRC were illegal when 








arrested several of them without charge and held them for weeks before bringing any 
charges against them, in clear violation of Congolese legal procedures. By early 
December, they had been in detention for ten months but there has been no effort to 
bring them to trial [original footnote omitted, ChP].70 
 
However, the Prosecution, which had already referred to these words as supporting 
material to convince the Pre-Trial Chamber of the urgency of issuing an arrest 
warrant (because these alleged irregular circumstances could lead to Lubanga 
Dyilo’s release),71 stated that on the basis of the official information,72 “there was 
(…) and still is no reason to believe that the arrest and detention of Thomas 
LUBANGA DYILO in the DRC was illegal”.73 According to this official 
information, there was a legal basis for the proceedings against Lubanga Dyilo and 
Lubanga Dyilo was informed of the allegations which led to his arrest.74 That may, 
of course, be true, but neither should one forget that this official information is also 
one-sided, namely information provided by the DRC authorities.75 One can imagine 
that these authorities will not readily admit that their own proceedings were 
conducted in an irregular way. It is therefore a pity that the Prosecution did not try 
to determine, with help of the information provided by Human Rights Watch, what 
really happened to Lubanga Dyilo in the DRC, especially now that it did use this 
‘unofficial’ information from Human Rights Watch for another purpose, namely to 
convince the Pre-Trial Chamber of the urgency of issuing an arrest warrant against 
Lubanga Dyilo. 
Be that as it may, the Deputy Prosecutor submitted that even if violations of 
DRC law had occurred, these could not be attributed to the ICC and thus could not 
                                                          
70 Human Rights Watch, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo. Elections in sight: “Don’t Rock the Boat”?’, 
15 December 2005 (available at: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/drc1205/drc1205.pdf), 
p. 15.  
71 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Submission of Further Information and 
Materials’ (Under Seal, Ex Parte, Prosecutor Only), ICC-01/04-01/06, 25 January 2006, para. 11. 
72 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to Application for Release’ (Public 
Formatted and Redacted Version), ICC-01/04-01/06, 13 June 2006, para. 12: “The knowledge of the 
Prosecution in respect of the reasons for and details of Thomas LUBANGA DYILO’s detention in the 
DRC prior to his arrest for and surrender to the Court was determined by and limited to the information 
contained in the NOTE SYNOPTIQUE SUR ETAT DE LA PROCEDURE-DOSSIER DE L’ITURI of 
10 August 2005 (NOTE SYNOPTIQUE), the copy of the DRC file on Thomas LUBANGA DYILO’s 
detention, and discussions with representatives of the DRC authorities [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].” 
73 Ibid. 
74 See ibid.  
75 This is clear with respect to the DRC file on Lubanga Dyilo’s detention and the discussions with 
representatives of the DRC authorities, but also with respect to the ‘Note Synoptique’ of 10 August 
2005, which was signed by DRC Brigadier General Joseph Ponde Isambwa, see ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, ‘Decision on the confirmation of charges’ (Public Redacted Version with Annex 1), ICC-01/04-








impact on the legality of the ICC arrest, surrender and detention.76 For example, she 
rejected the allegation that the ICC had failed to intercede in the DRC, had endorsed 
and assisted in the violation of fundamental rules of international law and taken 
advantage of the alleged male captus;77 in this context, she also refused to accept the 
analogy to, for example, the Loizidou case of the ECtHR as support for the idea that 
the ICC is under a duty to investigate the legality of Lubanga Dyilo’s arrest and 
detention in the DRC.78 As explained earlier, such a duty would only exist from the 
moment the ICC was involved in the case. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the ICC 
should go beyond that reasoning and should supervise any violation which occurs in 
the context of its case more generally. That is the only way to prevent a suspect 
from becoming the victim of his proceedings being fragmented over two or more 
jurisdictions.  
The Deputy Prosecutor then went on to reject the Defence’s assertion79 that both 
the OTP and the Pre-Trial Chamber had considered the illegality of Lubanga Dyilo’s 
arrest and detention in the DRC.80 She explained that “[b]oth the Prosecution and 
the Pre-Trial Chamber had indeed reason to believe that Thomas LUBANGA 
DYILO could be released in the near future”,81 and that “[t]his belief was based on 
the fact that the local investigations against him turned out to be very difficult”,82 
but that this consideration “had no bearing on the legality of Thomas LUBANGA 
DYILO’s arrest and detention in the DRC”.83 That may indeed be true, but one can 
question whether this is what the Defence had asserted in the first place. After all, 
the Defence had only argued that “the Chamber took into consideration the 
possibility that the applicant had been arbitrarily arrested and that he might 
subsequently be released [emphasis added, ChP]”.84  
Subsequently, the Deputy Prosecutor stressed the fact that the arrest and 
detention of Lubanga Dyilo before 1485/1586/1687 March 2006 could not be 
attributed to the ICC as follows: 
 
                                                          
76 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to Application for Release’ (Public 
Formatted and Redacted Version), ICC-01/04-01/06, 13 June 2006, para. 11. 
77 See ibid., para. 13. 
78 See ibid., n. 43. 
79 See ibid., para. 14. 
80 See ibid.  
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid.  
83 Ibid.  
84 See n. 28 and accompanying text. 
85 The day the ICC’s Registrar transmitted the request for arrest and surrender to the Procureur Général 
de la République, see ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In 
the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Defence Challenge to the 
Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-
01/06, 3 October 2006, p. 7. 
86 The day the Auditeur Général des FARDC was notified of the request for arrest and surrender (which 
was sent to him by the Procureur Général de la République on 14 March 2006, see ibid.). 








[T]he arrest and detention of Thomas LUBANGA DYILO in March 2005 was not 
triggered by a request or any other involvement of the OTP, nor had the OTP or any 
other organ of the Court prior to the notification of the Auditeur Général des FARDC 
(…) of the DRC pursuant to Article 87 of the Statute on 15 March 2006 made a 
request to keep Thomas LUBANGA DYILO in custody. Thus, given that (1) Thomas 
LUBANGA DYILO was not arrested and detained in the DRC “at the behest of”[88] 
the OTP and, consequently, (2) that he was not in the Court’s “constructive 
custody”[89] prior to his arrest and surrender on 16 March 2006, the alleged violation 
of the rights of Thomas LUBANGA DYILO cannot be attributed to the OTP or the 
Court [original footnotes omitted, ChP].90    
 
First of all, it is interesting to note that the Deputy Prosecutor apparently recognises 
a point which was already argued before in this study,91 namely that if violations 
occur in the context of constructive custody/during arrest/detention at the behest of 
the ICC (hence executed by third parties), these violations can be attributed to the 
ICC, even if, strictly speaking, third parties were responsible for them. That is to be 
welcomed: one can indeed assert that the ICC must take the general responsibility 
for violations which occur in those contexts. Furthermore, one can also agree with 
the Deputy Prosecutor that if the ICC were otherwise involved in the irregularities 
(for example, prior to the official constructive custody), such irregularities can also 
be attributed to the ICC. Nevertheless, involvement of the ICC is arguably only one 
situation which can lead to legal attribution. One could also think of conduct of third 
parties acknowledged and adopted by the ICC as its own, see Subsection 3.3.1 of 
                                                          
88 Here, the Prosecution referred to the first decision in the ICTR case of Barayagwiza and explained 
that the Defence’s reliance on this case was misplaced as it had “neglected the fundamental differences 
in respect of the underlying facts between the case of The Prosecutor vs. Barayagwiza and the instant 
case: Barayagwiza’s detention in Cameroon from 4 March 1997 until his transfer to the ICTR’s 
Detention Unit on 19 November 1997 was triggered by an official request of the ICTR Prosecutor 
[emphasis in original, ChP].” (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to 
Application for Release’ (Public Formatted and Redacted Version), ICC-01/04-01/06, 13 June 2006, 
para. 15, n. 45.) There are, of course, indeed important differences between these two cases, but as 
earlier explained in Part 3 of this book, the ICTR arguably also took responsibility for violations which 
occurred even when Barayagwiza was not detained at the behest/in the constructive custody of the 
ICTR, see n. 857 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. (Moreover (and from a more factual point of 
view), it should neither be forgotten that Barayagwiza was also held at the behest of the ICTR before 4 
March 1997, namely between 17 April 1996 and 16 May 1996, see ns. 824-825 and accompanying text 
of Chapter VI.) The Prosecution also referred here to paras. 30 and 33 of the Rwamakuba decision of 12 
December 2000. This reference is arguably more convincing as the Rwamakuba case seems to be less 
far-going on this issue than a case like Barayagwiza, see Subsections 3.1.6 (within the discussion of the 
Karadžić case), 3.2.4 (within the discussion of the Rwamakuba case itself) and 5.1 (within the context of 
the Duch case). See also n. 170 of Chapter VII. 
89 Here also, the Prosecution referred to the Barayagwiza case. Like this study (see the final words of n. 
829 and n. 855 of Chapter VI), the Prosecution apparently views the concepts of ‘detention at the behest 
of’ and ‘in the constructive custody of’ as equal concepts. 
90 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to Application for Release’ (Public 
Formatted and Redacted Version), ICC-01/04-01/06, 13 June 2006, para. 15. 








Chapter III and footnote 484 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. In addition, it 
can be argued that the fact that a male captus cannot be legally attributed to the ICC 
does not mean that it should not act upon it. The ICC should follow the reasoning of, 
for example, the Barayagwiza case and should supervise any violations which occur 
in the context of its case more generally, whether or not the violations can be legally 
attributed to it. An example often discussed is the kidnapping by private individuals, 
bringing a suspect, of whom it was clear to some that the ICC was interested, into 
the jurisdiction of the Court. In such a case, the male captus cannot be attributed to 
the ICC, for example, because it did not commit the abduction itself, because it was 
not otherwise involved in the abduction, because it had not yet officially initiated the 
investigation, because it did not acknowledge or adopt the abduction of its own, 
because it cannot be seen as an arrest/detention at the behest/request of the Court, 
etc. However, notwithstanding this, the male captus can arguably be seen as falling 
within the context of the Court’s case more generally. Deterrence, the integrity of 
the proceedings and simple fairness towards the suspect92 demand that in such a 
case, the male captus is considered and properly remedied by the final prosecuting 
forum (of course, taking into account that the male captus cannot be legally 
attributed to it).  
Finally, the Deputy Prosecutor argued that even if the alleged irregularities at the 
national level could be attributed to the ICC (quod non), the requested remedy, 
release, was disproportionate to the violations.93 In this context, she referred to the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision in Nikolić, the second decision of the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber in Barayagwiza and the 31 May 2000 decision of the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber in Semanza, explaining “that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
Tribunals requires that the violation of the rights be of “egregious nature” for the 
extraordinary remedy of release to be granted [emphasis in original, ChP]”.94 This 
shows again (see footnote 58 and accompanying text) that the Prosecution viewed 
the requested remedy as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction/as a male detentus 
remedy/as a release with prejudice to the Prosecution remedy. 
Now that the alleged illegality of Lubanga Dyilo’s arrest and detention in the 
DRC prior to the ICC arrest had been addressed, the Deputy Prosecutor looked at 
the allegation that violations had occurred in the context of the proceedings based on 
Article 59 of the ICC Statute. She maintained that Lubanga Dyilo was arrested and 
surrendered to the ICC in compliance with all the requirements; in particular, the 
proceedings were held before the competent judicial authority of the DRC, the 
                                                          
92 See n. 849 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. See also n. 171 and accompanying text of Chapter 
VII and n. 286 of the previous chapter. 
93 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to Application for Release’ (Public 
Formatted and Redacted Version), ICC-01/04-01/06, 13 June 2006, para. 16. 








Auditeur Général, and Lubanga Dyilo had been served with, among other things, a 
copy of the arrest warrant in the DRC on 16 March 2006.95  
Finally, it was argued that no violation of Article 67, paragraph 1 (a) of the ICC 
Statute had occurred because Lubanga Dyilo had been comprehensively informed of 
the charges against him.96  
The Defence subsequently requested, and was granted, the possibility to react on 
the Prosecution’s observations. In its confidential ‘Conclusions en réplique à la 
réponse du Procureur à la demande de mise en liberté’ of 10 July 2006, the Defence 
argued “that the Application for Release is grounded, on the one hand, on article 55 
(1) (d) juncto article 85 of the Statute, and, on the other hand, on the inadmissibility 
of the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”.97 
On 13 July 2006, Pre-Trial Chamber I considered “that in the various documents 
submitted to the Chamber regarding the Application for Release, the Defence has 
resorted to a variety of procedural remedies”.98 As a result, it ordered the Defence 
“to make clear which procedural remedy it is using for the Application for Release 
of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”.99   
The response of the Defence was filed on 17 July. In this document, the Defence 
re-characterised its application as a challenge to the jurisdiction of the ICC100 (as 
was already assumed by Deputy Prosecutor Bensouda in her response of 13 June 
2006 to Lubanga Dyilo’s application for release, see footnote 58 and accompanying 
text). In doing so, the Defence again referred to the Barayagwiza case and repeated 
(see footnote 54 and accompanying text) the relevance of the abuse of process 
doctrine, without again, however, clearly explaining how this doctrine fits the 
system of the ICC:101 
 
The application of the doctrine of “abuse of process” consists of making the Court 
state that it declines to exercise its jurisdiction in proceedings where continuing to 
exercise this competence and jurisdiction in relation to violations of the Accused’s 
fundamental rights would cause irreparable damage to the integrity of the judicial 
process. For the reasons previously set out, the Court, within the context of its 
supervisory powers, could not endorse a violation of the Accused’s fundamental 
                                                          
95 See ibid., para. 17. See for more information with respect to the point that proceedings were held 
before the competent authority ibid., para. 18 and for more information with respect to the point that 
Lubanga Dyilo had been served with an arrest warrant in the DRC ibid., paras. 19-20. 
96 See ibid., paras. 21-22. 
97 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 3 October 2006, 
p. 3. 
98 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Order relating to the Application for Release’ (Public 
Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 13 July 2006, p. 3. 
99 Ibid., p. 4. 
100 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Submissions Further to the Order of 13 July 2006’ (Public 
Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 17 July 2006, para. 8. 








rights by continuing to exercise its jurisdiction over him. In this respect, the Court no 
longer has personal jurisdiction over the applicant. Since the Court must reject the 
Prosecutor’s criminal proceedings in their entirety, release is also essential under this 
current challenge to jurisdiction [original footnote omitted, ChP].102    
 
After this, the DRC and the victims presented their observations on this matter (and, 
not surprisingly, requested the ICC to reject the application).103 Although the 
observations of the DRC are confidential and hence cannot be discussed here,104 
those of the victims are not and are indeed very interesting. The legal representatives 
of the victims first of all indirectly showed their adherence to a strict male captus 
bene detentus view.105 For example, they argued that “[a]n irregularity that was 
committed at the time of the arrest or detention of an accused person should not 
have any consequence on the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
[emphasis added, ChP]”106 and that  
 
[n]o provision of the Statute states that the Court will lose its jurisdiction over such a 
person, even if that person was arrested or detained illegally, or even arbitrarily, 
which should cause any challenge to jurisdiction based on an irregularity committed 
at the time of the accused’s arrest or detention to be rejected [emphasis added, 
ChP].107 
 
                                                          
102 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Submissions Further to the Order of 13 July 2006’ (Public 
Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 17 July 2006, paras. 8-9. 
103 Note that in contrast to, for example, the context of the ICTY and ICTR, victims have a much greater 
role to play in the context of the ICC. See, for example, Fernández de Gurmendi and Friman 2002, pp. 
312-324. 
104 Some general information can, however, be found in ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision 
on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute’ 
(Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 3 October 2006, p. 4, where the judges explain that the DRC 
requested the ICC “(i) to deny the Defence challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court on the ground that 
the said challenge has no legal basis; (ii) to reject the Defence assertion based on the alleged illegal 
detention of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo in the DRC; (iii) to reject the Defence assertion concerning the 
irregularities surrounding the arrest and surrender to the Court of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo; and (iv) to 
declare the Defence Application for Release admissible but without merit and thereby dismiss the 
request”. See also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the 
Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 
19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 
2006, para. 6: “The DRC (…) maintained that Mr. Lubanga Dyilo was brought before the judicial 
authorities having competence in the matter of enforcement of the warrant of the Court and that the 
process followed was the one ordained by law.” 
105 See also ns. 119 and 121 and accompanying text.   
106 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Observations of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 
Regarding the Challenge to Jurisdiction Raised by the Defence in the Application of 23 May 2006’ 
(Public), ICC-01/04-01/06, 24 August 2006, para. 7. 








It is, of course, true that the ICC Statute does not contain any explicit provisions in 
that respect, see also the previous chapter of this book, but the more interesting 
question is obviously whether an article such as Article 21 of the ICC Statute may 
nevertheless provide some direction in that respect.  
The legal representatives then turned to the two main aspects of the case, namely 
1) the alleged illegal detention of Lubanga Dyilo in the DRC before 16 March 2006 
and 2) the alleged irregularities related to the ICC arrest and surrender pursuant to 
Article 59 of the ICC Statute.  
A few interesting observations which are related to the first aspect and which 
should be mentioned here are the fact that the legal representatives stressed the 
limited scope of Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute108 – see on this matter 
also footnote 32 and accompanying text – and that “an illegal detention under 
national law is not necessarily arbitrary detention within the meaning of article 55 
or article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [emphasis in 
original but bold emphasis changed into italicised emphasis, ChP]”.109  
With respect to this last point, it may be instructive to refer back to footnote 216 
of Chapter III of this book where “one of the most important interpretations of 
“arbitrary” [original footnote omitted, ChP]”110 (from the 1964 UN Committee’s 
‘Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, and 
Exile’) was presented:   
 
Arrest or detention is arbitrary if it is (a) on grounds or in accordance with procedures 
other than those established by law or (b) under the provisions of a law, the purpose 
of which is incompatible with the right to liberty and security of person [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP].111 
 
This means that arbitrariness is broader than illegality and that an arrest which, 
strictly speaking, is not unlawful may nevertheless be seen as arbitrary (namely if 
the law on which it is based is in itself incompatible with the right to liberty and 
security).112 However, this interpretation also clarifies the fact that an illegal 
arrest/detention can also be seen as an arbitrary arrest. After all, “[a]rrest or 
detention is arbitrary if it is (a) on grounds or in accordance with procedures other 
than those established by law”.113  
                                                          
108 See ibid., paras. 13-15. 
109 Ibid., para. 16. 
110 Marcoux, Jr. 1982, p. 366. 
111 See n. 216 of Chapter III. 
112 See also Hall 2008 A, p. 1096, commenting on Art. 55, para. 1 (d) of the ICC Statute: “The 
prohibition in the second part of paragraph 1 (d) is independent of the prohibition in the first part of 
arbitrary arrest and detention; an arrest or detention made on grounds and in accordance with procedures 
established by the Statute could still be arbitrary in certain circumstances.” Although this statement may 
also be seen as support for the statement of the legal representatives of the victims that an illegal 
detention is not necessarily arbitrary (see the words “is independent of”), Hall refers to the 1964 UN 
Committee’s ‘Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, and Exile’ as 
well (see ibid., n. 24), which may mean that he follows the reasoning mentioned in the main text. 








The legal representatives of the victims also referred to the seriousness of 
Lubanga Dyilo’s alleged crimes, arguing that these “are so serious that any 
violations of the accused’s procedural rights could not lead to a straightforward 
release or stop any proceedings making it possible to determine his 
responsibility”.114 It can be argued that this view should be resolutely rejected: the 
fact that Lubanga Dyilo’s alleged crimes are very serious does not mean that serious 
violations of his procedural rights can never lead to the ending of the case. If that 
were the case, then an abduction of Lubanga Dyilo by the ICC’s OTP, accompanied 
by serious mistreatment – to provide an extreme example – would not lead to the 
ending of the case either. That would be unacceptable: some male captus cases are 
so serious that jurisdiction must be refused if the Court wants to be taken seriously 
as a true institution based on law, whether or not one is dealing with suspects of 
international crimes.  
Interestingly, the legal representatives also referred to the state of emergency in 
the DRC, an argument which the Defence had earlier rejected, see footnote 20 and 
accompanying text.115 In this context, they made the statement that “[i]n a situation 
of armed conflict, the rules governing the detention of a person accused of war 
crimes are to be judged more on the basis of the law of armed conflicts, and more 
specifically the 1949 Geneva Conventions and additional protocols, than on the 
basis of instruments ensuring human rights”.116 However, it must not be forgotten 
that human rights law is, in principle, applicable at all times, not only in times of 
peace, but also in times of war. This is only different if the State has validly 
derogated from its human rights obligations because of the emergency/war situation, 
see Chapter III. (Note, furthermore, that some rights, and the right to habeas corpus 
appears to be one of them,117 are of a non-derogable status and can thus never be 
neglected.) 
With respect to the second aspect of the case (the one related to the alleged 
irregularities in the context of the ICC arrest and surrender pursuant to Article 59 of 
the ICC Statute), the legal representatives noted, among other things, that  
 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo was obligated to deliver the accused to the 
Court, regardless of the legal or illegal nature of his detention and regardless of 
whether its domestic legislation was adhered to in the period preceding the issuing of 
the arrest warrant; it would even have been obligated to arrest him and deliver him to 
the Court if he had been free or if he had been detained arbitrarily by forces outside 
the State’s control.118  
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This is another way of saying that notwithstanding any sort of male captus, the 
suspect must always be surrendered to the ICC. As explained in Chapter VIII, how 
the exact scope of Article 59 of the ICC Statute is to be seen and what has to be 
done if the competent judicial authority determines that a suspect was not arrested 
according to the proper process or that his rights were not respected will depend 
from State to State. Although there may indeed be States which will always 
surrender the suspect, notwithstanding irregularities in either the official ICC arrest 
process or the domestic phase preceding the official ICC arrest, it may also be the 
case that States, after consultation with the ICC (which is in any case mandatory), 
will refuse the surrender because of serious irregularities. As also clarified in 
Chapter VIII, the State’s position on the male captus issue may also play a role here. 
(It was explained earlier that it is obvious that the legal representatives of the 
victims adhere to the traditional male captus bene detentus position.)119 
Furthermore, States may be of the opinion that certain (less serious) violations 
demand the release of the suspect. However, as explained earlier, this remedy 
should be avoided as it can be used as a pro forma remedy, to be immediately 
followed by a new arrest. In that case, the authorities could claim that the wrong has 
been repaired by the pro forma release and that the surrender can continue as if 
nothing had happened.120 It would be better if national authorities in that case were 
to surrender the suspect and report the alleged irregularities to the ICC so that the 
judges in The Hague can accord appropriate and real remedies.  
Not surprisingly,121 the legal representatives also argued that the ICC itself could 
rely on “the principle of “male captus, bene detentus” which has been consistently 
applied before international and national courts [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP]”.122 As has hopefully become clear from this book, such a statement is, of 
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course, far too over-simplified. At the national level, for example, one can also find 
several male captus male detentus cases. However, these were not mentioned by the 
legal representatives, who were thus too selective in their choice of male captus case 
law.123 As explained earlier, much will depend on the exact circumstances of the 
case here. In fact, it was submitted that, with respect to certain serious male captus 
situations, such as an abduction executed by the authorities of the prosecuting forum 
and followed by a protest and request for the return of the suspect from the injured 
State or an abduction executed by the authorities of the prosecuting forum and 
accompanied by serious mistreatment, State practice indicates that courts will refuse 
jurisdiction. With respect to the first male captus situation, it was even argued that 
this is a rule of customary international law. Furthermore, it is true that at the level 
of the international courts, all the male captus cases ultimately led to a bene detentus 
outcome,124 but this does not mean that judges follow the traditional male captus 
bene detentus maxim in that “a court may exercise jurisdiction over an accused 
person regardless of how that person has come into the jurisdiction of that court 
[emphasis added, ChP]”.125 This traditional definition of the maxim has clearly been 
abandoned. Also in this context, much will depend on the exact circumstances. It is 
confusing that the legal representatives, on the one hand, refer to the traditional 
definition of the male captus bene detentus maxim, but, on the other, also (correctly) 
acknowledge that certain serious situations may nevertheless lead to a refusal of 
jurisdiction.126   
Finally, the legal representatives of the victims stated that it was not even 
necessary to refer to the male captus bene detentus principle as “unlike the situation 
in the Barayagwiza case, any violations of the accused’s rights in the present case 
are in no way attributable to the Court, not even for a short time, since the accused 
was in The Hague barely 24 hours after a request for surrender was served in the 
DRC”.127 However, counsel forget here that Barayagwiza128 (and the rest of the 
tribunal male captus case law)129 acknowledges that judges can refuse jurisdiction 
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under the abuse of process doctrine, irrespective of the entity responsible for the 
violation. Hence, in very serious cases, the tribunal can refuse jurisdiction, even if 
the violations could not be attributed to the tribunal. In addition, it was earlier 
argued that the tribunal should more generally take responsibility for violations 
which occur in the context of its case, whether or not these violations could be 
attributed to it and whether or not they were so serious that it would lead to the 
ending of the case.  
The Defence and Prosecution then filed their responses to the observations of the 
DRC and the victims. Although these responses are confidential, some information 
on these responses can nevertheless be found in the paragraphs describing this 
case’s background information in the still-to-discuss Appeals Chamber’s decision. 
In those paragraphs, it was explained that  
 
Mr. Lubanga Dyilo submitted that the Prosecutor was privy to his prior illegal 
detention by the Congolese authorities with a view to facilitating his unimpeded arrest 
under the warrant of the Court. There was, in his submission, complicity on the part 
of the Prosecutor in the action of the Congolese authorities to secure his arrest by 
devious means; shifting thereby the weight of his submission from responsibility of 
the Prosecutor for acts of the DRC to responsibility attributed to him on account of 
underhanded dealings with the authorities of that state.130 
 
In response,  
 
[t]he Prosecutor refuted the allegation that he was party to any surreptitious dealings 
or arrangements with a view to bypassing the legal process or infringing the rights of 
the suspect or that he connived in any act of ill-treatment of the suspect. He submitted 
that the process for the enforcement of the warrant before the Congolese authorities 
followed the path envisaged by law (…) [original footnote omitted, ChP][.]131   
 
After all the submissions and responses of the participants had been filed, it was 
finally time for the ICC judges to address their very first male captus case. On 3 
October 2006, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued its decision. The judges first of all 
recapitulated Lubanga Dyilo’s two main allegations of this case, namely  
 
(i) the alleged arbitrary arrest by the DRC authorities on 13 August 2003 and the 
alleged subsequent illegal detention of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo in the DRC prior to 16 
March 2006; and (ii) certain alleged irregularities in the execution of the Court’s 
cooperation request for the arrest and surrender of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (…) sent 
to the DRC on 14 March 2006 [original footnote omitted, ChP][.]132  
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They then made it clear that Lubanga Dyilo had challenged the ICC’s jurisdiction on 
the basis of Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute – an important provision 
which was discussed at length in Section 4 of the previous chapter but which was 
not yet explicitly mentioned in the public submissions of the Defence – and the 
abuse of process doctrine.133 Furthermore, they explained that Lubanga Dyilo had 
claimed that, in the context of the execution of the ICC’s cooperation request, his 
rights under Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute, again a crucial provision, 
see Chapters VIII and IX, had been violated.134  
Starting with this last point, the judges clarified the fact that the phrase “in 
accordance with the law of the State” (as can be found in Article 59, paragraph 2 of 
the ICC Statute) “means that it is for national authorities to have primary 
jurisdiction for interpreting and applying national law [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]”135 but  
 
that this does not prevent the Chamber from retaining a degree of jurisdiction over 
how the national authorities interpret and apply national law when such an 
interpretation and application relates to matters which, like those here, are referred 
directly back to that national law by the Statute [original footnote omitted, ChP][.]136   
 
This appears to be a good division of responsibilities, one which leaves room for the 
previously mentioned idea that national authorities are, of course, the experts when 
interpreting and applying their own law in determining, for example, whether the 
person has been arrested in accordance with the proper process and whether that 
person’s rights have been respected but that the ICC should also have a supervising 
role to play here to ensure that the suspect does not become the victim of the fact 
that his criminal process is fragmented over two or more jurisdictions and that every 
violation in the context of an ICC case is ultimately properly remedied. 
The judges then explained that the DRC authorities were obliged to determine 
the points mentioned in Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute in the context of 
the ICC’s request for arrest and surrender, but that there was no obligation for them 
to look into the lawfulness of the arrest and detention prior to the date this request 
was sent (14 March 2006) “insofar as that detention was related solely to national 
proceedings in the DRC”.137 Earlier in this chapter, it was explained that the DRC 
authorities also looked (albeit only briefly) at Lubanga Dyilo’s arrest and detention 
                                                                                                                                              
Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 3 October 2006, 
p. 5. 
133 See ibid.  
134 See ibid. 
135 Ibid., p. 6. Interestingly, the ICC judges referred here to the Barbie (Altmann) case before the 
ECtHR, see n. 334 and accompanying text of Chapter III. Unfortunately, however, they did not explain 
what kind of role such case law plays within the context of the ICC, for example, whether it is only used 
as an authoritative source or whether it may enter the law of the ICC itself pursuant to Art. 21 of the ICC 
Statute, see the previous chapter. 
136 Ibid., p. 6. The ICC judges referred here to the Winterwerp case, see again (see the previous footnote) 









related to the national DRC proceedings, prior to the official ICC arrest in the 
context of Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute and that that stance is to be 
welcomed for it may very well be that this part must be seen as falling within the 
context of an ICC case and it is important that every alleged violation which took 
place in that context is considered and, if needed, remedied. The ICC judges 
explained that the DRC authorities could indeed review that arrest/detention, even 
though they were not obliged to do so. The words of the judges also indicate that if 
the detention was not only related to national proceedings (read: but also to the 
proceedings of the ICC), the DRC authorities would also have been obliged, under 
Article 59 of the ICC Statute, to look into the lawfulness of that arrest/detention 
prior to sending of the request for arrest and surrender on 14 March 2006. This can 
not only be a reference to an arrest/detention based on an ICC’s request for 
provisional arrest pending presentation of the actual request for arrest/surrender, but 
also to an arrest/detention in which the ICC was somehow involved and which can 
somehow be seen as being related to the ICC proceedings, even before the sending 
of these official requests.  
These provisions having been explained in more detail, the judges turned to the 
specifics of the case. First of all, they concluded that Lubanga Dyilo had been 
brought before the competent judicial authority of the DRC, the Auditeur Général 
des FARDC (in this case his representative: the Premier Avocat Général des 
FARDC),138 “because he was being detained at that time in relation to national 
proceedings before the Congolese Military Courts [emphasis added, ChP]”.139 In 
addition, they opined, “no material breach of article 59 (2) of the Statute can be 
found in the procedure followed by the competent Congolese national authorities 
during the execution of the Court’s Cooperation Request”.140 Although it indeed 
appears that, in the context of the execution of the ICC arrest, the procedures were 
correctly followed and Lubanga Dyilo’s rights were respected (see footnote 140 for 
more details), it would nevertheless have been even clearer had the judges explicitly 
addressed the points mentioned in Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute, 
namely that there was no violation of that provision because the competent judicial 
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authority in the DRC had determined that the warrant applied to Lubanga Dyilo, that 
he had been arrested in accordance with the proper process and that his rights had 
been respected (and that there was no reason to assume that the competent judicial 
authority erred in his rulings).141 In addition, even though the Pre-Trial Chamber 
seemingly implied that the competent judicial authority must also look into the 
lawfulness of the arrest and detention prior to the official ICC arrest if that 
arrest/detention is somehow related to the ICC proceedings (and that it may do so if 
the arrest/detention was not related to the ICC proceedings), the ICC judges, as the 
supervisors which must marginally check the determinations of Article 59, 
paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute, did not clearly go into that matter themselves. 
Hence, it is unclear to what extent the ICC judges, under Article 59 of the ICC 
Statute, would also look into the prior arrest and detention, but one can assume that 
they would consider that arrest/detention if that arrest/detention could somehow be 
linked to the proceedings before the ICC. In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber can be 
criticised for not discussing provisions which are arguably relevant for the context 
of Article 59 of the ICC Statute, such as Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC 
Statute142 and Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute.143 These provisions 
arguably play a role once the ICC has started an investigation (55) and once the ICC 
is involved in a case (21). That is certainly the case in the context of Article 59 of 
the ICC Statute. 
The judges then turned to the first allegation of Lubanga Dyilo and explained  
 
that the Defence is currently challenging the jurisdiction of the Court by stating that 
“Article 21 (3) […] vests the Court with the obligation to consider whether its 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is consistent with such 
general principles of human rights, or whether, given the serious violations of his 
human rights, it would be an abuse of process to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
him in such circumstances” [original footnote omitted, ChP][.]144    
 
The judges held that, according to Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute,  
 
any violations of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s rights in relation to his arrest and 
detention prior to 14 March 2006 will be examined by the Court only once it has been 
established that there has been concerted action between the Court and the DRC 
authorities [original footnote omitted, ChP][.]145  
                                                          
141 See also n. 272 and accompanying text. 
142 See also n. 156 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII. 
143 Cf. also ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of [the] Congo, In the Case 
of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Defence Appeal against the Decision on the Defence 
Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 26 October 2006, 
para. 40, n. 62 and para. 41. 
144 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 










In making this statement, the Pre-Trial Chamber, again without clearly explaining 
what kind of role such case law plays within the context of the ICC,146 referred to 
the ECtHR’s case Stocké,147 the ECmHR’s case Barbie148 and the ICTR cases 
Semanza and Rwamakuba, these last two as authorities for the idea that the ICTR 
“has repeatedly stated that the Tribunal is not responsible for the illegal arrest and 
detention of the accused in the custodial State if the arrest and detention was not 
carried out at the behest of the Tribunal”.149 Hence, it appears that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber followed the view of the Deputy Prosecutor mentioned at footnote 90 and 
accompanying text, namely that the ICC will take its responsibility, first, for 
violations which occur after the official request has been sent (violations taking 
place in the constructive custody of the ICC/violations in the arrest/detention at the 
behest/request of the ICC: Semanza and Rwamakuba)150 and secondly, for violations 
which occurred prior to these official requests if these violations stem from 
concerted action between the ICC and the external authorities (in the case of 
Lubanga Dyilo: the DRC authorities): Stocké and Barbie. This second situation can 
be compared with the Prosecutor’s words “or any other involvement of the OTP”, as 
in: “[T]he arrest and detention of Thomas LUBANGA DYILO in March 2005 was 
not triggered by a request or any other involvement of the OTP”.151 In those two 
situations, the violations can be attributed to the ICC.  
That which was said in the context of the Deputy Prosecutor’s remarks can also 
be said here: it is good that both the Deputy Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber 
are of the opinion that violations which occur in the context of constructive 
custody/arrest/detention at the behest/request of the ICC can be attributed to the ICC 
and will thus be considered. Furthermore, one can also agree with the point that, 
prior to the sending of the official request, irregularities can be attributed to the 
ICC/can be considered by the Court if they stem from concerted action between the 
ICC and third parties. This also accords with the previously made assumption in the 
context of Article 59 of the ICC Statute that the ICC, as the supervisors marginally 
checking this provision, would also look at an arrest/detention prior to the official 
ICC arrest if that arrest/detention was somehow related to the ICC proceedings. This 
is comparable with the idea that the ICC would look at the arrest/detention prior to 
the official ICC arrest if the ICC was somehow involved in that arrest/detention/if 
there was concerted action between the ICC and third parties.  
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However, one should not forget that there are also other situations (besides 
concerted action) which entail that certain conduct can be attributed to the ICC, for 
example, if the ICC acknowledges and adopts the conduct of third parties as its own. 
It is regrettable that this point was not mentioned. In addition, it must be repeated 
that the fact that a male captus cannot be legally attributed to the ICC does not mean 
that it should not be considered. The better solution would be if the judges were to 
take responsibility for any violation which occurs in the context of their case more 
generally and then, in deciding the kind of remedy, take into account, for example, 
whether these violations can be legally attributed to the ICC (using all the 
possibilities in that respect: constructive custody, involvement, acknowledgment and 
adoption as its own, etc.).  
Only this more general view will arguably bring greater flexibility and fairness 
into a system which is sometimes overly focused on the ultimate remedy: refusal of 
jurisdiction (male detentus). In that respect, it is to be regretted that the ICC judges 
restrict the scope of Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute to violations in the 
context of constructive custody and in the context of an arrest/detention which 
resulted from concerted action between the ICC and third parties. Although this 
seemingly comports with what Article 21, paragraph 3 requires, see Chapter IX152 
where it was explained that the provision covers any situation in which the ICC is 
involved, including, for example arrest/detentions executed by national authorities at 
the behest of the ICC, it was argued in the same chapter that it would be even fairer 
for the ICC to repair any violations which occur in the context of its case more 
generally. After all, the judges may always be confronted by violations which, 
strictly speaking, cannot be seen as falling under the above-mentioned situations but 
which it would be very unfair not to consider/repair.153 Again, one can mention 
abduction by private individuals here. If the judges are of the opinion that, in that 
situation, internationally recognised human rights were violated, they should be able 
under Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute to repair these violations. (Cf. also 
the similar argument made in the context of Article 55 of the ICC Statute.)154  
This more general reasoning can arguably be found in several tribunal cases, see 
footnote 170 and accompanying text of Chapter VII. Furthermore, support for this 
more general reasoning can also be found in the context of the extreme cases; the 
tribunals have argued that under the abuse of process doctrine, courts may refuse 
jurisdiction in very serious male captus cases, irrespective of the entity responsible. 
As submitted before, if the tribunals take the ultimate responsibility for violations 
which occur in the context of their case (refusal of jurisdiction), irrespective of the 
entity responsible, they should also do so (more clearly) in the case of less serious 
violations.155  
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Although this last idea is not shared by the Pre-Trial Chamber, it did look at the 
context of the extreme cases, holding  
 
that whenever there is no concerted action between the Court and the authorities of 
the custodial State, the abuse of process doctrine constitutes an additional guarantee 
of the rights of the accused;[156] and that, to date, the application of this doctrine, 
which would require that the Court decline to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular 
case,[157] has been confined to instances of torture or serious mistreatment by national 
authorities of the custodial State in some way related to the process of arrest and 
transfer of the person to the relevant international criminal tribunal[158] [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP][.]159 
 
Before going into the merits of this statement, which were briefly discussed in the 
Duch case, see Chapter VI, it should be said that it should be welcomed that the ICC 
judges accept the abuse of process doctrine, although it can be maintained that it is 
unclear how the Pre-Trial judges incorporate this doctrine (and the same goes for the 
international (criminal) tribunal case law)160 into the system of the ICC/Article 21 of 
the ICC Statute.161 In Chapter IX of this book, it was explained that the reasoning 
behind this doctrine, namely that courts have the power to refuse jurisdiction in 
certain serious male captus cases (one should not focus too much on the common 
law label ‘abuse of process’ here) can perhaps be seen as a principle/rule of 
international law pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) of the ICC Statute162 or 
otherwise as general principle of law derived by the Court from national laws of 
legal systems of the world pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC 
Statute.163 Because so many courts seem to recognise this power, it could be held 
that it is an inherent power164 of any court of law, a point which was made earlier in 
this study.165  
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Hence, it could be argued that the ICC also has this inherent power to refuse 
jurisdiction in very serious male captus cases, irrespective of the entity involved. If 
the ICC agrees that it has an inherent abuse of process-like power, it should follow 
the broad abuse of process doctrine of the other international tribunals, which 
accepts that jurisdiction can be refused, irrespective of the entity responsible. It is 
submitted that that is the only appropriate abuse of process doctrine for an 
institution with no police force of its own. However, it is also clear that involvement 
of the prosecuting forum’s own authorities (such as the OTP) is an important 
element in deciding whether or not a male detentus outcome must follow, cf. the 
national level and the abuse of process doctrine in that context. 
Thus, while recognising that one must be careful with implied/inherent powers in 
the context of the ICC,166 it is submitted that even if the judges do not accept that the 
reasoning behind the abuse of process doctrine can be seen as a principle/rule of 
international law pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) of the ICC Statute or 
otherwise as a general principle of law derived by the Court from national laws of 
legal systems of the world pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute, 
they may nevertheless be of the opinion that it must be seen as an inherent power of 
the ICC judges. In the words of Currie:   
 
The ICC must, like any other court, have the ability to control its own process and to 
address any abuse of its process – up to, and including, the ability to impose dismissal 
as a remedy. This is a matter of simple credibility for any court, and goes to basic 
notions of legality; as Professor Morgenstern wrote many decades ago, “[I]t is the 
duty of courts to administer the law with an eye not only to the merits of each 
individual case but also to higher considerations of legality.” Both the ICTY and 
ICTR have invoked such inherent/implied powers, including the ability to remedy 
abuse of process, though it is not spoken to in their respective Statutes or Rules of 
Evidence and Procedure [original footnotes omitted, ChP].167 
 
As explained in Chapter VI, it is indeed true that the abuse of process doctrine 
shows that tribunals will refuse jurisdiction in the event of very serious male captus 
situations, even if the authorities which can be linked to the tribunal in question 
were not involved in the male captus. However, these situations do not necessarily 
need to be confined to torture or serious mistreatment. The only real test is that 
judges can refuse jurisdiction in very serious male captus cases and that it is for 
them to judge whether the male captus in question is serious enough to refuse 
jurisdiction. It is obvious that the male captus does not need to be restricted to 
serious mistreatment/torture-like practices when the tribunal is involved – the first 
Barayagwiza decision is, of course, the best example of this168 – but also when the 
tribunal is not involved in the alleged male captus, the situation on which the ICC is 
focusing here, it might be possible that judges nevertheless find the male captus 
                                                          
166 See n. 131 of Chapter IX. 
167 Currie 2007, p. 375. 
168 The fact that in the end, the factual outcome of this case was altered in a second decision, does not in 








serious enough to refuse jurisdiction. One could perhaps think here of an forceful 
abduction, executed by national special forces, backed up by the peacekeeping force 
in the area, accompanied by mistreatment inflicted on the suspect (albeit not serious 
mistreatment) and followed by protests and a request for the return of the suspect 
from the injured State and condemnations of other States.  
It may perhaps seem odd, but at this point, it is worth returning to Currie’s rugby 
pitch and his introduction of the term ‘lateral’ mentioned at the end of Chapter VIII. 
That chapter clarified that the ICC’s cooperation regime has both horizontal and 
vertical elements and that it is clearly not as vertical as the system of the ICTY and 
ICTR. Now, in Section 2 of this book’s Chapter VII (the principles distilled from the 
cases between States), it was argued that the male captus situation of an abduction 
executed by the prosecuting forum’s authorities and followed by a protest and 
request for the return of the suspect can be seen as having customary international 
law status. In Section 3 of that chapter (the principles distilled from the cases 
between States and international(ised) criminal tribunals), it was consequently 
explained169 that such a rule, now that it has customary international law status, 
should in principle also apply to the context of the tribunals, but that judges in 
national courts would probably refuse jurisdiction in such cases to, among other 
things, protect the fragile legal international order based on the equality of sovereign 
States and that that rationale is less important (albeit not absent) in the vertical 
context of the ICTY and ICTR. It was then stated that one can thus question whether 
this rule of customary international law can be applied mutatis mutandis to the 
context of these Tribunals.170 However, to what extent would this rule be applicable 
to the not-so-vertical context of the ICC? One should not be too surprised if the ICC 
judges (correctly) attached more importance to a protest from an injured State and 
the violation of that State’s sovereignty than, for example, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber’s ‘carte blanche decision’ of Nikolić. Perhaps, the ICC judges would feel 
bound by the above-mentioned customary international law rule and would thus 
refuse jurisdiction, not because they believe that they ought to, but because they 
believe that they must do so. Likewise, if the above-mentioned scenario of the 
forceful abduction were to materialise (a situation in which the tribunal itself is not 
involved), one can expect that the truly vertical (and merely temporal) ICTY and 
ICTR would not be very impressed by a protest from the injured State and a request 
for the return of the suspect. But this may be different for the (permanent) ICC, in 
whose “lateral” context the sovereignty of States plays a much bigger role. In the 
words of Currie:   
 
In the lateral system (…) the case for of universally condemned offences as the 
overarching threats to international peace and order cannot be made with either the 
                                                          
169 See n. 104 of Chapter VII. See also n. 652 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
170 Note, however, that even though this would mean that there would be no obligation for these 
Tribunals to refuse jurisdiction in such cases, it was already submitted earlier that in the case of an 
abduction orchestrated by these Tribunals, the latter should return (conditionally) the suspect back, 








legal or normative force that it was by the ICTY in Nikolić. While the ICC has a large 
number of state parties, it is by no means a universal treaty; third party states will 
inevitably be engaged, since international criminals will not necessarily respect 
borders.[171] The state parties, moreover, exist as sovereign equals in what is 
essentially a glorified treaty regime. The obligations under the Rome Statute are for 
parties to cooperate with the Court, even to the point of surrendering jurisdiction in 
appropriate circumstances, but those obligations are ultimately owed to the state 
parties themselves. The lack of “verticality” deprives ICC proceedings of some of the 
moral suasion that attaches to the ad hoc tribunals.172 
                                                          
171 Of course, where the sovereignty of non-States Parties, especially those hostile to the ICC, is violated 
by the male captus, the judges of the ICC simply cannot afford not to address that dimension of the male 
captus, see Currie 2007, p. 386, who notes that an abduction of a national from a non-State Party 
(irrespective of the place of the abduction) may lead to similar serious consequences, see ibid. 
172 Ibid., p. 385. See also ibid., p. 389: “The Appeal Chambers’ suggestion in Nikolić that a reviewing 
court should not attribute any significance to international law violations stemming from abduction must 
be rejected. The legality of this holding is questionable even before that body, but it is entirely 
inappropriate for the lateral system in which the ICC exists. The ICC must engage with, and must be 
seen to engage with, the issues of abduction, illegal rendition and illegal arrest, and in a manner which 
makes the Court’s jurisdiction ratione personae a live issue; unlike the UN tribunals, it does not have 
the freedom not to.” This point was also already made by Sloan 2006, p. 333 (see n. 642 of Chapter VI): 
“[T]o simply observe that the violation [of State sovereignty, ChP] may lead to ‘consequences for the 
international responsibility of the State or organization involved’, without establishing meaningful 
parameters regarding when such violations will be tolerated by the ICTY, gives a blank cheque to those 
who would violate state sovereignty in what they perceive to be the best interests of international 
criminal justice. If this were to be considered a precedent for capture of those indicted by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) residing in non-cooperating member states, the ramifications could 
be very damaging to international peace and security [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” Currie (2007, 
pp. 387-388), elaborating more on this issue, notes that “[i]ronically enough, if the Nikolić line of 
reasoning prevails before the ICC there may be certain cases where prosecuting universally condemned 
offences will create threats to international peace and security – different from those underpinning the 
offence itself but no less destructive for that. The prospect of dousing a smaller fire only to start a larger 
one is troubling, but very real. Even the more “minor” political conflicts can only hurt the cause, 
legitimacy and credibility of a Court which already has to operate in a highly-charged political 
atmosphere; if it is seen to be encouraging or approving of international illegality, then the Court may 
very well play into the hands of those who view it as a politicized and biased forum. A wholesale 
application of the mala captus bene detentus rule should have no future before the ICC [emphasis in 
original and original footnote omitted, ChP].” It may finally be interesting to note that Currie also sees a 
role for the ASP here. He suggests (ibid., p. 391): “The Assembly of States Parties should enact some 
form of formalized mechanism to address abduction or other illegality, perhaps by way of amending the 
Rome Statute to add some kind of complaints-resolution mechanism or at least a subforum in which 
these issues could be discussed, and to which non-state parties could bring complaints. While it is 
difficult to imagine the state parties adopting anything beyond a fairly toothless kind of “talk shop,” this 
forum could nonetheless act as a sort of pressure valve, allowing states to engage each other on the 
issues without having recourse to other measures, e.g. claims before the ICJ.” Although a forum where 
States can talk about these issues is always useful, one wonders whether it would be necessary to set up 
a complete new mechanism within the context of the ICC if States have already enough opportunities to 
discuss such matters in existing international fora such as the UN (or in simple bilateral talks). As 
concerns a sort of complaints-resolution mechanism: that indeed does not appear to be achievable as 
States will know beforehand that it can never be truly effective. After all, even if the abducting State 
were to agree with the ultimate complaint of the injured State that the latter’s sovereignty has been 
violated by the male captus and that the suspect must be returned, they both know that the case is now 








One can argue that the above-mentioned view, that the abuse of process doctrine, in 
cases where the tribunal in question is not involved in the male captus, should not be 
limited to serious mistreatment/torture situations and that the ICC may more easily 
refuse jurisdiction in serious male captus situations which are not accompanied by 
serious mistreatment/torture than the ICTY/ICTR because it will probably attach 
more importance to a concept such as State sovereignty,173 does not seem to be 
rejected by the ICC judges. After all, they state that the application of the abuse of 
process doctrine, “to date, (…) has been confined to instances of torture or serious 
mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial State in some way related to the 
process of arrest and transfer of the person to the relevant international criminal 
tribunal [emphasis added and original footnotes omitted ChP][.]”174 However, the 
fact that until October 2006, the application of this doctrine has been restricted to a 
certain situation does not mean that the ICC will also restrict itself to such 
situations.175 
                                                                                                                                              
result of a (political) forum. However, what is important is, of course, that these judges are aware of all 
the facts of the case so that they can issue the most just decision (which may indeed be the final release 
of that suspect). Hence, if a State (whether a State Party or not) is of the opinion that a male captus has 
occurred on its territory and that the ICC judges should know about this violation of its sovereignty (this 
would be especially important if there are indications that the OTP was involved in this violation) the 
ICC should, of course, allow that State to file its views with the ICC so that the judges have all the 
information at their disposal to be able to issue the most just decision. 
173 Related to this point is that the ICC hopefully sees that its model function vis-à-vis national courts 
may even be greater than that of the ICTY and the ICTR (see n. 127 and accompanying text of Chapter 
VI and n. 106 and accompanying text of Chapter VII). See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, ‘Pre-
Trial Rights in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, International Criminal Court Briefing Series, Vol. 
2, No. 3, February 1999, available at: 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/LCHRPreTrialRightsFeb99.pdf, where it is written that the ICC “will 
act as a standard setting mechanism in the interpretation and application of international law and provide 
a model for national authorities in the administration of criminal justice.” See also Stapleton 1999, p. 
546: “Ideologically, one of the purposes of an international tribunal like the ICC is to extend “the rule of 
law and … [to bring] … national courts up to the standards of international law.” International human 
rights and humanitarian conventions are committed to providing an expansive view of rights and to 
extending the rights of individuals so that national governments will follow their example. Allowing the 
ICC, an aggressive enforcer of human rights, to deviate from the minimum international standards for a 
fair trial would undermine the credibility of existing human rights norms. How can a national 
government be expected to follow “minimum” standards for a fair trial if an international tribunal does 
not [original footnote omitted, ChP]?” 
174 See also n. 1276 of Chapter VI. 
175 Cf., for example, the following decisions from 2009: ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. 
Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on the Accused’s Holbrooke Agreement Motion’ (Public), Case No. IT-
95-5/18-PT, 8 July 2009, para. 85: “As for the example of “serious mistreatment” of the accused by a 
third party, such as torture or cruel and/or degrading treatment, there is no indication that the Accused 
suffered such serious mistreatment or that there was any other egregious violation of his rights, 
including his right to political activity [emphasis added and emphasis (of the word “egregious”) in 
original, ChP].” See also ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on 
Karadžić’s Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on Alleged Holbrooke Agreement’ (Public), Case No. 
IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, 12 October 2009, para. 47: “[T]he Trial Chamber adopted the common standard 
established by the Appeals Chamber in the Barayagwiza Decision and in the Nikolić Appeal Decision, 
and not a higher one, by considering whether the Appellant suffered a serious mistreatment or if there 








Before returning to that point, another issue must be addressed, an issue which 
was briefly mentioned in Chapter VI.176 The Pre-Trial Chamber talks about 
“instances of torture or serious mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial 
State in some way related to the process of arrest and transfer of the person to the 
relevant international criminal tribunal [emphasis added and original footnote 
omitted, ChP]”. 
The problem is that under the abuse of process doctrine in the tribunal context, 
the italicised words are not required: the male captus does not need to have been 
committed by national authorities. Jurisdiction can be refused, irrespective of the 
entity responsible: think, for example, of the actions of the private individuals in the 
Nikolić case. However, whether this is a mistake of the Pre-Trial Chamber is not 
clear. On the one hand, it does refer to tribunal cases alone (Nikolić (Appeals 
Chamber), Kajelijeli and Dokmanović) 177 but on the other, the test from the Appeals 
Chamber’s decision in Nikolić case was not very clear (see Subsection 3.1.4 of 
Chapter VI), Kajelijeli involved the actions of State authorities working at the 
behest of the ICTR and the exact paragraphs from the Dokmanović case to which the 
Pre-Trial Chamber refers contain examinations of national cases. (And in the 
national context, the abuse of process doctrine appears to require the involvement of 
authorities which can be linked to the prosecuting forum.) The following does not 
solve this issue either: one could argue that the Pre-Trial Chamber adheres to the 
normal abuse of process doctrine from the tribunal context (not requiring the 
involvement of State authorities) but only applies the specifics of the case before it 
to the theory in question. However, even though a number of quotations from this 
decision can be seen as such,178 this particular quotation cannot, for it is too 
generally formulated. Hence, it is not clear whether the Pre-Trial Chamber would 
refuse jurisdiction irrespective of the entity responsible or whether it would only do 
so in the case of a male captus committed by the national authorities of the custodial 
State.  
                                                                                                                                              
question before the Appeals Chamber is whether, assuming that the Appellant’s factual submission are 
accepted, proceeding with the trial of the Appellant would contravene to the Tribunal’s sense of justice 
or would be detrimental to the Tribunal’s integrity, due to pre-trial impropriety or misconduct 
amounting to serious and egregious violations of the Appellant’s rights.” 
176 See ns. 1216, 1273-1274 and 1276 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
177 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 3 October 2006, 
p. 10, n. 33. See also n. 156. 
178 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 3 October 2006, 
pp. 9 (“[A]ny violations of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s rights in relation to his arrest and detention prior to 
14 March 2006 will be examined by the Court only once it has been established that there has been 
concerted action between the Court and the DRC authorities [original footnote omitted, ChP]”) and 10: 
“[N]o issues has arisen to any alleged act of torture against or serious mistreatment of Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo by the DRC national authorities prior to the transmission of the Court’s Cooperation Request on 








Returning now to the point that the Pre-Trial Chamber had stated that the 
application of the abuse of process doctrine, to date, has been confined to instances 
of torture or serious mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial State in 
some way related to the process of arrest and transfer of the person to the relevant 
international criminal tribunal and that this statement does not mean that the ICC 
will restrict itself to such situations; unfortunately, when the Pre-Trial Chamber 
moved from the theory to the facts of this specific case, it did not more generally 
determine for itself whether the male captus was so serious that jurisdiction had to 
be refused: it only focused on the examples of serious mistreatment/torture and 
concluded 
 
that in the course of the present proceedings under article 19 of the Statute, no issues 
has arisen to any alleged act of torture against or serious mistreatment of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo by the DRC national authorities[179] prior to the transmission of the 
Court’s Cooperation Request on 14 March 2006 to the said authorities[.]180 
 
Now that the abuse of process doctrine could not be relied upon, the judges turned to 
the question of “whether there was concerted action between the Court and the DRC 
authorities in connection with the arrest and detention of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
prior to 14 March 2006 [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.181 Here, the judges 
concluded 
 
that there is no evidence indicating that the arrest and detention of Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo prior to (…) 14 March 2006 was the result of any concerted action between the 
Court and the DRC authorities; and that the Court will therefore not examine the 
lawfulness of the arrest and detention of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo by the DRC 
authorities prior to 14 March 2006[.]182 
 
The final conclusion was thus that Lubanga Dyilo’s challenge to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction was deemed unfounded and consequently dismissed. As the Pre-Trial 
Chamber was only prepared to look at the lawfulness of Lubanga Dyilo’s 
arrest/detention prior to 14 December 2006, if that arrest/detention resulted from 
concerted action between the ICC and the DRC authorities (quod non) and as it was 
only prepared to look beyond that test in the context of the abuse of process doctrine 
(which is focused on the ultimate remedy, refusal of jurisdiction, only), Lubanga 
                                                          
179 In this specific case, in which, for example, no private individuals were involved in the male captus, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber could restrict itself here to the national authorities, see the previous footnote and 
accompanying text. Nevertheless, it is to be recalled that the general abuse of process doctrine from the 
tribunals is not restricted to actions of the national authorities. 
180 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 3 October 2006, 
p. 10. 
181 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 








Dyilo was not granted any other, less far-reaching remedies for his alleged irregular 
arrest/detention in the DRC prior to the official ICC arrest.  
Again, it can be argued that a better method would be for the ICC judges to first 
try to find out exactly what happened to Lubanga Dyilo in the DRC before his 
official ICC arrest and whether the violations, if they did in fact occur, can be seen 
as falling within the context of the ICC case. It may very well be that the judges 
would then still be of the opinion that the violations – if they did occur – cannot be 
seen as falling within the context of the ICC case.183 If that were so, then the ICC 
would not have to remedy the violations. (Of course, the context of an ICC case 
must have some boundaries.) However, in that case, the judges would at least have 
used a test which is arguably fairer than that used now.  
Lubanga Dyilo subsequently filed a confidential appeal, which was followed by 
a confidential response by the Prosecution, observations from the DRC and the 
victims and a reply from the Defence. After that, the long-awaited decision of the 
Appeals Chamber was issued. Although the appeal by the Defence and the response 
by the Prosecution themselves are confidential, the Appeals Chamber summarised 
their contents. Furthermore, publicly available redacted versions of the Defence’s 
appeal184 and the Prosecutor’s response were filed.185 As a result, it is possible to 
examine their (counter)arguments. As many arguments of the Defence and the 
Prosecution have been reviewed supra, this study will, in principle, follow the 
summary of the Appeals Chamber. However, a few interesting observations from 
the Defence’s appeal and the Prosecutor’s response will also be mentioned.  
The appeal of the Defence contained five grounds, namely:  
 
1st ground: Adoption by the Pre-Trial Chamber “of an incorrect legal test for the 
determination as to whether to stay the exercise of jurisdiction over Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo”[;] 2nd ground: Failure of the Chamber “to consider relevant and significant 
                                                          
183 In the Appeals Chamber’s decision, which will be discussed in a moment in the main text, it was 
stated that “[p]rior to his arrest on the authority of the warrant of the Court, Mr. Lubanga Dyilo was held 
in custody by the Congolese authorities for crimes other than those that were found to justify the issue of 
a warrant for his arrest by the Court.” (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court 
pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 
(OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 5.) See also ibid., para. 42: “It is worth reminding that the crimes for 
which Mr. Lubanga Dyilo was detained by the Congolese authority were separate and distinct from 
those which led to the issuance of the warrant for his arrest.” This fact may, of course, play a role in 
determining whether or not any violations in that detention can be seen as falling within the context of 
the ICC case, although it is arguably not the only element which should be taken into account. This 
point will be returned to infra. 
184 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of [the] Congo, In the Case of 
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Defence Appeal against the Decision on the Defence 
Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 26 October 2006. 
185 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to Defence Appeal against the Decision 
on the Defence Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006’ (Public Redacted Document), ICC-01/04-








indicia concerning the relationship between the DRC and the ICC prosecution”[;] 
3[rd] ground: Application by the Chamber of “an incorrect legal standard for assessing 
the relevant law of the DRC in the context of article 59 (2) of the Statute”[;] 4[th] 
ground: Failure of the Chamber “to consider the cumulative effect of the violations of 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s rights”[;] 5[th] ground: Failure of the Chamber “to consider 
whether a lesser remedy would be appropriate” [original footnotes omitted, ChP][.]186 
 
As well as noting that the subject of the fifth ground of appeal was already 
addressed supra, it is interesting to examine a few points mentioned by the Appeals 
Chamber after it had presented these five grounds. The judges explained that the 
Defence had argued, among other things, that  
 
the concept of human rights and the implications of their violations (…) should not be 
viewed statically but from an ever-evolving perspective of the impact of human rights 
violations on judicial proceedings. Reference was made to inter alia the jurisprudence 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the test of “due diligence” adopted 
as the measure of testing the propriety of action of the prosecuting authorities as well 
as the conduct of private actors [original footnotes omitted, ChP].187 
 
These are certainly interesting thoughts which can be seen as additional support for 
the already – so often – expressed idea of this study that the tribunal in question, in 
this case the ICC, should be the ultimate guarantor that violations which take place 
in the context of an ICC case are, ultimately, properly remedied, irrespective of the 
entity responsible for these violations (thus including the actions of private 
individuals).  
Another interesting point made by the Defence was that  
 
[t]orture or serious mistreatment (…) should not be confined to isolated acts but may 
be configured by the cumulative effect of a series of acts involving violations of the 
rights of a person. The appellant depicted inter alia his stay while in custody and the 
conditions of his detention as an act of torture [original footnotes omitted, ChP].188  
 
The Defence here wanted to convince the Appeals Chamber that (the conditions of) 
his detention at the national level amounted to torture, for the simple reason that that 
qualification, torture, is one of the most accepted avenues towards a male detentus 
result. However, and without qualifying Lubanga Dyilo’s detention in the DRC as 
torture, there is no need to prove this. As stated before in this study, serious 
mistreatment or torture is ‘only’ an example of such a serious male captus that 
jurisdiction must be refused. However, it may very well be that judges are of the 
                                                          
186 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
13. 









opinion that a certain male captus is so serious that male detentus must follow, even 
if the male captus was not accompanied by serious mistreatment/torture. And 
indeed, many not so serious violations can cumulate and lead to such a serious male 
captus that jurisdiction must be refused nevertheless, cf. the Barayagwiza case, see 
footnote 875 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. This should, of course, be clear 
if the male captus was executed by staff from the ICC itself, but judges may also 
refuse jurisdiction if the male captus was not executed by authorities which can be 
linked to the ICC, see also the example mentioned after footnote 168 and 
accompanying text.  
A final interesting point mentioned by the Defence was that “[t]he deference by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to national law and the process followed by the Congolese 
authorities in enforcing the arrest warrant was unjustified”.189 Although it appears 
that the ICC quite properly checked whether the official ICC arrest was executed 
correctly – even though it was also noted that it would have been even clearer for it 
to have explicitly addressed the points mentioned in Article 59, paragraph 2 of the 
ICC Statute190 – one can indeed agree with the Defence that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
can be criticised for not examining provisions which arguably must play a role 
within the context of Article 59 of the ICC Statute, namely Article 55, paragraph 1 
(d) of the ICC Statute and Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute.191  
Conversely, the Prosecution supported the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in every 
respect.192 A few interesting remarks from the redacted version of its response 
should definitely be mentioned here. 
First of all, the Prosecutor stressed that, even though the principle that justice 
must be done with full respect for the rights of the suspect/accused should be 
cherished, the ICC is not required to provide a remedy “for violations that occurred 
outside of its jurisdiction, custody or control, and in respect of separate national 
investigations or proceedings”.193 In this context, it also referred, among other 
things, to the scope of Article 55 of the ICC Statute (which only talks about rights in 
the context of an investigation).194 As clarified before, one can argue that, strictly 
speaking, the Prosecutor is right: according to such provisions as Article 21, 
paragraph 3 and Article 55 of the ICC Statute, the ICC must focus on the rights 
which occurred when the ICC exercised jurisdiction in the case/was involved in the 
case (Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute) or when it initiated the 
                                                          
189 Ibid. 
190 See n. 141 and accompanying text. 
191 This point was already made earlier, see n. 143 and accompanying text. 
192 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
15.  
193 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to Defence Appeal against the Decision 
on the Defence Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006’ (Public Redacted Document), ICC-01/04-
01/06, 17 November 2006, para. 7. 








investigation (Article 55 of the ICC Statute). However, it is submitted that the final 
adjudicators, the judges, should determine for themselves whether an irregularity is 
to be seen as falling within the context of their case more generally and hence 
whether it should be remedied. One can reassure the Prosecutor that if the suspect 
was in custody at the national level for other crimes, if the ICC was not yet officially 
involved in the case and if the ICC had not concerted with the authorities 
responsible for violations committed in the context of the suspect’s national 
detention, prior to the initiation of the investigation, judges will not quickly 
determine that these violations can be seen as falling within the context of their case. 
However, neither is it impossible that if the suspect, quite soon after such violations, 
is surrendered to the ICC, which profited from the fact that the suspect was in 
detention at the national level, judges may nevertheless feel that the violations are to 
be seen as falling within the context of their case and thus need to be repaired.195 
This is so, even if the fact that the judges benefited from the fact that he was already 
in detention at the national level does not mean that the ICC is thus also, in a strict 
legal sense, responsible for the violations. (That would, however, be different in the 
case of, for example, acknowledgement and adoption of the conduct as its own,196 
which, in turn, might be more easily to establish if the ICC were to benefit from 
                                                          
195 An analogy can be drawn here to the abuse of process doctrine. If judges are willing to take the 
ultimate responsibility (namely the refusal of jurisdiction) for violations in which the ICC was not 
involved and which are not directly related to the process of arrest and surrender to the ICC – this point 
is not only shared by the Defence (see ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of [the] Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Defence Appeal against the 
Decision on the Defence Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-
01/06, 26 October 2006, para. 21), but also by the Prosecution (see ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
‘Prosecution’s Response to Defence Appeal against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to 
Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006’ (Public Redacted Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 17 November 2006, 
para. 22: “The Prosecution also acknowledges that there is no strict requirement that the violations in 
question necessarily be directly connected with the arrest and surrender process [original footnote 
omitted, ChP]”) – they should also consider less serious violations which can be seen as falling within 
the context of the ICC’s case. Note that the Defence did not agree with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s view 
“that an applicant must always demonstrate that the breach of his rights occurred in connection with 
arrest and transfer proceedings to the international judicial forum, or that each concrete breach must 
amount to torture or other serious mistreatment.” (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of [the] Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
‘Defence Appeal against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006’ 
(Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 26 October 2006, para. 17.) However, one can agree with the 
Prosecution here (see ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the 
Case of The Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to Defence Appeal against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006’ (Public Redacted Document), 
ICC-01/04-01/06, 17 November 2006, para. 23) that this is not what the Pre-Trial Chamber was 
asserting, because the latter did not only use the words “to date” but also the more general words “in 
some way related to”. Hence, it appears that both the Defence, Prosecution and Pre-Trial Chamber share 
the same broad (and welcome) vision in that respect. 
196 Cf. also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of 
The Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to Defence Appeal against the 
Decision on the Defence Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006’ (Public Redacted Document), 








these violations without reviewing whether they have to be seen as falling within the 
context of their case and thus are in need of reparation.)197 If that happened, the 
judges would have to be able to grant remedies, even if the relevant provisions, 
strictly speaking, do not go that far. It is submitted that the final adjudicators of the 
case, the judges, should have the final say in this; they are in the best position to 
determine whether or not the violation can be seen as falling within the context of 
the case and hence needing to be repaired. However, in that case, they must, of 
course, have this test at their disposal, and that is what this study is submitting here. 
One could respond that this broader task would divert the ICC from its main 
objective, which is to fight impunity.198 However, as Chapter IX has already shown, 
the ICC must not only fight impunity, it must do so in a way which respects, among 
other things, international law, due process and human rights, including the right to 
a fair trial. In other words: it must fight impunity fairly. If the judges are of the 
opinion that it is not fair to disregard irregularities which can more generally be seen 
as falling within the context of their case, they must be able to remedy them. In 
addition, it is not to be expected that this broader task will derail the ICC as one can 
expect that judges would normally view irregularities which occur beyond the 
involvement of the ICC as not falling within the context of their case. Furthermore, 
the ICC judges do not stand alone in this task, for they can use the determinations of 
the competent judicial authority as a first indication of how certain irregularities at 
the national level must be assessed.  
Another interesting remark by the Prosecutor is that “[t]he Appellant never 
discusses the implications of the relief that he seeks: that the Court would be ruling 
that the violations of his rights were so severe as to justify granting him impunity for 
the crimes with which he is charged”.199  
However, as already made clear, even though one can assume that the male 
captus of Lubanga Dyilo would not be seen as being that serious that jurisdiction 
must be refused, a refusal of jurisdiction (if it were nevertheless granted) ‘only’ 
means the ending of the case before this institution. However, that does not mean 
that the suspect may not be tried before another court. It does not necessarily lead to 
impunity. While it must be admitted that such an operation may indeed be 
complicated – as was explained earlier,200 the ICC Statute does not contain an 
explicit provision empowering it to transfer suspects to States which can prosecute 
the case when the ICC refuses jurisdiction – the lack of such an explicit provision 
does not mean that the ICC judges, with reference to the ICC’s overarching 
objective to fight impunity, should not do everything in their power to ensure that a 
                                                          
197 See Sluiter 2009, p. 465: “[A] refusal to review the national activities that have benefited the Court 
can with good reason be seen as acceptance of them, and implicates the integrity of international 
proceedings.” 
198 Cf. ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to Defence Appeal against the Decision 
on the Defence Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006’ (Public Redacted Document), ICC-01/04-
01/06, 17 November 2006, para. 25. 
199 Ibid., para. 8. 








case is tried elsewhere if they refuse jurisdiction. In that context, they could perhaps 
make use of a provision such as Rule 185, paragraph 1 of the ICC RPE, see the text 
following footnote 86 and accompanying text of the previous chapter.201  
Inspiration may also be drawn from Rule 215, paragraph 3 of the ICC RPE, even 
if it applies to another situation (namely one in which the ICC had jurisdiction and 
in fact had finished the case against the suspect):  
 
The Presidency may authorize the temporary extradition of the sentenced person to a 
third State for prosecution only if it has obtained assurances which it deems to be 
sufficient that the sentenced person will be kept in custody in the third State and 
transferred back to the State responsible for enforcement of the sentence pronounced 
by the Court, after the prosecution. 
 
Moreover, it must also be stressed that a suspect will normally raise his male captus 
claims before the actual trial starts, meaning that the ‘new’ court’s jurisdiction 
cannot be challenged through a ne bis in idem claim.202  
However, notwithstanding all this, it is, of course, also clear that the inclusion of 
a more specific provision in the ICC rules, comparable with Rule 11 bis of the 
ICTR/ICTY RPE, may be very welcome.  
Another important aspect of the Prosecutor’s response – as will become even 
clearer in the remainder of this book – was the fact that the Prosecution (correctly) 
agreed that “there is power to stop proceedings for abuse of process [original 
footnote omitted, ChP]”.203 Moreover, it also addressed the point of the Defence 
with respect to the deference to the law and procedures of the custodial State (see 
supra) and opined that such deference is implicit from Article 59, paragraph 2 of the 
ICC Statute and reinforced by Article 99, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute.204 As 
                                                          
201 Cf. also Sluiter 2003 C, p. 644 (writing on the (identical) provision of the Draft ICC RPE): 
“According to Paragraph 1 of this provision, a released person may only be transferred to a third state 
for the purpose of prosecution with the consent of the surrendering state [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” 
202 See n. 353 of Chapter VI. 
203 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
15. However, here also, it was not clarified how this doctrine enters the system of the ICC. The 
Prosecution merely stated that “[t]he manner in which the Pre-Trial Chamber exercised its discretion on 
whether in all the circumstances it would constitute an abuse of process to exercise jurisdiction over the 
Appellant was entirely reasonable and consistent with established jurisprudence [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the 
Case of The Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to Defence Appeal against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006’ (Public Redacted Document), 
ICC-01/04-01/06, 17 November 2006, para. 21.) 
204 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 








clarified supra, it is indeed true that the national authorities are, of course, the 
ultimate experts in assessing whether or not the arrest and detention was executed in 
accordance with the proper national laws. Furthermore, it is also true, as submitted 
by the Prosecutor, that, strictly speaking, “[n]either the Prosecutor nor the Court 
bear responsibility or can be held accountable for the detention of the appellant by 
the Congolese authorities or his treatment while in custody”.205 However, this does 
not mean that the ICC should not keep an eye on alleged violations which occur at 
this national level for it is the ICC which must be the ultimate guarantor that 
violations which occur in the context of the ICC case (whether they occur at the 
national level or not) are ultimately properly remedied. 
Finally, the DRC and the victims observed that Lubanga Dyilo’s appeal had to 
be dismissed,206 a point which was, of course, rejected by the Defence in its final 
responses.207  
                                                                                                                                              
for assistance shall be executed in accordance with the relevant procedure under the law of the requested 
State and, unless prohibited by such law, in the manner specified in the request, including following any 
procedure outlined therein or permitting persons specified in the request to be present at and assist in the 
execution process.”) deals with the execution of requests under Artt. 93 and 96 of the ICC Statute (these 
are requests of cooperation other than requests pertaining to arrest and surrender). Perhaps, a reference 
to Art. 89, para. 1 of the ICC Statute (“States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part 
and the procedures under their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender.”) would have 
been more appropriate. However, in the original response, this is better formulated, see ICC, Appeals 
Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor vs. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Prosecution’s Response to Defence Appeal against the Decision on the Defence 
Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006’ (Public Redacted Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 17 
November 2006, para. 51: “The Court’s limited supervisory role in relation to the manner in which 
States perform cooperation tasks is further emphasized by Article 99(1)”. 
205 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
16. 
206 See ibid., para. 17. For more information on the views of the DRC, see [ICC, Appeals Chamber,] 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, ‘Observations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, [ICC-01/04-01/06, 4 December 2006] 
(this is the English translation of the French document of 21 November 2006). Note that the DRC, like 
the Prosecution, also agreed with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s “sufficient explanation of the scope of (…) 
the abuse of process doctrine”. (Ibid., para. 13.) For more information on the views of the victims, see 
ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Observations of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 
with respect to the Defence appeal against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of 
the Court pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Statute’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 22 November 
2006. In these observations, one can find the same arguments with respect to the male captus bene 
detentus maxim as were already used in their first, and not uncriticised, observations, see ns. 105 et seq. 
and accompanying text. 
207 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
18. For more information, see ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of [the] 








It was then up to the Appeals Chamber. In its decision of 14 December 2006, it 
presented the issues it wished to address as follows: 
 
A. The parameters of the jurisdiction of the Court 
B. The doctrine or principle of abuse of process, its ambit and applicability in 
proceedings before the ICC 
C. Article 21 (3) of the Statute, and its relevance to the assumption of 
jurisdiction by the Court in any given case 
D. The validity of the findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber respecting 
a. the absence of wrongdoing on the part of the Prosecutor in the 
detention and sequential treatment of the appellant by the Congolese 
authorities; 
b. the absence of evidence of mistreatment, grave or otherwise, of the 
appellant; and 
c. the application of article 59 (2) of the Statute.208 
 
Starting with issue A, the judges explained that  
 
the conclusion to which the Appeals Chamber is driven is that the application of Mr. 
Lubanga Dyilo and the proceedings following do not raise a challenge to the 
jurisdiction of the Court within the compass of article 19 (2) of the Statute. What the 
appellant sought was that the Court should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction in 
                                                                                                                                              
the Government of the Democratic Republic of [the] Congo’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 27 
November 2006 and ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of [the] Congo, In 
the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Defence Reply to the Observations of the 
Victims’ Representatives’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 28 November 2006. It may be 
interesting to note that in this last response, the Defence noted “that the Prosecution concurred with the 
Defence that the arguments submitted by the victims’ representatives pertaining to the doctrine of male 
captus bene detentus were misconceived [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid., para. 7.) As this 
Prosecution’s response is confidential (see (the text preceding) n. 131 and accompanying text), the 
accuracy of this point of the Defence cannot be assessed. However, if it is indeed true, then it can be 
seen as support for the criticism which this study vented against the observations of the victims on these 
matters, see ns. 105 et seq. and accompanying text. A final interesting point is that the Defence also 
referred to the words of Arbour which were already mentioned in ns. 23-24 of Chapter I of this book, 
see also the final words of n. 878 of Chapter VI. In those footnotes, one can read that Arbour argued that 
terrorism suspects “are being arrested, detained and interrogated with no apparent intention of bringing 
them to trial. And I say ‘with no apparent intention of bringing them to trial’ because the circumstances 
of their arrest, detention and interrogation – take only the length of their detention – would in any 
credible jurisdiction amount to such an abuse of process that trial jurisdiction, if it ever existed, could 
never be exercised.” Although one can doubt that Arbour would also agree with the Defence that 
Lubanga Dyilo had to be released by the ICC because of his alleged irregular detention in the DRC, one 
must not forget either that in principle, any circumstance (such as, indeed, a long irregular pre-trial 
detention), and not only serious mistreatment/torture, can lead to a refusal of jurisdiction, as long as the 
judges find this male captus so serious that it would undermine the integrity of the Court to continue 
with the case nonetheless. 
208 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 









the matter in hand. Its true characterization may be identified as a sui generis 
application, an atypical motion, seeking the stay of the proceedings, acceptance of 
which would entail the release of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo.209   
 
As already made clear in Chapter VIII (see footnote 141 and accompanying text of 
that chapter), it is true that, strictly speaking, a suspect who files a challenge to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC because of his serious male captus, is not claiming that the 
ICC has no jurisdiction but that it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction. 
However, one should not focus too strongly on this difference. After all, if the Court 
indeed decides to follow the suspect’s claim and to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, 
the Court’s jurisdiction ratione personae over that person is permanently lost.210 
This means that if the Prosecutor nevertheless wants to restart the trial, the Court 
would say that it has no jurisdiction ratione personae because it cannot try this 
person, in the same way as the ICC would state that it has no jurisdiction ratione 
temporis if it is confronted by crimes committed before 1 July 2002. Hence, because 
the result of the suspect’s challenge, if it succeeds, would lead to a loss of 
jurisdiction ratione personae, it is perfectly understandable that not only the 
Defence, but also the Prosecution211 and the Pre-Trial Chamber212 were of the 
opinion that this application of Lubanga Dyilo (seemingly) constituted a challenge 
to the ICC’s jurisdiction under Article 19 of the ICC Statute.  
One can assert that if the ICC were to dismiss a challenge purely because it 
cannot, strictly speaking, be seen as a challenge to the ICC’s jurisdiction, this would 
constitute a violation of the suspect’s right to challenge the lawfulness of his 
arrest/detention, a crucial right213 which is covered by Article 21, paragraph 3 of the 
ICC Statute. 
Be that as it may, the Appeals Chamber was of the opinion that the challenge 
could not be seen as a challenge to the ICC’s jurisdiction and that the sui generis 
application of Lubanga Dyilo could only survive if the ICC is “vested with 
jurisdiction under the Statute or endowed with inherent power to stop judicial 
proceedings where it is just to do so”.214 It then explained that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber had 
 
                                                          
209 Ibid., para. 24. 
210 See also n. 102 and accompanying text: “For the reasons previously set out, the Court, within the 
context of its supervisory powers, could not endorse a violation of the Accused’s fundamental rights by 
continuing to exercise its jurisdiction over him. In this respect, the Court no longer has personal 
jurisdiction over the applicant.”  
211 See ns. 58-60 and accompanying text. 
212 See ns. 144 and 180 and accompanying text. 
213 It is to be recalled – see Subsection 2.2.5 of Chapter III – that this right has customary international 
law/general international law status and cannot even be derogated from in times of emergency and war. 
214 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 









identified two related grounds, as may be summarized, that might provide 
justification to refuse to exercise jurisdiction in a case brought before it: a) abuse of 
process and b) serious violations of the rights of the suspect or the accused, resulting 
from “concerted action” between the Prosecutor and the DRC, derailing the process to 
an extent making it antagonistic to the ends of justice to put him/her on trial.215 
 
To this one could, of course, also add serious violations which occur in the context 
of an arrest/detention at the request/behest of the ICC/the ICC’s constructive 
custody, when the ICC has sent its official requests, but perhaps, the Appeals 
Chamber views this as a form of “concerted action” between the ICC and the 
executing authorities. 
The judges started with the abuse of process doctrine and thus moved to issue B. 
They first of all noted that abuse of process “is a principle evolved by English case 
law constituting a feature of the common law adopted in many countries where this 
system of law finds application”.216 The doctrine/principle217 was then further 
explained with help of case law, such as the already discussed cases of Bennett, 
Hartley, Ebrahim,218 Levinge and – as an exception to Alvarez-Machain – 
Toscanino.219 
However, the Appeals Chamber also opined that “[t]he doctrine of abuse or 
process as known to English law finds no application in the Romano-Germanic 
systems of law”.220  
Nevertheless, as previously explained, although the concept of ‘abuse of process’ 
as such may not be used by courts in the civil law system, it appears that also in this 
system (as in mixed systems incidentally),221 judges can refuse jurisdiction if they 
are confronted by such a serious male captus that it would undermine the integrity 
of the court if they were to nonetheless continue with the case.222 The Appeals 
                                                          
215 Ibid., para. 25.   
216 Ibid., para. 26. 
217 The judges noted on this point that “[a]buse of process is a principle associated with the 
administration of justice, referred to as a doctrine because of wide adherence to the principle involved 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].” (Ibid.) 
218 Note that the South African legal system is a mixture of civil law and common law, see n. 650 of 
Chapter V. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber also referred to a case from Cyprus, whose legal system 
is also a mixture of common and civil law, see JuriGlobe’s ‘Alphabetical Index of the Political Entities 
and Corresponding Legal Systems’, available at: http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/index-alpha.php.  
219 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, paras. 
29 and 32. 
220 Ibid., para. 33. 
221 See, for example, the systems of South Africa and Cyprus, to which the Appeals Chamber itself 
refers, see n. 218. Cf. also the Zimbabwean case Beahan and the reasoning of Acting Justice of Appeal 
O’Linn in the Namibian case Mushwena. 









Chamber’s subsequent explanation as to why the doctrine finds no application in the 
romano-germanic systems of law is not terribly convincing. It stated: 
 
The principle encapsulated in the Latin maxim male captus bene detentus has 
received favourable reception in the French case of re Argoud but not an enthusiastic 
one in the old case of re [Jolis]. The German Constitutional Court too appears to have 
endorsed like principles to those approved in re Argoud. But where serious violations 
of the fundamental rights of the accused or international law are involved, the rule is 
mitigated [original footnotes omitted, ChP].223 
 
The Appeals Chamber explains here that it appears that the German Constitutional 
Court also accepts the male captus bene detentus rule, except for the situation where 
serious violations of the fundamental rights of the accused or international law are 
involved. In that case, the (male captus bene detentus) rule is mitigated.  
Before commenting on the abuse of process point, it should be noted that the use 
of the word “mitigated” can be seen as something of an understatement of what the 
German Federal Constitutional Court really decided in the case to which the 
Appeals Chamber refers, the previously discussed Al-Moayad case. After all, in that 
case, the German Federal Constitutional Court held:    
 
In this context, it need not be decided whether a national obstacle precluding criminal 
proceedings or extradition results from customary international law if the prosecuted 
person has been taken from his or her state of origin to the state of the forum or to the 
requested state by use of force. Admittedly, more recent state practice, in particular as 
a consequence of dealing with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Alvarez-
Machain case (…) indicates that the principle male captus, bene detentus is rejected 
at any rate if the state of the forum got hold of the prosecuted person by committing 
serious human rights violations, and if the state whose territorial sovereignty was 
violated protested against such procedure (…).224 
 
Hence, the Constitutional Court is arguably of the opinion that more recent State 
practice indicates that male captus bene detentus is rejected at any rate in the case 
of 1) an abduction accompanied by serious human rights violations or 2) an 
abduction followed by a protest from the injured State. Thus, according to the 
German judges, in those two situations, more recent State practice indicates that 
male captus bene detentus is rejected and jurisdiction refused.  
Returning to the abuse of process point now, even though the German Court 
does not use this term here, it does hold that judges in general (“more recent state 
                                                          
223 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
33. 








practice”) refuse jurisdiction in two very serious male captus cases.225 It can be 
argued that there is no substantive difference between a common law judge refusing 
jurisdiction under the abuse of process doctrine and a judge from another law 
system who, without perhaps using the explicit label ‘abuse of process’, or another 
label such as ‘supervisory powers’,226 refuses jurisdiction in exactly the same 
manner because he is confronted by such a serious male captus that he feels that he 
cannot proceed with the case without undermining the integrity of the court/his 
sense of justice. In the words of Oehmichen: “Im Ergebnis folgt das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht damit in Fällen völkerrechtswidriger gewaltsamer 
Entführung der „abuse of process-Doktrin,“”.227   
Of course, the test leading to a refusal of jurisdiction may differ from State to 
State (the male detentus test of cases like Bennett, Hartley, Ebrahim and Levinge is 
far lower (and arguably better) than the test mentioned here by the German Court, 
although it must also be borne in mind that this is a test by which male captus bene 
detentus is rejected at any rate, which means that courts can also use a lower 
threshold), but one can expect that any judge will refuse jurisdiction if he is of the 
opinion that the male captus is so serious that he can, in good conscience, no longer 
proceed with the case.228 
If even in the State which is so often seen as the champion of male captus bene 
detentus, the US, it appears that judges would refuse jurisdiction in certain serious 
male captus situations,229 one can expect that judges in France (to also address that 
point made by the Appeals Chamber) would similarly refuse jurisdiction in certain 
serious male captus situations, even if their male detentus test may be stricter than in 
other States.230  
                                                          
225 Note, by the way, that the ICC’s Appeals Chamber, when arguing that “[t]he German Constitutional 
Court too appears to have endorsed like principles to those approved in re Argoud [original footnote 
omitted, ChP]”, referred to, among other things, the Stocké case, hereby not mentioning that this case 
also contains exceptions to the male captus bene detentus rule, see ns. 505, 512, 516-517 and 
accompanying text of Chapter V. 
226 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 76: “Closely related to the abuse of process doctrine is the 
notion of supervisory powers. It is generally recognised that courts have supervisory powers that may be 
utilised in the interests of justice, regardless of a specific violation.” 
227 Oehmichen 2007, p. 237. 
228 See again n. 222. 
229 See n. 206 and accompanying text of Chapter V and n. 23 and accompanying text of Chapter VII (the 
Toscanino case). This point was also explicitly recognised by the ICC’s Appeals Chamber, see ICC, 
Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision 
on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 
October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 32: “In the 
United States of America, the doctrine of abuse of process has had a mixed reception, recognising on the 
one hand its existence but confining its application within very narrow straits [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” (The Appeals Chamber refers here to Toscanino and Alvarez-Machain.) 
230 In Chapter V (see n. 402 and accompanying text of that chapter), it was explained that Argoud 
appears to support the idea that even if there would be a clear-cut violation of international law (which, 
it is reminded, was not the case in Argoud as it was not clearly established that his abduction was carried 








The judges then asked themselves the question as to whether “the principle or 
doctrine of abuse of process find application under the Statute as part of the 
applicable law and in particular under the provisions of article 21 (1) (b) and (c)”.231  
First of all, it must be noted that the fact that the judges of the Appeals Chamber, 
in contrast to their colleagues at the Pre-Trial Chamber232 and other participants,233 
examine to what extent the abuse of process doctrine falls within the ICC’s system 
of applicable law (Article 21 of the ICC Statute) should be applauded.  
Now, the abuse of process doctrine cannot be found, as such, in the ICC Statute: 
“Abuse of process is not listed as a ground for relinquishing jurisdiction”234 under 
the ICC Statute. However, this does not mean that the ICC does not have the power 
to refuse jurisdiction in very serious male captus situations. It was discussed earlier 
in the present chapter that, as explained in Chapter IX of this book, the reasoning 
behind this doctrine, namely that courts have a discretion to refuse jurisdiction in 
certain serious male captus cases (one should not focus too much on the common 
law label ‘abuse of process’ here) can perhaps be seen as a principle/rule of 
international law pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) of the ICC Statute or 
otherwise as general principle of law derived by the Court from national laws of 
legal systems of the world pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute. 
In addition, because so many (inter)national courts seem to recognise this power, it 
could be held that it is an inherent power of any court. That would mean that the 
ICC would also have this inherent power.  
However, the judges – arguably focusing too much on the specific label ‘abuse 
of process’ – did not concur. The Appeals Chamber held that it  
 
shall not examine the implications of article 4 (1) of the Statute[235] for under no 
circumstances can it be construed as providing power to stay proceedings for abuse of 
process. The power to stay proceedings for abuse of process, as indicated, is not 
                                                                                                                                              
Germany), the Court would still be of the opinion that the international law problem had to be solved by 
the Governments of the two States involved. (In that sense, Argoud goes clearly further than other courts 
which may already refuse jurisdiction in such a situation.) However, one can only guess how a modern 
French judge (note that the French Court of Cassation issued its decision in Argoud on 4 June 1964) 
would have reacted if it was established that Argoud had indeed been kidnapped by French State agents 
and, in the course of his abduction, had moreover been seriously mistreated by those agents. 
231 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
34. 
232 See n. 161 and accompanying text. 
233 See the text following n. 54 and accompanying text, n. 101 and accompanying text and n. 203. 
234 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
34. 
235 This provision states: “The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall also have such 








generally recognised as an indispensable power of a court of law, an inseverable 
attribute of the judicial power.236  
 
The Appeals Chamber concluded that “the Statute does not provide for stay of 
proceedings for abuse of process as such”237 and noted that Article 21, paragraph 1 
(b) and (c) of the ICC Statute did not have to be looked to since paragraph (a) of that 
provision was exhaustive on the matter.238  
Clearly, this study does not agree with this conclusion. It seems far too easy to 
conclude that the ICC Statute is exhaustive on the matter simply because the abuse 
of process doctrine is not explicitly mentioned or implicitly covered (via – the 
seemingly irrelevant239 – Article 4, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute) by the ICC 
instruments.240 The judges do not seriously review other relevant provisions which 
                                                          
236 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
35. 
237 Ibid. 
238 See ibid., para. 34. The judges referred here to ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, ‘Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-
Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 
13 July 2006, a decision which was already discussed in the previous chapter. 
239 This provision appears to focus on very different issues, see Rückert 2008, p. 124: “This standard 
provision clarifies that the Court shall possess at the municipal level the legal capacity essential for it to 
carry out its functions. This provision makes it incumbent upon the States Parties to ensure that the ICC 
enjoys such legal status under national law as may be necessary for it to perform its functions. (…) The 
legal capacity of the ICC, however, extends only as far as the purpose and functioning of the ICC 
requires. Here, the functional limitation of the legal capacity is explicitly provided for in the Statute. 
Article 2 of the Draft Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the ICC illustrates the extent of the 
Court’s legal capacity. According to this provision on the legal status and juridical personality of the 
Court, it shall in particular have the capacity to contract, to acquire and to dispose of immovable and 
movable property and to participate in legal proceedings [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” However, 
the fact that the abuse of process power cannot be seen as an inherent power under this (seemingly 
irrelevant) provision does not mean that the ICC does not have such an inherent power nonetheless. 
240 Cf. also the comparable criticism of Manning (2007, p. 837) who states: “The decision (…) 
concludes its dizzying survey by stopping short of determining whether the abuse of process doctrine 
merits status as a genuine general principle of law, which the Court might rightfully derive from 
national laws of the legal systems of the world. The decision leaves the question unanswered because 
the Statute’s treatment of jurisdiction is found to be “exhaustive.” Thus “no room is left for recourse to 
the second or third source of law.” This conclusion is confusing because it renders the three previous 
pages of the decision irrelevant. It is surprising because it is made in the absence of any reference to the 
drafting history to suggest that the omission of authority to decline jurisdiction was deliberate [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” Although this study does concur with the last point, it does not agree with 
Manning’s remark that “[t]his conclusion is confusing because it renders the three previous pages of the 
decision irrelevant.” After all, the ICC’s examination of the cases was arguably not made in the context 
of Art. 21, para. 1 (b) or (c) of the ICC Statute, even if the judges asked themselves whether “the 
principle or doctrine of abuse of process find application under the Statute as part of the applicable law 
and in particular under the provisions of article 21 (1) (b) and (c) [emphasis added, ChP]?” (see n. 231 
and accompanying text), but in the context of Art. 21, para. 1 (a) of the ICC Statute: to show that the 
ICC Statute, which does not explicitly recognise the doctrine, does not implicitly recognise the doctrine 








might shed light on the question of whether the ICC has power to issue a male 
detentus verdict in the case of a serious male captus, taking into account the rules of 
interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (as was done in 
Chapter IX of this book). A more extensive review arguably shows that Article 21, 
paragraph 1 (a) of the ICC Statute, taking into account Article 21, paragraph 3 of the 
ICC Statute, is not exhaustive on the matter and thus that one can turn to Article 21, 
paragraph 1 (b) and (c) of the ICC Statute to fill this legal lacuna. And as argued in 
Chapter IX, the power of a court to refuse jurisdiction in the case of a serious male 
captus might be seen as a principle/rule of international law pursuant to Article 21, 
paragraph 1 (b) of the ICC Statute (namely as practice of international courts) or as 
a general principle of law pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute. 
In addition, because the power of a court to refuse jurisdiction in very serious male 
captus cases, without looking at the exact label of this power (such as abuse of 
process/supervisory powers), is used by so many (inter)national courts, it could be 
seen as an inherent power of any court, including of the ICC.  
The judges then turned to issue C, Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute. 
They noted that, even though the abuse of process doctrine as such could not be 
found in the ICC Statute, the doctrine  
 
had ab initio a human rights dimension in that the causes for which the power of the 
Court to stay or discontinue proceedings were largely associated with breaches of the 
rights of the litigant, the accused in the criminal process, such as delay, illegal or 
deceitful conduct on the part of the prosecution and violations of the rights of the 
accused in the process of bringing him/her to justice.241 
 
And that aspect of the doctrine, the human rights dimension, was obviously covered 
by the ICC Statute, as can be discerned from provisions such as Articles 55 and 67 
of the ICC Statute and, most importantly, Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute, 
which “requires the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with 
internationally recognized human rights norms”.242 Before continuing with the 
reasoning of the ICC judges, it must be noted that this last point can be seen as 
support for the interpretation at footnotes 246-247 and accompanying text of 
Chapter IX, namely that Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute covers any 
situation in which the ICC exercises jurisdiction/any case in which the ICC is 
involved, including the pre-trial actions from third parties, for example, when 
arrests/detentions are made at the behest of the ICC. This view arguably also 
comports with the position of the Pre-Trial Chamber that the scope of Article 21, 
paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute extends to constructive custody/arrest/detention at 
the request/behest of the ICC and to “concerted action” between the ICC and third 
                                                          
241 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 










parties. This, of course, covers quite a considerable part of the context of the ICC 
case and that is to be welcomed. However, as there may always occur situations 
which do not fall within such concepts, but which are nevertheless to be seen as 
falling within the context of an ICC case, it would be better and fairer for the ICC to 
go even beyond those concepts and to repair any violations which occur in the 
context of its case more generally.243  
Returning to the words of the ICC judges, the following eloquent statement was 
then made: 
 
Human rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it, including the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Its provisions must be interpreted and more importantly 
applied in accordance with internationally recognized human rights; first and 
foremost, in the context of the Statute,[244] the right of a fair trial, a concept broadly 
perceived and applied, embracing the judicial process in its entirety.[245] The Statute 
itself makes evidence obtained in breach of internationally recognized human rights 
inadmissible in the circumstances specified by article 69 (7) of the Statute.[246] Where 
fair trial becomes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of the 
suspect or the accused by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to put 
the person on trial. Justice could not be done. A fair trial is the only means to do 
justice. If no fair trial can be held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated and 
the process must be stopped [original footnotes omitted, ChP].247   
                                                          
243 See also n. 32 and accompanying text (with respect to Art. 55 of the ICC Statute). 
244 Here, the judges referred to, among other things, Art. 64, para. 2 of the ICC Statute (“The Trial 
Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights 
of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses”) and Art. 67, para. 1 of the 
ICC Statute. See for this latter provision (and the argument that it applies in the pre-trial phase as well) 
ns. 201 and 261 of Chapter VIII and n. 45 of Chapter IX. See finally ns. 44, 96 and 242 and 
accompanying text of the present chapter. 
245 It may be interesting to note that the judges referred here to Nowak 1993, p. 244, see also n. 194 and 
accompanying text of Chapter III. 
246 See n. 265 of Chapter IX. 
247 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
37. Note this refusal of jurisdiction would, of course, be the final ending of the case before the ICC. It 
was already discussed in Chapter III that a stay of the proceedings may be lifted (as happened in another 
decision of the Lubanga Dyilo case, decided some two years after this one, see n. 623 of Chapter III) but 
that would only be possible with regard to irregularities which can truly be repaired. However, certain 
male captus situations are so serious that they can no longer be fixed. In such cases, the judges will 
permanently stay the proceedings/refuse jurisdiction as a remedy. See also ICC, Appeals Chamber, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
‘Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on 
the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and 
the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the 
Status Conference on 10 June 2008”’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, 21 October 2008, 
paras. 79-80: “The above statements in the Judgment of 14 December 2006 [here, the Appeals Chamber 
referred to paras. 37 and 39 of the 14 December 2006 decision, ChP] were made in the context of 
allegations by the appellant in that case that he had been illegally detained and ill-treated by the 








First of all, one should welcome the broad (pre-trial) interpretation the ICC gives 
here to a fair trial. This point was already suggested in Chapter IX (see footnote 248 
and accompanying text of that chapter) but it is very good to see that the ICC shares 
this position. However, one should not be dazzled by these beautiful words.248 After 
all, the male detentus test states that “[w]here fair trial becomes impossible because 
of breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect or the accused by his/her 
accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to put the person on trial [emphasis 
added, ChP]”. The words “by his/her accusers” typically seems to refer to the ICC 
(Prosecution), which obviously includes concerted action between the ICC and third 
parties.249 Given the information provided in the previous pages, one can arguably 
also include here violations committed by third parties working at the behest of the 
ICC.  
However, what if the President of State A (a State Party to the ICC), who has 
called upon the international community for months to arrest a certain suspect from 
State B (a non-State Party to the ICC) who keeps committing serious international 
crimes in State A, is frustrated by the inaction of the international community and 
                                                                                                                                              
contravention of the rights of the appellant. The nature of the allegations was such that, if established, 
the breaches of the rights of the appellant might have led to an objectively irreparable and incurable 
situation. Accordingly, the Judgment of 14 December 2006 envisaged that a stay of proceedings 
imposed on such a basis would be absolute and permanent. The Judgment of 14 December 2006, 
however, did not rule out the imposition of a conditional stay of proceedings in suitable circumstances. 
If the unfairness to the accused person is of such nature that – at least theoretically – a fair trial might 
become possible at a later stage because of a change in the situation that led to the stay, a conditional 
stay of the proceedings may be the appropriate remedy. Such a conditional stay is not entirely 
irreversible: if the obstacles that led to the stay of the proceedings fall away, the Chamber that imposed 
the stay may decide to lift it in appropriate circumstances and if this would not occasion unfairness to 
the accused person for other reasons, in particular in light of his or her right to be tried without undue 
delay (see article 67 (1) (c) of the Statute). If a trial that is fair in all respects becomes possible as a 
result of changed circumstances, there would be no reason not to put on trial a person who is accused of 
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes – deeds which must not go unpunished and for which 
there should be no impunity (see paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Preamble to the Statute).” 
248 Cf. also Sluiter 2009, p. 465. 
249 Cf. also the following references under issue C of the decision: “The doctrine of abuse of process had 
ab initio a human rights dimension in that the causes for which the power of the Court to stay or 
discontinue proceedings were largely associated with breaches of the rights of the litigant, the accused in 
the criminal process, such as delay, illegal or deceitful conduct on the part of the prosecution and 
violations of the rights of the accused in the process of bringing him/her to justice [emphasis added, 
ChP].” (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
36.) See also ibid., para. 38, the paragraph immediately following the quotation mentioned at n. 247 and 
accompanying text: “The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Case of Teixeira de 
Castro v. Portugal, a case of entrapment by undercover agents, provides an example of serious breaches 
of the rights of the accused by the investigating authorities, rendering the holding of a fair trial 
impossible. The following passage from the judgment puts the matter in perspective as to the 
implications that such conduct may have on the holding of a fair trial. Improper conduct by the 
investigating authorities and the use of evidence resulting therefrom “in the impugned criminal 
proceedings meant that, right from the outset, the applicant was definitively deprived of a fair trial.” 








orders the kidnapping of the suspect (at a moment when that suspect was back in 
State B) – a kidnapping which was accompanied by mistreatment (albeit not serious 
mistreatment)250 and followed by a protest and request for the return of the suspect 
from State B. State A ignores these protests and subsequently places the suspect in 
detention. The ICC, which was already making initial inquiries to find out whether a 
proper investigation could be initiated, now requests the arrest and surrender of the 
suspect from State A which subsequently surrenders the suspect to The Hague.251 
Such a male captus may be deemed by judges to be so serious (note that the ICC 
judges will probably attach more weight to an abduction (followed by a protest and 
request for the return of the suspect, see supra)) and falling within the context of the 
ICC case, even if the ICC was not yet formally involved in the case, that jurisdiction 
must be refused. Under the abuse of process doctrine advocated in this study (which 
merely demands such a serious male captus in the context of an ICC case that 
judges, in good conscience, can no longer continue with the case), this would not 
have constituted any problem. However, under the above-mentioned ICC test, this 
would not be possible. After all, the violations did not occur at a time when the ICC 
was involved in the case, cannot be seen as being executed “by his/her accusers” 
(the abduction was not executed by State A on behalf of the ICC). In addition, and 
this point was already briefly made at the end of the previous chapter, under the 
abuse of process doctrine, violations of State sovereignty (and of other values such 
as the rule of law more generally) can easily be taken into account, whereas one can 
question whether this would also be possible under the ICC test, which only focuses 
on human rights violations.252 In another scenario, one could replace the kidnappers 
of State A with private individuals. Here, an additional problem could arise. Even if 
the judges, using the above-mentioned test, accept that those private individuals can 
be seen as “his/her accusers”, one or more of them may be of the opinion that 
private individuals simply cannot violate internationally recognised human rights 
(or the sovereignty of another State).253 In that case, jurisdiction cannot be refused, 
                                                          
250 The serious mistreatment/torture issue is complicated and will be separately addressed infra. 
251 See also Currie 2007, pp. 383-384. (See also n. 50 of Chapter I.) 
252 See also the problems identified by Currie (ibid., p. 393) in that respect: “[I]n rejecting the use of the 
abuse of process doctrine the Appeals Chamber has taken a distinctly different tack on its powers than 
that taken by the ICTY and ICTR. On the whole, by way of a strict interpretation of its powers regarding 
jurisdiction and process, the Court may have painted itself into a corner on the abduction issue. If it has 
no access to abuse of process powers, then the justiciability of sovereignty violations in the 
apprehension of an accused (as opposed to human rights violations) is in doubt. Yet, as argued above, a 
failure by the Court to deal with this issue when presented is likely to wreak havoc. A possible solution 
is to treat the sovereignty violation as a human rights issue. If an individual is abducted in state A by 
officials/agents of state B, then the arresting parties are acting illegally under the laws of state A and the 
apprehension itself amounts to, in human rights terms, an arbitrary detention or illegal deprivation of 
liberty. This is a workable solution that nonetheless leaves the inter-state conflict outside the Court’s 
purview, and will only cover some situations. Alternatively, perhaps the answer lies in the inherent 
powers of the Court to which the Appeals Chamber briefly averred, but this is currently far from clear.” 
253 See Subsection 3.2 of Chapter III. Currie has a simple solution in that respect, see ibid., p. 389: “In a 
Nikolić-type situation where the fugitive was “apprehended” by persons unknown who have no provable 








whereas this would, in principle, be unproblematic under the broad abuse of process 
doctrine, which merely demands that judges have to assess whether the male captus 
is so serious that jurisdiction must be refused.254  
However, the criticism does not stop here. The test itself is not clear either. After 
all, two paragraphs later, the judges state: “Where the breaches of the rights of the 
accused are such as to make it impossible for him/her to make his/her defence 
within the framework of his[/her] rights, no fair trial can take place and the 
proceedings can be stayed.”255 First of all, there is a clear difference between the 
obligation to stop the proceedings in the first formulation of the test (“If no fair trial 
can be held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated and the process must be 
stopped [emphasis added, ChP]”) and the discretion mentioned in the second 
formulation of the test, where it is explained that if no fair trial can take place, “the 
proceedings can be stayed [emphasis added, ChP]”. However, more importantly, 
although the first formulation (correctly) appears to acknowledge that certain 
violations of the fundamental rights of the suspect can already entail that one can no 
longer speak of a fair trial (in the broad sense of the word), the second formulation 
seemingly demands more, namely that the violations of the accused have to be “such 
as to make it impossible for him/her to make his/her defence within the framework 
of his[/her] rights”. Hence, only if those violations are such as to entail the accused 
no longer being able to mount his defence, one can say that no fair trial can be held. 
This reasoning, which was also identified in the ICTY Karadžić case,256 can be 
criticised as it can be seen as a return to the old-fashioned concept of a fair trial, 
focusing on the fair trial in the courtroom.257 Under this formulation, the accused 
                                                                                                                                              
order to dispense with any argument as to whether the accused enjoys human rights vis-à-vis private 
actors [original footnote omitted, ChP]”. 
254 See also n. 738 of Chapter VI. 
255 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
39. 
256 See ns. 727 and 733 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. For another more recent case, one could 
perhaps also refer here to the French case of Carlos the Jackal (Ramirez Sánchez), where the French 
Supreme Court agreed with the following statement of the Court of Appeal: “Moreover, case-law also 
provides that the circumstances in which someone, against whom proceedings are lawfully being taken 
and against whom a valid arrest warrant has been issued, has been apprehended and handed over to the 
French legal authorities are not in themselves sufficient to render the proceedings void, provided that 
they have not vitiated the search for and process of establishing the truth, nor made it impossible for the 
defence to exercise its rights before the investigating authorities and the trial courts.” See ns. 535 and 
537 and accompanying text of Chapter V. See also, but arguably to a lesser extent, the Barbie case, see 
n. 496 and accompanying text of the same chapter.  
257 This also clearly contradicts the Appeals Chamber’s earlier and welcome words on “the right of a fair 
trial, a concept broadly perceived and applied, embracing the judicial process in its entirety”, see n. 245 
and accompanying text. See also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, ‘Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 
31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 13 July 2006, para. 
11: “The principles of a fair trial are not confined to trial proceedings but extend to pre-trial proceedings 








may suffer very serious violations, but if he is still able, in spite of these violations, 
to make his defence, the ICC could conclude that a fair trial can still take place. 
However, in such a case, the judges should consider whether the serious violations 
as such are not already so serious that one can no longer speak of a fair trial in 
general/that it would be unfair to have a trial in the first place/that it would 
undermine the integrity of the Court to proceed258 and thus that jurisdiction must be 
refused, whether or not the accused is still able to make his defence. In that respect, 
the subsequent words of the ICC judges are to be welcomed – also because they 
emphasise the importance of a fair trial to anyone, even to persons charged with 
very serious crimes – but they arguably do not comport with the idea mentioned in 
the second formulation: 
 
Unfairness in the treatment of the suspect or the accused may rupture the process to 
an extent making it impossible to piece together the constituent elements of a fair 
trial. In those circumstances, the interest of the world community to put persons 
accused of the most heinous crimes against humanity on trial, great as it is, is 
outweighed by the need to sustain the efficacy of the judicial process as the potent 
agent of justice.259  
 
Another point concerning (what could be seen as) the third formulation of the male 
detentus test should be mentioned. These words (and see also the words mentioned 
at footnotes 241 and 255 and accompanying text) show that the Appeals Chamber 
seems mostly concerned with the violations as such and not with the question as to 
whether these violations were, for example, committed intentionally or not.260 This 
                                                                                                                                              
(c) of the Statute. Breach of or deviation from the rules of a fair trial at the pre-trial stage of the 
proceedings may have implications on the proceedings and may affect the outcome of the trial. Purging 
the pre-trial process of errors consequential in the above sense is designed as a safeguard for the 
integrity of the proceedings.” Cf. finally the words of Sluiter in n. 246 of Chapter IX or in n. 276 of the 
present chapter.  
258 In the words of Choo 1994 B, p. 629, commenting on the Bennett case: “Central to the decision of the 
House of Lords was the notion that a criminal court should not be concerned solely with accurate fact-
finding or, to put it another way, the determination of the ‘truth.’ A court also has a duty to protect the 
moral integrity of the criminal process.” It appears that Groenhuijsen and Knigge also focus on this 
broad concept of a fair trial. They state (see Groenhuijsen and Knigge 2004, p. 154 or n. 617 of Chapter 
III) that the inadmissibility of the Prosecution is especially then the appropriate answer when the non-
compliance entails that one can no longer speak of a fair trial and that the question is not whether the 
non-compliance seriously violates the principles of proper procedure but whether initiating or 
continuing a prosecution in spite of such non-compliance would violate fundamental principles of law. 
In this context, they note the emergence of a suspect’s right to a fair trial and the principle of fair 
balancing as central criteria. 
259 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
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may be viewed as a rather broad stance as other courts have often demanded, in their 
male detentus test, an intention on the part of the prosecuting authorities to commit 
the male captus.261 Nevertheless, even though the ICC does not explicitly demand 
an intent, it seems clear that it requires serious violations – cf. the words “[w]here 
fair trial becomes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of the 
suspect or the accused by his/her accusers” – and that it is very well possible that the 
ICC may only view those violations which are committed intentionally (note, by the 
way, that some male captus situations, such as an abduction, can arguably not be 
committed unintentionally)262 as serious violations which can lead to the ending of 
the case.263 In any case, one can assume that the ICC will more readily refuse 
jurisdiction if the violations are committed intentionally, even if its test does not 
require the violations to be intentional. 
Before turning to issue D, one final, and not unimportant, point must be made. In 
the previous pages, three formulations of a test which could lead to the ending of an 
ICC case were presented. As this case’s central problem deals with the 
consequences of an alleged male captus, with problems related to the way a person 
was brought to justice/into the jurisdiction of the Court, the three formulations were 
also applied to that specific situation. This seems logical. Indeed, as will be shown 
at footnote 292 and accompanying text, the Appeals Chamber clarified the fact that 
this decision dealt with “the process of bringing the appellant to justice” (the 
remainder of the Appeals Chamber’s words will be discussed infra) and that it had 
examined whether “in relation to this process (…) breaches of the rights of the 
suspect or the accused may provide ground for halting the process.” In addition, one 
could also refer here to the already-mentioned (see footnote 247) words of the 
Appeals Chamber almost two years later that the paragraphs in which one can find 
these three formulations were made in the context of Lubanga Dyilo’s male captus 
allegations. 
Nevertheless, it is also possible – and this might explain the differences between 
the (broader) first and third formulation on the one hand and the (restricted) second 
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formulation on the other – that the second formulation is not dealing with alleged 
male captus situations but with problems relating to the actual trial proceedings. The 
words would then not be a more strict and demanding version of the Appeals 
Chamber’s test regarding male captus problems (see the first and third formulations 
which could very well be applied to such problems), but simply another, additional 
possibility for the judge to stay the proceedings. A possibility which is not focused 
on problems related to the way a person was brought into the jurisdiction of the now 
trying forum, but on problems which occur during the actual trial proceedings. In 
that case, the second formulation supports the idea that a judge, alongside staying 
the proceedings because of a male captus situation, because of irregularities in the 
way a person was brought into the jurisdiction of the prosecuting forum (see the first 
and third formulations), can also stay the proceedings when during the trial, serious 
violations occur which entail that the accused can no longer make his defence. The 
fact that the Appeals Chamber was also interested in other situations which could 
lead to a stay of the proceedings, see footnote 241 and accompanying text, may also 
lead to that conclusion. A final point which could be used as support for the view 
that the second formulation may be focused on irregularities in the actual trial 
proceedings is the fact that both the first and third formulation speak of “suspect or 
the accused”, whereas the second formulation only uses the word “accused”. 
However, with respect to this last point, it could also be argued that the use of the 
word “accused” does not necessarily mean that the second formulation may not be 
applied to male captus problems; even though most male captus claims will be 
made by suspects like Lubanga Dyilo, before the confirmation of the charges, it is 
not impossible either that an accused makes such a claim. See in that respect also the 
already-mentioned words of the Appeals Chamber at footnote 241 and 
accompanying text, where it talked about “violations of the rights of the accused in 
the process of bringing him/her to justice [emphasis added, ChP].”  
Having said that, it is now time to see how the Appeals Chamber tackled issue D. 
It noted the Defence’s claim that the Pre-Trial Chamber had “adopted an unduly 
restrictive approach to the relinquishment of jurisdiction for violations of the 
fundamental rights of the accused [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.264 The Appeals 
Chamber did not concur, however. In fact, it held that the Pre-Trial Chamber had 
adopted an even broader standard “than the one warranted in law in that it failed to 
require the specific consideration of whether a fair trial remained possible in the 
particular circumstances of the case”.265 According to the Appeals Chamber, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s conclusion that no ill-treatment took place in Lubanga Dyilo’s 
arrest and surrender to the ICC “sideline[d] the importance of the precise ambit of 
the test”.266 What the Pre-Trial Chamber apparently should have considered, 
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according to the Appeals Chamber, was whether there were violations and if so, 
whether, in spite of these violations, a fair trial would still be possible. Only if the 
violations were such that one could no longer speak of a fair trial, could jurisdiction 
be refused. This can be seen as a repetition of the first and third formulation of the 
male detentus test mentioned above. However, it is arguably different from the 
second formulation – if that formulation can indeed be applied to male captus 
situations in the first place, see supra – which requires that these violations must in 
fact make it impossible for the accused to make his defence. 
Another complaint of the Defence, the Appeals Chamber continued, was  
 
that the Pre-Trial Chamber applied the wrong standard in reviewing the efficacy of 
the process leading to the arrest and surrender of the suspect, allegedly ignoring or 
paying inadequate attention to the supervisory role of the Pre-Trial Chamber under 
article 59 (2) of the Statute [original footnote omitted, ChP].267   
 
According to the Defence, “the Pre-trial Chamber is charged under this article to 
review the correctness of the decision of the Congolese authority to sanction the 
enforcement of the warrant of arrest”.268 However, the Appeals Chamber did not 
agree with this either: “[n]o such role is cast on the Court”.269 Nevertheless, in its 
subsequent explanation, the Appeals Chamber did admit – and arguably correctly so 
– a certain supervisory role with respect to the points which the competent judicial 
authority in the custodial State must determine pursuant to Article 59, paragraph 2 
of the ICC Statute. It explained:  
 
The Court does not sit in the process (…) on judgment as a court of appeal on the 
identificatory decision of the Congolese judicial authority. Its task is to see that the 
process envisaged by Congolese law was duly followed and that the rights of the 
arrestee were properly respected.270 
 
Although it is, of course, true that the ICC is not a court of appeal with respect to the 
decisions of the competent judicial authority under Article 59, paragraph 2 of the 
ICC Statute, it would nevertheless be extremely wise for the ICC to check whether 
the person surrendered to the ICC is indeed the person in which it is interested (if 
there are reasons to doubt the correct identity of the surrendered person). Otherwise, 
the wrong person will be tried. With respect to determinations (b) (has the person 
been arrested in accordance with the proper process) and (c) (have the rights of the 
person been respected) of Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute, the ICC clearly 
states that it has a role to play here. This can not only be deduced from the word 
“[i]ts”, which refers to “[t]he Court”, the ICC, but also from the remainder of the 
paragraph, where it is stated that    
 
                                                          











the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that the process followed accorded with Congolese 
law. There is nothing to contradict this statement in light of the fact that the suspect 
was in custody for crimes coming within the purview of the military authorities. The 
suspect was afforded an opportunity to voice his views before the judicial authority 
that examined the request for his surrender. Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that 
his arrest or appearance before the Congolese authority involved or entailed any 
violation of his rights.271 
 
It is good that the Appeals Chamber, like the Pre-Trial Chamber, (marginally) 
checks whether Lubanga Dyilo’s was arrested in accordance with the proper process 
and whether his rights were respected. In addition, it is to be welcomed that in doing 
so, the Appeals Chamber, in contrast to the Pre-Trial Chamber,272 explicitly and 
systematically turns to the points mentioned in Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC 
Statute. Unfortunately, however, and again in contrast to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the 
Appeals Chamber does not delve into whether the competent judicial authority, in 
determining points (b) and (c) of Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute, could 
also look at the phase prior to the official ICC arrest. Although it stated that “[t]he 
suspect was afforded an opportunity to voice his views before the judicial authority 
that examined the request for his surrender” – which views also concerned this 
phase prior to the official ICC arrest – the Appeals Chamber only mentions this 
point to explain that Lubanga Dyilo’s rights, including the right to voice his 
concerns before the competent judicial authority, were respected in the context of 
the execution of the official ICC request for arrest and surrender. Because of that, it 
is also unclear whether the ICC judges, as the supervisors marginally checking the 
scope of Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute, would also look into the 
arrest/detention prior to the official ICC arrest under Article 59 of the ICC Statute. 
Both the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber can be criticised for not 
clearly elucidating this point.273 
In addition, and this point was also mentioned in the context of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s decision, the Appeals Chamber does not explain whether the competent 
judicial authority (or the Appeals Chamber marginally supervising the competent 
judicial authority), in the context of Article 59 of the ICC Statute, must also look to 
provisions such as Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute and Article 55, 
paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute. The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Pre-Trial 
Chamber “that the process followed accorded with Congolese law” and that “there is 
nothing to indicate that his arrest or appearance before the Congolese authority 
involved or entailed any violation of his rights”. However, this appears to refer to 
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national law only. It was explained in Chapter VIII that Article 59, paragraph 2 (b) 
of the ICC Statute implied that the national process cannot violate international 
(human rights) law274 and that Article 59, paragraph 2 (c) of the ICC Statute may 
also refer to consistency with human rights treaties.275 In addition, Chapter IX 
clarified the fact that whenever the ICC exercises jurisdiction, whenever the ICC is 
involved in a case (including actions of third parties working at the behest of the 
ICC), that involvement must be consistent with Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC 
Statute: internationally recognised human rights. Finally, it must not be forgotten 
that Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute applies as from the initiation of 
the investigation. This apparently restricted interpretation by the Appeals Chamber 
of the scope of Article 59 of the ICC Statute can be criticised. In the words of 
Sluiter:  
 
This ruling leaves us in the dark as to (i) the applicable law – only Congolese law, or 
also internationally protected human rights law, and (ii) the level of review – what 
margin of appreciation is left to national courts? The Appeals Chamber emphasis 
seems to be, however, on an interpretation of Article 59 (2) as essentially – or merely 
– offering the protection of national law. This can in my opinion be inferred from the 
conclusion in this section that ‘the process followed accorded with Congolese law’. 
The logical follow-up question, whether Congolese law – or simply the process as it 
was applied in practice – was consistent with internationally protected human rights, 
at least those rights set out in treaties to which Congo is a party, is not addressed. 
Hereby, Article 59 (2) loses much of its protective force and its interpretation is not in 
keeping with Article 21 (3) of the Statute.276 
 
Then, “[t]he gravamen of the appellant’s complaint, where the essence of the 
appellant’s case lies”,277 was addressed, namely “that the Pre-Trial Chamber ignored 
                                                          
274 See n. 155 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII.  
275 See n. 157 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII. 
276 Sluiter 2009, pp. 473-474. See also ibid., p. 465: “Another matter which was not tackled head-on by 
the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga concerns the effect of Article 21 (3) for the pre-trial phase. Clearly, 
the applicable law of the ICC and the right to a fair trial is not confined to what happens in the 
courtroom, or at the seat of the Court. The protection of Article 21 (3), like the protection of the right to 
a fair trial, should extend to the pre-trial phase. Any other approach deprives individuals of essential 
protection and may make the Court the beneficiary of activities it would not wish to be associated with. 
A number of provisions in the Statute, like Articles 55 and 59, are illustrative of a deliberate and wise 
choice for closer supervision of the pre-trial phase. However, (…) the initial case law of the ICC reveals 
a tendency to retreat within the safe limits of The Hague and a strong desire to keep hands clean by 
refusing to supervise activities within domestic jurisdictions. By doing so, the adverse effect may be 
achieved: a refusal to review the national activities that have benefited the Court can with good reason 
be seen as acceptance of them, and implicates the integrity of international proceedings. And since we 
are dealing with proceedings that extend over many jurisdiction, with a great variety in the national level 
of protection, a strong supervisory effect triggered by Article 21 (3) seems to me indispensable, simply 
to save the credibility of the Court in human rights terms.” (See also n. 197 and accompanying text.) 
277 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 








breaches of his human rights prior to his appearance before the Court and the 
directions for the enforcement of the warrant of arrest [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]”278 (these “directions for the enforcement of the warrant of arrest” is probably 
a reference to the request for arrest and surrender), and that the Prosecution was 
involved in these breaches.279 However, the Appeals Chamber concurred with the 
Pre-Trial Chamber that there was no concerted action between the ICC and the DRC 
authorities,280 emphasising that “[m]ere knowledge on the part of the Prosecutor of 
the investigations carried out by the Congolese authorities is no proof of 
involvement on his part in the way they were conducted or the means including 
detention used for the purpose”.281 This appears to mean that the Appeals Chamber 
agrees with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s test mentioned at footnote 145 and 
accompanying text that if there was concerted action prior to the sending of the 
request for arrest and surrender, the Appeals Chamber would look into these 
violations.282 This also corresponds with what seemingly is the Appeals Chamber’s 
view of the ambit of Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute, which extends to 
situations in which the ICC exercises jurisdiction, to situations in which the ICC is 
involved (“by his/her accusers”). As stated earlier, this will cover a fair amount of 
the context of the ICC’s case, but it is arguably not enough. The ICC should 
consider any violations which occur in the context of its case more generally, 
whether or not the ICC (or third parties working for it) was involved in it.  
Finally, the Appeals Chamber also concluded that “the findings of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber respecting the absence of torture or serious mistreatment have not been 
shown to be erroneous in any way”.283  
It can be argued that it is not very clear how this last point should be assessed. It 
does mean, of course, that the Appeals Chamber concurs factually with the Pre-Trial 
Chamber that there was no serious mistreatment/torture in this case, but does it 
mean more than that?  
Of course, one can expect that the serious mistreatment/torture point can be 
integrated in the Appeals Chamber’s own male detentus test. Although this test is 
not entirely clear because of the different formulations used, the first formulation 
appears to have some additional support in the decision. This formulation reads:  
 
Where fair trial becomes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of 
the suspect or the accused by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to 
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put the person on trial. Justice could not be done. A fair trial is the only means to do 
justice. If no fair trial can be held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated and 
the process must be stopped.284 
 
Obviously, if the suspect’s male captus, executed by “his/her accusers” (which 
should be read to include third parties working at the request of the ICC), is 
accompanied by serious mistreatment/torture (surely breaches of his fundamental 
rights), it would be very difficult for the judges to maintain that this would not 
jeopardise the (fairness of the) trial.  
However, the more interesting question is, of course, whether the words of the 
Appeals Chamber must be understood to mean that it would also refuse jurisdiction 
in the case of serious mistreatment/torture irrespective of the entity responsible, for 
example, when the male captus was perpetrated by private individuals alone,285 cf. 
the Nikolić case?  
In the Duch case before the ECCC, the co-investigating judges referred to the 
paragraph which contained the words of the Appeals Chamber that “the findings of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber respecting the absence of torture or serious mistreatment 
have not been shown to be erroneous in any way”286 to argue that the Appeals 
Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo followed the Trial Chamber’s decision in Nikolić, in 
which it was clearly stated that the ICTY, under the abuse of process doctrine, 
would refuse jurisdiction in the case of serious violations of the rights of the suspect, 
such as serious mistreatment/torture, irrespective of the entity responsible, for 
example, if the male captus was committed by private individuals.287 Hence, the co-
investigating judges in Duch were of the opinion that the ICC Appeals Chamber 
would also refuse jurisdiction in such a case.288  
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However, whether the ICC’s Appeals Chamber would refuse jurisdiction in the 
case of serious mistreatment/torture, irrespective of the entity responsible, is not 
clear at all.  
First, one must not forget that the remarks made by the Pre-Trial Chamber on 
serious mistreatment/torture were made in the context of the abuse of process 
doctrine, a doctrine which the Appeals Chamber has explicitly rejected. It could, of 
course, be argued that it is true that the abuse of process doctrine was rejected, but 
that the Appeals Chamber nevertheless accepted the human rights dimension of that 
doctrine and that the serious mistreatment/torture exception could fall under that 
Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute dimension. However, as stated above, 
within that human rights dimension, the Appeals Chamber already created its own 
male detentus test, one which seemingly requires that the violations (which indeed 
may include serious mistreatment/torture) must be executed by “his/her accusers”, 
which refers to the ICC/involvement of the ICC/actions of third parties working at 
the behest of the ICC, cf. concepts like concerted action and constructive custody. 
Secondly (and this point was also briefly made earlier in this chapter),289 the Pre-
Trial Chamber’s view of the abuse of process doctrine itself is not clear. This is 
because it writes that the application of this doctrine, to date, “has been confined to 
instances of torture or serious mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial 
State in some way related to the process of arrest and transfer of the person to the 
relevant international criminal tribunal [emphasis added and original footnote 
omitted, ChP]”.  
This is arguably incorrect, but it is uncertain whether the Pre-Trial Chamber is 
aware of this mistake. It is unclear whether it is of the opinion that this is the correct 
test (requiring that the male captus be committed by national authorities) or whether 
it would now be of the opinion that these words were indeed incorrectly formulated 
and that it would also refuse jurisdiction in the case of serious mistreatment/torture, 
irrespective of the entity responsible, hence also including, for example, the actions 
of private individuals.  
Because of the Appeals Chamber’s rejection of the abuse of process doctrine and 
the lack of clarity with respect to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s view of the abuse of 
process doctrine, it is not clear how the Appeals Chamber would act in the case of 
serious mistreatment/torture by, for example, private individuals.290  
In other words, even though others have interpreted the decision to mean that the 
ICC Appeals Chamber would refuse jurisdiction in the case of serious 
mistreatment/torture, irrespective of the entity responsible, the fact that the Appeals 
Chamber explicitly rejected the (abuse of process) doctrine in which context that 
male detentus avenue was created and the lack of clarity with respect to the Pre-
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Trial Chamber’s view of the abuse of process doctrine means that it is possible that 
the serious mistreatment/torture example only applies to the Appeals Chamber’s 
own male detentus test, which demands violations by the ICC/violations in which 
the ICC is involved/violations by third parties working at the behest of the ICC (“by 
his/her accusers”). Hence, the only thing one can be clear of is that the test is 
unclear. (A conclusion, unfortunately, often made in this study.)   
A final point which must be made about this decision before moving to the next 
case, the Bemba Gombo case, is that one can question to what extent Lubanga Dyilo 
would be entitled to less far-reaching remedies (than a refusal of jurisdiction) since 
that the Appeals Chamber has concluded that there was no serious 
mistreatment/torture in this case. Even if it is true that Lubanga Dyilo had not asked 
for this earlier in the proceedings,291 judges should consider the issue. This is valid a 
fortiori for the judges of the Appeals Chamber as Lubanga Dyilo had mentioned this 
point in his fifth ground of appeal, see footnote 186 and accompanying text. In fact, 
one could argue that the ICC judges are obliged to look into any violation (and 
remedy that violation) in the event it can be said that the ICC was involved in the 
case, see Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute, which covers the internationally 
recognised human right to an effective remedy against a violation. And going 
beyond that obligation: it would be good if the ICC were to remedy every violation 
occurring in the context of its cases more generally, whether or not the ICC was 
involved. However, unfortunately, the Appeals Chamber, in its final words before 
dismissing the appeal, did not go into that and focused only on the ultimate remedy, 
refusal of jurisdiction:  
 
At issue is the process of bringing the appellant to justice for the crimes that form the 
subject-matter of the proceedings before the Court. The Pre-Trial Chamber 
determined that it is in relation to this process that breaches of the rights of the 
suspect or the accused may provide ground for halting the process. And none was 
shown.292  
 
This is truly to be regretted. Given the allegations of irregularities at the national 
level, irregularities which were partly confirmed by Human Rights Watch, it is a 
pity that the Appeals Chamber did not make a more serious effort to find out what 
happened to Lubanga Dyilo, whether the violations – if they did indeed occur – 
could be seen as falling within the context of the ICC case and if so, what kind of 
remedies Lubanga Dyilo would be entitled to.293  
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In that context, it must also be stressed that the above-mentioned point of the 
Appeals Chamber that it would only look at irregularities which occur in “the 
process of bringing the appellant to justice for the crimes that form the subject-
matter of the proceedings before the Court” does not seem to comport with the 
earlier statement that it would look at irregularities in the context of concerted action 
between the ICC and third parties.  
This must be clarified further. In the discussion of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
remarks on the scope of Article 59 of the ICC Statute, the ICC judges stated that the 
competent judicial authority was not obliged to look into the lawfulness of the 
suspect’s arrest/detention prior to the sending of the request for arrest and surrender 
insofar as that detention was related solely to national proceedings. That implies that 
that authority was obliged to look at irregularities in the context of an 
arrest/detention prior to the official ICC arrest if that arrest/detention was somehow 
related to the ICC proceedings. Although the Pre-Trial Chamber did not itself 
clearly go into the role of the ICC judges, the supervisors of Article 59 of the ICC 
Statute, it was assumed that these words probably meant that the ICC judges would 
look into irregularities in the context of an arrest/detention prior to the official ICC 
arrest if that arrest/detention were somehow related to the ICC proceedings, an 
assumption which arguably found support in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s later, more 
general, remark that the ICC judges would look into irregularities prior to the 
official ICC arrest if they were the result of concerted action between the ICC and 
third parties. Hence, if there is involvement of the ICC in the irregularities, if the 
national detention is somehow related to the ICC proceedings, if there is concerted 
action between the ICC and third parties, the irregularities stemming therefrom will 
be considered.  
Now, one could argue that the Appeals Chamber’s agreement with the Pre-Trial 
Chamber on the concerted action point means that the Appeals Chamber would also 
look into irregularities in the above-mentioned contexts, for example, if the national 
detention were somehow related to the ICC proceedings.  
Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber now requires an additional point, namely 
that it would not look into a national detention if the suspect was in detention for 
crimes other than the ones for which the ICC was now prosecuting this suspect. 
However, that is arguably a stricter view than the idea that one would look at the 
national detention if that detention was somehow related to the ICC proceedings, if 
there was concerted action between the ICC and third parties.  
To provide an example, it is not impossible that the Prosecutor informally 
requests national authorities to keep a suspect, who is in detention for crimes other 
than those in which the ICC is interested, in custody so that the Prosecutor has more 
time to prepare a request for arrest and surrender. In such a case, it can be argued 
that the ICC should definitely be able to consider alleged violations occurring in this 
arrest/detention, for the simple reason that the ICC was involved in it, because that 








suspect was in detention at the national level for the same crimes in which the ICC 
is now interested or not.294  
In fact, it could be argued, see also supra, that the judges should adopt an even 
broader stance. It is submitted that the ICC judges should decide for themselves 
whether the irregularities can be seen as falling within the context of their case more 
generally. Of course, the fact that somebody is in custody at the national level for 
crimes other than those in which the ICC is interested and the fact that the ICC is 
not somehow involved in that arrest/detention may very well constitute good 
reasons to argue that irregularities occurring in that context cannot be seen as falling 
within the context of the ICC case. However, judges may also take other elements 
into account here. It is very well possible that judges feel that this detention made 
the surrender to the ICC in the end possible and thus that it can be seen as falling 
within the context of the ICC case more generally. If the judges in that case were 
also to follow the normal abuse of process doctrine, it is by no means unthinkable 
that, if a person, during this national detention, is seriously mistreated by the 
national authorities and then, after the ICC becomes involved in the case, is 
subsequently surrendered to the ICC, the judges may nevertheless refuse 
jurisdiction, even if the national charges were not exactly the same as those of the 
ICC and even if the ICC was not yet involved in the case. They could then adopt the 
following, and more general, task assigned to courts (even if that task stems from a 
decision addressed by the ICC judges in the context of the (later rejected) abuse of 
process doctrine), namely that they accept their “inescapable duty to secure fair 
treatment for those who come or are brought before them [emphasis added, 
ChP]”.295  
                                                          
294 Cf. also the discussion of the scope of Art. 60, para. 4 of the ICC Statute in Chapter VIII of this book. 
As argued in that chapter, involvement of the Prosecutor does not necessarily have to be triggered by an 
ICC arrest warrant and thus by detention based on the ICC charges. For another opinion, see the 
references in n. 510 of the present chapter or n. 265 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII. 
295 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
29. This quotation is from Lord Devlin’s opinion in the Connelly case as discussed in Bennett and has 
already been mentioned earlier in this study, see n. 127 and accompanying text of Chapter V. The 
example from the main text could also fall under the abuse of process doctrine of the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
which demands “instances of torture or serious mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial 
State in some way related to the process of arrest and transfer of the person to the relevant international 
criminal tribunal [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP]”. (This broad stance was 
arguably also accepted by the Defence and the Prosecution in that case, see n. 195.) See also the abuse 
of process doctrine under Duch: “Where the violations in question are not attributable to an international 
tribunal, this doctrine appears to be confined to instances of torture or serious mistreatment by the 
external authorities and has most usually been applied in relation to the process of arrest and transfer 
[emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request 
for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 33.) See further the 
following formulation from Bennett (a formulation which was also used in the ICTY Milošević case (see 
n. 411 of Chapter VI) and the ICTR Barayagwiza case (see n. 842 of Chapter VI)): “[A] court has a 
discretion to stay any criminal proceedings on the ground that to try those proceedings will amount to an 








3 BEMBA GOMBO 
 
The second ICC case under discussion here is the case of Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo,296 former vice-President and senator of the DRC and alleged President and 
Commander-in-chief of the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), an armed 
group which intervened, among other things, in the conflict in the CAR, a 
neighbouring country of the DRC, between October 2002 and March 2003.  
On Friday 23 May 2008, Pre-Trial Chamber III of the ICC issued a sealed 
warrant of arrest for Bemba Gombo,297 including a request for provisional arrest.298 
The arrest warrant found that in the context of the MLC intervention in the CAR, 
there were reasonable grounds to believe that Bemba Gombo was criminally 
responsible for a number of war crimes and crimes against humanity.299 The next 
morning, the Registry of the ICC notified the request for provisional arrest to the 
authorities of (ICC State Party) Belgium300 because it had become known that 
Bemba Gombo was at that moment in Belgian territory.301 The ICC used a request 
for provisional arrest pursuant to Article 92 of the ICC Statute instead of the normal 
request for arrest and surrender pursuant to Article 91 of the ICC Statute, as it was 
discovered that Bemba Gombo wanted to leave Belgium a few days later, namely on 
                                                                                                                                              
accused a fair trial or (2) because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try 
the accused in the circumstances of a particular case [emphasis added ChP].” (House of Lords, Lord 
Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England 
Law Reports 161.) See finally the ICTY Trial Chamber’s view in Nikolić, arguing that “[d]ue process of 
law also includes questions such as (…) how an Accused has been brought into the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal [emphasis added, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on 
Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 
October 2002, para. 111.) See also ibid., para. 114: “[I]n a situation where an accused is very seriously 
mistreated, maybe even subjected to inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, or torture, before being 
handed over to the Tribunal, this may constitute a legal impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction over 
such an accused [emphasis added, ChP].” 
296 Much of the following has been taken from Paulussen 2010, pp. 195-205. 
297 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Urgent Warrant of Arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’ 
(Under seal), ICC-01/05-01/08, 23 May 2008. 
298 See CPI, La Chambre Préliminaire III, Situation en R[é]publique Centrafricaine, Affaire Le 
Procureur c. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Demande d’arrestation provisoire de M. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo adressée au Royaume de Belgique’ (Sous scellés), ICC-01/05-01/08, 23 mai 2008. 
299 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Urgent Warrant of Arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’ 
(Under seal), ICC-01/05-01/08, 23 May 2008, para. 21. 
300 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision to Unseal the Warrant of Arrest for Mr Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo’ (Public Document), ICC-01/05-01/08, 24 May 2008, para. 5. 
301 See CPI, La Chambre Préliminaire III, Situation en R[é]publique Centrafricaine, Affaire Le 
Procureur c. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Demande d’arrestation provisoire de M. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo adressée au Royaume de Belgique’ (Sous scellés), ICC-01/05-01/08, 23 mai 2008, para. 3: 
“Lors de l’audience, le Procureur a soutenu que M. Jean-Pierre Bemba aurait quitté la République 








25 May.302 Only 13 hours later,303 at around 10 p.m. on Saturday evening,304 Bemba 
Gombo was apprehended by Belgian authorities in Sint-Genesius-Rode, a small 
town near Brussels, where he had acquired a home.305  
The next day (Sunday 25 May), Bemba Gombo was brought before Hervé 
Louveaux, juge d’instruction (investigating judge)306 in Brussels.307 According to 
the Loi de 29 mars 2004 concernant la coopération avec la cour pénale 
internationale et les tribunaux pénaux internationaux, the Belgian law describing 
Belgium’s cooperation obligations with the ICC and other international criminal 
tribunals (hereinafter: the Belgian cooperation law),308 Bemba Gombo needed to 
appear before this judge within 24 hours after his deprivation of liberty,309 which 
was indeed what happened. The Belgian cooperation law also states that this judge 
must verify whether the person arrested is indeed the person sought and whether the 
documents as mentioned in Article 92, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute – which are 
the documents which must accompany the request for provisional arrest310 – have 
been provided by the ICC.311 In addition, this judge must issue a national arrest 
warrant, on which basis the ICC’s request for provisional arrest can be executed.312  
It must be noted that the Belgium cooperation law, in contrast to, for example, 
the Explanatory Memorandum to the Dutch International Criminal Court 
                                                          
302 See ibid.: “Le Procureur a souligné l’urgence qu’il y avait pour la Chambre de traiter sa requête au 
regard des risques de fuite de M. Jean-Pierre Bemba. Lors de l’audience, le Procureur a soutenu que M. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba aurait quitté la République portugaise pour se rendre au Royaume de Belgique, dans 
une demeure à l’extérieur de Bruxelles qu’il compte apparemment quitter le 25 [m]ai 2008, pour une 
destination non connue à ce jour.” 
303 See ‘Jean-Pierre Bemba, former Congo warlord, arrested in Belgium’, International Herald Tribune, 
25 May 2008, available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/05/25/europe/EU-GEN-War-Crimes-
Bemba.php. 
304 See the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) Legal Action Group’s report FIDH and 
the situation in the Central African Republic before the International Criminal Court. The case of Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, July 2008, No. 502a (available at: 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CPIaffbemba502ang2008.pdf), p. 20. 
305 See ‘Jean-Pierre Bemba, former Congo warlord, arrested in Belgium’, International Herald Tribune, 
25 May 2008, available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/05/25/europe/EU-GEN-War-Crimes-
Bemba.php. 
306 The English translations of the names of the different Belgium authorities have been taken from  
Vandermeersch 2004, pp. 133-157. 
307 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Application for interim release’ (Public Document), [ICC-
]ICC-01/05-01/-8, 23 July 2008, para. 8. 
308 This law can be consulted through the very practical University of Nottingham, Human Rights Law 
Centre, International Criminal Justice Unit’s ‘Database of National Implementing Legislation’, available 
at: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/hrlc/international-criminal-justice-unit/implementation-
database.php.  
309 See Art. 14, para. 2 of the Belgian cooperation law. (The Belgian procedures regarding a request for 
provisional arrest can be found in the second section (‘Demande d’arrestation provisoire’) of Chapter 4 
(‘Arrestation, transfert, transit et remise de personnes à la Cour’) of the Belgian cooperation law (Artt. 
14-15).) 
310 See n. 124 of Chapter VIII.  
311 See again Art. 14, para. 2 of the Belgian cooperation law.  








Implementation Act,313 does not explicitly mention the points of Article 59, 
paragraph 2 (b) and (c) of the ICC Statute, namely that the judge also has to 
determine that the person has been arrested in accordance with the proper process 
and that the person’s rights have been respected, see Chapter VIII. Looking at the 
literal text, one will only find that the investigating judge has to verify that the 
person before him is indeed the person sought by the ICC, thereby fulfilling the 
requirement as mentioned in Article 59, paragraph 2 (a) of the ICC Statute. 
Vandermeersch, in his article on the (then draft) Belgian cooperation law,314 
explains, however, that the requirement under (b) has also been included in the 
Belgian cooperation law and that the requirement under (c) is not particularly 
relevant.  
To start with the first requirement (under (b), namely that the competent judicial 
authority has to determine that the person has been arrested in accordance with the 
proper process), Vandermeersch is of the opinion that this condition is fulfilled by 
the fact that the Belgian authority has to verify that the information required under 
Article 92, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute has been duly received.315 Although it 
was earlier clarified in Chapter VIII that the exact meaning of this provision may 
differ from State to State, it is clear that this is a very restrictive view. In fact, one 
can assert that checking whether the ICC has provided all the necessary paperwork 
so that the request for provisional arrest can be executed is merely a small part of the 
process of verification that the person was arrested according to the proper process. 
                                                          
313 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the International Criminal Court Implementation Act (Tweede 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2001-2002, 28 098 (R 1704), Uitvoering van het Statuut van 
het Internationaal Strafhof met betrekking tot de samenwerking met en bijstand aan het Internationaal 
Strafhof en de tenuitvoerlegging van zijn vonnissen (Uitvoeringswet Internationaal Strafhof), Nr. 3, 
Memorie van Toelichting), p. 25: “The reference to article 59, paragraph 2 of the [ICC] Statute has been 
included because the Statute prescribes that the public prosecutor [the officier] checks with respect to 
a(n) (provisionally) arrested person whether there is perhaps a case of mistaken identity, whether the 
(national) arrest procedure has been correctly applied and whether the rights which the person pursuant 
to national and international law enjoys in this situation, have been respected [own translation, ChP].” 
The Dutch International Criminal Court Implementation Act itself (see n. 170 of Chapter VIII) only uses 
more general references, see Section 14 for provisional arrest (“After the person claimed has been 
questioned in accordance with article 55, paragraph 2, and article 59, paragraph 2 of the Statute, the 
public prosecutor may order that he be detained in police custody for three days from the moment of the 
provisional arrest [emphasis added, ChP].”) and Section 18, para. 2 for arrest (“The person claimed shall 
be brought before the public prosecutor within 24 hours of his arrest. After questioning the person 
claimed in accordance with article 55, paragraph 2, and article 59, paragraph 2 of the Statute, the public 
prosecutor may order that he be detained in police custody until the date on which the District Court 
decides on his remand in custody [emphasis added, ChP].”). 
314 See Vandermeersch 2004. 
315 Or at least, that is the impression one gets. After all, after each requirement from Art. 59, para. 2 of 
the ICC Statute, Vandermeersch adds a footnote arguably explaining what these requirements entail. 
After Art. 59, para. 2 (a) of the ICC Statute for example, he explains in n. 91 of his article: “Verification 
of the identity of the person.” Likewise, one can read in n. 92 of his article (positioned after Art. 59, 
para. 2 (b) of the ICC Statute): “Verification that the information required under Art. 92.2 of the Statute 








The competent judicial authority should also check whether the arrest itself was 
executed procedurally correctly.316 
With respect to the second requirement (under (c), namely that the competent 
judicial authority has to determine that the person’s rights have been respected), 
Vandermeersch comments: “This general formula is not of particular relevance 
within the present context, as the requirement to respect the rights of the accused is 
satisfied simply by following the relevant procedures prescribed by law.”317 This is, 
again, a rather restrictive view, see Subsection 3.2 of Chapter VIII. As explained in 
that subsection, where a – careful – analogy to the human right to liberty and 
security was drawn,318 the competent judicial authority could, in fact, make a more 
substantive review, namely with respect to the prohibition of arbitrariness; although 
the substantive and procedural legal bases of the deprivation of liberty would not be 
readily labelled as arbitrary, this may be different with respect to the second element 
of arbitrariness, which relates to the enforcement of the law in a given case. Hence, 
even if the arrest were based on the correct grounds (this is up to the ICC to decide), 
were executed in accordance with a certain procedure (see the requirement under 
(b)), and even if these substantive and procedural legal bases are generally to be 
viewed as non-arbitrary, the factual execution of a person’s specific arrest may still 
qualify as arbitrary/incorrect. In addition, it must also be stressed that the fact that 
Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute mentions the procedural dimension of the 
national arrest separately (under (b)) also seems to indicate that the meaning of the 
words under (c) cannot be restricted to mere procedural issues. If that were the case, 
then the words under (c) could, of course, also have been left out completely (which 
they were not). 
Be that as it may, three days after his ‘Belgian’ arrest and detention were 
authorised by the juge d’instruction, on Wednesday 28 May, Bemba Gombo 
appeared before the Chambre du Conseil (the Closed Court) of Brussels.319 This 
again was in conformity with the Belgian cooperation law,320 which clarifies the fact 
that this Court – like the juge d’instruction – must check whether the person 
standing before it is indeed the person sought and whether the documents as 
mentioned in Article 92, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute have been provided by the 
ICC.321 Furthermore, this Court must decide, after having heard the ministère public 
(the Public Prosecutor), the suspect and his lawyer, whether or not the provisional 
arrest must be confirmed.322 In the Bemba Gombo case, the Chambre du Conseil 
decided on the very same day to keep Bemba Gombo under arrest. 
                                                          
316 See El Zeidy 2006, pp. 454-455 (see n. 153 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII). 
317 Vandermeersch 2004, p. 149, n. 93. 
318 See n. 159 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII. 
319 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Application for interim release’ (Public Document), [ICC-
]ICC-01/05-01/-8, 23 July 2008, para. 8. 
320 See Art. 14, para. 4 of the Belgian cooperation law.  
321 See ibid. 








According to the Belgium cooperation law, both the Public Prosecutor and the 
suspect can appeal the decision of the Chambre du Conseil before the Chambre des 
Mises en Accusation (Court of Appeal’s Indictments Chamber) within 24 hours of 
the decision of the Chambre du Conseil.323 After hearing all the parties, this Court of 
Appeal’s Indictments Chamber must promulgate its decision within eight days.324 
On 29 May, Bemba Gombo appealed the decision of the Chambre du Conseil and 
one week later, Bemba Gombo appeared before the Chambre des Mises en 
Accusation in Brussels which shortly afterwards dismissed the appeal of Bemba 
Gombo as well as his request for provisional release.325  
Then, on 10 June 2008, the ICC issued a revised arrest warrant326 and a request 
for arrest and surrender pursuant to Article 91 of the ICC Statute.327 On 1 July 2008, 
the highest court in Belgium,328 the Cour de Cassation (the Court of Cassation) 
                                                          
323 See Art. 14, para. 5 of the Belgian cooperation law.  
324 See ibid. 
325 See the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) Legal Action Group’s report FIDH and 
the situation in the Central African Republic before the International Criminal Court. The case of Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, July 2008, No. 502a (available at: 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CPIaffbemba502ang2008.pdf), p. 20. (It must be noted that this 
report speaks of 5 June 2008 as the date that the Chambre des Mises en Accusation rejected Bemba 
Gombo’s appeal whereas Bemba Gombo’s defence lawyers use the date of 6 June 2008, see ICC, Pre-
Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Application for interim release’ (Public Document), [ICC-]ICC-01/05-01/-8, 23 
July 2008, para. 9.) A request for interim release pending surrender can be made by the arrested person 
to the Chambre des Mises en Accusation pursuant to Art. 16, para. 1 of the Belgian cooperation law 
(which implements Art. 59, para. 3 of the ICC Statute). 
326 See CPI, La Chambre Préliminaire III, Situation en République Centrafricaine, Affaire Le Procureur 
c. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Mandat d’arrêt à l’encontre de Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo remplaçant le 
mandat d’arrêt décerné le 23 mai 2008’ (Public), ICC-01/05-01/08, 10 juin 2008. 
327 See CPI, La Chambre Préliminaire III, Situation en R[é]publique Centrafricaine, Affaire Le 
Procureur c. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Demande d’arrestation et de remise de Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo adressée au Royaume de Belgique’ (Public), ICC-01/05-01/08, 10 juin 2008. (The Belgian 
procedures regarding a request for arrest and surrender can be found in the first section (‘Demande 
d’arrestation et de remise’) of Chapter 4 (‘Arrestation, transfert, transit et remise de personnes à la 
Cour’) of the Belgian cooperation law (Artt. 11-13).) As also explained in n. 124 of Chapter VIII, Art. 
92, para. 3 of the ICC Statute and Rule 188 of the ICC RPE entail that the requested State must have 
received the request for surrender (including the documents supporting that request) at the latest two 
months after the provisional arrest. If not, then the person provisionally arrested may be released from 
custody. The Belgian cooperation law states that the provisionally arrested person must in any case be 
released from custody if three months have passed, see its Art. 15.  
328 An interesting point which deserves to be mentioned here is that the fact that a Belgian case can be 
litigated up to the highest court in the State, the Cour de Cassation, does not mean that this is the 
procedure to be followed in each and every country executing an ICC request. As explained in Chapter 
VIII, the arrest and surrender must be executed on the basis of the Statute and national law and national 
implementations of the ICC’s cooperation obligations may, of course, differ from State to State. For 
example, in the Netherlands, there is no appeal possible against the decision of the District Court in The 
Hague, see Section 27, para. 4 of the Dutch International Criminal Court Implementation Act (see n. 170 
of Chapter VIII). Nevertheless, it is also possible that States may allow a person’s case to be litigated up 
to for example the ECtHR. See Sluiter 2003 C, p. 625. Note finally that according to Bemba Gombo’s 
defence lawyers, the decision of the Chambre des Mises en Accusation (of either 5 or 6 June 2008, see 
n. 325) was only brought to Bemba Gombo’s attention on 18 June 2008. Although Bemba Gombo 








finally “rejected the requests of Bemba’s lawyers, concerning, in particular, the 
alleged irregularity of the Belgian proceedings”,329 thereby removing the final 
obstacles from the path leading to Bemba Gombo’s surrender to The Hague. Hence, 
two days later, on Thursday 3 July, he was surrendered to the ICC330 where he is 
now facing justice. 
Although this case is interesting in many respects, see, for example, the topic of 
provisional release,331 this study will naturally focus on those alleged irregularities 
in the Belgian surrender proceedings.  
In their application of 23 July 2008, Bemba Gombo’s counsel argued that Bemba 
Gombo’s rights pursuant to Article 55, paragraph 2 (c) and (d) of the ICC Statute 
were violated during the surrender proceedings in Belgium.332 These provisions 
read: 
 
Where there are grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court and that person is about to be questioned either by the 
Prosecutor, or by national authorities pursuant to a request made under Part 9, that 
person shall also have the following rights of which he or she shall be informed prior 
to being questioned: (…) (c) To have legal assistance of the person’s choosing, or, if 
the person does not have legal assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to him or 
her, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by the 
person in any such case if the person does not have sufficient means to pay for it; and 
(d) To be questioned in the presence of counsel unless the person has voluntarily 
waived his or her right to counsel. 
 
More concretely, the Defence claimed:  
 
During Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba’s questioning at the investigating judges in regard to 
the arrest warrant of the 23rd of May 2008 [this took place on 25 May 2008, ChP] Mr 
Jean-Pierre Bemba asked to be represented by his lawyer Maître Pierre Legros of the 
Bar of Brussels (…)[.] Neither the investigating judge nor the registrar respected Mr 
Jean-Pierre Bemba’s wish to be represented by Maître Legros. Therefore Mr (…) 
Jean-Pierre Bemba was deprived of his fundamental right to be assisted by a counsel 
of his own choice. In regard to the execution of the arrest warrant of the 10th of June 
                                                                                                                                              
of the case because it considered the appeal to have become futile given the fact that the arrest warrant 
of 23 May 2008 had been replaced by the revised one on 10 June 2008. (See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber 
III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, ‘Application for interim release’ (Public Document), [ICC-]ICC-01/05-01/-8, 23 July 2008, 
para. 9.) 
329 The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) Legal Action Group’s report FIDH and the 
situation in the Central African Republic before the International Criminal Court. The case of Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, July 2008, No. 502a (available at: 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CPIaffbemba502ang2008.pdf), p. 20. 
330 See ibid. 
331 See also n. 284 of Chapter VIII. 
332 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Application for interim release’ (Public Document), [ICC-








2008 it is submitted, that this was not fulfilled in a lawful way because Mr Jean-Pierre 
Bemba was neither heard nor represented in these proceedings.333 
 
As a result, it was submitted “that the arrest warrants of the 23rd of May 2008 and 
the 10th of June 2008 are null and void and that Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba (…) should 
be put into liberty”.334  
Judge Kaul of Pre-Trial Chamber III did not agree, however. In its decision of 20 
August 2008, the Chamber held, while stressing the relevance of Article 21, 
paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute335 and the importance of the right to liberty,336 that 
the ICC “is not a court of appeal in relation to the national authorities and that its 
power to review questions of substance and procedure before national courts is 
limited [original footnotes omitted, ChP]”.337 Judge Kaul referred here to the two 
decisions in the Lubanga Dyilo case which were already discussed in the previous 
section. Kaul was of the opinion “that such questions should primarily be raised and 
pursued before the national authorities as these are better placed than international 
jurisdictions to deal with such questions and, as the case may be, to provide for an 
adequate remedy [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.338 As also clarified in the 
Lubanga Dyilo case, one can agree with this stance, but it should also be repeated 
that this does not mean that the ICC does not have the ultimate responsibility for its 
own cases, including the pre-trial phase at the national level; the ICC should ensure 
that all violations are, ultimately, remedied and that it steps in if the national 
authorities, for whatever reason, do not grant appropriate remedies for violations.339  
After these general observations, Judge Kaul turned to the specifics of this case 
and concluded “that the defence has not substantiated sufficiently its allegations of 
procedural irregularities at the national level so as to allow unequivocally to 
establish the facts and to verify their compliance with the applicable legal 
regime”.340  
                                                          
333 Ibid., paras. 13-14. 
334 Ibid., para. 15. See also ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the 
Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision on application for interim release’ 
(Confidential), ICC-01/05-01/08, 20 August 2008 (available as the annex to the decision ICC, Pre-Trial 
Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision concerning the public version of the “Decision on application for interim 
release” of 20 August 2008’ (Public Document), ICC-01/05-01/08, 26 August 2008), para. 27. 
335 See ibid., para. 36. 
336 See ibid., para. 37: “The Single Judge observes at the outset that the right to liberty is of fundamental 
importance for everyone and that for any deprivation of liberty to be acceptable, it must be on such 
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by the applicable legal regime. 
Furthermore, it must not be arbitrary [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (It may be interesting to note 
that Judge Kaul refers here not only to, among other things, Artt. 9 of the ICCPR, 5 of the ECHR and 7 
of the ACHR, but also to para. 54 of the Bozano case, see n. 266 of Chapter III.) 
337 Ibid., para. 42. 
338 Ibid. 
339 See also the words of Sluiter (2003 C, pp. 644 and 651) at n. 201 of Chapter VIII. 
340 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision on application for interim release’ (Confidential), ICC-01/05-








For example, with respect to the alleged violation during the hearing of 25 May 
in relation to the arrest warrant of 23 May 2008, Judge Kaul was not sure whether 
this hearing was real questioning pursuant to Article 55, paragraph 2 (d) of the ICC 
Statute.341 According to him, it rather appeared to be a mere interview to establish 
Bemba Gombo’s identity and to inform him of his rights.342 In that case, “the 
allegedly unlawful absence of the counsel would only entail a potential exclusion 
pursuant to article 69(7) of the Statute of evidence obtained in the interview”.343 
This remark implies that if the hearing were seen as true questioning pursuant to 
Article 55, paragraph 2 (d) of the ICC Statute, the consequences of the absence of 
counsel could be greater than mere exclusion of evidence obtained in the interview. 
Finally, Judge Kaul observed that the absence of counsel during the meeting of 25 
May did “not seem to have resulted into any actual prejudice to him [original 
footnote omitted, ChP]”.344 That may, of course, be true, but one could argue that 
the level of prejudice should only have an influence on the question of how serious 
the violation was (and consequently, what kind of remedy must be provided), and 
not on the question of whether there was a violation in the first place/whether the 
suspect is entitled to a remedy. It could be argued that any violation of the rights of 
the suspect345 constitutes some injustice/prejudice to the suspect and that it is not 
necessary to demand actual/material prejudice before granting remedies, although 
the level of prejudice can, of course, be taken into account when determining the 
exact remedies.346 As explained in Chapter IX, pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 3 
of the ICC Statute, a right to an effective remedy against a violation enters the law 
of the ICC. This means that whenever the ICC is involved in a case, it must grant 
appropriate remedies for violations which occur in that context.  
With respect to the alleged violations in the context of the second/revised arrest 
warrant, Judge Kaul noted “that Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba had effective legal 
representation and that he was afforded adequate procedural protection with ample 
opportunities to raise any objections that he had at the national level at the 
appropriate time”.347 As a result, he concluded that he had  
                                                                                                                                              
the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision 
concerning the public version of the “Decision on application for interim release” of 20 August 2008’ 
(Public Document), ICC-01/05-01/08, 26 August 2008), para. 44. 
341 See ibid., para. 45. 
342 See ibid. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Ibid., para. 46. 
345 It must be borne in mind, however, that not every error in the proceedings amounts to a violation, 
which, in turn, should lead to a remedy. One could hereby think, for example, of a simple and small 
technical error in the arrest warrant. Cf. n. 603 of Chapter III (with reference to the Brima case and the 
question when an arrest/detention can be qualified as unlawful/illegal). See also ns. 205, 242 and 832 of 
Chapter VI. 
346 Cf. also ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-
97-20-A, 31 May 2000, para. 125 (see also n. 997 and accompanying text of Chapter VI): “[A]ny 
violation, even if it entails only a relative degree of prejudice, requires a proportionate remedy.” See 
also n. 1164 and accompanying text of Chapter VI (with respect to the Rwamakuba case). 
347 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor 








found no indication of any irregularity or arbitrariness in the procedure followed by 
the competent Belgian authorities that would constitute a material breach of article 
59(2) of the Statute affecting the proceedings before the Court or render the detention 
of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba on the authority of the Court otherwise unacceptable 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].348 
 
Two days later, Bemba Gombo filed a notice of appeal349 and on 16 December 
2008, the ICC’s Appeals Chamber issued its own decision.350 Unfortunately, as the 
alleged irregularities in the way Bemba Gombo was surrendered to the ICC were not 
(clearly)351 part of Bemba Gombo’s appeal,352 any views of the Appeals Chamber 
on this issue are not to be found.  
                                                                                                                                              
01/08, 20 August 2008 (available as the annex to the decision ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in 
the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision 
concerning the public version of the “Decision on application for interim release” of 20 August 2008’ 
(Public Document), ICC-01/05-01/08, 26 August 2008), para. 48. 
348 Ibid., para. 49. 
349 Three (see ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision 
of Pre-Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on application for interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-
01/05-01/08 OA, 16 December 2008, para. 7) or four (see ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the 
Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on 
application for interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-01/05-01/08 OA, 16 December 2008, 
Dissenting opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 1) days later (on 25 or 26 August 2008), the 
document in support of the appeal was filed. However, as this document (including the response of the 
Prosecution to the appeal) were filed confidentially, they can unfortunately not be discussed here, see 
ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber III entitled “Decision on application for interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-01/05-01/08 
OA, 16 December 2008, para. 8. 
350 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on application for interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-01/05-
01/08 OA, 16 December 2008. 
351 Perhaps, the words “the Appellant states that the Impugned Decision: was not based on reliable 
evidence” (see the next footnote) could be seen as a general statement, also challenging the views of 
Pre-Trial Chamber III regarding the alleged irregularities in Belgium. 
352 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on application for interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-01/05-
01/08 OA, 16 December 2008, para. 10: “In the Document in Support of the Appeal, the Appellant 
states that the Impugned Decision: was not based on reliable evidence and the Single Judge: a. Erred in 
failing sufficiently to establish the existence of a risk that Jean-Pierre Bemba would abscond; b. Erred in 
failing to demonstrate that Jean-Pierre Bemba would obstruct or endanger the investigation or the Court 
proceedings; c. Erred in failing sufficiently to establish a causal link between the alleged risks of 
absconding or threats and the interim release of Jean-Pierre Bemba [original footnote omitted, ChP]”. 
See also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision 
of Pre-Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on application for interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-








However, what the Appeals Chamber, like Pre-Trial Chamber III, did mention is 
the relevance of Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute and the importance of the 
right to liberty. In this context, it specifically cited, in the main text of the decision, 
paragraphs 2-4 of Article 5 of the ECHR,353 which may be seen as additional 
support for the view that the ICC considers the remedy of release in paragraph 4, in 
principle, to be relevant for the Court’s functioning, something which was already 
argued in the previous chapter.354 The Appeals Chamber also more generally 
referred to the importance of a suspect being able to challenge the lawfulness of his 
detention (see also Chapter IX, footnotes 290 and 292 and accompanying text), an 
avenue which is not explicitly mentioned in the ICC Statute.355  
In his dissenting opinion to this decision, Judge Pikis does not go into these 
irregularities either, but he did note that Judge Kaul “summarily dismissed”356 the 
contentions of Bemba Gombo regarding the alleged irregularities in Belgium. 
Furthermore, he also referred to Judge Kaul’s conclusion as mentioned at footnote 
340 and accompanying text “because it reflects the Single Judge’s understanding of 
the law, that it is not for the prosecutorial authority to establish and justify the 
prolongation of the arrestee’s detention, but for the latter to justify his release from 
captivity”.357 (Something with which Judge Pikis does not agree.)358 Furthermore, 
Judge Pikis also repeats (see footnote 293 and accompanying text of Chapter IX) the 
                                                          
353 It also referred to paras. 2-4 of Art. 9 of the ICCPR and paras. 4-6 of Art. 7 of the ACHR in ns. 64-
65, respectively. 
354 See also ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo and Convening Hearings with the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Portugal, the Republic 
of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, and the Republic of South Africa’ 
(Public Document), ICC-01/05-01/08, 14 August 2009, para. 35, writing about the scope of Art. 21, 
para. 3 of the ICC Statute: “The right of an arrested person to have access to a judicial authority vested 
with the power to adjudicate upon the lawfulness and justification of his or her detention is enshrined in 
many international human rights instruments, such as article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 5 of the (European) 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, article 6 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and article 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
355 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on application for interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-01/05-
01/08 OA, 16 December 2008, para. 32: “Based on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the Appeals 
Chamber considers that, in order to ensure both equality of arms and an adversarial procedure, the 
defence must, to the largest extent possible, be granted access to documents that are essential in order 
effectively to challenge the lawfulness of detention, bearing in mind the circumstances of the case.” 
These considerations are, of course, very interesting for the situation in which the ICC is confronted by 
a Todorović-like situation where the peacekeeping force in question refuses to disclose evidence as to 
the manner by which the suspect was brought into the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
356 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on application for interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-01/05-
01/08 OA, 16 December 2008, Dissenting opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 5. 
357 Ibid. 








importance of a suspect’s right to challenge the lawfulness of his detention, a right 
which is not explicitly mentioned in the ICC Statute, but which may nevertheless be 
inferred from a provision such as Article 60, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute.359 A 
final point from Judge Pikis’ dissenting opinion should be mentioned and that is that 
he states that “everything that would enable the person to effectively challenge the 
lawfulness of his detention must be disclosed”.360 Although Judge Pikis makes this 
remark in the context of the substantive grounds and reasons of the detention, his 
words may nevertheless be interesting for the situation – see also footnote 355 – in 
which the ICC is confronted by a Todorović-like situation where the peacekeeping 
force in question refuses to disclose evidence as to the manner by which the suspect 
was brought into the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
Before turning to the last case, that of Germain Katanga, a final point of the 
Bemba Gombo case should be addressed, namely his allegations with respect to a 
violation of Article 60, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute, a provision which was 
discussed in the previous two chapters.  
On 3 November 2008, Bemba Gombo filed an urgent application for interim 
release, requesting, “as his primary relief, to be released unconditionally and, in the 
alternative, to be granted interim release with conditions”.361 This was because he 
was of the opinion “that he has been detained for an extended period prior to the 
trial due to unjustified delay by the Prosecutor in the conduct of the proceedings”.362 
Although the request to be released unconditionally might be seen as a request for 
final release, comparable with the release with prejudice of the first Barayagwiza 
decision, it appears that in this case, Bemba Gombo views this unconditional release 
to also constitute an interim release, not jeopardising the trial itself, see the title of 
his application. As also explained in Chapter VIII, as this provision is surrounded by 
provisions addressing the concept of interim release, one can imagine that it would 
normally be used for an interim release.363 Nevertheless, as also argued in the same 
                                                          
359 See ibid., para. 20: “If there were no provision in the Statute affording the arrested person the 
opportunity to contest the deprivation of his/her liberty, we would be confronted with a dire denial of 
his/her human rights. Every person is assured the right to contest the lawfulness of his/her detention. 
Lawfulness in this context signifies the soundness in law of the factual basis of the decision, as well as 
the correctness of the legal provisions by reference to which the case is decided. The right of a person to 
contest the lawfulness of his detention, ordered in his absence and without hearing him, is safeguarded 
by the provisions of article 60 (2) of the Statute, requiring the Pre-Trial Chamber to evaluate, in 
proceedings held in the presence and with the participation of the person affected, the lawfulness and 
sequentially the justification of the deprivation of liberty. The provisions of article 60 (2), like every 
other provision of the Statute, must (…) be construed and applied in accordance with internationally 
recognized human rights.” See also ibid., para. 31: “[A]rticle 21 (3) assures to every individual the right 
to effectively contest the deprivation of liberty.” 
360 Ibid., para. 29. 
361 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Urgent Application for Interim Release’ (Confidential, Including 3 
Confidential Annexes), ICC-01/05-01/08, 3 November 2008, para. 1. 
362 Ibid., para. 8. 
363 See also ibid., para. 9, where counsel for Bemba Gombo refers to the following words of Pre-Trial 
Chamber III in another decision: “The Single Judge would take this opportunity to recall that any 








chapter, the word “release” itself does not preclude a further-reaching release, a 
release with prejudice, ending the entire trial, in very serious violations of Article 
60, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute.364 This interesting provision also played a role in 




The final male captus case is that of Germain Katanga, the alleged commander of 
the FRPI, the Force de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri. That this case is addressed 
here will hopefully not come as a real surprise, as in the Lubanga Dyilo case, the 
following passage of a report from Human Rights Watch on the situation in the 
DRC was presented:  
 
In some of the few cases where justice has been pursued, authorities have failed to 
observe international standards of due process. In February and March a number of 
influential armed group leaders from Ituri were arrested in Kinshasa following the 
killings of nine U.N. peacekeepers. Several of those arrested, including Thomas 
Lubanga, Floribert Njabu[365] and Germain Katanga, were accused by Human Rights 
Watch and others of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Authorities arrested 
several of them without charge and held them for weeks before bringing any charges 
against them, in clear violation of Congolese legal procedures. By early December, 
they had been in detention for ten months but there has been no effort to bring them to 
trial [original footnote omitted, ChP].366 
 
On 2 July 2007, a sealed warrant of arrest was issued against Katanga, charging him 
with a number of war crimes and crimes against humanity related to the attack on 
the village of Bogoro on 24 February 2003.367 Four days later, the ICC Registrar 
                                                                                                                                              
Chamber’s examination of any request for interim release by Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba pursuant to article 
60(4) of the Statute [emphasis added, ChP].” 
364 See n. 269 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII. 
365 As also stated in the context of the Lubanga Dyilo case, one can expect that Njabu, if he is brought 
before the ICC one day, will raise similar allegations as Lubanga Dyilo and Katanga. 
366 Human Rights Watch, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo. Elections in sight: “Don’t Rock the Boat”?’, 
15 December 2005 (available at: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/drc1205/drc1205.pdf), 
p. 15. See also n. 70 and accompanying text. 
367 For more information, see ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ‘Urgent Warrant of Arrest for Germain 
Katanga’ (Under seal), ICC-01/04-01/07, 2 July 2007, p. 6: “[T]here are reasonable grounds to believe 
that Germain Katanga is criminally responsible under article 25(3)(a) or, in the alternative, under article 
25(3)(b) of the Statute, for: i) murder as a crime against humanity, punishable under article 7(1)(a) of 
the Statute; ii) wilful killing as a war crime, punishable under article 8(2)(a)(i) or article 8(2)(c)(i) of the 
Statute; iii) inhumane acts as a crime against humanity, punishable under article 7(1)(k) of the Statute; 
iv) inhuman treatment as a war crime, punishable under article 8(2)(a)(ii) or cruel treatment as a war 
crime, punishable under article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute; v) the war crime of using children under the age 
of fifteen years to participate actively in hostilities, punishable under article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) or article 
8(2)(e)(vii) of the Statute; vi) sexual slavery as a crime against humanity, punishable under article 
7(1)(g) of the Statute; vii) sexual slavery as a war crime, punishable under article 8(2)(b)(xxii) or article 








filed an urgent and sealed request to the DRC for the arrest and surrender of 
Katanga,368 including an urgent and sealed request for the identification, tracing, 
freezing and seizure of Katanga’s property and assets.369 Although it is not entirely 
clear when this latter request was actually issued to the DRC (although it is probably 
the same date as the date of transmission of the request for arrest and surrender), the 
request for arrest and surrender was transmitted to the DRC on 18 September 
2007.370 In any case, Katanga was already in custody at the time, at the same 
detention centre where Lubanga Dyilo was imprisoned. On 17 October 2007, 
Katanga was removed from this Centre pénitentiaire371 et de rééducation de 
Kinshasa so that the DRC authorities could surrender him to the ICC on 18 October 
2007.372 At the initial hearing before the ICC on 22 October 2007, duty counsel for 
Katanga, Xavier-Jean Keita, made comparable male captus allegations as Lubanga 
Dyilo had done before,373 but it was only much later, on 30 June 2009, after the 
                                                                                                                                              
population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities, punishable under 
article 8(2)(b)(i) or article 8(2)(e)(i) of the Statute; ix) pillaging a town or place, even when taken by 
assault as a war crime, punishable under article 8(2)(b)(xvi) or article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute”. 
368 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ‘Urgent Request to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the 
Arrest and Surrender of Germain Katanga’ (Under seal), ICC-01/04-01/07, 6 July 2007. 
369 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ‘Urgent Request to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the 
Purpose of Obtaining the Identification, Tracing, Freezing and Seizure of the Property and Assets of 
Germain Katanga’ (Under seal), ICC-01/04-01/07, 6 July 2007. 
370 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of [the] Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public Redacted Version of the Defence 
motion for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings (ICC-01/07-01/04-1258-Conf-
Exp)’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/07, 2 July 2009, p. 10 or ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion for a declaration on unlawful detention and 
stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-
01/04-01/07, 17 August 2009, para. 3. 
371 See n. 5.  
372 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public redacted version of the “Decision 
on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of 
Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp)’ (Public document), ICC-01/04-
01/07, 3 December 2009, para. 6. It may be interesting to note that pictures from Katanga’s surrender 
can be viewed at http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/47548#. 
373 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation [in the] Democratic Republic of [the] Congo, First 
Appearance Hearing – Open Session, Transcript ICC-01-04-01-07-T-5-ENG, 22 October 2007, 
available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc357321.PDF, pp. 16-21. At these pages, it was 
claimed, among other things, that Katanga was deprived of his liberty in February 2005 and that he was 
officially placed in detention on 10 March 2005. (See ibid., p. 16.) Furthermore, the Defence contended 
that according to Congolese law, Katanga had to be brought before a judge within 12 months but that 
this did only happen after 14 months, on 1 May 2006, when he appeared before a military court. (See 
ibid., pp. 16-17.) (However, note that Katanga’s lawyer also explained that before that time, namely on 
20 January 2006, Katanga was heard once by a certain Colonel Tsino – this must be Tsinu, see n. 390 
and accompanying text – and that in that interview, which was held in the absence of Katanga’s lawyer, 
Katanga was asked about Bogoro, see ibid., p. 18.) (Note furthermore that it will be shown infra that the 








confirmation of the charges (on 26 September 2008), but before the commencement 
of the actual trial (on 24 November 2009), that the Defence filed an official male 
captus submission.374  
In this submission, of which the publicly available redacted version was filed on 
2 July 2009, the Defence argued that Katanga, who had become an accused in the 
meantime (see footnote 30 of Chapter I),  
 
was unlawfully arrested and detained by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of 
[the] Congo (…) with a consequent flagrant breach of his human rights in 
international law and under the Statute of the ICC. It is submitted that these violations 
must be viewed in the light of the actions and omissions of the Office of the 
Prosecutor and the Registry, and in the context that this detention was in part at the 
behest and for the purposes of the International Criminal Court. The accused is 
entitled to an effective remedy for the violation of those rights.375 
   
That the Defence tries to convince the judges that the ICC was involved in the male 
captus and that this was in part at the behest of the ICC may not come as a surprise. 
After all, if the ICC judges were to agree with that, the arrest/detention would fall 
under concepts such as concerted action/action “by his/her accusers”/constructive 
custody, see the case of Lubanga Dyilo, concepts which trigger the application of 
Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute. In addition, if the male captus were 
                                                                                                                                              
May 2006, and that Katanga was not brought before a court until 1 December 2006.) At the meeting(s) 
in May 2006, Katanga’s lawyer challenged the irregularity of Katanga’s detention. However, this plea 
was apparently unsuccessful as Katanga’s detention was extended by 60 days. Nevertheless, it was only 
on 30 November 2006 that Katanga was brought before the military court for the second time (see the 
point mentioned above that it will be explained infra that Katanga appeared before a court for the first 
time on 1 December 2006), which – again – extended his detention by 60 days. He was allegedly not 
brought before the Court two months later, however, but some four and a half months later, on 10 April 
2007. At this hearing, his detention was again extended for two months. (See ibid., p. 17.) It was also 
claimed, among other things, that during the official ICC arrest and surrender, irregularities occurred, 
see, for example, ibid., p. 19, where it is claimed that Katanga did not receive a copy of his arrest 
warrant. In that context, it was also argued that “he was not asked to challenge the Warrant of Arrest 
that was read out to him or to rely on Congolese law, which gives him the right to request his release, 
even interim release”. (Ibid., pp. 19-20.) 
374 This delay was explained by the fact that “[t]he Defence was persuaded to file this motion having 
been appraised of all the documents, views of the DRC on the nature and course of the national 
proceedings as well as those of the Prosecutor on his knowledge of documents and interactions with the 
DRC, but especially those observations expressed on the 1st of June 2009 [original footnote omitted, 
ChP].” (ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of [the] Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public Redacted Version of the Defence 
motion for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings (ICC-01/07-01/04-1258-Conf-
Exp)’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/07, 2 July 2009, para. 3.) The observations of 1 June 2009 can be found at 
ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation [in the] Democratic Republic of [the] Congo, Case against Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Hearing – Open Session, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-65-ENG ET WT, 1 
June 2009, available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc694962.pdf. 
375 ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of [the] Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public Redacted Version of the Defence 
motion for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings (ICC-01/07-01/04-1258-Conf-








deemed so serious that one can no longer speak of a fair trial, one can expect that the 
ICC would issue a male detentus verdict/a refusal of jurisdiction/a final stay of the 
proceedings.376 
Focusing on the remedy for the alleged violations, the Defence first argued that 
these “have such an impact on the integrity of the process that the appropriate 
remedy is a stay or termination of the proceedings”.377 Alternatively, it was 
submitted that Katanga would be entitled to compensation and, in the case of 
conviction, a reduction of the sentence.378 
Specifically, the Defence divided the alleged violations into three phases: 1) “the 
initial and subsequent detention of the accused while not yet envisaged as an 
accused before the ICC”;379 2) “the detention of the accused from the time he 
became a principal suspect in the case but before the issuance of an international 
warrant of arrest”380 and 3) “from the time of the issuance of an international 
warrant of arrest[381] on the 2nd July 2007 until the completion of his transfer to The 
Hague”.382 Returning to the concerted action/action “by his/her 
accusers”/constructive custody point mentioned above, the Defence explained that 
the second and third phases “involved the participation of organs of the ICC, thus 
giving continuity to the unlawfulness of the detention into the processes of the 
ICC”.383 
With respect to the first phase, the Defence noted that Katanga was initially 
arrested at the Grand Hotel in Kinshasa on 26 February 2005, in the aftermath of the 
killing of nine MONUC peacekeepers one day earlier.384 He was confined by agents 
to the hotel premises and given no documents. Likewise, his lawyers were not, in 
fact never, given access to the case file.385 Two days later, he was taken to another 
hotel and then – again – to a third. Around 9 March 2005, he was brought to a small 
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local prison but only the day after, on 10 March 2005, did the official procedures 
begin, when a warrant was issued for his arrest according to the legal procedures.386   
In the second phase, the Defence continued, Katanga became the principal 
suspect of the ICC case in Ituri, the case dealing with the attack on the village of 
Bogoro. Although the Defence was not sure when Katanga became a suspect in this 
case exactly – this was up to the Prosecution to clarify387 – it was argued that this 
had to be at least by November 2005, when “the Prosecutor announced that he had a 
new investigation and this turned out to be that of Katanga’s involvement in 
Bogoro”.388 On 18 January 2006, Katanga (and his co-accused) filed a written 
complaint, “noting that they had not been informed of the reasons for their arrest 
and requesting provisional release [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.389 Two days 
later, and 11 months after he was first deprived of his liberty, Katanga was 
interviewed by Colonel Tsinu Phukuta,390 officer of the Public Ministry at the 
Military High Court.391 The Defence claimed that at this interview, Katanga was 
unrepresented, was not given the opportunity to make a telephone call and was not 
informed of the charges – even when he specifically asked to be – nor of his 
rights.392 
The Defence then went on to state that on 4 April 2006, 13 months and six days 
after his initial detention and 12 months and 25 days after his formal arrest, “[t]he 
illegality of continued detention beyond 12 months without court order was brought 
to the attention of the Auditor General”.393 As a result of this, court hearings were 
held on 5, 9 and 12 May 2006, 14 months after Katanga’s initial detention.394 
Katanga was not present and his lawyers were deprived access to the case file.395 In 
addition, because the bench was inadequately constituted, the hearing was 
adjourned, for no less than seven months.396 
On 1 December 2006, Katanga appeared in court for the very first time, 21 
months after his initial detention. “This hearing was a result of the request of the 
Auditor General to seek an extension of the detention of the accused.”397 According 
to the Defence, the decision of this hearing, also dated 1 December 2006 and 
allegedly not served on Katanga,398 stated on the one hand that Katanga’s detention 
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ran from 9 March 2005 (thus not mentioning the period between 26 February 2005 
and 9 March 2005), but asserted on the other that he had been detained for only 12 
months.399 Although Katanga’s lawyers were still denied access to the case file, they 
nevertheless “asked for release on the grounds that the detention was illegal 
[original footnote omitted, ChP]”.400 The Military High Court, however, opined   
 
that the question of illegality could not be raised for the period running from the 
initial seizure of the court on 20th April 2005 to the 1st December 2005 because the 
Public Minister could not be held responsible and the court’s jurisdiction was seized 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].401      
 
The Court also “held that there were ‘serious and grave’ indications of guilt, being 
the fundamental condition for provisional detention”,402 a point which, according to 
the Defence, seemingly contradicted the statement of the DRC on 1 June 2009 (see 
footnote 374) “that no significant investigative steps were taken [original footnote 
omitted, ChP]”.403   
It can be argued that the quotation at footnote 401 and accompanying text is 
rather confusing as the two dates of 20 April 2005 and 1 December 2005 were not 
mentioned previously in the Defence’s submission. This confusion increases in the 
remainder of the submission where reference is made to 20 April 2006 as the date 
“when the court was seized by motion”,404 which may mean that the Defence is 
actually referring here to the period between 20 April 2006 and 1 December 2006.   
However, even in that case: if one agrees with the Military High Court that the 
point of illegality cannot be raised for the period between 20 April 2006 and 1 
December 2006, one wonders what happened to the alleged violations in the period 
between 26 February 2005 and 20 April 2006. The fact that the Defence also 
addresses this period (between 26 February 2005 and 20 April 2006)405 may indeed 
mean that the above-mentioned dates of 20 April 2005 and 1 December 2005 are 
simply erroneous.  
Then, on 2 March 2007, the Auditor General again sought an extension of 
Katanga’s detention.406 A hearing was scheduled for 5 April 2007 but it only took 
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place on 10 April 2007.407 At this hearing, the Military High Court once more 
decided to extend Katanga’s detention, holding “that the reasons for keeping the 
accused in detention, given at the prior hearing, remained valid [original footnote 
omitted, ChP]”,408 one of them being that Katanga “was being pursued for crimes 
against humanity [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.409 It did not, however, answer 
the claim of Katanga “that the Public Minister demonstrated negligence in 
maintaining the detention through not exercising due diligence in bringing the case 
to trial [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.410 It is, of course, very interesting, the 
Defence continued, how all this must be see in light of the fact that the DRC had 
claimed on 1 June 2009, see again footnote 374, “that no investigations were ever 
conducted with respect to the accused for any crime, including that of the death of 
the nine blue helmets”.411 
Finally, on 25 June 2007, a second letter asking for provisional release was 
written by Katanga,412 who noted “that he had been detained since 26 February 2005 
and that the last prorogation [had] expired on 21 June 2007 [original footnote 
omitted, ChP]”.413 
With respect to the third and last phase, which began with the issuance of the 
ICC arrest warrant on 2 July 2007, the Defence explained, among other things, that 
Katanga was taken to the Auditorat Général on the morning of 17 October 2007 
without his lawyer being informed about this.414 In the afternoon, he was 
interviewed by Colonel Mutalizi (this must be: Colonel Muntazini Mukimapa),415 
about which interview the Defence asserts: 
 
The accused was not informed of the charges against him, nor read his rights. He was 
not informed of his right to silence, nor of his rights not to incriminate himself. His 
lawyer was not present and there is no indication in the documents that the accused 
consented to this situation.416 
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However, it was admitted that later that day, his lawyer, who was (merely) contacted 
by a colleague, arrived to assist him.417 Although the Defence does not mention this 
point, it is possible that Katanga was informed of the charges after his lawyer had 
arrived. At least, that may be deduced from (the comments to) one of the photos of 
Katanga’s surrender, see footnote 372, where one can see a person reading a 
document to Katanga and another person, and where one can read: “Le Colonel 
[Muntazini Mukimapa] lit les chefs d’accusation devant [G]ermain Katanga et son 
avocat”. In that respect, one can also refer to the words of Katanga’s duty counsel 
during the initial hearing on 22 October 2007, where he stated:   
 
From 10.00 in the morning till 7.00 in the evening he was detained in a cell. At 7.00 
he was visited by his lawyer, Mr. (…) Bertin Boki, with whom he was able to talk for 
a few minutes. And when he came out of his cell, two cameramen were present and 
so were photographers, and the senior military officer, the general, read out in French 
the Warrant of Arrest that the Court has just caused to be read out. Mr. Katanga 
informs me that a copy of this Warrant of Arrest which was read out to him in French 
was not handed to him or to his counsel, and he was not asked to sign any report 
whatsoever.418 
 
Be that as it may (this point will be returned to infra), the Defence continued to 
explain that when Muntazini Mukimapa, in his interview, and in the absence of 
Katanga’s counsel, asked Katanga if he accepted being surrendered to the ICC, 
Katanga stated that he did.419 The Defence also complained of the fact that “no steps 
were taken at the Auditorat Général to verify his medical condition or provide 
medical assistance”420 when Katanga replied, when asked about his state of health, 
that “he had finished a course of treatment for malaria two days previously”421 and 
that “he was coughing and had a cold”.422 Moreover, no food was provided, even 
though Katanga had not eaten breakfast (he only received food when his flight to 
The Hague left on 18 October 2007),423 and Katanga was not allowed to use the 
toilet.424 In addition, the Defence continued, “[t]he documents do not indicate 
whether the accused was asked if he needed to call anyone or if any arrangements 
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needed to be made for his family”.425 Finally, with respect to his arrival in The 
Hague, the Defence asserted: 
 
The accused was brought a doctor then taken through search procedures. It is not 
indicated that any specific medical attention was given to the accused. There is no 
indication that the ICC officials informed the accused of his rights or spoke of them, 
or that he was informed of his right to silence.[426] As far as the record shows, no 
arrangements were made with respect to his family. The lawyer for the accused was 
not present during these procedures.427 
  
Now that the three phases had been discussed factually, the Defence turned to the 
legal merits of the case, claiming that “serious violations of his rights under 
international law run through all three phases in a continuing manner”.428 
After having explained international legal standards on arrest and detention 
(namely the right to personal liberty429 (of which it correctly noted, by the way, that 
it is “[w]ithout any doubt (…) part of internationally recognised human rights, in the 
sense of Article 21 (3) of the ICC Statute”),430 the right to be brought promptly 
before the competent judicial authority,431 the right to be informed of the reasons for 
arrest/of the charges432 and the right to have access to and assistance of counsel)433 
and the law of the DRC on these matters,434 it claimed that the four above-
mentioned rights had been violated. 
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Specifically, with respect to the right to personal liberty, it was submitted “that 
the arrest and detention of the accused was unlawful under national as well as 
international law and, in the context of the length of unlawful detention, amounted 
to serious mistreatment”.435 More specifically, it was argued, among other things, 
“that the initial arrest [made in the aftermath of the killing of the nine MONUC 
peacekeepers, ChP] was unlawful as it was not supported by reasonable grounds or 
justification”.436 In addition, it was asserted that Katanga’s subsequent provisional 
detention was irregular and in violation of the Constitution, the Military Legal Code 
and the Code of Criminal Procedure.437 Katanga stressed that these were not mere 
technical irregularities but serious human rights violations:438 
 
It is submitted that his fundamental right to liberty was violated in a very basic way 
because the authorities which detained him had no reasonable justification for his 
arrest on the basis of the murder of the MONUC soldiers nor for his continued 
detention for such offence. The DRC authorities stated to the Chamber that no steps 
were taken to investigate the matter. Even if the arrest had been on reasonable 
grounds, his continued detention for more than two and a half years could not be 
premised on reasonable grounds or constitute a reasonable duration in the absence of 
investigations.439 
 
In that context, the Defence argued that the DRC’s claim of ‘preventive 
custody/detention’ had to be rejected.440 According to the Defence, it appeared “that 
the state authorities in the DRC have been keeping individuals in detention without 
charge merely for the benefit of the ICC”,441 a point which was allegedly confirmed 
by Human Rights Watch and the Minister of Human Rights.442 Although these are, 
of course, only general allegations, the Defence also asserted that “[t]here is some 
evidence of this nature directly relating to the accused, in that the State had 
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indicated that it was awaiting elements from the ICC [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]”.443 
With respect to the second right, the right to be brought promptly before the 
competent judicial authority, it was maintained that Katanga was deprived of his 
liberty for the first time on 26 February 2005 and that he was only brought before a 
judge 21 months later, on 1 December 2006.444 The Defence submitted that “this 
constituted a grossly excessive period of time without the opportunity to challenge 
the lawfulness of his detention, such that it amounted to a grave violation of the 
right to be brought promptly before a judicial authority”,445 both under DRC and 
international law.446 The Defence also explained that even if the interview of 20 
January 2006447 were to be seen as the moment Katanga was brought before a 
judicial authority, there was still “a grotesquely unacceptable period of delay of 11 
months – or, of over 10 months if detention ran from March 2005”.448 
Concerning the third right, the right to be informed of the reasons for arrest/of 
the charges, the Defence argued that “[t]here is no official record indicating the 
accused was informed of any charges against him at any stage before the reading of 
the international arrest warrant”449 and hence concluded that this long period (more 
than two and a half years) “is by any standard a serious violation of this right under 
national and international law and a flagrant violation of human rights”.450 
With respect to the fourth and final right, the right to have access to and 
assistance of counsel, the Defence repeated the assertion that Katanga’s counsel was 
not present at the interviews of 20 January 2006 and 17 October 2007 and concluded 
“that these violations in themselves amounted to serious mistreatment in the light of 
the significance of these two interviews to his general situation”.451 However, as 
explained supra, and only focusing here on the hearing of 17 October 2007, it must 
also be noted that there are certain indications that at some point that day, Katanga 
was informed of the charges, in the presence of his counsel. Again, this point will be 
dealt with infra.  
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The Defence subsequently tried to demonstrate the ICC’s involvement with 
respect to the violations from the last two phases, which allegedly started, it is 
recalled,452 at least as from November 2005, when Katanga became a target for the 
Prosecutor.  
Before continuing on this point, it is, however, first worth noting that the 
Defence argued that it would actually not be necessary to establish 
involvement/responsibility here for under the abuse of process doctrine of 
Barayagwiza, it is irrelevant who was responsible for the serious violations of 
Katanga.453 Nevertheless, the Defence continued, “an analysis of the participation of 
the organs of the Court reinforces a connection to the ICC and the view that prior 
violations go directly to the integrity of the process before the ICC”.454 Although the 
Defence does not explain how the abuse of process doctrine falls within the ICC’s 
system – which is, of course, especially relevant now that the ICC Appeals Chamber 
in Lubanga Dyilo had explicitly rejected this doctrine some two and a half years 
earlier – the Defence’s remark on the abuse of process doctrine itself is arguably 
correct: even though serious violations as such can undermine the integrity of the 
ICC and lead to a refusal of jurisdiction, violations in which it can be proven that the 
ICC was involved, can, of course, even more strongly undermine the integrity of the 
Court,455 cf. also the male detentus test in Lubanga Dyilo, which requires action “by 
his/her accusers”.  
Returning now to the exact point in time at which the ICC became involved in 
the Katanga’s case: this could not be clearly established. However, the Defence felt 
that it was up to the Prosecutor to clarify this point.456 In any case, the issuance of 
the arrest warrant would be “an artificial point to measure the beginning of 
participation by the ICC in the situation of the accused”457 as already before that 
point, “there was the formulation of an intention on the part of his Office to treat the 
accused as a principal suspect in the case concerning Bogoro”.458 The Defence was 
of the opinion that as from the moment the Prosecutor was involved in the case, he 
had a duty of care towards Katanga.459 This is reminiscent of the concept of due 
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diligence as was mentioned, for example, in the Lubanga Dyilo case,460 and indeed, 
Katanga’s Defence would also later turn to this latter concept, see infra.  
However, first, it explained the legal foundation of the duty of care towards the 
accused, by presenting the ICC’s unique cooperation regime. In doing so, it 
correctly pictured a context rather akin to Currie’s lateral system/the “rugby 
pitch”.461 According to the Defence, in this interplay, the organs of the ICC cannot 
“work on the premise that whatever goes on before an accused is in The Hague is of 
no relevance”.462 Crucial in that respect was a provision such as Article 21, 
paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute.463 The Defence opined that, as a result of this 
provision and general principles,     
 
each organ of the Court has an inherent duty to protect the values underlying the 
protection of human rights in the exercise of their discretion and refrain from 
knowingly participating in and/or facilitating the continued violations of the rights of 
an accused. This duty is expressly provided for with respect to the Prosecutor’s 
functions in Article 54(1)(c).464 
 
According to the Defence, this was not what the Prosecutor had done in this case, as 
he “ought to have been in possession of sufficient information (…) to be aware that 
the accused’s detention in the DRC was inconsistent with international human rights 
standards”.465 What the Prosecutor should have done, the Defence continued, was 
 
to act with speed and diligence in requesting the transfer of the accused once it was 
determined that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused had 
committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC and that his detention was tainted 
with illegality. This, it is suggested, necessarily flows from his duty of care to the 
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Article 59 of the Statute and Rule 117 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence [emphasis in original, 
ChP].” For Currie’s “rugby pitch”, see the final pages of Chapter VIII. 
462 Ibid., para. 82. (This point was actually formulated in the form of a rhetorical question.) 
463 See ibid. 
464 Ibid., para. 83. Note that Art. 54, para. 1 (c) of the ICC Statute was explicitly mentioned in Chapter 
IX, in the examination of a number of provisions from the proper instruments of the ICC which could be 
seen as being (indirectly) relevant for the male captus discussion, see the text preceding n. 44 and 
accompanying text of Chapter IX. 








accused and the right of the accused to be tried without undue delay encapsulated in 
Article 67(1)(c) of the Statute.466 
 
Not surprisingly (see footnote 460), the Defence then referred to Barayagwiza467 to 
show that the ICC Prosecutor had failed in his prosecutorial due diligence.468 Instead 
of ending the violations of Katanga’s rights once the Prosecutor became involved in 
the case pursuant to such provisions as Articles 21, paragraph 3, 54, paragraph 1 (c) 
and 67, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute,469 he knowingly countenanced the illegal 
detention of Katanga in the DRC, “thereby facilitating and taking advantage of a 
situation of illegality”.470 It must be borne in mind that this situation is somewhat 
different from a court which exercises jurisdiction over a person who has been the 
victim of a male captus because that male captus was not very serious and indeed, 
not the fault of the prosecuting authorities. In principle, one could argue that in this 
case, the court also takes advantage of an illegality. However, in the case of 
Katanga, the Defence claims that the male captus is far more serious as the 
Prosecutor allegedly took advantage of a situation of which he was aware but upon 
which he nevertheless decided not to act. In fact, the Defence made an even more 
serious allegation when it stated that  
 
[t]here is circumstan[t]ial evidence to suggest that the DRC and the Prosecutor acted 
in tandem in this respect since the DRC was holding accused persons with the 
specific purpose of their transfer to the ICC before the issuance of warrants of arrest 
[original footnote omitted, ChP].471 
 
What the Defence also reproached the Prosecutor for is that he did not keep the Pre-
Trial Chamber properly informed of the (illegal) proceedings in the DRC, 
information which, according to the Defence, could be relevant for the Pre-Trial to 
decide on, for example, the issuance of an arrest warrant.472 After all, pursuant to 
Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber should “refuse to 
grant a warrant of arrest if to do so might implicate the ICC in the violation of the 
rights of a suspect”.473 By not informing the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Prosecutor had 
made the ICC a participant in the violations.474 The Defence went even further, 
                                                          
466 Ibid., para. 86. Note again (see n. 464) that Art. 67, para. 1 (c) of the ICC Statute was also explicitly 
mentioned in Chapter IX, in the examination of a number of provisions from the proper instruments of 
the ICC which could be seen as being (indirectly) relevant for the male captus discussion, see n. 45 and 
accompanying text of Chapter IX. See also n. 261 of Chapter VIII. 
467 See ibid.: “[O]nce the Pr[o]secutor has set this process [namely the process of bringing a defendant to 
trial, ChP] in motion, she is under a duty to ensure that, within the scope of her authority, the case 
proceeds to trial in a way that respects the rights of the accused [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See 
also n. 865 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. (See also n. 460 of the present chapter.) 
468 See ibid. 
469 See ibid., para. 90. 
470 Ibid., para. 92. 
471 Ibid., para. 93. See also ns. 441-443 and accompanying text. 
472 See ibid., para. 95. 
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arguing that if the Prosecutor had informed the Pre-Trial Chamber, the judges 
themselves had to be blamed for being knowing participants in Katanga’s 
violations.475 
The Defence then turned to the third phase of Katanga’s detention and argued 
that Katanga fell under the ICC’s constructive custody between 2 July 2007 (the 
issuance of the arrest warrant) and 18 October 2007 (when Katanga was surrendered 
to the ICC). As from that moment, the Defence submitted, “it is no longer necessary 
(…) to inquire into issues of knowledge and duty of care. At this point any 
continuing illegality becomes the shared fruit and responsibility of the DRC and the 
ICC”.476 Although this last reasoning is definitely correct, one can imagine that 
some discussion is possible with respect to the actual moment Katanga falls under 
the constructive custody of the ICC. The Defence focuses on the arrest warrant and 
the idea behind this document,477 but one could also view this point in a more 
practical way and argue that one should not look at the issuance of the arrest warrant 
(which, despite its title, focuses more on the accusations than on the arrest of the 
suspect), but at the moment the DRC authorities started to actually detain the 
suspect on behalf of the ICC, which can only be after 18 September 2007, the 
moment the more concrete request for arrest and surrender was sent to the DRC 
authorities.478  
However, it can be argued that one should not focus too much on the definition 
and actual starting moments of concepts which can fragment a process which should 
not be fragmented in the first place. What the judges should do is ensure that all 
violations which occur more generally in the context of their case are ultimately 
remedied and that, in determining what kind of remedy be provided, attention is 
being paid, among other things, to the degree of involvement of the ICC in the 
violations. Such involvement is, of course, greater in the context of a provision such 
as Article 59 of the ICC Statute, which starts to apply as from the moment the 
national authorities have received a request for provisional arrest or for arrest and 
surrender, but already before these proceedings, which execute the official ICC 
arrest, the ICC can be said to be involved in the case and to have responsibilities in 
that respect. One could think here of a provision such as Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) 
of the ICC Statute which states that “[i]n respect of an investigation under this 
Statute, a person: (…) Shall not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, and 
                                                          
475 See ibid., para. 99. 
476 Ibid., para. 101. See also ibid., para. 106. 
477 See ibid., para. 102: “[C]ustody may be said to be constructive once it serves the interests of, enables, 
and is in fact being taken advantage of by the ICC for the purpose of his eventual transfer to the ICC. 
Having issued a warrant of arrest against the accused, the ICC had taken a definite and official step with 
a view to his prosecution before the ICC. His continued detention served the direct interests of the ICC 
and the ICC was aware of that detention.” 
478 It is possible (but, because of the omitted information, not clear) that this is the alternative argument 
of the Defence, see ibid., para. 108: “Alternatively, the accused must have come within the constructive 
custody of the Court between [REDACTED], and the 17th October when constructive custody became 
the actual custody of the ICC. During that period the rights of the accused continued to be violated and 
he was not even informed promptly of the new charges against him under the Statute, let alone those 








shall not be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with 
such procedures as are established in this Statute.”479 However, as previously 
clarified, the ICC should not restrict itself to such concepts as investigation, 
arrest/detention at the behest of/constructive custody and the like: irregularities may 
also occur in which the ICC (or a third party working at the behest of the ICC) is not 
involved, but which may nevertheless be seen as falling within the context of an 
ICC case and in need of a remedy (think of the abduction by private individuals just 
before the ICC has initiated its official investigation). 
The Defence also complained about the Registry, namely in the context of 
allegations that Article 59 of the ICC Statute was violated by the DRC because 
Katanga was not brought promptly before the competent judicial authority who, in 
addition, had not inquired whether Katanga had been arrested in accordance with the 
proper process and whether his rights had been respected.480 According to the 
Defence, “[t]he DRC failed to comply with the requirements of Article 59, nor is 
there any indication that the Prosecutor or Registry requested that they do so”.481 In 
this context, the Defence made the general allegation that the fact that the arrest 
warrant was not executed until three and a half months later showed “an intent not 
to put into effect the warrant of arrest”.482 Furthermore, it was also asserted that 
“[o]n the day of his transfer there was continued mistreatment, with the participation 
of the Registry”.483 
Now, what was to be done about all these alleged violations? The Defence 
argued, returning to the point mentioned above, that it is unclear how the Defence 
viewed the abuse of process doctrine to fit within the ICC’s system, that “[w]hatever 
may be the precise status at the ICC of the common law doctrine of ‘abuse of 
process’ there is no doubt that the principles the doctrine is aimed at upholding and 
give effect to are principles equally valued by the ICC”.484 That is, of course, true, 
although neither must it be forgotten that the abuse of process doctrine/the doctrine 
which in the common law context is called abuse of process is broader and more 
suitable to tackle other pre-trial irregularities which are not necessarily related to the 
human rights dimension (the dimension on which the ICC focuses) but which may 
nevertheless be deemed to be so serious that it would undermine the integrity of the 
Court to continue with the case. One could hereby think of violations of State 
sovereignty and the rule of law. In addition, it is to be remembered that the ICC’s 
male detentus test only concerns action by the “accusers” of the suspect/accused and 
that it possibly – see the discussions on the second formulation supra – requires an 
old-fashioned and outdated element, namely that the accused can no longer make his 
defence because of the male captus.  
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480 See ibid., paras. 112-113. 
481 Ibid., para. 112. 
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The Defence, however, was not concerned with this. The fact that an abduction 
did not take place and that private individuals were not involved in the male captus 
of Katanga may also have helped to persuade the Defence that the ICC Appeals 
Chamber’s reasoning in Lubanga Dyilo sufficed here.  
The Defence noted that under this reasoning, the ICC, like the other international 
criminal tribunals “may review the actions of such separate entities [the Defence 
referred here to “state authorities and potentially other international 
organisations”,485 ChP] prior to the transfer of an accused to the tribunal”.486 In fact, 
it was alleged that it does not only have the power, but also the responsibility to do 
so.487 In that context, Katanga also asked the Chamber, and this will remind one of 
the Todorović case, “to consider whether it would be appropriate to order an 
evidentiary hearing in the determination of this matter”.488  
Then, finally, the Defence turned to the last point of its submission, the 
appropriate remedy for these violations. It argued that first, the ICC had to make a 
declaration of illegality, as a result of which it could decide, pursuant to Katanga’s 
right to a remedy, “on the appropriate remedy which may be awarded or left to a 
later decision following the appropriate procedure”.489 With respect to this 
appropriate remedy, the Defence argued, referring to Barayagwiza, Nikolić and 
Lubanga Dyilo, “that given the length and extent of the unlawful detention the 
accused has been subjected to serious mistreatment and the appropriate remedy is a 
stay or termination of the proceedings against him”.490 In this context, it also – 
interestingly – turned to the earlier discussed (male detentus?) formulation in 
Lubanga Dyilo that the violations must be “such as to make it impossible for 
him/her to make his/her defence within the framework of his[/her] rights”.491 
However, the Defence does not go clearly into the arguably most interesting words 
of this statement, namely what it means for the violations to be “such as to make it 
impossible for him/her to make his/her defence within the framework of his[/her] 
rights [emphasis added, ChP]”. It rather focused on the meaning of the idea of the 
violations being “such as to make it impossible for him/her to make his/her defence 
within the framework of his[/her] rights [emphasis added, ChP]”. According to the 
Defence, it was clear that all the violations suffered by Katanga brought “these legal 
proceedings in such disrepute, that a fair trial within the framework of the rights of 
the accused is no longer possible”.492 Of course, one might be of the opinion that 
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Katanga’s violations were such that one can no longer speak of a fair trial, even if 
the trial at the ICC (in the ICC courtroom) itself is fair, but that idea represents the 
other (namely the first and third) formulations of the male detentus test of the ICC 
Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga Dyilo case. However, the Defence does not clarify 
to what extent the violations of Katanga would also lead to a refusal of jurisdiction 
under a (possible) male detentus formulation which, in addition, demands that the 
violations must be “such as to make it impossible for him/her to make his/her 
defence [emphasis added, ChP]”.493 
Be that as it may, the Defence also argued that Katanga was entitled to 
compensation pursuant to Article 85, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute.  
Finally, it was requested “that the matter of the accused[’s] unlawful arrest and 
detention be taken into account at the relevant time, in the event that he is convicted 
of any offence within the jurisdiction of the court”.494 The Defence stated in that 
context that “Rule 146 [this must be Rule 145 of the ICC RPE (‘Determination of 
sentence’), ChP] sets out a variety of factors to be tak[en] into account in the 
determination of sentence, but these are not exhaustive”.495 
On 23 July 2009, the legal representatives of the victims presented their (brief) 
observations. They argued that Katanga had been in detention in the DRC for his 
alleged involvement in the killing of the nine MONUC peacekeepers – not for the 
situation in Bogoro496 – and that his “détention préventive”497 was extended several 
times for the purpose of the investigation.498 Moreover, they opined that the 
procedure by which Katanga was brought before the competent judicial authority 
was in accordance with Congolese law.499 With respect to the allegations of 
                                                                                                                                              
where the total disregard for the basic rights of the accused in arresting and detaining him and the use of 
this to enable his transfer to the Court cloud the legitimacy of his presence in the courtroom every 
additional day the accused is kept in detention. It is therefore submitted that the trial will remain unfair 
as long as the continued detention formerly based on a total disregard for the rights of the accused 
persists, and the justice administered by the court has been brought into such serious disrepute that a fair 
trial has in fact become an impossibility, regardless of the impartiality of the judges in the assessment of 
the evidence.” 
493 In the following paragraph, the Defence does mention the words “make his defence”, but again does 
not explain to what extent the accused can no longer make his defence when brought to court after these 
violations, see ibid., para. 128: “It is important to note that when the Appeals Chamber speaks of a fair 
trial not being possible it takes the view that this occurs when an accused cannot make his defence 
within the framework of his rights. If an unlawful detention in flagrant violation of human rights not 
only continues but effectively enables his attendance at the trial, then the trial cannot take place within 
the framework of his rights and the whole trial is vitiated.” 
494 Ibid., para. 138. 
495 Ibid., para. 137. 
496 See CPI, La Chambre de Première Instance I[I], Situation en République Démocratique du Congo, 
Affaire Le Procureur c. Germain Katanga et Mathieu [Ngudjolo] Chui, ‘Observations des représentants 
légaux des victimes représentées par Me Jean-Louis GILLISEN et Me Joseph KETA sur « The Defence 
motion for a declaration on unlawful d[e]tention and stay of proceedings (ICC-01/04-01/07-125-conf-
Exp) »’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/07, 23 juillet 2009, para. 8. 
497 Ibid., para. 2. See also ibid., para. 8. See for the issue of “preventive detention” n. 440 and 
accompanying text. 
498 See ibid., para. 2. See also ibid., para. 8. 








violations of Congolese law and international human rights law in the context of 
Katanga’s detention in the DRC, in which the ICC organs allegedly participated, the 
legal representatives made a reservation as they were not in the possession of all the 
documents from the case file.500 However, they submitted that if by any chance, the 
judges had to consider involvement of the Court in the violations committed in the 
DRC, the remedy could not be the refusal of jurisdiction in view of the seriousness 
of the alleged crimes of Katanga.501 Such a remedy would violate the rights of the 
victims to the truth and to justice.502  
This study does not agree with the legal representatives of the victims that 
refusal of jurisdiction cannot follow merely because of the seriousness of Katanga’s 
alleged crimes. Obviously, if the violations are so serious that it would undermine 
the integrity of the ICC to continue, a male detentus should follow, whether one is 
dealing with suspects of international crimes or not.503 The victims should not focus 
on their right to have the (alleged) perpetrators of their crimes tried.504 They should 
focus on their right to have the (alleged) perpetrators of their crimes tried fairly. 
However, as concerns this specific case, one can indeed concur that a refusal of 
jurisdiction would be a disproportionate remedy, taking into account, among other 
things, the seriousness of the alleged crimes. Indeed, the fact that some of Katanga’s 
charges were already confirmed may constitute an additional drive for the judges not 
to relinquish jurisdiction unless absolutely necessary.505 However, in that case, 
perhaps other remedies would be justified, a point which the legal representatives of 
the victims, unfortunately, do not address.   
Next, it was up to the Prosecution. In the introduction to its response, the 
Prosecution did not adopt the Defence’s division of the case into three phases, but 
divided the relevant time frame in two periods, namely 1) 26 February 2005 (arrest 
of Katanga by the DRC authorities) – 18 September 2007 (transmission by the 
Registry to the DRC authorities of the ICC’s request for arrest and surrender) and 2) 
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1) that perpetrators of crimes are prosecuted; 2) that perpetrators of crimes are judged and found guilty 
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Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
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18 September 2007 – 18 October 2007 (surrender of Katanga).506 The date of 18 
September 2007 is an interesting one and has already been alluded to in the 
discussion of the Defence’s submission, namely that some time after that date could 
mark the beginning of the ICC’s constructive custody of Katanga, see footnote 478 
and accompanying text.507   
The Prosecution was of the opinion that Katanga’s detention in the first period 
“could not be attributed to the Court and cannot affect the jurisdiction of this 
Court”.508 It hereby referred to the Lubanga Dyilo case and the previously 
mentioned (and criticised) reasoning of the Appeals Chamber in that case “that 
issues regarding his prior detention were relevant only where they were part of”509 
“the process of bringing the appellant to justice for the crimes that form the subject-
matter of the proceedings before the Court”.510 And that was not the case here, as 
“[t]he DRC authorities expressly confirmed that the Accused had not been kept in 
detention for facts related to Bogoro [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.511 As argued 
earlier, the fact that a person may be in detention at the national level for other 
crimes during a time in which the ICC is not involved may very well not be 
considered to fall within the context of the ICC’s case. However, if, during this 
period, a suspect is, for example, seriously mistreated and consequently surrendered 
to the ICC, judges may still be of the opinion that this male captus falls within the 
context of their case and that the violation must hence be remedied. If that male 
captus is so serious that they feel that it would undermine the integrity of the ICC to 
proceed, they will refuse jurisdiction, even – to come back to the assertion of the 
Prosecution mentioned at footnote 508 and accompanying text – if that male captus 
cannot be legally attributed to the ICC. With respect to this first period, the 
                                                          
506 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion 
for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of 
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Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of 
proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07, 
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Prosecutor moreover maintained that there was no concerted action between the 
Prosecutor and the authorities in the DRC to detain Katanga “in order to ensure that 
he would be in custody and available for surrender to the Court [original footnote 
omitted, ChP]”.512 
With respect to the second period, the Prosecutor admitted that the detention 
based on the ICC’s request for arrest and surrender, which lasted about a month, was 
attributable to the ICC.513 One could argue that, in making this statement, the 
Prosecutor follows the apparent view of the Deputy Prosecutor in Lubanga Dyilo 
(see n. 90 and accompanying text) that if a suspect is arrested/detained at the 
behest/request of the ICC, violations in that context can be attributed to the ICC. 
This broad responsibility for violations occurring in the suspect’s constructive 
custody is surely to be welcomed. However, the Prosecutor continued, both 
Katanga’s detention and the surrender “were legally and factually unblemished”.514 
A little earlier, it was explained that the Prosecutor argued that the detention in 
the first period “could not be attributed to the Court and cannot affect the 
jurisdiction of this Court”. However, perhaps the Prosecutor retreats from this 
assertion when he made his final point, stating that  
 
the Defence does not substantiate that the Accused suffered torture or any other 
serious form of mistreatment which could have the consequence that this Court 
cannot properly proceed against him. A stay of proceedings is the most exceptional of 
remedies, to be applied only in cases where it is impossible to secure a fair trial of the 
Accused [original footnote omitted, ChP].515 
 
The word “perhaps” has been used here as the words of the Prosecutor are very 
generally formulated and could easily apply to situations in which the suspect is 
seriously mistreated as such, irrespective of the entity responsible. However, doubt 
is created by his reference to paragraph 39 of the Appeals Chamber’s decision in the 
Lubanga Dyilo case, a paragraph used in the Appeals Chamber’s discussion of its 
own male detentus test, a test which demands action “by his/her accusers”. A test, 
moreover, created by an Appeals Chamber which rejected the abuse of process 
doctrine.  
Now that the introduction of his response was presented, the Prosecutor turned to 
the relevant factual background. Here, he argued, among other things, that when 
Katanga was brought before the competent judicial authorities on 17 October 2007, 
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these authorities “determined that he was the person named in the warrant, notified 
the Accused of the warrant of arrest, and read out the charges against him [original 
footnotes omitted, ChP]”.516 In addition, when this happened, Katanga was assisted 
by his counsel.517 Although the Prosecutor does not go into the other two points of 
Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute here (namely that the competent judicial 
authority must determine whether Katanga has been arrested in accordance with the 
proper process and whether his rights have been respected), the assertion that his 
lawyer was present when the charges were read to Katanga strengthens the already 
expressed doubt (see footnote 418 and accompanying text) with respect to 
Katanga’s allegations on this point. The Prosecutor also contested other claims of 
Katanga concerning his surrender and arrival at the ICC, maintaining that on 17 
October 2007, Katanga “was medically examined by a doctor designated by the 
Court, who certified that the Accused was fit to travel [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]”518 and that, when Katanga arrived in The Hague, “he was subjected to a 
medical examination [original footnote omitted, ChP]”519 and “visited by staff of the 
Court, who gave him a file containing the Court’s basic legal documents, including 
a certified copy of the warrant of arrest, and read him his rights [original footnote 
omitted, ChP]”.520 
After these factual issues had been addressed, the Prosecutor turned to the legal 
arguments of the case, where he looked at 1) the relevant legal framework; 2) the 
point that Katanga’s detention by the DRC authorities does not require a stay of the 
proceedings or in fact any other remedy and 3) the point that the Defence did not 
substantiate any allegation of torture or serious mistreatment. 
In his discussion of first point, the relevant legal framework, the Prosecutor 
addressed three issues, namely a) the doctrine of abuse of process and stay of the 
proceedings; b) the relevance of detention by national authorities to the proceedings 
before the ICC and c) the point that the jurisprudence adduced by the Defence does 
not support the Defence motion.    
With respect to the point under a), the Prosecutor first (correctly) explained that 
the abuse of process as such had been rejected by the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga 
Dyilo but that the judges had nevertheless formulated a test of their own in the 
context of Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute.521 According to the 
Prosecutor, the remedy of a stay of the proceedings only applied:  
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a) where “either the foundation of the prosecution or the bringing of the accused to 
justice is tainted with illegal action or gross violation of the rights of the individual 
making it unacceptable for justice to embark on its course;” b) “[w]here the breaches 
of the rights of the accused are such as to make it impossible for him/her to make 
his/her defence within the framework of his[/her] rights, no fair trial can take place 
and the proceedings can be stayed”; or c) “[i]f, at the outset, it is clear that the 
essential preconditions of a fair trial are missing and there is no sufficient indication 
that this will be resolved during the trial process” [original footnotes omitted, ChP].522  
 
The last possibility does not stem from the decision of 14 December 2006, but from 
a very famous decision issued almost two years later in which the Appeals Chamber 
confirmed the Trial Chamber’s stay of the proceedings because of other, evidence-
related, problems, namely because the Prosecution had improperly/too extensively 
used Article 54, paragraph 3 (e) of the ICC Statute523 when obtaining information 
from the UN and NGOs.524 This had led to the non-disclosure of a considerable 
amount of exculpatory evidence and thus to the inability of Lubanga Dyilo to defend 
himself. Although this is indeed a stay of the proceedings possibility, it is, of course, 
better to focus here on the formulations used by the ICC in actual male captus 
decisions. After all, the case from 2008 did not involve a male captus issue, as it did 
not concern a problem related to the way the suspect was brought into the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. With respect to the evidence problems suffered by Lubanga 
Dyilo, one can indeed concur with the Appeals Chamber/Trial Chamber525 in that 
case that the unfairness of the trial may be resolved during the proceedings in court, 
namely when the exculpatory evidence is nonetheless disclosed to the Defence.526 
However, this is different with respect to very serious male captus cases. If such 
serious situations occur, it is irrelevant whether the suspect can still enjoy a fair trial 
in court because it would be unfair to try the suspect in the first place; some 
                                                          
522 Ibid., para. 23. 
523 This provision states that “[t]he Prosecutor may (…) Agree not to disclose, at any stage of the 
proceedings, documents or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality 
and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the information consents”. 
524 See (the already briefly mentioned, see n. 623 of Chapter III and n. 247 of this chapter) ICC, Appeals 
Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled 
“Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) 
agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues 
raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008”’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, 21 
October 2008. The words to which the Prosecutor in Katanga refers can be found at para. 76 of this 
decision. In fact, they stem not from the Appeals Chamber itself, but from the Trial Chamber (whose 
decision was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber), see ICC, Trial Chamber I, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Urgent 
Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) 
agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues 
raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 13 June 2008, 
para. 91. 
525 See the previous footnote. 
526 See also n. 623 of Chapter III and accompanying text, explaining the difference between a 








situations are simply not reparable. In that respect, it is a pity that the Prosecutor 
only mentions the second formulation of the Appeals Chamber’s (male detentus?, 
see supra and infra) test and not, for example, the first, where it was stated that 
“[w]here fair trial becomes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental 
rights of the suspect or the accused by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction 
in terms to put the person on trial”. Although such a broader avenue can be found in 
the first possibility presented by the Prosecutor, one must not forget that these words 
stem from a case discussed in the context of the abuse of process doctrine, a doctrine 
which was explicitly rejected by the Appeals Chamber.527  
A final interesting point to be made here is that the Prosecutor, in contrast to the 
Appeals Chamber in its decision of 14 December 2006, clearly presents different 
possibilities which can lead to the ending of the case. That may constitute additional 
evidence for the earlier mentioned idea that the second (male detentus?) formulation 
as used by the Appeals Chamber in its decision of 14 December 2006 may not be a 
more strict version of the first and third formulations in that decision, but may 
constitute an additional possibility to lead to the ending of the case, namely in case 
certain serious violations entail that the accused can no longer make his defence. If 
that were so, than a male captus victim does not need to turn to this seemingly 
stricter formulation as he can already rely on the broader formulations which better 
suit male captus problems, namely the first and third formulations. (Or the first 
formulation presented here by the Prosecutor.)  
After having presented these three possibilities, the Prosecutor turned to the 
point under b), the relevance of detention by national authorities to the ICC’s 
proceedings, repeating the (criticised) point mentioned in his introduction that the 
Appeals Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo had stated that it would only look at 
irregularities in the detention if these were part of “the process of bringing the 
appellant to justice for the crimes that form the subject-matter of the proceedings 
before the Court”.528 The Prosecutor then explained, and this point has to do with 
                                                          
527 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
31. 
528 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion 
for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07, 17 August 2009, para. 24. In this context (see 
ibid., para. 24, n. 38), the Prosecutor also asserted that “[a]ccording to the established practice before 
this Court, detention by national authorities prior to the transfer of an Accused to the Court is also not 
relevant for the purposes of Article 60(4)”, referring to ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Decision on the powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber to review proprio motu the pre-trial 
detention of Germain Katanga’ (Urgent, Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/07, 18 March 2008, p. 11 
(see also n. 510) and ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In 
the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Decision on the 
Conditions of the Pre-Trial Detention of Germain Katanga’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/07, 21 








the word “perhaps” (see the text following footnote 515 and accompanying text), 
that besides the Appeals Chamber’s male detentus test in which involvement of the 
ICC is required,529 “torture or serious mistreatment of the suspect that is “in some 
way related to the process of arrest and transfer of the person”[530] to the Court 
might – if sufficiently outrageous – justify the non-assumption of the jurisdiction in 
any given case”.531 One can, of course, agree with this view, which would arguably 
also lead to a refusal of jurisdiction, irrespective of the entity responsible (the words 
“in any given case” reinforce that idea) and irrespective of the question for which 
crimes the person was in detention at the national level, cf. the very general words 
“in some way related to the process of arrest and transfer of the person” to the 
ICC.532 However, as the Prosecutor concurred earlier with the Appeals Chamber’s 
view in Lubanga Dyilo, demanding that the irregularities must be connected to “the 
process of bringing the appellant to justice for the crimes that form the subject-
matter of the proceedings before the Court”,533 it is unclear whether the above-
mentioned broader formulation does in fact represent the Prosecutor’s stance. With 
respect to the words “in any given case”, this test is surely better presented than that 
of the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo which spoke of “instances of torture or 
serious mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial State [emphasis added 
ChP]”. However, where the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo surpassed the 
Prosecutor in Katanga is that the former stated that the application of this reasoning, 
to date, has been restricted to these instances (which does not exclude other serious 
male captus situations which do not involve serious mistreatment/torture), whereas 
the Prosecutor in Katanga was only interested in serious mistreatment/torture if 
                                                                                                                                              
addition, besides the fact that the first decision, which referred to the 13 February 2007 decision in 
Lubanga Dyilo, was already criticised earlier, see n. 510 of the present chapter and n. 265 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VIII, it arguably did take detention prior to surrender into account, 
namely the detention at the behest of the ICC between the issuance of the arrest warrant/request for 
arrest and surrender and the actual surrender. 
529 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion 
for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07, 17 August 2009, para. 25. The Prosecutor referred 
here (see ibid., para. 25, n. 41), among other things, to the decision of 21 October 2008 (see n. 524 and 
accompanying text), the decision which did not concern a male captus issue, but in which the Appeals 
Chamber nevertheless discussed the reasoning of its male captus decision of 14 December 2006 
(including the “by his/her accusers” paragraph). 
530 This is very much reminiscent not only of the abuse of process formulation of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
in Lubanga Dyilo (see n. 159 and accompanying text), but also of the abuse of process formulation in 
the Duch case (see n. 1276 and accompanying text of Chapter VI), see also n. 295 of the present chapter. 
531 ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion 
for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07, 17 August 2009, para. 25. 
532 This would also comport with the Prosecutor’s stance in Lubanga Dyilo, see ns. 195 and 295. 








sufficiently outrageous. In fact, the Prosecutor confined this test even further when 
referring to the (criticised)534 words of the ICTY Trial Chamber in Karadžić that  
 
it could only be in exceptional circumstances that actions of a third party that is 
completely unconnected to the Tribunal or the proceedings could ever lead to those 
proceedings being stayed. Where an accused is seriously mistreated by such a third 
party, that mistreatment is unlikely to be a barrier to a fair trial which can be secured 
in various other ways, for example, by excluding any evidence obtained by torture at 
the hands of the third party [original footnote omitted, ChP].535 
 
However, as already argued in Chapter VI and in this chapter, wondering whether a 
person can still enjoy a fair trial in the courtroom after being seriously 
mistreated/tortured is the wrong question, one which focuses on the restricted view 
of a fair trial, a fair trial in the courtroom. The judges confronted by such a case 
should not consider whether in such a case, the suspect/accused can still enjoy a fair 
trial in court. They should consider whether the serious mistreatment/torture as such 
is not already so serious that one can no longer speak of a fair trial/that it would be 
unfair to have a trial in the first place and thus that jurisdiction must be refused, 
whether or not the suspect/accused can still enjoy a fair trial in court. 
Finally, it must be borne in mind that even though one may agree with (some 
aspects of) the above-mentioned view of the Prosecutor, it is not at all clear whether 
the Appeals Chamber also shares the serious mistreatment/torture male detentus 
avenue as the remarks related to that avenue were made in the context of the abuse 
of process doctrine,536 a doctrine which the Appeals Chamber explicitly rejected. 
The fact that the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo factually agreed with the Pre-
Trial Chamber that no serious mistreatment/torture occurred in the case537 does not 
necessarily mean that it also shares the legal (and unclear) view of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber with respect to the serious mistreatment/torture male detentus avenue, see 
the text following footnote 283 and accompanying text.  
The third legal point the Prosecutor wished to make, the point under c), had to do 
with the jurisprudence used by the Defence. According to the Prosecutor, this case 
law did not support the Defence motion.538 In his view,  
                                                          
534 See ns. 727 and 733 and accompanying text of Chapter VI and n. 256 and accompanying text of the 
present chapter. 
535 ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion 
for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07, 17 August 2009, para. 25 or n. 733 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
536 See also ibid., para. 25, n. 42, referring, among other things, to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s serious 
mistreatment/torture remarks in Lubanga Dyilo. 
537 See ibid., referring, among other things, to para. 43 of the Appeals Chamber’s male captus decision 
in Lubanga Dyilo where the judges of the Appeals Chamber stated that “the findings of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber respecting the absence of torture or serious mistreatment have not been shown to be erroneous 
in any way.” 








an analysis of the factual basis of the cases relied upon in the Defence Motion and the 
conclusions drawn by the respective courts in those cases corroborates that a stay of 
proceedings based on abuse of process is the most exceptional of remedies. It also 
shows that any abuse must be related to the process of bringing a person to justice for 
crimes that form the subject-matter of the proceedings for which a stay is sought.539  
 
Although one can agree with the Prosecutor that it is unlikely that the male captus of 
Katanga is so serious that one must turn to the “most exceptional of remedies”, 
namely the refusal of jurisdiction, the second part of the quotation repeats the earlier 
criticised requirement of the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo that the 
irregularities must be connected to “the process of bringing a person to justice for 
crimes that form the subject-matter of the proceedings” of the ICC. It also provides 
additional support for the view mentioned above, namely that it is unclear whether 
the broader formulation mentioned at footnote 531 and accompanying text does in 
fact constitute the Prosecutor’s stance.  
In Chapter VII of this book, the principle was distilled that at both the national 
level and the international level, courts use their discretion not to exercise 
jurisdiction if the male captus is so serious that to continue exercising jurisdiction 
would constitute an abuse of the court’s process. However, what constitutes such a 
serious male captus is up to the judges to determine. At the national level, there is an 
additional condition, namely that the authorities of the now prosecuting forum must 
be involved in the male captus, but this requirement is absent (and rightly so) in the 
context of the tribunals which do not have an enforcement arm of their own. 
Otherwise, judges at both levels have the same task, namely to find out whether the 
alleged male captus exists and is so serious that they cannot, in good conscience, 
continue with the case. If the irregularities are connected to a national detention of a 
suspect who was held for the same charges in which the now prosecuting forum is 
interested, one can easily assert that this male captus takes place within the context 
of the prosecuting forum’s case and should therefore be looked into. However, other 
irregularities may occur which do not have the above-mentioned feature but which 
are nevertheless to be seen as falling within the context of the prosecuting forum’s 
case. For example, if a suspect was held at the national level for certain crimes but 
during his detention was seriously mistreated by the national authorities before 
being surrendered to the ICC for other crimes, judges may still believe that this male 
captus falls within the context of their case and that the violation must hence be 
remedied. In short, judges must look at the context of their case more generally.540  
In the remainder of his response, the Prosecutor (correctly) explained that the 
case law of the tribunals – Nikolić,541 Barayagwiza542 and Duch543 – shows that 
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540 See n. 295 for several cases arguably supporting that broader view. 
541 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion 
for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07, 17 August 2009, para. 28. 








refusal of jurisdiction under the abuse of process doctrine is an exceptional remedy, 
but not one of these cases can arguably be seen as support for that other idea, 
namely that the male captus must be connected to the process of bringing a person 
to justice for crimes that form the subject-matter of the now prosecuting forum.544 
Having addressed the relevant legal framework, the Prosecutor turned to the 
second issue related to the legal arguments of his case, namely the point that 
Katanga’s detention by the DRC authorities does not require a stay of the 
proceedings or, in fact, any other remedy. 
In the discussion of this issue, the Prosecutor repeated the previously mentioned 
and criticised point that Katanga’s first period of detention in the DRC was 
“unrelated to the process of bringing the Accused to justice for crimes that form the 
subject-matter of the proceedings before the Court”.545 In this context, he noted that 
the Defence had admitted that the killing of the nine MONUC peacekeepers had 
constituted the reason for Katanga’s initial arrest546 and that the DRC authorities had 
stated that the Bogoro case had not been the subject of proceedings in the DRC.547 
That may indeed be true, but one becomes very curious then to know for which 
crimes (if any at all) Katanga was actually being held at the DRC. See in that respect 
the allegations by the Defence that, during the interview of 20 January 2006, 
Katanga was asked about Bogoro by Colonel Tsinu,548 that the Military High Court 
had held that Katanga was pursued for crimes against humanity549 and finally that 
the DRC authorities had stated “that no investigations were ever conducted with 
respect to the accused for any crime, including that of the death of the nine blue 
helmets”.550 
The Prosecutor subsequently reiterated his argument that, until the ICC request 
for arrest and surrender was served on the DRC authorities, the starting moment of 
the second period of detention, there was no involvement/concerted action/collusion 
of the ICC in the DRC detention.551 Involvement which could, of course, entail that 
violations be imputed to the ICC. With respect to another issue related to the starting 
point of the second period of detention, namely the Defence’s point that the ICC 
                                                                                                                                              
543 See ibid., para. 30. 
544 In fact, in Nikolić, Duch and Barayagwiza, one will find broader formulations, see n. 295. 
545 ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion 
for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07, 17 August 2009, para. 31. 
546 See also n. 384 and accompanying text. 
547 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion 
for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07, 17 August 2009, para. 34.  
548 See n. 373. 
549 See n. 409 and accompanying text. 
550 See n. 411 and accompanying text. 
551 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion 
for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of 








was obliged to speedily transmit the request for arrest and surrender,552 the 
Prosecutor replied, and arguably correctly so, that the Court was under no duty to 
transmit this request without delay.553 The Prosecutor also turned to Article 59 of the 
ICC Statute, again rightly noting that the obligations of this provision only start to 
run as from the request for arrest and surrender/request for provisional arrest.554 
Moreover, he stated that paragraph 2 of this provision “does not impose a further 
obligation on national authorities, or on the ICC, to review the legality of any 
previous detention of the person for national criminal proceedings that are unrelated 
to the process before the Court [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.555 This point was 
also made by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo. In the discussion of that 
case, it was argued that this provision indeed does not contain a clear obligation in 
that respect, but that this does not mean that the competent judicial authority of the 
custodial State – or the ICC, as the ultimate supervisor – should not take into 
account irregularities which occurred prior to the official ICC arrest if these can be 
seen as taking place within the context of the ICC case. Furthermore, it can be 
argued that if the national detention was somehow related to the ICC proceedings, if 
the Prosecutor was involved in that detention, even if it concerned other crimes for 
which the ICC is in the end prosecuting the suspect, both the competent judicial 
authority in the custodial State and the ICC – marginally supervising that authority – 
must review that detention. A provision such as Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC 
Statute would arguably demand this as well.  
The Prosecutor then went on to reject the Defence’s submission that it had a duty 
of care towards Katanga prior to the transmission of the request for arrest and 
surrender.556 According to the Prosecutor, the Defence had misconstrued the 
Prosecutor’s duty under Article 54, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute, in particular 
with respect to Article 67, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute (the right to be tried 
                                                          
552 See n. 466 and accompanying text. 
553 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion 
for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of 
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48: “Contrary to the contention of the Defence, the Prosecution was not obliged to seek a warrant of 
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multiple statutory duties [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
554 See ibid., para. 44. 
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without undue delay).557 The Prosecutor held that the rights under Article 67 of the 
ICC Statute 
 
apply to a person against whom charges have been confirmed, as well as to a “person 
subject to a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear”. However, these rights do not 
extend to a person who is not subject to an enforceable warrant of arrest or a 
summons to appear (i.e. a warrant or a summons that has been issued by a Chamber 
and transmitted to national authorities and/or served on the person) [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].558  
 
However, one can question whether the scope of this provision is not broader. One 
does not even need to refer to the comments of Schabas in that respect:559 one can 
already refer to the Appeals Chamber’s views in Lubanga Dyilo, which stated that 
whenever the ICC is involved in a case, whenever it exercises jurisdiction (this may, 
of course, be prior to the constructive custody, namely in the case of concerted 
action between the ICC and third parties) it must follow internationally recognised 
human rights, such as those stemming from Articles 55, 67 and 21, paragraph 3 of 
the ICC Statute.560  
The Prosecutor also rejected the allegation that he had not acted with due 
diligence:561 he “did not “sit back until he was ready”, as suggested by the Defence, 
but he also did not act prematurely [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.562 Finally, he 
argued that he did not have a duty to inform the judges “of issues pertaining to the 
fact and the conditions of detention by national authorities. Such information would 
be irrelevant for the Chamber’s exercise of its functions [original footnotes omitted, 
ChP].”563 However, if one is of the opinion – as is this study – that the judges have a 
supervisory role in ensuring that all violations occurring in the context of their case 
is, ultimately, remedied, information on alleged irregularities in the pre-trial phase 
would not be irrelevant, it would in fact be indispensable.  
Next, the Prosecutor turned to the second phase of the DRC detention, after 18 
September 2007 (the transmission of the request for arrest and surrender to the DRC 
authorities). Although he conceded that during this phase of constructive custody, 
possible violations could be attributed to the ICC, nothing irregular had happened 
during that phase.564 
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561 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
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ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07, 17 August 2009, para. 50. See also n. 468 and 
accompanying text. 
562 Ibid. 
563 Ibid., para. 52. 








Specifically, he maintained that this second phase could not be seen as a 
continuation of the first phase because “the former detention was tied to a national 
investigation and ordered by national authorities, without participation or influence 
by this Court”.565 However, even if, theoretically, both phases could be linked, the 
Prosecutor continued, the facts nevertheless showed that the two phases constituted 
separate events.566 
The Prosecutor was also of the opinion that the argument of the Defence “that 
the prior detention of the accused can or should be attributed to the Court because 
the Court benefitted from it [original footnote omitted, ChP]”,567 hence the idea 
“that but for the prior detention, the Accused would not have been surrendered”,568 
was “factually incorrect and legally irrelevant”.569 Of course, one could agree with 
the Prosecutor that one can never assert that Katanga would not have been 
surrendered were it not for the fact that he was already in detention; it may very well 
have been possible, if Katanga were at liberty, for him to have been arrested, 
detained and surrendered to the ICC in a normal way.570 However, because Katanga 
was not at liberty, because he was already in custody before being surrendered to the 
ICC, one can, of course, argue that the ICC profited from the fact that he was 
already in detention. However, that does not mean that this detention can be legally 
attributed to the ICC, although the ICC judges may, of course, be of the opinion 
that, notwithstanding this, the detention is nonetheless to be seen as falling within 
the context of their case. 
According to the Prosecutor, nothing irregular occurred in the process of the 
execution of the request for arrest and surrender. In this context, he maintained that 
“[b]ecause the period of delay [of one month, ChP] is reasonable, there is no need to 
consider whether excessive delay could deprive the Court of jurisdiction over the 
Accused”.571 He also submitted, and this touches upon the point made in Chapter 
VIII (in the context of uncooperative States), “that a failure by a national authority 
to act promptly cannot deprive this Court of the ability to prosecute. Such an 
interpretation would enable a State to effectively shield a person from justice, by 
delaying their surrender [original footnote omitted, ChP].”572 This is indeed an 
important point, one which justifies that judges take their role as supervisors over 
the entire proceedings seriously.573 However, it appears that the abuse of process 
doctrine, incorrectly rejected by the Lubanga Dyilo Appeals Chamber, because it is 
so broad, and because the judges can take every element of the case into account, 
would be perfectly able to deal with such situations. If it becomes clear that State 
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authorities have intentionally violated procedures and human rights – only to shield 
the ICC – the judges will not readily conclude that the male captus is so serious as 
to undermine the integrity of the ICC if it were to continue with the case. That might 
even be the case in the event of a prima facie case of serious mistreatment/torture. 
Experienced judges should be able in such cases to determine whether such 
mistreatment/torture was set up or whether it was genuine and to balance all the 
different elements at stake to reach a just verdict. Although judges should, of course, 
be very careful not to become the adjudicators of victims of authentic torture 
practices, much will depend on the circumstances. In any case, one cannot state 
beforehand that any case of serious mistreatment/torture must lead to the ending of 
the case for that would constitute the trigger for States which do not want to 
surrender their own nationals to inflict severe (physical or mental) pain or suffering 
upon them574 before surrendering them to the ICC (if they had not refused to 
surrender those suspects already beforehand, in the context of the Article 59 of the 
ICC Statute proceedings). It would, of course, be a ridiculous situation if a State 
would sooner torture its own nationals (probably even persons high up the hierarchy 
of the State) than to surrender them to a court which, even though it is not perfect, is 
definitely fair in general. However, as there are – unfortunately – ridiculous regimes 
in the world, it is not impossible that judges may nevertheless be confronted by such 
a situation.  
The Prosecutor then went on to reject a number of factual assertions on the part 
of the Defence, assertions (and rejections) which were mentioned earlier and which 
do not need to be repeated here.575 
The third and final point of the Prosecutor’s legal arguments of the case (after 
having discussed the relevant legal framework and the point that Katanga’s 
detention by the DRC authorities does not require a stay of the proceedings or in 
fact any other remedy), was that the Defence had not substantiated any allegation of 
torture or serious mistreatment. 
In the discussion of this point, the Prosecutor again repeated (a slightly different 
version of) the broader formulation mentioned at footnote 531 and accompanying 
text, namely that besides the Appeals Chamber’s male detentus test in which 
involvement of the ICC is required, “torture or serious mistreatment of the suspect 
that is “in some way related to the process of arrest and transfer of the person” to the 
Court may justify the non-assumption of the jurisdiction”.576 The differences 
between this formulation (at paragraph 62 of the Prosecutor’s response) and the one 
mentioned at footnote 531 and accompanying text (at paragraph 25 of the 
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575 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
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for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07, 17 August 2009, para. 60. 








Prosecutor’s response) is that the former speaks of “may” and the latter of “might – 
if sufficiently outrageous –” and in addition, that the latter does not contain the 
words “in any given case”. Although the words “in any given case” reinforce the 
idea that the ICC would refuse jurisdiction under this test, irrespective of the entity 
responsibility, without these words, the test can still be interpreted as such. The fact 
that the words “might – if sufficiently outrageous –” have been deleted is to be 
welcomed as one could argue that serious mistreatment/torture is already 
sufficiently outrageous to possibly lead to a refusal of jurisdiction (note that there is 
still a discretion here). The more important point is that the problem remains as to 
whether the Prosecutor is of the opinion that serious mistreatment/torture as such 
can lead to the ending of the case, or whether it must be related to a detention which 
can be seen as being part of a process of bringing a suspect to justice for the crimes 
that form the subject-matter of the proceedings before the ICC. Although there are a 
number of indications that the Prosecutor follows this last idea, the fact that this 
broader formulation is repeated here (even if a slightly different version has been 
used) again engenders doubt. This doubt is augmented by the remainder of the 
Prosecutor’s response, where he examines whether the detention by the DRC 
authorities (which he had stated concerned crimes other than those in which the ICC 
is interested) can be seen as serious mistreatment/torture. 
Be that as it may, it is in any case clear that the Prosecutor did not factually agree 
with the Defence: 
 
Not every violation of a right amounts to mistreatment, and not every serious 
violation of a right amounts to serious mistreatment. The Prosecution submits that 
serious mistreatment requires proof of acts causing grave physical or mental suffering 
or injury or constituting a serious attack on human dignity. The claims made by the 
Defence are inadequate to establish that the Accused has been subject to serious 
mistreatment [original footnote omitted, ChP].577  
  
Again, one can assert that it may very well be that Katanga’s male captus is not so 
serious as to refuse jurisdiction, but that neither must one forget that serious 
mistreatment/torture are only the more ‘physically’ coloured examples which could 
lead to a refusal of jurisdiction. Hence, it may indeed be the case that “not every 
serious violation of a right amounts to serious mistreatment”, but that is not 
particularly important, because a serious violation of a right as such may already be 
deemed to constitute such a serious male captus that a male detentus must follow. 
After having repeated the previously criticised additional requirement that “a 
stay of the proceedings may be ordered only if the breaches of the rights of the 
accused are such as to make it impossible to conduct a fair trial”578 (in the strict 
                                                          
577 Ibid., para. 64. 








sense of the word),579 the Prosecutor turned to the fourth and final issue of his 
response, the remedy.  
Importantly, he submitted  
 
that the Chamber should refrain from entering a finding on the legality of the 
detention of the Accused by the DRC authorities and on whether the Accused’s rights 
have been violated during that period. To do so at all, and in particular based on 
incomplete facts, would overstep this Court’s mandate and the statutory limits to its 
jurisdiction.580  
 
He hereby asserted that the ICC’s supervisory role under Article 59, paragraph 2 of 
the ICC Statute is restricted “to the process of arrest and surrender by national 
authorities subsequent to the notification of a request for arrest and surrender by the 
Court”.581 According to him, this provision “does not impose an obligation on 
national authorities, or a power to the Court, to review the legality of any previous 
detention of the Appellant for national criminal proceedings unrelated to Court 
proceedings [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.582  
As argued before, this point is reminiscent of the words of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
in Lubanga Dyilo, where it was stated that the competent judicial authority was not 
obliged to look into irregularities in the context of an arrest/detention prior to the 
official ICC arrest insofar as that arrest/detention was related solely to national 
proceedings. Although the Pre-Trial Chamber did not clearly explain the role of the 
ICC judges themselves on this particular matter, it was assumed that these words 
meant that if the arrest/detention were somehow related to the ICC proceedings, 
there was an obligation, both for the national competent judicial authority and the 
ICC judges themselves to examine irregularities stemming therefrom, an assumption 
which was arguably confirmed when the Pre-Trial Chamber later explained that it 
would look at irregularities prior to the official ICC arrest if those irregularities were 
the result of concerted action between the ICC and third parties. (Note that the 
Appeals Chamber adopted a stricter approach here, demanding that the suspect had 
to be in detention for the same crimes as those for which the ICC was now 
prosecuting that person, an approach which is hard to reconcile with the Appeals 
Chamber’s confirmation of the concerted action point of the Pre-Trial Chamber.)    
It can be asserted that a provision such as Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC 
Statute (applicable as from the moment the ICC gets involved in the case, in the case 
of concerted action) also demands such a supervisory role. 
This also means that if the detention were not somehow related to the ICC, if the 
ICC were not involved in that detention, there is no strict obligation to look into 
irregularities arising therefrom. However, as also argued in the context of the 
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Lubanga Dyilo case, the judges should nevertheless go one step further and should 
supervise any irregularity which can be seen as falling within the context of an ICC 
case more generally.    
Returning to the Prosecutor’s response, his argument that the ICC, for the same 
reasons, “may also not review the detention of the Accused by national authorities 
for the purposes of any claim for compensation pursuant to Article 85 and Rules 
173-175 [original footnote omitted, ChP]”583 is not very convincing.584 Article 85, 
paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute is formulated very generally (“Anyone who has been 
the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to 
compensation”) and if judges are of the opinion that irregularities mentioned in the 
above-mentioned scenario lead to an unlawful arrest or detention in the context of 
their case, suspects are entitled to compensation.585 
The Prosecutor also submitted that the judges should dismiss the Defence’s 
request to impose a stay or termination of the proceedings. At this juncture, he 
repeated the fact that the abuse must be connected to “the process of bringing the 
Accused to justice for the crimes charged before the Court”,586 again adding 
confusion to the point as to whether or not he is of the opinion that the ICC can also 
refuse jurisdiction if the abuse can more generally be seen to be “in some way 
related to the process of arrest and transfer of the person” to the ICC. In addition, the 
more general formulation presented by the Prosecutor at footnote 531 and 
accompanying text, arguably mentioned separately from the normal male detentus 
test of the ICC (requiring involvement of the ICC), could also cover abuse 
irrespective of the entity responsible. The fact that the formulation talks about the 
“non-assumption of the jurisdiction in any given case [emphasis added, ChP]” 
reinforces that idea, an idea which can also find support in the Prosecutor’s efforts 
                                                          
583 Ibid., para. 73. 
584 However, the Prosecutor had a point in arguing that this specific Chamber could not rule on the 
matter of compensation because of Rules 173-175 of the ICC RPE. See ibid., para. 75: “The Chamber 
has not been properly seized with any requests in relation to compensation. Rule 173(1) provides that 
“[a]nyone seeking compensation on any of the grounds indicated in article 85 shall submit a request, in 
writing, to the Presidency, which shall designate a Chamber composed of three judges to consider the 
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grant the remedy. Rule 173 expressly states that the judges who decide on any request for compensation 
“shall not have participated in any earlier judgement of the Court regarding the person making the 
request”. This implies that the Chamber shall refrain from making any finding or declaration in relation 
to compensation of the Accused [original footnote omitted, ChP].” 
585 Cf. the discussion at n. 216 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII. Note that the second, and 
broader formulated, requirement under the Prosecutor’s test (“in connection with proceedings before the 
Court”, see infra) can in fact be seen as support for this view, but the remainder of his words again refer 
to the more strict requirement that this means that the suspect must be in detention at the national level 
for the same crimes as those for which the ICC is now prosecuting him: “A right to compensation under 
Article 85 is limited to instances where a person has been unlawfully arrested or detained (1) in 
violation of specific provisions of the Statute, the Rules or international law, but only (2) in connection 
with proceedings before the Court. The Court has no duty, or authority, to pay compensation to a person 
who has been detained by national authorities for conduct that is unrelated to the process of bringing the 
person to justice for the crimes charged before the Court [emphasis added and original footnotes 
omitted, ChP].” (Ibid., para. 73.) 








to show that the actions of the national authorities in the first phase of detention did 
not amount to serious mistreatment/torture.587 However, at this point in his response, 
the Prosecutor confusingly requires the attribution of the abuse to the ICC.588  
Finally, the Prosecutor also rejected Katanga’s request for a reduction of the 
sentence (as being “premature”)589 and his request for an evidentiary hearing590 (as 
being unnecessary).591  
After that, it was time for the judges to pronounce on the case. In their decision 
of 3 December 2009, the judges of Trial Chamber II first of all noted that they had 
invited the Registry and the authorities in the DRC to file their observations on the 
matter.592 The Registry reacted, but its observations are confidential and cannot – 
directly (but see infra) – be discussed here.593 The authorities of the DRC, on the 
other hand, did not find it necessary to respond.594 The judges also remarked that the 
Prosecutor has requested to add a case law reference, a request which was 
                                                          
587 See n. 577 and accompanying text. 
588 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion 
for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07, 17 August 2009, para. 74: “Without abuse 
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Chapter VI. In addition, it must be noted that in the Barayagwiza case, the ICTR took responsibility for 
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Rule 145 of the ICC RPE. 
590 See n. 488 and accompanying text. 
591 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence motion 
for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted Version of 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07, 17 August 2009, para. 77. 
592 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public redacted version of the “Decision 
on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of 
Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp)’ (Public document), ICC-01/04-
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granted.595 In (the annex to) this submission, the Prosecutor filed a copy of the 31 
August 2009 decision in Karadžić,596 discussed earlier in this study.597  
The judges first summarised the visions of the Defence, the legal representatives 
of the victims and the Prosecutor, all of which have been discussed at length in the 
previous pages (and which therefore do not need to be repeated here). The only 
issue which should be mentioned here is the view of the Registry, whose 
observations were, after all, filed confidentially. The judges noted that the Registry 
had submitted that “from the time it took Germain Katanga into custody, it ensured 
that all necessary procedures were followed and that his rights were not 
prejudiced”.598 According to the Registry, “all required procedures were carried out 
and hence Germain Katanga’s rights were respected [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]”.599  
The judges then turned to their own analysis. Not very surprisingly, they noted 
that the Defence had relied on the abuse of process doctrine, a doctrine which was 
rejected by the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo.600 Nevertheless, they also 
explained that the Appeals Chamber, in the context of Article 21, paragraph 3 of the 
ICC Statute, had stated that “[u]nfairness in the treatment of the suspect or the 
accused may rupture the process to an extent making it impossible to piece together 
the constituent elements of a fair trial”.601 (This was the third formulation of the 
Appeals Chamber’s male detentus test.)  
However, before they turned to the real merits of this case, the judges first 
wanted to determine whether Katanga’s submission was in fact admissible; whether 
the ICC law authorised a participant in the proceedings to file a male captus 
submission after the confirmation of the charges and at this stage of the proceedings 
(read: so late).602  
In fact, the judges opined that a male captus challenge, especially when it is 
accompanied by an application to stay or terminate the proceedings “must be 
submitted in the initial phase of the proceedings”.603 This was in the interest of all 
parties, especially the victim of the alleged male captus.604  
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For example, the judges noted that pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, 
“challenges to admissibility or jurisdiction must be made at the earliest opportunity, 
so as to avoid obstructing or delaying the proceedings [original footnote omitted, 
ChP]”.605 They also pointed to Rule 122, paragraph 2 of the ICC RPE,606 which 
specifies that if the Pre-Trial Chamber is requested to rule on such a challenge in the 
course of the confirmation of the charges hearing, “it must ensure compliance with 
the provisions on expeditiousness expressly prescribed by rule 58 of the Rules”.607 
In addition, they continued, the same Rule 122, in paragraphs 3 and 4,608 provides 
“that any objection or observation concerning an issue related to the proper conduct 
of the proceedings prior to the confirmation hearing must be raised at the start of the 
hearing, failing which it will no longer be possible to do so subsequently [emphasis 
in original, ChP].”609 The judges also stressed that pursuant to Article 64, paragraph 
2 of the ICC Statute, the Trial Chamber must ensure that a trial is fair and 
expeditious and that it is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused, 
which, in this case, involves the right of Katanga’s co-accused, Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, to be tried without undue delay as well.610   
That Katanga had raised his male captus from the very start of the trial is clear: 
on 22 October 2007, during the initial hearing, the alleged illegal arrest and 
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606 This provision reads: “If a question or challenge concerning jurisdiction or admissibility arises, rule 
58 applies.” See for the contents of this latter rule the next footnote. 
607 ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
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608 These paragraphs read: “3. Before hearing the matter on the merits, the Presiding Judge of the Pre-
Trial Chamber shall ask the Prosecutor and the person whether they intend to raise objections or make 
observations concerning an issue related to the proper conduct of the proceedings prior to the 
confirmation hearing. 4. At no subsequent point may the objections and observations made under sub-
rule 3 be raised or made again in the confirmation or trial proceedings.” 
609 ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public redacted version of the “Decision 
on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of 
Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp)’ (Public document), ICC-01/04-
01/07, 3 December 2009, para. 41.  








detention of Katanga in the DRC (between February 2005 until his surrender) was 
emphasised by his duty counsel, as a result of which the Pre-Trial Chamber had 
invited the Defence to submit this issue in writing.611 In this context, the Defence 
had submitted, on 7 April 2008, an application to the Pre-Trial Chamber based on 
Article 57, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute612 to obtain the cooperation of the DRC 
on these matters.613 In this application, the Defence specified “that the requested 
documents were necessary in order to substantiate certain of its submissions 
concerning the lawfulness of prior proceedings”614 and stressed the urgency of this 
cooperation in view of the time limits imposed by Rule 122, paragraphs 3 and 4 of 
the ICC RPE.615 
During an ex parte hearing ten days later, the Defence repeated its request, 
“expressing the concern that it risked finding “the door closed” before the Trial 
Chamber if it did not raise such matters”616 within the time limits of Rule 122, 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the ICC RPE.617 However, during the same hearing, the 
judges continued, the Defence was informed that even if the DRC authorities were 
not to respond to the request for cooperation before the confirmation of the charges 
hearing (which indeed occurred as the information was only provided on 28 August 
2008, after the confirmation of the charges hearing, which took place from 27 June 
2008 to 18 July 2008),618 “no prejudice would be caused to the right of the Accused 
to make such challenges (to the lawfulness of prior proceedings or the admissibility 
of the case) under article 19 of the Statute [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.619 This 
is, of course, an interesting remark, for it shows that the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
Katanga, about a year and a half after the decisions in Lubanga Dyilo, concurred 
with the Pre-Trial Chamber (but not with the Appeals Chamber) in that case that the 
male captus claims could be seen as a challenge pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC 
Statute, something which was previously submitted by this study in the discussion 
of the Lubanga Dyilo decisions.  
This reasoning was confirmed in a decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber issued ex 
parte on 25 April 2008, in which the judges had stated that Article 59, paragraph 2 
of the ICC Statute only applies to the proceedings following the transmission, by the 
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Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public redacted version of the “Decision 
on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of 
Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp)’ (Public document), ICC-01/04-
01/07, 3 December 2009, para. 43. 
614 Ibid. 
615 See ibid.  
616 Ibid. 
617 See ibid. 
618 See ibid., para. 61. 








Registry, of the request for arrest and surrender and that as a result, any alleged prior 
international human rights violations of the suspect, which, according to the 
Defence, could prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over him, were to be 
raised in the context of a challenge to the ICC’s jurisdiction pursuant to Article 19 
of the ICC Statute – a challenge which is not subjected to the time limits of Rule 
122, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the ICC RPE.620  
Although it is true that Article 59 of the ICC Statute only applies as from the 
request for provisional arrest/for arrest and surrender, the competent judicial 
authority (and the ICC should perform a supervisory role here as well), when 
determining the points of paragraph 2 of that article, can also look into alleged 
irregularities prior to the ICC requests. It appears that the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
Lubanga Dyilo held that the competent judicial authority and the ICC as its 
supervisor could look into irregularities prior to the official ICC arrest if those 
irregularities stemmed from a detention which was somehow related to the ICC 
proceedings.  
The judges of the Trial Chamber in Katanga consequently noted that the 
decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of 25 April 2008 was also confirmed by the Pre-
Trial Chamber during a hearing on 14 May 2008:621 when the Defence again 
expressed its concerns and doubts whether this was indeed the correct procedure to 
follow to raise this question, the Pre-Trial Chamber likewise indicated that a similar 
motion had been filed in Lubanga Dyilo.622 This is, of course, true, but has the Pre-
Trial Chamber in Katanga forgotten that the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo 
had stated that Article 19 of the ICC Statute could not be used? Even if the Defence 
is of the opinion, as is this study, that Article 19 of the ICC Statute can be used for 
these kinds of claims, it is quite understandable that the Defence in Katanga was 
concerned about using it here, the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo having 
rejected it. 
The judges of the Trial Chamber in Katanga then went on to note that the issue 
of the arrest and detention of Katanga was raised neither in the course of the 
confirmation of the charges hearing nor in the Defence’s written observations 
preceding that hearing.623 In a decision of 29 April 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber had 
given the parties until 23 June 2008 – this is four days before the start of the 
confirmation of the charges hearing – “to file a list concisely setting out those issues 
pertaining to jurisdiction and admissibility and any other issue concerning the 
proper conduct of the prior proceedings that they intended to raise under rule 122(2) 
and (3) [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.624 In addition, a decision issued on 13 
June 2008 “gave the parties the possibility of presenting observations on 
jurisdiction, admissibility, and any other procedural issue [original footnote omitted, 
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ChP]”.625 On 24 June 2008, the judges explained, the Defence filed its written 
observations (which were presented orally before the Pre-Trial Chamber on 2 July 
2008) and on 28 July 2008, the Defence presented its written observations on the 
issues addressed during the confirmation of the charges hearing.626 The issues 
regarding jurisdiction, admissibility and other procedural matters were addressed 
both on 2 July 2008 and in the written observations, although it appears, the judges 
noted, “that the Defence was then seeking primarily to challenge the admissibility of 
certain evidentiary material tendered for the purpose of the confirmation hearing 
[original footnote omitted, ChP]”.627 In that context, it contested, among other 
things, “the admissibility of a record of an interview before the military court dated 
20 January 2006”.628 It was only in that context, the judges remarked, that the 
Defence had stressed that at that time, Katanga did not yet have a legal counsel and 
had not yet been informed of the charges and reasons justifying his detention.629 
In fact, the judges held, it was not until a hearing held ex parte on 11 July 2008 
that Katanga’s Defence again raised the necessity of obtaining the requested 
information and documents from the DRC authorities in order to be able to 
formulate and submit the challenges to jurisdiction and admissibility of the case.630 
However, in its final observations on 28 July 2008, the Defence did not return to the 
alleged male captus.631 
As a result, the Trial Chamber concluded that, even though the Defence had 
raised the issue of the male captus several times during the pre-trial phase of the 
proceedings (including during Katanga’s initial appearance),632 it had not submitted, 
finally, “a motion in that regard to the Pre-Trial Chamber, whether by claiming that 
the proceedings were unlawful or by raising a challenge to jurisdiction”.633 
However, according to the Chamber, “such a motion should have been introduced 
during the pre-trial phase and addressed at that stage”.634 
Nevertheless, the Chamber recognised that this may also have been caused by 
the position adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber.635 Hence, what had to be determined 
now was whether the Trial Chamber itself had been timely and officially seized of 
such a motion.636  
                                                          
625 Ibid. 
626 See ibid. 
627 Ibid. 
628 Ibid. See also ns. 391-392 and accompanying text. 
629 See ibid.  
630 See ibid., para. 47. 
631 See ibid. 
632 See ibid., para. 48. 
633 Ibid. 
634 Ibid. 
635 See ibid.: “The Chamber is nevertheless mindful that the position adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
may have led the Defence for the Accused to believe that it was authorised to defer the filing of its 
motion and postpone it until after the decision on the confirmation of the charges.” 








The Chamber stated that between its constitution, on 24 October 2008, and the 
hearing of 1 June 2009,637 the Defence had never raised the question of Katanga’s 
illegal detention with the Chamber, even though it had the opportunity to do so 
several times: it had not done so during the status conferences638 held on 27-28 
November 2008 and 3 February 2009, in its written submissions and during the 
hearings on Katanga’s continued detention.639  
Although it may be true, especially given that the Defence had received the 
required information from the DRC authorities on 28 August 2008,640 that the 
Defence did not timely mention the allegations concerning Katanga’s male 
captus,641 it is not that strange that it did not do so during the hearings on Katanga’s 
continued detention, the hearing reviewing his pre-trial detention. These reviews are 
based on Article 60, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute642 and Rule 118, paragraph 2 of 
the ICC RPE643 and although they are rather generally formulated, they are preceded 
by provisions dealing with interim releases.644 If the Defence is of the opinion that it 
                                                          
637 See n. 374. 
638 See for this concept Rule 132 of the ICC RPE: “1. Promptly after it is constituted, the Trial Chamber 
shall hold a status conference in order to set the date of the trial. The Trial Chamber, on its own motion, 
or at the request of the Prosecutor or the defence, may postpone the date of the trial. The Trial Chamber 
shall notify the trial date to all those participating in the proceedings. The Trial Chamber shall ensure 
that this date and any postponements are made public. 2. In order to facilitate the fair and expeditious 
conduct of the proceedings, the Trial Chamber may confer with the parties by holding status conferences 
as necessary.” 
639 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public redacted version of the “Decision 
on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of 
Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp)’ (Public document), ICC-01/04-
01/07, 3 December 2009, para. 51. 
640 See ibid., para. 61. 
641 A good example can be found in the context of the first status conference. In preparation of that 
conference, the Trial Chamber sent a list of questions to the participants “inviting them (…) to inform it 
of “issues and observations which they would deem relevant and on which they would like the Chamber 
to rule” [original footnote omitted, ChP]”. (Ibid., para. 52.) One can indeed argue that such an open 
invitation should make the Defence raise the male captus issue, even if it would only have stated that it 
will soon submit its official motion on these matters. 
642 “The Pre-Trial Chamber shall periodically review its ruling on the release or detention of the person, 
and may do so at any time on the request of the Prosecutor or the person. Upon such review, it may 
modify its ruling as to detention, release or conditions of release, if it is satisfied that changed 
circumstances so require.” 
643 “The Pre-Trial Chamber shall review its ruling on the release or detention of a person in accordance 
with article 60, paragraph 3, at least every 120 days and may do so at any time on the request of the 
person or the Prosecutor.” 
644 See Art. 60, paras. 1-2 of the ICC Statute: “1. Upon the surrender of the person to the Court, or the 
person’s appearance before the Court voluntarily or pursuant to a summons, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall 
satisfy itself that the person has been informed of the crimes which he or she is alleged to have 
committed, and of his or her rights under this Statute, including the right to apply for interim release 
pending trial. 2. A person subject to a warrant of arrest may apply for interim release pending trial. If the 
Pre-Trial Chamber is satisfied that the conditions set forth in article 58, paragraph 1, are met, the person 
shall continue to be detained. If it is not so satisfied, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall release the person, with 
or without conditions.” See also Rule 118, para. 1 of the ICC RPE: “If the person surrendered to the 








can only use such hearings to obtain a remedy in which it is not interested, namely a 
‘mere’ interim release – and it appears that the Defence was indeed of this 
opinion645 – it is not so odd for it not to use them to submit male captus claims, 
which, after all, have nothing to do with interim releases but with actual, final 
releases. Nevertheless, as already explained, in those hearings, judges must also pay 
attention to the distinct Article 60, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute. This provision is, 
of course, also surrounded by provisions dealing with interim releases, but it was 
nevertheless argued earlier in this study that this provision could perhaps be used for 
male captus allegations.646 However, if so, the suspect needs to argue that his rights 
have been so seriously violated by the unreasonable pre-trial detention647 due to 
inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor that his right to a fair trial can no longer be 
guaranteed/that it would undermine the integrity of the Court to proceed648 and thus 
that the Prosecutor has forfeited his right to prosecute. Because Katanga alleged that 
the Prosecutor was involved in his illegal DRC detention, he could perhaps have 
persuaded the Trial Chamber to take that provision into account here. However, 
according to the Trial Chamber, he did not do so.649  
                                                                                                                                              
accordance with rule 121 or subsequently, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall decide upon the request without 
delay, after seeking the views of the Prosecutor.” Cf. also n. 259 of Chapter VIII. 
645 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public redacted version of the “Decision 
on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of 
Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp)’ (Public document), ICC-01/04-
01/07, 3 December 2009, para. 54: “The Chamber is bound to observe once again that, in its written 
submissions, the Defence did not request the Accused’s interim release and that it confined itself to 
stating that, at that stage, it had no particular observations to make and that it was reiterating its previous 
observations [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also ibid., para. 55: “At that 
hearing [a public hearing on 23 March 2009, in the context of the third review of Katanga’s pre-trial 
detention, ChP], the Defence for Germain Katanga stated, as it had in its written submissions, that it was 
taking a realistic and pragmatic position. In this respect, the Defence essentially stressed that, in the 
absence of any facility enabling release under judicial supervision in the Netherlands or a neighbouring 
State, it “[saw] no practical purpose served in applying for the provisional release of Mr. Katanga at 
th[at] time”. Moreover, it made it clear that it was not making an application for interim release, that it 
had “come relatively empty-handed before the Court”, and that it was confining itself to seeking a 
pragmatic solution to a problem which went beyond Germain Katanga’s case alone [emphasis added and 
original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
646 See n. 269 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII. 
647 Which arguably includes any pre-trial detention, whether or not the suspect was in detention for the 
same crimes which the ICC is now prosecuting, see the text following n. 265 and accompanying text of 
Chapter VIII. 
648 See House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 
June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 161: “[A] court has a discretion to stay any criminal 
proceedings on the ground that to try those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process 
either (1) because it will be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) 
because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the 
circumstances of a particular case.” 
649 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of [the] Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Fifth review of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
Decision Concerning the Pre-Trial Detention of Germain Katanga pursuant to rule 118(2) of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence’ (Public), ICC-01/04-01/07, 19 November 2009, para. 30: “The Defence for 








In any case, this decision now under discussion indicates that even though the 
hearings on the review of the pre-trial detention seem to be confined to the 
arrest/detention in The Hague/interim releases only (with the possible exception of 
Article 60, paragraph 4 of the ICC Statute), a suspect/accused can apparently use 
them for any question related to his detention.650 This would be especially relevant 
for a person such as Katanga who claims that the involvement of the ICC in his male 
captus contributed to the illegality of his detention, which continued in the context 
of the ICC procedures:  
 
The Defence for Germain Katanga doubtless considered that the detention then under 
review covered only the period starting with his arrival at the Court’s Detention 
Centre on 18 October 2007. It remains the case that the Defence contends that the 
participation of the organs of the Court during the period of detention prior to the 
accused’s transfer contributed to “giving continuity to the unlawfulness of the 
detention into the processes of the ICC”. In view of such a contention, it follows that 
the failure to act on the part of the Defence for Germain Katanga cannot be justified 
[emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].651 
 
The judges then turned to the final part of their decision, the conclusions. They 
stated that it was only during the meeting of 1 June 2009652 that the Defence had 
stated that it was intending to file its male captus motion, which, in turn, only 
occurred 30 days later, seven months after the first status conference.653 The judges 
noted that the Defence had maintained, among other things, that it “was persuaded 
to file this motion having been appraised of all the documents, views of the DRC on 
the nature and course of the national proceedings as well as those of the Prosecutor 
on his knowledge of documents and interactions with the DRC, but especially those 
observations expressed on the 1st of June 2009 [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.654  
                                                                                                                                              
Prosecution within the meaning of article 60(4) of the Statute in either its current or previous 
observations on the accused’s detention review.” However, note that in the context of the proceedings 
before the Pre-Trial Chamber, reference was made to this provision, see n. 264 of Chapter VIII. 
650 See in that respect the following words of the Trial Chamber, made in the context of the third review 
of Katanga’s pre-trial detention: “On that occasion, once again, the Defence made no reference whatever 
to the unlawfulness of its client’s prior detention, despite the fact that the hearing had been convened 
with the specific aim of raising and addressing any issue concerning the Accused’s detention [emphasis 
added, ChP].” (ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case 
of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public redacted version of the 
“Decision on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention 
and Stay of Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp)’ (Public document), 
ICC-01/04-01/07, 3 December 2009, para. 55.) 
651 Ibid., para. 58. See also n. 383 and accompanying text. 
652 See n. 374. 
653 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public redacted version of the “Decision 
on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of 
Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp)’ (Public document), ICC-01/04-
01/07, 3 December 2009, para. 59. 








However, the judges were not convinced: according to them, the Defence “ha[d] 
not advanced any convincing reasons to justify the filing of the Motion at such an 
advanced stage of the proceedings”.655 Although the Defence had argued that “the 
information provided by the DRC representatives at the meeting of 1 June 2009 was 
decisive in the filing of the Motion”,656 the judges were of the opinion that it 
appeared that the arguments in the motion relied, “for the most part on information 
which was already available to the Defence at the pre-trial phase”.657 In that context, 
they also noted that the requested information from the DRC authorities658 had 
already been provided on 28 August 2008.659 The judges felt that if the filing of the 
motion depended on obtaining certain information, the Defence should have notified 
the judges of this need.660  
However, the misery for the Defence did not stop there. The judges also referred 
to Article 24, paragraph 5 of the Code of Professional Conduct for counsel, which 
states: “Counsel shall represent the client expeditiously with the purpose of avoiding 
unnecessary expense or delay in the conduct of the proceedings”.661 This provision, 
the judges continued, had to be seen as “a reminder to the Defence of the Chamber’s 
general and ongoing obligation under article 64(2) of the Statute[662] to ensure that 
the trial is expeditious.”663 According to the judges, the Defence, by filing its motion 
only seven months after the Chamber had invited the Defence “to submit to the 
Chamber the relevant issues on which it wished the latter to rule”,664 had not 
followed the above-mentioned provision.665 
                                                          
655 ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public redacted version of the “Decision 
on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of 
Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp)’ (Public document), ICC-01/04-
01/07, 3 December 2009, para. 61. 
656 Ibid. 
657 Ibid. 
658 See n. 613 and accompanying text. 
659 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public redacted version of the “Decision 
on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of 
Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp)’ (Public document), ICC-01/04-
01/07, 3 December 2009, para. 61. 
660 See ibid., para. 62. 
661 See ibid., para. 63. 
662 “The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect 
for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.” 
663 ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public redacted version of the “Decision 
on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of 
Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp)’ (Public document), ICC-01/04-
01/07, 3 December 2009, para. 63. 
664 Ibid., para. 65. See also n. 641.  








Consequently, the judges concluded that the motion was filed too late and hence 
inadmissible,666 as a result of which the substantive arguments of the parties and 
participants were not to be examined in this decision.667 
What can be said about this utter anticlimax? One can agree with the judges that 
the seven-month period between the first status conference (27 November 2008) and 
the submission of the request (30 June 2009) is rather long. Indeed, one could argue 
that the delay is not seven but ten months, between 28 August 2008 (when the 
Defence received the requested DRC information) and 30 June 2009. In that context, 
it must also be borne in mind that in this decision one can read that the “requested 
documents were necessary in order to substantiate certain of its submissions 
concerning the lawfulness of prior proceedings”.668 That seems to imply that the 
Defence had already drafted a concept submission (which would not be unusual 
given the fact that the Defence had already briefly mentioned a number of male 
captus allegations during the initial appearance on 22 October 2007), of which parts 
had to be checked/confirmed with help of the DRC information. That would, of 
course, need some time, but ten months is indeed quite long. However, suppose that 
the Defence had handed in the request just before the winter recess, some three and 
a half months after 28 August 2008. Although one can only guess how the judges 
would have reacted in that case, it is likely that such a period of time would be 
deemed reasonable. However, that would mean that the judges, invoking Article 64, 
paragraph 2 of the ICC Statute, would be prepared to attach the most extreme 
consequence, namely that the issue would not be addressed substantively at all, to a 
delay of a little more than six months. Again, it appears that the Defence can indeed 
be reproached for the delay but is the sanction not far too severe? The ICC judges 
should not forget that these matters go to the foundations of their case, namely to the 
question of how the suspect was brought into their jurisdiction. It is submitted that 
they should want to know what happened to the suspects they are now trying prior 
to their arrival in The Hague. This is especially so since an NGO report has partly 
confirmed the male captus allegations of Katanga and when it can be argued that the 
ICC profited from the fact that he was already in detention in the DRC. One can 
question how any judge can continue a case without being able to state that he is 
sure that the alleged pre-trial irregularities are absent, or are present but not so 
serious that jurisdiction must be refused. The ICC judges in the Katanga case run 
the risk of continuing a case which has an unstable foundation and whose 
unstableness is not repaired, hence jeopardising the fairness/integrity of the ICC 
proceedings.669 As previously argued in the context of the Lubanga Dyilo case, the 
                                                          
666 See ibid., para. 66. 
667 See ibid., para. 67. 
668 See n. 614 and accompanying text. 
669 Cf. also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Judgment on 
the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 
Decision Denying Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 13 July 2006, para. 11: “The 
principles of a fair trial are not confined to trial proceedings but extend to pre-trial proceedings as well 
as the investigation of crime; a fact directly borne out by the provisions of article 55 and 54 (1) (c) of the 








ICC should be careful not to return to the old-fashioned concept of a fair trial, 
namely a fair trial in the courtroom. This decision can easily be interpreted as a 
confirmation of Sluiter’s words (written at a time when this decision was not yet 
issued) that “the initial case law of the ICC reveals a tendency to retreat within the 
safe limits of The Hague and a strong desire to keep hands clean by refusing to 
supervise activities within domestic jurisdictions”.670 It may even be seen as a 
violation of a suspect’s right to effectively challenge the lawfulness of his arrest and 
detention, a crucial right covered by Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute.671 
This is especially unfortunate since in an earlier decision from the Katanga case, it 
was held – and rightly so – that  
 
according to articles 55, 57 and 67, one of the functions of the Chamber is to be the 
ultimate guarantor of the rights of the Defence, including the right “not to be deprived 
of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures 
as are established in the Statute”[.]672 
 
According to Sluiter, who refers to comparable words from another decision (also 
from the Katanga case),673 such words reinforce the idea that because of the fact that 
“the ICC system is more inquisitorial in nature than the ad hoc tribunals”,674 judges 
must “explore issues ultra petitum and address violations proprio motu”.675  
 
                                                                                                                                              
have implications on the proceedings and may affect the outcome of the trial. Purging the pre-trial 
process of errors consequential in the above sense is designed as a safeguard for the integrity of the 
proceedings.” 
670 See n. 276. 
671 Cf. also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision 
of Pre-Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on application for interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-
01/05-01/08 OA, 16 December 2008, Dissenting opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 31: 
“[A]rticle 21 (3) assures to every individual the right to effectively contest the deprivation of liberty.” 
672 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Decision on the powers of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to review proprio motu the pre-trial detention of Germain Katanga’ (Urgent, Public 
Document), ICC-01/04-01/07, 18 March 2008, p. 8. See also n. 201 of Chapter VIII. 
673 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of [the] Congo, In the Case of 
The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ‘Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Detention of Germain Katanga’ 
(Urgent, Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/07, 21 February 2008, p. 6, where the judge is referred to “as 
the ultimate guarantor of the rights of the Defence”. 
674 Sluiter 2009, p. 471. This point was already earlier clarified in n. 9 of Chapter IV, see Swart 2002 B, 
p. 1601: “A comparison of the Rome Statute with the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals reveals that in the 
Statute, too, there is a mixture of adversarial and inquisitorial elements. Again, the adversarial elements 
largely prevail, although there is stronger contribution of the inquisitorial tradition, especially where the 
structure of pre-trial investigations is concerned.” 








Indeed, it can be argued that the judges of the Trial Chamber should have been 
more concerned with what actually happened to Katanga than to – rather too readily 
– dismiss the entire motion for being submitted too late.676 
                                                          
676 Note that in the Kajelijeli case before the ICTR, the Appeals Chamber decided in 2005 that Kajelijeli 
could not re-litigate the issue of the ICTR’s personal jurisdiction as “[t]he Appeals Chamber squarely 
held, in its 16 November 2001 decision, that the Appellant procedurally lost his entitlement to raise his 
personal jurisdiction objection by failing to file a sufficiently specific notice of appeal, even after the 
Appeals Chamber had allowed him extra time to do so after his initial failure. This holding disposed of 
the personal jurisdiction objection. The Appellant has not demonstrated any cause to reconsider this 
determination on a discretionary basis: there is no clear error in the Appeals Chamber’s reasoning, nor is 
reconsideration necessary to prevent an injustice.” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 205.) However, in that case, 
the issue was already examined by the Trial Chamber. (Cf. also the ICTY case of Tolimir or the ICTR 
case of Rwamakuba where the Trial Chamber examined the male captus allegations and the Appeals 
Chamber dismissed the appeal for procedural reasons.) In addition, in 2005, the judges in Kajelijeli did 
(marginally) review the issue themselves, when they stated (see ibid., para. 206): “[E]ven if it were to 
reconsider the issue of its personal jurisdiction, the Appeals Chamber does not find that these newly and 
more detailed submitted breaches rise to the requisite level of egregiousness amounting to the Tribunal’s 
loss of personal jurisdiction. The Appeals Chamber is mindful that it must maintain the correct balance 
between “the fundamental rights of the accused and the essential interests of the international 
community in the prosecution of persons charged with serious violations of international humanitarian 
law.” While a Chamber may use its discretion under the circumstances of a case to decline to exercise 
jurisdiction, it should only do so “where to exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious and egregious 
violations of the accused’s rights would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity.” For example, “in 
circumstances where an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe even subject to inhuman, cruel or 
degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to the Tribunal, this may constitute a legal 
impediment.” However, those cases are exceptional and, in most circumstances, the “remedy of setting 
aside jurisdiction, will . . . be disproportionate.” The Appeals Chamber gives due weight to the 
violations alleged by the Appellant; however, it does not consider that this case falls within the 
exceptional category of cases highlighted above [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” Finally, the judges 
in 2005 also examined whether the violations, even if they did not lead to the ending of the case, should 

















ANSWERING THE CENTRAL QUESTION, 






This study must now come to an end. The only thing that remains is to answer the 
central question with which this book began (Section 2), to provide 
recommendations which may hopefully be helpful to anyone interested in this topic, 
in particular the ICC judge confronted by a male captus situation (Section 3), and to 
conclude this book with a brief epilogue (Section 4).  
  
2 ANSWERING THE CENTRAL QUESTION 
 
In the very first pages of this book, the following central question was presented: 
 
How does the ICC currently cope with the dilemmas that a male captus case can 
give rise to and how should this approach be assessed? 
 
This question encompasses two elements, namely 1) the ICC’s current position on 
the male captus issue and 2) an assessment of that position. With respect to the 
second element, it was explained that this study would create two evaluative 
frameworks with which the ICC position on the male captus issue would be 
assessed, namely an external one (vis-à-vis the position of other courts that have 
dealt with this problem before, namely to find out how similar or different the ICC 
position is in comparison with the position of these other courts) and an internal one 
(vis-à-vis the law of the ICC itself, namely to find out how the ICC position is to be 
seen in view of what the law of the ICC – to be found in Article 21 of the ICC 
Statute – itself prescribes the judges to do). 
In short, three elements have to be sorted out here before turning to the 
recommendations in Section 3, namely: 1) the ICC’s current position on the male 
captus issue (Subsection 2.1), 2) the ICC’s current position on the male captus issue 
assessed in the context of this book’s external evaluative framework (Subsection 
2.2) and 3) the ICC’s current position on the male captus issue assessed in the 









2.1 The ICC’s current position on the male captus issue  
 
Before being able to assess a certain position, the position itself must, of course, be 
identified. And here, the first problem arises; it does not seem to be very clear what 
the ICC’s current position on the male captus issue is.  
In the Appeals Chamber’s decision in Lubanga Dyilo, arguably the most 
authoritative decision on this matter, the Appeals Chamber presented the following 
male detentus test: 
 
Where fair trial becomes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of 
the suspect or the accused by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to 
put the person on trial. Justice could not be done. A fair trial is the only means to do 
justice. If no fair trial can be held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated and 
the process must be stopped [original footnotes omitted, ChP].1   
 
However, this formulation of the Appeals Chamber’s test was followed by another, 
one which arguably differs from the above-mentioned words in a number of 
important aspects: “Where the breaches of the rights of the accused are such as to 
make it impossible for him/her to make his/her defence within the framework of 
his[/her] rights, no fair trial can take place and the proceedings can be stayed.”2  
Besides the fact that the second formulation has a discretionary (“the 
proceedings can be stayed”) and the first one an automatic sanction (“the process 
must be stopped”) when it is determined that no fair trial can be held, the second 
formulation is arguably much more restrictive than the first one when it demands 
that the violations must be “such as to make it impossible for him/her to make 
his/her defence within the framework of his[/her] rights”. Hence, whereas the first 
formulation states that certain violations as such can already ensure that no fair trial 
is possible, thus accepting a broad concept of fair trial,3 the second formulation 
                                                          
1 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
37. 
2 Ibid., para. 39. 
3 See also ibid., para. 37: “Human rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it, including the exercise 
of the jurisdiction of the Court. Its provisions must be interpreted and more importantly applied in 
accordance with internationally recognized human rights; first and foremost, in the context of the 
Statute, the right of a fair trial, a concept broadly perceived and applied, embracing the judicial process 
in its entirety [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary 
Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal’ (Public 
Document), ICC-01/04, 13 July 2006, para. 11: “The principles of a fair trial are not confined to trial 
proceedings but extend to pre-trial proceedings as well as the investigation of crime; a fact directly 
borne out by the provisions of article 55 and 54 (1) (c) of the Statute. Breach of or deviation from the 
rules of a fair trial at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings may have implications on the proceedings and 
may affect the outcome of the trial. Purging the pre-trial process of errors consequential in the above 








appears to be in favour of the old-fashioned concept of a fair trial, namely a fair trial 
in the courtroom, when it argues that the violations must be such that the person can 
no longer make his defence. 
After this second formulation, a third one was presented. This formulation, 
which also stressed the concept of a fair trial, even for persons charged with very 
serious crimes, seemingly supports the first formulation, which could constitute 
evidence for the argument that the ICC’s position on the male captus issue can be 
found in the first formulation and not in the second, which demands that the accused 
must prove that the male captus was so serious that as a result, he could no longer 
make his defence before the ICC.  
 
Unfairness in the treatment of the suspect or the accused may rupture the process to 
an extent making it impossible to piece together the constituent elements of a fair 
trial. In those circumstances, the interest of the world community to put persons 
accused of the most heinous crimes against humanity on trial, great as it is, is 
outweighed by the need to sustain the efficacy of the judicial process as the potent 
agent of justice.4  
 
It was also this formulation to which the ICC Trial Chamber in Katanga referred, 
although it did not express its own views on the male detentus test.5  
Additional evidence for the argument that one should focus on the first 
formulation can be found in the following words of the Appeals Chamber, when it 
censured the Pre-Trial Chamber for using the wrong test:  
 
As may be discerned from the principles identified in the decision of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber as relevant to stay of proceedings, a broader standard was adopted than the 
one warranted in law in that it failed to require the specific consideration of whether a 
fair trial remained possible in the particular circumstances of the case. The findings of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to the effect that the appellant was not subjected to any ill-
treatment in the process of his arrest and conveyance before the Court sidelines the 
importance of the precise ambit of the test applied as a guide to the resolution of this 
appeal.6 
 
These words mean that it would not be necessary for the person to show that he can 
no longer make his defence because of the violations (a strict version of the concept 
of fair trial), but he would have to show that because of these violations, one can no 
                                                          
4 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
39. 
5 See n. 601 and accompanying text of Chapter X. 
6 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 









longer speak of a fair trial (in the broad sense of the word). This can be seen as a 
repetition of the first and third formulation of the male detentus test mentioned 
above. 
A final indication that one may rely on the first (and third) formulation is that it 
could be argued that the second formulation, even if it was presented in a case 
dealing with an alleged male captus situation, is not to be used as a male detentus 
test, a test which deals with problems related to the way a person was brought into 
the jurisdiction of the Court (and hence can neither be seen as a stricter and more 
demanding version of the first or the third formulation, which could very well be 
applied to male captus situations). It could be asserted that this formulation must be 
seen as an additional avenue leading to the ending of the case, namely when the 
accused (note also that in contrast to the first and third formulations, the second one 
only refers to an accused), during the trial proceedings themselves, is confronted by 
such serious violations that he can no longer make his defence. It appears that this 
position would also be shared by the Prosecution in the Katanga case, see the text 
following footnote 527 and accompanying text of Chapter X. Nevertheless, even 
though this would explain the difference between the strict second formulation and 
the broader first and third formulations, doubts remains. For example, the fact that 
the word “accused” is used in the second formulation does not necessarily mean that 
the test cannot be applied to male captus situations, as an accused can also make 
male captus claims. In that case, the problem remains whether a victim of a male 
captus situation may refer to the broader first (and third) formulation or whether he 
also needs to show that the violations were such that he can no longer make his 
defence.  
Hence, even though it appears that the first formulation of the ICC Appeals 
Chamber should be used here, the second formulation still casts some doubt as to 
the identification of the definitive ICC male detentus test.  
Moreover, another problem with respect to the ICC’s male captus position can 
be identified. In the Duch case before the ECCC, it was held that the ICC Appeals 
Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo would also refuse jurisdiction, under the abuse of 
process doctrine, in the case of grave violations of the suspect’s rights (thereby 
focusing on the more ‘physical’ words serious mistreatment/torture) as such, hence 
irrespective of the entity responsible:7  
 
The Co-Investigating Judges are (…) compelled to follow the solution adopted in 
Nikolic and Lubanga which requires, for the application of the abuse of [process] 
doctrine, the existence of grave violations of the rights of the Accused. Where it has 
not been established or even alleged that DUCH suffered incidents of torture or 
serious mistreatment prior to his transfer before the Extraordinary Chambers, the 
                                                          
7 See also n. 1213 of Chapter VI where the co-investigating judges of the ECCC referred to the 
following statement of the Trial Chamber in Nikolić: “Here, the Chamber observes that the assumed 
facts, although they do raise some concerns, do not at all show that the treatment of the Accused by the 
unknown individuals (…) was of such an egregious nature.”” (ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating 
Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 002/14-08-2006, Investigation No. 001/18-








prolonged detention under the jurisdiction of the Military Court, in comparison with 
the crimes against humanity alleged against the Accused, cannot be considered a 
sufficiently grave violation of the rights of the Accused.8  
 
However, whether the ICC Appeals Chamber, besides its above-mentioned male 
detentus test – which requires the involvement of the ICC (or third parties working 
at the behest/request of the ICC), see the words “by his/her accusers”9 – would also 
refuse jurisdiction in the case of grave violations/serious mistreatment/torture as 
such, irrespective of the entity responsible (such as private individuals), is not at all 
clear. 
The co-investigating judges in Duch referred in this context to the following 
words of the Appeals Chamber: “[T]he findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber respecting 
the absence of torture or serious mistreatment have not been shown to be erroneous 
in any way”.10 What is clear about these words is that the Appeals Chamber 
factually agrees with the Pre-Trial Chamber that there was no serious 
mistreatment/torture in this case. However, that does not mean that it would go 
beyond its own male detentus test (requiring the involvement of the ICC: “by his/her 
accusers”) and would refuse jurisdiction in cases of serious mistreatment/torture, 
irrespective of the entity responsible, for example if the male captus was committed 
by private individuals.  
This lack of clarity can be explained in two ways. First, one must not forget that 
the remarks made by the Pre-Trial Chamber on serious mistreatment/torture were 
made in the context of the abuse of process doctrine, a doctrine which the Appeals 
Chamber has explicitly rejected. Secondly, the position of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
itself on the abuse of process doctrine is not clear, since it writes that its application, 
to date, “has been confined to instances of torture or serious mistreatment by 
national authorities of the custodial State in some way related to the process of 
arrest and transfer of the person to the relevant international criminal tribunal 
                                                          
8 Ibid., para. 21. See also ibid., para. 19 where the judges explain that the ICC had “held that the 
violation of the rights of the defendant at the time of his prior arrest and detention could only be taken 
into account in two cases: if the court acted in concert with the external authorities, or if the defendant 
was the victim of torture or serious mistreatment.” See (arguably equally incorrect) ECCC, ‘Decision on 
Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 16 (or n. 1254 
of Chapter VI). See also n. 1275 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
9 Note that the involvement of the ICC (or third parties working at the behest/request of the ICC) can 
arguably be seen as a requirement for all three formulations mentioned supra. Although it is best 
illustrated by the words “by his/her accusers” in the first formulation, one can find other references to 
this requirement in the section of the Appeals Chamber’s decision in which the three formulations can 
be found. See n. 249 of Chapter X.  
10 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
43. See also ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal 








[emphasis added and original footnotes omitted, ChP]”.11 This is incorrect, but it is 
uncertain whether the Pre-Trial Chamber would nevertheless follow its words 
(requiring that the male captus be committed by national authorities) or whether it is 
of the opinion that these words are indeed erroneous, entailing that it would also 
refuse jurisdiction in the case of serious mistreatment/torture, irrespective of the 
entity responsible, hence also including, for example, the actions of private 
individuals.  
In short, even though others have read the decision to mean that the ICC Appeals 
Chamber would refuse jurisdiction in the case of serious mistreatment/torture, 
irrespective of the entity responsible, the fact that the Appeals Chamber explicitly 
rejected the (abuse of process) doctrine in which context that male detentus avenue 
was created and the lack of clarity with respect to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s view of 
the abuse of process doctrine means that it is possible that the serious 
mistreatment/torture example only applies to the Appeals Chamber’s own male 
detentus test, which demands that there are violations by the ICC/violations in 
which the ICC is involved/violations by third parties working at the behest of the 
ICC (“by his/her accusers”). 
Another unclear issue is related to the fact that the Appeals Chamber seemingly 
agreed with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s view that it would look into irregularities when 
these were committed in the context of concerted action between the ICC and third 
parties, even before the sending of the ICC request for arrest and surrender (hence 
before the constructive custody). This term, “concerted action”, is very general and 
could encompass any involvement of the ICC in irregularities. It was also this term 
which arguably confirmed the assumption made in the context of the Lubanga Dyilo 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s views on Article 59 of the ICC Statute that the judges of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber were probably of the opinion that they would have to examine 
irregularities in the context of a national arrest/detention prior to the official ICC 
arrest if that arrest/detention were somehow related to the ICC proceedings.  
However, even though the Appeals Chamber thus accepted the concerted action 
term, a term which could encompass a national arrest/detention if that 
arrest/detention were somehow related to the ICC proceedings, the Appeals 
Chamber also presented an additional requirement, namely that only violations of 
the suspect’s rights which are related to the “process of bringing the appellant to 
justice for the crimes that form the subject-matter of the proceedings before the 
Court (…) may provide ground for halting the process”.12 However, that is a stricter 
                                                          
11 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 3 October 2006, 
p. 10.  
12 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
44. See also ibid., para. 42: “It is worth reminding that the crimes for which Mr. Lubanga Dyilo was 








condition as one can imagine that there are situations in which the ICC was involved 
in a national arrest/detention, in which there was concerted action between the ICC 
and third parties, in which the national arrest/detention was somehow related to the 
ICC proceedings, even if the suspect was not in detention for the same crimes as 
those for which the ICC is now prosecuting him. For example, it is not impossible 
for the Prosecutor to informally request national authorities to keep a suspect, who is 
in detention for crimes other than those in which the ICC is interested, in custody so 
that the Prosecutor has more time to prepare a request for arrest and surrender. In 
such a case, it can be argued that the ICC is involved in the case, that there is 
concerted action between the ICC and third parties, that the national arrest/detention 
is somehow related to the ICC proceedings (which would entail the examination of 
irregularities stemming therefrom), whether that suspect was in detention at the 
national level for the same crimes as those for which the ICC is now prosecuting 
him or not. 
A final unclear issue is that the ICC Appeals Chamber does not view a motion of 
a suspect who has allegedly been the victim of a male captus and who argues that 
the ICC should refuse jurisdiction because of that male captus as a challenge to its 
jurisdiction under Article 19 of the ICC Statute. It considers such a challenge to be a 
sui generis/atypical motion, seeking the stay of the proceedings.13 This view, with 
which the Appeals Chamber corrected the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in this case, 
was, however, seemingly rejected by Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga, decided after 
the Appeals Chamber’s decision in Lubanga Dyilo.14 Although the Trial Chamber in 
Katanga referred to the Appeals Chamber’s view in Lubanga Dyilo, it did not 
further comment on it.15  
Now that these obscurities with respect to the ICC position on the male captus 
issue have been addressed, a few less ambiguous features which can be identified in 
                                                                                                                                              
the warrant for his arrest.” The same argument was used in the context of Art. 60, para. 4 of the ICC 
Statute, where the ICC judges referred to this decision of 14 December 2006, cf. ICC, Appeals 
Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté provisoire de Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo”’ (Public Document), [ICC-]01/04-01/06 (OA 7), 13 February 2007, para. 121 and ICC, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Decision on the powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
review proprio motu the pre-trial detention of Germain Katanga’ (Urgent, Public Document), ICC-
01/04-01/07, 18 March 2008, p. 11. 
13 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
24. 
14 See ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public redacted version of the “Decision 
on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of 
Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp)’ (Public document), ICC-01/04-
01/07, 3 December 2009, paras. 43-45. 








the ICC’s handling of an alleged male captus case should be mentioned. It must be 
clarified that the following points may also reveal inconsistencies between, for 
example, the decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber in 
Lubanga Dyilo. However, as the Appeals Chamber specifically reviewed the Pre-
Trial Chamber’s decision in that case, this study does not view a correction of the 
Appeals Chamber in that respect as a lack of clarity but as a more authoritative view 
of the ICC. The obscurities discussed above were different: they either included 
unclear issues with respect to the Appeals Chamber’s decision itself or lack of 
clarity engendered by a Chamber taking another view after the Appeals Chamber 
had issued its decision.  
First, the ICC does not accept the doctrine which is so often contrasted with the 
male captus bene detentus rule, the abuse of process doctrine, because it is not 
covered by Article 21 of the ICC Statute. However, what is covered by this 
provision, namely by its paragraph 3, is the human rights dimension of the abuse of 
process doctrine. It is that human rights dimension which the ICC uses to solve male 
captus claims. It is clear that the ICC theoretically attaches great importance to 
human rights – and the human rights to a fair trial16 and to liberty and security 
(including the right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention, a right which is 
not explicitly mentioned in the ICC’s proper instruments) in particular.17 In this 
                                                          
16 See, for example, ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the 
Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 
19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 
2006, para. 37: “Human rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it, including the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Its provisions must be interpreted and more importantly applied in accordance 
with internationally recognized human rights; first and foremost, in the context of the Statute, the right 
of a fair trial, a concept broadly perceived and applied, embracing the judicial process in its entirety 
[original footnotes omitted, ChP].” See also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s “Application for Leave to Reply to ‘Conclusions de la défense en réponse au mémoire 
d’appel du Procureur’” (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 12 September 2006, Separate opinion of 
Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 3: “Internationally recognized may be regarded those human rights 
acknowledged by customary international law and international treaties and conventions. The right to a 
fair trial belongs to this class of rights.” 
17 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté provisoire de 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo”’ (Public Document), [ICC-]01/04-01/06 (OA 7), 13 February 2007, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 16 (“Article 21 (3) of the Statute ordains the application and 
interpretation of every provision of the Statute in a manner consistent with internationally recognized 
human rights. Internationally recognized human rights in this area, as may be distilled from the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international and regional treaties and conventions on 
human rights, acknowledge a right to an arrested person to have access to a court of law vested with 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the lawfulness and justification of his/her detention. Such a right is 
afforded to the arrestee from the outset [original footnotes omitted, ChP].”), ICC, Appeals Chamber, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, ‘Decision on the admissibility of the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision 
of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Décision sur la confirmation des charges” of 29 January 2007 (…)’ 








context, it was also remarked that “the defence must, to the largest extent possible, 
be granted access to documents that are essential in order effectively to challenge 
the lawfulness of detention, bearing in mind the circumstances of the case”.18 The 
                                                                                                                                              
judges refer to Artt. 21, para. 3 of the ICC Statute, 9, para. 4 of the ICCPR, 5, para. 4 of the ECHR and 
7, para. 6 of the ACHR, ChP] of a person to have recourse to judicial review of a decision affecting his 
liberty is entrenched in article 60 of the Statute [original footnote omitted, ChP].”), ICC, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Decision on the powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
review proprio motu the pre-trial detention of Germain Katanga’ (Urgent, Public Document), ICC-
01/04-01/07, 18 March 2008, p. 8 (“[A]ccording to articles 55, 57 and 67, one of the functions of the 
Chamber is to be the ultimate guarantor of the rights of the Defence, including the right “not to be 
deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are 
established in the Statute””.), ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In 
the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision on application for interim release’ 
(Confidential), ICC-01/05-01/08, 20 August 2008 (available as the annex to the decision ICC, Pre-Trial 
Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision concerning the public version of the “Decision on application for interim 
release” of 20 August 2008’ (Public Document), ICC-01/05-01/08, 26 August 2008), para. 37 (“The 
Single Judge observes at the outset that the right to liberty is of fundamental importance for everyone 
and that for any deprivation of liberty to be acceptable, it must be on such grounds and in accordance 
with such procedure as are established by the applicable legal regime. Furthermore, it must not be 
arbitrary [original footnote omitted, ChP].”) and ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Central 
African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision on the Interim 
Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and Convening Hearings with the Kingdom of Belgium, the 
Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, 
and the Republic of South Africa’ (Public Document), ICC-01/05-01/08, 14 August 2009, para. 35, 
writing about the scope of Art. 21, para. 3 of the ICC Statute: “The right of an arrested person to have 
access to a judicial authority vested with the power to adjudicate upon the lawfulness and justification of 
his or her detention is enshrined in many international human rights instruments, such as article 9 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, article 5 of the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and article 7 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” Cf. also ICC, Appeals Chamber, 
Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on 
the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber III entitled 
“Decision on application for interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-01/05-01/08 OA, 16 December 
2008, Dissenting opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 20: “If there were no provision in the 
Statute affording the arrested person the opportunity to contest the deprivation of his/her liberty, we 
would be confronted with a dire denial of his/her human rights. Every person is assured the right to 
contest the lawfulness of his/her detention. Lawfulness in this context signifies the soundness in law of 
the factual basis of the decision, as well as the correctness of the legal provisions by reference to which 
the case is decided. The right of a person to contest the lawfulness of his detention, ordered in his 
absence and without hearing him, is safeguarded by the provisions of article 60 (2) of the Statute, 
requiring the Pre-Trial Chamber to evaluate, in proceedings held in the presence and with the 
participation of the person affected, the lawfulness and sequentially the justification of the deprivation 
of liberty. The provisions of article 60 (2), like every other provision of the Statute, must (…) be 
construed and applied in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.” See finally also 
ibid., para. 31: “[A]rticle 21 (3) assures to every individual the right to effectively contest the 
deprivation of liberty.” 
18 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on application for interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-01/05-








Katanga case has shown that even provisions which do not seem relevant for the 
male captus topic (such as provisions on interim releases) can apparently be used in 
that respect if the suspect is of the opinion that his male captus has tainted the 
lawfulness of his detention in The Hague.19  
The ICC furthermore appears to concentrate on the violations themselves and not 
so much on the question of whether the ICC (or third parties working at the behest 
of the ICC) – see again the words “by his/her accusers” – intentionally violated 
certain norms.20 However, what seems to be required, see the Bemba Gombo case, is 
that violations must result into actual prejudice to the suspect.21 
Another important aspect of the male captus issue is the role of the competent 
judicial authority of the custodial State in the whole procedure, a point which was 
already briefly mentioned supra. In contrast to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Appeals 
Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo did not explain to what extent that authority, under 
Article 59 of the ICC Statute, can look into irregularities prior to the official 
arrest/detention. In addition, and this time just like the Pre-Trial Chamber, the 
Appeals Chamber did not clarify the role of the ICC judges, who marginally 
supervise the points of Article 59, paragraph 2 (b) and (c) of the ICC Statute,22 in 
this context of the prior arrest/detention. Finally, again following the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, the Appeals Chamber does not elucidate to what extent provisions such as 
Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute and Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC 
Statute should be considered here. The focus appears to be on national law only. 
Finally, the Appeals Chamber seems only interested in the ultimate remedy, the 






                                                                                                                                              
African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on application for 
interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-01/05-01/08 OA, 16 December 2008, Dissenting opinion of 
Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 29. 
19 See ns. 650-651 and accompanying text of Chapter X. 
20 See also ICC, Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Urgent Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of 
exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution 
of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008’ 
(Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 13 June 2008, para. 90. 
21 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision on application for interim release’ (Confidential), 
ICC-01/05-01/08, 20 August 2008 (available as the annex to the decision ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 
Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
‘Decision concerning the public version of the “Decision on application for interim release” of 20 
August 2008’ (Public Document), ICC-01/05-01/08, 26 August 2008), para. 46. 
22 This marginal role was also confirmed in the Bemba Gombo case, see n. 337 and accompanying text 








2.2 The ICC’s current position on the male captus issue assessed in the context 
of this book’s external evaluative framework  
 
Now, how can the above-mentioned position – taking into account that some of its 
aspects are not very clear – be viewed vis-à-vis the male captus position of other 
courts? How similar or different is the ICC’s handling of the male captus issue in 
comparison with that of these other courts? 
First of all, it appears that the ICC, like almost every modern court or tribunal, 
does not accept the old-fashioned version of male captus bene detentus that 
jurisdiction will be exercised, regardless of the way that person came into the power 
of the Court.  
Human rights are considered to be of paramount importance and extend to the 
entire proceedings, including the pre-trial phase. This includes the (for this study) so 
important human right to liberty and security, including its sub-right to challenge the 
lawfulness of one’s detention, even if that sub-right is not explicitly mentioned in 
the proper instruments of the ICC.23 This resembles the position of other tribunals.24 
It will also be very interesting to see how the ICC will interpret its remark that “the 
defence must, to the largest extent possible, be granted access to documents that are 
essential in order effectively to challenge the lawfulness of detention, bearing in 
mind the circumstances of the case”25 when it is confronted by a Todorović-like 
male captus situation in which peacekeeping forces do not wish to share the exact 
information on the way a person was brought into their hands with third parties.   
As a result, the pre-trial phase will be examined to see what kind of effect 
violations of these rights may have on the jurisdiction of the Court. The Trial 
Chamber in Katanga did not do so on procedural grounds – and can be criticised for 
that – but it is uncertain, and in fact improbable, for this decision to be viewed as 
support for the old-fashioned version of male captus bene detentus mentioned 
above. It is simply unimaginable that the Trial Chamber would also refuse to look at 
a male captus claim because the motion was submitted too late if there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that the male captus was extremely serious, for 
example, because it involved an abduction operation orchestrated by the ICC OTP 
itself. 
                                                          
23 See n. 17 and accompanying text. 
24 See n. 148 of Chapter VII. 
25 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on application for interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-01/05-
01/08 OA, 16 December 2008, para. 32. See also ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Central 
African Republic, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber III entitled “Decision on application for 
interim release”’ (Public document), ICC-01/05-01/08 OA, 16 December 2008, Dissenting opinion of 
Judge Georghios M. Pikis, para. 29, where Judge Pikis states that “everything that would enable the 
person to effectively challenge the lawfulness of his detention must be disclosed.” As explained in 
Chapter X: although Judge Pikis makes this remark in the context of the substantive grounds and 









If one is of the opinion that the ICC Appeals Chamber’s one and only male 
detentus test can be found in the words at footnote 1 and accompanying text (and 
this is most probably the case), then the ICC shares the view of, for example, the 
Trial Chamber in Nikolić and the Ebrahim case in that the Prosecution (including 
third parties working at its behest) must come to court with clean hands.26 If that is 
not the case, for example, if the fundamental rights of the suspect have been violated 
in the process of bringing that suspect before the ICC, judges can conclude that one 
can no longer speak of a fair trial in the broad sense of the word, a conclusion which 
must lead to the ending of the case. Because the words “breaches of the fundamental 
rights of the suspect” are very generally formulated, these could include all kinds of 
male captus situations, such as abductions, luring situations and other techniques 
which could (possibly) be seen as violations of the person’s right to liberty and 
security.27 
Before continuing on this topic, it is interesting to note that the ICC seems to 
concentrate here on the violations themselves and not so much on the question of 
whether the ICC (or third parties working at the behest of the ICC) intentionally 
violated certain norms. This can be considered a rather liberal stance as other courts 
have often demanded, in their male detentus tests, an intention on the part of the 
prosecuting authorities to commit the male captus.28 Nevertheless, as also explained 
in the previous chapter, even though the ICC does not explicitly demand an intent, it 
seems clear that it requires serious violations – cf. the words “[w]here fair trial 
becomes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect or 
                                                          
26 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion 
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 
111: “Due process of law also includes questions such as how the Parties have been conducting 
themselves in the context of a particular case and how an Accused has been brought into the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal. The finding in the Ebrahim case that the State must come to court with clean hands 
applies equally to the Prosecution coming to a Trial Chamber of this Tribunal.” 
27 See the authorities mentioned in n. 17 and Hall 2008 A, p. 1093, writing on “the fundamental rights 
recognized in article 55, para. 1” (of which the section under (d) contains the ICC’s right to liberty and 
security). In fact, Hall notes that the absence of this section under (d) “has led to inconclusive and 
unsatisfactory jurisprudence concerning challenges to the lawfulness of arrests by UN peace-keeping 
forces in the former Yugoslavia in the Dokmanovic, Todorovic, Nikolic and Krajisnik [see for this latter 
case n. 659 of Chapter VI, ChP] cases (…) [with reference to Lamb 2001, ChP] and to the lawfulness of 
prolonged pre-trial detention by national authorities pursuant to ICTR arrest warrants (…) [with 
(probably) reference to the two decisions of Barayagwiza and the one of Semanza of 31 May 2000, 
ChP].” (Ibid., n. 26.) Hall refers to “see decisions cited in supra note 44 below”, but it is in n. 53 of his 
contribution that one will find, among other things, the three above-mentioned ICTR decisions. See 
finally Knoops 2002, p. 260, writing that the ICC “cannot act arbitrarily, such as by assuming eo ipso 
the prevalence of its surrender provisions over treaty provisions which indirectly prohibit forcible 
abduction and luring such as Article 9 (1) of the ICCPR.” At the same page, Knoops even writes that 
“[t]he protection against forcible abduction and luring may figure as jus cogens arising from these 
international fundamental human rights norms.” (See also n. 433 of Chapter III.)     
28 See n. 20 of Chapter VII (for the inter-State context). In the male captus decisions of the tribunals, the 
intent is not explicitly mentioned, but some reasonings could definitely contain this element, see ns. 
120-122 of Chapter VII. Note finally that the first male detentus possibility proposed by the OTP itself 
in the Nikolić case also contains this element, see ns. 114 and 116 and accompanying text of Chapter VII 








the accused by his/her accusers” – and that it is very well possible that the ICC may 
only view those violations which are committed intentionally (note, by the way, that 
some male captus situations, such as an abduction, can arguably not be committed 
unintentionally)29 as serious violations which can lead to the ending of the case.30 In 
any case, one can assume that the ICC will more readily refuse jurisdiction if the 
violations are committed intentionally, even if its test does not require the violations 
to be intentional. 
However, what appears to be required, see the Bemba Gombo case, is that 
violations must result into actual prejudice to the suspect.31 Nevertheless, other 
tribunal cases can be seen as supporting the view that the level of prejudice is only 
relevant for determining how serious the violations were (and, consequently, what 
kind of remedy must be provided) and not for determining whether there were 
violations in the first place/whether the suspect would be entitled to a remedy. In 
that view, every violation causes some level of injustice/prejudice to the suspect, 
whether or not the suspect suffered actual/material prejudice.32 
Returning to the ICC’s words “breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect” 
being so generally formulated that these could include all kinds of male captus 
situations, including abductions and luring situations: if the ICC were to refuse 
jurisdiction if the suspect’s accusers were responsible for an abduction as such, the 
ICC would side with the decisions in Levinge,33 Bennett,34 Ebrahim35 and Beahan.36 
                                                          
29 See n. 20 and accompanying text of Chapter VII.  
30 Cf. in that respect also the Prosecution in Nikolić which clarified, after having mentioned its first male 
detentus possibility, which contains the element of intent (“[u]nambiguous, advertent violations of 
international law which can be attributed to the Office of the Prosecutor [emphasis added, ChP]”): “(i.e. 
the Prosecution’s own conduct would have to be in some way egregious [emphasis in original, ChP])”. 
See ns. 114 and 116 and accompanying text of Chapter VII. 
31 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Decision on application for interim release’ (Confidential), 
ICC-01/05-01/08, 20 August 2008 (available as the annex to the decision ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 
Situation in the Central African Republic, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
‘Decision concerning the public version of the “Decision on application for interim release” of 20 
August 2008’ (Public Document), ICC-01/05-01/08, 26 August 2008), para. 46. 
32 See, for example, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case 
No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, para. 125 (see also n. 997 and accompanying text of Chapter VI): 
“[A]ny violation, even if it entails only a relative degree of prejudice, requires a proportionate remedy.” 
See also n. 1164 and accompanying text of Chapter VI (with respect to the Rwamakuba case). 
33 See, for example, the following general reasoning in that case (not focusing now on the specifics of 
the case, which did not involve a traditional kidnapping): “Where a person, however unlawfully, is 
brought into the jurisdiction and is before a court in this State, that court has undoubted jurisdiction to 
deal with him or her. But it also has a discretion not to do so, where to exercise its discretion would 
involve an abuse of the court’s process. Such an abuse may arise by reason of delay on the part of 
prosecuting authorities. But delay is only one variety of unfair or wrongful conduct on the part of those 
authorities. Other such conduct may exist, including wrongful and even unlawful involvement in 
bypassing the regular machinery for extradition and participating in unauthorised and unlawful removal 
of criminal suspects from one jurisdiction to another.” (Levinge v Director of Custodial Services, 
Department of Corrective Services, 23 July 1987, 89 FLR 142.) 
34 See, for example, the following general reasonings in that case (not focusing now on the specifics of 
the case, which did not involve a traditional kidnapping): “If British officialdom at any level has 








(Taking into account that Levinge, Bennett and Beahan explicitly, and Ebrahim 
implicitly, made these remarks in the context of the abuse of process doctrine, a 
doctrine rejected by the ICC Appeals Chamber, which, in turn, focuses on the 
human rights dimension.) These are reasonings which fall short of the test about 
which, according to the German Federal Constitutional Court in Al-Moayad, more 
recent State practice agrees that it must, in any event, lead to rejection of the male 
captus bene detentus rule, namely in the case of an abduction 1) accompanied by 
serious human rights violations/serious mistreatment or 2) followed by a protest and 
request for the return of the suspect from the injured State.37 With respect to the 
context of the tribunals, if the ICC were to refuse jurisdiction because the suspect’s 
accusers were responsible for an abduction as such, the ICC would probably also 
side with the tribunal cases. Although none of these cases involved abductions 
perpetrated by the tribunal itself, one could refer here to general statements which 
                                                                                                                                              
law, the comity of nations and the rule of law generally if our courts allow themselves to be used by the 
executive to try an offence which the courts would not be dealing with if the rule of law had prevailed. It 
may be said that a guilty accused finding himself in the circumstances predicated is not deserving of 
much sympathy, but the principle involved goes beyond the scope of such a pragmatic observation and 
even beyond the rights of those victims who are or may be innocent. It affects the proper administration 
of justice according to the rule of law and with respect to international law.” (House of Lords, Lord 
Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England 
Law Reports 163.) See also House of Lords, Lord Griffiths, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ 
Court and another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 151: “In my view your Lordships 
should now declare that where process of law is available to return an accused to this country through 
extradition procedures our courts will refuse to try him if he has been forcibly brought within our 
jurisdiction in disregard of those procedures by a process to which our own police, prosecuting or other 
executive authorities have been a knowing party.” 
35 See Supreme Court (Appellate Division), Opinion in State v. Ebrahim, 16 February 1991, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), p. 896: “When the state is a party to a dispute, as for example in 
criminal cases, it must come to court with “clean hands”. When the state itself is involved in an 
abduction across international borders, as in the present case, its hands are not clean.” 
36 See, for example, the following general reasoning in that case (not focusing now on the specifics of 
the case, which did not involve a traditional kidnapping): “In my opinion it is essential that in order to 
promote confidence in and respect for the administration of justice and preserve the judicial process 
from contamination, a court should decline to compel an accused person to undergo a trial in 
circumstances where his appearance before it has been facilitated by an act of abduction undertaken by 
the prosecuting state. There is an inherent objection to such a course both on grounds of public policy 
pertaining to international ethical norms and because it imperils and corrodes the peaceful co-existence 
and mutual respect of sovereign nations. For abduction is illegal under international law, provided the 
abductor was not acting on his own initiative and without the authority or connivance of his 
government. A contrary view would amount to a declaration that the end justifies the means, thereby 
encouraging states to become law-breakers in order to secure the conviction of a private individual.” 
(Supreme Court, Beahan v. State, 4 September 1991, International Law Reports, Vol. 103 (1996), p. 
214.) 
37 Although this point is not very clear, it is possible that the German Federal Constitutional Court in Al-
Moayad would follow the 1986 case from Germany, meaning that it would not refuse jurisdiction if the 
abduction was not accompanied by serious human rights violations/serious mistreatment and followed 
by a protest and request for the return of the suspect from the injured State, see the text between ns. 587-








can be found in Nikolić38 and Barayagwiza.39 (Taking – again – into account the fact 
that the remark in the Barayagwiza case was made in the context of the abuse of 
process doctrine.) One could also refer to the Dokmanović case, about which Scharf 
noted that “the Trial Chamber focused on the distinction between “luring” (the 
means used to arrest Dokmanović) and “forcible abduction”, reckoning that the 
former was acceptable while the latter might constitute grounds for dismissal in 
future cases [original footnote omitted, ChP]”.40 
Turning to this concept of luring, the ICC’s phrase “breaches of the fundamental 
rights of the suspect” is so generally formulated that it could also cover a situation 
of luring, as long as the judges are of the opinion that that would constitute a 
violation of a suspect’s fundamental rights (namely his right to liberty and 
security).41 
In that case, the ICC would follow – taking into account for the third time the 
fact that the ICC uses the human rights dimension here and not the more general 
tool of the abuse of process doctrine – the more progressive inter-State cases of 
Levinge42 and Bennett,43 cases which (are considered to) contain very general male 
                                                          
38 See n. 26. As explained earlier in this book, there is some lack of clarity here with respect to the 
vision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Nikolić, which stated that “certain human rights violations are 
of such a serious nature that they require that the exercise of jurisdiction be declined.” Although these 
words are very broad, it could be argued, because it was assumed that Nikolić was the victim of an 
abduction, because the Appeals Chamber was apparently not very impressed by the value of State 
sovereignty and because the Appeals Chamber, in justifying its approach, refers to passages from cases 
which particularly focus on serious mistreatment when writing about their male detentus threshold, that 
the Appeals Chamber’s male detentus test appears to be mainly interested in the seriousness of the 
mistreatment inflicted on the suspect. This could mean that the Appeals Chamber would not be 
concerned about an abduction, as long as that abduction was not accompanied by serious mistreatment. 
It is not very clear from the decision, however, whether this is the general male detentus test or whether 
it is only the test applicable to the case at hand, which involved the actions of private individuals. 
39 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74: “Under the doctrine of “abuse of process”, proceedings 
that have been lawfully initiated may be terminated after an indictment has been issued if improper or 
illegal procedures are employed in pursuing an otherwise lawful process. (…) It is a process by which 
Judges may decline to exercise the court’s jurisdiction in cases where to exercise that jurisdiction in 
light of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s rights would prove detrimental to the court’s 
integrity.” 
40 Scharf 1998, p. 371. 
41 See Subsections 2.2.1 and 2.2.4 of Chapter III. 
42  Where the Court formulated the following, rather general, male captus male detentus test: “Where a 
person, however unlawfully, is brought into the jurisdiction and is before a court in this State, that court 
has undoubted jurisdiction to deal with him or her. But it also has a discretion not to do so, where to 
exercise its discretion would involve an abuse of the court’s process. Such an abuse may arise by reason 
of delay on the part of prosecuting authorities. But delay is only one variety of unfair or wrongful 
conduct on the part of those authorities. Other such conduct may exist, including wrongful and even 
unlawful involvement in bypassing the regular machinery for extradition and participating in 
unauthorised and unlawful removal of criminal suspects from one jurisdiction to another.” 
43 Where (as summarised by the Court in Westfallen) it had to be sorted out “whether it appears that the 
police or the prosecuting authorities have acted illegally or procured or connived at unlawful procedures 
or violated international law or the domestic law of foreign States or abused their powers in a way that 








detentus reasonings and which could cover luring operations (even though these 
cases did not concern such operations), but would distance itself from the inter-State 
luring cases such as Yunis44 and Stocké45 where the judges would probably only 
refuse jurisdiction if the luring were accompanied by serious mistreatment.46 
The tribunal context is less straightforward. Although it is clear that if the ICC 
were to refuse jurisdiction in a case of luring as such, it would take a more liberal 
stance than the ICTY judges in Dokmanović had done (who had condoned this legal 
technique,47 except where accompanied by serious mistreatment, cf. the cases of 
Yunis and Stocké),48 such a position could perhaps also fall under the more general 
words of the ICTR as mentioned in footnote 39. In addition, neither must it be 
forgotten that the general words of Nikolić as mentioned in footnote 26 could also 
cover a luring operation and that the decision in which these words can be found 
was issued after the Dokmanović case. 
Returning to ‘the’ position of the ICC: if one is, however, of the opinion that the 
Appeals Chamber’s requirement that one can no longer speak of a fair trial must be 
seen in the strict sense of the word, namely a fair trial in the courtroom (see the 
words at footnote 2 and accompanying text but recall the discussion related to the 
second formulation whether it must be seen as a (more strict) male detentus test at 
all), the ICC’s position is arguably different from most of the more recent national 
and international courts. Most of these courts seemingly also refuse jurisdiction, not 
only if one can no longer speak of a fair trial (in the strict sense of the word), but 
                                                          
44 See US District Court, District of Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, Crim. No. 87-
0377 (681 F.Supp. 909), p. 920: “In cases where defendants have urged the court to dismiss the 
indictment solely on the grounds that they were fraudulently lured to the United States, courts have 
uniformly upheld jurisdiction.” 
45 In Stocké, the Court held that the prosecuting State’s authorities were not involved in the luring 
operation (or, if they were, were not acting on the State’s authority), but that, even if they were, the male 
captus was not serious enough to divest jurisdiction. 
46 See US District Court, District of Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, Crim. No. 87-
0377 (681 F.Supp. 909), p. 920: “In this action, there is no dispute that United States law enforcement 
officers were fully involved in the planning and execution of defendant’s arrest. However, defendant has 
failed either to allege or to show any actions committed by these officers that meet the standard of 
outrageousness established by Toscanino and its progeny requiring this Court to divest itself of 
jurisdiction. The record in this proceeding has been reviewed with care and the Court fails to find the 
type of cruel, inhumane and outrageous conduct that would warrant dismissal under Toscanino.” In 
Stocké, the German Federal Constitutional Court stated that jurisdiction could be refused on the basis of 
national law if a certain male captus situation could be seen as an “extremely exceptional case”. 
Although it is not clear what the exact meaning is of this concept (although the more serious male 
captus situation of an abduction (as such) will not fall under the term, see the abduction case which was 
decided by the Constitutional Court one year later), it may be that the Court was thinking of Toscanino-
like circumstances, see Wilske 2000, p. 334, n. 413 (commenting on this concept): “[D]as Gericht hatte 
hier möglicherweise die schweren Folterungen im Toscanino-Fall im Auge.” See also Grams 1994, pp. 
70-71. It is also possible that the German Federal Constitutional Court in Al-Moayad would follow the 
Stocké case, namely that it would not refuse jurisdiction in the case of a normal luring operation, but 
only if that luring was accompanied by serious violations/mistreatment, see the text between ns. 587-588 
and accompanying text of Chapter V. 
47 See n. 197 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 








also in the broad sense of the word, namely if it were to be unfair in general/if it 
were to undermine the integrity of the court to have a trial in the first place (hereby 
often using the abuse of process doctrine). To provide two examples, in Bennett, it 
was held that  
 
a court has a discretion to stay any criminal proceedings on the ground that to try 
those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process either (1) because it will 
be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) 
because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the 
accused in the circumstances of a particular case.49 
 
And in Nikolić, the Trial Chamber explained: 
 
There exists a close relationship between the obligation of the Tribunal to respect the 
human rights of the Accused and the obligation to ensure due process of law. 
Ensuring that the Accused’s rights are respected and that he receives a fair trial forms, 
in actual fact, an important aspect of the general concept of due process of law. In that 
context, this Chamber concurs with the view expressed in several national judicial 
decisions, according to which the issue of respect for due process of law encompasses 
more than merely the duty to ensure a fair trial for the Accused. Due process of law 
also includes questions such as how the Parties have been conducting themselves in 
the context of a particular case and how an Accused has been brought into the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal.50 
 
An exception to this, however, can be found in the ICTY case of Karadžić, a case to 
which the Prosecutor in Katanga also referred.51 In that case, the Trial Chamber 
                                                          
49 House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court and another, 24 June 
1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 161. Note that these words were also referred to in the ICTY 
Milošević case (see n. 411 of Chapter VI) and the ICTR Barayagwiza case (see n. 842 of Chapter VI). 
This point is also very clearly described by Lord Steyn in Latif (see n. 346 and accompanying text of 
Chapter V): “[P]roceedings may be stayed in the exercise of the judge’s discretion not only where a fair 
trial is impossible but also where it would be contrary to the public interest in the integrity of the 
criminal justice system that a trial should take place.” (House of Lords, Lord Steyn, Regina v. Latif; 
Regina v. Shazad, 18 January 1996, 1 W.L.R. 112-113 [1996].) 
50 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the 
Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 111. For a focus 
on the broad concept of a fair trial, see also SCSL, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor Against Morris Kallon 
(Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E)) and Brima Bazzy Kamara (Case No. SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E)), 
‘Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty’, 13 March 2004, para. 79. (See n. 1289 
and accompanying text of Chapter VI.) 
51 See n. 535 and accompanying text of Chapter X. For another more recent case, one could perhaps also 
refer here to the French case of Carlos the Jackal (Ramirez Sánchez), where the French Supreme Court 
agreed with the following statement of the Court of Appeal: “Moreover, case-law also provides that the 
circumstances in which someone, against whom proceedings are lawfully being taken and against whom 
a valid arrest warrant has been issued, has been apprehended and handed over to the French legal 
authorities are not in themselves sufficient to render the proceedings void, provided that they have not 
vitiated the search for and process of establishing the truth, nor made it impossible for the defence to 








judges held that proceeding with the case, even if the so-called Holbrooke 
Agreement existed, “would not affect any of the Accused’s fair trial rights”52 and 
that  
 
it could only be in exceptional circumstances that actions of a third party that is 
completely unconnected to the Tribunal or the proceedings could ever lead to those 
proceedings being stayed. Where an accused is seriously mistreated by such a third 
party, that mistreatment is unlikely to be a barrier to a fair trial which can be secured 
in various other ways, for example, by excluding any evidence obtained by torture at 
the hands of the third party.53 
 
This quotation also provides a nice stepping-stone to the next point which should be 
discussed here.  
It must be stressed that the above-mentioned position of the ICC, whether one 
follows that supporting the broad concept of a fair trial or that advocating the 
restricted concept, assumes the involvement of the ICC in the violations. This can 
not only be inferred from the words “by his/her accusers” (which arguably includes 
concerted action between the ICC and third parties54 and action of third parties 
working at the behest of the ICC),55 but also from other references in the section in 
which the different male detentus formulations are presented, to the prosecuting 
forum’s own authorities.56 
As explained supra, it is not clear whether the Appeals Chamber only follows 
this male detentus test, demanding involvement of the ICC, or whether it would also 
refuse jurisdiction in the case of, for example, serious mistreatment/torture, 
irrespective of the entity responsible, for instance, if that mistreatment/torture were 
committed by private individuals. 
                                                                                                                                              
accompanying text of Chapter V. See also, but arguably to a lesser extent, the Barbie case, see n. 496 
and accompanying text of the same chapter. 
52 See n. 727 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
53 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on the Accused’s Holbrooke 
Agreement Motion’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, 8 July 2009, para. 85. Note, however, that the 
Appeals Chamber judges did not agree with this restricted test, see ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor 
v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on Karadžić’s Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on Alleged 
Holbrooke Agreement’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, 12 October 2009, para. 51: “The 
Appeals Chamber observes at the outset that none of the Appellant’s allegations qualify as a situation 
making a fair trial impossible, pursuant to the first prong of the test set out in the Barayagwiza Decision. 
The Appellant’s allegations point instead to the second prong of the test set out in the Barayagwiza 
Decision. In other words, the question before the Appeals Chamber is whether, assuming that the 
Appellant’s factual submission are accepted, proceeding with the trial of the Appellant would 
contravene to the Tribunal’s sense of justice or would be detrimental to the Tribunal’s integrity, due to 
pre-trial impropriety or misconduct amounting to serious and egregious violations of the Appellant’s 
rights [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” 
54 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 3 October 2006, 
pp. 9-10 and its references to Semanza and Rwamakuba. 
55 See ibid., p. 9 and its references to Stocké en Altmann (Barbie). 








If one assumes that the ICC only follows its male detentus test demanding ICC 
involvement, the ICC would follow most of the national cases (but see the 1982 
Swiss (male captus male deditus) case of X) which require the involvement of one’s 
own people.57 However, in that case, it would also clearly deviate from the tribunal 
cases which recognise that, under the abuse of process doctrine, a doctrine which the 
ICC Appeals Chamber rejects, very serious male captus cases can lead to the ending 
of the case, irrespective of the entity responsible.58 
If the ICC (Appeals Chamber) were nevertheless to refuse jurisdiction in very 
serious male captus cases, irrespective of the entity responsible – this is how the co-
investigating judges in Duch read the Appeals Chamber’s decision – and if it were 
to follow the Pre-Trial Chamber’s statement in that case (assuming that the 
reference to “torture or serious mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial 
State [emphasis added, ChP]” is erroneous), the Appeals Chamber would also 
recognise that this male detentus avenue is not restricted to torture or serious 
mistreatment. After all, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that  
 
to date, the application of this doctrine [of abuse of process, ChP], which would 
require that the Court decline to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular case, has been 
confined to instances of torture or serious mistreatment by national authorities of the 
custodial State in some way related to the process of arrest and transfer of the person 
                                                          
57 See n. 51 and accompanying text of Chapter VII. 
58 See, for example, the Trial Chamber’s decision in Nikolić (with reference to the 1999 Barayagwiza 
decision): “[I]n a situation where an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe even subjected to 
inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to the Tribunal, this may 
constitute a legal impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction over such an accused. This would certainly 
be the case where persons acting for SFOR or the Prosecution were involved in such very serious 
mistreatment. But even without such involvement this Chamber finds it extremely difficult to justify the 
exercise of jurisdiction over a person if that person was brought into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
after having been seriously mistreated. This, the Chamber observes, is in keeping with the approach of 
the Appeals Chamber in the Barayagwiza case, according to which in cases of egregious violations of 
the rights of the Accused, it is “irrelevant which entity or entities were responsible for the alleged 
violations of the Appellant’s rights” [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial 
Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of 
Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 114.) See further ICTY, Trial 
Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, ‘Decision on Preliminary Motions’, Case No. IT-99-37-
PT, 8 November 2001, para. 51, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 30, 
SCSL, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor Against Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie 
Borbor Kanu, ‘Written Reasons for the Trial Chamber’s Oral Decision on the Defence Motion on Abuse 
of Process Due to Infringement of Principles of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and Non-Retroactivity as to 
Several Counts’, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, 31 March 2004, para. 26, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal 
Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 206, ECCC, 
Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 002/14-08-
2006, Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 21, ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on 
Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 33, ICTY, 
Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on the Accused’s Holbrooke Agreement 
Motion’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, 8 July 2009, para. 85 and ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on Karadžić’s Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on 








to the relevant international criminal tribunal [emphasis added and original footnotes 
omitted, ChP][.]59 
 
This means that the ICC may also refuse jurisdiction in serious male captus cases 
other than serious mistreatment/torture. This appears to be similar to the position of 
the tribunals. Although several cases, perhaps inspired by the Trial Chamber’s 
words in Dokmanović,60 a case issued prior to (the abuse of process test from) the 
Barayagwiza case,61 have focused on the more ‘physically’ coloured words “serious 
mistreatment” and “torture” (which is not without problems as this can gradually 
turn the abuse of process test into a ‘torture test’),62 the more recent Karadžić case 
has clarified that serious mistreatment/torture are only to be seen as examples of 
such serious cases that a court may refuse jurisdiction.63   
                                                          
59 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 3 October 2006, 
p. 10. 
60 See ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksić, Miroslav Radić, Veselin Šlijvančanin and 
Slavko Dokmanović, ‘Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused Slavko Dokmanović’, Case 
No. IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997, para. 75: “[T]here was no “cruel, inhumane and outrageous 
conduct that would warrant dismissal under Toscanino” in the arrest of Mr. Dokmanović. The accused 
was not mistreated in any way on his journey to the Erdut base. There was nothing about the arrest to 
shock the conscience [emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” It is reminded that 
Toscanino was tortured for almost three weeks. 
61 See ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 77: “[T]he abuse of process doctrine may be relied on in 
two distinct situations: (1) where delay [or other circumstances, see the test from Bennett (see n.  49 and 
accompanying text) to which the judges in the Barayagwiza case referred, see ibid., para. 75, ChP] has 
made a fair trial for the accused impossible; and (2) where in the circumstances of a particular case, 
proceeding with the trial of the accused would contravene the court’s sense of justice, due to pre-trial 
impropriety or misconduct.” 
62 See, for example, ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 
001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 33: “Where the violations in question are not 
attributable to an international tribunal, this doctrine appears to be confined to instances of torture or 
serious mistreatment by the external authorities and has most usually been applied in relation to the 
process of arrest and transfer [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See also ECCC, Office of the Co-
Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case File 002/14-08-2006, 
Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 21: “It is obvious that in a case of crimes against 
humanity, the proceedings should be stayed only where the rights of the accused have been seriously 
affected, at least, for example, to the degree in Toscanino.” (It is again to be recalled that Toscanino was 
tortured for nearly three weeks.) The co-investigating judges of the ECCC also used more generally 
words when they stated that they “are (...) compelled to follow the solution adopted in Nikolic and 
Lubanga which requires, for the application of the abuse of [process] doctrine, the existence of grave 
violations of the rights of the Accused” (ibid.), but the words following that quotation again show that 
the co-investigating judges apparently require serious mistreatment/torture-like circumstances: “Where 
it has not been established or even alleged that DUCH suffered incidents of torture or serious 
mistreatment prior to his transfer before the Extraordinary Chambers, the prolonged detention under the 
jurisdiction of the Military Court, in comparison with the crimes against humanity alleged against the 
Accused, cannot be considered a sufficiently grave violation of the rights of the Accused.” (Ibid.) 
63 See ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on the Accused’s 
Holbrooke Agreement Motion’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, 8 July 2009, para. 85: “As for the 








Another point which should be discussed here is the scope of review. As 
explained supra, there is lack of clarity as to whether the Appeals Chamber, prior to 
the constructive custody of the ICC, would examine irregularities during a national 
detention which result from concerted action between the ICC and third parties more 
generally or whether it would only consider irregularities if the suspect were in 
detention for the same crimes as he is now being prosecuted at the ICC.  
However, first looking at the context of constructive custody itself, it appears 
that the ICC accepts that it will review and in fact take responsibility for any 
violations which occur in this context, in the context of an arrest/detention executed 
at the behest of the ICC.64 Several tribunal cases can be interpreted as support for 
                                                                                                                                              
degrading treatment, there is no indication that the Accused suffered such serious mistreatment or that 
there was any other egregious violation of his rights, including his right to political activity [emphasis 
added and emphasis (of the word “egregious”) in original, ChP].” See also ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, ‘Decision on Karadžić’s Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on 
Alleged Holbrooke Agreement’ (Public), Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, 12 October 2009, para. 47: 
“[T]he Trial Chamber adopted the common standard established by the Appeals Chamber in the 
Barayagwiza Decision and in the Nikolić Appeal Decision, and not a higher one, by considering whether 
the Appellant suffered a serious mistreatment or if there was any other egregious violation of his rights 
[emphasis added, ChP].” See also ibid., para. 51: “[T]he question before the Appeals Chamber is 
whether, assuming that the Appellant’s factual submission are accepted, proceeding with the trial of the 
Appellant would contravene to the Tribunal’s sense of justice or would be detrimental to the Tribunal’s 
integrity, due to pre-trial impropriety or misconduct amounting to serious and egregious violations of 
the Appellant’s rights.” 
64 For example, when the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo explained that “any violations of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo’s rights in relation to his arrest and detention prior to 14 March 2006 [when the request 
for arrest and surrender was transmitted to the DRC, ChP] will be examined by the Court only once it 
has been established that there has been concerted action between the Court and the DRC authorities 
[original footnote omitted, ChP]” (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Defence 
Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute’ (Public 
Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 3 October 2006, p. 9), it referred to the ECtHR’s cases of Stocké and 
Barbie (with respect to the concerted action point) and the ICTR cases of Semanza and Rwamakuba, 
these last two as authorities for the idea that the ICTR “has repeatedly stated that the Tribunal is not 
responsible for the illegal arrest and detention of the accused in the custodial State if the arrest and 
detention was not carried out at the behest of the Tribunal.” (Ibid., pp. 9-10, n. 30.) Hence, it appears 
that the Pre-Trial Chamber followed the vision of the Deputy Prosecutor in Lubanga Dyilo (see n. 90 
and accompanying text of Chapter X), namely that the ICC will take its responsibility, first, for 
violations which occur after the official request has been sent (violations taking place in the constructive 
custody of the ICC/violations in the arrest/detention at the behest/request of the ICC: Semanza and 
Rwamakuba) and secondly, for violations which occurred prior to these official requests if these 
violations stem from concerted action between the ICC and the external authorities (in the case of 
Lubanga Dyilo: the DRC authorities): Stocké and Barbie. See also the following view of the Prosecutor 
in Katanga: “The Second Period of detention of the Accused by the DRC authorities dates from the time 
the Court transmitted to the DRC authorities a formal request for the Accused’s arrest and surrender. 
The detention based on the ICC’s request for surrender lasted approximately one month. It is attributable 
to the Court.” (ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of 
The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Prosecution Response to Defence 
motion for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedings’ (Public, Public Redacted 
Version of ICC-01/04-01/07-1335-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07, 17 August 2009, para. 6.) The Appeals 
Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo did not really delve into this issue, as it was especially focusing on the main 








that view,65 although there are also cases in which the judges refused to review the 
legality of the national arrest/detention proceedings.66 
                                                                                                                                              
appellant’s case lies, is that the Pre-Trial Chamber ignored breaches of his human rights prior to his 
appearance before the Court and the directions for the enforcement of the warrant of arrest [original 
footnote omitted, ChP].” (ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant 
to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 
December 2006, para. 42.) One can assume that the Appeals Chamber does not reject the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s stance on taking responsibility for violations which occur after the requests have been sent. 
Additional evidence for this assertion may be found in the fact that the Appeals Chamber connects the 
ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction in general, whenever the ICC is involved in a case (which arguably also 
includes making an arrest/detention via third parties), to Art. 21, para. 3 of the ICC Statute, see the 
concept of “by his/her accusers”. 
65 See, for example, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, 
Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 85, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza v the Prosecutor, ‘Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration)’, Case 
No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 31 March 2000, para. 74, ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Laurent Semanza vs. The 
Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, 31 May 2000, paras. 78, 87 and 125, ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 23 May 2005, 
paras. 226-227, 232, 255 and 322, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba et alia, 
‘Decision on the Defence Motion Concerning the Illegal Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused’, 
Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, 12 December 2000, para. 23, ICTR, Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor v. 
André Rwamakuba, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, 20 September 2006, para. 218 and ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber, André Rwamakuba v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision on Appeal against Decision on 
Appropriate Remedy’, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-A, 13 September 2007, para. 24 (although it must also 
be admitted that the Rwamakuba case is arguably less far-going than the other above-mentioned cases). 
See finally also ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 001/18-
07-2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 16 (see n. 165 of Chapter VII). Note that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
in Lubanga Dyilo referred to both Semanza and Rwamakuba as support for the idea that the ICTR “has 
repeatedly stated that the Tribunal is not responsible for the illegal arrest and detention of the accused in 
the custodial State if the arrest and detention was not carried out at the behest of the Tribunal.” (See n. 
64.) However, even though Semanza can indeed be seen as support for the idea that it will look at any 
violation in the context of an arrest/detention at the behest of the ICTR, Rwamakuba is arguably less far-
going as in that case, the judges also stated that they would only review some aspects of an 
arrest/detention at the behest of the ICTR. Note finally that the above-mentioned cases can in fact be 
interpreted as support for the reasoning that any violation occurring in the context of the tribunal case 
more generally, a context which is often triggered by the tribunal request, but not necessarily limited to 
the constructive custody, see the cases of Barayagwiza and Duch, must be remedied. 
66 See, for example, ICTY, Trial Chamber I, Motion on Behalf of General Djorde Djukić, ‘Decision’, 
Case No. IT-96-19-Misc. 1, 28 February 1996, D211, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor versus 
Edouard Karemera, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion for the Release of the Accused’, Case No. ICTR-
98-44-I, 10 December 1999, para. 4.3, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Matthieu 
Ngirumpatse, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion Challenging the Lawfulness of the Arrest and Detention 
and Seeking Return or Inspection of Seized Items’, Case No. ICTR-97-44-I, 10 December 1999, para. 
56, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor versus J[u]v[é]nal Kajelijeli, ‘Decision on the Defence 
Motion Concerning the Arbitrary Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused and on the Defence Notice 
of Urgent Motion to Expand and Supplement the Record of 8 December 1999 Hearing’, Case No. 
ICTR-98-44-I, 8 May 2000, paras. 34-35, ICTR, Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Siméon 
Nshamihigo, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion Seeking Release of the Accused Person and/or Any 
Other Remedy on the Basis of Abuse of Process by the Prosecutor’, Case No. ICTR-2001-63-DP, 8 May 
2002, n. 2, ICTR, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Joseph Nzirorera, ‘Decision on the Defence 








With respect to examining irregularities beyond the constructive custody: if the 
ICC were more generally to review irregularities which resulted from concerted 
action between the ICC and third parties, it would follow several (inter)national 
courts in which it is recognised that responsibility must be taken for action in which 
the prosecuting forum’s own authorities participated, in which those authorities 
were involved. Two inter-State cases (discussed by the ECtHR and ECmHR) were 
already mentioned in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in Lubanga Dyilo: Stocké67 
and Altmann (Barbie).68 As regards the tribunal context, one could refer to the views 
of the co-investigating judges, the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the judges of 
the Trial Chamber in the Duch case before the ECCC (who, in turn, relied on the 
Lubanga Dyilo case).69 However, there are also judges who look more broadly at the 
issue of responsibility and do not confine themselves to concerted action. One may 
here refer to the Nikolić case, where the judges of the Trial Chamber considered 
whether the male captus of the private individuals could be attributed to SFOR and 
whether, in turn, the conduct of SFOR could be attributed to the OTP. Here, the 
                                                                                                                                              
of Personal Items Seized’, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, 7 September 2000, para. 27 and ICTR, Trial 
Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, ‘Decision on the Defence Motion for Exclusion 
of Evidence and Restitution of Property Seized’, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, 12 October 2000, para. 28. 
67 In the Stocké case, the ECtHR held that “[n]either the facts found by the Commission nor the 
circumstances of the case as a whole established that the cooperation that there had unquestionably been 
between the German prosecuting authorities and Mr Köster had extended to “unlawful activities abroad 
such as [returning] the applicant against his will from France to the Federal Republic of Germany”.” 
(ECtHR (Chamber), Case of Stocké v. Germany, Application No. 11755/85, ‘Judgment’, 19 March 
1991, para. 51.) See also ibid., para. 54: “Like the Commission, the Court considers that it has not been 
established that the cooperation between the German authorities and Mr Köster extended to unlawful 
activities abroad.” (See also n. 384 and accompanying text of Chapter III.) 
68 In the Altmann (Barbie) case, the ECmHR stated: “The question nevertheless arises of whether any 
concerted action between the two Governments, or the fact that he was expelled rather than extradited, 
would constitute grounds for considering the applicant’s imprisonment after he was handed over to the 
French authorities as illegal.” (ECmHR (Plenary), Klaus Altmann (Barbie) v/France, Application No. 
10689/83, ‘Decision of 4 July 1984 on the admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, No. 
37, p. 234.) (See also n. 334 and accompanying text of Chapter III.) 
69 See ECCC, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, ‘Order of Provisional Detention’, Criminal Case 
File 002/14-08-2006, Investigation No. 001/18-07-2007, 31 July 2007, para. 20 where the co-
investigating judges explained that “[t]he fact that the Extraordinary Chambers is part of the judicial 
system of the Kingdom of Cambodia does not lead to the conclusion that this special internationalised 
Tribunal acted in concert with the military court: the Extraordinary Chambers only became operational 
on June 22, 2007 (...). Prior to the initiation of this judicial investigation, the Co-Investigating Judges 
(who together form the sole authority empowered to decide upon matters of provisional detention) had 
no means of intervening. Once they were in a position to do so, they dealt with the issue.” See also 
ECCC, Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order of Kaing Guek 
Eav Alias “Duch”’, Criminal Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (PTC01), 3 December 2007, 
para. 15, where the judges stated that they could only take into account a violation of Art. 9 of the 
ICCPR “when the organ responsible for the violation was connected to an organ of the ECCC, or had 
been acting on behalf of any organ of the ECCC or in concert with organs of the ECCC.” (See also ibid., 
para. 21.) See finally ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ (Public), Case File 
001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 33: “The abuse of process doctrine constitutes an 
additional guarantee of the rights of the accused and may apply even in circumstances where there is no 
concerted action between the international criminal tribunal and the external authorities [original 








judges, cautiously making use of the ILC’s DARS, also examined whether SFOR 
acknowledged and adopted the conduct of the private individuals as its own (Article 
11 of the DARS).70    
Finally, if the ICC(’s Appeals Chamber) were not to look at concerted action 
more generally but only at irregularities, prior to the constructive custody of the 
ICC, if the suspect were in detention for the same crimes as those for which he was 
now being prosecuted at the ICC, that stance would constitute a deviation from other 
(inter)national courts which simply appear to be interested in the seriousness of the 
pre-trial irregularities in general, whether or not a suspect was in detention for the 
same crimes as those for which the court is now prosecuting him.71 It is very well 
possible that the prosecuting forum is somehow involved in a national detention, 
even if the suspect was detained for other crimes. In that case, judges may be of the 
opinion that there was concerted action, entailing legal responsibility. Note in that 
respect that Duch, in whose case the judges made the above-mentioned remarks on 
concerted action, was also initially detained for crimes other than those for which 
the ECCC was now prosecuting him. In addition, it must also be repeated72 that the 
cases mentioned in footnote 65 can be interpreted as supporting the idea that the 
                                                          
70 See n. 488 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
71 For example, Lord Devlin stated in the Connelly case that courts must accept their “inescapable duty 
to secure fair treatment for those who come or are brought before them [emphasis added, ChP].” (ICC, 
Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision 
on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 
October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 29). One could 
also refer here to the vision of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo, which merely demands 
“instances of torture or serious mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial State in some way 
related to the process of arrest and transfer of the person to the relevant international criminal tribunal 
[emphasis added and original footnote omitted, ChP]”. (This broad stance was arguably also accepted by 
the Defence and the Prosecution in that case, see n. 195 of Chapter X.) See also the abuse of process 
doctrine under Duch: “Where the violations in question are not attributable to an international tribunal, 
this doctrine appears to be confined to instances of torture or serious mistreatment by the external 
authorities and has most usually been applied in relation to the process of arrest and transfer [emphasis 
added and original footnote omitted, ChP].” (ECCC, Trial Chamber, ‘Decision on Request for Release’ 
(Public), Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 15 June 2009, para. 33.) See further the following 
formulation from Bennett (a formulation which was also used in the ICTY Milošević case and the ICTR 
Barayagwiza case (see n. 49)): “[A] court has a discretion to stay any criminal proceedings on the 
ground that to try those proceedings will amount to an abuse of its own process either (1) because it will 
be impossible (usually by reason of delay) to give the accused a fair trial or (2) because it offends the 
court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of a particular 
case [emphasis added ChP].” (House of Lords, Lord Lowry, Bennett v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ 
Court and another, 24 June 1993, [1993] 3 All England Law Reports 161.) See finally the ICTY Trial 
Chamber’s view in Nikolić, arguing that “[d]ue process of law also includes questions such as (…) how 
an Accused has been brought into the jurisdiction of the Tribunal [emphasis added, ChP].” (ICTY, Trial 
Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of 
Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 111.) See also ibid., para. 
114: “[I]n a situation where an accused is very seriously mistreated, maybe even subjected to inhuman, 
cruel or degrading treatment, or torture, before being handed over to the Tribunal, this may constitute a 
legal impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction over such an accused [emphasis added, ChP].” 








tribunal will take responsibility for any violations which occur in the context of its 
case more generally, whether that concept of “in the context of its case” is triggered 
by an arrest/detention at the behest of the tribunal (which was often the case) or not 
(see Barayagwiza and Duch). In that case, it would not matter if the suspect were in 
detention for crimes other than those for which the prosecuting forum was now 
trying him.  
A few remaining elements can be briefly addressed here.  
First, it is clear that the competent judicial authority in the custodial State, 
because of Article 59 of the ICC Statute, has become a much more serious and 
powerful link in the surrender proceedings than the national authorities in the 
context of the UN ad hoc Tribunals.  
Secondly, the (possible)73 idea of the ICC that a male captus motion cannot be 
seen as a challenge to the ICC’s jurisdiction (ratione personae) does not seem to be 
shared by other (inter)national courts, even if, strictly speaking, the motion 
challenges the exercise of personal jurisdiction and not the personal jurisdiction 
itself.74 
Thirdly, with respect to the ICC’s sole focus on the ultimate remedy (male 
detentus): the cases examined at the inter-State level did not clearly identify the 
reasoning that the suspect, if his claim for a male detentus was rejected, might be 
entitled to other remedies from the prosecuting forum such as a reduction of the 
sentence or financial compensation, although it was, of course, possible for the male 
captus victim to sue the kidnappers in a civil case, see that of Alvarez-Machain, 
discussed after his criminal case. In addition, it is possible that the prosecuting 
forum was of the opinion that during the male captus, other legal rules were 
violated; violations for which it could grant remedies, such as the exclusion of 
                                                          
73 But see ICC, Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Public redacted version of the “Decision 
on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of 
Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp)’ (Public document), ICC-01/04-
01/07, 3 December 2009, paras. 43-45. 
74 See, for example, US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 22 July 
1991, No. 88-5462 (939 F.2d 1341), p. 1343: [I]f the Mexican government formally objects to the treaty 
breach and a defendant timely raises that breach in a pending criminal proceeding the courts of the 
United States may not exercise personal jurisdiction over that defendant, provided the Mexican 
government is willing to accept repatriation.” (See n. 104 of Chapter V.) See also ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of 
Arrest’, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, 5 June 2003, para. 19: “[T]he Appeals Chamber wishes to clarify that 
what is at issue here, is not jurisdiction ratione materiae but jurisdiction ratione personae. Jurisdiction 
ratione materiae depends on the nature of the crimes charges. The Accused is charged with war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. As such, there is no question that under the Statute, the International 
Tribunal does have jurisdiction ratione materiae. In this case, jurisdiction ratione personae depends 
instead on whether the Appeals Chamber determines that there are any circumstances relating to the 
Accused which would warrant setting aside jurisdiction and releasing the Accused. It is to this 
determination that the Chamber now turns.” (See also n. 591 and accompanying text of Chapter VI.) Cf. 
finally ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, ‘Judgement’, Case No. ICTR-98-
44A-A, 23 May 2005, para. 206: “[T]he Appeals Chamber does not find that these newly and more 
detailed submitted breaches rise to the requisite level of egregiousness amounting to the Tribunal’s loss 








unlawfully obtained evidence.75 As regards the context of the tribunals, the focus on 
the ultimate remedy alone, refusal of jurisdiction, can certainly be found here.76 
Nevertheless, there are also cases where the judges, after having rejected the male 
detentus claim, have examined whether the suspect would be entitled to other, less 
far-reaching, remedies instead.77 
Fourthly, the ICC has not yet explicitly mentioned the element ‘seriousness of 
the crimes’ when considering male captus claims, an element which can be found in 
the context of both inter-State and tribunal cases.78 However, this is not that strange 
as the ICC has rejected the abuse of process doctrine, a doctrine in which this 
element played a major role. Nevertheless, if the ICC were to follow the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and consider refusing jurisdiction in the case of serious violations, 
irrespective of the entity responsible (assuming for now that that is the position of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber), one can expect that the ICC would not refuse jurisdiction 
too readily and in doing so, would refer to both the absence of responsibility on the 
part of the suspect’s accusers and the importance of prosecution (read: the 
seriousness of the suspect’s alleged crimes).   
A last point which should be mentioned here before turning to the assessment of 
the ICC position in the context of this book’s internal evaluative framework is that 
the ICC does not explicitly support the male captus bene/male detentus maxim. This 
is similar to other courts and tribunals. Although the Appeals Chamber does contrast 
the male captus bene detentus rule with the abuse of process doctrine and although 
that latter doctrine is rejected by the Appeals Chamber (which could be interpreted 
as meaning that the Appeals Chamber follows the male captus bene detentus rule), 
this is certainly not the case, as the Appeals Chamber clearly supports a large part, 
namely the human rights dimension, of the abuse of process doctrine. Looking now 
at the first (and third) formulation of the ICC’s male detentus test: if the ICC is of 
the opinion that no fair trial (in the broad sense of the word) can be held because of 
a serious male captus committed by the suspect’s accusers, a male detentus verdict 
must follow. That is even the case – to return to the above-mentioned point of the 
                                                          
75 For example, it was explained in Chapter V, in the context of the Yunis luring case, that Yunis’ male 
detentus claim was rejected, but that his confession made after his arrest had to be suppressed because 
“the FBI failed to comply fully with constitutional restraints and precedential Supreme Court decisions.” 
(US District Court, District of Columbia, United States v. Yunis, 23 February 1988, Crim. No. 87-0377 
(681 F.Supp. 909), p. 929.) See also ns. 179-180 and accompanying text of Chapter V. 
76 See, for example, the Trial and Appeals Chamber’s decisions in Nikolić and the Trial Chamber’s 
decision in Tolimir, see n. 155 of Chapter VII. 
77 See, for example, the second decision in Barayagwiza, Semanza, Kajelijeli, Rwamakuba (although 
that case concerned compensation after an acquittal) and Duch. (See also n. 152 of Chapter VII.) 
78 Cf. also the more general importance the European institutions attach to prosecution (of serious 
crimes), see, for example, ECmHR (Plenary), Illich Sánchez Ramirez v/France, Application No. 
28780/95, ‘Decision of 24 June 1996 on the admissibility of the application’, Decisions and Reports, 
No. 86-B, p. 162 (see n. 316 of Chapter III) and ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, 








seriousness of the alleged crimes – if a suspect is charged with very serious 
crimes.79  
 
2.3 The ICC’s current position on the male captus issue assessed in the context 
of this book’s internal evaluative framework 
 
Before turning to the merits of this subsection, it is interesting to note that, in the 
course of writing this study, it became clear that the two evaluative frameworks can 
merge: even though the external evaluative framework was created ‘merely’ to see 
how similar or different the ICC’s position on the male captus issue is to the point of 
view of other courts which have dealt with the problem before, the examination of 
Article 21 of the ICC Statute in Chapter IX elucidated that within this provision, 
within this book’s internal evaluative framework, there might be room for the results 
of the external evaluative framework. This was made possible by a number of 
concepts – such as “principles and rules of international law” and “general 
principles of law of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of 
the world” – whose exact scope is not clear, but of which it can be argued that they 
can house the practice of (inter)national courts. In other words, all the critically 
reviewed practices of national courts and international(ised) criminal tribunals may 
not only be used to see how similar or different the ICC position on the male captus 
issue is in comparison with other courts; they may also be used, in a less non-
committal way: to assess the ICC position vis-à-vis its own law.  
Having said that, how is the ICC’s current position on the male captus issue to 
be assessed vis-à-vis its own law?  
First of all, one can question whether a number of aspects of what could be the 
ICC position on the male captus issue (as explained: this is not entirely clear) are in 
conformity with Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute. This provision, among 
other things, demands that the application and interpretation of the ICC law must be 
consistent with internationally recognised human rights. 
For example, one can question whether the (male detentus?) requirement that 
certain violations must be such that a person can no longer make his defence before 
one can speak of the impossibility of a fair trial is in fact in accordance with Article 
21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute. This latter provision definitely contains the 
human right to a fair trial and arguably a human right to a fair trial which is not 
limited to the fair trial in court but which extends to the entire proceedings. It may 
                                                          
79 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
39: “Unfairness in the treatment of the suspect or the accused may rupture the process to an extent 
making it impossible to piece together the constituent elements of a fair trial. In those circumstances, the 
interest of the world community to put persons accused of the most heinous crimes against humanity on 
trial, great as it is, is outweighed by the need to sustain the efficacy of the judicial process as the potent 








be worth in that respect recalling the words of Nowak, commenting on Article 14 of 
the ICCPR:  
 
The claim to a fair trial in court on a criminal “charge” (“accusation”) does not arise 
only upon the formal lodging of a charge but rather on the date on which State 
activities substantially affect the situation of the person concerned. This is usually the 
first official notification of a specific accusation, but in certain cases, this may also be 
as early as arrest [original footnotes omitted, ChP].80   
 
However, if the ICC were to adhere to its words which focus on a broad concept of 
fair trial (and this is probably more likely),81 there would be no violation of the 
ICC’s law. In this context, it must also be remarked that the ICC’s view that a broad 
concept of a fair trial must be cherished, even for persons charged with very serious 
crimes, is definitely in conformity with internationally recognised human rights, 
which are, of course, applicable to anyone, whether that anyone is charged with 
fraud or genocide.     
Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute also contains the human right to 
liberty and security, including a person’s right to challenge the lawfulness of his 
detention, even if that right is not explicitly mentioned by the ICC Statute. This has 
also been confirmed by the ICC itself.82 However, the refusal of the judges in the 
Katanga case to look into the motion of the suspect challenging the lawfulness of 
his pre-trial arrest and detention, for the only reason that the motion was filed too 
late, might perhaps be interpreted as a violation of this right and thus of the ICC law. 
In this context, it must be noted that this right is so crucial – it is to be recalled83 that 
it has customary international law/general international law status and cannot even 
be derogated from in times of emergency and war – that the ICC, according to 
Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute, must always accept and review such a 
challenge, especially if the motion argues that the unlawfulness of the 
arrest/detention is so serious that it should lead to the ending of the case. This is so, 
whether the challenge, strictly speaking, can be seen as a challenge to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction or not.84  
That the ICC concentrates on the violations themselves (and not so much on the 
question of whether they were violated intentionally) can be seen as being in 
accordance with the right to an effective remedy in the case of violations, a right of 
which Section 3 of Chapter IX concluded that it can also be qualified as an 
internationally recognised human right. Conversely, the additional requirement as 
                                                          
80 Nowak 1993, p. 244. Another interesting quotation can be found in ECtHR (Chamber), Case of 
Miailhe v. France (No. 2), Application No. 18978/91, ‘Judgment’, 26 September 1996, where the 
ECtHR stated in para. 43 that it must “satisfy itself that the proceedings as a whole were fair, having 
regard to any possible irregularities before the case was brought before the courts of trial and appeal and 
checking that those courts had been able to remedy them if there were any”. (Note, however, that this 
case dealt with the admissibility of evidence.) See also n. 194 and accompanying text of Chapter III. 
81 See n. 16. 
82 See n. 17. 
83 See Subsection 2.2.5 of Chapter III. 








can be found in the Bemba Gombo case that the violation must have caused actual 
prejudice to the suspect before remedies can be granted would not be in accordance 
with this right. 
The ICC has acknowledged that whenever it exercises jurisdiction, whenever the 
ICC is involved in a case, that involvement must be in accordance with 
internationally recognised human rights.85 This appears to be a correct interpretation 
of Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute. If the ICC(’s) Appeals Chamber were 
to agree with the Pre-Trial Chamber that it would look, beyond the constructive 
custody of the suspect, to irregularities which result from concerted action between 
the ICC and third parties, that stance would be in accordance with the scope of 
Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute. However, if the Appeals Chamber 
followed its additional requirement that it would only look at irregularities suffered 
by the suspect if that suspect was in detention for the same crimes as those for which 
he is now being prosecuted at the ICC, this can be seen as a violation of Article 21, 
paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute. After all, that provision applies to any situation in 
which the ICC is involved. It is very well possible that the Prosecution would 
informally request national authorities to keep a suspect in national detention (for 
other crimes) until it has finished preparing its case. If irregularities occur during 
that national detention, it can certainly be said that they take place in a context in 
which the ICC was involved, whether or not the suspect was in detention for the 
same crimes as those for which he is now being prosecuted at the ICC.  
One of the most interesting points to be discussed here is, of course, that the 
ICC’s male detentus test assumes the involvement of the ICC (or third parties 
working at its behest). It appears – although this is not entirely clear – that the ICC 
would not refuse jurisdiction, for example, if private individuals were responsible 
for a very serious male captus. This would be unproblematic if the ICC had 
accepted the abuse of process doctrine, which is very general and which merely 
demands that judges must refuse jurisdiction if they feel that the male captus is so 
serious that it would undermine the integrity of the court/their sense of justice/the 
idea of a fair trial in general to continue the case. However, the ICC rejected this 
doctrine. How is this rejection of the abuse of process doctrine to be assessed vis-à-
vis the ICC’s law? 
The ICC judges are right when they argue that this doctrine cannot be found in 
the ICC’s proper instruments pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (a) of the ICC 
Statute. However, after having clarified that a certain provision of the ICC Statute – 
Article 4, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute – “cannot be construed as providing power 
to stay proceedings for abuse of process”,86 they concluded that Article 21, 
                                                          
85 See n. 16. 
86 ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 









paragraph 1 (a) of the ICC Statute was exhaustive on the matter and hence that one 
did not have to look to Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) and (c) of the ICC Statute. 
One can have serious doubts whether this conclusion is in accordance with the 
ICC’s law, however. As explained in Chapter X, it seems far too easy to conclude 
that the ICC Statute is exhaustive on the matter simply because the abuse of process 
doctrine is not explicitly mentioned or implicitly covered (via – the seemingly 
irrelevant87 – Article 4, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute) by the ICC instruments.88 
The judges, who arguably focus too much on the common law label ‘abuse of 
process’ here, do not seriously review other relevant provisions which might shed 
light on the question of whether the ICC has power to issue a male detentus verdict 
in the case of a serious male captus, taking into account the rules of interpretation of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (as was done in Chapter IX of this 
book). The much more extensive review in Chapter IX has arguably shown that 
Article 21, paragraph 1 (a) of the ICC Statute, taking into account Article 21, 
paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute, is not exhaustive on the matter and thus that one can 
turn to Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) and (c) of the ICC Statute to fill this legal lacuna. 
And, as argued in that chapter, the power of a court to refuse jurisdiction in the case 
of a serious male captus might be seen as a principle/rule of international law 
pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) of the ICC Statute (namely as practice of 
international courts) or as a general principle of law pursuant to Article 21, 
paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute. In addition, because the power of a court to 
refuse jurisdiction in very serious male captus cases, without looking at the exact 
label of this power (such as abuse of process/supervisory powers) now, is used by so 
many (inter)national courts, it could be seen as an inherent power of any court,89 
including of the ICC (even if it cannot be construed via Article 4, paragraph 1 of the 
ICC Statute).  
Another important aspect which should be mentioned here concerns the ICC’s 
views on Article 59 of the ICC Statute. Although the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga 
Dyilo did not go into this matter, the Pre-Trial Chamber in that case clarified the fact 
that the competent judicial authority in the custodial State was not obliged to look 
into the pre-trial phase if that phase concerned national proceedings only. However, 
that appears to mean that the competent judicial authority is, nevertheless, allowed 
to do so and in fact, must do so if those national proceedings were somehow related 
to the ICC, for example, because the ICC was involved in them. That would 
constitute a role in accordance with Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute, 
which demands compliance with internationally recognised human rights as from 
the moment the ICC is involved in a case, which may, of course, be the case before 
the official requests were sent to the national authorities. However, regarding the 
                                                          
87 This provision appears to focus on very different issues, see Rückert 2008, p. 124. (See n. 239 of 
Chapter X for more information.) However, the fact that the abuse of process power cannot be seen as 
an inherent power under this (seemingly irrelevant) provision does not mean that the ICC does not have 
such an inherent power nonetheless. 
88 Cf. also the comparable criticism of Manning 2007, p. 837 (see n. 240 of Chapter X for more 
information). 








role of the ICC judges, as the supervisors marginally reviewing this provision, both 
the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber do not discuss to what extent these 
judges could look into the phase before the official ICC requests were sent. In 
addition, both Chambers, and the same goes for the judges in Bemba Gombo, do not 
clearly review the execution of the ICC’s official arrest in terms of provisions such 
as Articles 21, paragraph 3 and 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute. (They merely 
stress the importance of such rights in their decisions more generally.) They seem 
interested in national law alone. This restrictive interpretation is arguably in 
violation of the ICC’s own law, since both provisions certainly apply to the Article 
59 of the ICC Statute proceedings. (Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute 
applies already as from the moment the ICC becomes involved in the case and 
Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute applies already as from the moment 
the ICC initiates an investigation.)  
The final point which should be addressed here, before turning to the 
recommendations, is that the Appeals Chamber is only interested in the ultimate 
remedy, the refusal of jurisdiction/a halt of the procedures, even though Lubanga 
Dyilo raised the point of other, less far-reaching, remedies in his appeal. However, 
Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute contains the internationally recognised 
human right to an effective remedy in the case of a violation. This means that every 
violation as from the moment the ICC becomes involved in the case must be 
repaired, whether this leads to the ending of the case or not. Although it is possible 
that no violations occurred in this case as from the moment the ICC became 
involved in it (and hence that no violation of the ICC’s law occurred here), the ICC 
must not forget in general that suspects would, however, be entitled, pursuant to 
Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute, to appropriate remedies in the case of 




This study has tried to examine case law, literature and regulatory documents as 
objectively (but certainly not uncritically!) as possible because it was – and still is – 
held that only such an approach can lead to useful internal and external evaluative 
frameworks. However, it has also become clear that the material could sometimes be 
interpreted in several ways and that in such instances, this study has not hesitated to 
take a position. One could hereby think of the role and scope of Article 21, 
paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute.90 
                                                          
90 See also Sluiter 2009 p. 475: “Initial case law, especially Pre-Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber 
decisions in the Lubanga case, reveals flawed interpretation and application of two vital provisions for 
the protection of individual rights in the pre-trial phase, Article 21 (3) and Article 59. Article 21 (3) has 
not yet occupied its prominent place as a systematic and obligatory human rights review standard for 
each and every activity of the Court and activity that is of benefit to the proceedings before the Court. 
Furthermore, many questions in respect of the precise scope and content of Article 21 (3) remain – yet – 
unaddressed. The same applies to Article 59, where the Appeals Chamber has in the Lubanga case 








This has also to do with the third goal of this study – besides more generally 
combining two fascinating subjects which have not previously been put together in a 
book and more specifically answering the book’s central question – namely to make 
a contribution to the male captus discussion itself, to the discussion as to how ICC 
judges and judges in general can best deal with alleged irregularities in the pre-trial 
phase of their case, to the discussion as to how proceedings can be achieved which 
are considered both effective and fair. The most important recommendations will 
now be presented. 
First of all, this study is obviously of the opinion that the ICC should at least 
follow its own law. This means that it should reject all the above-mentioned 
reasonings which could be seen as being in violation of Article 21 of the ICC 
Statute, and in particular its paragraph 3.91 
Hence, it ought to abandon the old-fashioned and restrictive concept of a fair trial 
that certain violations must be such that a person can no longer make his defence 
before one can speak of the impossibility of a fair trial (if that concept is indeed 
supported by the ICC in the male captus discussion). Some violations are simply so 
serious that it would undermine the judges’ sense of justice/the integrity of the 
Court/the concept of a fair trial broadly perceived to proceed with the case, whether 
or not that suspect can still make his defence in court.92  
Furthermore, it is to be welcomed that in theory, the ICC so often stresses the 
importance of human rights, even for suspects of the most serious crimes93 and even 
regarding rights which are not explicitly mentioned in the ICC Statute (such as the 
right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention), but that also means that 
suspects should be able to exercise those rights in practice. However, it can be 
argued that the Katanga case, for example, did not crystallise that thought. It is 
submitted that judges should always want to find out what happened to their 
suspects, what the foundation of their case is. Consequently, they should not focus 
too much on the exact title of the male captus motion or dismiss too readily the 
entire motion for being submitted too late. The judges can also censure the Defence 
for its tardiness and still proprio motu review the allegations. Although it is 
recognised that the ICC’s system is in many respects unique and should be 
                                                          
91 In doing so, it could rely on Art. 21, para. 2 of the ICC Statute, which clarifies that the ICC is not 
obliged to “apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.” 
92 In the words of Choo 1994 B, p. 629, commenting on the Bennett case: “Central to the decision of the 
House of Lords was the notion that a criminal court should not be concerned solely with accurate fact-
finding or, to put it another way, the determination of the ‘truth.’ A court also has a duty to protect the 
moral integrity of the criminal process.” (See also n. 258 of Chapter X.) Cf. also the formulation used by 
the ICC in the case of illegally obtained evidence, see Art. 69, para. 7 of the ICC Statute: “Evidence 
obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or internationally recognized human rights shall not be 
admissible if: (a) The violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or (b) The 
admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the integrity of the 
proceedings.” (See also n. 265 of Chapter IX and n. 246 and accompanying text of Chapter X.) See also 
Knoops 2002, pp. 252-253 and 263 and Currie 2007, p. 390. 








preserved as much as possible,94 the judges cannot hide behind this uniqueness to 
disregard what is arguably their main task, namely to try suspects of international 
crimes in a fair way.95 With that comes a serious examination of the way in which 
those suspects were brought into the jurisdiction of the ICC, of the foundation of 
their case. 
The feeling one gets from the Katanga case, that the judges do not seem to be 
really interested in a full examination of the legality of the pre-trial phase, can also 
be found in the Lubanga Dyilo and Bemba Gombo cases, where the judges did not 
seriously examine the relevance of provisions such as Articles 21, paragraph 3 and 
55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute in the context of Article 59 of the ICC 
Statute. In addition, one can also refer to the focus on the ultimate remedy in 
Lubanga Dyilo here.96 The ICC must be very careful not to, in the words of Sluiter, 
“retreat within the safe limits of The Hague”.97 Put another way, “the ICC must 
strengthen its grip on national activities which are an indispensable and inextricable 
part of ICC proceedings, whether we like it or not”.98 
The ICC has stated that whenever it exercises jurisdiction, whenever it is 
involved in a case, that exercise of jurisdiction, that involvement (which includes the 
actions of third parties working at the behest of the ICC) must be in accordance with 
Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute. This is a correct statement of the law, 
meaning, in turn, that the ICC Appeals Chamber’s additional requirement that it will 
only look into irregularities if the suspect was in detention at the national level for 
the same crimes as those for which he is now being prosecuted at the ICC should be 
                                                          
94 See, for example, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In 
the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and 
the Establishment of a Timetable’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06, 15 May 2006, Annex I 
(‘Discussion of the Decision on the Final System of Disclosure’), para. 4: “[T]he single judge considers 
that the need to safeguard the uniqueness of the criminal procedure of the International Criminal Court 
(…) is one of the primary considerations in contextual interpretation of the relevant provisions.” 
95 See n. 53 of Chapter IX. See in that respect also the Tadić case where the ‘uniqueness’ was also used 
to grant the suspect less than a fair trial (in that case even a fair trial in the strict sense of the word: in the 
courtroom). See also ns. 132-133 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. Cf. also Stapleton 1999, p. 570: 
“The Tadić case, and, in particular, the judgment allowing testimony by anonymous witnesses, is 
relevant insofar as it relates to the issue of procedural rights of the accused and impacts interpretation of 
the Rome Statute. It is important to note that the reasoning behind the decision rested on the 
characterization of the ICTY as a “unique” body – a characterization that enabled the majority to 
interpret the right to a fair trial within the limited context of the ICTY rather than the broader context of 
human rights.”  
96 Cf. Sluiter 2009, pp. 465 and 471-474. In this context, one can also share Sluiter’s concern (see ibid., 
p. 475) that the fact that the ICC judges do not sufficiently supervise the proceedings of Art. 59 of the 
ICC Statute may also backfire, may lead to serious problems in the context of uncooperative States, in 
which case that provision can become a Trojan horse. It is submitted that the ICC should indeed 
consider to what extent this provision can still be used for these kinds of States. See also ns. 198-199 
and accompanying text of Chapter VIII. In any case, it can be seen as yet another justification for the 
judges to closely supervise the pre-trial phase of their case. See n. 573 and accompanying text of 
Chapter X. 
97 Ibid., p. 465. 








abandoned.99 However, even though the first statement is in accordance with the 
ICC’s law, it is submitted that the judges should go one step further: they should 
examine any violation which occurs in the context of their case more generally, 
whether or not there is involvement on the part of the ICC.100 Normally, violations 
which occur during a period before the ICC was involved in a case will not readily 
be viewed as falling within the context of the ICC’s case. Hence, this broader test 
should not be feared too much from a practical point of view.101 Conversely, it 
should be cherished from a legal point of view, because it is the only test which can 
enable judges to remedy violations which they deem to fall within the context of 
their case, even if the ICC was not yet involved in it. 
Another important aspect is that if the ICC is confronted by a new male captus 
case, it should more extensively examine whether or not the ICC has the power to 
refuse (the exercise of) jurisdiction in serious male captus cases, comparable with 
the abuse of process doctrine. The examination in Chapter IX of this study has 
arguably shown that Article 21, paragraph 1 (a) of the ICC Statute is not exhaustive 
on the matter and hence that the judges can turn to Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) and 
(c) of the ICC Statute. If they agree with this study that these provisions, via 
concepts such as “principles and rules of international law” and “general principles 
of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world” can 
cover established practices of (inter)national courts, they can use these practices to 
solve their male captus problem.  
As concerns “principles and rules of international law”, one could think of the 
acceptance of a broad concept of abuse of process (in that jurisdiction may be 
refused in very serious male captus cases, irrespective of the entity responsible) and 
the fact that the seriousness of the crimes with which the suspect is charged can be 
taken into account when applying the abuse of process doctrine.  
If these principles bring no relief, the ICC may turn to the “general principles of 
law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world”. These 
stipulate that most courts confronted by a male captus will use their discretion, for 
instance (in the common law system) under the abuse of process doctrine, to balance 
all the different elements of the case to decide whether or not the male captus is so 
serious that jurisdiction must be refused. In addition, most courts seem to refuse 
jurisdiction only if their own authorities were involved in the male captus. Finally, it 
appears that quite a number of courts – although it is unclear whether “quite a 
number” would be enough to lead to a general principle of law pursuant to Article 
21, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute – would also take into account the seriousness 
of the crimes with which the victim of the male captus is charged in deciding 
whether or not jurisdiction must be refused. 
Finally, because both the “principles and rules of international law” and the 
“general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems 
                                                          
99 Hence, the ICC should follow the general formulas as can be found in n. 295 of Chapter X (or in n. 71 
of the present chapter). 
100 See n. 72 and accompanying text.  








of the world” seem to accept an abuse of process-like power, one could argue that 
any court, including the ICC, is invested with such an inherent power.102 
Hence, even if the judges do not accept that the reasoning behind the abuse of 
process doctrine can be seen as a principle/rule of international law pursuant to 
Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) of the ICC Statute or otherwise as general principle of 
law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world pursuant 
to Article 21, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute, they should embrace the abuse of 
process-like power they arguably already possess (“inherent”)103 – in the same way 
as they seem to embrace the right of a suspect to challenge the lawfulness of his 
detention (probably including, in principle, the remedy to be released in the case of 
an unlawful arrest/detention), even if that right is not explicitly mentioned in the 
ICC instruments.104 In exercising that power, they should balance all the different 
elements of the case in finding the most appropriate remedies for the violations, 
such as the seriousness of the alleged crimes/the importance of having the case 
continued and the seriousness of the male captus, which increases when the 
involvement of the ICC105 is greater (thereby looking at all the different possibilities 
of attributing conduct to the ICC, including, for example, acknowledgment and 
adoption of the conduct as its own), when the violations have been committed 
intentionally,106 when the male captus has caused great prejudice to the suspect, 
when the male captus was accompanied by serious mistreatment, etc.107  
If the ICC is not convinced that such a broad balancing exercise can be found in 
the ICC’s law or cannot be seen as an inherent power of the Court, it may, perhaps, 
be more susceptible to practical arguments. It is to be recalled that the male detentus 
test of the ICC ‘only’ takes into account the human rights dimension of the abuse of 
process doctrine. In addition, it assumes the involvement of the ICC (or third parties 
working at its behest).  
However, what happens – to repeat the example given in Chapter X – if the 
President of State A (a State Party to the ICC), who has called upon the international 
                                                          
102 See Currie 2007, p. 375 (see n. 167 and accompanying text of Chapter X). 
103 Although they do not explain how the doctrine enters the ICC’s framework, it should neither be 
forgotten that, in contrast to the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo, the Defence (see ns. 54 and 102 
and accompanying text of Chapter X), the Prosecution (see n. 203 and accompanying text of Chapter 
X), the DRC (see n. 206 of Chapter X) and the Pre-Trial Chamber (see n. 159 and accompanying text of 
Chapter X) in that case did all embrace the abuse of process doctrine. (Cf. Manning 2007, pp. 837-838.) 
This may mean that these actors are also of the opinion that the doctrine is an inherent power of the ICC. 
104 See n. 17 and accompanying text of this chapter and n. 140 and accompanying text of Chapter IX. 
105 One can argue that the ICC, like the other tribunals, should follow the broad abuse of process 
doctrine here, which accepts that jurisdiction can be refused, irrespective of the entity responsible. 
However, it is, of course, clear that involvement of the prosecuting forum’s own authorities is an 
important element in deciding whether or not a male detentus outcome must follow, cf. the national 
level.  
106 As explained supra, although the ICC seemingly presents a test which does not contain the element 
of intent, one can assume that also the ICC will view violations which are committed intentionally as 
more serious and more susceptible to a male detentus verdict. In addition, it must again be noted that 
some male captus situations, such as an abduction, can arguably not be committed unintentionally. 









community for months to arrest a certain suspect from State B (a non-State Party to 
the ICC) who keeps committing serious international crimes in State A, is frustrated 
by the inaction of the international community and orders the kidnapping of the 
suspect (at a moment when that suspect was back in State B) – a kidnapping which 
was accompanied by mistreatment and followed by a protest and request for the 
return of the suspect from State B. State A ignores these protests and subsequently 
places the suspect in detention. The ICC, which was already making initial inquiries 
to find out whether a proper investigation could be initiated, now requests the arrest 
and surrender of the suspect from State A, which subsequently surrenders the 
suspect to The Hague.  
Under the abuse of process doctrine, which merely demands a male captus in the 
context of an ICC case that is so serious that judges, in good conscience, can no 
longer continue with the case, judges could refuse jurisdiction in this case if they are 
of the opinion that such a serious situation is present here. (It is to be noted that it is 
probable, or at least to be hoped, that the ICC judges would not follow the ‘carte 
blanche’ decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision in Nikolić and would 
attach more importance to the value of State sovereignty, a concept which the judges 
of the “lateral” ICC cannot ignore in the same way as the judges of the truly 
“vertical” ICTY did.)108 
However, under the ICC test, this would not be possible. After all, the violations 
did not occur at a time when the ICC was involved in the case, cannot be seen as 
being executed “by his/her accusers” (the abduction was not executed by State A on 
behalf of the ICC). In addition, under the abuse of process doctrine, violations of 
State sovereignty (and of other values such as the rule of law more generally) can 
easily be taken into account, whereas one can question whether this would also be 
possible under the ICC test, which only focuses on human rights violations.109  
In another scenario, one could replace the kidnappers of State A with private 
individuals. Here, an additional problem could arise. Even if the judges, using the 
above-mentioned test, were to accept that those private individuals can be seen as 
“his/her accusers”, one or more of them may be of the opinion that private 
individuals simply cannot violate internationally recognised human rights (or the 
sovereignty of another State), see the discussions in Chapter III on this topic. In that 
case, jurisdiction cannot be refused, whereas this would, in principle, be 
unproblematic under the broad abuse of process doctrine, which merely demands 
that judges have to assess whether the male captus is so serious that jurisdiction 
must be refused. This may include the acts of private individuals, even if their acts 
cannot be seen as proper human rights violations/violations of a State’s 
sovereignty.110 
This study does not argue that in the above-mentioned scenarios, judges should 
refuse jurisdiction; this will depend on the exact circumstances, including, of course, 
the level of involvement on the part of the ICC. However, this study asserts that the 
                                                          
108 See the remarks made by, for example, Currie, at ns. 171-173 and accompanying text of Chapter X. 
109 See the words of Currie at n. 252 and accompanying text of Chapter X. 








judges should in any case have the tools, the possibility, to refuse jurisdiction in 
such scenarios. That does not seem to be possible under the present male detentus 
test.  
Another important suggestion is connected to the previously mentioned right of a 
suspect to challenge the lawfulness of his arrest/detention. If the judge is of the 
opinion that his arrest/detention is indeed unlawful (but not so serious that 
jurisdiction must be refused), he may wonder what the consequences of that 
determination must be, now that the ICC Statute does not mention the remedy of 
release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention and now that this right, including 
its remedy of release, can be seen as having customary international law status and 
thus, in principle, is applicable to the ICC as well. Here, the judges may turn to the 
examination of this remedy in Chapter IX, where it was concluded that pursuant to 
Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute, this remedy is in principle to be 
accorded. However, it was also explained in that context (and also elsewhere in this 
book) that the remedy is problematic because it is over-simplified, because it can be 
used as a pro forma remedy and finally because there is a risk that a suspect of 
international crimes will escape prosecution because he is released for a minor 
violation, for example, because he was not promptly informed of the reasons for his 
arrest. This study argues that not only in the context of the abuse of process doctrine 
(or a comparable doctrine which can be used in determining whether the male 
captus is so serious that jurisdiction must be refused) but also in the context of this 
problematic remedy of release, a judge should be able to consider all the relevant 
elements of the case, including the seriousness of the alleged crimes.111 That means 
that a suspect of international crimes should not be released because of the 
determination ‘unlawful arrest/detention’ but should remain in custody and should 
be granted other appropriate remedies, such as a reduction of the sentence (on the 
basis of Rule 145 of the ICC RPE), compensation (which in any case appears to be 
mandatory pursuant to Article 85 of the ICC Statute) or perhaps merely a statement 
that a violation has occurred and that this is to be regretted, taking into account the 
seriousness of the male captus. However, if the unlawful arrest/detention is very 
serious, for example, because the ICC orchestrated an abduction, jurisdiction should 
be refused and the person permanently released. That is a far-reaching consequence, 
but some male captus situations are so serious that the ICC, in good conscience, can 
                                                          
111 It must be stressed that this study is of the opinion that in these two specific situations, the abuse of 
process doctrine and the problematic remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention, such 
a balancing exercise can be used. However, one should be very careful not to extend the balancing 
exercise much further. For example, the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s statement in Nikolić that there is a 
legitimate expectation that persons accused of ‘Universally Condemned Offences’ are quickly brought 
to justice and that this expectation “needs to be weighed against the principle of State sovereignty and 
the fundamental rights of the accused” (see n. 600 and accompanying text of Chapter VI) can easily be 
abused, namely as an argument that fundamental human rights of suspects of international crimes can be 
given less weight than fundamental human rights of suspects of ordinary crimes. That, of course, cannot 
be the case. Fundamental human rights are applicable to anyone. However, in the event of a 
discretionary remedy (the abuse of process doctrine) or a fundamental human right which is arguably 
problematic in many aspects, such as the release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention 








no longer proceed with the case without undermining its integrity as an institution 
based on law. Furthermore, it must also be stressed that the fact that the ICC can no 
longer try this suspect does not mean that it should not do everything in its power to 
ensure that the suspect is tried before another court.112 It still has a general duty to 
fight impunity, whether that fight takes place before the ICC or not. 
However, the most important thing is that tribunal judges – and this goes 
especially for the ICC judges113 – as the final adjudicators, as the ultimate 
guarantors of the suspect’s rights,114 remedy every violation occurring in the context 
of their case, whether or not that leads to a refusal of jurisdiction and irrespective of 
the entity responsible.115 Such an approach, in which context the ICC judges may 
use the determinations of the competent judicial authority in the custodial State as a 
first indication of how certain irregularities at the national level must be assessed,116 
will deter parties in the arrest and surrender proceedings from committing 
irregularities, will best protect the integrity of the ICC and will provide fairness to 
the suspect, who will not become the victim of a legal vacuum due to the fact that 
his case has been fragmented over two or more jurisdictions.117 In addition, because 
                                                          
112 As a suspect will normally raise his male captus claims before the actual trial starts, the ‘new’ court’s 
jurisdiction cannot be challenged through a ne bis in idem claim, see n. 202 and accompanying text of 
Chapter X. 
113 This is not only because of a provision such as Art. 85 of the ICC Statute (see the words of Zappalà 
in n. 86 and accompanying text of Chapter IX), but also because “the ICC system is more inquisitorial in 
nature than the ad hoc tribunals, requiring Judges to explore issues ultra petitum and address violations 
proprio motu”. (Sluiter 2009, pp. 471-472. See also ns. 674-675 and accompanying text of Chapter X.) 
Note that Sluiter also recognises the relevance of Art. 85 of the ICC Statute here, see ibid., p. 472. 
114 See ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ‘Decision on the powers of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to review proprio motu the pre-trial detention of Germain Katanga’ (Urgent, Public 
Document), ICC-01/04-01/07, 18 March 2008, p. 8. See also n. 201 and accompanying text of Chapter 
VIII and n. 672 and accompanying text of Chapter X. 
115 See also n. 100 and accompanying text. Note in that respect the remark of Sluiter that not reviewing 
may in fact be seen as acceptance of the male captus, thus triggering the concept of strict legal 
responsibility through attribution (acknowledgement and acceptance of the conduct as its own), see 
Sluiter 2009, p. 465: “[A] refusal to review the national activities that have benefited the Court can with 
good reason be seen as acceptance of them, and implicates the integrity of international proceedings.” 
116 Those national authorities should then broadly review, on the basis of Art. 59 of the ICC Statute, how 
the suspect was brought before them, cf. the words of El Zeidy at n. 153 and accompanying text of 
Chapter VIII. 
117 See n. 849 and accompanying text of Chapter VI, n. 171 and accompanying text of Chapter VII, n. 
286 of Chapter IX and n. 92 and accompanying text of the previous chapter. Cf. also ICC, Appeals 
Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Judgment on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying 
Leave to Appeal’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04, 13 July 2006, para. 11: “The principles of a fair trial 
are not confined to trial proceedings but extend to pre-trial proceedings as well as the investigation of 
crime; a fact directly borne out by the provisions of article 55 and 54 (1) (c) of the Statute. Breach of or 
deviation from the rules of a fair trial at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings may have implications on 
the proceedings and may affect the outcome of the trial. Purging the pre-trial process of errors 
consequential in the above sense is designed as a safeguard for the integrity of the proceedings.” Note 
that if the ICC properly remedies violations committed in the context of its case, criticism towards the 
ICC’s non-supervision by external authorities may also be reduced, see ns. 235-236 and accompanying 








not many male captus cases are so serious that jurisdiction must be refused, neither 
will it easily jeopardise the victims’ idea of fairness (in that a trial must be held). 
Moreover, it will lead to greater differentiation in a context which is sometimes 
overly focused on the ultimate remedy (refusal of jurisdiction).118 This will also 
‘soften’ the old-fashioned male captus bene detentus image that international courts 
have. Even though it appears that the ICC follows the male captus male detentus 
reasoning as concerns serious irregularities by the suspect’s “accusers” (which 
includes the actions of third parties working at the ICC’s behest),119 something 
which is to be welcomed, the male captus cases by which the ICC will be 
confronted will very often not concern such irregularities. This means that in 
practice, the ICC will probably almost always continue a male captus case, which 
could, in a way, be seen as acceptance of the male captus bene detentus rule. (Note 
in that respect that it is to be applauded that the ICC explicitly supports neither the 
male captus bene detentus nor the male captus male detentus rule, as these maxims 
are the height of simplicity, leaving no room for differentiation at all.)120  
Regarding the above-mentioned point that it appears that the ICC follows the 
male captus male detentus reasoning as concerns serious irregularities by the 
suspects “accusers”; this study is very much in favour of granting discretion, in the 
context of the abuse of process doctrine (or a comparable doctrine) and in the 
context of determining the consequences of an unlawful arrest/detention, to judges 
so that they balance all the relevant elements of the case. However, it is also aware 
of the fact that too much discretion can lead to problems, for example, in terms of 
equality, transparency and predictability.121 Hence, there must be some beacons to 
guide this discretion.122  
                                                                                                                                              
Suspects and Accused Persons in International Criminal Proceedings’, Working Paper No. 27 – June 
2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 
http://www.ggs.kuleuven.be/nieuw/publications/working%20papers/new_series/wp27.pdf), p. 20. Cf. 
finally Sloan (2003 B, pp. 546-547) for comparable values at the inter-State level: “By one approach, 
which may be summarized by the maxim male captus, male detentus, the national court would refuse 
jurisdiction where the circumstances of the accused’s capture were sufficiently irregular. Among the 
reasons given by these national courts for refusing jurisdiction in such circumstances have been the 
following: (i) the rule of law; (ii) the integrity of the executive branch (it must not be rewarded for 
illegal behaviour); (iii) the integrity of the judicial branch; (iv) the fairness of the legal process; and (v) 
respect for state sovereignty [original footnotes omitted, ChP].” (See also n. 17 of Chapter VII.) 
118 See n. 76 and accompanying text. 
119 See n. 1 and accompanying text. 
120 See again (see also n. 76 and accompanying text of Chapter VII) Garner 2004, p. 1703, citing James 
Fitzjames Stephen in his 1883 History of the Criminal Law of England (Vol. 2, p. 94, n. 1): “It seems to 
me that legal maxims in general are little more than pert headings of chapters. They are rather minims 
than maxims, for they give not a particularly great but a particularly small amount of information. As 
often as not, the exceptions and disqualifications to them are more important than the so-called rules.” 
121 See also the following concerns expressed by the Defence of Nikolić: “If the matter is simply left to a 
court’s discretion then that may be an invitation to the continued exercise of that discretion in favour of 
continuing a trial; the individual’s safeguard then rests solely upon the integrity of any given court and 
not upon the fundamental principle. If that were deemed sufficient by the international community there 
would be no need for the rights to be enshrined as they are in international law as well as certain 
regional and national jurisprudence”. (ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision 








First of all, it is submitted that in some cases, it must be understood that there is 
normally only one possible outcome. For example, if it becomes clear that the OTP 
was involved in an abduction operation flouting all the relevant legal rules, the 
judges cannot but refuse jurisdiction if they want to be taken seriously as custodians 
of the law, whether or not that suspect was charged with serious crimes.123 This 
                                                                                                                                              
October 2002, para. 6. See for this motion: ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli[ć], 
‘Motion for Relief Based Inter Alia Upon Illegality of Arrest Following Upon the Prior Unlawful 
Kidnapping and Imprisonment of the Accused and Co-Related Abuse of Process Within the 
Contemplation of Discretionary Jurisdictional Relief Under Rule 72’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 17 May 
2001, para. 13.) See further the final words of Zappalà’s book (see Zappalà 2003, p. 258): “One of the 
distinctive traits of international criminal trials, at least so far, has been the flexibility of procedural 
rules. This feature may be explained by the relatively short life of this branch of law, and by a tradition 
of procedural flexibility in international courts. Today, however, with the establishment of the ICC, 
international criminal justice aims to become an ‘ordinary’ system of judicial accountability for very 
serious criminal offences. Therefore, increasingly flexibility in international criminal trials should be 
reduced: procedural rules should be drafted in more rigorous terms, and strict compliance with these 
rules should be ensured. Borrowing Montesquieu’s words one should recall that ‘les formalités de la 
justice sont nécessaires à la liberté’. Only by strengthening respect for procedural rules will 
international criminal justice be truly just and fair. It will also be perceived as such by defendants, 
victims, and public opinion, both in the States concerned and in the rest of the world [original footnote 
omitted, ChP].” 
122 Cf. Groenhuijsen and Knigge 2004, p. 154 (see n. 617 of Chapter III). See also Choo 1994 A, p. 177, 
writing on the inter-State context: “In my view, a mandatory stay should not be ordered in every case 
where a prosecution has been commenced in consequence of an illegally executed extradition. What is 
required, rather, is a discretionary approach based upon a weighing up of all relevant considerations. 
Inherent in judicial discretion is, of course, the danger of uncertainty, but this danger is likely to be 
minimized by the courts’ gradual development of a coherent set of guidelines for particular cases. As 
noted earlier, considerations that a court might take into account in deciding whether to order a stay 
include whether physical violence was involved; whether the police were acting in circumstances of 
urgency, emergency, or necessity; and whether the offense charged was serious.” See also ibid., p. 179: 
“[A] discretionary approach, based upon a weighing of all relevant considerations, is preferable because 
it safeguards important constitutional rights while at the same time preserving flexibility.”  
123 See also (the on the inter-State context writing) Rayfuse 1993, p. 895, with the comment that 
Rayfuse, even though it seems that she is focusing on abductions here, sometimes uses rather broad 
formulations (“violation of his human rights”) and the comment that human rights, which are, of course, 
applicable to anyone, as such do not contain a male detentus sanction, although serious violations of 
human rights can, of course, constitute a reason for the judge to refuse jurisdiction: “[W]here the 
defendant (…) is not admissible, because his presence has been secured by a violation of his human 
rights, the better position must be that the court lacks all jurisdiction to try him. To give the court a 
discretion in this matter is to invite the continued exercise of that discretion in favour of the abducting 
authority and to invite the court to participate in and compound the pre-existing violation of the 
defendant’s human rights. While the UK practice may now be different as a result of the decision in 
Bennett, as we have seen in the US context, the courts have not exercised their discretion in favour of 
the abducted individual. This is perhaps not surprising given the sometimes manifestly hideous nature of 
the crimes with which these individuals stand charged or the policy decisions which have been made 
with respect to stemming certain criminal activities. However, no matter how hideous the crime, these 
individuals are entitled to equal protection of the law, and that includes their customary international 
legal rights. It is not up to the courts to decide to whom they will accord these rights. They belong to 
everyone. The existence and uncertainty of exercise of a discretion in this matter cannot help but bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. The separation of executive and judicial powers, the 
requirements of an independent and impartial judiciary and of a fair trial, including the presumption of 








view, which falls short of the test about which, according to the German Federal 
Constitutional Court in Al-Moayad, more recent State practice agrees that it must, in 
any event, lead to rejection of the male captus bene detentus rule, probably also 
constitutes the view of the ICC124 and that is to be welcomed.125 In other less 
obvious cases, all the above-mentioned elements, see footnote 107 and 
accompanying text, should play a guiding role in determining whether or not 
jurisdiction should be refused. For instance, if the violation was committed 
intentionally or was accompanied by mistreatment, the chances increase that 
jurisdiction is refused. In that respect, (the information provided in Chapter III on) 
human rights law, even if it does not contain a right to a male detentus outcome as 
                                                                                                                                              
favour of the position that there can be no jurisdiction over an individual who has been brought before 
the court by virtue of a State-sponsored violation of his human rights.” See also Knoops 2002, pp. 263-
264, referring to Rayfuse. See further International Law Association 1994, p. 163: “The objection to 
such a discretionary power is that abduction does not constitute an absolute bar to the exercise of 
jurisdiction. The most desirable approach is for a municipal court in the abducting state to be absolutely 
barred from exercising jurisdiction on the ground that the presence of the abductee has been secured in 
violation of basic human rights. The abductee should then be released and allowed to return to the state 
from which he has been abducted [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Cf. finally also ns. 225, 411, 414 
and accompanying text of Chapter III, n. 523 and accompanying text of Chapter V, ns. 258 and 656 and 
accompanying text of Chapter VI and ns. 46 and 64 of Chapter VII. 
124 See n. 119 and accompanying text. Note that under the very broad words of the ICC judges (see n. 41 
and accompanying text), a luring operation executed by the suspect’s accusers could possibly also lead 
to the ending of the case, although much will depend here on the circumstances of the case. One can 
assume that many will argue that the ICC can legally approve a luring operation executed by the ICC 
OTP, with reference to the ICTY Dokmanović case. Cf. also Scharf 2000, p. 971: “This precedent will 
be useful to a permanent international criminal court, which may directly or through third parties resort 
to luring as a method of obtaining custody over offenders present in non-cooperating states.” (See also 
Knoops 2002, p. 260, referring to Scharf.) However, the ICC judges must not forget either that this 
decision was not without criticism, see Chapter VI of this book, and furthermore (see also the text 
following n. 48 and accompanying text), that after the Dokmanović case was decided, the ICTY also 
held, in the Nikolić case: “Due process of law also includes questions such as how the Parties have been 
conducting themselves in the context of a particular case and how an Accused has been brought into the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The finding in the Ebrahim case that the State must come to court with 
clean hands applies equally to the Prosecution coming to a Trial Chamber of this Tribunal.” (ICTY, 
Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, ‘Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise 
of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal’, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, 9 October 2002, para. 111.) Even if a luring 
operation cannot be compared with an abduction operation (as the one in Ebrahim), the words “come to 
court with clean hands” are, of course, very general and may also encompass a luring operation, 
although much will depend here on the exact circumstances of the case: was there a circumvention of 
regular procedures, was there a violation of State sovereignty, was there a violation of human rights, etc. 
Cf. also the following general words of the Barayagwiza case, issued after the Dokmanović case as well: 
“Under the doctrine of “abuse of process”, proceedings that have been lawfully initiated may be 
terminated after an indictment has been issued if improper or illegal procedures are employed in 
pursuing an otherwise lawful process [emphasis added, ChP].” (ICTR, Appeals Chamber, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ‘Decision’, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 3 November 1999, para. 74.) 
See also ns. 50, 121 and 122 of Chapter VII and ns. 26 and 39 of the present chapter. Cf. finally the 
suggestion of this study, made in the Nikolić case, that the tribunal should refuse jurisdiction if 
employees of the tribunal itself intentionally committed serious (procedural) irregularities in the process 
of bringing a suspect to trial, such as an abduction. (See n. 633 and accompanying text of Chapter VI.) 








such, can certainly be used to channel the discretion in the balancing exercise,126 
although it must also be borne in mind, see this study’s criticism regarding the over-
simplified remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention, that certain 
human rights provisions, because of their rigid language and their potential for 
abuse, may also be problematic.127 Thus, even though certain indicators should be 
followed in the balancing exercise to ensure that the discretion is not unlimited, the 
ultimate responsibility should still lie with the judges because it was shown that too 
harsh rules may also lead to abuse128 and because judges may always be confronted 
by situations not envisaged.129  
Another observation which should be made is that this book was premised on 
two features of the ICC’s system, namely that the ICC cannot try suspects in 
absentia130 and does not have its own police force.131 However, one can obviously 
imagine that if the ICC were to be endowed with such features, this could decrease 
the chances of the ICC judges being confronted by a male captus case in the first 
place. After all, in the first case, suspects could be tried even without them being 
present in the courtroom (meaning that there would not be a need to resort to a 
(male) captus). In the second case, the ICC would still have to capture the suspect, 
but would then be less dependant on third parties which may have an idea of what 
constitutes a regular arrest and detention which differs from that of the ICC.  
Although this study has shown that the idea of an own international arrest team 
is not yet politically feasible,132 the ICC might consider following the example of 
the ICTY in creating tracking teams,133 a term which has already been presented in 
                                                          
126 See n. 121. 
127 Cf. also Warbrick 2000, p. 495, writing on the inter-State context: “On the face of it, there are 
advantages to considering the treatment of the fugitive/defendant in terms of his human rights – there is 
here the potential capacity to bring objective standards to bear and thus, to some degree, structure the 
exercise of the discretionary power of the court to order a stay. (…) There are, however, obstacles to 
realising this potential. First, what human rights are at stake and what the consequences are of their 
violation in situations of this kind is far from resolved – to the extent it is, a wide power is left to 
national States. Second, if violations of human rights are involved, the discretionary power which 
characterises the abuse of process determination may be overridden by a mandatory obligation to give 
relief to a defendant.” 
128 See n. 573 and accompanying text of Chapter X where it was explained that one cannot state 
beforehand that any case of serious mistreatment/torture must lead to the ending of the case for that 
would constitute the trigger for States which do not want to surrender their own nationals to inflict 
severe (physical or mental) pain or suffering upon them before surrendering them to the ICC. 
129 See also House of Lords, Lord Steyn, Regina v. Latif; Regina v. Shazad, 18 January 1996, 1 W.L.R. 
112-113 [1996]: “The speeches in Ex parte Bennett conclusively establish that proceedings may be 
stayed in the exercise of the judge’s discretion not only where a fair trial is impossible but also where it 
would be contrary to the public interest in the integrity of the criminal justice system that a trial should 
take place. An infinite variety of cases could arise. General guidance as to how the discretion should be 
exercised in particular circumstances will not be useful.” (See n. 346 and accompanying text of Chapter 
V and n. 49 of the present chapter.) 
130 See n. 32 and accompanying text of Chapter I. 
131 See ns. 35-36 and accompanying text of Chapter I. 
132 See n. 107 of Chapter VI and n. 36 of Chapter VIII. 








the context of the ICC.134 By this term, this study does not mean a team of 
investigators on the ICC premises assembling and analysing information from third 
parties about the whereabouts of the suspect. Such teams, of course, already exist.135 
                                                          
134 See the presentation of David Tolbert of the ICTY during the ‘Second public hearing of the Office of 
the Prosecutor, Session 2: NGOs and Other Experts’, The Hague, 26 September 2006 (available at: 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Network+with+Partners/Public+
Hearings/Second+Public+Hearing/Session+2), commenting on the ICC OTP’s Report on Prosecutorial 
Strategy, The Hague, 14 September 2006 (available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D673DD8C-D427-4547-BC69-
2D363E07274B/143708/ProsecutorialStrategy20060914_English.pdf): “Our experience in obtaining 
arrests is directly relevant to the 3 rd Objective of the strategic plan. [Which is “to gain the forms of 
cooperation necessary to mobilize and facilitate successful arrest operations”, see the Report on 
Prosecutorial Strategy at p. 8, ChP.] In this regard, paragraph 5(a) of this Objective, which provides that 
while the Court itself does not have the power to effect arrests, it “should deploy substantial efforts to 
gathering information on the whereabouts of suspects”, is particularly important. Moreover, it is 
important to note that this point is then linked or should be linked to “galvanizing support and 
cooperation for arrests and surrender” and this in turn is linked to a 3 rd point of the objective, that is to 
promoting cooperation among “national and international parties”[.] If we analyze these elements in the 
context of our experiences at the ICTY, we see that there are two elements in which (…) the Tribunal or 
the Court must develop expertise. We are all familiar with one aspect, which might be referred to as 
political or diplomatic efforts to obtain arrests. These include using diplomatic means to persuade States 
to fulfil their legal obligations. In this regard, various diplomatic carrots and sticks, such as in the 
ICTY’s case conditionality concerning potential membership in the European Union (EU), have been 
particularly effective. Others include conditionality of foreign aid and other diplomatic and political 
measures. A second element is the gathering [of] information itself regarding the fugitives and their 
networks. This element is often overlooked in discussions related to effecting arrests, but the diplomatic 
and political efforts are made much more effective by having in-house expertise. At the ICTY, we call 
this unit the “Tracking Team”, and it deploys in the region as needed and analyses information to 
determine where fugitives might be as well as the networks supporting them. It is very important 
technical expertise to have in the Office and complements diplomatic efforts. I would liken it to two 
hands working together, one without the other is a bit like one hand clapping.” (…) [T]he Office needs 
“eyes and ears” of its own. (…) The principal lesson from the ICTY is that there must be carrots and 
sticks plus internal information-gathering by the OTP itself for diplomatic and political strategies to 
work. It is indeed the Prosecutor’s own intelligence gathering that shows whether a State is, in fact, 
cooperating, thus making these carrots and sticks much more effective.” Note that in the new strategic 
plan, the item of the tracking team will not be found, see ICC OTP’s ‘Prosecutorial Strategy 2009 - 
2012’, The Hague, 1 February 2010 (available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-
3650-4514-AA62-D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf). 
135 See CPI, La Chambre Préliminaire III, Situation en R[é]publique Centrafricaine, Affaire Le 
Procureur c. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Demande d’arrestation provisoire de M. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo adressée au Royaume de Belgique’ (Sous scellés), ICC-01/05-01/08, 23 mai 2008, para. 3: “Le 
Procureur a souligné l’urgence qu’il y avait pour la Chambre de traiter sa requête au regard des risques 
de fuite de M. Jean-Pierre Bemba. Lors de l’audience, le Procureur a soutenu que M. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
aurait quitté la République portugaise pour se rendre au Royaume de Belgique, dans une demeure à 
l’extérieur de Bruxelles qu’il compte apparemment quitter le 25 [m]ai 2008, pour une destination non 
connue à ce jour.” (See also n. 302 of Chapter X.) See further ‘Bemba in Hands of International Justice’, 
Hirondelle News Agency, 7 July 2008 (available at: 
http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/6242/517/): “For the first time, the prosecutor set up a 
“tracking team”, a team charged with following the actions of the leader of the Congolese opposition.” 
See finally C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, Working Paper No. 24 – 
April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 








It would be a team that can also operate in the State where the suspect is thought to 
be residing. However, because the work of such teams consists of traditional police 
work (such as shadowing and observing the suspect), they must have the consent of 
that State, which will obviously be very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain from 
uncooperative States. 
Allowing – under certain circumstances – trials in absentia would solve that 
problem.136 This topic was already “[o]ne of the most controversial legal issues 
during the negotiation process”137 of the ICC Statute, but one can expect that the 
debate will return with a vengeance if arrest warrants are not executed for long 
periods of time. The introduction of an in absentia provision into the system of the 
STL138 may also constitute a catalyst in that respect.  
However, the ICC is simply not (yet)139 equipped with these features. This 
means that it must make (perhaps more)140 use of the tools it already has.  
In this context, it is submitted that the ICC must stay far away from dubious 
methods of bringing a suspect into its jurisdiction. Of course, resorting to such 
methods may sometimes be tempting, for instance, when arrest warrants are not 
executed for a long time and public criticism grows against an “ineffective ICC”. 
However, individual ICC staff members – who do not have a “permanent” life and 
would like to be successful during their stay at the ICC – must always be aware of 
the fact that the Court they (temporarily) work for is permanent. And resorting to 
dubious methods to reach a short-term goal, besides the fact that it undermines, at 
that particular moment, the values for which the ICC stands,141 and that it may not 
                                                          
136 Although it will also raise new problems, one of them being “that trials in absentia may deflate public 
pressure to ensure the arrest of the accused war criminal [original footnote, ChP].” (Sharp, Sr. 1997, p. 
459, commenting on a recommendation from the Carnegie International Commission on the Balkans to 
have trials in absentia in the context of the ICTY.) Cf. also the remarks of Quintal (1998, p. 723) in n. 
89 of Chapter VI (in the context of the Rule 61 proceedings). 
137 Friman 1999, p. 255. 
138 See n. 1169 and accompanying text of Chapter VI. 
139 The ICC Review Conference, which will take place in Kampala, Uganda, between 31 May and 11 
June 2010, does not have these items on the agenda either. 
140 One could hereby think, for example, of the freezing of assets, see ICC, ASP, Sixth session, New 
York, 30 November to 14 December 2007, Report of the Bureau on cooperation, ICC-ASP/6/21, 19 
October 2007, paras. 41, 68 and 71. See n. 300 of Chapter VIII with respect to the ICC’s possibilities as 
concerns this tool. 
141 See ICC, Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, In the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against 
the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of 
the Statute of 3 October 2006’ (Public Document), ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, para. 
37: “A fair trial is the only means to do justice.” Or in the more dramatic words of Chief Prosecutor 
Jackson during his opening statement before the IMT of Nuremberg on 21 November 1945: “We must 
never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which history 
will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well.” 
See Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Vol. 2, Second Day, Wednesday, 21 November 1945, Morning 
Session, available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/11-21-45.asp. Cf. finally the following words of 
Judge Mansfield from the inter-State context: “Society is the ultimate loser when, in order to convict the 








be that ‘successful’ at all given that such tactics can lead to the ending of the case 
(see supra),142 can seriously damage the ICC’s mission in the long run.  
This is because the ICC needs the practical support of the international 
community, especially because it does not have its own enforcement arm.143 Hence, 
to ensure that it has the constant goodwill of States, the ICC’s enforcers, it must 
always prosecute a suspect in a fair, law-abiding way.144 Consequently, ICC 
officials should not focus too strongly on the specific suspects with whom they are 
dealing at the time: they should focus on the fairness of the system in general, on the 
system which will apply to any suspect who will appear before the ICC. If sceptical, 
but mighty States (such as the US) see that the ICC is a fair court, they may more 
readily become a party to the ICC Statute, which will in turn lead to greater support 
and a more powerful enforcement arm of the ICC.145 
                                                                                                                                              
Circuit, United States v. Toscanino, 15 May 1974, No. 746, Docket 73-2732 (500 F 2d 267), p. 274. See 
also n. 58 and accompanying text of Chapter V.) 
142 See also C. Ryngaert, ‘The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, Working Paper No. 24 – 
April 2009, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (available at: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), p. 59. 
143 This is, by the way, also valid for the inter-State context, where States are sometimes also dependent 
on other States, for example, in extradition cases, see Schultz 1984, pp. 110-111 (commenting on the 
1982 decision of the Swiss Federal Court in the case of X): “Vorkommnisse, wie sie sich in dem hier 
geschilderten Auslieferungsfall abspielten, sind nicht nur eines Staates, der sich als Rechtsstaat ausgibt, 
unwürdig. Sie sind außerdem überaus bedauerlich, weil sie allen denen Auftrieb geben, die der 
zwischenstaatlichen Rechtshilfe jeder Art mit Mißtrauen begegnen und überall Mißbrauch wittern. Der 
kurzfristige Vorteil, einmal einen ins Ausland entwischten Angeschuldigten, der schwerer Delikte 
bezichtigt wird, auf eine solche Weise zur Strecke zu bringen, wiegt die dadurch hervorgerufene, lange 
nachwirkende Erschütterung des Vertrauens in dieses wichtige Mittel zwischenstaatlicher 
Zusammenarbeit nie auf [original footnote omitted, ChP].” (See n. 428 of Chapter V.) 
144 See also Stapleton 1999, p. 536: “For the ICC to succeed as a viable permanent tribunal, it must 
guarantee the accused a fair trial. (…) [U]nfair trials could seriously undermine the legitimacy of the 
ICC and limit its chances for success.” This is so, even if this means that sometimes, the ICC may have 
to issue decisions which a particular State or organisation will not like, cf. the Barayagwiza and 
Todorović cases. However, with respect to the Barayagwiza case, it must be repeated that the criticism 
in that decision was perhaps not so much directed towards the fact that the ICTR can issue a male 
captus male detentus decision, but more that it did so in this specific case (where the violations were 
probably indeed not so serious as to refuse jurisdiction) and that it did not properly take care of the 
aftermath of its decision, forgetting that it has a more general responsibility to fight impunity, whether 
before the ICTR or not. 
145 See also ibid., p. 546: “A fair trial is important at both the national and international level, but at the 
international level the importance is heightened for both practical and ideological reasons. Practically, 
the ICC depends on the acceptance as well as financial and administrative support of the international 
community. Additionally, the ICC depends on this community to turn over individuals for prosecution.” 
(The ideological reason will come back in a moment.) See also ibid., pp. 577-578, where Stapleton 
makes a comparison between the ad hoc ICTY and the permanent ICC: “Thus, the ICC cannot make 
rules to fit a specific situation and cannot justify deviating from international standards of fairness; 
doing so would endanger the Tribunal’s existence as it would deter states from cooperating and would 
invalidate the justification for removing trials from national forums.” See finally ibid., p. 609: “If the 
ICC is to be successful it needs respect, it needs state cooperation, and it needs to be created by a statute 
that is structurally sound and presided over by a judiciary willing to interpret this statute in such a way 
that the court is able to fulfill its mandate – to provide effective and fair trials in situations where 








Furthermore, and in the more distant future, showing respect for fairness and 
human rights may also lead to fewer human rights violations at the national level, 
which, in turn, will ensure that the ICC’s goal to put an end to impunity and to 
contribute to the prevention of international crimes146 can be realised and thus that 
the ICC can be seen as an effective court.147 
As a result, this study argues that if judges are confronted by the dilemma 
presented in the very first chapter of this book, namely effectiveness (in the sense of 
achieving prosecutions and convictions) versus fairness, they should always opt for 
                                                          
146 See the ICC’s Preamble. 
147 See the following words of Edwards (2001, p. 334), reminding of the already-mentioned (see n. 173 
of Chapter X) model function of the ICC towards the national level: “[A]ffording suspects and accused 
persons full rights is consistent with eradicating impunity and with full human rights for all, and will 
ultimately impact society positively. Respecting rights of suspects and the accused will educate officials 
and the public about the sanctity of human rights, and will encourage human rights compliance. Human 
rights education at the international level will likely trickle down to the grassroots. As governments and 
citizens become more aware of the need to enforce these rights, fewer human rights violations will 
occur.” See also the remainder of the words of Stapleton from n. 145 (words which were also mentioned 
earlier in n. 173 of Chapter X): “Ideologically, one of the purposes of an international tribunal like the 
ICC is to extend “the rule of law and … [to bring] … national courts up to the standards of international 
law.” International human rights and humanitarian conventions are committed to providing an expansive 
view of rights and to extending the rights of individuals so that national governments will follow their 
example. Allowing the ICC, an aggressive enforcer of human rights, to deviate from the minimum 
international standards for a fair trial would undermine the credibility of existing human rights norms. 
How can a national government be expected to follow “minimum” standards for a fair trial if an 
international tribunal does not [original footnote omitted, ChP]?” One could also refer here to 
international law violations more generally (such as violations of another State’s sovereignty). If the 
ICC judges do not refuse jurisdiction in case ICC staff have orchestrated an abduction violating a State’s 
sovereignty, this can have an effect on the inter-State context, where respect for another State’s 
sovereignty is even more crucial. See also ns. 638-640 and accompanying text of Chapter VI (in the 
context of the Nikolić case and the ICTY). Hence, the effect of an ICC decision, even if decided in a sui 
generis context, may not be limited to that own context. That is arguably also the case for a decision like 
the one of 14 December 2006, even if it focused heavily on its own provisions. Manning (2007, p. 839), 
however, does not agree, writing that “the Jurisdictional Appeal Decision will have no impact on the 
international law debate between the old male captus, bene detentus principle and the increasingly-
recognized abuse of process doctrine. Because the decision is grounded entirely in the ICC provisions, 
its relevance beyond the Court is curtailed.” However, it is very well possible that a national court 
focusing on a restricted fair trial notion refers to the ICC’s second (male detentus?) formulation – 
“[w]here the breaches of the rights of the accused are such as to make it impossible for him/her to make 
his/her defence within the framework of his[/her] rights, no fair trial can take place and the proceedings 
can be stayed” – to support its own stance on the male captus issue. Conversely, more progressive 
courts may refer to the Court’s first formulation – “[w]here fair trial becomes impossible because of 
breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect or the accused by his/her accusers, it would be a 
contradiction in terms to put the person on trial” – to back their own vision that jurisdiction must be 
refused in any male captus situation (including, for example, luring) which can be seen as a breach of a 
fundamental right (the right to liberty and security) if that breach would undermine the notion of a fair 
trial broadly perceived, whether or not one is dealing with a suspect of international crimes: “Unfairness 
in the treatment of the suspect or the accused may rupture the process to an extent making it impossible 
to piece together the constituent elements of a fair trial. In those circumstances, the interest of the world 
community to put persons accused of the most heinous crimes against humanity on trial, great as it is, is 
outweighed by the need to sustain the efficacy of the judicial process as the potent agent of justice.” 








the latter concept. Only fairness can engender real effectiveness, meaning 
effectiveness in the long term. If the ICC conducts unfair trials to attain short-term 
effectiveness, it will never be truly effective.148 
In this respect, the words of Judge Woodhouse from the New Zealand Hartley 
case that “this must never become an area where it will be sufficient to consider that 
the end has justified the means”149 are also definitely applicable to the ICC context. 
The fight against impunity must be fought, but must be fought fairly. It must never 
become a true ‘war on impunity’, a term which hints at diminished respect for the 
law,150 cf. also the abductions of Alvarez-Machain (in the context of the ‘war on 
drugs’)151 and Abu Omar (in the context of the ‘war on terror’).152  
Another point which cannot be made strongly enough in this discussion is that 
introducing new tools for the ICC to increase its capabilities to start a trial, such as a 
provision on allowing trials in absentia (if that possibility were to be introduced in 
the future), runs the risk of masking the real problem, namely why the enforcement 
arm of the ICC, formed by States party to the ICC Statute (and States ordered by the 
UNSC to cooperate with the ICC), is not functioning as it should. It must be borne 
in mind that States have the prime obligation to arrest and surrender suspects and 
that this obligation must be taken very seriously. 
This means, for example, that if suspects cannot be apprehended by the custodial 
State, other States (or States working together in an international peacekeeping 
force) should assist that State in its efforts. Not only logistically or financially,153 but 
perhaps also with an actual arrest team. As long as the custodial State provides its 
consent to such an operation on its territory, the arrest itself is executed lawfully154 
                                                          
148 See again Stapleton 1999, p. 544: “[I]f the ICC is unable to guarantee minimum procedural rights 
necessary to fair trial or uphold international standards of behavior, it is ineffective; (…) [I]neffective 
prosecutions undermine the purpose and jurisdiction of the ICC, thus undermining the Court’s chance 
for success.”  
149 See n. 129 and accompanying text of Chapter V. 
150 See the famous phrase of Cicero from Pro Milone: silent [enim] leges inter arma, “[l]aws are silent 
amid arms” (Garner 2004, p. 1758). See also n. 18 of Chapter I. 
151 See Baker 2004, p. 1376. 
152 See ns. 18-22 and accompanying text of Chapter I. 
153 In this context, one could also think of financial rewards for citizens of that State for information or 
assistance which will lead, in the end, to the arrest of suspects of international crimes, comparable with 
the ‘US Rewards for Justice Program’, discussed in n. 115 of Chapter VI (which is, of course, not (yet) 
focusing on the ICC). See also Scharf 2000, p. 951 who notes, after having discussed the ICTY context 
(where this program offered a reward of $ 5 million for such information and assistance): “The ICC 
could similarly benefit from the institution of a rewards program. The amount required for reward offers 
is a relatively small price compared to the costs of running the ICC”. A comparable tool could indeed be 
used by the ICC, with the comment that it should be clearly understood by all that awards will only be 
granted for information and assistance in the arrest efforts of the competent authorities and not for 
actually turning in the suspect in question, which may lead to chaotic wild-west scenarios executed by 
private bounty hunters. Scenarios which, in serious cases, may even lead to the dismissal of the case, cf. 
the case of Nikolić and ns. 115, 281 and 444 of Chapter VI. 
154 In the case of an international peacekeeping force, this would, among other things, require a clear 








and non-arbitrarily and all the (human) rights of the suspect are respected during the 
operation, there would be nothing wrong with such support.155  
As regards uncooperative States, third States should turn to the carrot-and-stick 
method which has worked so well for the ICTY, meaning that they must stress that 
cooperation with the ICC will lead to financial/political support and that non-
cooperation will lead to embargoes/sanctions/political isolation.156 Such a method 
would have more legitimacy if it were executed within the context of a collectivity 
of States, such as international organisations. In this context, reference should also 
be made to the role of the UNSC. While acknowledging that this organ’s 
relationship with the ICC is a difficult one (it should be remembered that three of its 
                                                          
155 Cf. the concept of “assisted arrest”, introduced by Gillett (see also n. 56 of Chapter VIII), who 
suggests agreements “between peacekeeping forces and the territorial State in which they were located, 
granting the former the authority to carry out arrests in the host state’s territory. Ideally, such 
agreements would contain “assisted arrest” clauses allowing peace-keepers to execute arrest warrants 
and to hand the accused directly to the ICC in cases of substantial or total collapse of the State’s judicial 
or governmental infrastructure.” (Gillett 2008, p. 21.) Gillett even proposes in this context the creation, 
by the ICC’s ASP, of a multilateral reciprocal treaty, see ibid., p. 27: “The acceptance of ad hoc assisted 
arrest operations, while a positive development in the struggle to try those accused of the most serious 
crimes known to mankind, would not be an ideal long-term solution to the problem of impunity. To 
provide an ongoing, regulated basis for assisted arrests to be conducted in States unable to execute 
warrants through their own agents, the Assembly of State Parties of the ICC would need to conclude an 
assisted arrest agreement as a subsidiary instrument to the Rome Statute. Within this agreement, State 
Parties would provide a prior and continuing consent to assistance in executing ICC arrest warrants in 
situations where they are unable to do so through their own agents, and also would reciprocally agree to 
aide in the execution of ICC arrest warrants within other State Parties’ territories, when those States are 
unable to do so [original footnote omitted, ChP].” Cf. also Rastan 2008, p. 454: “The ‘unable’ state 
could invite capable states or an international peacekeeping presence on its territory to assist it in 
fulfilling its duties towards the Court. Moreover, although the Court’s non-compliance procedure is 
normally discussed with reference to a state’s ‘unwillingness’ to co-operate, the Court could possibly 
treat ‘inability’ also as a failure to comply with a co-operation request. Rather than indicating the 
international wrongfulness of non-co-operation, the purpose of such a finding would be to invite the 
ASP or the Security Council, as appropriate, to consider the matter with a view to promoting co-
operation. Such considerations may, for example, take the form of the Security Council modifying the 
mandate of relevant peacekeeping operations to enable regional co-operation and co-ordination with a 
territorial state that is willing but otherwise unable to perform arrest and surrender operations, or may 
lead to the exertion of political pressure through issue-linkage to secure co-operation from a hitherto 
‘unwilling’ state [original footnote omitted, ChP].” See finally the more general words of Hall at ns. 54-
55 and accompanying text of Chapter VIII.  
156 See also Ciampi 2006, p. 736: “[T]he main incentive available to the international community to 
compel a State to cooperate with the ICC (and, more generally, with international criminal tribunals) is 
through political pressure, eventually accompanied by the imposition (or threat) of sanctions or other 
enforcement measures against the non-cooperating State.” Roper and Barria (2008, pp. 466-467) see 
especially a role for economic pressure here: “We regard political pressure by third parties, whether by 
states or non-state actors, as generally having a limited ability to enhance the bargaining effectiveness of 
the ICC with regard to the capture of indictees. Instead, military or peacekeeping pressure and especially 
economic pressure are more successful tools available to third parties to enhance the leverage of the 
ICC. (…) [W]e argue more generally that significant economic pressure may be one of the most 
effective tools available to third parties in order to support the activity of the ICC. (…) Especially for 
states which are highly export-dependent, third-party economic pressure may be one of the most 
important means by which the international community can assist the ICC in securing the apprehension 








five permanent members (China, the US and Russia) are not States Parties to the 
ICC): if that organ decides that certain States must cooperate with the ICC and those 
States refuse to do so, the UNSC should act, much more than it has done until now. 
The Council should understand that its soft responses to non-cooperation from 
States such as Sudan – and one could also refer here to the Council’s role in the 
context of the ICTY – seriously undermines not only the fight against impunity but 
also – and this may be considered to be more relevant for the Council itself – its 
own credibility. It is, of course, recognised that demanding cooperation is very 
difficult if the ultimate leader of that State is himself charged with international 
crimes (as in the case of Sudan) as one can assume that such a leader would never 
turn himself in to the ICC.157 However, in such a case, the UNSC must, to borrow 
the words of the former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR Carla Del Ponte, 
                                                          
157 In the case of Sudan, there is the additional problem that the leader is also involved in important 
peace talks, which brings in the ever-returning question of peace versus justice (see also the situation in 
Uganda). However, and without wanting or being able to properly address this interesting question here, 
a question about which entire books can be written, it can be briefly argued that the two terms are not 
mutually exclusive; there cannot be any peace without justice. One does always wonder why those 
arguing in favour of the peace process and against arrest warrants of the main negotiator(s) do not see 
this either. (In the context of Sudan, one could refer here to the role of the AU Member States which, 
with a reservation of Chad, decided not to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of Al 
Bashir, see AU, Assembly of the African Union, Thirteenth Ordinary Session, 1 – 3 July 2009, Sirte, 
Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Assembly/AU/Dec. 243-267 (XIII) Rev. 1, 
Assembly/AU/Decl.1-6(XIII), Decisions and Declarations, adopted on 3 July 2009 (available at: 
http://www.africa-
union.org/root/AU/Conferences/2009/july/summit/docs/DECISIONS/ASSEMBLY%20AU%20DEC%2
0243%20-%20267%20(XIII)%20_E.pdf), ‘Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’, Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII), 
Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev. 1, para. 10.) It is difficult to understand why a peace process would 
be so much dependable on one or a few persons. If those arguing in favour of peace are really 
committed to the peace process – note, however, that some persons asserting that justice should yield to 
peace are arguably not genuinely interested in peace but only use this argument in an effort to save their 
own skin and that serious peace talks may only begin because of the political pressure caused by the 
arrest warrants – they will ensure that peace is achieved, whatever it takes and whoever is main 
responsible for the talks. In fact, a peace agreement may even be more easily reached without the 
persons most loudly claiming that arrest warrants are obstructing the peace talks. See in that respect 
Goldstone, who notes that “specific evidence suggests that without the work of the ICTY – without the 
indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Radko Mladic by the ICTY and their consequent isolation by the 
world community – there would have been no Dayton Peace Agreement.” (Goldstone 1998, p. 205.) 
While taking into account that Karadžić and Mladić did not have the same position as Al Bashir has 
know, even a President’s position is not sacred and can be effectively undermined. See again Goldstone: 
“I hear the refrain, “But if these are the leaders of an important constituency, how can we avoid 
negotiating with them?” As you cannot choose your family, so you cannot choose the leaders you have 
to negotiate with. But history teaches us that leaders come and leaders go. There is nothing immutable 
about the political process. Indeed, we all know that the political process is a fickle one. Political 
support is based on (assumed) legitimacy and capacity. Few people would, if they knew the truth of the 
ambitions and associated misconduct of leaders responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity, 
long continue to support such a leader. If this is crediting humanity too much, then I rely on the 
alternative that few would long continue to support a leader who, because of his or her international 
political condemnation and isolation, is unable to represent her or his constituency meaningfully in the 
international community or who, even worse, has brought on his or her constituency military, 








“be creative in finding ways to bring to bear the sort of pressures that will produce 
results”.158 It should connect such political and economic sanctions to the non-
cooperation that the leader’s role domestically is challenged, in addition to publicly 
demand from States to arrest that person if he enters their territory. Hopefully, such 
measures would not only lead to the suspect being branded as an international 
pariah159 (an effect which would also be reached after a trial in absentia) but one 
day also to that suspect’s surrender. In the ultimate case, after years of non-
compliance – and possibly after the extension of the mandate of the peacekeeping 
force already on the ground has brought no relief160 – the Council may even allow, 
as an ultimum remedium, an arrest operation by foreign States on the territory of the 
uncooperative State,161 even though one can assume that it is very unlikely that such 
a politically risky undertaking – not only for the States in the Council approving 
such an operation but also for the States executing the actual operation – will occur 
very soon.162 
In short, the international community must (better) understand that it has major 
responsibilities in the functioning, effectiveness163 and thus success and credibility 
of the ICC.164 In the same vein, critics should recognise that if arrest warrants are 
not executed, they should criticise not the ICC for being ineffective, but the States 
                                                          
158 UNSC, Fifty-fourth year, 4063rd meeting, 10 November 1999, S/PV.4063, p. 4 (see also n. 120 of 
Chapter VI). Cf. also n. 121 of the same chapter and its reference to the Taylor and Lockerbie cases. 
159 See again (see n. 157) Goldstone, but now ten years later: “The arrest warrants for President Bashir 
reveal to the world what type of regime holds power in Khartoum. They should also push the Security 
Council to apply real pressure on the Sudanese government. The council and its member states should 
make President Bashir’s government an international pariah, imposing sanctions against its leaders and, 
most important, Sudan’s oil exports, which have so effectively insulated the regime.” (R. Goldstone, 
‘Catching a War Criminal in the Act’, The New York Times, 15 July 2008.) See also C. Ryngaert, ‘The 
International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention’, Working Paper No. 24 – April 2009, Leuven Centre for 
Global Governance Studies (available at: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp133e.pdf), p. 25, n. 78. 
160 See n. 56 of Chapter VIII and the ideas of Ryngaert as concerns arrests of peacekeeping forces in 
unwilling States. See also the more general words of Hall at ns. 54-55 and accompanying text of the 
same chapter. 
161 See n. 157 of Chapter III. 
162 In fact, in the context of the Harun case (and before he filed his application requesting the issuance 
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which refuse to cooperate.165 If the international community does not adequately 
react in the event of non-compliance, States undermine the system of the ICC – of 
which they constitute the enforcement pillar166 – and hence the fight against 
impunity themselves.167 The international community has, in the words of Rastan, a 
responsibility to enforce here:  
 
The successful enforcement of the Court’s decisions will (…) require the assumption 
of responsibilities by the international community should an individual State fail in its 
duties to cooperate with the Court. Much like the preventative principle expressed 
under the responsibility to protect to which it was a precursor,[168] or the threat of 
united reprisal action under collective security arrangements, the system is predicated 
on the successful operation of a covenant of undertakings between the individual 
State and the collective. In the context of the ICC, such a covenant is formed between 
the States that are party to the Rome Statute, and may, in the case of a Security 
Council referral, be extended to embrace all UN Member States as a result of their 
duties under the Organisation’s Charter. (…) [S]uch enforcement will only be 
effective, however, if the ICC can rely on unity of thought and action from the 
collective community of States. If the non-compliance procedure is to genuinely 
influence State behaviour, therefore, the support for justice must be matched by 
concerted, consistent and unified action by the international community under a 
notional responsibility to enforce [original footnotes omitted ChP].169    
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designed on two pillars. The Court itself is the judicial pillar. The enforcement pillar belongs to States.” 
See also ICC, ASP, Sixth session, New York, 30 November to 14 December 2007, Report of the Bureau 
on cooperation, ICC-ASP/6/21, 19 October 2007, para. 39 and Rastan 2009, pp. 164-165.  
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Moreno Ocampo. (Note that the 2009 contribution of Moreno Ocampo stems from a speech from 25 
June 2007.) See finally ibid., p. 456: “Unless the duty of states to co-operate in the fight against 
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It must be stressed that this study has focused on the ICC’s current position on the 
male captus issue. That necessarily means that Section 2 of this chapter ‘merely’ 
constitutes a picture of a situation at a given moment in time. In addition, it must be 
admitted that this picture is somewhat blurred since the definitive current position of 
the ICC is not very clear – something to which the ICC judges should pay more 
attention in the future. As a result, the answer to the central question of this study is, 
necessarily, restricted as well. However, it is to be hoped that the reader will 
recognise that the real value of his study will be found not so much in its, 
unavoidably, limited conclusions but rather in its elaborate and more timeless 
corpus, in its effort to position the complex male captus topic into the equally 
intricate ICC context.  
The ICC is a permanent institution and will undoubtedly be confronted by new 
male captus situations in the future, situations which may include those which have 
not yet occurred in the ICC context, such as luring situations and abductions. 
Hopefully, this study (including its critical observations as can be found in 
Subsection 2.3 and Section 3 of this chapter), or the discussions which it may 
engender, will inspire and help the ICC when it is confronted by a new male captus 
situation to issue a decision which does (more) justice to its difficult but 
commendable objective, namely to fight impunity in a fair way. A fight, as was 
argued in Section 3 of this chapter, that can only be won if the international 










In Part 1 (and Chapter I) of this book, the reader was introduced to the subject of 
this study. The infamous abduction of Adolf Eichmann in Argentina on 11 May 
1960 and the recent kidnapping of suspected terrorist Abu Omar in Italy on 17 June 
2003 showed that the use of irregular means was and is still considered an option in 
apprehending suspects, especially when the interests are (considered to be) strong.  
Since the International Criminal Court (ICC) also has to deal with suspects of 
serious crimes, it was considered what the position of this Court, arguably the most 
important institution in the field of international criminal justice, is towards suspects 
who claim that the way they were brought into the Court’s jurisdiction was irregular 
(male captus). Basically, would it opt – taking into account, of course, that much 
would depend on the exact circumstances of the case – for effectiveness (in the 
sense of achieving prosecutions and convictions) and would it continue to exercise 
its jurisdiction notwithstanding the male captus (male captus bene detentus) or 
would it be of the opinion that values such as fairness, human rights and the 
integrity of its proceedings demand that in the case of a male captus, the exercise of 
jurisdiction must be refused (male captus male detentus/ex iniuria ius non oritur)? 
This led to the following central question: 
 
How does the ICC currently cope with the dilemmas that a male captus case can 
give rise to and how should this approach be assessed? 
 
For this purpose, it was explained that two evaluative frameworks would be created; 
an external one (to find out how similar or different the ICC male captus position 
was to the position of other courts that have dealt with this problem before) and an 
internal one (to find out how the ICC position is to be assessed in relation to its own 
law pursuant to Article 21 of the ICC Statute). 
Besides answering this specific central question, it was made clear that this study 
also had two other objectives, namely 1) to more generally combine two fascinating 
subjects which have not previously been put together in one book (the ICC and the 
male captus bene detentus maxim) and 2) to make a contribution to the male captus 
discussion itself, to the discussion as to how ICC judges and judges in general can 








discussion on how proceedings can be achieved which are considered both effective 
and fair.  
In Part 2 of this study, the male captus bene detentus maxim itself was 
scrutinised. 
Chapter II looked at the origin of the maxim and noted, among other things, that 
even though male captus bene detentus has often been labelled in literature as a(n 
“ancient” or “old”) Roman maxim, a modest inquiry into Roman criminal law 
showed that the maxim did not seem to have its roots in antiquity at all and that the 
four-word Latin phrase may in fact be relatively modern.  
In any case, the oldest text in which this study could find the maxim is M.H. 
Cardozo’s article ‘When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the Solution?’, which was 
published in the American Journal of International Law of January 1961.  
Chapter II also looked into the origin of the reasoning behind the maxim and 
concluded that the legal reasoning of the English Ex Parte Susannah Scott case, 
decided by Lord Chief Justice Tenterden of the Court of King’s Bench on Tuesday, 
19 May 1829, is probably the oldest male captus bene detentus reasoning with a 
truly multi-jurisdictional, international dimension – the ‘target dimension’ of this 
study.  
In Chapter III, the different elements of the maxim were thoroughly analysed 
with help of four main questions: 1) “Which male captus situations exist?”, 2) 
“What is violated by these male captus situations?”, 3) “Who violates?” and 4) 
“What are the consequences of such violations?” 
In the discussion of the first main question, it was first of all explained that even 
though male captus situations can encompass every pre-trial irregularity which can 
be seen to have occurred within the context of a certain case (including, for 
example, an irregular pre-trial detention), Chapter III would focus on three basic 
male captus situations which looked at the irregularity of the apprehension: 
disguised extradition, luring and kidnapping/abduction. As these situations 
originated from the horizontal, inter-State context, it was made clear that that 
context would be the principal background against which Chapter III would be 
discussed.    
After a discussion of these three basic male captus situations, it was explained 
which values those situations could violate (State sovereignty, human rights – the 
two most important being the right to liberty and security/the right not to be arrested 
or detained arbitrarily, rights which arguably have customary international 
law/general international law status – and the more general rule of law concept) and 
which kinds of exceptions could apply so that a violation does not occur: consent, 
self-defence and humanitarian grounds (as concerns a violation of State sovereignty) 
and war or other public emergency (as regards a violation of human rights).  
As regards the human rights context, two important provisions were discussed, 
namely Article 9, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR and Article 5, paragraph 1 of the 
ECHR. Alongside a more theoretical examination of both provisions, it was 








and the ECHR (namely the (now defunct) ECmHR and the ECtHR) had interpreted 
these provisions in the context of alleged male captus cases.  
An interesting observation stemming from this context was that there is a 
difference discernible between, on the one hand, the ECtHR and ECmHR, which 
still find the attitude of the ‘injured’ State important in determining whether a 
kidnapping/abduction violates human rights, and, on the other, the HRC, which only 
appears to focus on the interests of the individual and thus may conclude that a 
human rights violation has occurred, even when the ‘injured’ State has colluded in 
the operation and thus even when there is no problem from a classical (inter-State) 
international law point of view. 
More generally, it appeared that whereas the HRC only looks at the interests of 
the individual, the European institutions also take the other side of the coin into 
account, namely the importance of cooperation between States in prosecuting 
alleged criminals – a reasoning which was very well articulated in the famous 
Öcalan case. A reasoning which can also be abused in order to condone rather 
questionable pre-trial proceedings. In that respect, it is not strange that literature has 
criticised several cases decided by the European institutions, including the Öcalan 
case, for (implicitly) supporting the male captus bene detentus maxim. 
The discussion of the third main question of Chapter III – “Who violates?” – 
made clear that not only States/State officials, but also private individuals may be 
involved in the different male captus situations. It addressed the controversial issue 
of whether private individuals as such can violate values like State sovereignty and 
human rights and concluded that there is no clear-cut answer to this question. As a 
result, it was suggested, using the example of a kidnapping of a person by private 
individuals in the context of the tribunals, that one could argue more generally that 
even if one is of the opinion that private individuals, in principle, cannot have 
violated that person’s right to liberty and security or the injured State’s sovereignty, 
it seems hard to view that abduction as a purely private violation of domestic law 
either. Because the abduction is the reason why the suspect is now standing before 
his judges, it has gained a certain public dimension. Thus, and without maintaining 
that the tribunal in such a case has violated the person’s right to liberty and security 
or the injured State’s sovereignty, one could argue that a (wrong akin to a) violation 
of that person’s right to liberty and security or the injured State’s sovereignty has 
nonetheless occurred in the context of the tribunal case and that the tribunal ought to 
repair this violation. Obviously, the fact that such a violation/wrong has been 
perpetrated by private individuals may/should then also be taken into account when 
determining its consequences. 
After this discussion, the less controversial point of how conduct of private 
individuals can be attributed to a State was explored with help of the ILC’s Draft 
articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts (such as Article 
11 on conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own), the Eichmann case 
and the concept of due diligence. 
The fourth and final main question of this chapter dealt with the consequences of 








the suspect in the case of a violation of State sovereignty), remedies (such as a 
release of the suspect in the case of a violation of the right to liberty and security) 
and abuse of process (such as a stay of the proceedings in the case of a violation of 
the rule of law) were addressed. In addition, it was examined how those different 
consequences were to be viewed when compared with the male detentus outcome, 
that is, the refusal to exercise jurisdiction.  
An important point made in the final pages of this chapter was that the remedy of 
release in the case of an unlawful (arrest and) detention (see Article 9, paragraph 4 
of the ICCPR and Article 5, paragraph 4 of the ECHR) is arguably problematic; if a 
person has been the victim of an unlawful arrest/detention (but not one which is so 
serious that it leads to the ending of the case), he must, strictly speaking, be 
released. However, a release does not preclude a new arrest on the spot and a new 
exercise of jurisdiction by the court. This is because the above-mentioned provisions 
simply speak of a release (as such) and not of, for example, a release/dismissal of 
the case with prejudice to the Prosecutor, meaning that the Prosecutor is barred from 
starting a new trial against the suspect after the latter’s release. Hence, a new arrest 
is not precluded, especially if the suspect is charged with serious crimes and 
prosecution is considered to be of utmost importance. In such a case, the prosecuting 
authorities could assert that this ‘remedy’ (the ‘release’) has repaired the initial 
iniuria of the irregularity and that the trial can continue as normal. However, in that 
case, the suspect would only be granted a pro forma remedy which does not 
comport with the idea that a remedy must be real and effective, see Article 2, 
paragraph 3 (a) of the ICCPR and Article 13 of the ECHR. In addition, the pro 
forma release does not take account of the exact seriousness of the irregularity. In 
other words: it is not only a pro forma remedy but also an over-simplified remedy. 
As a result, it was suggested that it would be better if a judge were to avoid this 
problematic remedy of release and would, if he determines that a person’s 
arrest/detention is unlawful, simply grant the most appropriate remedy which takes 
into account all the specifics of the case, not only the seriousness of the male captus, 
but also the seriousness of the suspect’s alleged crimes and the importance of having 
the case continued. If one follows that route, then one can still satisfy the common 
sense idea behind the immediate re-arrest mentioned above, namely that suspects of 
serious crimes must be prosecuted if possible – although a male detentus outcome 
must, of course, also not be excluded for these suspects – but one will also avoid the 
strange pro forma release and immediate re-arrest and replace it with real remedies, 
such as a reduction of the sentence and/or compensation. The judge can then take 
the exact seriousness of the irregularity into account in determining how much the 
sentence should be reduced or how much compensation one should accord the 
suspect. Such a solution would arguably be fairer to the suspect and more capable of 
putting flexibility into the system. Furthermore, this solution also avoids the 
(justified) criticism one may expect from various actors if a suspect of serious 
crimes is released for an irregularity which is not so serious as to lead to the ending 
of the case (in such serious cases, the public must understand that the court has no 








but which nevertheless ensures that the detention must be qualified as unlawful and 
that, strictly speaking, the suspect must be released. Even if that suspect, given his 
alleged serious crimes, would probably be re-arrested on the spot, one can assume 
that the public/the international community/the victims will not grasp how, for 
example, a suspect of genocide can be released because he has not been promptly 
informed of the reasons for his arrest, especially if that person is not re-arrested and 
subsequently flees. 
After these rather theoretical chapters on the male captus bene detentus maxim, 
Part 3 of this study delved into practice, with the purpose of creating the external 
evaluative framework with which the current ICC male captus position could be 
compared. 
Chapter IV contained a brief introduction, explaining how the biggest part of this 
book was going to be tackled methodologically. 
In Chapter V, male captus case law stemming from the context between States 
was critically described and analysed. The chapter was divided in three categories, 
addressing dozens of inter-State cases stemming from arguably the two most 
important legal systems (common and civil law) and a third category of interesting 
cases which did not (clearly) fall under either category. All three categories looked 
at both older cases and more recent cases (the more recent cases starting with the 
1974 case of Toscanino) in the hope of seeing more clearly whether the maxim was 
developing in a certain direction or not. 
Before turning to the main conclusions of this chapter, which were summarised 
in Chapter VII, the general features of the intervening Chapter VI should be 
discussed here. 
In Chapter VI, male captus case law stemming from the context between States 
and international(ised) criminal tribunals was – again critically – described and 
analysed. The focus was on arguably the two most important international criminal 
tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR. As a result, not were only ten male captus cases 
decided by these UN ad hoc Tribunals extensively discussed (Dokmanović, 
Todorović, Milošević, Nikolić, Tolimir and Karadžić (ICTY) and Barayagwiza, 
Semanza, Kajelijeli and Rwamakuba (ICTR)), but the main characteristics of the 
vertical cooperation and transfer regime of these Tribunals were also reviewed. It 
was explained that this regime was seemingly primarily focused on efficiency, on 
the obligation of States to transfer suspects, and, to a lesser extent, on the rights of 
those (to be) transferred. Nevertheless, it was also noted that case law had repaired 
some of the deficiencies on paper, such as the absence of a right to habeas corpus, a 
right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention and to be released in the case of 
an unlawful (arrest or) detention. Finally, a number of interesting strategies to obtain 
custody of the suspect were addressed, such as the use of sealed indictments, 
peacekeeping forces, tracking teams and political pressure from third States and 
organisations (think of the carrot-and-stick method with respect to finances and 
membership of organisations). 
In contrast, only a few general remarks were devoted to the system of legal 








are half international, half national – as it was unnecessary for the purpose of this 
study to explain in detail all the different cooperation regimes of these tribunals, 
which are very much akin to the horizontal inter-State cooperation regimes. The fact 
that it was discovered afterwards that the context of the internationalised criminal 
tribunals only seemed to contain one case in which the male captus problem played 
an important part in the proceedings (the Duch case before the ECCC, involving an 
alleged irregular pre-trial detention) could now, with hindsight, be seen as another 
justification for a less far-reaching discussion of the system of legal assistance in the 
context of the internationalised criminal tribunals. Finally, Chapter VI ended with a 
few interesting observations from cases stemming from internationalised criminal 
tribunals which could not be seen as real male captus cases but which nevertheless 
touched upon topics which, more generally, could be connected to this book’s 
central topic and which were mentioned earlier in Chapter VI, such as habeas 
corpus and abuse of process.  
The final chapter of this part of the book was Chapter VII, which summarised the 
principles distilled from Chapters V and VI and so created the external evaluative 
framework of this study.  
As regards the inter-State context (Chapter V), it was observed in Chapter VII 
that most judges in the older male captus cases continued exercising jurisdiction, 
stating that they could not or did not want to (because it would make no difference 
anyway) look at the way a person was brought into the jurisdiction of the State of 
the now prosecuting court, even if irregularities might have been committed (by 
authorities from that State) in the pre-trial phase abroad (male captus bene detentus). 
As such, they adhered to the non-inquiry rule and a restricted notion of a fair trial, 
excluding that phase which had in fact ensured that the person was brought to the 
courtroom in the first place. 
With the arrival of human rights treaties such as the ICCPR and the rising status 
of the individual in the international context, judges appeared to pay more attention 
to concepts such as fair trial and were more willing to look at the pre-trial phase 
abroad, independently of the question of whether or not there had been a protest 
from the injured State.  
Nevertheless, this did not mean that the era of male captus bene detentus was 
over and that male captus male detentus or ex iniuria ius non oritur was now the 
new preferred guideline for judges.  
Even though the old(-fashioned) version of the male captus bene detentus rule 
(in that judges cannot or will not look at how the suspect came into the jurisdiction 
of the State of the now prosecuting court) indeed seemed to have been (rightly) 
abandoned, it was also concluded that many judges still issue decisions which could 
be qualified as male captus bene detentus decisions; not because they state that they 
cannot or will not look at alleged pre-trial irregularities abroad (and hence that they 
are going to exercise jurisdiction, regardless of the circumstances in which the 
suspect came into the jurisdiction of the State of the now prosecuting court), but 
because they are of the opinion that, having investigated the pre-trial phase abroad, 








not so serious) male captus bene detentus. It was observed that much depended here 
on the exact circumstances and the question of how those circumstances were to be 
weighed in the balancing exercise which judges clearly prefer.  
In some instances, the male captus was deemed to be so serious that judges were 
of the opinion that refusing jurisdiction was the only way to protect such values as 
respect for another State’s sovereignty, due process of law/human rights of the 
suspect and the rule of law/the integrity of the (executive/judicial) proceedings. 
Much used in that respect was the abuse of process doctrine, which stems from the 
common law context but whose rationale can arguably also be found in the 
reasonings of judges from other legal contexts: courts in principle have jurisdiction 
(bene detentus) but will use their discretion not to exercise that jurisdiction (male 
detentus) if the male captus is so serious that to continue exercising jurisdiction 
would constitute an abuse of the court’s process.  
Applying these general remarks to the different basic male captus situations 
presented in Chapter III of this book (disguised extradition, luring and abduction – 
male captus situations whose definitions imply, incidentally, that they are executed 
intentionally), and starting with abduction, Chapter VII concluded that it appeared 
that the more recent cases showed that courts would refuse jurisdiction in the case of 
an abduction (performed by the prosecuting State’s own agents on another State’s 
territory without the latter’s consent) which 1) was accompanied by serious human 
rights violations/serious mistreatment or 2) was followed by a protest and request 
for the return of the suspect from the injured State. In fact, it seemed that State 
practice more generally indicated that in those two circumstances (the two so-called 
Toscanino possibilities/exceptions), jurisdiction had to be refused. As concerns the 
second situation, an even more far-reaching conclusion was reached, namely that 
customary international law seemingly indicated that a male detentus had to follow. 
It was also stressed that the above-mentioned situations were situations in which 
male captus bene detentus was rejected at any rate. However, that did not mean that 
courts have not utilised lower male captus male detentus thresholds in the case of 
abductions. There were also male captus cases where courts have suggested a male 
detentus test which does not require a protest from the injured State or serious 
mistreatment. Nevertheless, it appeared that these lower thresholds, even if they can 
be applauded, and even if these cases may be seen as evidence of a certain trend in 
State practice, did not have the same degree of support in the rest of the world as the 
two Toscanino possibilities. Hence, it was arguably difficult to maintain that in any 
case involving an abduction (even one without serious mistreatment or without a 
protest and request for the return of the suspect), State practice (let alone customary 
international law) indicated that a court will issue a male detentus decision. 
As regards the two other male captus techniques, luring and disguised 
extradition (and other less serious irregular methods not clearly falling within these 
three basic male captus situations, such as an informal transfer between two States 
without any procedural guarantees), quite a few of the more recent cases showed 
that such techniques, even if they can be considered less serious than abduction, can 








on the condition that the now prosecuting State’s own authorities were involved in 
the male captus. That also meant that courts would generally continue with the case 
if the prosecuting State’s own authorities were not involved in the male captus. 
Nevertheless, there were also quite a few recent cases in which such techniques had 
been used and where it was established that the prosecuting State’s own authorities 
had been involved in the male captus but where the court nevertheless did not refuse 
jurisdiction. Those cases showed that a luring operation or a disguised extradition as 
such are not seen as such a serious male captus as to lead to the ending of the case.  
An important observation from Chapter VII was that the element of ‘seriousness 
of the alleged crimes with which a suspect is charged’ sometimes seemed to play a 
role in the judge’s balancing exercise; perhaps a male captus had indeed occurred, 
but given the fact that the suspect’s alleged crimes were more serious and the 
continuation of the proceedings was hence of more importance, such a male captus 
did not lead to the ending of the case. 
In short, a lot depended on the exact circumstances, on questions such as: what 
kind of male captus was involved, was the male captus committed intentionally, 
who committed the male captus, did the male captus lead to a violation of another 
State’s sovereignty (including a protest and request for the return of the suspect), 
was the person seriously mistreated during the male captus and was the victim of the 
male captus charged with serious crimes? Finally, it was noted that judges 
sometimes also avoided the entire male captus discussion by simply arguing that no 
male captus occurred in the first place, even if there were indications that something 
irregular had happened. 
As regards the principles distilled from the cases between States and 
international(ised) criminal tribunals (Chapter VI), it was concluded that Chapter VI 
had arguably shown that tribunals nowadays reject the old-fashioned version of the 
male captus bene detentus maxim in that they do not support the idea that the 
tribunals have jurisdiction, regardless of the circumstances in which the suspect was 
brought before them. This was explained by the fact that these tribunals, after a 
perhaps somewhat dubious start, have often stressed the importance of human 
rights, due process and fair proceedings and have generally not limited these 
concepts to the proceedings in the courtroom. This (welcome) position could be 
explained by the fact that when the tribunals discussed in Chapter VI came into 
being – as from the 1990s – concepts such as human rights and fair proceedings 
were already firmly established in the mindset of judges. The much older idea that a 
trial had to continue, irrespective of what happened in the course of bringing a 
suspect to justice had simply become out of step with these ideas.  
However, also in this context of the international(ised) criminal tribunals, it was 
shown that this did not mean that this could be qualified as a male captus male 
detentus context. In fact, although in the inter-State context, several male captus 
cases still resulted in a male detentus outcome, there was only one case in the 
context of the international(ised) criminal tribunals where a male captus led to a 
male detentus outcome: the Barayagwiza case before the ICTR. However, even that 








the sentence) after the Government of Rwanda, which would not allow such a ‘big 
fish’ as Barayagwiza to escape justice, had suspended its cooperation with the 
Tribunal and after the Appeals Chamber had reviewed its decision. In that respect, it 
was maintained that the tribunals, even if they do not support the old-fashioned 
version of the maxim and even if they do not explicitly champion the male captus 
bene detentus maxim, were more easily affiliated with the latter maxim than with its 
counterpart male captus male detentus. How could this be explained? 
Chapter VII made clear that the tribunals argue, as do most national courts, that 
they have, in principle, jurisdiction (bene detentus), but that a serious male captus 
situation can lead, under the discretionary abuse of process doctrine, to a male 
detentus outcome. In doing so, the tribunals have adopted a broad version of the 
abuse of process doctrine in that, in determining whether a male captus is so serious 
that jurisdiction should be refused, it may not matter if the entity committing the 
male captus cannot be linked to the tribunal. This stance, Chapter VII explained, 
clearly goes further than the national abuse of process doctrine where the 
involvement of the authorities of the prosecuting forum appears to be required.  
However, even if the tribunals had adopted a broader version of the abuse of 
process doctrine than the one at the national level, and even if the tribunals appeared 
to accept – this was not clear due to the imprecise decision of the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in Nikolić, arguably the most important male captus decision from the 
context of the tribunals – that they would refuse jurisdiction in the case of a 
‘normal’ abduction performed by their own people – hence falling below the male 
detentus test at the inter-State level – they were still more readily affiliated with the 
male captus bene detentus rule because no male captus situation had, ultimately, led 
to a male detentus result. This, Chapter VII continued, might be explained by the 
following two factors. (Note that the following two factors assume the existence of a 
male captus. However, like courts at the inter-State level, tribunals may also be of 
the opinion that no male captus occurred in the first place, even if one can doubt 
whether that is accurate.)  
First, as the tribunals do not have their own police force, the male captus will 
often be performed by third parties. This, of course, diminishes the seriousness of 
the male captus.  
The second factor which may explain why the tribunals are still more readily 
affiliated with the male captus bene detentus rule is that the judges, even if they 
establish that a serious male captus has occurred, also look at the other side of the 
coin, namely the fact that the suspect is charged with serious crimes and that the 
international community demands that such a suspect should, if possible, be 
prosecuted. Hence, the judges basically have to determine, taking every aspect of 
their case into account, what is more serious: the male captus or that the suspect is 
prosecuted.  
In other words, although a serious male captus may lead to a male detentus 
outcome, even with respect to suspects of serious crimes (think of the above-
mentioned point that tribunals will probably refuse jurisdiction when their own 








only with respect to the male captus technique used, but also with respect to the 
actors responsible for the male captus.  
Hence, it was explained that an abduction orchestrated by the OTP may lead to 
the ending of the case, whereas an abduction performed by third parties may not 
(see also the decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Nikolić). However, this will 
probably be different when that abduction is accompanied by other serious 
violations/irregularities, such as serious mistreatment. (Note that even though 
tribunals have often focused on serious mistreatment here, the test ‘only’ requires 
such serious violations/irregularities that the judge cannot proceed with the case, not 
necessarily serious mistreatment/torture-like circumstances.) In such a case, the 
male captus may also lead to a male detentus outcome, even if the OTP is not 
responsible for the male captus.  
As regards less serious male captus situations such as luring, Chapter VII 
explained that a luring operation executed by the OTP was condoned by the ICTY 
Trial Chamber in Dokmanović, but that bene detentus outcome could have been 
different if that luring was accompanied by, for example, serious mistreatment. In 
addition, it was also noted that the general reasonings of, for example, the Nikolić 
and Barayagwiza cases, cases which were decided after the Dokmanović case, may 
entail that tribunal judges confronted by luring-like situations are of the opinion that 
the OTP has not come to court with clean hands, has resorted to illegal procedures, 
and thus that jurisdiction must be refused. 
This study has accepted the above-mentioned element of ‘seriousness of the 
alleged crimes’ in the context of the discretionary abuse of process doctrine, but has 
also warned that it must not become a carte blanche with respect to transferring 
suspects of serious crimes to the tribunals (and the same goes for the inter-State 
context); the view that one may take the seriousness of the crimes into account to a 
certain extent in deciding the consequences of a certain male captus cannot in any 
way be seen as a green light for using male captus techniques in the context of 
international crimes. Some male captus situations are so serious – for example, 
because the OTP intentionally committed serious (procedural) irregularities in the 
process of bringing a suspect to trial, such as an abduction – that jurisdiction should 
be refused if the tribunal wants to be taken seriously as a court of law, whether it is 
dealing with a suspect of serious crimes or not. One could also mention practical 
considerations here; proceeding with the case under such circumstances would 
arguably also be damaging for the entire mission of the tribunal. In addition, neither 
should one forget that the negative consequences of proceeding with a case 
involving an abduction might not be limited to the context of the tribunals. For 
national States/courts, these international institutions may be seen as examples to 
follow. If employees of a tribunal are involved in an abduction and in a way get 
away with it (because the judges do not decline jurisdiction), then national 
States/courts can refer to the tribunal’s approach to defend their own (potentially) 
dubious methods of bringing suspects to trial or to defend the ‘approval’ of such 
methods by proceeding with the case. That in turn would harm the integrity of these 








the horizontal context than for the context of the tribunals – the very foundation of 
the inter-State level itself, namely respect for another State’s sovereignty. 
Chapter VII clarified the fact that the element of ‘seriousness of the alleged 
crimes’ was also accepted in the more controversial context of the consequences of 
the determination that a person’s arrest or detention was deemed unlawful. Noting 
the problems of the remedy of release as already identified in Chapter III of this 
book and emphasising that a release, in the context of the tribunals, may even more 
easily lead to a suspect of international crimes evading justice because of relatively 
minor irregularities, it was stated that although the law should obviously be obeyed, 
one must also be careful not to apply the law in such a strict way that it leads to 
great injustice: summum ius, summa iniuria.  
In other words, Chapter VII maintained, the human rights of all suspects must be 
respected. The fact that one is dealing with suspects of international crimes cannot 
in any way be used as an excuse to violate human rights or to argue that no violation 
occurred in the first place where such a violation was clearly present. Furthermore, 
when violations occur, appropriate remedies must be granted. However, in granting 
these remedies, one must be careful that one does not potentially pave the way for 
absurd consequences which are counter to the concept of justice, for example, 
through a strict application of the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful 
arrest/detention. In such a case, it would arguably be better to keep a suspect of 
international crimes in custody and to grant appropriate and real remedies instead, 
taking into account the seriousness of the male captus.  
A final important issue from Chapter VII which should be mentioned in this 
summary is that it was suggested that all violations which occur in the context of a 
tribunal case must be remedied and not only if those violations can be attributed to 
the tribunal (although it is clear that the involvement of the tribunal may lead to 
more far-reaching remedies).  
This suggestion was uncontroversial in the context of the abuse of process 
doctrine; in the context of the question of whether the male captus is so serious that 
the judges, in good conscience, can no longer proceed with the case, the tribunals 
have confirmed that they will look at the violations, irrespective of the entity 
responsible for those violations.  
However, this was far less certain regarding less serious violations which do not 
come within the domain of the abuse of process doctrine. Nevertheless, it was 
argued that it would be quite odd for the tribunals to only look at the actions of third 
parties if those actions reach a certain seriousness. If the tribunal is willing, under 
the abuse of process, to take the ultimate responsibility for actions of third parties 
(namely by refusing jurisdiction), it should also be perfectly able to take 
responsibility for less serious violations. To ensure that the suspect does not become 
the victim of the fact that his proceedings have been fragmented over two or more 
systems, it is fair that the final adjudicator, the tribunal, in the context of whose case 
these violations occurred, takes responsibility for every violation. This in turn also 
implies, of course, that a judge must be able to examine how the 








making the arrest at the behest/request of the tribunal respected all the (national) 
arrest procedures. After all, if an arrest was clearly made in contravention of such 
procedures, it is difficult to maintain that a person’s right to liberty and security was 
not violated, even if all the rules of the tribunal (such as the issuance of a valid 
indictment and an arrest warrant) have been adhered to.  
It was explained that in this specific context, tribunal decisions have been issued 
which follow a rather non-inquiry/male captus bene detentus-like view and which 
support the idea that the legality of the national arrest/detention proceedings cannot 
be examined. However, there were also cases which could be interpreted as meaning 
that the tribunal would look into what happened at the national level and would in 
fact repair any violation which occurred in that context, even if the tribunal were, 
strictly speaking, not responsible for it.   
Nevertheless, if it were indeed true that the case law contained both 
interpretations, it was submitted that the judge should opt for the second 
interpretation, the one which does investigate any pre-trial irregularities and which 
does not demand the attribution of the violations to the tribunal/the tribunal’s strict 
legal responsibility for the violations. Deterrence, the integrity of the proceedings 
and simple fairness towards the suspect (in that a suspect does not end up in a legal 
vacuum) demand that the now prosecuting forum remedies all the violations which 
have been committed in the context of its case. This position could also ‘soften’ the 
(unpopular) male captus bene detentus image that the tribunals have; providing 
remedies for all violations which occurred in the context of their cases shows that 
the tribunals are not only concerned with prosecuting suspects of international 
crimes but also with ensuring fair proceedings for these suspects. In that context, 
one could also reassure those who object to this position that granting remedies may 
not have drastic consequences. One can assume that very often, a judge will only be 
confronted by minor violations. For those kinds of violations, small remedies will be 
appropriate, for example, a (minor) reduction of the sentence in the case of 
conviction. This ensures that both the sense of justice of the person in question (in 
that his violations are remedied) and of the victims/the international community as a 
whole (in that a suspect of international crimes, if found guilty, receives an 
appropriate (which very often means stern) penalty for his deeds) are met.  
After this important chapter, to which – accordingly – considerable attention has 
been paid in this summary, it was time to look at Part 4 of this book, which 
addressed the context of the ICC. In the first chapter of this part, Chapter VIII, the 
ICC’s more general cooperation regime, including the specific arrest and surrender 
provisions, were examined. In this context, the role of international forces in 
surrendering suspects to the ICC was addressed as well. A crucial subject, among 
other things because States which wish to cooperate with the ICC are often unable to 
do so because the war which may have triggered the attention of the ICC may also 
have ruined the legal systems of these States.  
In Chapter VIII, special attention was paid to Article 59, paragraph 2 of the ICC 
Statute, a habeas corpus-like provision which can be seen as one of the most 








international levels meet. It was observed that quite a few questions remain with 
respect to this provision, the main one being what the consequences are when the 
competent judicial authority in the custodial State determines that a person has not 
been arrested in accordance with the proper process and that the person’s rights have 
not been respected. It was concluded that the answer to this question may depend 
from State to State but that because of several reasons, including the important fact 
that uncooperative States could abuse this provision, one could agree with most 
authors that national authorities should be very reluctant to refuse the surrender of a 
suspect if it is determined at the national level that a person has not been arrested in 
accordance with the proper process or that the person’s rights have not been 
respected. Nevertheless, a State may very well be justified in arguing that a release 
may constitute the correct legal remedy in the case of violations. However, in that 
case, the national authorities were reminded of the previously identified problems of 
this remedy. In fact, in the ICC context, a release of a suspect could even more 
easily lead to an escape as the released suspect could flee to many non-State Parties 
which are, in principle, not obliged to cooperate with the ICC, a feature missing in 
the ICTY/ICTR context.  
Furthermore, it was also remembered that Article 59 of the ICC Statute – which 
generally accords much more importance to national law (interpreted in light of 
human rights law) and national authorities than the vertical regime of the 
ICTY/ICTR does – ‘only’ regulates the arrest proceedings for States and that the 
arrest procedures for, for example, peacekeeping forces – if these forces have a 
mandate to make arrests for the ICC – remain unclear. Nevertheless, several 
suggestions from legal scholars were addressed which could solve these problems, 
such as a direct surrender by peacekeeping forces of the suspect to the ICC, 
provided that certain safeguards are respected.  
An important point observed in Chapter VIII was that many aspects of the 
human rights habeas corpus provisions, thanks to Articles 55, 59 and 60 of the ICC 
Statute, were present in the arrest and surrender regime of the ICC, and that this 
constituted an improvement when compared to the legal context of the ICTY/ICTR, 
but that an unequivocal and explicit right for a suspect to challenge the lawfulness of 
his arrest and detention and to be released in the case of an unlawful arrest and 
detention was missing. This rather strange point would be returned to in Chapter IX.  
Finally, it was concluded that Chapter VIII had revealed that the ICC’s regime 
contains both vertical and horizontal elements and that the term “lateral”, introduced 
by Currie, may be a fitting (and in any case original) term for this regime. 
In the next chapter, Chapter IX, the internal evaluative framework of this study 
was created through an examination of Article 21 of the ICC Statute. Not only the 
content of the three different paragraphs of this article, but also the correlation 
between the three parts of the first paragraph were addressed with help of both 
doctrine and case law.  
As part (a) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute was silent on the male 
captus issue, use was made of the general rule of interpretation and the 








the Law of Treaties. As textual/contextual/teleological interpretation of a number of 
provisions from the proper instruments of the ICC which could be seen as being 
(indirectly) relevant for the male captus discussion did not clarify whether the ICC 
Statute could be seen as clearly in favour of either male captus bene detentus or 
male captus male detentus (Article 31, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties), recourse was made to the travaux préparatoires of the ICC Statute 
(Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Although a number 
of interesting remarks were found in these documents regarding the correlation 
between the ICC and the issue of irregular arrests, including one explicit comment 
by the Jamaican delegate Patrick Robinson that male captus bene detentus should 
have no application to the ICC’s jurisdiction, it was concluded that an examination 
of the travaux préparatoires had not elucidated the general opinion of the 120 
States which voted in favour of the ICC Statute with respect to the male captus 
issue. As a result, it was found that an examination of several provisions from the 
ICC Statute and the latter’s travaux préparatoires had brought no clarity with 
respect to the male captus issue, which meant that on this issue, there was a legal 
lacuna which had to be filled by looking at parts (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of 
Article 21 of the ICC Statute.  
However, before that was done, Chapter IX also looked at a related issue, namely 
what the ICC instruments said on the consequences of an unlawful arrest. It was 
already earlier established – also in this summary – that many aspects of the human 
rights habeas corpus provisions, thanks to Articles 55, 59 and 60 of the ICC Statute, 
were present in the arrest and surrender regime of the ICC, but that an unequivocal 
and explicit right for a suspect to challenge the lawfulness of his arrest and detention 
and to be released in the case of an unlawful arrest and detention was missing. It 
was questioned how the deletion of the remedy of release from the right to liberty 
and security, as can be found in Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute, had 
to be viewed. Had it to be seen as a deliberate choice of the drafters that this remedy 
is not applicable to suspects or was it simply forgotten or not deemed essential 
enough to mention in the ICC Statute?  
Again, recourse was made to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Also in the context of the remedy of release, textual/contextual/teleological 
interpretation of Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute (Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) brought no relief, hence necessitating an 
examination pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(the travaux préparatoires).  
After a detailed examination, it was concluded that it is hard to maintain that it is 
clear that the drafters of the ICC Statute intentionally deleted the remedy of release 
because they did not want this remedy to be available for a suspect unlawfully 
arrested or detained. Since the ICC legislation was arguably unclear on this point, 
and thus left a legal lacuna, there was justification for looking to part (b) of 
paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute.  
Part (b) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute thus had to be 








but also in the case of the issue related to the male captus discussion, namely the 
remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention. 
An examination of part (b) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute 
showed that the term “applicable treaties” did not shed light on the male captus 
issue, but that this term did cover the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful 
arrest/detention and that this remedy could by applied by the ICC judges “where 
appropriate”.  
As concerns the meaning of the term “the principles and rules of international 
law”, it was concluded that this term, in any case, included customary international 
law and that one could turn to the conclusion of Section 2 of Chapter VII of this 
book to determine what customary international law had to say on the male captus 
issue. This was something special, as the external evaluative framework of this 
study, which was (merely) created to see how similar or different the current ICC 
position on the male captus problem was in comparison with the position of other 
courts, had now entered, via the concept of customary international law, the less 
non-committal internal evaluative framework, a framework established to see how 
the actual ICC position had to be assessed in view of the Court’s own law.  
It was noted that Section 2 of Chapter VII of this book had clarified that one 
cannot generally state that either male captus bene detentus or male captus male 
detentus had reached customary international law status, because such general 
assertions did not do justice to the enormous variety of possible male captus 
situations and the different ways those varying situations were received by courts. In 
fact, Chapter VII had concluded that only one male captus situation could probably 
be seen as having customary international law status, namely the situation that 
judges will refuse jurisdiction in the case of an abduction performed by the 
authorities of the prosecuting forum followed by a protest and request for the return 
of the suspect by the injured State. However, it was also noted that because of the 
probable rationale of this rule and the different role of State sovereignty in the 
context of the ICC, one can question whether the judges would find it “appropriate” 
to transplant this rule into the specific system of the ICC. Notwithstanding this, it 
was also submitted that the ICC, even if it was indeed found that it would not be 
appropriate to transplant this rule into the context of the ICC, and thus that the Court 
would not have to follow it, should resolutely refuse jurisdiction if it were 
implicated in an abduction, whether or not that abduction was followed by a protest 
and request for the return of the suspect from the injured State. 
After that, it was considered, now that Section 2 of Chapter VII had entered the 
internal evaluative framework of this study, whether Section 3 of Chapter VII (the 
principles distilled from the international(ised) criminal tribunals’ male captus case 
law) might also enter this internal evaluative framework. Could these principles 
perhaps also fall under the notion of customary international law?  
Using the traditional definition of customary international law, which focuses on 
State practice (but acknowledging that one can ask whether the formation of 
customary international law can still be seen as the privilege of States), it was 








presenting overviews of State practice) cannot be used to find customary 
international law. This could, however, be different with respect to internationalised 
criminal tribunals, some of which could be seen as forming part of a State’s legal 
system.   
Finally, the related topic of the remedy of release was addressed. It was 
concluded that this remedy could be seen as having customary international law 
status. Hence, if this remedy were not already to fall under the notion “applicable 
treaties”, it would in any case be covered by the term “principles and rules of 
international law”.  
After this examination of customary international law, it was questioned whether 
the term “principles and rules of international law” could also cover more than just 
customary international law. It was concluded that it could and that the practice of 
the ICTY/ICTR (and this might perhaps also be valid for other international 
(judicial) institutions such as the HRC, the ECtHR and certain internationalised 
criminal tribunals) could be applied by the ICC judges if those judges, after a 
detailed analysis, are of the opinion that certain practices can be transplanted into 
the specific system of the ICC as a principle/rule of international law. In that case, 
the conclusions from Section 3 of Chapter VII might also enter the internal 
evaluative framework of this study. As regards these practices of international 
criminal tribunals, one could think of the acceptance of a broad concept of abuse of 
process (in that jurisdiction may be refused in very serious male captus cases, 
irrespective of the entity responsible) and the fact that the seriousness of the crimes 
with which the suspect is charged can be taken into account when applying the 
abuse of process doctrine. With respect to the related issue of the remedy of release, 
one could think of the fact that all these tribunals have stressed the importance of 
habeas corpus, even if the regulatory instruments of the tribunal in question did not 
explicitly contain such a provision.  
However, it was also noted that if the ICC judges are of the opinion that it would 
not be appropriate to transplant the established practices of the international criminal 
tribunals with respect to the male captus issue, as principles and rules of 
international law, into the specific system of the ICC, or if they are of the opinion 
that one should not look at the jurisprudence of these tribunals in the context of this 
provision at all, then part (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute had to 
be looked at.  
As a result, this last part of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute was also 
examined. It was concluded that in determining whether there exist general 
principles related to the male captus problem, one could again turn to the overviews 
of Chapter V and the principles distilled in Section 2 of Chapter VII. Hence, here 
also, the results from the external evaluative framework could be used for the 
internal evaluative framework.   
With respect to the male captus bene/male detentus maxim itself, it was found 
that the overviews of Chapter V clearly showed that one cannot make the general 
assertion that one of these maxims can be seen as a general principle of law 








male captus case law which were shared by most systems of law, elements which 
may perhaps – taking into account the overviews of this study being extensive but 
not exhaustive – be seen as general principles of law falling under the terminology 
used in Article 21, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute. For example, one could think 
of the fact that most courts confronted by a male captus will use their discretion, for 
instance (in the common law system) under the abuse of process doctrine, to balance 
all the different elements of the case to decide whether or not the male captus is so 
serious that jurisdiction must be refused. In addition, most courts seemed to refuse 
jurisdiction only if their own authorities are involved in the male captus. Finally, it 
appeared that quite a number of courts – although it was unclear whether “quite a 
number” was enough to lead to a general principle of law pursuant to Article 21, 
paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute – would also take into account the seriousness of 
the crimes with which the victim of the male captus is charged in deciding whether 
or not jurisdiction must be refused.  
With respect to the related issue of the remedy of release, it was concluded that 
not only the general right to liberty and security/the right not to be arrested or 
detained arbitrarily, but also its more specific habeas corpus provision (including 
the release in the case of an unlawful (arrest or) detention) could be seen as a 
general principle of law. 
Finally, it was noted that also with respect to part (c) (cf. the words “where 
appropriate” in the context of part (b)), the ICC judges will probably only use these 
solutions from the national level if they believe that they can transpose these 
solutions in the specific context of the ICC. That could mean that the ICC judges 
may follow the principles which can be related to the proper male captus issue 
mentioned above but may be more reluctant with respect to the problematic remedy 
of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention.   
After a short rejection of paragraph 2 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute for the 
purpose of this study’s internal evaluative framework, attention was paid to the final 
paragraph of this crucial article. 
In the examination of paragraph 3 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute, it was argued 
that whenever the ICC exercises its jurisdiction, whenever it is involved in a case, 
that involvement, that exercise of jurisdiction, had to be applied and interpreted in 
conformity with those internationally recognised human rights which are relevant to 
the ICC’s functioning. That exercise of jurisdiction/involvement, of course, included 
the proceedings in the courtroom, when the ICC is actually trying the case, but it 
would also include the exercise of jurisdiction/involvement in the pre-trial phase and 
hence also, for example, the actions of third parties when these parties make 
arrests/detentions/surrenders at the request of the ICC. Furthermore, it was remarked 
that this is the path the ICC should follow in any case: ensuring that whenever the 
ICC is involved in a case (including the actions of third parties working at the behest 
of the ICC), that involvement is consistent with internationally recognised human 
rights. However, it was argued that it would even be fairer for the ICC to take its 
responsibility for violations in the context of its case more generally. Although 








arrest/detention ‘stock’, the ICC may always be confronted by male captus claims 
which go beyond such situations (cf. abduction by private individuals). It would be 
highly just if the ICC, as the ultimate prosecuting forum, would also repair those 
violations, even if it were not involved in the male captus.  
As regards the internationally recognised human rights which are relevant to the 
ICC’s functioning in the context of the pre-trial phase, one could think, for example, 
of a broad concept of the right to a fair trial and the right to liberty and security, 
including the remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention.  
During the examination of paragraph 3, the earlier correlation between the 
different parts of paragraph 1 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute was re-assessed. This 
had consequences for the issue of the remedy of release. It was explained that in 
interpreting part (a) of paragraph 1 (the right to liberty and security without the 
remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention), the ICC judges had to 
take into account paragraph 3. Since this latter paragraph includes the remedy of 
release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention, the judges no longer had 
discretion to consider whether it would be “appropriate” to transplant (see part (b) of 
paragraph 1) or whether they can transpose (see part (c) of paragraph 1) the remedy 
of release into the context of the ICC. In other words, the remedy of release, in 
principle, would have to be applied. It was further explained that this outcome was 
perhaps not so problematic because this study had argued that it was not clearly 
established that the drafters of the ICC Statute intentionally wanted to delete this 
remedy. However, matters would turn out to be more complicated if one were of the 
opinion, on the basis of the information presented in Chapter IX, that it was in fact 
clearly the intention of the drafters to delete this remedy. In that case, it had to be 
ascertained which solution would take precedence here: the intention of the drafters 
(no remedy of release) or the remedy of release pursuant to paragraph 3. In this 
context, two different doctrinal choices were presented, that of Pellet (whose 
approach would lead to the remedy of release) and that of Hafner and Binder (whose 
approach would not lead to the remedy of release). This study was more in favour of 
Pellet’s view.  
Nevertheless, it was also acknowledged that the fact that the ICC judges, if they 
were to follow the view of Pellet, must apply the remedy of release, even if it was 
clearly the intention of the drafters not to grant this remedy, does not make the 
problems which can be related to this remedy suddenly disappear. Because of this, 
judges, it was submitted, could opt for the solution presented in this research; they 
could, while realising that this remedy, in principle, has to be respected and thus that 
remedies must be granted in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention, keep the 
suspect in custody and grant proper remedies, depending on the exact circumstances 
of the case. They could thereby also rely on the right to an effective remedy, another 
right which can certainly be seen as an internationally recognised human right 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 21 of the ICC Statute.  
In the last chapter of Part 4, Chapter X, this study tried to find the current ICC 
position on the male captus issue through an examination of the three ICC cases in 








Dyilo, Bemba Gombo and Katanga. Since the final chapter of this book, Chapter XI, 
summarised the conclusions of Chapter X, it is appropriate to immediately go to the 
summary of Chapter XI now. 
In the final part of this book, Part 5, consisting of one chapter only (Chapter XI), 
this study was concluded. Because this last chapter is so important as regards the 
findings of this study, this summary will pay most attention to this chapter. That one 
cannot briefly summarise this chapter was also a result of the first problem 
encountered in Chapter XI: after repeating the central question of this study as 
presented in Chapter I, it was remarked that it is difficult to give a plain answer to 
this question as it did not seem to be very clear what the ICC’s current position on 
the male captus issue – a crucial part of the central question – is. This was for a 
number of reasons.  
First of all, the Appeals Chamber’s decision in Lubanga Dyilo, arguably the 
most authoritative decision on this matter, contained different formulations of what 
the male detentus threshold of the ICC could be. However, it was also noted that the 
broad first formulation (confirmed by the third formulation) – and not the restricted 
second formulation, which stipulated that “[w]here the breaches of the rights of the 
accused are such as to make it impossible for him/her to make his/her defence 
within the framework of his[/her] rights, no fair trial can take place and the 
proceedings can be stayed” – probably constituted the correct test: 
 
Where fair trial becomes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of 
the suspect or the accused by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to 
put the person on trial. Justice could not be done. A fair trial is the only means to do 
justice. If no fair trial can be held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated and 
the process must be stopped [original footnotes omitted, ChP].   
 
Nevertheless, another problem with respect to the ICC’s male captus position was 
identified. In the Duch case before the ECCC, it was held that the ICC Appeals 
Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo would also refuse jurisdiction, under the abuse of 
process doctrine, in the case of grave violations of the suspect’s rights (thereby 
focusing on the more ‘physical’ words serious mistreatment/torture) as such, hence 
irrespective of the entity responsible. Reference was hereby made to the following 
words of the Appeals Chamber: “[T]he findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber respecting 
the absence of torture or serious mistreatment have not been shown to be erroneous 
in any way.” However, it was explained that whether the ICC Appeals Chamber, 
besides its above-mentioned male detentus test – which requires the involvement of 
the ICC (or third parties working at the behest/request of the ICC), see the words 
“by his/her accusers” – would also refuse jurisdiction in the case of grave 
violations/serious mistreatment/torture as such, irrespective of the entity responsible 
(and thus also in the case of private individuals), was not at all clear. First, it was 
pointed out that the remarks made by the Pre-Trial Chamber on serious 
mistreatment/torture were made in the context of the abuse of process doctrine, a 
doctrine which the Appeals Chamber has explicitly rejected. Secondly, there was 








process doctrine as it stated that its application, to date, “ha[d] been confined to 
instances of torture or serious mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial 
State in some way related to the process of arrest and transfer of the person to the 
relevant international criminal tribunal [emphasis added and original footnotes 
omitted, ChP]”. The italicised words are incorrect, but it was uncertain whether the 
Pre-Trial Chamber would nevertheless follow its words (requiring that the male 
captus be committed by national authorities) or whether it was of the opinion that 
these words were indeed erroneous, entailing it to also refuse jurisdiction in the case 
of serious mistreatment/torture, irrespective of the entity responsible, hence also 
including, for example, the actions of private individuals.  
Another unclear issue was related to the fact that the Appeals Chamber 
seemingly agreed with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s view that it would look at 
irregularities when these were committed in the context of concerted action between 
the ICC and third parties, even before the sending of the ICC request for arrest and 
surrender (hence before the constructive custody). This term, “concerted action”, is 
very general and could encompass any involvement of the ICC in irregularities. 
However, even though the Appeals Chamber thus accepted the concerted action 
term, a term which could encompass a national arrest/detention if that 
arrest/detention were somehow related to the ICC proceedings, the Appeals 
Chamber also presented an additional requirement, namely that only violations of 
the suspect’s rights which are related to the “process of bringing the appellant to 
justice for the crimes that form the subject-matter of the proceedings before the 
Court (…) may provide ground for halting the process”. However, it was argued that 
that is a stricter condition.  
A final unclear issue was that the ICC Appeals Chamber did not view a motion 
of a suspect who had allegedly been the victim of a male captus, and who argued 
that the ICC should refuse jurisdiction because of that male captus, as a challenge to 
its jurisdiction under Article 19 of the ICC Statute. It considered such a challenge to 
be a sui generis/atypical motion, seeking a stay of the proceedings. This view, with 
which the Appeals Chamber corrected the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in this case, 
was, however, seemingly rejected by the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
Katanga, decided after the Appeals Chamber’s decision in Lubanga Dyilo. 
Although the Trial Chamber in Katanga referred to the Appeals Chamber’s view in 
Lubanga Dyilo, it did not comment further on it. 
Although this study thus found several obscurities with respect to the ICC’s 
position on the male captus issue, it could also present a few less ambiguous 
features which could be identified in the ICC’s handling of an alleged male captus 
case.   
First, the ICC did not accept the doctrine which is so often contrasted with the 
male captus bene detentus rule, the abuse of process doctrine, because it was not 
covered by Article 21 of the ICC Statute. However, what was covered by this 
provision, namely by its paragraph 3, was the human rights dimension of the abuse 
of process doctrine. It was that human rights dimension which the ICC used to solve 








to human rights – and the human rights to a fair trial and to liberty and security 
(including the right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention, a right which is 
not explicitly mentioned in the ICC’s proper instruments) in particular.  
The ICC furthermore appeared to concentrate on the violations themselves and 
not so much on the question of whether the ICC (or third parties working at the 
behest of the ICC) intentionally violated certain norms. However, what seemed to be 
required, see the Bemba Gombo case, was that violations had to result into actual 
prejudice to the suspect. 
Another important aspect of the male captus issue was the role of the competent 
judicial authority of the custodial State in the whole procedure. Chapter XI showed 
that, in contrast to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga Dyilo 
did not explain to what extent that authority, under Article 59 of the ICC Statute, 
could look into irregularities prior to the official arrest/detention. In addition, and 
this time just like the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber did not clarify the 
role of the ICC judges, who marginally supervise the points of Article 59, paragraph 
2 (b) and (c) of the ICC Statute, in this context of the prior arrest/detention. Finally, 
again following the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber did not elucidate to 
what extent provisions such as Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute and 
Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute had to be considered here. The focus 
appeared to be on national law only. 
A final point was that the Appeals Chamber seemed only interested in the 
ultimate remedy, the refusal of jurisdiction/a halt to the procedures.  
Now that the ICC’s current position on the male captus issue had been presented 
– taking into account the fact that some of its aspects were not very clear – that 
position was assessed in the context of this book’s external evaluative framework, 
vis-à-vis the position of other courts. 
First of all, it was explained that it appeared that the ICC, like almost every 
modern court or tribunal, did not accept the old-fashioned version of male captus 
bene detentus that jurisdiction will be exercised, regardless of the way that person 
came into the power of the Court. Human rights were considered to be of paramount 
importance and extended to the entire proceedings, including the pre-trial phase. 
This included the (for this study) so important human right to liberty and security, 
including its sub-right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention, even if that 
sub-right was not explicitly mentioned in the proper instruments of the ICC. This 
position, it was asserted, resembled the position of other tribunals. As a result of 
this, the ICC judges will examine the pre-trial phase to see what kind of effect 
violations of these rights may have on the jurisdiction of the Court. It was noted that 
the Trial Chamber in Katanga did not do so on procedural grounds – and could be 
criticised for that – but that it was uncertain, and in fact improbable, for this decision 
to be viewed as support for the old-fashioned version of male captus bene detentus 
mentioned above.  
Chapter XI continued by explaining that if one were of the opinion that the ICC 
Appeals Chamber’s one and only male detentus test could be found in the first 








summary), then the ICC shared the view of, for example, the ICTY Trial Chamber 
in Nikolić and the Ebrahim case in that the Prosecution (including third parties 
working at its behest) must come to court with clean hands. If that were not the case, 
for example, if the fundamental rights of the suspect had been violated in the 
process of bringing that suspect before the ICC, judges could conclude that one can 
no longer speak of a fair trial in the broad sense of the word, a conclusion which 
must lead to the ending of the case. It was noted that because the words “breaches of 
the fundamental rights of the suspect” were very generally formulated, these could 
include all kinds of male captus situations, such as abductions, luring situations and 
other techniques which could (possibly) be seen as violations of someone’s right to 
liberty and security.  
Before Chapter XI continued on this topic, it was pointed out that the ICC 
seemed to concentrate on the violations themselves and not so much on the question 
of whether the ICC (or third parties working at the behest of the ICC) intentionally 
violated certain norms. This could be considered a rather liberal stance as other 
courts had often demanded, in their male detentus tests, an intention on the part of 
the prosecuting authorities to commit the male captus. However, what appeared to 
be required, see the Bemba Gombo case, was that violations had to result into actual 
prejudice to the suspect. Nevertheless, other tribunal cases could be seen as 
supporting the view that the level of prejudice was only relevant for determining 
how serious the violations were (and, consequently, what kind of remedy had to be 
provided) and not for determining whether there were violations in the first 
place/whether the suspect would be entitled to a remedy.  
Chapter XI then returned to the proposition that the ICC’s words “breaches of 
the fundamental rights of the suspect” were so generally formulated that these could 
include all kinds of male captus situations, including abductions and luring 
situations.  
It was explained that if the ICC were to refuse jurisdiction if the suspect’s 
accusers were responsible for an abduction as such, it would side with the decisions 
in Levinge, Bennett, Ebrahim and Beahan. These were reasonings which fell short 
of the test about which more recent State practice seemingly agreed that it must, in 
any event, lead to rejection of the male captus bene detentus rule (see the Toscanino 
exceptions mentioned supra). With respect to the context of the tribunals, it was 
clarified that if the ICC were to refuse jurisdiction because the suspect’s accusers 
were responsible for an abduction as such, the ICC would probably also side with 
the tribunal cases. Although none of these cases involved abductions perpetrated by 
the tribunal itself, one could refer here to general statements from, for example, 
Nikolić and Barayagwiza.  
Turning to the concept of luring, this study explained that the ICC’s phrase 
“breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect” was so generally formulated that 
it could also cover a situation of luring, as long as the judges were of the opinion 
that that would constitute a violation of a suspect’s fundamental rights (namely his 
right to liberty and security). In that case, the ICC would follow the more 








to) contain very general male detentus reasonings and which could cover luring 
operations (even though these cases themselves did not concern such operations), 
but would distance itself from the inter-State luring cases such as Yunis and Stocké 
where the judges would probably only refuse jurisdiction if the luring were 
accompanied by serious mistreatment. The tribunal context, Chapter XI continued, 
was, however, less straightforward. Although it was clear that if the ICC were to 
refuse jurisdiction in a case of luring as such, it would take a more liberal stance 
than the ICTY judges in Dokmanović had done, more general words from the 
tribunals had been issued after Dokmanović, which could also cover a luring 
operation.  
Returning to ‘the’ position of the ICC: Chapter XI then remarked that if one 
were, however, of the opinion that the Appeals Chamber’s requirement that one can 
no longer speak of a fair trial had to be seen in the strict sense of the word, namely a 
fair trial in the courtroom (see the second formulation of the ICC test mentioned 
supra, that which demands that the violations must be such that the accused can no 
longer make his defence, also about which this study concluded that it was uncertain 
that this is the ICC’s male detentus position), the ICC’s position was arguably 
different from most of the more recent national and international courts. Most of 
these courts – although there were some exceptions – seemingly also refused 
jurisdiction, not only if one can no longer speak of a fair trial in the strict sense of 
the word, but also in the broad sense of the word, namely if it were unfair in 
general/if it were to undermine the integrity of the court to have a trial in the first 
place (hereby often using the abuse of process doctrine).  
Another point that needed to be assessed concerned the lack of clarity as to 
whether the Appeals Chamber’s male detentus test demanded involvement of the 
ICC, or whether the ICC would also refuse jurisdiction in the case of, for example, 
serious mistreatment/torture, irrespective of the entity responsible, for instance, if 
that mistreatment/torture were committed by private individuals. 
It was explained that if one assumed that the ICC only followed the male 
detentus test demanding ICC involvement, the ICC would follow most of the 
national cases which require the involvement of one’s own people. However, in that 
case, it would also clearly deviate from the tribunal cases which recognise that, 
under the abuse of process doctrine, a doctrine which the ICC Appeals Chamber 
rejected, very serious male captus cases can lead to the ending of the case, 
irrespective of the entity responsible. 
If the ICC (Appeals Chamber) were nevertheless to refuse jurisdiction in very 
serious male captus cases, irrespective of the entity responsible – this is how the co-
investigating judges in Duch read the Appeals Chamber’s decision – and if it were 
to follow the Pre-Trial Chamber’s statement in that case (assuming that the 
reference to “torture or serious mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial 
State [emphasis added, ChP]” was erroneous), the ICC (Appeals Chamber) would 
also recognise that this male detentus avenue is not restricted to torture or serious 
mistreatment, see the Pre-Trial Chamber’s words that the application of the abuse of 








mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial State in some way related to the 
process of arrest and transfer of the person to the relevant international criminal 
tribunal [emphasis added and original footnotes omitted, ChP]”. This meant, 
Chapter XI clarified, that the ICC might also refuse jurisdiction in serious male 
captus cases other than serious mistreatment/torture. It was noted that this stance 
appeared to be similar to the position of the tribunals. Although several cases, 
perhaps inspired by the Trial Chamber’s words in Dokmanović, a case issued prior 
to (the abuse of process test from) the Barayagwiza case, had focused on the more 
‘physically’ coloured words “serious mistreatment” and “torture”, the more recent 
Karadžić case had clarified that serious mistreatment/torture are only to be seen as 
examples of such serious cases that a court may refuse jurisdiction.   
Another point that Chapter XI had to discuss was the scope of review. As 
explained supra, there was lack of clarity as to whether the Appeals Chamber, prior 
to the constructive custody of the ICC, would examine irregularities during a 
national detention which result from concerted action between the ICC and third 
parties more generally or whether it would only consider irregularities if the suspect 
were in detention for the same crimes as he is now being prosecuted at the ICC.  
First, the context of constructive custody itself was addressed. It appeared that 
the ICC accepted that it would review and in fact take responsibility for any 
violations which occur in this context, in the context of an arrest/detention executed 
at the behest of the ICC. It was noted that several tribunal cases could be interpreted 
as support for that view, although there were also cases in which the judges refused 
to review the legality of the national arrest/detention proceedings. 
With respect to examining irregularities beyond the constructive custody it was 
explained that if the ICC were more generally to review irregularities which resulted 
from concerted action between the ICC and third parties, it would follow several 
(inter)national courts in which it was recognised that responsibility must be taken 
for action in which the prosecuting forum’s own authorities participated, in which 
those authorities were involved. However, Chapter XI continued, there were also 
judges who looked more broadly at the issue of responsibility and did not confine 
themselves to concerted action. Finally, it was noted that if the ICC(’s Appeals 
Chamber) were not to look at concerted action more generally but only at 
irregularities, prior to the constructive custody of the ICC, if the suspect were in 
detention for the same crimes as those for which he is now being prosecuted at the 
ICC, that stance would constitute a deviation from other (inter)national courts which 
simply appear to be interested in the seriousness of the pre-trial irregularities in 
general, whether or not a suspect was in detention for the same crimes as those for 
which the court is now prosecuting him. 
After this, a few remaining points from the external assessment were briefly 
addressed.  
First, it was noted that the competent judicial authority in the custodial State, 
because of Article 59 of the ICC Statute, had become a much more serious and 
powerful link in the surrender proceedings than the national authorities in the 








Secondly, it was explained that the (possible) idea of the ICC that a male captus 
motion cannot be seen as a challenge to the ICC’s jurisdiction (ratione personae) 
does not seem to be shared by other (inter)national courts, even if, strictly speaking, 
the motion challenges the exercise of personal jurisdiction and not the personal 
jurisdiction itself. 
Thirdly, with respect to the ICC’s sole focus on the ultimate remedy (male 
detentus): it was noted that the cases examined at the inter-State level did not clearly 
identify the reasoning that the suspect, if his claim for a male detentus was rejected, 
might be entitled to other remedies from the prosecuting forum such as a reduction 
of the sentence or financial compensation, although it was, of course, possible for 
the male captus victim to sue the kidnappers in a civil case. As regards the context 
of the tribunals, it was explained that the focus on the ultimate remedy alone, refusal 
of jurisdiction, could certainly be found here. Nevertheless, Chapter XI continued, 
there were also cases where the judges, after having rejected the male detentus 
claim, have examined whether the suspect would be entitled to other, less far-
reaching, remedies instead. 
Fourthly, it was remarked that the ICC had not yet explicitly mentioned the 
element ‘seriousness of the crimes’ when considering male captus claims, an 
element which could be found in the context of both inter-State and tribunal cases. 
However, this was not that strange as the ICC had rejected the abuse of process 
doctrine, a doctrine in which this element played a major role. Nevertheless, it was 
explained that if the ICC were to follow the Pre-Trial Chamber and consider 
refusing jurisdiction in the case of serious violations, irrespective of the entity 
responsible (assuming for now that that is the position of the Pre-Trial Chamber), 
one could expect that the ICC would not refuse jurisdiction too readily and in doing 
so, would refer to both the absence of responsibility on the part of the suspect’s 
accusers and the importance of prosecution (read: the seriousness of the suspect’s 
alleged crimes).   
A last point was that the ICC did not explicitly support the male captus 
bene/male detentus maxim. This was similar to other courts and tribunals. Although 
the Appeals Chamber did contrast the male captus bene detentus rule with the abuse 
of process doctrine and although that latter doctrine was rejected by the Appeals 
Chamber, which could be interpreted as meaning that the Appeals Chamber 
followed the male captus bene detentus rule, this was certainly not the case, as the 
Appeals Chamber clearly supported a large part, namely the human rights 
dimension, of the abuse of process doctrine.  
Then, Chapter XI assessed the ICC position on the male captus issue in the 
context of this study’s internal framework, vis-à-vis the law of the ICC itself.     
After having repeated the point also mentioned in this summary that this study 
has shown that the two evaluative frameworks could merge, that a number of 
unclear concepts from Article 21 of the ICC Statute – the central article of the 
internal evaluative framework – could encompass the results of the external 








ICC position on the male captus issue could be (as explained: this was not entirely 
clear) were in conformity with Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute.  
For example, it was explained that one can question whether the test which 
requires that certain violations must be such that a person can no longer make his 
defence before one can speak of the impossibility of a fair trial – which could be the 
ICC’s male detentus test, although this was doubted by this study – was in fact in 
accordance with Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute. It was noted that this 
provision definitely contained the human right to a fair trial and arguably a human 
right to a fair trial which was not limited to the fair trial in court but which extended 
to the entire proceedings. However, it was also remarked that if the ICC were to 
adhere to its words which focused on a broad concept of fair trial (and this was 
probably more likely), there would be no violation of the ICC’s law. In this context, 
it was also explained that the ICC’s view that a broad concept of a fair trial had to be 
cherished, even for persons charged with very serious crimes, was definitely in 
conformity with internationally recognised human rights. 
It was then noted that Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute also contained 
the human right to liberty and security, including a person’s right to challenge the 
lawfulness of his detention, even if that right was not explicitly mentioned by the 
ICC Statute, and that the refusal of the judges in the Katanga case to look into the 
motion of the suspect challenging the lawfulness of his pre-trial arrest and detention, 
for the only reason that the motion was filed too late, might perhaps be interpreted 
as a violation of this right and thus of the ICC law. In this context, it was explained 
that this right was so crucial that the ICC, according to Article 21, paragraph 3 of the 
ICC Statute, must always accept and review such a challenge, especially if the 
motion argues that the unlawfulness of the arrest/detention was so serious that it had 
to lead to the ending of the case. This was the case, whether the challenge, strictly 
speaking, could be seen as a challenge to the ICC’s jurisdiction or not.  
Chapter XI then went on to explain that the fact that the ICC concentrated on the 
violations themselves (and not so much on the question of whether rights were 
violated intentionally) could be seen as being in accordance with the right to an 
effective remedy in the case of violations, a right of which Section 3 of Chapter IX 
had concluded that it could also be qualified as an internationally recognised human 
right. However, it was also remarked that the additional requirement as could be 
found in the Bemba Gombo case – that the violation must have caused actual 
prejudice to the suspect before remedies can be granted – would not be in 
accordance with this right.     
Chapter XI then turned to the point that the ICC had acknowledged that 
whenever it exercised jurisdiction, whenever the ICC was involved in a case, that 
involvement had to be in accordance with internationally recognised human rights. 
This appeared to be a correct interpretation of Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC 
Statute. It was then explained that if the ICC(’s Appeals Chamber) were to agree 
with the Pre-Trial Chamber that it would look, beyond the constructive custody of 
the suspect, to irregularities which result from concerted action between the ICC and 








paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute. However, it was also noted that if the Appeals 
Chamber followed its additional requirement that it would only look at irregularities 
suffered by the suspect if that suspect was in detention for the same crimes as those 
for which he is now being prosecuted at the ICC, this could be seen as a violation of 
Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute because that provision applied to any 
situation in which the ICC is involved. 
One of the most interesting points of the internal assessment was that the ICC’s 
male detentus test assumed the involvement of the ICC (or third parties working at 
its behest). It appeared that the ICC would not refuse jurisdiction, for example, if 
private individuals were responsible for a very serious male captus. This would be 
unproblematic if the ICC had accepted the abuse of process doctrine, which is very 
general and which merely demands that judges must refuse jurisdiction if they feel 
that the male captus is so serious that it would undermine the integrity of the 
court/their sense of justice/the idea of a fair trial in general to continue the case. 
However, the ICC had rejected this doctrine. How was this rejection of the abuse of 
process doctrine to be assessed vis-à-vis the ICC’s law? 
It was noted that the ICC judges were right when they argued that this doctrine 
could not be found in the ICC’s proper instruments pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 
1 (a) of the ICC Statute. However, after having clarified that a certain provision of 
the ICC Statute – Article 4, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute – “cannot be construed 
as providing power to stay proceedings for abuse of process”, they concluded that 
Article 21, paragraph 1 (a) of the ICC Statute was exhaustive on the matter and 
hence that one did not have to look to Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) and (c) of the ICC 
Statute. 
Serious doubts were raised, however, as to whether this conclusion was in 
accordance with the ICC’s law. It was noted that it seemed far too easy to conclude 
that the ICC Statute was exhaustive on the matter simply because the abuse of 
process doctrine was not explicitly mentioned or implicitly covered (via – the 
seemingly irrelevant – Article 4, paragraph 1 of the ICC Statute) by the ICC 
instruments. It was explained that the judges, who arguably focused too much on the 
common law label ‘abuse of process’ here, had not seriously reviewed other relevant 
provisions which might shed light on the question of whether the ICC had power to 
issue a male detentus verdict in the case of a serious male captus, taking into 
account the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(as was done in Chapter IX of this book). Chapter XI maintained that the much more 
extensive review in Chapter IX had arguably shown that Article 21, paragraph 1 (a) 
of the ICC Statute, taking into account Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute, 
was not exhaustive on the matter and thus that one could turn to Article 21, 
paragraph 1 (b) and (c) of the ICC Statute to fill this legal lacuna. And, as argued in 
that chapter, the power of a court to refuse jurisdiction in the case of a serious male 
captus might be seen as a principle/rule of international law pursuant to Article 21, 
paragraph 1 (b) of the ICC Statute (namely as practice of international courts) or as 
a general principle of law pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute. 








in very serious male captus cases, without looking at the exact label of this power 
(such as abuse of process/supervisory powers) now, was used by so many 
(inter)national courts, it could be seen as an inherent power of any court, including 
of the ICC (even if it could not be construed via Article 4, paragraph 1 of the ICC 
Statute).  
Another important aspect from the internal assessment concerned the ICC’s 
views on Article 59 of the ICC Statute. Although the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga 
Dyilo did not go into this matter, the Pre-Trial Chamber in that case clarified the fact 
that the competent judicial authority in the custodial State was not obliged to look 
into the pre-trial phase if that phase concerned national proceedings only. However, 
Chapter XI continued, that appeared to mean that the competent judicial authority 
was, nevertheless, allowed to do so and in fact, was obliged to do so if those 
national proceedings were somehow related to the ICC, for example, because the 
ICC was involved in them. It was noted that that would constitute a role in 
accordance with Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute, which demanded 
compliance with internationally recognised human rights as from the moment the 
ICC was involved in a case, which may, of course, be the case before the official 
requests were sent to the national authorities. However, regarding the role of the 
ICC judges, as the supervisors marginally reviewing this provision, Chapter XI 
remarked that both the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber did not discuss 
to what extent these judges could look into the phase before the official ICC 
requests were sent. In addition, both Chambers, and the same goes for the judges in 
Bemba Gombo, did not clearly review the execution of the ICC’s official arrest in 
terms of provisions such as Articles 21, paragraph 3 and 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the 
ICC Statute. (They merely stressed the importance of such rights in their decisions 
more generally.) They seemed interested in national law alone. It was argued that 
this restrictive interpretation was in violation of the ICC’s own law, since both 
provisions certainly apply to the Article 59 of the ICC Statute proceedings. (Article 
21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute applies already as from the moment the ICC 
becomes involved in the case and Article 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute 
applies already as from the moment the ICC initiates an investigation.)  
The final point which had to be addressed was that the Appeals Chamber was 
only interested in the ultimate remedy, the refusal of jurisdiction/a halt of the 
procedures. However, it was explained that Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC 
Statute contained the internationally recognised human right to an effective remedy 
in the case of a violation. This meant that every violation as from the moment the 
ICC becomes involved in the case had to be repaired, whether this leads to the 
ending of the case or not. Although it was possible that no violations occurred in 
Lubanga Dyilo as from the moment the ICC became involved in it (and hence that 
no violation of the ICC’s law occurred in this case), the ICC was reminded not to 
forget in general that suspects would, however, be entitled, pursuant to Article 21, 
paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute, to appropriate remedies in the case of violations as 








Now that the central question of this study was answered, Chapter XI turned to 
the most important recommendations.  
First of all, it was argued that the ICC should at least follow its own law. This 
meant that the ICC should reject all the above-mentioned reasonings which could be 
seen as being in violation of Article 21 of the ICC Statute, and in particular its 
paragraph 3.  
Hence, it was argued that the ICC ought to abandon the old-fashioned and 
restrictive concept of a fair trial that certain violations must be such that a person 
can no longer make his defence before one can speak of the impossibility of a fair 
trial (if that concept was indeed supported by the ICC in the male captus 
discussion).  
Furthermore, it was noted that it is to be welcomed that in theory, the ICC so 
often stressed the importance of human rights, even for suspects of the most serious 
crimes and even regarding rights which are not explicitly mentioned in the ICC 
Statute (such as the right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention), but that 
also meant that suspects had to be able to exercise those rights in practice. However, 
it could be argued, Chapter XI continued, that the Katanga case, for example, did 
not crystallise that thought. It was submitted that judges should always want to find 
out what happened to their suspects, what the foundation of their case was. 
Consequently, they were not to focus too much on the exact title of the male captus 
motion or dismiss too readily the entire motion for being submitted too late. Judges 
could also censure the Defence for its tardiness and still proprio motu review the 
allegations. Although it was recognised that the ICC’s system is in many respects 
unique and should be preserved as much as possible, it was also claimed that the 
judges could not hide behind this uniqueness to disregard what is arguably their 
main task, namely to try suspects of international crimes in a fair way. With that 
came a serious examination of the way in which those suspects were brought into 
the jurisdiction of the ICC, of the foundation of their case. 
It was noted that the feeling one got from the Katanga case, that the judges did 
not seem to be really interested in a full examination of the legality of the pre-trial 
phase, could also be found in the Lubanga Dyilo and Bemba Gombo cases, where 
the judges did not seriously examine the relevance of provisions such as Articles 21, 
paragraph 3 and 55, paragraph 1 (d) of the ICC Statute in the context of Article 59 
of the ICC Statute. In addition, one could also refer to the focus on the ultimate 
remedy in Lubanga Dyilo here. It was argued that the ICC must be very careful not 
to, in the words of Sluiter, “retreat within the safe limits of The Hague”.  
The ICC had stated that whenever it exercised jurisdiction, whenever it was 
involved in a case, that exercise of jurisdiction, that involvement (which included 
the actions of third parties working at the behest of the ICC) had to be in accordance 
with Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute. This was a correct statement of the 
law, meaning, in turn, that the ICC Appeals Chamber’s additional requirement that 
it would only look into irregularities if the suspect was in detention at the national 
level for the same crimes as those for which he is now being prosecuted at the ICC 








statement was in accordance with the ICC’s law, the judges should go one step 
further: they should examine any violation which occurs in the context of their case 
more generally, whether or not there is involvement on the part of the ICC. It was 
explained that normally, violations which occur during a period before the ICC was 
involved in a case will not readily be viewed as falling within the context of the 
ICC’s case. Hence, this broader test was not to be feared too much from a practical 
point of view. Conversely, it had to be cherished from a legal point of view, because 
it was the only test which could enable judges to remedy violations which they 
deemed to fall within the context of their case, even if the ICC was not yet involved 
in it. 
Another important recommendation was that if the ICC is confronted by a new 
male captus case, it should more extensively examine whether or not it has the 
power to refuse (the exercise of) jurisdiction in serious male captus cases, 
comparable with the abuse of process doctrine. Chapter XI asserted that the 
examination in Chapter IX had arguably shown that Article 21, paragraph 1 (a) of 
the ICC Statute was not exhaustive on the matter and hence that the judges could 
turn to Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) and (c) of the ICC Statute. If they agreed with this 
study that these provisions, via concepts such as “principles and rules of 
international law” and “general principles of law derived by the Court from national 
laws of legal systems of the world” could cover established practices of 
(inter)national courts, they could use these practices to solve their male captus 
problem.  
As concerns “principles and rules of international law”, Chapter XI pointed to 
the acceptance of a broad concept of abuse of process (in that jurisdiction might be 
refused in very serious male captus cases, irrespective of the entity responsible) and 
the fact that the seriousness of the crimes with which the suspect is charged could be 
taken into account when applying the abuse of process doctrine.  
If these principles brought no relief, Chapter XI continued, the ICC might turn to 
the “general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world”. These stipulated that most courts confronted by a male 
captus will use their discretion, for instance (in the common law system) under the 
abuse of process doctrine, to balance all the different elements of the case to decide 
whether or not the male captus is so serious that jurisdiction must be refused. In 
addition, most courts seemed to refuse jurisdiction only if their own authorities were 
involved in the male captus. Finally, it appeared that quite a number of courts – 
although it was unclear whether “quite a number” would be enough to lead to a 
general principle of law pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute – 
would also take into account the seriousness of the crimes with which the victim of 
the male captus was charged in deciding whether or not jurisdiction had to be 
refused. 
Finally, Chapter XI explained that because both the “principles and rules of 
international law” and the “general principles of law derived by the Court from 








like power, one could argue that any court, including the ICC, was invested with 
such an inherent power. 
Hence, Chapter XI argued that even if the judges did not accept that the 
reasoning behind the abuse of process doctrine could be seen as a principle/rule of 
international law pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (b) of the ICC Statute or 
otherwise as general principle of law derived by the Court from national laws of 
legal systems of the world pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 1 (c) of the ICC Statute, 
they had to embrace the abuse of process-like power they arguably already 
possessed (“inherent”) – in the same way as they seemed to embrace the right of a 
suspect to challenge the lawfulness of his detention (probably including, in 
principle, the remedy to be released in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention), 
even if that right was not explicitly mentioned in the ICC instruments. In exercising 
that power, Chapter XI continued, they should balance all the different elements of 
the case in finding the most appropriate remedies for the violations, such as the 
seriousness of the alleged crimes/the importance of having the case continued and 
the seriousness of the male captus, which increased when the involvement of the 
ICC was greater (thereby looking at all the different possibilities of attributing 
conduct to the ICC, including, for example, acknowledgment and adoption of the 
conduct as its own), when the violations had been committed intentionally, when the 
male captus had caused great prejudice to the suspect, when the male captus was 
accompanied by serious mistreatment, etc.  
Chapter XI then noted that if the ICC were not convinced that such a broad 
balancing exercise could be found in the ICC’s law or could not be seen as an 
inherent power of the Court, it might, perhaps, be more susceptible to practical 
arguments. Chapter XI recalled that the male detentus test of the ICC ‘only’ took 
into account the human rights dimension of the abuse of process doctrine. In 
addition, it assumed the involvement of the ICC (or third parties working at its 
behest). 
According to this study, this could lead to serious problems engendered by male 
captus situations, which, for example, involved violations of State sovereignty 
and/or violations committed by States/private individuals in which the ICC was not 
involved.  
Chapter XI explained that under the abuse of process doctrine, judges could 
refuse jurisdiction if they are of the opinion that such a serious male captus in the 
context of an ICC case occurred that they can no longer, in good conscience, 
continue with the case. This is a very general test which could cover, for example, 
violations of State sovereignty and violations committed by States/private 
individuals in which the ICC was not involved. (It was noted in this context that it 
was probable, or at least to be hoped, that the ICC judges would not follow the 
‘carte blanche’ decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision in Nikolić and 
would attach more importance to the value of State sovereignty, a concept which the 
judges of the “lateral” ICC could not ignore in the same way as the judges of the 








ICC test, this would not seem to be possible, whereas the ICC should definitively 
have the tools, the possibility to refuse jurisdiction in such situations. 
Another important suggestion was connected to the previously mentioned right 
of a suspect to challenge the lawfulness of his arrest/detention. Chapter XI explained 
that if the judge is of the opinion that his arrest/detention is indeed unlawful (but not 
so serious that jurisdiction must be refused), he may wonder what the consequences 
of that determination must be, now that the ICC Statute does not mention the 
remedy of release in the case of an unlawful arrest/detention and now that this right, 
including its remedy of release, can be seen as having customary international law 
status and thus, in principle, is applicable to the ICC as well. Here, Chapter XI made 
it clear that the judges might turn to the examination of this remedy in Chapter IX, 
where it was concluded that pursuant to Article 21, paragraph 3 of the ICC Statute, 
this remedy is in principle to be accorded. However, it was also explained in that 
context (and also elsewhere in this book and in this summary) that the remedy is 
problematic because it is over-simplified, because it can be used as a pro forma 
remedy and finally because there is a risk that a suspect of international crimes will 
escape prosecution because he is released for a minor violation, for example, 
because he was not promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest. This study 
argued that not only in the context of the abuse of process doctrine (or a comparable 
doctrine which can be used in determining whether the male captus is so serious that 
jurisdiction must be refused) but also in the context of this problematic remedy of 
release, a judge should be able to consider all the relevant elements of the case, 
including the seriousness of the alleged crimes. That meant, Chapter XI continued, 
that a suspect of international crimes should not be released because of the 
determination of ‘unlawful arrest/detention’ but should remain in custody and 
should be granted other appropriate remedies, such as a reduction of the sentence 
(on the basis of Rule 145 of the ICC RPE), compensation (which in any case 
appeared to be mandatory pursuant to Article 85 of the ICC Statute) or perhaps 
merely a statement that a violation had occurred and that this had to be regretted, 
taking into account the seriousness of the male captus. However, Chapter XI also 
noted that if the unlawful arrest/detention was very serious, for example, because the 
ICC orchestrated an abduction, jurisdiction had to be refused and the person 
permanently released. This is a far-reaching consequence, but some male captus 
situations are so serious that the ICC, in good conscience, can no longer proceed 
with the case without undermining its integrity as an institution based on law. 
Furthermore, it was also stressed that the fact that the ICC could no longer try this 
suspect did not mean that it should not do everything in its power to ensure that the 
suspect was tried before another court. It still had a general duty to fight impunity, 
whether that fight takes place before the ICC or not. 
However, Chapter XI asserted that the most important thing was that 
tribunals/ICC judges, as the final adjudicators, as the ultimate guarantors of the 
suspect’s rights, remedy every violation occurring in the context of their case, 
whether or not that leads to a refusal of jurisdiction and irrespective of the entity 








might use the determinations of the competent judicial authority in the custodial 
State as a first indication of how certain irregularities at the national level had to be 
assessed, would deter parties in the arrest and surrender proceedings from 
committing irregularities, would best protect the integrity of the ICC and would 
provide fairness to the suspect, who would not become the victim of a legal vacuum 
due to the fact that his case had been fragmented over two or more jurisdictions. In 
addition, because not many male captus cases are so serious that jurisdiction must 
be refused, it was argued that neither would it easily jeopardise the victims’ idea of 
fairness (in that a trial must be held). Moreover, it would lead to greater 
differentiation in a context which is sometimes overly focused on the ultimate 
remedy (refusal of jurisdiction). This, Chapter XI continued, would also ‘soften’ the 
old-fashioned male captus bene detentus image that international courts have. Even 
though it appeared that the ICC followed the male captus male detentus reasoning as 
concerns serious irregularities by the suspect’s “accusers” (which included the 
actions of third parties working at the ICC’s behest), something which was to be 
welcomed, it was explained that the male captus cases by which the ICC would be 
confronted would very often not concern such irregularities. This meant that in 
practice, the ICC would probably almost always continue a male captus case, which 
could, in a way, be seen as acceptance of the male captus bene detentus rule. (It was 
applauded in that respect that the ICC explicitly supported neither the male captus 
bene detentus nor the male captus male detentus rule, as these maxims were 
arguably the height of simplicity, leaving no room for differentiation at all.)  
Regarding the above-mentioned point that it appeared that the ICC followed the 
male captus male detentus reasoning as concerns serious irregularities by the 
suspects “accusers”; this study was very much in favour of granting discretion, in 
the context of the abuse of process doctrine (or a comparable doctrine) and in the 
context of determining the consequences of an unlawful arrest/detention, to judges 
so that they balance all the relevant elements of the case. However, it was also 
aware of the fact that too much discretion can lead to problems, for example, in 
terms of equality, transparency and predictability. Hence, there had to be some 
beacons to guide this discretion.  
First of all, Chapter XI submitted that in some cases, it had to be understood that 
there is normally only one possible outcome. For example, if it became clear that the 
OTP was involved in an abduction operation flouting all the relevant legal rules, the 
judges could not but refuse jurisdiction if they still wanted to be taken seriously as 
custodians of the law, whether or not that suspect was charged with serious crimes. 
This view, Chapter XI noted, which fell short of the test about which more recent 
State practice seemingly agreed that it must, in any event, lead to rejection of the 
male captus bene detentus rule, probably also constituted the view of the ICC and 
that was to be welcomed. In other less obvious cases, all the above-mentioned 
elements had to play a guiding role in determining whether or not jurisdiction ought 
to be refused. Thus, even though certain indicators had to be followed in the 
balancing exercise to ensure that the discretion is not unlimited, the ultimate 








shown that too harsh rules might also lead to abuse and because judges might 
always be confronted by situations not envisaged.  
Finally, Chapter XI noted that this book was premised on two features of the 
ICC’s system, namely that the ICC cannot try suspects in absentia and does not 
have its own police force. However, it was explained that one could obviously 
imagine that if the ICC were to be endowed with these features, this could decrease 
the chances of the ICC judges being confronted by a male captus case in the first 
place.  
In this context, it was argued that although this study had shown that the idea of 
an own international arrest team was not yet politically feasible, the ICC might 
consider following the example of the ICTY in creating tracking teams. However, 
because the work of such teams consisted of traditional police work in the State in 
question, they had to have the consent of that State, which would obviously be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain from uncooperative States. 
Chapter XI then noted that allowing – under certain circumstances – trials in 
absentia would solve that problem.  
However, as the ICC was simply not (yet) equipped with these features, it was 
explained that this meant that it must make (perhaps more) use of the tools it already 
has.  
In this context, it was submitted more generally that the ICC must stay far away 
from dubious methods of bringing a suspect into its jurisdiction because resorting to 
such methods to reach a short-term goal, besides the fact that it undermines, at that 
particular moment, the values for which the ICC stands, and that it may not be that 
‘successful’ at all given that such tactics can lead to the ending of the case (see 
supra), can seriously damage the ICC’s mission in the long run.  
This was, Chapter XI explained, because, among other things, the ICC needs the 
practical support of the international community, especially because it does not have 
its own enforcement arm. Hence, to ensure that it has the constant goodwill of 
States, the ICC’s enforcers, it must always prosecute a suspect in a fair, law-abiding 
way. If sceptical, but mighty States (such as the US) see that the ICC is a fair court, 
Chapter XI continued, they may more readily become a party to the ICC Statute, 
which will in turn lead to greater support and a more powerful enforcement arm of 
the ICC. 
As a result, this study argued that if judges are confronted by the dilemma 
presented in the very first chapter of this book, namely effectiveness (in the sense of 
achieving prosecutions and convictions) versus fairness, they should always opt for 
the latter concept. Only fairness can engender real effectiveness, meaning 
effectiveness in the long term.  
Another important point expressed in Chapter XI was that introducing new tools 
for the ICC to increase its capabilities to start a trial, such as a provision on allowing 
trials in absentia (if that possibility were to be introduced in the future), runs the risk 
of masking the real problem, namely why the enforcement arm of the ICC, formed 
by States party to the ICC Statute (and States ordered by the UNSC to cooperate 








the prime obligation to arrest and surrender suspects and that this obligation must be 
taken very seriously. 
According to Chapter XI, this meant, for example, that if suspects could not be 
apprehended by the custodial State, other States (or States working together in an 
international peacekeeping force) had to assist that State in its efforts. Not only 
logistically or financially, but perhaps also with an actual arrest team.  
As regards uncooperative States, it was explained that third States had to turn to 
the carrot-and-stick method which had worked so well for the ICTY, meaning that 
they had to stress that cooperation with the ICC would lead to financial/political 
support and that non-cooperation would lead to embargoes/sanctions/political 
isolation. Such a method, Chapter XI continued, would have more legitimacy if it 
were executed within the context of a collectivity of States, such as international 
organisations. In this context, reference was also made to the role of the UNSC. 
Although Chapter XI acknowledged that this organ’s relationship with the ICC is a 
difficult one, it was argued that if that organ decides that certain States must 
cooperate with the ICC and those States refuse to do so, the UNSC should act, much 
more than it has done until now. In this context, a number of strategies were 
presented which could help the UNSC in its efforts to fight impunity and to save its 
own credibility.  
In short, Chapter XI argued that the international community, the enforcement 
pillar of the ICC, must (better) understand that it has major responsibilities in the 
functioning, effectiveness and thus success and credibility of the ICC. The 
international community has, in the words of Rastan, a responsibility to enforce 
here. 
Chapter XI, Part 5 and this study ended with a brief epilogue in which it was 
hoped, among other things, that this study (including its critical observations as can 
be found in Subsection 2.3 and Section 3 of Chapter XI), or the discussions which it 
may engender, will inspire and help the ICC when it is confronted by a new male 
captus situation to issue a decision which does (more) justice to its difficult but 
commendable objective, namely to fight impunity in a fair way. A fight, as was 
argued in Section 3 of Chapter XI, that can only be won if the international 












In Deel 1 (en Hoofdstuk I) van dit boek maakte de lezer kennis met het onderwerp 
van deze studie. De geruchtmakende ontvoering van Adolf Eichmann in Argentinië 
op 11 mei 1960 en de recente kidnapping van de van terrorisme verdachte Abu 
Omar in Italië op 17 juni 2003 lieten zien dat het gebruik van onregelmatige 
methoden destijds een optie was, en nu nog steeds een optie is, bij het in hechtenis 
nemen van verdachten, vooral als de belangen groot zijn dan wel als zodanig 
worden beschouwd.  
Omdat het Internationaal Strafhof (IS) eveneens met verdachten van ernstige 
misdrijven moet omgaan, rees de vraag hoe dit Hof, het – volgens deze studie – 
meest belangrijke instituut op het gebied van internationaal strafrecht, zich opstelt 
ten aanzien van verdachten die beweren dat de manier waarop zij onder de 
jurisdictie van het Hof zijn gebracht onregelmatig was (male captus). Zou het ten 
gronde kiezen – natuurlijk rekening houdend met het feit dat veel zou/zal afhangen 
van de precieze omstandigheden van het geval – voor effectiviteit (in de zin van het 
tot stand komen van vervolgingen en veroordelingen) en zijn jurisdictie blijven 
uitoefenen ondanks de male captus (male captus bene detentus) of zou het van 
oordeel zijn dat waarden als fairness, mensenrechten en de integriteit van het proces 
eisen dat in het geval van een male captus, de uitoefening van jurisdictie moet 
worden geweigerd (male captus male detentus/ex iniuria ius non oritur)?  
Dit leidde tot de volgende centrale vraag: 
 
Hoe gaat het IS momenteel om met de dilemma’s die een male captus zaak met zich 
meebrengt en hoe dient deze aanpak beoordeeld te worden? 
 
Om deze vraag te kunnen beantwoorden werd uiteengezet dat er twee 
toetsingskaders zouden worden gecreëerd; een extern kader (om na te gaan hoe 
vergelijkbaar of verschillend de male captus opstelling van het IS was ten opzichte 
van de opstelling van andere hoven die eerder met dit probleem te maken hebben 
gehad) en een intern kader (om na te gaan hoe de opstelling van het IS moet worden 









Naast het beantwoorden van deze centrale vraag werd duidelijk gemaakt dat deze 
studie nog twee andere doelen had, namelijk 1) het meer in het algemeen 
samenvoegen van twee fascinerende onderwerpen die nog niet eerder in één boek 
zijn verschenen (het IS en het male captus bene detentus maxime) en 2) het 
bijdragen aan de male captus discussie zelf, aan de discussie hoe IS rechters en 
rechters in het algemeen het best kunnen omgaan met vermeende 
onregelmatigheden in de voorfase van de aan hen voorgelegde zaak, aan de 
discussie op welke wijze een zowel effectief als eerlijk proces kan worden bereikt. 
In Deel 2 van deze studie werd het maxime male captus bene detentus zelf onder 
de loep genomen.  
Hoofdstuk II onderzocht de herkomst van het maxime en merkte onder andere op 
dat hoewel male captus bene detentus in de literatuur vaak is bestempeld als een 
“ancient” of “old” Romeins maxime, een bescheiden Romeins strafrechtelijk 
onderzoek liet zien dat het maxime helemaal geen antieke wortels leek te hebben en 
dat de uit vier woorden bestaande Latijnse spreuk in feite relatief modern zou 
kunnen zijn.  
In elk geval was de oudste tekst waarin deze studie het maxime tegenkwam M.H. 
Cardozo’s artikel ‘When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the Solution?’, dat werd 
gepubliceerd in de American Journal of International Law van januari 1961.  
Hoofdstuk II onderzocht ook de herkomst van de gedachte achter het maxime en 
concludeerde dat de juridische redenering in de Engelse Ex Parte Susannah Scott 
zaak, van de hand van Lord Chief Justice Tenterden van de Court of King’s Bench, 
van dinsdag 19 mei 1829, waarschijnlijk de oudste male captus bene detentus 
gedachte is met een werkelijk méér jurisdicties omvattende, internationale, dimensie 
– de dimensie waar deze studie zich op richtte. 
In Hoofdstuk III werden de verschillende elementen van het maxime diepgaand 
onderzocht aan de hand van vier hoofdvragen: 1) “Welke male captus situaties 
bestaan er?” 2) “Wat wordt er geschonden door deze male captus situaties?” 3) 
“Wie schendt?” en 4) “Wat zijn de gevolgen van zulke schendingen?” 
In het kader van de eerste hoofdvraag werd allereerst toegelicht dat, ook al 
kunnen male captus situaties elke onregelmatigheid in de juridische voorfase 
omvatten die gezien kan worden als een onregelmatigheid welke valt binnen de 
context van een bepaalde zaak (inclusief, bijvoorbeeld, een onregelmatige 
voorlopige hechtenis), Hoofdstuk III zich zou concentreren op drie basis male 
captus situaties die keken naar de onregelmatigheid van de aanhouding: verkapte 
uitlevering, luring en kidnapping/ontvoering. Omdat deze situaties uit de 
horizontale, interstatelijke context voortkomen, werd toegelicht dat deze context de 
voornaamste achtergrond zou zijn waartegen Hoofdstuk III zou worden besproken. 
Na deze drie basis male captus situaties te hebben besproken werd uiteengezet 
welke waarden zij zouden kunnen schenden (staatssoevereiniteit, mensenrechten – 
waaronder de belangrijkste twee: het recht op vrijheid en veiligheid/het recht niet te 
worden onderworpen aan willekeurige arrestatie of gevangenhouding, rechten met 
een volgens deze studie internationaal gewoonterechtelijke/algemeen 








welke uitzonderingen van toepassing zouden kunnen zijn om te bewerkstelligen dat 
geen schendingen plaatsvinden: toestemming, zelfverdediging en humanitaire 
gronden (ten aanzien van een schending van staatssoevereiniteit) alsmede oorlog of 
een andere algemene noodtoestand (ten aanzien van een mensenrechtschending).  
In het kader van de mensenrechtelijke context werden twee belangrijke 
bepalingen besproken, namelijk artikel 9, lid 1 van het Internationaal Verdrag 
inzake Burgerrechten en Politieke Rechten (IVBPR) en artikel 5, lid 1 van het 
Europees Verdrag tot Bescherming van de Rechten van de Mens en de 
Fundamentele Vrijheden (EVRM). Naast een meer theoretische analyse van beide 
bepalingen werd onderzocht hoe de mensenrechtelijke organen die toezicht houden 
op het IVBPR (namelijk het Mensenrechtencomité) en het EVRM (namelijk de (nu 
niet meer bestaande) Europese Commissie voor de Rechten van de Mens en het 
Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens) deze bepalingen hadden 
geïnterpreteerd in de context van vermeende male captus zaken. 
Een interessante observatie uit deze context was dat er een verschil 
waarneembaar is tussen enerzijds de Europese Commissie voor de Rechten van de 
Mens en het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens, die de houding van de 
gelaedeerde staat nog steeds belangrijk achten bij het bepalen of een 
kidnapping/ontvoering mensenrechten schendt, en anderzijds het 
Mensenrechtencomité, dat enkel en alleen oog lijkt te hebben voor de belangen van 
het individu en dus kan concluderen dat een mensenrechtschending heeft 
plaatsgevonden, zelfs indien de ‘gelaedeerde’ staat heeft samengespannen in de 
operatie en dus zelfs indien er geen probleem is vanuit een klassiek (interstatelijk) 
internationaalrechtelijk oogpunt.  
Meer in het algemeen leek het erop dat terwijl het Mensenrechtencomité alleen 
de belangen van het individu op het oog heeft, de Europese instituten ook de andere 
kant van de medaille meenemen, namelijk het belang van samenwerking tussen 
staten bij het vervolgen van vermeende criminelen – een opvatting die zeer goed 
werd verwoord in de beroemde Öcalan zaak. Een opvatting die ook misbruikt kan 
worden om enigszins dubieuze procedures in de voorfase van het strafproces door 
de vingers te zien. In dat opzicht is het niet vreemd dat de literatuur verscheidene 
zaken van de Europese instituten, inclusief de Öcalan zaak, heeft bekritiseerd 
wegens het (impliciet) steunen van het male captus bene detentus maxime. 
De bespreking van de derde hoofdvraag van Hoofdstuk III – “Wie schendt?” – 
maakte duidelijk dat niet alleen staten/staatsambtenaren, maar ook particulieren 
betrokken kunnen zijn bij de verschillende male captus situaties. Het behandelde de 
controversiële kwestie of particulieren als zodanig waarden als staatssoevereiniteit 
en mensenrechten kunnen schenden en concludeerde dat er geen pasklaar antwoord 
is op deze vraag. Daarom werd geopperd, hierbij gebruik makende van het 
voorbeeld van een kidnapping van een persoon door particulieren in de context van 
de tribunalen, dat men meer in het algemeen kon stellen dat, zelfs wanneer men van 
oordeel is dat particulieren, in principe, niet het recht op vrijheid en veiligheid van 
die persoon of de soevereiniteit van de gelaedeerde staat hebben kunnen schenden, 








nationaal recht te zien. Omdat de kidnapping de reden is waarom de verdachte nu 
voor zijn rechters staat, heeft deze een zekere publieke dimensie gekregen. Men zou 
dus kunnen beargumenteren, overigens zonder te beweren dat het tribunaal in zo’n 
geval het recht op vrijheid en veiligheid van deze persoon of de soevereiniteit van de 
gelaedeerde staat heeft geschonden, dat een (inbreuk gelijkend op een) schending 
van het recht van vrijheid en veiligheid van die persoon of van de soevereiniteit van 
de gelaedeerde staat desondanks heeft plaatsgevonden in de context van de 
tribunaalzaak en dat het tribunaal deze schending zou moeten herstellen. Natuurlijk 
mag/moet dan, bij het bepalen van de gevolgen van deze schending/inbreuk, 
rekening gehouden worden met het feit dat deze is begaan door particulieren.  
Na deze discussie werd de minder controversiële kwestie onderzocht hoe gedrag 
van particulieren kan worden toegerekend aan de staat met behulp van de Draft 
articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts van de 
International Law Commission (zoals artikel 11 over gedrag dat de staat erkent en 
tot het zijne maakt), de Eichmann zaak en het concept due diligence. 
De vierde en laatste hoofdvraag van dit hoofdstuk behandelde de gevolgen van 
de verschillende schendingen. In deze context werden onderwerpen behandeld als 
reparation (zoals teruggave van de verdachte in het geval van schending van 
staatssoevereiniteit), remedies (zoals vrijlating van de verdachte in het geval van 
schending van het recht op vrijheid en veiligheid) en abuse of process (zoals het 
aanhouden van de zaak in het geval van schending van de rule of law). Bovendien 
werd nagegaan hoe deze verschillende gevolgen gezien moesten worden indien deze 
werden vergeleken met de male detentus uitkomst, dat wil zeggen de weigering om 
jurisdictie uit te oefenen. 
Een belangrijk punt, aangestipt in de laatste pagina’s van dit hoofdstuk, was dat 
de remedie vrijlating in het geval van een onrechtmatige (arrestatie en) detentie (zie 
artikel 9, lid 4 van het IVBPR en artikel 5, lid 4 van het EVRM) naar het oordeel 
van deze studie problematisch is. Indien een persoon slachtoffer is geworden van 
een onrechtmatige arrestatie/detentie (maar niet van een die zo ernstig is dat het leidt 
tot het einde van de zaak) moet hij, strikt genomen, worden vrijgelaten. Echter, 
vrijlating sluit een nieuwe arrestatie ter plekke en een hernieuwde uitoefening van 
jurisdictie niet uit. Dit komt omdat bovengenoemde bepalingen eenvoudigweg 
spreken over vrijlating (als zodanig) en niet over bijvoorbeeld vrijlating/afwijzing 
van de zaak with prejudice to de Aanklager, hetgeen betekent dat de Aanklager geen 
nieuw proces meer tegen deze verdachte kan starten na diens vrijlating. Een nieuwe 
arrestatie is dus niet uitgesloten, zeker als de verdachte is aangeklaagd voor ernstige 
misdrijven en vervolging zeer belangrijk wordt geacht. In zo’n geval zouden de 
vervolgende autoriteiten kunnen beweren dat deze ‘remedie’ (de ‘vrijlating’) de 
initiële iniuria van de onregelmatigheid heeft hersteld en dat het proces vervolgens 
gewoon doorgang kan vinden. Echter, in dat geval zou de verdachte alleen maar een 
pro forma remedie verkrijgen, hetgeen niet overeenkomt met het idee dat een 
remedie daadwerkelijk en effectief moet zijn, zie artikel 2, lid 3 onder (a) van het 








rekening met de exacte mate van ernst van de onregelmatigheid. Met andere 
woorden, het is niet alleen een pro forma, maar ook een ongenuanceerde remedie. 
Daarom werd gesteld dat het beter zou zijn wanneer de rechter deze 
problematische remedie van de vrijlating zou vermijden en dat hij, wanneer hij 
vaststelt dat de arrestatie/detentie van een persoon onrechtmatig is, eenvoudigweg 
de meest geëigende remedie zou verlenen die rekening houdt met alle 
omstandigheden van het geval, niet alleen de ernst van de male captus, maar ook de 
ernst van de vermeende misdrijven van de verdachte en het belang om de zaak voort 
te zetten. Als men deze route volgt, kan men nog steeds recht doen aan het 
hierboven genoemde ‘gezond verstand’ idee dat schuilgaat achter de onmiddellijke 
nieuwe arrestatie, namelijk dat verdachten van ernstige misdrijven indien mogelijk 
vervolgd moeten worden – hoewel een male detentus uitkomst natuurlijk ook voor 
zulke verdachten niet kan worden uitgesloten – maar zal men ook de vreemde, pro 
forma release en onmiddellijke nieuwe arrestatie vermijden en deze vervangen door 
werkelijke remedies, zoals strafvermindering en/of compensatie. De rechter kan dan 
rekening houden met de exacte ernst van de onregelmatigheid bij het bepalen in 
welke mate strafvermindering of compensatie aan de verdachte zou moeten worden 
verleend. Zo’n oplossing zou naar het oordeel van deze studie fairder zijn ten 
opzichte van de verdachte en bovendien beter in staat zijn om nuance in het systeem 
aan te brengen. Ook ontloopt deze oplossing de (terechte) kritiek die men van 
verschillende actoren kan verwachten wanneer een verdachte wordt vrijgelaten 
wegens een onregelmatigheid die niet zo ernstig is dat deze tot het einde van de zaak 
leidt (in zulke ernstige gevallen dient het publiek te begrijpen dat het hof geen 
andere keuze heeft dan jurisdictie te weigeren en de verdachte vrij te laten (maar nu 
daadwerkelijk)), maar die desondanks met zich meebrengt dat de detentie als 
onrechtmatig moet worden beschouwd en dat, strikt genomen, de verdachte moet 
worden vrijgelaten. Zelfs indien deze verdachte, gezien zijn vermeende ernstige 
misdrijven, waarschijnlijk ter plekke opnieuw zou worden gearresteerd, kan men 
aannemen dat het publiek/de internationale gemeenschap/de slachtoffers niet zullen 
begrijpen hoe, bijvoorbeeld, een verdachte van genocide kan worden vrijgelaten 
omdat hij niet onverwijld op de hoogte is gebracht van de redenen van zijn 
arrestatie, zeker indien deze persoon niet opnieuw gearresteerd wordt en vervolgens 
de vlucht neemt.     
Na deze tamelijk theoretische hoofdstukken over het male captus bene detentus 
maxime dook Deel 3 van deze studie in de praktijk, met het doel een extern 
toetsingskader te creëren aan de hand waarvan de huidige male captus opstelling 
van het IS kon worden vergeleken. 
Hoofdstuk IV bevatte een korte introductie die uiteenzette hoe het grootste deel 
van het boek methodologisch aangepakt ging worden. 
In Hoofdstuk V werd male captus rechtspraak uit de context tussen staten 
kritisch beschreven en geanalyseerd. Het hoofdstuk was verdeeld in drie categorieën 
en behandelde tientallen interstatelijke zaken uit de volgens deze studie twee 
belangrijkste rechtssystemen (common en civil law) en een derde categorie 








categorieën. Alle drie de categorieën behandelden zowel oudere als meer recente 
zaken (de meer recente zaken beginnende bij de Toscanino zaak uit 1974) in de 
hoop om duidelijker te zien of het maxime zich in een bepaalde richting 
ontwikkelde of niet. 
Alvorens naar de hoofdconclusies van dit hoofdstuk te gaan, die werden 
samengevat in Hoofdstuk VII, moeten hier eerst de algemene kenmerken van het 
tussenliggende Hoofdstuk VI worden besproken. 
In Hoofdstuk VI werd male captus rechtspraak uit de context tussen staten en 
internationale/geïnternationaliseerde straftribunalen – opnieuw kritisch – beschreven 
en geanalyseerd. De ‘focus’ lag op de volgens deze studie twee belangrijkste 
internationale straftribunalen, het Joegoslavië Tribunaal (ICTY) en het Rwanda 
Tribunaal (ICTR). Daarom werden niet alleen tien male captus zaken berecht door 
deze VN ad hoc Tribunalen uitgebreid bediscussieerd (Dokmanović, Todorović, 
Milošević, Nikolić, Tolimir en Karadžić (ICTY) en Barayagwiza, Semanza, 
Kajelijeli en Rwamakuba (ICTR)), maar ook de belangrijkste kenmerken van het 
verticale samenwerkings- en overleveringsregime van deze Tribunalen behandeld. 
Verklaard werd dat dit regime zich schijnbaar voornamelijk richtte op effectiviteit, 
op de verplichting van staten om verdachten over te leveren, en in mindere mate op 
de rechten van de over te leveren/overgeleverde personen. Desalniettemin werd ook 
opgemerkt dat de rechtspraak enkele gebreken op papier had hersteld, zoals de 
afwezigheid van een recht op habeas corpus, een recht de rechtmatigheid van de 
detentie aan te vechten en vrijgelaten te worden in het geval van een onrechtmatige 
(arrestatie of) detentie. Tenslotte passeerden ook enige interessante strategieën om 
een verdachte in hechtenis te nemen de revue, zoals het gebruik van verzegelde 
aanklachten, vredestroepen, tracking teams en politieke druk van derde staten en 
organisaties (denk aan de carrot-and-stick methode ten aanzien van geldmiddelen en 
lidmaatschappen van organisaties). 
Daarentegen werden er slechts een paar algemene opmerkingen gewijd aan het 
juridisch samenwerkingssysteem in de context van de geïnternationaliseerde 
straftribunalen – tribunalen die half internationaal, half nationaal zijn – omdat het 
voor het doel van deze studie niet nodig was alle verschillende 
samenwerkingsregimes van deze tribunalen, die zeer lijken op de horizontale 
interstatelijke samenwerkingsregimes, in detail uiteen te zetten. Dat achteraf ontdekt 
werd dat de context van de geïnternationaliseerde straftribunalen slechts één zaak 
leek te bevatten waarin het male captus probleem een belangrijk facet van de 
procedure uitmaakte (de Duch zaak voor de Buitengewone Kamers in de Hoven van 
Cambodja (ECCC), die ging over een vermeende onregelmatige voorlopige 
hechtenis) zou thans, met de wijsheid van nu, gezien kunnen worden als een andere 
rechtvaardiging voor een minder vergaande bespreking van het juridisch 
samenwerkingssysteem in de context van de geïnternationaliseerde straftribunalen. 
Hoofdstuk VI eindigde tenslotte met enkele interessante observaties afkomstig uit 
zaken van geïnternationaliseerde straftribunalen die niet gezien konden worden als 
echte male captus zaken, maar die desondanks onderwerpen aanstipten die meer in 








die eerder in Hoofdstuk VI de revue waren gepasseerd, zoals habeas corpus en 
abuse of process. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk van dit deel was Hoofdstuk VII, dat beginselen afgeleid uit 
Hoofdstukken V en VI samenvatte en aldus het externe toetsingskader van deze 
studie creëerde. 
Ten aanzien van de interstatelijke context (Hoofdstuk V) werd opgemerkt dat de 
meeste rechters uit de oudere male captus zaken de uitoefening van jurisdictie 
zouden doorzetten, hierbij aangevende dat zij de manier waarop een persoon onder 
de jurisdictie van de staat van het nu berechtende gerecht was gebracht niet konden 
of niet wilden (omdat het toch geen verschil zou uitmaken) bezien, zelfs wanneer er 
onregelmatigheden konden zijn gepleegd (door de autoriteiten van die staat) in de 
buitenlandse voorfase van het strafproces (male captus bene detentus). Aldus hingen 
zij de non-inquiry regel en een beperkte notie van een eerlijk proces aan, namelijk 
door dat deel uit te sluiten dat er toe geleid had dat de persoon überhaupt naar de 
rechtszaal was gebracht. 
Met de komst van mensenrechtenverdragen als het IVBPR en de rijzende status 
van het individu in de internationale context, leken rechters meer aandacht te 
besteden aan concepten als een eerlijk proces en waren zij eerder geneigd om de 
buitenlandse voorfase van het strafproces te bezien, ongeacht de vraag of er wel of 
niet een protest was gekomen van de gelaedeerde staat. 
Dit betekende echter niet dat het male captus bene detentus tijdperk ten einde 
gekomen was en dat male captus male detentus of ex iniuria ius non oritur nu het 
door rechters geprefereerde richtsnoer was. 
Ook al leek het erop dat de oude(rwetse) versie van de male captus bene detentus 
regel (dat rechters de manier waarop de verdachte onder de jurisdictie van de staat 
van het nu berechtende gerecht was gekomen niet kunnen of niet willen bezien) 
(terecht) was opgegeven, werd ook geconcludeerd dat veel rechters nog steeds 
beslissingen nemen die gekwalificeerd zouden kunnen worden als male captus bene 
detentus beslissingen; niet omdat zij zeggen de vermeende onregelmatigheden in de 
buitenlandse voorfase van het strafproces niet te kunnen of niet te willen bezien (en 
dus dat zij jurisdictie gaan uitoefenen, ongeacht de omstandigheden waaronder de 
verdachte onder de jurisdictie van de staat van het nu berechtende gerecht is 
gekomen), maar omdat zij van oordeel zijn, na de buitenlandse voorfase van het 
strafproces te hebben onderzocht, dat de vermeende male captus in kwestie niet 
ernstig genoeg is om afstand te doen van jurisdictie; een (niet zo ernstige) male 
captus bene detentus. Opgemerkt werd dat veel afhing van de precieze 
omstandigheden en de vraag hoe deze omstandigheden gewogen dienden te worden 
in de balancing exercise waarvoor rechters een duidelijke voorkeur hebben.  
In sommige gevallen werd de male captus zo ernstig geacht dat rechters van 
oordeel waren dat het weigeren van jurisdictie de enige manier was om waarden als 
respect voor staatssoevereiniteit, due process of law/de mensenrechten van de 
verdachte en de rule of law/de integriteit van de (executieve/gerechtelijke) 
procedures te beschermen. Veel gehanteerd in dat opzicht was de abuse of process 








oordeel van deze studie ook gevonden kan worden in de overwegingen van rechters 
uit andere juridische contexten: gerechten hebben in principe jurisdictie (bene 
detentus), maar zullen hun discretie gebruiken om geen jurisdictie uit te oefenen 
(male detentus) wanneer de male captus zo ernstig is dat het een abuse of proces 
van het gerecht zou zijn om jurisdictie te blijven uitoefenen. 
Deze algemene opmerkingen toepassende op de verschillende basis male captus 
situaties zoals gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk III van dit boek (verkapte uitlevering, 
luring en ontvoering – male captus situaties wier definities overigens impliceren dat 
zij opzettelijk zijn uitgevoerd) en beginnende met ontvoering, concludeerde 
Hoofdstuk VII dat het erop leek dat de meer recente zaken aantoonden dat gerechten 
jurisdictie zouden weigeren in het geval van een ontvoering (uitgevoerd door de 
eigen agenten van de vervolgende staat op het grondgebied van een andere staat, 
zonder diens toestemming) die 1) gepaard ging met ernstige 
mensenrechtschendingen/ernstige mishandeling of 2) werd gevolgd door een protest 
en verzoek tot teruggave van de verdachte door de gelaedeerde staat. Het leek zelfs 
dat de statenpraktijk in het algemeen aangaf dat in deze twee omstandigheden (de 
twee zogenaamde Toscanino mogelijkheden/uitzonderingen) jurisdictie moest 
worden geweigerd. Ten aanzien van de tweede situatie werd zelfs een verdergaande 
conclusie getrokken, namelijk dat internationaal gewoonterecht schijnbaar aangaf 
dat een male detentus moest volgen. Ook werd onderstreept dat bovengenoemde 
situaties gevallen zijn waarin male captus bene detentus in elk geval verworpen 
werd. Echter, dat betekende niet dat gerechten geen gebruik hebben gebruikt van 
lagere male captus male detentus drempels bij ontvoeringen. Er zijn ook male 
captus zaken geweest waar gerechten een male detentus standaard hebben 
voorgesteld waarin een protest van de gelaedeerde staat of ernstige mishandeling 
niet vereist is. Het leek er echter op dat deze lagere drempels, ook al vallen deze toe 
te juichen, en zelfs indien deze zaken gezien kunnen worden als bewijs van een 
zekere trend in de statenpraktijk, niet evenveel steun kregen in de rest van de wereld 
als de twee Toscanino mogelijkheden. Het was naar het oordeel van deze studie dan 
ook niet goed vol te houden dat in elke zaak waarin een ontvoering plaatsvond (zelfs 
een zonder ernstige mishandeling of zonder een protest en een verzoek tot teruggave 
van de verdachte) de statenpraktijk (laat staan: internationaal gewoonterecht) aangaf 
dat een gerecht een male detentus beslissing zal uitvaardigen.  
Ten aanzien van de andere twee male captus technieken, luring en verkapte 
uitlevering (en andere minder ernstige onregelmatige methoden die niet duidelijk in 
deze drie basis male captus situaties zijn onder te brengen, zoals een informele 
overdracht tussen twee staten zonder enige procedurele waarborg), lieten nogal wat 
van de meer recente zaken lieten zien dat zulke technieken, zelfs als zij niet even 
ernstig worden geacht als ontvoering, nog steeds kunnen leiden tot een weigering 
om de zaak voort te zetten – iets wat wederom kan worden toegejuicht – mits de 
eigen autoriteiten van de nu berechtende staat betrokken waren bij de male captus. 
Dat betekende ook dat gerechten in het algemeen de zaak zouden voortzetten 
wanneer de eigen autoriteiten van de vervolgende staat niet betrokken waren bij de 








waren gebruikt en waar werd vastgesteld dat de eigen autoriteiten van de 
vervolgende staat betrokken waren geweest bij de male captus, maar waar het 
gerecht toch niet jurisdictie weigerde. Deze zaken toonden aan dat een luring 
operatie of een verkapte uitlevering als zodanig niet beschouwd worden als een 
dermate ernstige male captus dat dit moet leiden tot het einde van de zaak. 
Een belangrijke observatie uit Hoofdstuk VII was dat het element ‘ernst van de 
vermeende misdrijven waarvoor de verdachte is aangeklaagd’ soms een rol leek te 
spelen in de balancing exercise van de rechter; misschien had er dan inderdaad een 
male captus plaatsgevonden, maar gezien het feit dat de vermeende misdrijven van 
de verdachte ernstiger waren en de voortzetting van het proces dus van groter belang 
was, leidde een dergelijke male captus niet tot het einde van de zaak. 
Kortom, veel hing af van de precieze omstandigheden, van vragen als: wat voor 
male captus vond plaats, was de male captus opzettelijk gepleegd, wie pleegde de 
male captus, leidde de male captus tot een schending van de soevereiniteit van een 
andere staat (inclusief een protest en een verzoek tot teruggave van de verdachte), 
was de verdachte ernstig mishandeld tijdens de male captus en was het slachtoffer 
van de male captus aangeklaagd voor ernstige misdrijven? Tenslotte werd 
opgemerkt dat rechters soms ook aan de hele male captus discussie voorbijgingen 
door eenvoudigweg te stellen dat er überhaupt geen male captus had 
plaatsgevonden, zelfs indien er aanwijzingen waren dat iets onregelmatigs was 
gebeurd. 
Ten aanzien van de beginselen afgeleid uit de zaken tussen staten en 
internationale/geïnternationaliseerde straftribunalen (Hoofdstuk VI) werd 
geconcludeerd dat volgens deze studie de tribunalen tegenwoordig de ouderwetse 
versie van het male captus bene detentus maxime verwerpen, in die zin dat zij niet 
het idee aanhangen dat de tribunalen jurisdictie hebben, ongeacht de 
omstandigheden waarin de verdachte voor hen was gebracht. Dit kon worden 
verklaard uit het feit dat deze tribunalen, na een wellicht wat dubieuze start, vaak het 
belang van mensenrechten, due process en een eerlijk proces hebben benadrukt en 
deze concepten in het algemeen niet hebben beperkt tot het proces in de rechtszaal. 
Deze (toe te juichen) opstelling kon worden verklaard door de omstandigheid dat 
toen de in dit hoofdstuk besproken tribunalen opkwamen – vanaf de jaren 90 van de 
vorige eeuw – concepten als mensenrechten en een eerlijk proces al stevig wortel 
hadden geschoten in de denkrichting van rechters. Het veel oudere idee dat een 
proces moest worden voortgezet, wat er ook was gebeurd tijdens de procedures die 
een verdachte voor het gerecht hadden gebracht, was eenvoudigweg niet meer in 
overeenstemming met deze ideeën.  
Echter, ook in deze context van de internationale/geïnternationaliseerde 
straftribunalen werd aangetoond dat dit niet betekende dat deze als een male captus 
male detentus context kon worden beschouwd. Integendeel, hoewel in de 
interstatelijke context nog verschillende male captus zaken resulteerden in een male 
detentus uitkomst, was er maar één zaak in de context van de 
internationale/geïnternationaliseerde straftribunalen waar een male captus leidde tot 








uitkomst werd aangepast (in een bene detentus uitkomst, ‘verzacht’ met 
strafvermindering) nadat de regering van Rwanda, die niet toestond dat zo’n ‘grote 
vis’ als Barayagwiza aan justitie zou ontsnappen, haar samenwerking met het 
Tribunaal had opgezegd en nadat de Kamer van Beroep haar beslissing had herzien. 
Daarom werd beweerd dat de tribunalen, zelfs als zij de ouderwetse versie van het 
maxime niet steunen en zelfs als zij niet expliciet voorstander zijn van het male 
captus bene detentus maxime, toch gemakkelijker geassocieerd werden met het 
laatste maxime dan met zijn tegenpool male captus male detentus. Hoe kon dit 
worden verklaard? 
Hoofdstuk VII maakte duidelijk dat de tribunalen, net als de meeste nationale 
gerechten, stellen dat zij in principe jurisdictie hebben (bene detentus), maar dat een 
ernstige male captus situatie, op grond van de discretionaire abuse of process 
doctrine, tot een male detentus uitkomst kan leiden. Hierbij hebben de tribunalen 
een brede versie van de abuse of process doctrine omarmd, in die zin dat het bij het 
bepalen of de male captus zo ernstig is dat jurisdictie zou moeten worden 
geweigerd, niet zou uitmaken of de entiteit die de male captus heeft gepleegd al dan 
niet aan het tribunaal gerelateerd kan worden. Deze opvatting, zo zette Hoofdstuk 
VII uiteen, gaat duidelijk verder dan de nationale abuse of process doctrine waar de 
betrokkenheid van de autoriteiten van het vervolgende forum vereist lijkt te zijn. 
Echter, zelfs als de tribunalen een bredere versie van de abuse of process 
doctrine hadden omarmd, en zelfs als de tribunalen leken te aanvaarden – dit was 
niet helder vanwege de onduidelijke beslissing van de Kamer van Beroep van het 
ICTY in Nikolić, naar het oordeel van deze studie de belangrijkste male captus 
beslissing van de tribunalencontext – dat zij jurisdictie zouden weigeren in het geval 
van een ‘normale’ ontvoering gepleegd door hun eigen mensen – en aldus zouden 
‘duiken’ onder de male detentus standaard van het interstatelijke niveau – werden zij 
nog steeds gemakkelijker geassocieerd met de male captus bene detentus regel 
omdat geen enkele male captus situatie uiteindelijk had geleid tot een male detentus 
uitkomst. Dit, zo vervolgde Hoofdstuk VII, kon verklaard worden door de volgende 
twee factoren. (Opgemerkt zij dat de volgende twee factoren uitgaan van het bestaan 
van een male captus. Echter, net als de gerechten op het interstatelijke niveau 
kunnen ook tribunalen van oordeel zijn dat er überhaupt geen make captus had 
plaatsgevonden, zelfs als men kan betwijfelen of dat wel juist is.) 
Allereerst zal de male captus, omdat de tribunalen geen eigen politiemacht 
hebben, vaak gepleegd worden door derde partijen. Dit vermindert natuurlijk de 
ernst van de male captus. 
De tweede factor die kan verklaren dat de tribunalen nog steeds gemakkelijker 
worden geassocieerd met de male captus bene detentus regel is dat de rechters, zelfs 
wanneer zij vaststellen dat er zich een ernstige male captus heeft voorgedaan, ook 
oog hebben voor de andere kant van de medaille, namelijk de omstandigheid dat de 
verdachte is aangeklaagd voor ernstige misdrijven en dat de internationale 
gemeenschap eist dat de verdachte, indien mogelijk, vervolgd zou moeten worden. 








aspect van de aan hen voorgelegde zaak, wat belangrijker is: de male captus of het 
feit dat de verdachte wordt vervolgd. 
Met andere woorden, hoewel een ernstige male captus tot een male detentus 
uitkomst kan leiden, zelfs ten aanzien van verdachten van ernstige misdrijven (denk 
aan het bovengenoemde punt dat de tribunalen waarschijnlijk jurisdictie zullen 
weigeren wanneer hun eigen mensen betrokken zijn bij een ontvoering) is de male 
captus vaak niet zo ernstig. Niet alleen ten aanzien van de gebruikte male captus 
techniek, maar ook ten aanzien van de actoren die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de 
male captus.  
Uiteengezet werd dat een door het Bureau van de Aanklager (OTP) 
georganiseerde ontvoering dus tot het einde van de zaak kan leiden terwijl dat niet 
het geval hoeft te zijn bij een ontvoering uitgevoerd door derde partijen (zie ook de 
beslissing van de Kamer van Beroep van het ICTY in Nikolić). Dit zal 
waarschijnlijk echter anders zijn wanneer deze ontvoering gepaard gaat met andere 
ernstige schendingen/onregelmatigheden, zoals ernstige mishandeling. (Opgemerkt 
zij dat zelfs wanneer de tribunalen zich hier vaak concentreerden op ernstige 
mishandeling, de standaard ‘slechts’ zulke ernstige schendingen/onregelmatigheden 
vereist dat de rechter de zaak niet kan voortzetten, maar niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
ernstige mishandeling/op marteling gelijkende omstandigheden.) In zo’n geval kan 
de male captus ook tot een male detentus uitkomst leiden, zelfs wanneer de OTP 
niet verantwoordelijk is voor de male captus. 
Wat betreft de minder ernstige male captus situaties zoals luring zette Hoofdstuk 
VII uiteen dat een luring operatie uitgevoerd door de OTP door de vingers werd 
gezien door de Kamer van Berechting van het ICTY in Dokmanović, maar dat die 
bene detentus uitkomst anders kon zijn geweest wanneer de luring gepaard was 
gegaan met, bijvoorbeeld, ernstige mishandeling. Bovendien werd ook opgemerkt 
dat de algemene redeneringen uit, bijvoorbeeld, de Nikolić en Barayagwiza zaken, 
zaken die werden berecht ná de Dokmanović zaak, met zich mee kunnen brengen dat 
tribunaalrechters, geconfronteerd met op luring gelijkende situaties, van oordeel zijn 
dat de OTP niet met clean hands naar het hof is gekomen, dat deze zijn toevlucht 
heeft genomen tot illegale handelingen en dus dat jurisdictie moet worden 
geweigerd. 
Deze studie heeft het bovengenoemde element ‘ernst van de vermeende 
misdrijven’ erkend in de context van de discretionaire abuse of process doctrine, 
maar heeft er ook voor gewaarschuwd dat dit geen carte blanche mag worden ten 
aanzien van het overleveren van verdachten van ernstige misdrijven aan de 
tribunalen (en hetzelfde geldt voor de interstatelijke context): de visie dat men tot op 
zekere hoogte rekening kan houden met de ernst van de misdrijven wanneer men 
moet besluiten wat de gevolgen zullen zijn van een bepaalde male captus, kan op 
geen enkele wijze gezien worden als instemming met het gebruik van bepaalde male 
captus technieken in de context van internationale misdrijven. Sommige male 
captus situaties zijn zo ernstig – bijvoorbeeld omdat de OTP opzettelijk ernstige 
(procedurele) onregelmatigheden heeft gepleegd in het proces van overlevering van 








moeten worden indien het tribunaal serieus genomen wil worden als rechtshof, of 
het nu te maken heeft met een verdachte van ernstige misdrijven of niet. Men zou 
hier ook praktische overwegingen kunnen noemen; naar het oordeel van deze studie 
zou het voortzetten van de zaak onder zulke omstandigheden ook schadelijk zijn 
voor de totale missie van het tribunaal. Bovendien mag men niet vergeten dat de 
negatieve gevolgen van het voortzetten van een ontvoeringszaak niet beperkt hoeven 
te blijven tot de context van de tribunalen. Voor nationale staten/gerechten kunnen 
deze internationale instituties gezien worden als de na te volgen voorbeelden. 
Wanneer werknemers van een tribunaal betrokken zijn bij een ontvoering en daar – 
in zekere zin – mee wegkomen (omdat de rechters geen jurisdictie weigeren), dan 
kunnen nationale staten/gerechten verwijzen naar de aanpak van het tribunaal om 
hun eigen (mogelijk) dubieuze methoden teneinde verdachten voor het gerecht te 
brengen te rechtvaardigen of om hun ‘goedkeuring’ van zulke methoden te 
verdedigen door de zaak voort te zetten. Dat zou op zijn beurt weer schade 
berokkenen aan de integriteit van deze staten/gerechten, aan de mensenrechten van 
hun verdachten en – wat veel belangrijker is voor de horizontale context dan voor de 
tribunalencontext – aan de absolute fundering van het interstatelijke niveau zelf, 
namelijk aan het respect voor de soevereiniteit van een andere staat. 
Hoofdstuk VII verduidelijkte dat het element ‘ernst van de vermeende 
misdrijven’ ook werd aanvaard in de meer controversiële context van de gevolgen 
van de vaststelling dat de arrestatie of detentie van een persoon onrechtmatig was. 
Wijzende op de problemen van de remedie vrijlating zoals eerder in Hoofdstuk III 
van dit boek vastgesteld, en benadrukkende dat een vrijlating in de context van de 
tribunalen zelfs nog gemakkelijker er toe kan leiden dat een verdachte van 
internationale misdrijven, vanwege relatief kleine onregelmatigheden, aan de greep 
van justitie ontsnapt, werd aangegeven dat, hoewel het recht natuurlijk moet worden 
gerespecteerd, men ook voorzichtig moet zijn om het recht niet op zulke strikte 
wijze toe te passen dat dit tot groot onrecht verwordt: summum ius, summa iniuria. 
Met andere woorden, onderstreepte Hoofdstuk VII, de mensenrechten van alle 
verdachten moeten geëerbiedigd worden. Het feit dat men te maken heeft met 
verdachten van internationale misdrijven kan op geen enkele wijze aangegrepen 
worden als excuus om mensenrechten te schenden of om te stellen dat überhaupt 
geen schending heeft plaatsgevonden wanneer zo’n schending overduidelijk 
aanwezig was. Ook moeten, waar schendingen plaatsvinden, geëigende remedies 
worden verleend. Echter, bij het verlenen van deze remedies moet men in het oog 
houden dat men niet mogelijk de weg vrijmaakt voor absurde gevolgen die niets 
meer met het concept rechtvaardigheid te maken hebben, bijvoorbeeld, door een 
strikte toepassing van de remedie vrijlating in het geval van een onrechtmatige 
arrestatie/detentie. In zo’n geval zou het naar het oordeel van deze studie juister zijn 
om in plaats daarvan een verdachte van internationale misdrijven in hechtenis te 
houden en geëigende en werkelijke remedies te verlenen, rekening houdende met de 
ernst van de male captus.  
Een laatste belangrijk punt van Hoofdstuk VII dat in deze samenvatting genoemd 








context van een tribunaalzaak hersteld moeten worden, en dit niet alleen wanneer 
deze schendingen aan het tribunaal kunnen worden toegerekend (hoewel het 
duidelijk is dat betrokkenheid van het tribunaal tot meer verstrekkende remedies kan 
leiden).  
Deze suggestie was in de context van de abuse of process doctrine niet 
controversieel; in de context van de vraag of de male captus zo ernstig is dat de 
rechters naar eer en geweten de zaak niet kunnen voortzetten hebben de tribunalen 
bevestigd dat zij de schendingen zullen bezien, ongeacht welke entiteit 
verantwoordelijk is voor deze schendingen. 
Dit lag echter veel minder duidelijk ten aanzien van minder ernstige schendingen 
welke niet binnen het domein van de abuse of process doctrine komen. 
Desalniettemin werd gesteld dat het nogal vreemd zou zijn wanneer de tribunalen 
alleen de acties van derde partijen zouden bezien indien deze acties een bepaalde 
mate van ernst bereiken. Als het tribunaal bereid is, via de abuse of process 
doctrine, om de ultieme verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor acties van derde 
partijen (namelijk door het weigeren van jurisdictie), dan zou het ook heel wel in 
staat moeten zijn verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor minder ernstige schendingen. 
Om veilig te stellen dat de verdachte niet het slachtoffer wordt van de 
omstandigheid dat zijn proces over twee of meer systemen is verdeeld is het fair als 
de laatste oordelende instantie, het tribunaal, in de context van wiens zaak deze 
schendingen hebben plaatsgevonden, de verantwoordelijkheid neemt voor elke 
schending. Dit impliceert natuurlijk weer dat de rechter in staat moet zijn na te gaan 
hoe de arrestatie/detentie/overlevering was uitgevoerd ‘on the ground’, 
bijvoorbeeld, of de entiteiten die de arrestatie uitvoerden op verzoek van het 
tribunaal alle (nationale) arrestatieprocedures hebben geëerbiedigd. Immers, 
wanneer een arrestatie duidelijk in strijd was met zulke procedures, is het moeilijk 
vol te houden dat het recht van een persoon op vrijheid en veiligheid niet was 
geschonden, zelfs wanneer alle regels van het tribunaal (zoals het uitvaardigen van 
een geldige aanklacht en een arrestatiebevel) zijn nageleefd. 
Uiteengezet werd dat in deze specifieke context tribunaalbeslissingen zijn 
uitgevaardigd die er een enigszins non-inquiry/op male captus bene detentus 
gelijkende visie op na houden en die het idee ondersteunen dat de rechtmatigheid 
van de nationale arrestatie/detentieprocedures niet onderzocht kan worden. Echter, 
er waren ook zaken die geïnterpreteerd konden worden als inhoudend dat het 
tribunaal zou bezien wat er op het nationaal niveau gebeurde en dat het zelfs elke 
schending zou herstellen die plaatsvond in die context, ook indien het tribunaal, 
strikt genomen, hier geen verantwoordelijkheid voor droeg.  
Echter, als het inderdaad juist was dat de rechtspraak beide interpretaties bevatte, 
dan zou de rechter, zo werd gesteld, moeten kiezen voor de tweede interpretatie, de 
interpretatie die alle onregelmatigheden in de voorfase van het strafproces 
onderzoekt en die niet de toerekening van de schendingen aan het tribunaal/de 
strikte juridische verantwoordelijkheid van het tribunaal voor deze schendingen eist. 
Afschrikking, de integriteit van het proces en simple fairness ten opzichte van de 








terechtkomt) eisen dat het nu vervolgende forum alle schendingen herstelt die in de 
context van zijn zaak zijn gepleegd. Deze opstelling zou ook het (impopulaire) male 
captus bene detentus imago dat de tribunalen hebben, kunnen ‘verzachten’; het 
verlenen van remedies voor alle schendingen die zich hebben voorgedaan in de 
context van hun zaken laat zien dat de tribunalen zich niet alleen bekommeren om 
het vervolgen van verdachten van internationale misdrijven, maar ook om het veilig 
stellen van een eerlijk proces voor deze verdachten. In dit kader kon men mensen 
die bezwaar hebben tegen deze opstelling ook gerust stellen, in die zin dat het 
verlenen van remedies geen drastische gevolgen hoeft te hebben. Aannemelijk is dat 
de rechter heel vaak geconfronteerd zal worden met slechts geringe schendingen. 
Voor zulke schendingen past het om geringe remedies te verlenen, bijvoorbeeld, een 
(beperkte) strafvermindering in het geval van veroordeling. Dit leidt ertoe dat zowel 
aan het rechtvaardigheidsgevoel van de persoon in kwestie (in die zin dat de jegens 
hem begane schendingen worden hersteld) als aan dat van de slachtoffers/de 
internatonale gemeenschap als geheel (in die zin dat een verdachte van 
internationale misdrijven, indien deze schuldig wordt bevonden, een geëigende 
(hetgeen vaak zal betekenen: zware) straf voor zijn daden krijgt) tegemoet wordt 
gekomen. 
Na dit belangrijke hoofdstuk, waaraan dienovereenkomstig de nodige aandacht is 
besteed in deze samenvatting, werd het tijd om Deel 4 van dit boek te behandelen, 
dat de context van het IS onder de loep nam. In het eerste hoofdstuk van dit deel, 
Hoofdstuk VIII, werd het meer algemene samenwerkingsregime, inclusief de meer 
specifieke arrestatie- en overdrachtsbepalingen, onderzocht. In deze context werd 
ook de rol van internationale troepen bij het overdragen van verdachten aan het IS 
behandeld. Een cruciaal onderwerp, onder andere omdat staten die wensen samen te 
werken met het IS hier vaak niet toe in staat zijn omdat de oorlog die de aandacht 
van het IS heeft getrokken misschien ook het juridische systeem van deze staten 
heeft geruïneerd.  
In Hoofdstuk VIII werd speciale aandacht besteed aan artikel 59, lid 2 van het IS 
Statuut, een op habeas corpus gelijkende bepaling die gezien kan worden als een 
van de meest belangrijke in het arrestatie- en overdrachtssysteem van het IS, de 
bepaling waar het nationale en internationale niveau elkaar ontmoeten. Opgemerkt 
werd dat er nog vrij veel vragen blijven bestaan ten aanzien van deze bepaling, 
waarvan de belangrijkste is wat de gevolgen zijn wanneer de bevoegde gerechtelijke 
autoriteit in de ‘staat van bewaring’ vaststelt dat een persoon niet is aangehouden 
overeenkomstig de juiste procedure en dat de rechten van die persoon niet zijn 
geëerbiedigd. Geconcludeerd werd dat het antwoord op deze vraag van staat tot staat 
kan verschillen maar dat men het om meerdere redenen, inclusief het belangrijke feit 
dat niet-medewerkende staten deze bepaling zouden kunnen misbruiken, met de 
meeste auteurs eens kon zijn dat nationale autoriteiten zeer afkerig zouden moeten 
zijn de overdracht van een verdachte te weigeren wanneer op het nationale niveau 
wordt vastgesteld dat een persoon niet is aangehouden overeenkomstig de juiste 
procedure of dat de rechten van die persoon niet zijn geëerbiedigd. Desalniettemin 








juridische remedie is in het geval van schendingen. Echter, voor dat geval werden de 
nationale autoriteiten aan de eerder gesignaleerde problemen met betrekking tot 
deze remedie herinnerd. Sterker, in de context van het IS zou een vrijlating van een 
verdachte zelfs nog gemakkelijker kunnen leiden tot een ontsnapping, nu de 
vrijgelaten verdachte naar vele staten die niet partij zijn bij het IS zou kunnen 
vluchten. Staten die, in principe, niet verplicht zijn samen te werken met het IS, een 
kenmerk dat niet aanwezig is in de context van het ICTY/ICTR. 
Bovendien werd er ook aan herinnerd dat artikel 59 van het IS Statuut – dat in 
het algemeen veel meer belang hecht aan nationaal recht (geïnterpreteerd in het licht 
van mensenrechtenrecht) en nationale autoriteiten dan het verticale regime van het 
ICTY/ICTR doet – ‘slechts’ het arrestatieproces voor staten reguleert en dat de 
arrestatieprocedures voor bijvoorbeeld vredestroepen – indien deze mandaat hebben 
om arrestaties uit te voeren voor het IS – onduidelijk blijven. Niettemin werden 
verschillende voorstellen van rechtswetenschappers besproken die deze problemen 
zouden kunnen oplossen, zoals een directe overdracht van de verdachte door 
vredestroepen aan het IS, op voorwaarde dat bepaalde waarborgen worden 
geëerbiedigd. 
Een belangrijk punt, opgemerkt in Hoofdstuk VIII, was dat vele aspecten van de 
mensenrechtelijke habeas corpus bepalingen, dankzij de artikelen 55, 59 en 60 van 
het IS Statuut, voorkwamen in het arrestatie- en overdrachtsregime van het IS, en 
dat dit een belangrijke verbetering was vergeleken met de juridische context van het 
ICTY/ICTR, maar dat een ondubbelzinnig en expliciet recht van de verdachte om de 
rechtmatigheid van zijn arrestatie en detentie aan te vechten en om in het geval van 
een onrechtmatige arrestatie en detentie vrijgelaten te worden, ontbrak. Dit nogal 
merkwaardige punt zou terugkomen in Hoofdstuk IX. 
Tenslotte werd geconcludeerd dat Hoofdstuk VIII had uitgewezen dat het regime 
van het IS zowel verticale als horizontale elementen bevat en dat de door Currie 
geïntroduceerde term “lateraal” daarvoor een passende (en in ieder geval originele) 
kwalificatie zou kunnen zijn. 
In het volgende hoofdstuk, Hoofdstuk IX, werd het interne toetsingskader van 
deze studie gecreëerd door middel van een analyse van artikel 21 van het IS Statuut. 
Niet alleen de inhoud van de drie verschillende leden van dit artikel, maar ook de 
samenhang tussen de drie onderdelen van het eerste lid werden behandeld aan de 
hand van zowel doctrine als rechtspraak. 
Aangezien artikel 21, lid 1 onder (a) van het IS Statuut zweeg over de male 
captus kwestie, werd gebruik gemaakt van de algemene regel van uitlegging en de 
aanvullende middelen van uitlegging zoals deze gevonden kunnen worden in het 
Verdrag van Wenen inzake het verdragenrecht. Daar een 
tekstuele/contextuele/teleologische uitlegging van enkele bepalingen van de eigen IS 
documenten die gezien zouden kunnen worden als (indirect) relevant voor de male 
captus discussie geen opheldering gaf over de vraag of het IS Statuut gezien kon 
worden als duidelijk de voorkeur gevende aan hetzij male captus bene detentus 
hetzij male captus male detentus (artikel 31, lid 1 van het Verdrag van Wenen 








van het IS Statuut (artikel 32 van het Verdrag van Wenen inzake het 
verdragenrecht). Hoewel in deze documenten enkele interessante opmerkingen 
werden aangetroffen met betrekking tot de correlatie tussen het IS en de kwestie van 
onregelmatige arrestaties, inclusief een expliciete opmerking van de Jamaicaanse 
gedelegeerde Patrick Robinson dat male captus bene detentus niet van toepassing 
zou moeten zijn op de jurisdictie van het IS, werd geconcludeerd dat een analyse 
van de travaux préparatoires niet de algemene opvatting van de 120 staten die vóór 
het IS Statuut hadden gestemd met betrekking tot de male captus kwestie, had 
verduidelijkt. Daarom werd geoordeeld dat een analyse van verschillende 
bepalingen van het IS Statuut en diens travaux préparatoires geen duidelijkheid had 
geschapen ten aanzien van de male captus kwestie, hetgeen betekende dat er op dit 
punt een juridische lacune was die moest worden ingevuld met behulp van artikel 
21, lid 1 onder (b) en (c) van het IS Statuut. 
Echter, alvorens dit werd gedaan ging Hoofdstuk IX ook een gerelateerd punt na, 
namelijk wat de IS documenten zeiden over de gevolgen van een onrechtmatige 
arrestatie. Eerder was al vastgesteld – ook in deze samenvatting – dat vele aspecten 
van de mensenrechtelijke habeas corpus bepalingen, dankzij de artikelen 55, 59 en 
60 van het IS Statuut, voorkwamen in het arrestatie- en overdrachtsregime van het 
IS, maar dat een ondubbelzinnig en expliciet recht van de verdachte om de 
rechtmatigheid van zijn arrestatie en detentie aan te vechten en om in het geval van 
een onrechtmatige arrestatie en detentie vrijgelaten te worden, ontbrak. De vraag 
werd gesteld hoe het ontbreken van de remedie vrijlating, van het recht op vrijheid 
en veiligheid, zoals dat teruggevonden kan worden in artikel 55, lid 1 onder (d) van 
het IS Statuut, gezien moest worden. Moest het gezien worden als een doelbewuste 
keuze van de opstellers dat deze remedie niet van toepassing is op verdachten of was 
het eenvoudigweg vergeten of niet belangrijk genoeg geacht om te vermelden in het 
IS Statuut? 
Opnieuw werd aansluiting gezocht bij het Verdrag van Wenen inzake het 
verdragenrecht. Ook in de context van de remedie vrijlating bood een 
tekstuele/contextuele/teleologische uitlegging van artikel 55, lid 1 onder (d) van het 
IS Statuut (artikel 31 van het Verdrag van Wenen inzake het verdragenrecht) geen 
soelaas, hetgeen een analyse op basis van artikel 32 van het Verdrag van Wenen 
inzake het verdragenrecht (de travaux préparatoires) noodzakelijk maakte. 
Na een gedetailleerde analyse werd geconcludeerd dat het moeilijk was vol te 
houden dat het duidelijk is dat de opstellers van het IS Statuut bewust de remedie 
vrijlating hadden weggelaten omdat zij niet wilden dat deze remedie voorhanden 
was voor een verdachte die onrechtmatig was gearresteerd of gedetineerd. Nu de IS 
wetgeving op dit punt een juridische lacune vertoonde, was het gerechtvaardigd om 
artikel 21, lid 1 onder (b) van het IS Statuut tegen het licht te houden. 
Artikel 21, lid 1 onder (b) van het IS Statuut moest dus onderzocht worden, niet 
alleen in het kader van de echte male captus bene/male detentus vraag, maar ook in 
het kader van het punt gerelateerd aan de male captus discussie, namelijk de 








Een analyse van artikel 21, lid 1 onder (b) van het IS Statuut liet zien dat de term 
“applicable treaties” geen licht wierp op de male captus kwestie, maar dat deze term 
wel de remedie vrijlating in het geval van een onrechtmatige arrestatie/detentie 
behelsde en dat deze remedie zou kunnen worden toegepast door de IS rechters 
“where appropriate”. 
Ten aanzien van de betekenis van de term “the principles and rules of 
international law” werd geconcludeerd dat deze term in ieder geval internationaal 
gewoonterecht omvatte en dat men aan de hand van de conclusie van paragraaf 2 
van Hoofdstuk VII van dit boek kon nagaan wat internationaal gewoonterecht te 
zeggen had over de male captus kwestie. Dit was iets bijzonders, aangezien het 
externe toetsingskader van deze studie, dat (slechts) was gecreëerd om na te gaan 
hoe vergelijkbaar of verschillend de huidige opstelling van het IS ten aanzien van de 
male captus kwestie was in vergelijking met de opstelling van andere hoven, nu via 
het begrip internationaal gewoonterecht, het minder vrijblijvende interne 
toetsingskader, dat was opgezet om te zien hoe de actuele opstelling van het IS 
beoordeeld moest worden in het licht van het eigen recht van het Hof, was 
binnengedrongen. 
Opgemerkt werd dat paragraaf 2 van Hoofdstuk VII van dit boek had 
verduidelijkt dat men niet in het algemeen kan stellen dat male captus bene detentus 
of male captus male detentus een internationaal gewoonterechtelijk status had 
bereikt, aangezien zulke algemene beweringen geen recht deden aan de enorme 
variëteit aan mogelijke male captus situaties en de verschillende manieren waarop 
deze uiteenlopende situaties door gerechten waren behandeld. Sterker, Hoofdstuk 
VII had geconcludeerd dat slechts één male captus situatie waarschijnlijk gezien 
kon worden als een met internationaal gewoonterechtelijke status, namelijk de 
situatie dat rechters jurisdictie zullen weigeren in het geval van een ontvoering, 
uitgevoerd door de autoriteiten van het vervolgende forum en gevolgd door een 
protest en verzoek tot teruggave van de verdachte door de gelaedeerde staat. Echter, 
opgemerkt werd ook dat men zich vanwege de mogelijke beweegreden achter deze 
regel en de andere rol van staatssoevereiniteit in de context van het IS kan afvragen 
of de rechters het “appropriate” zouden vinden om deze regel naar het specifieke 
systeem van het IS over te zetten. Desondanks werd ook gesteld dat het IS, zelfs 
wanneer inderdaad kon worden geoordeeld dat het niet gepast zou zijn om deze 
regel naar de context van het IS over te zetten en dus dat het Hof deze niet hoefde te 
volgen, het resoluut jurisdictie zou moeten weigeren als het betrokken zou zijn bij 
een ontvoering, of deze ontvoering nu wel of niet was gevolgd door een protest en 
een verzoek tot teruggave van de verdachte door de gelaedeerde staat.       
Hierna werd de vraag gesteld, nu paragraaf 2 van Hoofdstuk VII het interne 
toetsingskader van deze studie was binnengedrongen, of ook paragraaf 3 van 
Hoofdstuk VII (de beginselen afgeleid uit de male captus rechtspraak van de 
internationale/geïnternationaliseerde straftribunalen) eveneens dit interne 
toetsingskader zouden kunnen binnendringen. Zouden deze beginselen misschien 








Gebruik makende van de traditionele definitie van internationaal gewoonterecht, 
die zich richt op de statenpraktijk (maar erkennende dat men zich kan afvragen of de 
vorming van internationaal gewoonterecht nog wel gezien kan worden als het 
privilege van staten), werd geconcludeerd dat de beslissingen van het ICTY/ICTR 
als zodanig (dus niet die beslissingen die overzichten van de statenpraktijk 
presenteerden) niet gebruikt kunnen worden om internationaal gewoonterecht op te 
sporen. Dit kon echter anders zijn ten aanzien van geïnternationaliseerde 
straftribunalen, waarvan enkele gezien zouden kunnen worden als deel uitmakende 
van het juridische systeem van een staat. 
Tenslotte werd het gerelateerde onderwerp van de remedie vrijlating behandeld. 
Geconcludeerd werd dat deze remedie gezien kon worden als een met internationaal 
gewoonterechtelijke status. Wanneer deze remedie dus niet al zou vallen onder de 
notie “applicable treaties”, zou ze in ieder geval gedekt worden door de term 
“principles and rules of international law”. 
Na deze analyse van internationaal gewoonterecht werd de vraag gesteld of de 
term “principles and rules of international law” ook méér zouden kunnen behelzen 
dan slechts internationaal gewoonterecht. Geconcludeerd werd dat dit inderdaad het 
geval was en dat de praktijk van het ICTY/ICTR (en dit zou misschien ook gelden 
voor andere internationale (juridische) instituten zoals het Mensenrechtencomité, het 
Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens en bepaalde geïnternationaliseerde 
straftribunalen) door de IS rechters zou kunnen worden toegepast wanneer deze 
rechters, na een uitvoerige analyse, van oordeel zijn dat bepaalde praktijken kunnen 
worden overgezet naar het specifieke systeem van het IS als een beginsel/regel van 
internationaal recht. In dat geval zouden ook de conclusies van paragraaf 3 van 
Hoofdstuk VII het interne toetsingskader van deze studie kunnen binnendringen. 
Wat betreft deze praktijken van de internationale straftribunalen zou men kunnen 
denken aan de aanvaarding van een breed concept abuse of process (in die zin dat 
jurisdictie in zeer ernstige male captus zaken kan worden geweigerd, ongeacht 
welke entiteit verantwoordelijk is) en aan de omstandigheid dat, bij het toepassen 
van de abuse of process doctrine, rekening kan worden gehouden met de ernst van 
de misdrijven waarvoor de verdachte is aangeklaagd. Ten aanzien van de 
gerelateerde kwestie van de remedie vrijlating zou men kunnen denken aan het feit 
dat al deze tribunalen het belang van habeas corpus hebben onderstreept, zelfs 
indien de regulerende documenten van het tribunaal in kwestie niet zo’n expliciete 
bepaling bevatten. 
Echter, opgemerkt werd ook dat wanneer de IS rechters van oordeel zijn dat het 
niet gepast zou zijn om de vaste praktijk van internationale straftribunalen met 
betrekking tot de male captus kwestie, als beginselen en regels van internationaal 
recht, naar het specifieke systeem van het IS over te zetten, of als zij van oordeel 
zijn dat men helemaal niet de jurisprudentie van deze tribunalen zou moeten bezien 
in de context van deze bepaling, dat dan artikel 21, lid 1 onder (c) van het IS Statuut 
moest worden onderzocht. 
Dientengevolge werd ook het laatste onderdeel van artikel 21, lid 1 van het IS 








beginselen bestaan ten aanzien van het male captus probleem, men opnieuw de 
overzichten van Hoofdstuk V en de afgeleide beginselen van paragraaf 2 van 
Hoofdstuk VII kon bezien. Ook hier konden dus de resultaten van het externe 
toetsingskader gebruikt worden voor het interne toetsingskader.  
Ten aanzien van het male captus bene/male detentus maxime zelf werd 
geoordeeld dat de overzichten van Hoofdstuk V duidelijk aantoonden dat men niet 
in het algemeen kan stellen dat een van beide maximes tegenwoordig gezien kan 
worden als een algemeen rechtsbeginsel. Echter, er werd ook opgemerkt dat er zeker 
elementen zijn uit de male captus rechtspraak die gedeeld werden door de meeste 
rechtssystemen, elementen die wellicht – rekening houdende met de omstandigheid 
dat de overzichten van deze studie uitgebreid maar niet uitputtend waren – gezien 
kunnen worden als algemene rechtsbeginselen op basis van de terminologie gebruikt 
in artikel 21, lid 1 onder (c) van het IS Statuut. Men kon bijvoorbeeld denken aan 
het feit dat de meeste gerechten geconfronteerd met een male captus hun discretie 
zullen gebruiken, bijvoorbeeld (in het common law systeem) met behulp van de 
abuse of process doctrine, om al de verschillende elementen van de zaak te wegen 
teneinde te beslissen of de male captus wel of niet zo ernstig is dat jurisdictie moet 
worden geweigerd. Bovendien leken de meeste gerechten alleen jurisdictie te 
weigeren wanneer hun eigen autoriteiten bij de male captus zijn betrokken. 
Tenslotte leek het erop dat nogal wat gerechten – hoewel onduidelijk was of “nogal 
wat” voldoende was om tot een algemeen rechtsbeginsel op basis van artikel 21, lid 
1 onder (c) van het IS Statuut te komen – rekening zouden houden, bij het besluit of 
jurisdictie wel of niet geweigerd moet worden, met de ernst van de misdrijven 
waarvoor het slachtoffer van de male captus was aangeklaagd.  
Ten aanzien van de gerelateerde kwestie van de remedie vrijlating werd 
geconcludeerd dat niet alleen het algemene recht op vrijheid en veiligheid/het recht 
niet te worden onderworpen aan willekeurige arrestatie of gevangenhouding, maar 
ook zijn meer specifieke habeas corpus bepaling (inclusief de vrijlating in het geval 
van een onrechtmatige (arrestatie of) detentie), gezien kon worden als een algemeen 
rechtsbeginsel. 
Tenslotte werd opgemerkt dat ook ten aanzien van onderdeel (c) (vergelijk de 
woorden “where appropriate” in de context van onderdeel (b)) de IS rechters 
waarschijnlijk alleen deze oplossingen van het nationale niveau zullen hanteren 
indien zij menen dat zij deze oplossingen kunnen overbrengen naar het specifieke 
systeem van het IS. Dat zou kunnen betekenen dat de IS rechters de bovengenoemde 
beginselen zouden kunnen volgen die aan de echte male captus kwestie gerelateerd 
kunnen worden, maar meer afwijzend zouden kunnen staan tegenover de 
problematische remedie vrijlating in het geval van een onrechtmatige 
arrestatie/detentie. 
Na een korte verwerping van artikel 21, lid 2 van het IS Statuut voor het doel van 
het interne toetsingskader van deze studie, werd aandacht besteed aan het laatste lid 
van dit cruciale artikel. 
In de analyse van artikel 21, lid 3 van het IS Statuut werd gesteld dat iedere keer 








betrokkenheid, die uitoefening van jurisdictie, toegepast en geïnterpreteerd diende te 
worden op een wijze verenigbaar met die internationaal erkende mensenrechten die 
relevant zijn voor het functioneren van het IS. Die uitoefening van 
jurisdictie/betrokkenheid omvatte natuurlijk het proces in de rechtszaal, wanneer het 
IS daadwerkelijk een zaak berecht, maar het zou ook de uitoefening van 
jurisdictie/betrokkenheid in de voorfase van het strafproces omvatten en dus ook, 
bijvoorbeeld, de acties van derde partijen indien deze partijen 
arrestaties/detenties/overdrachten uitvoeren op verzoek van het IS. Bovendien werd 
opgemerkt dat het IS in elk geval dat pad zou moeten volgen: ervoor zorg dragen dat 
iedere keer dat het IS betrokken is bij een zaak (inclusief de acties van derde partijen 
die werken op verzoek van het IS), die betrokkenheid verenigbaar is met 
internationaal erkende mensenrechten. Aangevoerd werd echter dat het zelfs nog 
fairder zou zijn wanneer het IS zijn verantwoordelijkheid neemt voor schendingen 
in de context van zijn zaak in het algemeen. Hoewel arrestaties/detenties uitgevoerd 
op verzoek van het IS een groot deel vormt van de ‘voorraad’ IS 
arrestaties/detenties, kan het IS altijd geconfronteerd worden met male captus 
claims die verder gaan dan deze situaties (vergelijk de ontvoering door 
particulieren). Het zou zeer gerechtvaardigd zijn wanneer het IS, als het ultiem 
berechtende forum, ook zulke schendingen zou herstellen, zelfs wanneer het niet 
betrokken was bij de male captus. 
Wat betreft de internationaal erkende mensenrechten die relevant zijn voor het 
functioneren van het IS in de context van de voorfase van het strafproces zou men 
bijvoorbeeld kunnen denken aan een breed concept van het recht op een eerlijk 
proces en op het recht op vrijheid en veiligheid, inclusief de remedie vrijlating in het 
geval van een onrechtmatige arrestatie/detentie.  
Tijdens de analyse van lid 3 werd de eerdere correlatie tussen de verschillende 
onderdelen van artikel 21, lid 1 van het IS Statuut opnieuw beoordeeld. Dit had 
consequenties voor de kwestie van de remedie vrijlating. Uiteengezet werd dat bij 
het interpreteren van artikel 21, lid 1 onder (a) van het IS Statuut (het recht op 
vrijheid en veiligheid zonder de remedie vrijlating in het geval van een 
onrechtmatige arrestatie/detentie) de IS rechters ook lid 3 in ogenschouw dienden te 
nemen. Aangezien dit laatste lid de remedie vrijlating in het geval van een 
onrechtmatige arrestatie/detentie omvat, hadden de rechters niet langer een discretie 
om na te gaan of het “appropriate” zou zijn om de remedie vrijlating naar de context 
van het IS over te zetten (zie lid 1 onder (b)) of om na te gaan of zij deze remedie 
zouden kunnen overbrengen in deze context (zie lid 1 onder (c)). Met andere 
woorden, de remedie vrijlating zou in beginsel toegepast moeten worden. 
Vervolgens werd uiteengezet dat deze uitkomst wellicht niet zo problematisch was 
aangezien deze studie had betoogd dat niet duidelijk kon worden vastgesteld dat de 
opstellers van het IS Statuut bewust deze remedie achterwege wilden laten. Echter, 
de zaken zouden gecompliceerder worden als men, op basis van de informatie 
gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk IX, van oordeel zou zijn dat het juist wel duidelijk de 
bedoeling was van de opstellers om deze remedie achterwege te laten. In dat geval 








van de opstellers (geen remedie vrijlating) of de remedie vrijlating op basis van lid 
3. In dit kader werden twee doctrinaire keuzen gepresenteerd, die van Pellet (wiens 
aanpak zou leiden tot de remedie vrijlating) en die van Hafner en Binder (wier 
aanpak niet zou leiden tot de remedie vrijlating). Deze studie had meer sympathie 
voor Pellets visie. 
Erkend werd echter ook dat het feit dat de IS rechters, indien zij de visie van 
Pellet zouden volgen, de remedie vrijlating moeten toepassen, zelfs wanneer het 
duidelijk de bedoeling was van de opstellers om deze remedie niét te verlenen, niet 
tot gevolg heeft dat de problemen die kunnen worden verbonden aan deze remedie 
plotseling verdwijnen. Daarom werd betoogd dat rechters konden kiezen voor de in 
dit onderzoek aangedragen oplossing; zij zouden, zich realiserende dat deze remedie 
in principe moet worden geëerbiedigd en dus dat remedies moeten worden verleend 
in het geval van een onrechtmatige arrestatie/detentie, de verdachte in hechtenis 
kunnen houden en echte remedies verlenen, een en ander afhankelijk van de 
precieze omstandigheden van het geval. Zij zouden daarbij ook kunnen vertrouwen 
op het recht op een effectieve remedie, een ander recht dat zeker gezien kan worden 
als een internationaal erkend mensenrecht op basis van artikel 21, lid 3 van het IS 
Statuut. 
In het laatste hoofdstuk van Deel 4, Hoofdstuk X, trachtte deze studie de huidige 
opstelling van het IS ten aanzien van de male captus kwestie vast te stellen door 
middel van een analyse van de drie zaken van het IS waarin het male captus item 
een (belangrijke) rol had gespeeld in het proces: Lubanga Dyilo, Bemba Gombo en 
Katanga. Aangezien het laatste hoofdstuk van dit boek, Hoofdstuk XI, de conclusies 
van Hoofdstuk X samenvatte, is het aangewezen om nu direct door te gaan naar de 
samenvatting van Hoofdstuk XI. 
In het laatste deel van dit boek, Deel 5, dat slechts uit één hoofdstuk (Hoofdstuk 
XI) bestond, kwam deze studie ten einde. Omdat dit hoofdstuk zo belangrijk is voor 
de bevindingen van deze studie zal deze samenvatting daaraan de meeste aandacht 
besteden. Dat men dit hoofdstuk niet kort kan samenvatten was ook een gevolg van 
het eerste probleem waar Hoofdstuk XI op stuitte: na de centrale vraag van deze 
studie zoals gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk I te hebben herhaald, werd opgemerkt dat 
het moeilijk is een helder antwoord te geven op deze vraag omdat de huidige 
opstelling van het IS ten aanzien van de male captus kwestie – een cruciaal 
onderdeel van de centrale vraag – niet erg duidelijk leek. Dit had verscheidene 
redenen. 
Allereerst bevatte de beslissing van de Kamer van Beroep in Lubanga Dyilo, 
volgens deze studie de meest gezaghebbende beslissing ten aanzien van deze 
kwestie, verschillende formuleringen van wat de male detentus drempel van het IS 
zou kunnen zijn. Echter, opgemerkt werd ook dat de brede eerste formulering 
(bevestigd door de derde formulering) – anders dan de beperkte tweede formulering, 
die bepaalde dat “[w]here the breaches of the rights of the accused are such as to 
make it impossible for him/her to make his/her defence within the framework of 
his[/her] rights, no fair trial can take place and the proceedings can be stayed” – 








Where fair trial becomes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of 
the suspect or the accused by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to 
put the person on trial. Justice could not be done. A fair trial is the only means to do 
justice. If no fair trial can be held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated and 
the process must be stopped [oorspronkelijke voetnoten weggelaten, ChP].   
                        
Echter, een ander probleem ten aanzien van de male captus opstelling van het IS 
werd gesignaleerd. In de Duch zaak voor het ECCC werd gesteld dat de Kamer van 
Beroep van het IS in Lubanga Dyilo ook jurisdictie zou weigeren, op grond van de 
abuse of process doctrine, in het geval van zware schendingen van de rechten van 
verdachte (waarbij men zich concentreerde op de meer ‘fysieke’ woorden ernstige 
mishandeling/marteling) als zodanig, dus ongeacht welke entiteit verantwoordelijk 
is. Hierbij werd verwezen naar de volgende formulering van de Kamer van Beroep: 
“[T]he findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber respecting the absence of torture or serious 
mistreatment have not been shown to be erroneous in any way.” Er werd echter 
uiteengezet dat het helemaal niet duidelijk was of de Kamer van Beroep van het IS, 
naast haar bovengenoemde male detentus standaard – die de betrokkenheid vereist 
van het IS (of van derde partijen die werken op verzoek van het IS), zie de woorden 
“by his/her accusers” – ook jurisdictie zou weigeren in het geval van zware 
schendingen/ernstige mishandeling/marteling als zodanig, ongeacht welke entiteit 
verantwoordelijk is (dus ook in het geval van particulieren). Allereerst werd 
aangegeven dat de opmerkingen over ernstige mishandeling/marteling van de 
Kamer van Vooronderzoek gemaakt waren in de context van de abuse of process 
doctrine, een doctrine die de Kamer van Beroep expliciet had verworpen. In de 
tweede plaats was er onduidelijkheid over de opstelling van de Kamer van 
Vooronderzoek zelf ten aanzien van de abuse of process doctrine aangezien zij 
opmerkte dat de toepassing van deze doctrine, tot op heden, “ha[d] been confined to 
instances of torture or serious mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial 
State in some way related to the process of arrest and transfer of the person to the 
relevant international criminal tribunal [nadruk toegevoegd en oorspronkelijke 
voetnoten weggelaten, ChP]”. De cursieve woorden zijn niet correct, maar het was 
onduidelijk of de Kamer van Vooronderzoek desondanks haar formulering zou 
volgen (die vereist dat de male captus wordt gepleegd door de nationale autoriteiten) 
of dat zij van oordeel zou zijn dat deze woorden inderdaad onjuist waren, hetgeen 
met zich zou mee zou brengen dat zij ook jurisdictie zou weigeren in het geval van 
ernstige mishandeling/marteling, ongeacht welke entiteit verantwoordelijk is en 
bijvoorbeeld dus ook acties van particulieren omvattende. 
Een ander onduidelijk punt had te maken met het feit dat de Kamer van Beroep 
schijnbaar akkoord ging met de visie van de Kamer van Vooronderzoek, te weten 
dat zij onregelmatigheden zou bezien indien deze waren gepleegd in de context van 
concerted action tussen het IS en derde partijen, zelfs vóórdat het verzoek van het IS 
tot aanhouding/overdracht was verstuurd (dus voor de constructive custody). Deze 
term, “concerted action”, is zeer algemeen en zou elke betrokkenheid van het IS bij 
onregelmatigheden kunnen omvatten. Echter, zelfs indien de Kamer van Beroep de 








arrestatie/detentie zou kunnen behelzen indien deze arrestatie/detentie op een 
bepaalde manier aan het IS proces kon worden gekoppeld, stelde de Kamer van 
Beroep tevens een aanvullende voorwaarde, namelijk dat alleen schendingen van de 
rechten van verdachte die gerelateerd zijn aan het “process of bringing the appellant 
to justice for the crimes that form the subject-matter of the proceedings before the 
Court (…) may provide ground for halting the process”. Dat was echter, zo werd 
gesteld, een striktere voorwaarde. 
Een laatste onduidelijkheid was dat de Kamer van Beroep van het IS een motion 
van een verdachte die beweerde het slachtoffer te zijn geweest van een male captus, 
en die volhield dat het IS jurisdictie zou moeten weigeren vanwege die male captus, 
niet zag als een betwisting van haar jurisdictie op grond van artikel 19 van het IS 
Statuut. Zij zag een dergelijk verweer als een sui generis/atypische motion die 
aanhouding van de zaak verlangde. Deze zienswijze, op grond waarvan de Kamer 
van Beroep de beslissing van de Kamer van Vooronderzoek in deze zaak 
corrigeerde, werd echter schijnbaar verworpen in de beslissing van de Kamer van 
Vooronderzoek in Katanga, uitgesproken na de beslissing van de Kamer van Beroep 
in Lubanga Dyilo. Ofschoon de Kamer van Berechting in Katanga refereerde aan de 
zienswijze van de Kamer van Beroep in Lubanga Dyilo, leverde zij daar verder geen 
commentaar op. 
Hoewel deze studie dus op verschillende onduidelijkheden met betrekking tot de 
opstelling van het IS ten aanzien van de male captus kwestie was gestuit, kon zij 
ook een paar minder onbegrijpelijke kenmerken aanduiden van de manier waarop 
het IS omgaat met een vermeende male captus zaak. 
In de eerste plaats aanvaardde het IS de doctrine die zo vaak tegenover de male 
captus bene detentus regel wordt gesteld, de abuse of process doctrine, niet, omdat 
deze niet werd gedekt door artikel 21 van het IS Statuut. Echter, wat wel was gedekt 
door deze bepaling, namelijk door lid 3, was de mensenrechtelijke dimensie van de 
abuse of process doctrine. Het was die mensenrechtelijke dimensie die het IS 
gebruikte om male captus claims op te lossen. Het was duidelijk dat het IS in theorie 
veel belang hechtte aan mensenrechten – en de mensenrechten op een eerlijk proces 
en op vrijheid en veiligheid (inclusief het recht de rechtmatigheid van de detentie 
aan te vechten, een recht dat niet expliciet genoemd wordt in de eigen documenten 
van het IS) in het bijzonder. 
Het IS leek zich verder te concentreren op de schendingen zelf en niet zozeer op 
de vraag of het IS (of derde partijen die werkten op verzoek van het IS) opzettelijk 
bepaalde normen schond(en). Wat echter wel vereist leek te zijn, zie de Bemba 
Gombo zaak, was dat de schendingen moesten resulteren in werkelijk nadeel voor 
de verdachte. 
Een ander belangrijk aspect van de male captus kwestie betrof de rol van de 
bevoegde gerechtelijke autoriteit van de ‘staat van bewaring’ in de hele procedure. 
Hoofdstuk XI liet zien dat de Kamer van Beroep in Lubanga Dyilo, in tegenstelling 
tot de Kamer van Vooronderzoek, niet uiteenzette in hoeverre die autoriteit, op basis 
van artikel 59 van het IS Statuut, onregelmatigheden voorafgaand aan de officiële 








van Vooronderzoek, verduidelijkte de Kamer van Beroep niet de rol van de IS 
rechters, die marginaal toezien op het bepaalde in artikel 59, lid 2 onder (b) en (c) 
van het IS Statuut, in deze context van de eerdere arrestatie/detentie. Tenslotte, en 
hierbij weer de Kamer van Vooronderzoek volgend, helderde de Kamer van Beroep 
niet op in hoeverre rekening moest worden gehouden met bepalingen zoals artikel 
21, lid 3 van het IS Statuut en artikel 55, lid 1 onder (d) van het IS Statuut. Men leek 
zich alleen op nationaal recht te concentreren. 
Een laatste punt was dat de Kamer van Beroep alleen geïnteresseerd leek in de 
ultieme remedie, de weigering van jurisdictie/het stilleggen van het proces. 
Nu de huidige opstelling van het IS ten opzichte van de male captus kwestie was 
beschreven – rekening houdend met het feit dat verschillende aspecten niet erg 
duidelijk waren – werd die opstelling beoordeeld in de context van het externe 
toetsingskader van dit boek, vis-à-vis de opstelling van andere hoven. 
Allereerst werd uiteengezet dat het erop leek dat het IS, zoals bijna elke modern 
gerecht of tribunaal, niet de ouderwetse versie van male captus bene detentus 
aanvaardde dat jurisdictie zal worden uitgeoefend, ongeacht de manier waarop de 
verdachte in het gezag van het Hof was gekomen. Mensenrechten werden zeer 
belangrijk geacht en strekten zich uit tot het gehele proces, inclusief de voorfase van 
het strafproces. Dit omvatte het (voor deze studie) zo belangrijke mensenrecht op 
vrijheid en veiligheid, inclusief zijn deelrecht om de rechtmatigheid van de detentie 
aan te vechten, zelfs indien dat deelrecht niet expliciet was genoemd in de eigen 
documenten van het IS. Deze opstelling, zo werd gesteld, leek op de opstelling van 
andere tribunalen. Op grond daarvan zullen IS rechters de voorfase van het 
strafproces onderzoeken om na te gaan wat voor effect schendingen van deze 
rechten zouden kunnen hebben op de jurisdictie van het Hof. Er werd opgemerkt dat 
de Kamer van Berechting in Katanga dit niet had gedaan op procedurele gronden – 
en hiervoor kon worden bekritiseerd – maar dat het onduidelijk, en zelfs 
onwaarschijnlijk, was dat deze beslissing gezien kon worden als steun voor de 
hierboven genoemde ouderwetse versie van male captus bene detentus. 
Hoofdstuk XI zette vervolgens uiteen dat wanneer men van oordeel was dat de 
enige echte male detentus standaard van de Kamer van Beroep van het IS gevonden 
kon worden in de eerste formulering uit Lubanga Dyilo (zie het bovengenoemde 
blokcitaat in deze samenvatting), het IS dan de zienswijze deelde van, bijvoorbeeld, 
de Kamer van Berechting van het ICTY in Nikolić en de Ebrahim zaak, in die zin 
dat de Aanklager (inclusief derde partijen die op zijn verzoek werken) naar het 
gerecht moeten komen with clean hands. Indien dat niet het geval zou zijn, 
bijvoorbeeld indien de fundamentele rechten van de verdachte geschonden waren in 
diens overdrachtsproces aan het IS, dan zouden rechters kunnen concluderen dat 
men niet meer van een eerlijk proces in de brede zin des woords kan spreken, een 
conclusie die tot het einde van de zaak moet leiden. Er werd opgemerkt dat nu de 
omschrijving “breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect” zeer algemeen was 
geformuleerd, deze allerlei male captus situaties zou kunnen omvatten, zoals 
ontvoeringen, luring situaties en andere technieken die (mogelijk) gezien konden 








Voordat Hoofdstuk XI verder ging met dit onderwerp, werd aangegeven dat het 
IS zich leek te concentreren op de schendingen zelf en niet zozeer op de vraag of het 
IS (of derde partijen die werken op verzoek van het IS) opzettelijk bepaalde normen 
hebben geschonden. Dit kon worden beschouwd als een vrij liberale opvatting 
omdat andere hoven in hun male detentus standaarden vaak een intentie hadden 
geëist aan de zijde van de vervolgende autoriteiten om de male captus te plegen. 
Echter, wat wel vereist leek te zijn, zie de Bemba Gombo zaak, was dat schendingen 
moesten resulteren in werkelijk nadeel voor de verdachte. Andere tribunaalzaken 
konden daarentegen gezien worden als steun voor de visie dat de mate van nadeel 
alleen relevant was om de ernst van de schendingen te bepalen (en derhalve wat 
voor soort remedie moest worden verleend) en niet voor de vraag of er überhaupt 
schendingen waren/of de verdachte recht had op een remedie. 
Vervolgens kwam Hoofdstuk XI terug op het punt dat de omschrijving van het 
IS “breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect” zo algemeen was 
geformuleerd dat deze allerlei soorten male captus situaties zou kunnen omvatten, 
inclusief ontvoeringen en luring situaties. 
Uiteengezet werd dat indien het IS jurisdictie zou weigeren wanneer de accusers 
van de verdachte verantwoordelijk waren voor een ontvoering als zodanig, het zich 
zou aansluiten bij beslissingen als Levinge, Bennett, Ebrahim en Beahan. Daar ging 
het om opvattingen die onder de standaard ‘doken’ ten aanzien waarvan de meer 
recente statenpraktijk het er schijnbaar over eens was dat deze, in elk geval, moet 
leiden tot een verwerping van de male captus bene detentus regel (zie de hierboven 
genoemde Toscanino uitzonderingen). Met betrekking tot de context van de 
tribunalen werd verduidelijkt dat indien het IS jurisdictie zou weigeren wanneer de 
accusers van de verdachte verantwoordelijk zouden zijn voor een ontvoering als 
zodanig, het IS zich waarschijnlijk ook zou aansluiten bij de tribunaalzaken. Hoewel 
geen van deze zaken betrekking had op door het tribunaal zelf uitgevoerde 
ontvoeringen kon men hier verwijzen naar algemene verklaringen uit, bijvoorbeeld, 
Nikolić en Barayagwiza. 
Overstappende naar het concept luring zette deze studie uiteen dat de 
omschrijving van het IS “breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect” zo 
algemeen geformuleerd was dat het ook een luring situatie kon omvatten, zolang de 
rechters maar van oordeel waren dat dit een schending van de fundamentele rechten 
van de verdachte (namelijk zijn recht op vrijheid en veiligheid) zou opleveren. Als 
dat zo zou zijn, zou het IS de meer progressieve interstatelijke zaken Levinge en 
Bennett volgen, zaken die/waarvan men vindt dat zij zeer algemene male detentus 
redeneringen bevatten en die luring situaties zouden kunnen omvatten (zelfs indien 
deze zaken zelf geen luring operaties betroffen), maar dat het zich zou distantiëren 
van de interstatelijke luring zaken als Yunis en Stocké waar de rechters 
waarschijnlijk alleen jurisdictie zouden weigeren indien de luring gepaard zou gaan 
met ernstige mishandeling. De tribunalencontext, zo vervolgde Hoofdstuk XI, was 
echter minder duidelijk. Hoewel helder was dat wanneer het IS jurisdictie zou 
weigeren in een luring zaak als zodanig, het zich liberaler zou opstellen dan de 








omschrijvingen van de tribunalen bekendgemaakt na Dokmanović die ook een 
luring operatie zouden kunnen omvatten. 
Terugkerende naar ‘de’ opstelling van het IS merkte Hoofdstuk XI vervolgens op 
dat indien men daarentegen van oordeel zou zijn dat het vereiste van de Kamer van 
Beroep dat men niet langer kan spreken van een eerlijk proces, gezien moest worden 
in de beperkte zin des woords, namelijk een eerlijk proces in de rechtszaal (zie de 
bovengenoemde tweede formulering van de standaard van het IS, welke vereist dat 
de schendingen van dien aard moeten zijn dat de aangeklaagde niet meer zijn 
verdediging kan voeren, ten aanzien waarvan deze studie ook concludeerde dat het 
onduidelijk was of dit de male detentus opstelling is van het IS), dat dan de 
opstelling van het IS naar het oordeel van deze studie afwijkend was van de meeste 
meer recente nationale en internationale hoven. De meeste van deze hoven – hoewel 
er ook een paar uitzonderingen waren – weigerden schijnbaar ook jurisdictie, niet 
alleen wanneer men niet meer kan spreken van een eerlijk proces in de beperkte zin 
des woords, maar ook in de brede zin, namelijk wanneer het meer in het algemeen 
unfair zou zijn/het de integriteit van het hof zou ondermijnen om überhaupt een zaak 
te beginnen (hierbij vaak gebruik makende van de abuse of process doctrine). 
Een ander punt dat beoordeeld moest worden betrof de onduidelijkheid over de 
vraag of de male detentus standaard van de Kamer van Beroep betrokkenheid van 
het IS vereiste, of dat het IS ook jurisdictie zou weigeren in het geval van, 
bijvoorbeeld, ernstige mishandeling/marteling, ongeacht welke entiteit 
verantwoordelijk is, zoals wanneer die mishandeling/marteling was gepleegd door 
particulieren. 
Uiteengezet werd dat als men ervan uitging dat het IS alleen de male detentus 
standaard volgde die betrokkenheid van het IS zelf vereist, het IS dan de meeste 
nationale zaken zou volgen die de betrokkenheid van eigen mensen eisen. Echter, in 
dat geval zou dit ook duidelijk afwijken van de tribunaalzaken die erkennen dat, op 
grond van de abuse of process doctrine, een doctrine die de Kamer van Beroep van 
het IS verwierp, zeer ernstige male captus zaken kunnen leiden tot het einde van de 
zaak, ongeacht welke entiteit verantwoordelijk is. 
Indien (de Kamer van Beroep van) het IS echter jurisdictie zou weigeren bij zeer 
ernstige male captus zaken, ongeacht welke entiteit verantwoordelijk is – zó hebben 
de onderzoeksrechters in Duch de beslissing van de Kamer van Beroep gelezen – en 
indien zij/het de uiteenzetting van de Kamer van Vooronderzoek in die zaak zou 
volgen (uitgaande van het feit dat de verwijzing naar “torture or serious 
mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial State [nadruk toegevoegd, 
ChP]” onjuist was), dan zou (de Kamer van Beroep van) het IS ook erkennen dat 
deze male detentus route niet beperkt is tot marteling of ernstige mishandeling, zie 
de formulering van de Kamer van Vooronderzoek dat de toepassing van de abuse of 
process doctrine “to date (…) ha[d] been confined to instances of torture or serious 
mistreatment by national authorities of the custodial State in some way related to the 
process of arrest and transfer of the person to the relevant international criminal 
tribunal [nadruk toegevoegd en oorspronkelijke voetnoten weggelaten, ChP]”. Dit 








weigeren in andere ernstige male captus zaken dan ernstige mishandeling/marteling. 
Opgemerkt werd dat deze opvatting vergelijkbaar leek te zijn met de opstelling van 
de tribunalen. Hoewel verschillende zaken, wellicht geïnspireerd door de 
terminologie van de Kamer van Berechting in Dokmanović, een zaak die was 
berecht vóór (de abuse of process standaard van) de Barayagwiza zaak, zich hadden 
geconcentreerd op de meer ‘fysiek’ getinte woorden “serious mistreatment” en 
“torture”, had de recentere Karadžić zaak verduidelijkt dat ernstige 
mishandeling/marteling slechts gezien moeten worden als voorbeelden van zaken 
die zo ernstig zijn dat een hof jurisdictie zou kunnen weigeren. 
Een ander punt dat Hoofdstuk XI moest bespreken betrof de scope of review. 
Zoals hierboven besproken, bestond er onduidelijkheid over de vraag of de Kamer 
van Beroep, voorafgaand aan de constructive custody van het IS, onregelmatigheden 
zou onderzoeken tijdens een nationale detentie die meer in het algemeen het gevolg 
zijn van concerted action tussen het IS en derde partijen of dat zij alleen 
onregelmatigheden zou bezien wanneer de verdachte in detentie zou verblijven voor 
dezelfde misdrijven als waarvoor hij nu berecht wordt bij het IS. 
Allereerst werd de context van de constructive custody zelf behandeld. Het leek 
erop dat het IS aanvaardde dat het alle schendingen zou onderzoeken en daarvoor 
verantwoordelijkheid zou nemen die plaatsvinden in deze context, dat wil zeggen 
met betrekking tot een arrestatie/detentie uitgevoerd op verzoek van het IS. 
Opgemerkt werd dat verschillende tribunaalzaken gezien konden worden als steun 
voor die visie, hoewel er ook zaken waren waarin de rechters weigerden de 
rechtmatigheid van de nationale arrestatie/detentie procedures te beoordelen. 
Ten aanzien van het onderzoeken van onregelmatigheden, anders dan die 
gepleegd in de constructive custody, werd uiteengezet dat indien het IS meer in het 
algemeen onregelmatigheden zou bezien die het resultaat waren van concerted 
action tussen het IS en derde partijen, het verschillende (inter)nationale hoven zou 
volgen die erkend hadden dat verantwoordelijkheid moet worden genomen voor een 
actie waarin eigen autoriteiten van het vervolgende forum participeerden, waarbij 
die eigen autoriteiten betrokken waren. Echter, zo vervolgde Hoofdstuk XI, er waren 
ook rechters die de kwestie van verantwoordelijkheid breder bezagen en die zich 
niet beperkten tot concerted action. Tenslotte werd opgemerkt dat indien (de Kamer 
van Beroep van) het IS niet concerted action in het algemeen zou bezien, maar 
alleen onregelmatigheden, voorafgaand aan de constructive custody van het IS, 
wanneer de verdachte in detentie zou verblijven voor dezelfde misdrijven als 
waarvoor hij nu wordt vervolgd bij het IS, die opvatting zou afwijken van andere 
(inter)nationale hoven die enkel geïnteresseerd lijken te zijn in de ernst van de 
onregelmatigheden in de voorfase van het strafproces, los van de vraag of de 
verdachte nu wel of niet in detentie zat voor dezelfde misdrijven als waarvoor het 
hof hem nu vervolgt. 
Hierna werden nog enkele overgebleven punten van het externe toetsingskader 
kort behandeld.  
Allereerst werd opgemerkt dat de bevoegde gerechtelijke autoriteit in de ‘staat 








invloedrijkere schakel was geworden in de overdrachtsprocedures dan de nationale 
autoriteiten in de context van de VN ad hoc Tribunalen. 
In de tweede plaats werd uiteengezet dat de (mogelijke) opvatting van het IS dat 
een male captus motion niet gezien kan worden als een betwisting van de jurisdictie 
(ratione personae) van het IS, niet gedeeld lijkt te worden door andere 
(inter)nationale hoven, zelfs als, strikt genomen, de motion de uitoefening van 
persoonlijke jurisdictie en niet de persoonlijke jurisdictie zelf betwist. 
In de derde plaats werd ten aanzien van de omstandigheid dat het IS zich alleen 
concentreerde op de ultieme remedie (male detentus), opgemerkt dat de zaken 
onderzocht op het interstatelijke niveau niet duidelijk de zienswijze aanhingen dat 
de verdachte, wanneer zijn claim voor een male detentus was verworpen, recht zou 
kunnen hebben op andere remedies van het vervolgende forum zoals 
strafvermindering of financiële compensatie, hoewel het natuurlijk mogelijk bleef 
voor het male captus slachtoffer om zijn kidnappers in een civiele zaak aan te 
klagen. Met betrekking tot de context van de tribunalen werd uiteengezet dat het 
gegeven dat men enkel aandacht had voor de ultieme remedie, weigering van 
jurisdictie, hier zeker kon worden teruggevonden. Echter, zo vervolgde Hoofdstuk 
XI, er waren ook zaken waarin de rechters, na de male detentus claim te hebben 
verworpen, hebben onderzocht of de verdachte niettemin recht zou hebben op 
andere, minder verstrekkende, remedies. 
In de vierde plaats werd opgemerkt dat het IS nog niet expliciet het element 
‘ernst van de misdrijven’ had genoemd bij het beoordelen van male captus claims, 
een element dat kon worden gevonden in de context van zowel de interstatelijke 
zaken als de tribunaalzaken. Dit was echter niet zo vreemd aangezien het IS de 
abuse of process doctrine had verworpen, een doctrine waarin dit element een 
belangrijke rol speelde. Uiteengezet werd dat indien het IS de Kamer van 
Vooronderzoek echter zou volgen en zou overwegen jurisdictie te weigeren in het 
geval van ernstige schendingen, ongeacht welke entiteit verantwoordelijk is 
(vooralsnog aannemende dat dit de opstelling van de Kamer van Vooronderzoek is), 
men dan kan verwachten dat het IS niet te gemakkelijk jurisdictie zou weigeren en 
in dat kader zou verwijzen zowel naar de afwezigheid van verantwoordelijkheid aan 
de zijde van de accusers van de verdachte als naar het belang van vervolging (lees: 
de ernst van de vermeende misdrijven van de verdachte).  
Een laatste punt was dat het IS niet expliciet het male captus bene/male detentus 
maxime onderschreef. Dit was vergelijkbaar met andere gerechten en tribunalen. 
Ofschoon de Kamer van Beroep de male captus bene detentus regel en de abuse of 
process doctrine tegenover elkaar stelde en hoewel deze laatste doctrine door de 
Kamer van Beroep verworpen werd, hetgeen geïnterpreteerd zou kunnen worden als 
aanwijzing voor het feit dat de Kamer van Beroep de male captus bene detentus 
regel volgde, was dit laatste zeker niet het geval, aangezien de Kamer van Beroep 
duidelijk een aanmerkelijk gedeelte, namelijk de mensenrechtelijke dimensie, van 








Vervolgens beoordeelde Hoofdstuk XI de opstelling van het IS met betrekking 
tot de male captus kwestie in de context van het interne toetsingskader van deze 
studie, vis-à-vis het recht van het IS zelf. 
Na het in deze samenvatting reeds genoemde punt herhaald te hebben dat deze 
studie had laten zien dat de twee toetsingskaders konden samengaan, dat enige 
onduidelijke begrippen uit artikel 21 van het IS Statuut – het centrale artikel van het 
interne toetsingskader – de resultaten van het externe toetsingskader konden 
omvatten, werd de vraag gesteld of enkele aspecten van wat de opstelling van het IS 
met betrekking tot de male captus kwestie zou kunnen zijn (zoals reeds uiteengezet 
was deze niet helemaal helder), in overeenstemming waren met artikel 21, lid 3 van 
het IS Statuut. 
Uiteengezet werd bijvoorbeeld dat men zich kan afvragen of de standaard die 
vereist dat bepaalde schendingen van dien aard moeten zijn dat de persoon niet meer 
zijn verdediging kan voeren alvorens men kan spreken van de onmogelijkheid van 
een eerlijk proces – hetgeen de male detentus standaard van het IS zou kunnen zijn, 
hoewel dit werd betwijfeld door deze studie – wel in overeenstemming was met 
artikel 21, lid 3 van het IS Statuut. Opgemerkt werd dat deze laatste bepaling zeker 
het mensenrecht op een eerlijk proces omvatte en wel, naar het oordeel van deze 
studie, op een eerlijk proces dat niet was beperkt tot een eerlijk proces in de 
rechtszaal, maar dat zich uitstrekte tot de gehele procedure. Echter, aangegeven 
werd ook dat indien het IS zou blijven bij zijn omschrijving die zich richtte op een 
breed concept van een eerlijk proces (en dat was waarschijnlijk aannemelijker), er 
geen schending van het IS recht zou zijn. In deze context werd ook uiteengezet dat 
de visie van het IS dat een breed concept van een eerlijk proces gekoesterd moest 
worden, zelfs ten aanzien van personen die aangeklaagd zijn voor zeer ernstige 
misdrijven, zeker verenigbaar was met internationaal erkende mensenrechten. 
Vervolgens werd opgemerkt dat artikel 21, lid 3 van het IS Statuut ook het 
mensenrecht op vrijheid en veiligheid omvatte, inclusief het recht van een persoon 
om de rechtmatigheid van zijn detentie aan te vechten, zelfs als dat recht niet 
expliciet genoemd was door het IS Statuut, en dat de weigering van de rechters in de 
Katanga zaak om de motion van de verdachte te bezien die de rechtmatigheid van 
zijn arrestatie en detentie in de voorfase van het strafproces aanvocht, enkel en 
alleen omdat de motion te laat was ingediend, mogelijk gezien zou kunnen worden 
als een schending van dit recht en dus van het IS recht. In dit verband werd 
uiteengezet dat dit recht zo cruciaal was dat het IS, op basis van artikel 21, lid 3 van 
het IS Statuut, een dergelijk verweer altijd moet toelaten en moet bezien, al 
helemaal wanneer de motion aanvoert dat de onrechtmatigheid van de 
arrestatie/detentie zo ernstig was dat het tot het einde van de zaak zou moeten 
leiden. Dit was het geval, ongeacht of het verweer, strikt genomen, nu wel of niet 
gezien kon worden als een betwisting van de jurisdictie van het IS. 
Hoofdstuk XI zette vervolgens uiteen dat de omstandigheid dat het IS zich 
concentreerde op de schendingen zelf (en niet zozeer op de vraag of rechten 
opzettelijk waren geschonden), gezien kon worden als zijnde in overeenstemming 








waarvan paragraaf 3 van Hoofdstuk IX had geconcludeerd dat het ook kon worden 
gekwalificeerd als een internationaal erkend mensenrecht. Echter, er werd ook 
aangegeven dat het aanvullende vereiste zoals gevonden kon worden in de Bemba 
Gombo zaak – te weten dat de schending daadwerkelijk nadeel moet hebben 
berokkend aan de verdachte voordat remedies kunnen worden toegekend – niet in 
overeenstemming met dit recht zou zijn. 
Hoofdstuk XI bezag vervolgens het gegeven dat het IS had erkend dat het iedere 
keer dat het jurisdictie zou uitoefenen, iedere keer dat het betrokken was bij een 
zaak, die betrokkenheid verenigbaar diende te zijn met internationaal erkende 
mensenrechten. Dit leek een correcte interpretatie van artikel 21, lid 3 van het IS 
Statuut te zijn. Daarna werd uiteengezet dat indien (de Kamer van Beroep van) het 
IS akkoord zou gaan met de zienswijze van de Kamer van Vooronderzoek dat 
zij/het, behalve de onregelmatigheden gepleegd in de constructive custody van de 
verdachte, ook onregelmatigheden zou bezien die het resultaat zijn van concerted 
action tussen het IS en derde partijen, deze opvatting in overeenstemming zou zijn 
met de draagwijdte van artikel 21, lid 3 van het IS Statuut. Echter, opgemerkt werd 
ook dat indien de Kamer van Beroep vast hield aan haar aanvullende vereiste, te 
weten dat zij alleen onregelmatigheden begaan tegen de verdachte zou bezien 
wanneer deze verdachte in detentie verbleef voor dezelfde misdrijven als waarvoor 
hij nu vervolgd wordt bij het IS, dit als een schending van artikel 21, lid 3 van het IS 
Statuut zou kunnen worden gezien, aangezien die bepaling van toepassing was op 
èlke situatie waarbij het IS is betrokken. 
Een van de meest interessante punten van het interne toetsingskader was dat de 
male detentus standaard van het IS uitging van de betrokkenheid van het IS (of van 
derde partijen die voor het IS werken). Het leek dat het IS niet jurisdictie zou 
weigeren indien bijvoorbeeld particulieren verantwoordelijk zouden zijn voor een 
zeer ernstige male captus. Dit zou niet problematisch zijn wanneer het IS de abuse 
of process doctrine had aanvaard, die zeer algemeen is en slechts vereist dat de 
rechters jurisdictie moeten weigeren indien zij van mening zijn dat de male captus 
zo ernstig is dat het de integriteit van het hof/hun rechtsgevoel/het idee van een 
eerlijk proces in het algemeen zou ondermijnen indien de zaak zou worden 
voortgezet. Echter, het IS had deze doctrine verworpen. Hoe diende deze 
verwerping van de abuse of process doctrine te worden beoordeeld vis-à-vis het 
recht van het IS? 
Opgemerkt werd dat de rechters van het IS gelijk hadden toen zij stelden dat 
deze doctrine niet in de eigen IS documenten op basis van artikel 21, lid 1 onder (a) 
van het IS Statuut kon worden gevonden. Echter, na verduidelijkt te hebben dat een 
zekere bepaling in het IS Statuut – artikel 4, lid 1 van het IS Statuut – “cannot be 
construed as providing power to stay proceedings for abuse of process”, 
concludeerden zij dat artikel 21, lid 1 onder (a) van het IS Statuut uitputtend was ten 
aanzien van deze kwestie en dus dat artikel 21, lid 1 onder (b) en (c) van het IS 
Statuut niet behandeld hoefde te worden. 
Serieuze twijfel werd echter geuit of deze conclusie wel in overeenstemming was 








concluderen dat het IS Statuut ten aanzien van deze kwestie uitputtend was om de 
enkele reden dat de abuse of process doctrine niet expliciet genoemd danwel 
impliciet (via – het ogenschijnlijk irrelevante – artikel 4, lid 1 van het IS Statuut) 
gedekt werd door de IS documenten. Uiteengezet werd dat de rechters, die naar het 
oordeel van deze studie zich hier teveel concentreerden op de common law 
kwalificatie ‘abuse of process’, niet serieus andere relevante bepalingen hadden 
onderzocht welke licht konden werpen op de vraag of het IS de mogelijkheid had 
om een male detentus oordeel uit te spreken in het geval van een ernstige male 
captus, met in acht name van de regels van uitlegging van het Verdrag van Wenen 
inzake het verdragenrecht (zoals was gedaan in Hoofdstuk IX van dit boek). 
Hoofdstuk XI stelde dat het aanmerkelijk uitgebreidere onderzoek in Hoofdstuk IX 
naar het oordeel van deze studie had aangetoond dat artikel 21, lid 1 onder (a) van 
het IS Statuut, rekening houdende met artikel 21, lid 3 van het IS Statuut, niet 
uitputtend was ten aanzien van deze kwestie en dat men dus aandacht zou kunnen 
besteden aan artikel 21, lid 1 onder (b) en (c) van het IS Statuut teneinde deze 
juridische lacune in te vullen. En zoals in dat hoofdstuk betoogd, de mogelijkheid 
van een hof om jurisdictie te weigeren in het geval van een ernstige male captus zou 
gezien kunnen worden als een beginsel/regel van internationaal recht op basis van 
artikel 21, lid 1 onder (b) van het IS Statuut (namelijk als praktijk van internationale 
hoven) dan wel als een algemeen rechtsbeginsel op basis van artikel 21, lid 1 onder 
(c) van het IS Statuut. Bovendien werd uiteengezet dat, nu de mogelijkheid van een 
hof om in zeer ernstige male captus zaken jurisdictie te weigeren, zonder nu te letten 
op de precieze kwalificatie daarvan (zoals abuse of process/supervisory powers), 
door zoveel (inter)nationale hoven was aangewend, dit gezien zou kunnen worden 
als een inherente mogelijkheid van ieder hof, inclusief van het IS (zelfs indien dit 
niet geconstrueerd zou kunnen worden via artikel 4, lid 1 van het IS Statuut). 
Een ander belangrijk aspect van het interne toetsingskader betrof de visie van het 
IS met betrekking tot artikel 59 van het IS Statuut. Hoewel de Kamer van Beroep in 
Lubanga Dyilo niet inging op deze kwestie, verduidelijkte de Kamer van 
Vooronderzoek in deze zaak dat de bevoegde gerechtelijke autoriteit in de ‘staat van 
bewaring’ niet verplicht was de voorfase van het strafproces te bezien indien die 
fase alleen nationale procedures betrof. Echter, zo vervolgde Hoofdstuk XI, dat leek 
te betekenen dat het de bevoegde gerechtelijke autoriteit dus wel toegestaan was dit 
te doen en deze zelfs verplicht was dit te doen in het geval dat die nationale 
procedures op enigerlei wijze in verband gebracht konden worden met het IS, 
bijvoorbeeld omdat het IS betrokken was bij deze procedures. Opgemerkt werd dat 
dat een rol zou zijn in overeenstemming met artikel 21, lid 3 van het IS Statuut, dat 
verenigbaarheid met internationaal erkende mensenrechten eiste vanaf het moment 
dat het IS betrokken was bij een zaak, hetgeen natuurlijk het geval kan zijn vóórdat 
de officiële verzoeken aan de nationale autoriteit waren verzonden. Echter, ten 
aanzien van de rol van de IS rechters, de supervisoren die deze bepaling marginaal 
beoordelen, merkte Hoofdstuk XI op dat noch de Kamer van Vooronderzoek, noch 
de Kamer van Beroep bespraken in hoeverre deze rechters de fase voordat de 








beide Kamers, en hetzelfde geldt voor de rechters in Bemba Gombo, niet duidelijk 
de wijze van tenuitvoerlegging van de officiële IS arrestatie aan de hand van 
bepalingen als artikel 21, lid 3 en 55, lid 1 onder (d) van het IS Statuut. (Zij 
onderstreepten in hun beslissingen slechts het belang van zulke rechten in het 
algemeen.) Zij leken alleen geïnteresseerd in nationaal recht. Gesteld werd dat deze 
beperkte interpretatie in strijd was met het eigen recht van het IS, aangezien beide 
bepalingen zeker van toepassing zijn op de procedures van artikel 59 van het IS 
Statuut. (Artikel 21, lid 3 van het IS Statuut is reeds van toepassing vanaf het 
moment dat het IS betrokken raakt bij de zaak en artikel 55, lid 1 onder (d) van het 
IS Statuut is reeds van toepassing vanaf het moment dat het IS een onderzoek start.) 
Het laatste punt dat behandeld moest worden was dat de Kamer van Beroep 
alleen geïnteresseerd was in de ultieme remedie, de weigering van jurisdictie/het 
stilleggen van het proces. Echter, uiteengezet werd dat artikel 21, lid 3 van het IS 
Statuut het internationaal erkende mensenrecht op een effectieve remedie bevatte in 
geval van een schending. Dit betekende dat elke schending vanaf het moment dat 
het IS betrokken raakt bij de zaak hersteld moest worden, of dit nu wel of niet leidt 
tot het einde van de zaak. Hoewel het mogelijk was dat er geen schendingen hadden 
plaatsgevonden in Lubanga Dyilo vanaf het moment dat het IS daarbij betrokken 
raakte (en dus dat schending van het IS recht niet had plaatsgevonden in deze zaak), 
werd het IS er in het algemeen aan herinnerd niet te vergeten dat verdachten, op 
basis van artikel 21, lid 3 van het IS Statuut, recht zouden hebben op geëigende 
remedies in het geval van schendingen vanaf het moment dat het IS bij de zaak 
betrokken raakt.  
Nu de centrale vraag van deze studie was beantwoord, stapte Hoofdstuk XI over 
naar de belangrijkste aanbevelingen.  
Allereerst werd betoogd dat het IS tenminste zijn eigen recht zou moeten volgen. 
Dit betekende dat het IS alle bovenstaande opvattingen zou moeten verwerpen die 
gezien zouden kunnen worden als zijnde in strijd met artikel 21 van het IS Statuut, 
en dan met name lid 3 daarvan. 
Aldus werd gesteld dat het IS het ouderwetse en beperkte concept van een eerlijk 
proces zou moeten prijsgeven, te weten dat sommige schendingen van dien aard 
moeten zijn dat de persoon niet meer zijn verdediging kan voeren alvorens men kan 
spreken van de onmogelijkheid van een eerlijk proces (indien dat concept inderdaad 
gesteund werd door het IS in de male captus discussie).  
Verder werd opgemerkt dat het toe te juichen valt dat het IS in theorie zo vaak 
het belang van mensenrechten heeft onderstreept, zelfs voor verdachten van de 
meest ernstige misdrijven en zelfs ten aanzien van rechten die niet expliciet 
genoemd zijn in het IS Statuut (zoals het recht de rechtmatigheid van de detentie aan 
te vechten), maar dat betekende ook dat verdachten in staat moesten zijn om deze 
rechten in de praktijk uit te oefenen. Echter, gesteld kon worden, zo vervolgde 
Hoofdstuk XI, dat bijvoorbeeld de Katanga zaak die gedachte niet concretiseerde. 
Gesteld werd dat rechters altijd zouden moeten willen uitzoeken wat er gebeurd was 
met hun verdachten, wat het fundament was van de aan hen voorgelegde zaak. Dit 








titel van de male captus motion en niet te gemakkelijk de gehele motion zouden 
moeten verwerpen omdat deze te laat werd ingediend. Rechters zouden ook de 
Verdediging kunnen berispen voor haar nalatigheid en nog steeds proprio motu de 
beschuldigingen beoordelen. Hoewel werd erkend dat het systeem van het IS in vele 
opzichten uniek is en zoveel mogelijk zou moeten worden geëerbiedigd, werd ook 
gesteld dat de rechters zich niet daarachter zouden kunnen verschuilen om te 
veronachtzamen wat naar het oordeel van deze studie hun belangrijkste taak is, 
namelijk het op een faire wijze berechten van verdachten van internationale 
misdrijven. Daarbij behoorde een serieus onderzoek naar de manier waarop deze 
verdachten onder de jurisdictie van het IS waren gebracht, naar het fundament van 
de aan hen voorgelegde zaak. 
Opgemerkt werd dat de indruk die men kreeg in de Katanga zaak, te weten dat 
de rechters niet werkelijk geïnteresseerd leken in een volledig onderzoek naar de 
rechtmatigheid van de voorfase van het strafproces, zich ook deed voelen in de 
Lubanga Dyilo en Bemba Gombo zaken, waar de rechters niet serieus de relevantie 
van bepalingen als de artikelen 21, lid 3 en 55, lid 1 onder (d) van het IS Statuut 
onderzochten in de context van artikel 59 van het IS Statuut. Bovendien zou men 
hier ook kunnen wijzen op het feit dat men zich concentreerde op de ultieme 
remedie in Lubanga Dyilo. Gesteld werd dat het IS behoedzaam moest zijn om niet, 
in de woorden van Sluiter “retreat within the safe limits of The Hague”. 
Het IS had aangegeven dat iedere keer dat het jurisdictie uitoefende, iedere keer 
dat het betrokken was bij een zaak, die uitoefening van jurisdictie, die betrokkenheid 
(welke ook de acties van derde partijen omvatte die op verzoek van het IS werken) 
in overeenstemming moest zijn met artikel 21, lid 3 van het IS Statuut. Dat was een 
correcte uiteenzetting van het recht, hetgeen weer met zich meebracht dat afstand 
moest worden gedaan van het aanvullende vereiste van de Kamer van Beroep van 
het IS, dat zij alleen onregelmatigheden zou bezien wanneer de verdachte op het 
nationaal niveau in detentie verbleef voor dezelfde misdrijven als waarvoor hij nu 
wordt berecht bij het IS. Echter, Hoofdstuk XI stelde dat, zelfs wanneer de 
eerstgenoemde uiteenzetting in overeenstemming was met het recht van het IS, de 
rechters een stap verder zouden moeten gaan: zij zouden elke schending die 
plaatsvindt in de context van de aan hen voorgelegde zaak in het algemeen moeten 
onderzoeken, los van de vraag of er nu wel of geen betrokkenheid is aan de zijde 
van het IS. Uiteengezet werd dat normaal gesproken schendingen die plaatsvinden 
in een periode waarin het IS nog niet betrokken was bij de zaak, niet snel gezien 
zullen worden als schendingen die vallen binnen de context van de IS zaak. 
Praktisch gezien behoefde men dus voor deze bredere standaard niet beducht te zijn. 
Maar juridisch gezien moest men deze koesteren, omdat het de enige standaard was 
die rechters in staat zou kunnen stellen om schendingen te herstellen waarvan zij 
van mening waren dat deze vallen binnen de context van de aan hen voorgelegde 
zaak, zelfs wanneer het IS er nog niet bij betrokken was. 
Een andere belangrijke aanbeveling was dat indien het IS geconfronteerd wordt 
met een nieuwe male captus zaak, het diepgaander zou moeten onderzoeken of het 








het geval van ernstige male captus zaken, vergelijkbaar met de abuse of process 
doctrine. Hoofdstuk XI stelde dat de analyse in Hoofdstuk IX naar het oordeel van 
deze studie had aangetoond dat artikel 21, lid 1 onder (a) van het IS Statuut niet 
uitputtend was ten aanzien van deze kwestie en dus dat de rechters aandacht zouden 
kunnen besteden aan artikel 21, lid 1 onder (b) en (c) van het IS Statuut. Indien zij 
het eens zouden zijn met deze studie dat deze bepalingen, via begrippen als 
“principles and rules of international law” en “general principles of law derived by 
the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world”, de vaste praktijk van 
(inter)nationale hoven zouden kunnen omvatten, dan zouden zij deze praktijk 
kunnen gebruiken om hun male captus probleem op te lossen. 
Ten aanzien van de “principles and rules of international law” wees Hoofdstuk 
XI op het aanvaarden van een breed abuse of process concept (in die zin dat 
jurisdictie zou kunnen worden geweigerd in zeer ernstige male captus zaken, 
ongeacht welke entiteit verantwoordelijk is) en het feit dat bij het toepassen van de 
abuse of process doctrine rekening gehouden kon worden met de ernst van de 
misdrijven waarvoor de verdachte is aangeklaagd. 
Wanneer deze beginselen geen opening boden, zo vervolgde Hoofdstuk XI, dan 
zou het IS aandacht kunnen besteden aan de “general principles of law derived by 
the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world”. Deze bepaalden dat de 
meeste gerechten, geconfronteerd met een male captus, hun discretie zullen 
gebruiken, bijvoorbeeld (in het common law systeem) met behulp van de abuse of 
process doctrine, om al de verschillende elementen van de zaak te wegen teneinde te 
besluiten of de male captus al dan niet zo ernstig is dat jurisdictie moet worden 
geweigerd. Bovendien leken de meeste gerechten alleen jurisdictie te weigeren 
indien hun eigen autoriteiten bij de male captus waren betrokken. Tenslotte leek het 
erop dat nogal wat gerechten – hoewel onduidelijk was of “nogal wat” voldoende 
zou zijn om tot een algemeen rechtsbeginsel op basis van artikel 21, lid 1 onder (c) 
van het IS Statuut te komen – ook rekening zouden houden, bij de beslissing of wel 
of geen jurisdictie moest worden geweigerd, met de ernst van de misdrijven 
waarvoor het slachtoffer van de male captus was aangeklaagd. 
Tenslotte zette Hoofdstuk XI uiteen dat, nu zowel de “principles and rules of 
international law” als de “general principles of law derived by the Court from 
national laws of legal systems of the world” een op abuse of process gelijkende 
mogelijkheid leken te aanvaarden, men zou kunnen betogen dat ieder hof, inclusief 
het IS, over zo’n inherente mogelijkheid beschikte.  
Hoofdstuk XI voerde dus aan dat zelfs indien de rechters niet aanvaardden dat de 
gedachte achter de abuse of process doctrine gezien kon worden als een 
beginsel/regel van internationaal recht op basis van artikel 21, lid 1 onder (b) van 
het IS Statuut, dan wel als een algemeen rechtsbeginsel dat door het Hof werd 
ontleend aan de nationale wetten van rechtsstelsels van de wereld op basis van 
artikel 21, lid 1 onder (c) van het IS Statuut, zij de op abuse of process gelijkende 
mogelijkheid moesten omarmen die zij naar het oordeel van deze studie al bezaten 
(“inherent”) – op dezelfde manier als zij het recht leken te omarmen van een 








inclusief, in beginsel, de remedie om vrijgelaten te worden in het geval van een 
onrechtmatige arrestatie/detentie), zelfs als dat recht niet expliciet genoemd was in 
de IS documenten. Bij het uitoefenen van deze mogelijkheid, zo vervolgde 
Hoofdstuk XI, zouden zij dan al de verschillende elementen van de zaak moeten 
afwegen om tot de meest geëigende remedies voor schendingen te komen, zoals de 
ernst van de vermeende misdrijven/het belang om de zaak voort te zetten en de ernst 
van de male captus, welke toenam naarmate de betrokkenheid van het IS groter was 
(waarbij gelet kon worden op alle verschillende mogelijkheden om gedrag aan het 
IS toe te rekenen, inclusief, bijvoorbeeld, gedrag dat het (IS) erkent en tot het zijne 
maakt), naarmate de schendingen opzettelijk waren gepleegd, naarmate de male 
captus groot nadeel aan de verdachte had berokkend, naarmate de male captus met 
ernstige mishandeling gepaard was gegaan, etc. 
Hoofdstuk XI merkte vervolgens op dat indien het IS niet overtuigd was dat zo’n 
brede balancing exercise gevonden kon worden in het recht van het IS of niet gezien 
kon worden als een inherente mogelijkheid van het Hof, het wellicht meer 
ontvankelijk zou kunnen zijn voor praktische argumenten. Hoofdstuk XI riep in 
herinnering dat de male detentus standaard van het IS ‘slechts’ rekening hield met 
de mensenrechtelijke dimensie van de abuse of process doctrine. Bovendien ging 
het uit van betrokkenheid van het IS (of van derde partijen die op zijn verzoek 
werken). 
Volgens deze studie kon dit leiden tot ernstige problemen veroorzaakt door male 
captus situaties, die, bijvoorbeeld, schendingen van staatssoevereiniteit en/of 
schendingen gepleegd door staten/particulieren waarbij het IS niet was betrokken, 
inhielden. 
Hoofdstuk XI zette uiteen dat rechters met behulp van de abuse of process 
doctrine jurisdictie zouden kunnen weigeren wanneer zij van oordeel zijn dat zo’n 
ernstige male captus in de context van een zaak van het IS heeft plaatsgevonden dat 
zij de zaak niet langer naar eer en geweten kunnen voortzetten. Dit is een heel 
algemene standaard welke bijvoorbeeld schending van staatssoevereiniteit en 
schendingen gepleegd door staten/particulieren waarbij het IS niet was betrokken, 
zou kunnen omvatten. (In dit kader werd opgemerkt dat het waarschijnlijk, of in 
ieder geval: te hopen, was dat de IS rechters niet de ‘carte blanche’ beslissing van de 
Kamer van Beroep van het ICTY in Nikolić zouden volgen en méér belang zouden 
hechten aan staatssoevereiniteit, een concept dat de rechters van het “laterale” IS 
niet konden negeren op dezelfde manier als de rechters van het werkelijk “verticale” 
ICTY hadden gedaan.) Echter, zo vervolgde Hoofdstuk XI, dit leek niet mogelijk te 
zijn bij de huidige IS standaard, terwijl het IS zeker het gereedschap, de 
mogelijkheid zou moeten hebben om in zulke situaties jurisdictie te weigeren. 
Een andere belangrijke aanbeveling was verbonden met het reeds genoemde 
recht van een verdachte om de rechtmatigheid van zijn arrestatie/detentie aan te 
vechten. Hoofdstuk XI zette uiteen dat indien de rechter van oordeel is dat diens 
arrestatie/detentie inderdaad onrechtmatig is (maar niet zo ernstig dat jurisdictie 
moet worden geweigerd), hij zich kan afvragen wat de gevolgen van deze 








een onrechtmatige arrestatie/detentie noemt en nu dit recht, inclusief de remedie 
vrijlating, gezien kan worden als een recht met internationaal gewoonterechtelijke 
status en dus in principe ook van toepassing is op het IS. Op dit punt verduidelijkte 
Hoofdstuk XI dat de rechters zich zouden kunnen aansluiten bij de analyse van deze 
remedie in Hoofdstuk IX, waar werd geconcludeerd dat op basis van artikel 21, lid 3 
van het IS Statuut deze remedie in principe zou moeten worden verleend. Echter, in 
die context (en tevens elders in dit boek en in deze samenvatting) werd ook betoogd 
dat deze remedie problematisch is omdat ze ongenuanceerd is, omdat ze gebruikt 
kan worden als een pro forma remedie en tenslotte omdat er een risico is dat een 
verdachte van internationale misdrijven aan vervolging zal ontsnappen omdat hij 
wordt vrijgelaten ten gevolge van een lichte schending, bijvoorbeeld, omdat hij niet 
onverwijld op de hoogte was gebracht van de redenen van zijn arrestatie. Deze 
studie stelde dat een rechter niet alleen in de context van de abuse of process 
doctrine (of een vergelijkbare doctrine welke gebruikt kan worden om na te gaan of 
de male captus zo ernstig is dat jurisdictie moet worden geweigerd), maar ook in de 
context van deze problematische remedie in staat zou moeten zijn rekening te 
houden met alle relevante facetten van de zaak, inclusief de ernst van de vermeende 
misdrijven. Dat betekende, zo vervolgde Hoofdstuk XI, dat een verdachte van 
internationale misdrijven niet zou moeten worden vrijgelaten bij de vaststelling 
‘onrechtmatige arrestatie/detentie’, maar in hechtenis zou moeten blijven en andere 
geëigende remedies zou moeten krijgen, zoals strafvermindering (op basis van 
Regel 145 van de IS Reglement van Proces- en Bewijsvoering), compensatie 
(hetgeen in ieder geval verplicht leek op basis van artikel 85 van het IS Statuut) of 
wellicht enkel een verklaring dat een schending had plaatsgevonden en dat dit te 
betreuren was, een en ander met in acht name van de ernst van de male captus. 
Echter, Hoofdstuk XI merkte ook op dat wanneer de onrechtmatige 
arrestatie/detentie zeer ernstig was, bijvoorbeeld omdat het IS een ontvoering 
organiseerde, dan jurisdictie zou moeten worden geweigerd en de verdachte 
definitief vrijgelaten zou moeten worden. Dit is een verstrekkend gevolg, maar 
sommige male captus situaties zijn zo ernstig dat het IS niet in gemoede de zaak kan 
voortzetten zonder zijn integriteit als rechtsinstituut te ondermijnen. Bovendien 
werd ook benadrukt dat de omstandigheid dat het IS niet langer deze verdachte zou 
kunnen berechten, niet betekende dat het er niet alles aan zou moeten doen om te 
bewerkstelligen dat de verdachte voor een ander hof werd berecht. Het had nog 
steeds een algemene verplichting om te strijden tegen straffeloosheid, of die strijd 
nu wel of niet voor het IS plaatsvindt. 
Echter, Hoofdstuk XI stelde dat het belangrijkste punt was dat tribunalen/IS 
rechters, als zijnde de laatste oordelende instanties, als de ultieme hoeders van de 
rechten van verdachte, elke schending die plaatsvindt in de context van de aan hen 
voorgelegde zaak herstellen, of dit nu wel of niet leidt tot een weigering van 
jurisdictie en ongeacht welke entiteit verantwoordelijk is. Aangevoerd werd dat zo’n 
aanpak, in welk kader de IS rechters gebruik zouden kunnen maken van de 
bevindingen van de bevoegde gerechtelijke autoriteit in de ‘staat van bewaring’, als 








worden beoordeeld, partijen betrokken bij het arrestatie- en overdrachtsproces zou 
afschrikken om onregelmatigheden te plegen, het best de integriteit van het IS zou 
kunnen beschermen en fairness zou kunnen bieden aan de verdachte, die zo niet het 
slachtoffer zou worden van een juridisch vacuüm veroorzaakt door het feit dat zijn 
zaak over twee of meer jurisdicties was verdeeld. Bovendien werd gesteld dat, 
aangezien niet veel male captus zaken zo ernstig zijn dat jurisdictie moet worden 
geweigerd, het ook niet snel het fairness idee van de slachtoffers (in die zin dat een 
proces moet worden gevoerd) in gevaar zou brengen. Verder zou het ook tot meer 
nuance leiden in een context die zich soms te veel richt op de ultieme remedie 
(weigering van jurisdictie). Dit, zo vervolgde Hoofdstuk XI, zou ook het ouderwetse 
male captus bene detentus imago ‘verzachten’ dat internationale tribunalen hebben. 
Zelfs indien het erop leek dat het IS de male captus male detentus zienswijze volgde 
ten aanzien van ernstige onregelmatigheden gepleegd door de “accusers” van de 
verdachte (hetgeen ook de actie van derde partijen die voor het IS werken omvatte), 
iets dat toegejuicht moest worden, werd betoogd dat de male captus zaken waarmee 
het IS geconfronteerd zou worden niet vaak zulke onregelmatigheden met zich mee 
zouden brengen. Dat betekende dat in de praktijk het IS waarschijnlijk bijna altijd de 
male captus zaak zou voortzetten, hetgeen, in zekere zin, gezien zou kunnen worden 
als aanvaarding van de male captus bene detentus regel. (In dat opzicht werd 
toegejuicht dat het IS noch de male captus bene detentus noch de male captus male 
detentus regel expliciet onderschreef, aangezien deze maximes naar het oordeel van 
deze studie het toppunt van eenvoud waren en totaal geen ruimte boden voor 
nuance.) 
Wat betreft het bovengenoemde punt dat het erop leek dat het IS de male captus 
male detentus zienswijze volgde met betrekking tot ernstige onregelmatigheden 
gepleegd door de “accusers” van de verdachte: deze studie sprak zich zeer uit voor 
het toekennen van discretie aan rechters, in de context van de abuse of process 
doctrine (of een vergelijkbare doctrine) en in de context van het vaststellen van de 
gevolgen van een onrechtmatige arrestatie/detentie, teneinde alle relevante 
elementen van de zaak te wegen. Echter, zij was er zich ook van bewust dat teveel 
discretie tot problemen kan leiden, bijvoorbeeld, op het gebied van gelijkheid, 
transparantie en voorspelbaarheid. Er moesten dus bepaalde bakens zijn om deze 
discretie vorm te geven. 
Allereerst stelde Hoofdstuk XI dat in sommige gevallen men diende te begrijpen 
dat er normaal gesproken maar één uitkomst mogelijk was. Indien bijvoorbeeld 
duidelijk zou worden dat de OTP betrokken was bij een ontvoeringsoperatie die alle 
relevante juridische regels negeerde, dan zouden de rechters alleen maar jurisdictie 
kunnen weigeren, indien zij tenminste nog serieus genomen wilden worden als 
hoeders van het recht, of de verdachte nu wel of niet aangeklaagd was voor ernstige 
misdrijven. Deze visie, merkte Hoofdstuk XI op, die onder de standaard ‘dook’ ten 
aanzien waarvan de meer recente statenpraktijk het schijnbaar eens was dat deze, in 
elk geval, moet leiden tot een verwerping van de male captus bene detentus regel, 
was waarschijnlijk ook de visie van het IS en dat viel toe te juichen. In andere, 








spelen bij het bepalen of wel of geen jurisdictie moest worden geweigerd. Hoewel 
dus bepaalde indicatoren gevolgd moesten worden in de balancing exercise om te 
bereiken dat de discretie niet ongelimiteerd is, diende de ultieme 
verantwoordelijkheid, zo stelde Hoofdstuk XI, toch te liggen bij de rechters, 
aangezien aangetoond was dat té strikte regels ook tot misbruik konden leiden en 
omdat rechters altijd geconfronteerd zouden kunnen worden met niet voorziene 
situaties. 
Tenslotte merkte Hoofdstuk XI op dat het boek twee kenmerken van het IS 
systeem had vóórondersteld, namelijk dat het IS geen verdachten in absentia kan 
berechten en dat het geen eigen politiemacht heeft. Uiteengezet werd echter dat men 
zich natuurlijk zou kunnen voorstellen dat wanneer het IS wèl deze kenmerken zou 
hebben, de kans kleiner zou kunnen worden dat IS rechters überhaupt 
geconfronteerd zouden worden met een male captus zaak.  
In deze context werd gesteld dat hoewel deze studie had laten zien dat het idee 
van een eigen internationaal arrestatieteam nog niet politiek haalbaar was, het IS 
zou kunnen overwegen het voorbeeld van het ICTY te volgen met betrekking tot het 
creëren van tracking teams. Echter, omdat het werk van zulke teams bestond uit 
traditioneel politiewerk in de staat in kwestie, hadden zij ook toestemming nodig 
van die staat, hetgeen uiteraard erg lastig, zo niet onmogelijk, te verkrijgen zou zijn 
van niet-meewerkende staten. 
Hoofdstuk XI merkte vervolgens op dat het toestaan – onder bepaalde 
omstandigheden – van processen in absentia dat probleem zou oplossen. 
Echter, omdat het IS eenvoudigweg (nog) niet was toegerust met deze 
kenmerken werd uiteengezet dat dit betekende dat het (wellicht meer) gebruik moet 
maken van het gereedschap dat het al heeft. 
In deze context werd in het algemeen gesteld dat het IS verre moet blijven van 
dubieuze methoden om een verdachte onder zijn jurisdictie te brengen, omdat het 
uitwijken naar zulke methoden teneinde een korte termijn doel te bereiken, naast het 
feit dat het op dat specifieke moment reeds de waarden waar het IS voor staat 
ondermijnt, en naast het feit dat zo’n aanpak helemaal nog niet zo ‘succesvol’ hoeft 
te zijn aangezien zulke tactieken kunnen leiden tot het einde van de zaak (zie 
hierboven), de missie van het IS op lange termijn ernstig kan beschadigen. 
Dit kwam, zo zette Hoofdstuk XI uiteen, omdat, onder andere, het IS de 
praktische steun van de internationale gemeenschap nodig heeft, in het bijzonder 
omdat het niet over een eigen handhavingsarm beschikt. Om veilig te stellen dat het 
dus de voortdurende welwillendheid van staten heeft, van de handhavers van het IS, 
moet het altijd een verdachte op een faire, rechtsbestendige manier vervolgen. 
Wanneer sceptische gestemde, maar machtige staten (zoals de VS) zien dat het IS 
een fair hof is, zo vervolgde Hoofdstuk XI, dan zouden zij wel eens sneller partij 
kunnen worden bij het IS Statuut, hetgeen op zijn beurt weer zal leiden tot meer 
steun en een meer daadkrachtigere handhavingsarm van het IS. 
Daarom stelde deze studie dat wanneer rechters geconfronteerd worden met het 
dilemma zoals gepresenteerd in het allereerste hoofdstuk van dit boek, namelijk 








versus fairness, zij altijd voor het laatste concept zouden moeten kiezen. Alleen 
fairness kan leiden tot werkelijke effectiviteit, namelijk effectiviteit op lange 
termijn. 
Een ander belangrijk punt dat werd duidelijk gemaakt in Hoofdstuk XI was dat 
het introduceren van nieuwe hulpmiddelen voor het IS teneinde diens mogelijkheden 
om een proces te starten te vergroten, zoals een bepaling die processen in absentia 
toestaat (als die mogelijkheid geïntroduceerd zou worden in de toekomst), het risico 
in zich bergt dat het echte probleem wordt gemaskeerd, namelijk de vraag waarom 
de handhavingsarm van het IS, gevormd door staten die partij zijn bij het IS Statuut 
(en staten die door de VN Veiligheidsraad verordonneerd zijn samen te werken met 
het IS) niet functioneert zoals hij zou moeten functioneren. Er werd aan herinnerd 
dat staten de voornaamste verplichting hebben tot het arresteren en overdragen van 
verdachten en dat deze verplichting zeer serieus moet worden genomen. 
Volgens Hoofdstuk XI betekende dit bijvoorbeeld dat als verdachten niet konden 
worden aangehouden door de ‘staat van bewaring’, andere staten (of staten die 
samenwerken in een internationale vredesmacht) die staat in zijn pogingen dienden 
te ondersteunen. Niet alleen logistiek en financieel, maar wellicht ook met een echt 
arrestatieteam. 
Ten aanzien van niet-meewerkende staten werd uiteengezet dat derde staten 
gebruik moesten maken van de carrot-and-stick methode die zo goed had gewerkt 
voor het ICTY, hetgeen betekende dat zij dienden te onderstrepen dat samenwerking 
met het IS zou leiden tot financiële/politieke steun en dat niet-samenwerking zou 
leiden tot embargo’s/sancties/politiek isolement. Zo’n methode, vervolgde 
Hoofdstuk XI, zou meer legitimiteit hebben indien deze zou worden uitgevoerd in 
het kader van een collectiviteit van staten, zoals internationale organisaties. In deze 
context werd ook verwezen naar de rol van de VN Veiligheidsraad. Hoewel 
Hoofdstuk XI erkende dat de verhouding tussen dit orgaan en het IS een lastige is, 
werd aangevoerd dat als dit orgaan beslist dat bepaalde staten moeten samenwerken 
met het IS en als die staten dat weigeren te doen, de VN Veiligheidsraad in actie 
moet komen en wel veel krachtdadiger dan hij tot nu toe heeft gedaan. In dit kader 
werden ook enkele strategieën gepresenteerd die de VN Veiligheidraad zouden 
kunnen helpen in zijn pogingen om de strijd met straffeloosheid aan te gaan en om 
zijn eigen geloofwaardigheid te behouden. 
Kortom, Hoofdstuk XI stelde dat de internationale gemeenschap, de 
handhavingspilaar van het IS, (beter) moet begrijpen dat zij grote 
verantwoordelijkheden heeft in het functioneren, de effectiviteit en dus het succes en 
de geloofwaardigheid van het IS. De internationale gemeenschap heeft hier, in de 
woorden van Rastan, een responsibility to enforce. 
Hoofdstuk XI, Deel 5 en deze studie eindigden met een kort nawoord waarin 
onder andere de hoop werd uitgesproken dat deze studie (inclusief haar kritische 
observaties van deelparagraaf 2.3 en paragraaf 3 van Hoofdstuk XI), dan wel de 
discussies die zij zou kunnen oproepen, het IS zullen inspireren en behulpzaam zijn 
indien dit geconfronteerd wordt met een nieuwe male captus situatie om een 








prijzenswaardige doelstelling, namelijk om op een faire manier te strijden tegen 
straffeloosheid. Een strijd, waarvan paragraaf 3 van Hoofdstuk XI had aangevoerd 
dat deze alleen gewonnen kon worden wanneer de internationale gemeenschap haar 
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